The volume that is now being published assembles great part of the papers presented during the Eighth International Conference of the International Plutarch Society – IPS, held at Coimbra from 23 to 27 September 2008. The contributions deal with symposion, philanthropia, and related subjects in six major sections: after an overview on Plutarch's place in the genre of symposion, the first two sections focus on the philosophical, literary and socio-political functions of Plutarchan banquets. This is followed by a number of papers on violence and conflict in disruptive symposia and by studies of the key concepts of philanthropia, philia and eros. Finally, separate sections are devoted to two specific works, viz. the Quaestiones convivales and the Convivium septem sapientium.
Discover the world's research
- 20+ million members
- 135+ million publications
- 700k+ research projects
Join for free
Symposion and
Philanthropia in Plutarch
José Ribeiro Ferreira, Delm Leão, Manuel Tröster
& Paula Barata Dias (eds)
Coimbra - Classica Digitalia / CECH - 2009
POCI/2010
E
José Ribeiro Ferreira, Delm Leão, Manuel Tröster & Paula Barata Dias
T
Symposion and Philanthropia in Plutarch
P
Centro de Estudos Clássicos e Humanísticos da Universidade de Coimbra (2009)
A C- E P
Maria do Céu Fialho
E B
José Ribeiro Ferreira, Maria de Fátima Silva, Francisco de Oliveira & Nair de Castro Soares
T D C
Delm F. Leão
R A
Ália Rodrigues & Rodolfo Lopes
D
Rodolfo Lopes
P
Simões & Linhares, Lda.
Av. Fernando Namora, nº 83 - Loja 4
3000 Coimbra
ISBN: 978-989-8281-17-3
L D: 302102/09
© C E C H U C
© C D V C
P P POCI 2010 - F C T.
P P "P E "
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,
or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, photocopying, or otherwise, without the
written permission of the publisher.
POCI/2010
Co n t e n t s
P
Editors
I
Christopher PELLING (Christ Church, Oxford)
op e n i n g se s s i o n
T P Sy m p o S i u m
Sven-Tage TEODORSSON (Göteborg University)
se C t i o n 1: p h i l o s o p h i C a l a n d l i t e r a r y C o n t e x t s o f t h e Sy m p o S i o n
Tr a b a j o S y Dí a S P
José Antonio FERNÁNDEZ DELGADO (Universidad de Salamanca)
M So b r e l a v i D a y p o e S í a D e Ho m e r o
P-P
Josefa FERNÁNDEZ ZAMBUDIO (Universidad de Murcia)
P' Sy m p o S i u m P' alc i b i a D e S
Timothy E. DUFF (University of Reading)
"I ". P'
Frederick E. BRENK (Pontical Biblical Institute of Rome)
P' T e c H n e r H e T o r i k e Qu a e S T i o n e S co n v i v a l e S :
Lluís GONZÀLEZ JULIÀ (University of Barcelona)
I p r o g y m n a S m a T a S y m p o S i a
P: el b a n Q u e T e D e l o S S i e T e S a b i o S
Ana VICENTE SÁNCHEZ (Universidad de Zaragoza)
S : "D "
Franco FERRARI (Università di Salerno)
R . T r i v i a l a i n i g m a T a v S . p H i l o S o p H i c a l p r o b l e m a T a
Simone BETA (University of Siena)
T G-R
C
Valeriy ALIKIN (University of Leiden)
P
Gennaro D'IPPOLITO (Università di Palermo)
i
iii
3
19
31
37
51
63
75
87
97
103
113
se C t i o n 2: t h e Sy m p o S i o n a s a s p a C e f o r s o C i a l a n d p ol i t i C a l g a t h e r i n g s
L , : p o l i T i k o S
Philip A. STADTER (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill)
A "" S y m p o S i u m p H i l a n T H r o p i a (ar T a x e r x e S 15)
Eran ALMAGOR (e Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
ce n a a p u D ca T o n e S :
Mark BECK (University of South Carolina, Columbia)
B li v e S o f fl a m i n i n u S ae m i l i u S pa u l l u S
Manuel TRÖSTER (University of Coimbra)
C P' li f e o f cr a S S u S
James T. CHLUP (University of Manitoba, Winnipeg)
se C t i o n 3: d i s r u p t i v e Sy m p o S i a
D P' al e x a n D e r
Jerey BENEKER (University of Wisconsin, Madison)
P
P
Antonio Ignacio MOLINA MARÍN (Universidad de Murcia)
T A
Pilar GÓMEZ & Francesca MESTRE (University of Barcelona)
C :
P' oT H o
Lukas DE BLOIS (Radboud University of Nijmegen)
F : P
Nuno Simões RODRIGUES (Universidade de Lisboa)
E vi D a S P
Israel MUÑOZ GALLARTE (Universidad de Groningen)
V :
Dámaris ROMERO GONZÁLEZ (Universidad de Birmingham)
se C t i o n 4: ph i l a n t h r o p i a , ph i l i a a n d Er o S
L p H i l a n T H r o p i a P:
Francesco BECCHI (Université de Florence)
pH i l a n T H r o p i a P'
Anastasios G. NIKOLAIDIS (University of Crete, Rethymno)
È S
Paola VOLPE CACCIATORE (Università di Salerno)
123
131
147
165
181
193
201
211
223
231
245
255
263
275
289
H : pH i l i a , e r o S a r e T e P
Toni BADNALL (University of Nottingham)
E P
Maria Leonor Santa BÁRBARA (Universidade Nova de Lisboa)
kr a S i S o i n o u D i k e n . A
'am a T o r i u S P
Rosario SCANNAPIECO (Università di Salerno)
T p H i l a n T H r o p i a li v e S o f De m o S T H e n e S a n D ci c e r o
Marta VÁRZEAS (University of Oporto)
A, e r o S pa i D e i a : vi D a D e ca T ó n e l vi e j o
Vicente M. RAMÓN PALERM (Universidad de Zaragoza)
F vi D a D e ca T ó n e l vi e j o
José M. CANDAU MORÓN (Universidad de Sevilla)
O p H i l a n T H r o p i a C,
C C Ú
Joaquim J. S. PINHEIRO (Universidade da Madeira)
se C t i o n 5: Qu a E S t i o n E S Co n v i v a l E S
E ... P, C T,
F
Geert ROSKAM (Catholic University of Leuven)
"V " . T P' T a b l e T a l k
VII, 9 – VIII, P (714A – 717A) M T' or a T i o n XXII
Jeroen LAUWERS (Research Foundation – Flanders; Catholic University of Leuven)
T P' Qu a e S T i o n e S co n v i v a l e S
Frances B. TITCHENER (Utah State University, Logan)
D P. D P' Ta b l e T a l k
Carlos A. Martins de JESUS (University of Coimbra)
T P' Qu a e S T i o n e S co n v i v a l e S
Rodolfo LOPES (University of Coimbra)
"A " E
P' Qu a e S T i o n e S co n v i v a l e S
Ália Rosa C. RODRIGUES (University of Coimbra)
T (P., Qu a e S T . c o n v . 4.2, 12)
Aldo SETAIOLI (University of Perugia)
A
Qu a e S T i o n e S co n v i v a l e S P
Aurelio PÉREZ JIMÉNEZ (Universidad de Málaga)
297
307
313
333
341
351
359
369
385
395
403
415
425
439
447
se C t i o n 6: Co n v i v i u m SE p t E m Sa p i E n t i u m
E ba n Q u e T e D e l o S Si e T e Sa b i o S P
José VELA TEJADA (Universidad de Zaragoza)
E ba n Q u e T e D e l o S Si e T e Sa b i o S T o u r D e f o r c e
Rodolfo GONZÁLEZ EQUIHUA (Universidad de Salamanca)
H , , P' ba n Q u e T o f T H e Se v e n Sa g e S
Lawrence KIM (University of Texas, Austin)
A p H i l a n T H r o p i a co n v i v i u m Se p T e m Sa p i e n T i u m
Stephen T. NEWMYER (Duquesne University, Pittsburgh)
M P' co n v i v i u m Se p T e m Sap i e n T i u m :
Roosevelt Araújo da ROCHA JÚNIOR (Federal University of Paraná)
T T y r a n n o S S o p H o S Se p T e m Sap i e n T i u m co n v i v i u m
Delm F. LEÃO (University of Coimbra)
in D e x r e r u m 523
in D e x l o c o r u m 533
L C 567
459
471
481
497
505
511
i
Preface
Preface
e volume that is now being published assembles great part of the papers
presented during the Eighth International Conference of the International
Plutarch Society – IPS, held at Coimbra from 23 to 27 September 2008. e
contributions deal with symposion , philanthropia, and related subjects in six
major sections: after an overview on Plutarch's place in the genre of symposion,
the rst two sections focus on the philosophical, literary and socio-political
functions of Plutarchan banquets. is is followed by a number of papers on
violence and conict in disruptive symposia and by studies of the key concepts
of philanthropia , philia and eros. Finally, separate sections are devoted to
two specic works, viz. the Quaestiones convivales and the Convivium septem
sapientium.
e intended audience of this book extends well beyond the growing
community of Plutarchists and includes anybody who makes regular or
occasional use of the Lives or of the Moralia. Considering the scope and nature
of Plutarch's multi-faceted work, the studies presented will be of interest to
scholars and students from a whole range of disciplines, such as history, politics,
philosophy, literature, education and arts.
e book may be used as a guide to study the symposion as a literary
genre, thus helping to analyse, from a structural and compositional point of
view, works that have the banquet as a scenario. At the same time, it shows
the broad range of functions and connotations associated with the symposion
as a space for philosophical, political and social gatherings. Beyond this, the
volume is designed to deepen the understanding of artistic expressions, such
as poetry, music and dance, by reading the symposion as a performative space
and as a place that encourages the participants to develop aective ties among
themselves.
e organization of the conference and the publication of this volume
would not have been possible without the support of the International Plutarch
Society, the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology - FCT
(through the project "Plutarch and the Founding of a European Identity"), the
Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, the SP (Portuguese branch of the
IPS), and the Centre of Classical and Humanistic Studies at the University of
Coimbra. e editors should also like to express their gratitude to the editorial
board of Classica Digitalia for having so readily accepted to include this volume
in the Humanitas Supplementum series.
Special thanks are owed to Christopher Pelling, president of the IPS, for
all his support and for having agreed to write the introduction to the volume,
tying together the many strands covered both by the individual contributors
and by Plutarch himself. e editors are equally grateful to the international
board of independent referees for their willingness to collaborate and for
their helpful criticism. Finally, thanks should be given to Ália Rodrigues and
Rodolfo Lopes, who spent many hours editing the individual contributions
and preparing the Index Locorum and Index Rerum to the volume.
C, N
T ,
J. R F, D. L, M. T P. B D
Introduction
Christopher Pelling
Christ Church, University of Oxford
Symposion and philanthropia, civilised drinking and friendship towards
one's fellow-humans: the two things have always gone closely together, and
were appropriately linked as the subject of the eighth International Conference
of the International Plutarch Society.
In his smug Roman way, Cicero claimed that the Latin notion of
convivium was somehow superior to the Greek symposion, because the Greek
word focused just on communal drinking while the Latin extended to the
whole notion of a shared life (ad Fam. 9.24.3, de Senectute 45). But Greeks, and
Plutarch in particular, knew that there was a lot more to the symposion than
simply drinking. Indeed, one could reply to Cicero that the symposion, when it
went well, did not embrace every aspect of shared human life, but rather some
of its highest elements – as Plutarch might put it himself (see Lopes' paper in
this volume), goodwill (eunoia), fellowship (koinonia), friendship (philia), and
of course philanthropia, that warm aection for one's fellow human beings.
ose qualities gave participants much to talk about at the conference, which
was held at Coimbra in Portugal on 23–27 September 2008.
Any reader of this volume will be struck by the range of topics that are
covered. As Teodorsson brings out in his introductory essay, symposia were
important features both of real Greek life and of the Greek literary landscape;
and inevitably the literary and the social aspects interact in multiple ways,
as the literary descriptions both reected and provided a model for real-life
behaviour: that suggests a rather rened sense of 'realism' in the portrayal, a
topic discussed by Titchener. at 'modelling', educational aspect is indeed
important, for just as real-life symposia provided an opportunity for the
younger participants to learn from the elder, so Plutarch's own representations
of ctional symposia provide a picture of how such occasions ought to proceed:
one can learn manners, certainly, and also a vast range of other things, as the
more experienced and better-informed give a practical illustration of the
ways to carry, and convey, one's learning lightly (Roskam). One catches the
personal note here of Plutarch himself: contrast Maximus of Tyre, with his
view of symposia as a threat to proper education, and his advice to the aspiring
philosopher to stay away if he is wise (Lauwers).
In real life, symposia can go wrong; in Plutarch's historical writings, we
see examples of that in plenty, and it is normally because those ideal qualities
are travestied or reversed, with hatred and hostility replacing friendship and
goodwill, and wine producing violence rather than good fellowship. at is
especially clear in a barbarian symposion such as that of Artaxerxes: Almagor
traces the way in which features of an idealised Greek symposion are there subtly
travestied and juggled to produce o-key, sometimes inverted, versions of what
it ought to be: the host's character indeed emerges, just as it should, but here in
a chilling way. is notion of a bloody feast builds on a long literary tradition
(Rodrigues), but on real life as well. In Greek as in Persian and Roman culture,
feasts were one of the few opportunities when the powerful mingled with an
extended company and – precisely because of all those relaxed and friendly
features of the ideal symposia – might be o their guard (Muñoz Gallarte);
poisoning was always a possibility too (Romero González). A banquet was
indeed a disturbingly dangerous place to be.
Macedonian symposia might be a special case, more drunken than the
Greek, with arms readily available, so that the potential for violence was even
more acute (Molina Marín). e banqueting of Alexander therefore provided a
specially rich theme, and one can see the skill with which Plutarch integrated
the theme within the texture of a particularly complex Life. Beneker brings out
the comparison with Alexander's father Philip, whose wedding with Cleopatra
provided so clear a warning of how a feast can go violently wrong: Alexander,
so highly educated in Greek culture, has every opportunity to do better than
his father – but, in a pattern that is distinctively Plutarchan, ends by falling
back into tellingly similar behaviour, with the murder of Cleitus evoking
memories of that disastrous early wedding-scene. Gómez and Mestre relate the
development to the evolving character of Alexander, and particularly the eect
of his interaction with eastern culture and the diculties he nds in integrating
the two worlds: that makes it an especially challenging test-case for how an
ideal ruler should behave, and how far Alexander falls short of that ideal.
In Plutarch's own day there were new rulers: the men of Rome, men with
dierent values and a dierent mode of dining, one with greater excess and
– generally – rather less culture. Not that all Roman habits were bad ones;
there are times when one can sense the inuence of Roman ideas of humanitas
(Molina Marín); Roman banquets were certainly more civilised than their
Parthian equivalents (Chlup); and Plutarch, with his typically advanced views
about women, would at least be torn on the Roman practice of a female
presence at the banquet, even if in his own constructed symposia the female
dimension is found rather in the nature of the topics discussed than in the
presence of women to discuss them (Rodrigues). e character of a person's
symposia certainly provided a useful register for gauging a Roman's Hellenism,
and in particular that crucial characteristic of philanthropia (Pinheiro, Tröster,
Chlup). And Romans could often outdo Greeks in their organisational skill
in putting together banquets and other spectacles if they so chose – but there
remained an uncomfortable taste of the military about it all (Tröster); there
was often some trumpeting of social standing (de Blois), something that
a tactful host would try to sidestep in a Greek symposion; and an imperial
banquet could go very badly wrong indeed, again owing to an uncomfortable
intrusion of the military and a reversal of the proprieties of imperial authority
(de Blois again).
If Alexander's banquets were the great test-case in the Greek Lives, the
Catos' symposia, and especially the elder Cato's, were an equivalent among
the Romans. As so often – more on this below – Plato's Socrates is in the
background as a permanent benchmark of comparison, one that is especially
clear in the Younger Cato; the Roman dinners there come out less well (Beck).
As for the elder Cato, philanthropia is once again the key quality for evaluation
throughout the Life (Ramón Palerm, Candau Morón, Beck again), and Cato
is several times found wanting, at the dinner-table as with his slaves and his
wives: it is paradoxical, perhaps, that he falls down most in his marital behaviour
towards the end of his life, at the time when he was nally more receptive to
Greek culture. It is striking too that philanthropia so often becomes a crucial
register for assessing the behaviour of a more powerful person towards those
who are weaker, as it is in Cato's treatment of his slaves; that is also clear in
Demosthenes–Cicero, a most carefully worked pair, and Várzeas there argues
for the importance of Sophocles' Antigone, especially his Creon, as giving an
intertextual register for this exploration of humane generosity in power.
So even within these historical descriptions in the Lives, we nd
thought-provoking exploration of moral questions, and especially questions
that concern the nature of power and the behaviour of the powerful. at is
also true as we turn to the ctional symposia in the Moralia. Two works are
particularly relevant here, the Septem Sapientium Convivium and the Quaestiones
Convivales. e Septem Sapientium Convivium is often viewed as a fairly early
work (and González Equihua agrees); if so, it is particularly interesting to see
how features of Plutarch's later thinking and artistic technique are already
developing – the suggestive use of animal imagery (Newmyer), the preference
for practical wisdom, the synkritic technique, the deft characterisation, and
particularly the deft use of pointed anecdotes and sayings, chreiai (González
Equihua again). at last feature in particular was one whose incorporation
sometimes stretched Plutarch's historical and literary imagination (Kim). en
the Quaestiones Convivales, clearly a work of Plutarch's maturity, are dedicated
to Q. Sosius Senecio, twice Roman consul, accomplished military man and
civilised Hellenophile – an instance in his own person of the humane mix
of cultures that the Quaestiones optimistically represent. Senecio is also the
dedicatee of the Parallel Lives, and it may well be that Plutarch regarded the
Lives and the Quaestiones Convivales as his major works: they are certainly
the longest and arguably the most ambitious. So the symposion is indeed a
setting where wisdom can speak to power, whether in the remote and
semi-legendary setting of the Septem Sapientium Convivium or in the more
Roman and contemporary world of the Quaestiones Convivales. In the Septem
Sapientium Convivium this has the interesting consequences traced by Leão,
with Periander, the most uncompromising of the men of power, increasingly
backstaged as the work goes on.
If such conversation is to work well, it must be properly managed, and one
of the educative functions of the Quaestiones Convivales is to give a picture of
proper party manners. Older and younger participants both have distinctive
roles to play, and the younger people in Quaestiones Convivales do not always
get their lines quite right (Roskam). A particularly important organisational
role falls to the symposiarch (Gonzàlez Julià), whose tactful party-management
provides a broader model for local political leadership as well (Stadter) –
another example to show that it was not just Cicero who saw a convivium as
a slice of life in general, reecting themes that go beyond the drinking. Room
can be found for various activities to make the party go with a swing, though
they tend to the cerebral rather than the riotous. Texts may be read after dinner,
in a way that has interesting analogies in early Christian communities (Alikin),
but it is important to have the right sort of text, Homer or Plato or Menander
(d'Ippolito). Perhaps riddles are appropriate, more so in Septem Sapientium
Convivium than in Quaestiones Convivales, provided they have some content of
philosophical substance (Beta). As for music ( Júnior) and dance ( Jesus), those
staples of real-life sympotic entertainment need not be banished completely, but
they gure as topics for reective discussion rather than for practical activity, a
think-up rather than a knees-up.
But discussion, especially philosophical discussion, is the key. Finding the
right level is important, so that the topics can draw in the less expert rather
than exclude them (Lopes, Gonzàlez Julià): practical philosophy is especially
appropriate (Vela Tejada), partly because it is more accessible and partly also
because it suits Plutarch's own characteristic insistence that the philosopher
needed to play a part in public life. But there is a lot more too that can count
as philosophy, including matters that we might today call scientic ('natural
philosophy', as it used to be called): 'why trues seem to be born through
the agency of thunder', for instance (Setaioli), or matters of astrometeorology
(Pérez Jiménez), and even the Seven Wise Men can be brought to consider
matters of household management and lifestyle as well as statecraft (Vela
Tejada). Manner is as important as theme. One always needs to bear in mind
who is present, and tailor the presentation accordingly (Gonzàlez Julià). at
of course is part of rhetorical good practice as well as of philosophy, and
rhetorical theorists from Plato and Aristotle onwards had insisted on the need
to gauge one's audience if one wished to be persuasive: no surprise, then, that
in this world where paideia (education) is so important, signs of rhetorical
education are particularly prominent (Gonzàlez Julià again, Vicente Sánchez).
e careful presentation of one's own character was a basic aspect of rhetorical
technique, and in the symposium it presented a particular problem, as a
speaker whose learning and insight outclasses the other diners can dampen
conversation rather than making it ow. Plutarch's own self-presentation as
a speaking character in Quaestiones Convivales is one interesting issue here
(Brenk); another is the way in which the discussions themselves so often
demonstrate an ideally civilised way and spirit in which dierent speakers can
disagree. One example is the discussion of the meaning of Plato's remark that
'God is always doing geometry', a suitable theme treated by the speakers in
a suitable matter (Ferrari). And one can also take the whole presentational
manner of Quaestiones Convivales as conveying a similar educational lesson:
the authorial voice is there so often elusive, an ideal way of airing 'provocative
and problematic views' on each side without pushing any of them too pushily
on to a reader (Brenk again).
So the content and the manner of the discussions come together closely
to present a strong view of philanthropia. Yet there is a danger here of
seeming, or making Plutarch seem, over-bland. Could anyone after all nd
philanthropia problematic? No-one, after all, was going to leap to his or her
feet and challenge Plutarch by delivering a paean on misanthropy, claiming
that the real model for human wisdom was Timon rather than Socrates. Still,
it may also be true that Plutarch could see the quality under threat in his
contemporary Roman world (Becchi) – at least in some moods, though we
should also remember that humanitas was a prized quality in the ideology of
Trajan's world (Candau Morón, Molina Marín): if there was a tension there
between noble ideal and more grubby reality, that was hardly unprecedented
in the ancient world or unparalleled in the modern. ere were other ways
too in which philanthropia, even if in itself an unambiguously positive quality,
could raise problems in practical reality. e demands of political life could
sometimes be hard to reconcile with genial sociability (Nikolaidis); Pericles
had his reasons for shunning social engagements. And the quality could raise
philosophical issues too. If Volpe Cacciatore is right, philanthropia could not
coherently be attributed to the Stoic Zeus, but could to the Zeus in which the
Platonist Plutarch could believe. If philanthropia was 'the very kernel of his
moral outlook' (Nikolaidis), it provided Plutarch with a perspective that did
not shirk the genuine moral and practical issues which real life could present.
'e Platonist Plutarch …': and of course Plato's Symposium is a constant
intertextual presence in all this. It is not the only one: Hesiod's Works and
Days mattered too (Fernández Delgado), not surprisingly given Plutarch's
interest in both theology and practical wisdom; and of course Homer is a
constant referent, not least because of all the banqueting in the Iliad and
Odyssey (cf. Fernández Zambudio on the ps.-Plutarchan On the Life and Work
of Homer). Menippean satire may well also be relevant, and so of course is
the Symposium of Xenophon (Teodorsson). But it is Plato who keeps coming
back: in the Quaestiones Convivales, where he is such a constant presence (it
is there that Plutarch tells us that he and his circle still celebrated Plato's and
Socrates' birthdays, separated as they were by only one day, Q.C. 717b); in the
Alcibiades, where the Platonic echoes go beyond sympotic behaviour and are
thought-provoking on themes such as education, love, and ambition (Du );
in Septem Sapientium Convivium, where the unexpected arrival of Periander's
brother Gorgos echoes the arrival of Alcibiades in Plato (Kim), even as he goes
on to add an echo of Herodotus too with his skilful retelling of the story of
Arion and the dolphin (Newmyer).
Where Plato's Symposium is felt, love, especially philosophically informed
and educative love, will be felt too: not all philanthropia is erotically charged,
of course, but some will always be. Badnall explains how Plutarch adapts and
remoulds elements from Plato's work to underpin and immortalise the praise
of conjugal love, mixing elements of the epithalamial – a rather dierent sort
of banquet is in point there – and the philosophically charged symposion. is
adaptation of Platonic thinking to emphasise the heterosexual, stressed also by
Bárbara, is vital to Plutarch, and seen also in the Amatorius; it brings out how
dynamic and malleable his Platonism can be, a repertoire of adaptable models
for exploring every aspect of human endeavour rather than an ideological
straitjacket. Scannapieco brings out how even the imagery for heterosexual
love is sympotic, with the 'mix' of wine in the symposion guring also the mix
of human elements in a good marriage to generate a new and stable unity.
Philanthropia, philia, eunoia, koinonia, all tempered by civilised manners
and learning borne lightly: no wonder Plutarch's portrayal of the symposion
can continue to be a model for us all. And it certainly proved a model at
Coimbra, not merely for the papers and the formal discussion but also for the
good fellowship that followed, including a nal symposion where Portuguese
hospitality owed freely and in style – with music playing a larger role than
Plutarch might have recommended, but in a way that he would fully have
appreciated (and probably added a further Quaestio on why Portuguese toasting
has such a musical dimension and has so much lip-smacking). anks of all
participants are again due to Delm Leão for his role as symposiarch, just as
readers will be grateful to him for collecting and editing these papers with
such exemplary despatch.
C P
P, I P S
A,
3
e place of Plutarch in the literary genre of Symposium
Th e p l a c e o f p l u T a r c h i n T h e l i T e r a r y g e n r e o f Sy m p o S i u m
S-T T
Göteborg University
Abstract
Plato´s idea to have a dialogue on serious philosophy taking place at a drinking-party is actually
astonishing, considering the traditionally rather "unphilosophic" entourage of these feasts. His
Symposion covers a vast scope extending from the most subtle philosophic reasoning of Socrates
to the nal deranged, unrestrained drinking-bout. In spite of this vulgar ending, however, the
work is basically a philosophic dialogue. at this work happened to form the starting-point
of a new literary genre, the symposion, may have been largely due to Xenophon. Many more
contemporary and somewhat later writers produced works of the kind, but all are lost. Since
the third century B.C. the Cynic Menippean sympotic genre became prevalent instead of the
philosophic Socratic one, which, as far as we know, is totally absent until Plutarch revived it with
his Sept. sap. conv. In addition he created a new subgenre of sympotic writing, the Quaestiones
convivales. He probably wrote his convivial works in opposition to the Menippean kind. His
evident ethical and educational purpose is singular in the genre of symposion; he received no
followers.
e banquet, constituted of the two sections, δεῖπνον and συμπόσιον/
πότος, was an essential part of ancient Greek culture. It can be traced back
as far as Homer1 , and during the Archaic period the sympotic customs were
established in a regular, almost ritualized form, the aristocratic συμπόσιον .
is was an institution for the upper classes, and it had its place in the courts
of kings and tyrants and in the ἀνδρῶνες of citizens in prominent position.
e symposion was an integrated part of life of the political and military clubs,
the aristocratic ἑταιρεῖαι. ese circles of educated and well-to-do people was
a natural environment for song, music, dance and recitation, which inspired
poets to the lavish productions of the archaic lyric and choral poetry, not least
the so-called scolia, and painters got abundant motives for vase paintings.
Artists of dierent profession, such as musicians, dancers, actors, acrobats
and merry-makers, were often engaged by the host, but the guests themselves
also took on large parts of the entertainment. e well-known competitive
spirit of the Greek society found a natural arena in the symposion. ere were
competitions in song and music, or in solving riddles and other problems.
A demand was laid on the symposiasts that each in turn should sing a song
accompanying himself with the lyre. For such performances a formal musical
education was presupposed. In the Archaic age all participants at symposia had
acquired the necessary competence. But towards the end of the sixth century
the great changes in the political state of things in Athens also brought about
changes in the character of the symposion. e conventional educational
system was modied, new groups of citizens advanced to power, and after
the Persian wars the living standards of the population rose. e institution
of the symposion received a more luxurious, and also more private and varied
1 Il. 1. 595-604; 9.197-224.
character, dierent from the conventionally regulated, aristocratic archaic
symposion. Plutarch tells of an incident that gives a notion of the easy manners
in the symposion of the Classical time. In the Life of Cimon he reports that
emistocles once frankly declared that he had not learnt to sing, nor to play
the lyre, but that he knew how to make the city great and rich2 . In the course
of time the ability to play the lyre declined, and recital gradually replaced
singing3 . As a consequence, less exacting activities lled larger parts of the
sympotic program, such as competitions of easy, banal kind, informal singing
and dancing4 , merry-making and, above all, heavy drinking, either freely or as
a contest performed serially around the company. e κῶμος became more
important as an ostentatious display of drunkenness5 . e change from the
symposion of the Archaic age into that of the period of democracy can be
studied in the motives of vase paintings of the time6 .
e symposion was in itself always aimed at pleasure. It oered the
opportunity of relaxation and permitted, or occasionally rather imposed
upon, the revellers to drink abundant quantities of wine, and thus to indulge
in misbehaviour and quite unbridled licence of erotic or violent kind. e
vase paintings oer abundant evidence, and indications can also be found in
literature7 . It was therefore entirely to be expected that Plato should adopt a
negative attitude towards symposia. In the dialogues Socrates never fails to
repudiate the heavy drinking that ran rampant at the contemporary symposia,
together with everything else that occupied it8 . He disdains listening to
the equivocal witticisms of the jesters and he scorns the customary riddles
and puzzles that occupy ordinary people's minds at the drinking-parties; he
compares them with children's riddles9 . It is Plato's conviction that philosophers
can have nothing in common with ordinary men. Enjoying drinking-parties
is not part of a philosopher's παιδεία. In the eaetetus Plato's Socrates draws
a very clear line of demarcation between the philosophers and the people of
the city who are busy with their politics and their symposia. Both should be
strictly avoided. Socrates says: "ese meetings and banquets and revellings
with chorus girls, it never occurs to the philosophers even in their dreams to
indulge in such things."10 .
2 Ion ap. Plu., Cim. 9.1; cf. em. 2.3-4.
3 Cf. S.-T. T, 1989, pp. 59-63.
4 At X., Smp. 7.1-2 Socrates improvises a song.
5 is behaviour was prevalent both in the upper classes and among common people, cf. the
known revel and κῶμος of Alcibiades and his group, and see the descriptions of the vulgar πότος
in Ar., V. 1208-1537. See also F. F, 2000.
6 See J. N. B, 1990, pp. 144-5, with a vast bibliography on the subject.
7 See, e.g., F. L, 1982, and cf. Ath. 13.577 E-F. 579 A, D, 607 CD.
8 Pl., R. 389 d-e σωφροσύνης ἆρα οὐ δεήσει ἡμῖν τοῖς νεανίαις; Πῶς δ᾽οὔ; Σωφροσύνης δὲ
ὡς πλήθει οὐ τὰ τοιάδε μέγιστα, ἀρχόντων μὲν ὑπηκόους εἶναι, αὐτοὺς δὲ ἄρχοντας τῶν περὶ
πότους καὶ ἀφροδίσια καὶ περὶ ἐδωδὰς ἡδονῶν, id. 395 e-396 a, et al. See M. T, 1990,
pp. 238-43.
9 R. 479 b-c. For the nature of the riddles and puzzles see S.-T. T, 1990, pp.
143-4.
10 t. 173 d σπουδαὶ δὲ ἑταιριῶν ἐπ᾽ ἀρχὰς καὶ σύνοδοι καὶ δεῖπνα καὶ σὺν αὐλητρίσι
5
e place of Plutarch in the literary genre of Symposium
Plato held these views nearly all his life. However, in his old age he
changed his mind. He abandoned his negative, reluctant attitude and
advocated a moderated and controlled use of wine as an integrated part of
the παιδεία. As is well known he devoted the rst two books of the Laws
to a lengthy discussion on symposia, wine and drunkenness. He denounces
practically all the symposia of his time as totally deranged and presents a
reform program. He argues that symposia, wine and intoxication can and
should be used as a means of education. For example, intoxication can be
used for testing the ἀρετή 11 . is awareness of the revealing eect of the
wine was not new; for example, it can be found in Alcaeus, Aeschylus and
Ion of Chios12 .
Plato's Symposium
Now, I would like to suggest that this was exactly what Plato had in mind
when he decided to locate his important dialogue on Eros in the sympotic
entourage. He wanted to demonstrate the ideal ἀρετή of Socrates, both his
sublime σωφροσύνη and self-control concerning carnal love-passion, and his
ability to withstand the negative eects of intoxication.
It is noticeable that in reporting the course of events of his Symposium
Plato describes everything as decent and orderly. is was probably how the
gatherings in the Academy were carried out under his guidance, in a decorous
way and characterized by intellectual conversations, though not entirely sober.
is kind of drinking-party Plato wanted to present to his readers when he
wrote his Symposium, and it was of course the condition necessary for a proper
philosophical dialogue, as is announced at the beginning, when the ute-girls
are dismissed, and drinking is inhibited.
After Socrates has nished his sublime speech, the spell is suddenly broken
when Alcibiades and his band rush in and bring about an abrupt change in the
lofty philosophic atmosphere. e time has now come for the test of Socrates'
virtue. Alcibiades' detailed report of Socrates power of resistance to his eorts
of seduction is substituted for a scene of that sort in real time at the party, and
then the nal drinking-bout displays Socrates as the victor in this test also.
Plato's Symposium is obviously far from being a representation of a real
banquet. His aim was entirely philosophic, to bring out the philosophic
Eros in full relief, incarnated in the person of Socrates, as contrasted with
κῶμοι, οὐδὲ ὄναρ πράττειν προσίσταται αὐτοῖς (sc. τοῖς κορυφαίοις).
11 Lg. 649 d-e τούτων δ᾽ εὐτελῆ τε καὶ ἀσινεστέραν πρώτον μὲν πρὸς τὸ λαμβάνειν
πεῖραν, εἶτα εἰς τὸ μελετᾷν, πλὴν τῆς ἐν οἴνῳ βασάνου καὶ παιδιᾶς τίνα ἔχομεν μηχανὴν
εἰπεῖν ἔμμετρον μᾶλλον, ἂν καὶ ὁπωστιοῦν μεθ᾽ εὐλαβείας γίγνηται; … (650 a) ἦθος ψυχῆς
θεάσασθαι; (648 b) … μετ᾽ ἀσφαλείας καὶ ἄνευ κινδύνων.
12 Alcaeus frg. 95 Rein. (=frg. 366 V.) οἶνος, ὦ φίλε παῖ, καὶ ἀλάθεα, frg. 73 Rein. (=frg.
333 V.) οἶνος γὰρ ἀνθρώπω δίοπτρον; A. frg. 393 R. κάτοπτρον εἴδους χαλκός ἐστ᾽, οἶνος δὲ
νοῦ; cf. eoc. 29.1-3 ῾Οἶνος᾽, ὦ φίλε παῖ, λέγεται ῾καὶ ἀλάθεα᾽.| κἄμμε χρῆ μεθύοντας ἀλαθέας
ἔμμεναι. | κἠγὼ μὲν ἐρέω τὰ φρένων κέατ᾽ ἐν μύχῳ; Io Chius frg. 26.12 West (= frg. 89 Leur.)
οἶνος ἔδειξε φύσιν; See W. R, 1995, pp. 106-12.
the inferior one of Alcibiades. Although Plato delusively makes eorts to
depict the scenery in realistic terms, the work comes out as a product of Plato's
imagination in order to present his philosophic message.13
Xenophon's Symposium
With his Symposium Plato founded a literary genre that was to live on
throughout antiquity and even further. It was no doubt thanks to the gure
of Socrates that there was a sequel at all. It was the gure of Socrates that
inspired Xenophon with the idea to write a similar work. But of course he had
no intention to emulate Plato. He had no motive for treating any philosophical
problem; his intention was simply to tell his readers what it was like to spend
a night at a drinking-party in company with Socrates. He wanted to represent
his friend in the role of a symposiast taking part in the conversation and the
entertainments of a conventional banquet. He declares his purpose directly in
the rst sentence, where he states that according to his opinion it is worth while
to report the deeds of Socrates even in times of relaxation. In fact, Xenophon's
Symposium might be regarded as a separate addition to the Memorabilia14 ,
written in order to complete the picture of the gure of Socrates. Just as in
that work he most probably had the ambition to represent him in a realistic
and thrustworthy way.
I called Xenophon's Symposium a conventional one. at is true as
regards the unconstrained variation of ingredients. e alternation between
entertainment and more of less serious conversation gives a seemingly realistic
picture of a normal banquetal scene. However, if Plato's sweeping description
of the drinking-parties of the time as totally deranged was true to reality, it
would mean that the party reported by Xenophon was also exceptional, just
as that of Plato. ere are no erotic indecencies, and when Philippus the
jester, exhausted after having performed a tiring dance, asks for a big cup
of wine, and Callias the host gladly agrees and says that all are thirsty from
laughing at him, Socrates intervenes. He calls for caution and gives a short
lecture on the proper use of wine, in the shape of a simile. Just as plants are
thrown to the ground and cannot produce fruit, when Zeus pours too much
rain on them, so it is with us: if we drink a lot of wine at once, both body
and soul will stagger, and we will be unable to say anything of value. And
Socrates proposes that the attending boys should besprinkle the company
with small drops only. Everyone agrees to the proposal, although Philippus
the jester wants the boys to ll up the cups faster15 . After that, nothing is
said about wine16 , and there is no nal drinking-bout. is agreement, a
result of the intervention of Socrates, announces the mode of behaviour that
13 See D. B, 1980.
14 is was the opinion of J. M, 1931, pp. 177-8 (following Ullrich).
15 See Ch. 2. 23-27.
16 At Ch. 6. 2 Hermogenes answers Socrates' question, what unconvivial behaviour
(παροινία ) is: "To give pain to one's companions under the inuence of wine".
7
e place of Plutarch in the literary genre of Symposium
is to characterize the party, namely a decorous social intercourse under his
unobtrusive guidance.
As in Plato's Symposium, Socrates had hesitated to accept the invitation to
the banquet. e rich Callias, who is paying large sums of money to Protagoras
for wisdom, seemed to him not to be the host to his taste. Xenophon describes
the feeling during dinner as quite depressed, with the guests feasting in deep
silence as though ordered to do so by some authority (I.11). Not even Philippus
the jester was able to cheer up the company.
After dinner, however, the atmosphere changes as Socrates gradually takes
the lead. He politely praises Callias for the perfect dinner and the performance
of the young artists, but when the host also oers perfume, he declines and
takes the chance of making some philosophic reections on fragrances. In
his view, there is no need of perfumes at all. Young men who excercise in the
gymnasium should smell of olive oil, and women smell of perfume themselves.
Elderly men, however, should smell of καλοκἀγαθία.
When Socrates had thus broken the ice and a lively discussion had arisen,
we would expect that he should go on philosophizing. He does not; instead he
himself proposes to postpone conversation until a second performance has been
given by the young dancers and acrobats. After this he makes some remarks on
their achievements and observes that women can very well be educated and
even learn courage. By such little sophisticated comments Socrates determines
the intellectual level of the conversation.e result is an exchange of views and
opinions of rather poor substance.
Now Socrates proposes that the symposiasts should themselves try to
benet and delight each other, and it is decided that each person should speak
about what he considers himself good at and is pride of. What follows is a
multifarious conversation more or less guided by Socrates. It is notable that
during these discussions he often exposes himself to irony and teasing, while
he is also ironic himself. Nevertheless the atmosphere is almost unchangingly
pleasant and friendly.
Of course we cannot judge whether Xenophon describes Socrates truly or
not, but in fact he makes us believe that he was really such a highly amiable,
humorous and concilatory man. In any case, Xenophon represents him as
extraordinary able to bring about an orderly and friendly symposion. As to the
intellectual standards of the subjects he initiates, however, we may doubt whether
Xenophon does him justice. Most of the talk on the various subjects during
the conversation that extends over four chapters (3-6) is rather nugatory. Only
the speech of Antisthenes on his poverty, which he calls wealth, is of a certain
philosophic value. But Xenophon is apparently satised with the conversation
and remarks (IV 29): "In this way they mixed playful and serious."
After this mixed, partly trivial conversation Xenophon makes Socrates
nish o the discussion with a long speech, very clearly following the lead of
Plato's Symposium. It would seem that Xenophon felt obliged somehow to make
Socrates appear in his role as "thinker", though at a not to sophisticated level.
e theme is arguably Eros, but since he was probably not able to represent
him as speaking of his sublime vision of αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν, he chooses to make
him speak on the basis of the speech of Pausanias in Plato's work.
Socrates describes the nature of Eros as not only dual but downright
antagonistic in nature, the one variant contending with the other, and he declares
that he will speak frankly against the Eros that is the opponent of the one that
is dwelling in himself17 . His speech then develops into a rather magisterial
lecture about the two conicting Erotes. Socrates argues in favour of friendly
love, whose object is the good soul, and he underlines that this chaste love is no
less graced by Aphrodite than the love of the body18 , and that actually no loving
relation worthy of mention can exist in the absence of friendship19 .
e serious tone adopted by Socrates in his speech contrasts in a striking
way to the easy-going, humorous conversation otherwise prevailing in the
symposion. And after his speech he apologizes for having spoken more seriously
than is appropriate at a drinking-party. It is also noticeable that Socrates directs
his outspokenly didactic and rather moralizing speech to Callias, his host, but
he does not take oence. Instead he expresses his appreciation, and Lycon,
the father of Callias' beloved Autolycus, praises Socrates as a good and noble
man20 .
Plato's picture of Socrates as able to resist even an Alcibiades' eorts of
seduction seems thus to be substantiated by the representation of him by
Xenophon. His speech appears to be critical only to pederasty21 , and this
is also incidentally suggested by contrast in the end of the work, when the
married guests hurry home to their wives, inspired by the scenic display of
the marriage of Dionysus and Ariadne by the young actors. e chaste kind
of Eros that Socrates praises as providing the love of souls and which he
arms is the one dwelling in him, this Eros seems in reality to be φιλία ,
friendly love, to judge from how he describes it. As a matter of fact there is
no properly erotic atmosphere in Xenophon's Symposium, except precisely
in the nal theatrical performance, although Xenophon tries to keep up a
semblance of a feeling such as in Plato's Symposium. Instead, it is the friendly,
good-humoured spirit of φιλία that prevails throughout, and which Socrates
conrms in his speech.
e followers
e ethos of friendliness, good temper and sense of humour which
characterizes Xenophon's Symposium was to determine the nature of the
Socratic kind of symposium for the future, as we can observe in Plutarch's
convivial works. With his Symposium Xenophon broadened the scope of the
17 Ch. 8. 24 ὁ ἀεὶ σύνοικος ἐμοὶ ἔρως κεντρίζει εἰς τὸν ἀντίπαλον ἔρωτα αὐτῷ
παρρησιάζεσθαι.
18 Ch. 8. 15 ἡ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς φιλία διὰ τὸ ἁγνὴ εἶναι … οὐ … διὰ τοῦτο καὶ
ἀνεπαφροδιτοτέρα.
19 Ch. 8. 13 ὅτι μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἄνευ φιλίας συνουσία οὐδεμία ἀξιόλογος πάντες ἐπιστάμεθα.
20 Ch. 8. 1 Νὴ τῆν ῞Ηραν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καλός γε κἀγαθὸς δοκεῖς μοι ἄνθρωπος εἶναι.
21 Ch. 8. 32-40.
9
e place of Plutarch in the literary genre of Symposium
newly founded genre. With the good spirits and the easy-going conversation
Xenophon added substantially to the foundation of the genre laid by Plato. e
greater comprehensibility of the content and the less sophisticated linguistic
form may have been what inspired the numerous writers at the time who
followed his lead and composed sympotic works. We may suppose that these
diered considerably among themselves according to the authors᾽ dierent
interests and preferences. But unfortunately, all of these writings are lost.
Aristotle is known to have written some kind of sympotic work22 ,
but our sources provide very scarce information on it; perhaps it bore a
resemblance to the scholarly Deipnosophistae of Athenaeus23 . According to
Plutarch, eophrastus and Aristoxenus also wrote Symposia. He mentions
that both treated questions of music in these writings24 . Epicurus' Symposium
is the only work of this genre at that time, on which we have a more detailed
information25 . Plutarch blames him for excluding questions about music
and similar inquiries from the drinking-parties and for enjoying instead
in vulgar buooneries26 . Athenaeus informs us that in the Symposium of
Epicurus the guests formed a company of atterers who praised one another,
and he contrasts this with the character of Plato's and Xenophon's works.
He censures the absence of an introduction and a specication of place and
time in Epicurus' Symposium, and he criticizes that the subjects discussed are
mainly sympotic and he also nds fault with his clumsy literary style27 . It
appears, then, that Epicurus Symposium may have been enacted in his Garden,
that his guests all belonged to his circle, and that the conversation was in the
main conned to the sympotic sphere.
It is worth noticing that only two Academics, Speusippus and Dion of
Alexandria, are given as writers of Symposia, but only by Plutarch who only
mentions their names28 . e absence of any positive information on these
texts, and considering that there are contrary indications as to their character,
makes it seem questionable whether they really were Symposia at all29 . Even if
the scarcity of information makes our judgement uncertain, then, we may raise
the question why there was little or practically no continuation of the true
Socratic symposium among Platonists. One would think that it should have
been natural for members of the Academy to follow the lead of the founders
and add works of their own to the new genre.
22 D. L. 5. 22 (5. 1.12). Only one fragment is preserved: Athen. 15.674 F-675 A; cf. Schol. in
eocr. 3. 21 p. 122.16 Wendel.
23 See R. H I, 1895, pp. 284-5, 346 n. 1; J. M, 1931, pp. 204-5.
24 Non posse 1095 E ἐν δὲ συμποσίῳ Θεοφράστου περὶ συμφωνιῶν διαλεγομέμου καὶ
᾽Αριστοξένου περὶ μεταβολῶν. Athen. 14.632 A-B quotes a work by Aristoxenus entitled
Σύμμικτα συμποτικά.
25 Phld., Rh. 90.27, 96.22, 97.22 Sudhaus.
26 Non posse 1095 C-D.
27 Ath. 5.182 A, 186 E, 187 C.
28 Quaest. conv. 612 DE.
29 See J. M, 1931, pp. 162-3, 196-7; S.- T. T, 1989, pp. 35-6.
Non-Socratic sympotic writings
1. P
Now, a new sort of sympotic writings originated, apparently initiated
by Persaeus, the pupil of Zenon of Cition. In his work, entitled Συμποτικοὶ
διάλογοι, or Συμποτικὰ ὑπομνήματα, he seems to have limited himself to
sympotic subjects in a strict sense, and with a strong emphasis on sexual
matters at that30 .
2. M Sy m p o S i a
Not much later, in the third century, Menippus the Cynic appeared
as the founder of a new genre, the Cynic satire. Among his works there
was also a Symposium. We know of it only thanks to a short mention by
Athenaeus in a passage on dierent kinds of dance31 . However, although we
know so little about Menippus' own sympotic writings, we may infer upon
their character from the Symposia and similar texts written by his numerous
imitators, Meleager, Lucilius, Varro, Horatius, Petronius, Lucian and Julian
the Emperor. is new kind of convivial literature, the so-called Menippean
Cynic symposium, diered very much from the classical Socratic one, to say
the least. Conversation on philosophic or other serious subjects is absent;
instead there are ironic allusions, wrangle and overt verbal attacks, and in the
end it may even come to blows. e happenings in Lucian's Symposium are
most illustrative of the intentions of the writers of this kind of literature. eir
aim is to make fun of and mock at prominent people, not least philosophers,
setting out their imperfections and oddities in such a way as to make them
appear as caricatures.
e considerable number of writers of this kind of works suggests that
this genre was rather popular. Shall we perhaps suppose that the Socratic kind
of symposium was not able to keep up with the competition? At any rate,
the contrast between the considerable frequency of that genre and the virtual
absence of Socratic symposia during about four hundred years, from the late
Classical time till Plutarch, calls for an explanation.
P
We can take for granted that Plutarch knew the Menippean kind of
symposium fairly well. We should of course not think that he had actually
read Petronius' Cena Trimalchonis, but it is reasonable to suppose that he had
knowledge of its content. Judging from what we know of his personality and
30 Ath. 13.607 B Περσαίου τοῦ Κιτιέως ἐν τοῖς Συμποτικοῖς ὑπομνήμασιν βοῶντος καὶ
λέγοντος περὶ ἀφροδισίων ἁρμοστὸν εἶναι ἐν τῷ οἴνῳ μνείαν ποιεῖσθαι, id. 4. 162 B-C
Περσαίου τε τοῦ καλοῦ φιλοσόφου Συμποτικοὺς διαλόγους συντεθέντας …, ἐν οἷς ζητεῖ, ὅπως
ἂν μὴ κατακοιμηθῶσιν οἱ συμπόται, καὶ πῶς ταῖς ἐπιχύσεσι χρηστέον πηνίκα τε εἰσακτέον
τοὺς ὡραίους καὶ τὰς ὡραίας εἰς τὸ συμπόσιον καὶ πότε αὐτοὺς προσδεκτέον ὡραϊζομένους
κτλ. …. (Περσαῖος), ὃς περὶ ταῦτα τὴν διάνοιαν ἀεὶ στρέφων.
31 Ath. 14. 629 EF καλεῖται δέ τις καὶ ἄλλη ὄρχησις κόσμου ἐκπύρωσις, ἧς μνημονεύει
Μένιππος ὁ κυνικὸς ἐν τῷ Συμποσίῳ.
11
e place of Plutarch in the literary genre of Symposium
ethical outlook, we may safely assume that he looked with disgust at that sort
of feasts and that kind of literature. It therefore appears as probable that his
loathing for such depravation was actually his main motive for composing
a quite dierent sort of symposium. It was certainly natural for him to
decide upon writing a symposium with participants interested in philosophic
questions, and diering among themselves in character and outlook, so as to
bring about a varied, interesting conversation. In short, Plutarch wanted to
write a Socratic symposium32 . For his Symposium of the Seven Wise Men he no
doubt used Xenophon's Symposium as a model. Plato's extraordinary work did
not match his purpose. His choice of the Seven Wise Men as participants at
the banquet shows his intention, to compose a symposium that would contain
a large range of topics and variegated discussions. e result was a work of
very mixed content, and with a distinct aim and direction. Plutarch makes
this quite clear from the beginning. He assigns the rst two chapters to the
declaration of his intention.
e story is well-known: Periander, the tyrant of Corinth, has invited
the Seven and many more to a banquet. ree of these, ales, Neiloxenus of
Naucratis and Diocles the narrator, are on their way to the place on foot, since
ales has dismissed the fashionable carriage placed at their disposition by the
host. e walk thus aords them the opportunity of free and undisturbed talk.
e main topic turns out to be about the despotic rule of kings and tyrants, a
rather surprising one for invited guests on their way to a host who is a ruling
tyrant. ales is very outspoken and says that he regards Solon as very wise in
refusing to be a tyrant. And he adds that Periander, who is aicted with the
disease of despotism, is actually making fair progress towards recovery now
that he is bringing about gatherings with men of sense.
But then it occurs to ales that it is not appropriate to talk only about
what can be demanded of the host. ere should also be some preparations
on the part of the guests. He then delivers a very Plutarchan speech on how a
guest should put his character in order and be prepared to take part in serious
or humorous conversations, and to listen and to talk on any topic that happens
to be suggested.
With these straightforward preliminaries Plutarch sets the tone for the
symposion. ales, the only one of the Seven who is a philosopher, is the natural
mouthpiece of Plutarch. He is to play a prominent part in the conversation,
always expressing wise and sensible thoughts, for example when he reproves
the young Alexidemus, who angrily complains of having been assigned an
ignominious place at table. ales censures this behaviour, telling him that his
complaint means objecting to his neighbour rather than the host. But Plutarch
is ironic at his own expense when he makes the young man retort:
"But I observe that you wise men are also eager for being honoured!".
32 Plu., Quaest. conv. 686 C-D explicitly uses this term to denote a symposion where
conversation on topics of philosophic inquiry is essential.
Plutarch frequently makes use of his sense of humour in the work, thus
avoiding the imminent risk of appearing too didactic. Taken as a whole, his
Symposium is a well composed mixture of seriousness and pleasantry, perhaps
even more well-balanced than that of Xenophon. e merry-maker Aesop
tells his fables, but the jesting replies and repartees of the guests contribute
more to the humorous and friendly convivial atmosphere. As in Xenophon,
seriousness receives a greater weight toward the end, but it is not concentrated
to one long speech like that of Socrates in that work33 . e content of the work
as a whole is more varied than in Xenophon.
is is owing to the dierent number of topics in the two Symposia. ere
is virtually only one in that of Xenophon, the question of what each is good at
and is proud of, whereas in Plutarch we distinguish as many as eight, namely
1. the question of what an absolute ruler should be like,
2. the list of questions of the Ethiopian king, which are seriously answered
by ales,
3. the topic on democratic government,
4. the question of management of a home,
5. the question of the adequate acquisition of property,
6. the discussion on food, drink and diet,
7. the topic of drinking caused by Periander's toast to Chilon, and
8. the telling of wonderful stories about dolphins on the occasion of the
rescue of Arion.
Most of these topics give rise to serious utterances and speeches as well as
pleasantries. Consequently, the conversation as a whole is more substantial and
rich in view-points in Plutarch's Symposium than in that of Xenophon.
As a matter of fact, there is a lot of ingrediences in Plutarch's Symposium
that have no correspondence in that of Xenophon or in any other known
earlier sympotic work. ey are:
1. e long preliminaries with a varied conversation before the banquet.
2. e narrator who remains unknown until the end of the third chapter.
3. e incident with the "monster", the infant centaur.
4. e incident with the guest who leaves in anger.
5. e numerous (Plutarchan) apophthegmata interspersed in the talk.
6. Political questions are discussed over the cups.
7. Women are present during the drinking-party.
8. e extraordinary story of Arion is reported to the company.
On the other hand, we observe that some elements are absent. It is
noticeable that entertainment is absent; only a ute-girl plays in connection
with the libation. And there is no erotic mood in the company, either a
genuinely erotic atmosphere as in Plato's Symposium, or a more or less articial
one as in Xenophon's work. And there is no heavy drinking. When Periander
drinks to Chilon in a big cup, this does not lead up to a drinking-bout, but
instead to a discussion on questions related to the wine, e.g., Pittacus' law
33 Admittedly, there is also the short radical speech of Antisthenes in Ch. 4.
13
e place of Plutarch in the literary genre of Symposium
that prescribed a double penalty for a man who commits an oence when
drunk than for a sober man, and it is emphasized that the task of Dionysus
is not intoxication and gulping down wine but rather the friendly feeling,
the longing and the association one with another. us the good-humoured
atmosphere is preserved throughout the party, even when delicate political
topics are discussed. Periander puts up rather well with listening to critical
remarks on despotic rule. Only once (152 B) he sets a hard face. Seeing that,
Aesop demonstrates sympathy with him and wisely reproves the critics, and
after there has been some talk on other things, the tyrant reenters into the
conversation (153 E), showing no resentment any more.
By these means of composition Plutarch succeeds on the one hand to
show the natural reaction of the tyrant to the criticism, and then to suggest how
irritation can, and should, be toned down. Plutarch simply does not accept bad
feelings at a symposion. He gives an expressive proof of his attitude when he
tells of how ales blames the guest who takes oence at the placing at table
and leaves before the beginning of the banquet. Plutarch certainly wanted to
demonstrate his principle directly at the beginning that uncivil persons have
no place at a symposion. It is noticeable that nobody asks the young man to
stay. Indeed, Plutarch does not conceal that he was writing his Symposium with
an ethical intent. We may assume that he wanted to lodge a protest against
the contemporary deranged convivial behaviour, and presumably his attack
was not least directed against Roman drinking-parties. A depressing survey
of the hard drinking in the Roman upper classes has been presented by Philip
Stadter34 .
Moreover, looked upon as a literary work it seems likely that Plutarch
intended his Symposium to be a counterbalance to the contemporary satirical
descriptions of chaotic symposia. It appears that it was the predominating
trend at the time to represent exactly these worst drinking-parties in sympotic
works. Instead, Plutarch wanted to describe a symposion conducted in good
order as an attempt at a revival of the Socratic kind of symposium. His decision
to write it may well have been precisely a reaction to Petronius' work, published
not much earlier. Plutarch's Symposium cannot be dated with any certainty, but
it was most probably written in the 80ies or 90ies. In any case, it was written
before the Quaestiones convivales 35 .
is work is singular in all respects. Since it is the only one of its kind
that is extant, we do not know if Plutarch had any model for it. We know
that Didymus Chalcenterus wrote a work that carried the title Συμποσιακά
or Σύμμικτα 36 , but we have no reliable knowledge of its shape. However, to
judge from what we know about the content and general nature of this writer's
34 P. A. S, 1999, pp. 488-9.
35 See C. P. J, 1966, pp. 72-3.
36 D. L. 5. 76 (V 5.6); Clem. Al. Strom. 4. 19. 618 P.; EM. 718.35; St. Byz. 305.1, 314.6,
452.8; Herenn. Philo Ammon. De di. p. 35 Valck; Et. Gud. 124.2; Eust. 1788.53-54; and see J.
M, 1931, pp. 172-3.
overwhelming authorship, of which we have rather scarce fragments, we may
suppose that this work was of a scholarly type similar to that of Athenaeus. e
fact that Plutarch considered it appropriate to elucidate the dierence between
the terms συμποτικά and συμποσιακά indicates that the latter term had not
been used before in the sense he uses it. We are thus entitled to assume that
with his Συμποσιακά he actually founded a new kind of convivial literature.
He presents his program for this kind in the very rst talk of the work where
he expressly refers to Plato's and Xenophon's Symposia. He declares that in
a company of educated men serious philosophic and scientic topics should
be allowed to dominate to a large extent. It would seem that such a claim
should have been unnecessary, especially for a philosopher, and a Platonist at
that. Does it really mean that substantial discussions over the cups were rather
uncommon at the drinking-parties of his time?
Plutarch declares that in a company of ordinary, less educated men
dierent kinds of entertainment may be allowed to predominate. But in
a mixed company the uneducated persons should keep quiet like mute
consonants between sonant vowels. Drinking should be controlled, as it
is in the Quaestiones convivales. And there entertainment occurs only as an
exception37 , but it is frequently made the object of discussion, in which certain
kinds of music and dancing are expressly condemned38 . More than anything
else Plutarch makes the pantomime the target of his scorn, as in the outburst
at the very end of the work.
Strong commitment to the amelioration of the symposion was then
obviously a main incentive for Plutarch to write his Symposium of the Seven Wise
Men and thus to revive the Socratic symposium. But this ethic incentive is no
less obvious in the Quaestiones convivales. is being the case, it seems to me that
the cause of origin of this work must be reconsidered. I will certainly not call in
question that Plutarch actually composed it on the request of Sosius Senecio,
but I think we should pose this question: Is it actually reasonable to think that it
was only because of Sosius' desire that Plutarch decided to compose and publish
his recollections of drinking-parties, either preserved in his own memory or in
some kind of notes? I feel doubts about that. It is obvious that large parts of the
Quaestiones convivales are based on Plutarch's own memories. Now, if he had
actually made some notes of the main features of his symposia, as to place, time,
occasion, participants, subjects discussed etc., should we imagine that he made
these notes only for his private use, as a kind of diary, with no intention to use
the material for publication? I venture to say that this is highly improbable. I
dare to suggest that Plutarch was actually prepared to publish at least part of
the material, and that he communicated his plans to his old companion at many
symposia, Sosius Senecio. It will have been quite natural for Plutarch to do that,
and for Sosius gladly to commend the publication.
What I argue, then, is that it was Plutarch himself who got the idea
of writing a series of short symposiac texts based in part on his own
37 As in Quaest. conv. VII 5.
38 E.g., Quaest. conv. VII 8.
15
e place of Plutarch in the literary genre of Symposium
remembrances and notes and in addition on collections of Problemata and
Zetemata and a great number of other sources. e result was a pioneer work
of a new kind within the genre of symposium. Presumably, Plutarch got a
vision of this new kind of convivial writing from his own experiences of
symposia characterized by conversation on subjects of value over the cups in
a friendly environment.
It appears as probable, then, that Plutarch produced his convivial writings in
two separate steps. First he decided to write a truly Socratic symposium with the
aim to revive this kind. e result was the Septem Sapientium convivium. en, in
the course of time, he got the idea of a new kind of sympotic writing, inspired
by his own experiences, and with the aim to propagate these to wider circles of
educated people. e result was the Συμποσιακά . With this innovative work he
actually laid the basis for the possible development of a new branch within the
genre of symposium. But unfortunately, his work was not followed by others of
similar kind. e writings of Athenaeus, Macrobius, Apuleius or Gellius have a
quite dierent character and are not properly symposiac writings.
And in addition the satiric Menippean tradition was not broken, as
Plutarch might have hoped, but instead was continued not much later by
Lucian, and then by Julian the Emperor.
e place of Plutarch in the history of the genre of symposium therefore stands
out as virtually exceptional. His convivial works are singular for three reasons:
1. e revival of the Socratic symposium,
2. e founding of the new genre of Συμποσιακά aiming at a close
combination of education and amusement, and
3. e ethical purpose displayed in both of these convivial writings.
W o r k s c i T e d
B, D. "Painture et dépassement de la réalité dans le Banquet de Platon",
REA 82, 1980, 5-29.
B, J. N., "Adolescents, symposion, and pederasty", in O. M, 1990,
pp. 135-48.
F, F. "Aimer, boire et chanter chez les Grecs: La littérature au banquet
d´Homère à Athénée", in Bacchanales, Cahiers du Gita, 13, 2000, 65-
105.
H, R., Der Dialog I-II, Leipzig, 1895.
J, C.P., "Towards a chronology of Plutarch's works", JRS, 56 (1966)
70-4.
L, F., Un ot d´images. Une esthetique du banquet grec, Paris, 1987.
(English translation: e Aesthetics of the Greek Banquet: Images of Wine
and Ritual, Princeton 1990.)
16
Sven-Tage Teodorsson
M, J., Symposion. Die Geschichte einer literarischen Form, Paderborn,
1931.
M C, J. G. . (eds.), Plutarco, Dioniso y el vino. Actas del VI
Simposio Español sobre Plutarco (Cádiz, 14-16 de Mayo, 1998),
Madrid, 1999.
M, O., Sympotica. A Symposium on the Symposion, Oxford, 1990.
M. O. & T, M. (eds.), In Vino Veritas, London, 1995.
R, W., "Wine and truth in the Greek Symposion" in O. M & M.
T (eds.), 1995, pp. 106-12.
S, P . A., "Drinking, Table Talk, and Plutarch's contemporaries", in J. G.
M C . (eds.), 1999, pp. 481-99.
T, M., "Logos sympotikos" in O. M, 1990, pp. 238-60.
T, S.-T., A Commentary on Plutarch's Table Talks I, Göteborg, 1989.
_____ A Commentary on Plutarch's Table Talks II, Göteborg, 1990.
17
S 1
Philosophical and Literary Contexts of the Symposion
19
Trabajos y Días como hipotexto de las obras simposíacas de Plutarco
Tr a b a j o S y Dí a S c o m o h i p o T e x T o d e l a s o b r a s s i m p o s í a c a s
d e p l u T a r c o
J A F D
Universidad de Salamanca
Abstract
After analyzing the inuence of the Hesiodic eogony on all of Plutarch's work in a former
paper ( J. A. Fernández Delgado, 2007), the study of the quotations of Works and Days just
in the sympotic works by Plutarch is justied because, rstly, the number of these quotations
throughout the whole Plutarchan corpus is so high that a complete approach to them would
vastly exceed the limits of a paper; secondly, the number of these quotations in the sympotic
works by Plutarch is not only relatively abundant, but it sometimes aects the treatment of
organizational aspects of the symposium or illustrates a question as inherent to it as wine is;
nally, such an important "question" as the rst of the ninth and last book of the "convivial"
ones deals with "On verse quotations made opportunely or inopportunely", as if it were indeed
a programme of our research, and two quotations from Works and Days respectively open and
close the chapter. ose aspects of the quotations are dealt with in this paper as well as their
dierent uses in each of the two sympotic Plutarchan works, their functional classication, and
their greater or lesser degree of intertextual "tension", in the sense of their relative distance from
the Hesiodic statement.
1. Si en un trabajo anterior de extensión similar al presente he podido
abordar el estudio de la relación intertextual entre la Teogonía hesiódica y el
conjunto de la obra plutarquea1 , el análisis de la presencia de Trabajos y Días
solamente, en el marco de las piezas simposíacas de Plutarco, condicionado por
la temática del presente congreso, se justica en primer lugar por el elevado
número de citas de este poema hesiódico en la obra del Queronense en general,
proporcionalmente mayor incluso que el de las citas homéricas, que son con
mucho las más numerosas2 . De hecho el número de pasajes de Teogonía citados
a lo largo de la obra de Plutarco – en realidad a lo largo de Moralia, pues en
Vitae no se registra ninguna – es de 18 ó 19 según los cálculos de Helmbold &
O'Neil3 , aunque tres de ellos son evocados dos o tres veces; el número de citas
de Trabajos y Días en sus obras simposíacas solamente, asciende a 24. De ellas
curiosamente corresponden la mitad al Banquete de los Siete Sabios y la mitad
a Cuestiones Simposíacas, si bien es cierto que dos de estas últimas (Mor. 692B:
VI 7 y Mor. 701D: VII 3) podrían referirse al mismo pasaje hediódico (Op.
368 s.) y la extensión de las obras es de 105 (Mor. 146B-164D) y 812 (Mor.
612C-748D) parágrafos de la paginación de Estéfano respectivamente, con lo
que el índice de frecuencia de las citas es aproximadamente de 8:1 a favor de
Banquete.
1 J. A. F D, 2007.
2 Cf. W. C. H E. ON 1959, s. v. Hay que tener en cuenta, no obstante, que la
mayoría de las citas de Trabajos y Días provienen del Comentario que Plutarco le ha dedicado. Cf.
también la selección de citas hesiódicas de Plutarco analizadas por A. P J, 2004.
3 Idem.
20
José Antonio Fernández Delgado
2. El carácter de las citas, por el contrario, es muy distinto en una y otra
obra, y no sólo por el hecho de que las de la primera se muestran acordes con el
contenido, más discursivo y menos simposial, de la obra, mientras que las de la
segunda tienen mucho más que ver con su ambiente propiamente simposíaco
y los elementos característicos de este, su organización, la comida y la bebida,
y otros temas típicos de conversación del banquete.
2. 1. Las primeras se concentran todas al nal del cap. 13 (Mor. 156E:
Op. 744) y al nal del cap. 14 (las once restantes), de los 21 de que consta
el opúsculo; las segundas, en proporción mucho menor (y todavía más si
se comparan con las citas homéricas, las de la tragedia o las de Platón), se
distribuyen, no obstante, aquí y allá, más o menos regular y parsimoniosamente
a lo largo de sus IX "libros" con sus diez o más cuestiones cada uno (el IX
contiene quince cuestiones), aun cuando las cuatro últimas cuestiones del libro
IV no se nos hayan conservado, siendo las únicas excepciones dignas de nota
la concentración de cuatro citas en el libro VII (cuestiones 2, 3, 4 y 6) y de tres
en el libro IX (cuestiones 1 y 2), a las cuales hay que sumar, cosa que no sucede
en Banquete (donde no hay ninguna otra cita hesiódica segura4 ), la presencia
de tres citas de Teogonía en la cuestión 14, otra en la cuestión 15, más otra del
fr. 9 M.-W. (Eeas) en esta misma cuestión5 .
2. 2. De las citas de Trabajos en Banquete, a excepción de la primera (Mor.
156E: Op. 744), que se aplica a una acción tan típicamente simposíaca cual es la
prohibición hesiódica de poner la enocoe sobre la cratera de vino, y de la última
(Mor. 158B), que sirve para dar un quiebro al tema tratado calicando al contertulio
Esopo de discípulo de Hesíodo con mayor derecho que Epiménides de Creta, al
hacerle heredar de la fábula hesiódica del halcón y el ruiseñor (Op. 203-212) toda
su sabiduría fabulística, las diez restantes se aplican al tema de la dieta, ya sea en la
forma de alimentación dietética practicada por Epiménides (Mor. 157E: Op. 41), ya
sea como frugalidad alimenticia (Mor. 157E: Op. 45 y Op. 46) o directamente como
medicina (Mor. 158B: las siete citas restantes, todas comprendidas entre Op. 559 sqq.
y Op. 750). De ellas solo las cuatro primeras reproducen más o menos literalmente
el verso (Mor. 157E: Op. 41 y Mor. 157F: Op. 46) o al menos la expresión clave
(Mor. 156E: Op. 744 y Mor. 157F: Op. 45) del correspondiente pasaje de Trabajos
y Días, las ocho restantes son solamente alusiones6 , de localización a menudo no
unívoca, referidas a la dieta médica, con excepción de la última7 .
4 El par de hexámetros atribuidos a Hesíodo en Sept. sap. conv. 10 (Mor. 154A) y no
localizados en la obra hesiódica conservada, levemente modicados son puestos en boca de
Homero en el Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi 100, que, en términos no concordantes con los de
Plutarco, se reere como aquel a la participación de Hesíodo en los juegos fúnebres en honor de
Andamante, episodio recordado nuevamente en Quaest. conv. V 2 (Mor. 675A), según luego
veremos.
5 Sobre la distribución de las citas y su naturaleza en la obra de Plutarco cf. E. B,
2008.
6 De acuerdo con la clasicación formal de la cita establecida por J. M. D L, 1994
a partir de otras clasicaciones anteriores ( J. A, 1948; J. B, 1958, 382-404; S.
M, 1970; A. C, 1979; G. D' I, 1985).
7 Dice Plutarco por boca de Cleodoro (Mor. 158B): "Hesíodo tenía conocimientos de
21
Trabajos y Días como hipotexto de las obras simposíacas de Plutarco
Las citas de Trabajos en Cuestiones Convivales, en cambio, proceden de un
espectro de pasajes del poema mucho más amplio y de ellas la mitad se aplican a
aspectos organizativos del simposio (I 2, Mor. 618F: Op. 26; VII 4, Mor. 703D:
Op. 748; VII 6, Mor. 707C: Op. 342) o a un elemento tan inherente al mismo
como es el vino (III 9, Mor. 657D: Op. 464; VI 7, Mor. 692B: Op. 368; VII 3,
Mor. 701D: Op. 368), y la otra mitad se aplica a temas de discusión propios del
banquete (VII 2, Mor. 701B "De quién es el lanzacuernos en Platón": Op. 471;
VIII 5, Mor. 725D "De por qué los navegantes se proveen de agua del Nilo":
Op. 595) y más particularmente a cuestiones escolástico-literarias (V 2, Mor.
675A: "De que era antiguo el certamen de poesía": Op. 654 sqq.; IX 1, Mor.
736E y 737C "Sobre las citas de versos hechas oportuna o inoportunamente":
Op. 11 y 763, la única "cuestión convival" que se sirve de dos citas de Trabajos
y Dias; IX 2, Mor. 738A "De cuál es la causa por la que la alfa es la primera de
las letras": Op. 405).
Frente al tipo de cita alusiva predominante en Banquete, aquí prevalece la
cita literal, ya sea de versos enteros o casi enteros (Mor. 725D: Op. 595, Mor.
736E: Op. 11) o de amplias partes de versos (Mor. 703D: Op. 748, Mor. 707C:
Op. 342, Mor. 737C: Op. 763), o bien la leve paráfrasis, de todo o casi todo
un verso (Mor. 618F: Op. 26, Mor. 657D: Op. 464, Mor. 701D: Op. 368) o de
partes de verso (Mor. 701B: Op. 471), mientras que la cita compendiaria (Mor.
692B: Op. 368, Mor. 738A: Op. 405) o la alusión (Mor. 675A: ¿Op. 654 sqq.?)
son menos frecuentes.
2. 3. Por lo que respecta a un aspecto de la cita no menos importante que
el de su morfología, que es el de la función que esta desempeña en el texto
receptor, las diferencias entre Banquete y Cuestiones Convivales en relación
con las citas de Trabajos también son notables. En la primera de las obras, a
pesar de la importante diferencia morfológica entre las cuatro primeras citas
y las ocho alusiones restantes, según hemos dicho, todas ellas desempeñan
una función esencialmente erudita, según la cual la opinión de Hesíodo es
mencionada como punto de referencia para la propia argumentación8 . Es
más, el afán de remitir a Hesíodo los principios de argumentación fuerza a
Plutarco, por un lado, a establecer a veces en la citación a modo de retruécanos
que aparentan contradecir la opinión hesiódica, como en Mor. 156E, donde
al tipo habitual de banquete, en el que Trabajos 744 exhorta a "no posar la
enocoe sobre la cratera", contrapone el banquete de los Sabios en los siguientes
términos: "las Musas, poniendo en medio de vosotros la palabra cual cratera
de sobrio contenido,...suscitan, fomentan y reparten amabilidad, dejando que
la jarra permanezca quieta la mayor parte del tiempo "sobre la cratera", algo
que Hesíodo prohibió en reuniones de hombres más capaces de beber que de
dialogar"9 ; o en Mor. 157F, donde la cita de parte del v. 45 y todo el v. 46 de
medicina, pues es evidente que no habla a la ligera y sin experiencia sobre la dieta, de la mezcla
del vino, del valor del agua, del baño de las mujeres, del momento adecuado para las relaciones
sexuales y de cómo se ha de sentar a los recién nacidos".
8 Cf. J. M. D L, 1994, p. 694.
9 αἱ Μοῦσαι καθάπερ κρατῆρα νηφάλιον ἐν μέσῳ προθέμεναι τὸν λόγον, ᾧ πλεῖστον
22
José Antonio Fernández Delgado
Trabajos, que Hesíodo remite a la Edad de Oro, en que no había necesidad de
trabajar, es contrapuesta a la renada elaboración de los digamos complejos
vitamínicos mediante el siguiente juego de palabras, fuente de dicultades
todavía hoy no resueltas en la transmisión del texto: "¿Cómo entonces en
Hesíodo no estará puesto "el timón al humo" y "se acabarían los trabajos de
los bueyes y los sufridos mulos", si ha de ser necesaria tanta preparación?"10 .
Por otro lado, la cita del v. 41 de Trabajos "cuán gran provecho hay en malva
y asfódelo"11 es sucesivamente sometida a una triple interpretación – y con
ello puesta implícitamente de maniesto la riqueza y complejidad del texto
hesiódico – por parte de los sabios simposiastas Solón, Periandro y Anacarsis,
de los cuales para el primero es el germen de la particular dieta alimenticia
seguida por Epiménides de Creta, para el segundo recomendación de
sobriedad y frugalidad en la alimentación y para el tercero alabanza de sus
propiedades salutíferas (tesis apoyada a continuación por Cleodoro mediante
la cita de la serie de alusiones de Trabajos en relación con los conocimientos
médicos de Hesíodo). En tercer lugar, una vez sobrepasado el umbral de la
primera cita del poema (cap. 13, Mor. 156E: Op. 744), aplicada al carácter
especial del presente simposio, todas las demás (cap. 14, Mor. 157E-158B) se
ensartan en un anillo composicional que comienza haciendo a Epiménides
discípulo de Hesíodo y, tras el despliegue de referencias de su poema al tema
objeto de discusión, a través de la última cita acaba concediéndole ese honor
en mayor medida a Esopo por su deuda para con este en una faceta distinta
y no menos brillante de su saber, la fábula (τῆς καλῆς ταύτης καὶ ποικιλίης
καὶ πολυγλώσσου σοφίας, como la calica Cleodoro).
La función de las citas de Trabajos en Cuestiones Convivales es mucho más
variada que en la otra obra, hasta el punto de que su casuística comprende las
tres clases a las que básicamente puede reducirse la tipología funcional de la
cita12 y de las cuales en Banquete no se constata más que el tipo erudito; a saber,
y aun con la dicultad que supone encasillar un tipo de intertexto en el que
generalmente más de una función se halla presente al mismo tiempo13 , citas
ornamentales (dos: Mor. 657D, 701B) y, dentro de las citas del tipo llamado
lógico por su implicación en el discurso del texto receptor, citas de autoridad
(seis: Mor. 618F, 692B, 703D, 707C, 725D, 737C) y citas eruditas (cuatro: Mor.
675A, 701D, 736E, 738A). Tal diversicación con respecto a Banquete alcanza
ἡδονῆς ἅμα καὶ παιδιᾶς καὶ σπουδῆς ἔνεστιν, ἐγείρουσι τούτῳ καὶ κατάρδουσι καὶ διαχέουσι
τὴν φιλοφροσύνην, ἐῶσαι τὰ πολλὰ τὴν 'οἰνοχόην' ἀτρέμα κεῖσθαι 'κρητῆρος ὕπερθεν,' ὅπερ
ἀπηγόρευσεν Ἡσίοδος ἐν τοῖς πίνειν μᾶλλον ἢ διαλέγεσθαι δυναμένοις.
10 Manteniendo el texto transmitido por la mayoría de los mss. se puede entender que el
dicho hesiódico de la malva y el asfódelo es equiparado, como sinónimo de sobriedad, al tiempo
de la Edad de Oro, en el que se colgaba el timón del carro por no haber necesidad de trabajar,
contraponiendo hiperbólicamente esa situación a la laboriosidad requerida por la fabricación de
los fármacos dietéticos.
11 ῞Οσον ἐν μαλάχῃ τε καὶ ἀσφοδέλῳ μέγ' ὄνειαρ. El verso ha sido privado por Plutarco de
su negación inicial para adaptarlo al contexto.
12 Cf. J. M. D L, 1994, pp. 693 sqq.
13 Ibidem, p. 691.
23
Trabajos y Días como hipotexto de las obras simposíacas de Plutarco
también a las citas de versos enteros o secciones importantes de versos, que, para
empezar, aquí son la mayoría y no solo las dos de la otra obra, y de ellas:
Mor. 618F: Op. 26 πτωχὸς γὰρ πτωχῷ <φθονέει> καὶ ἀοιδὸς ἀοιδῷ "el
mendigo envidia al mendigo y el aedo al aedo"
desempeña principalmente una función de autoridad (aparte de ornamental
y erudita), como justicación de la actitud del simposiarco (Lamprias, el
hermano de Plutarco), quien se propone colocar a los comensales por rasgos
complementarios de su carácter o condición e impidiendo reclinarse juntos a
los de una misma profesión (maliciosamente ejemplicada con "al sosta...con
un sosta y al poeta con un poeta") para evitar fricciones.
Mor. 657D: Op. 464 ἀλεξιάρην παίδων εὐκηλήτειραν "ahuyentadora de
males y contentadora de niños"
cita esencialmente ornamental (además de erudita) trasladada de su
aplicación hesiódica al rastrojo, a la mezcla de dos partes de agua con tres de
vino "la más musical,...adormecedora y quitapenas".
Mor. 701B: Op. 471 εὐθημοσύνην ἀρίστην "(no encuentran) la mejor
disposición"
cita entre ornamental y de autoridad de la segunda mitad pospentemímera
del verso, declinada, que Plutarco aplica a las semillas que al arrojarlas chocan
con los cuernos de los bueyes y no se entierran, y Hesíodo predica en positivo
del ocultamiento de la semilla para que no la coman los pájaros, dato del texto
hesiódico que Plutarco deja inferir a sus cultos lectores.
Mor. 701D: Op. 368 s. ἀρχομένου πίθου καὶ λήγοντος ἐμφορεῖσθαι,
μεσσόθι δὲ φείδεσθαι, "hartarse cuando se empieza y termina la tinaja, y
economizar a la mitad"
desempeña una función básicamente erudita (además de ornamental)
frente a la cual se establece una aparente polémica (que en el fondo no es
tal, puesto que se trata de aspectos distintos del mismo asunto) por boca del
suegro de Plutarco, Alexión, el cual sostiene sobre la calidad del vino la opinión
contraria, es decir, que el vino mejor es el del medio de la barrica.
Mor. 703D: Op. 748 ἀπὸ χυτροπόδων ἀνεπιρρέκτων "de marmitas sin
consagrar"14
cita entre erudita y de autoridad de cierta prohibición hesiódica para
explicar cómo las relaciones de agradecimiento y comunicación deben tenerse
no solo entre los humanos sino también con los seres inanimados.
Mor. 707C: Op. 342 Τὸν φιλέοντ' ἐπὶ δαῖτα καλεῖν "invita al banquete al
que te quiere"
cita de autoridad aplicada a la desaprobación de la costumbre de que los
invitados llamados sombras acudan acompañando a otros invitados.
Mor. 725D: Op. 595 κρήνης δ' ἀενάου καὶ ἀπορρύτου ἥ τ' ἀθόλωτος "de
una fuente sempiterna y continua que esté limpia"
cita de autoridad y erudita aplicada a la explicación de cómo el agua quieta
es más fácilmente corruptible, por la tierra que acumula, que el agua corriente.
14 Amplia porción del verso, no intercesural.
24
José Antonio Fernández Delgado
Mor. 736E: Op. 11 Οὐκ ἄρα μοῦνον ἔην Ἐρίδων γένος "Sin duda no fue
uno solo el linaje de las Disputas"
cita fundamentalmente erudita, cantada intencionadamente para abrir la
tertulia simposíaca subsiguiente al banquete con el que Amonio, el maestro de
Plutarco, agasajó a los efebos y profesores de cierta escuela ateniense, los cuales
se picaron entre sí.
Mor. 737C: Op. 763 φήμη δ'οὔ τις πάμπαν ἀπόλλυται "Ningún rumor
muere totalmente"
cita de autoridad en la cual cierto senador poco sensible basa su exhortación
a Casio Longino, a quien le había llegado el rumor de que había muerto su
hijo, a no desdeñar el chisme.
La diversicación alcanza también a los pocos casos de fuerte paráfrasis
y de alusiones, muchas menos que en Banquete : Mor. 675A (Op. 654 sqq.),
alusión a los juegos de Andamante como mero testimonio erudito; Mor. 692B
(Op . 368), alusión con función de autoridad en pro de la tesis de que no hay
que ltrar el vino, sino beberlo directamente de la tinaja; Mor. 738A ( Op. 405),
paráfrasis con función erudita del verso 405 de Trabajos Οἶκον μὲν πρώτιστα
γυναῖκά τε βοῦν τ' ἀροτῆρα, al cual, como en algún otro caso mencionado,
aparentemente contradice por mor de la explicación de que la alfa es la primera
de las letras porque así lo dispuso su inventor, el fenicio Cadmo, dado que los
fenicios llamaban así al buey, "al que consideraban no la segunda ni la tercera
de las cosas necesarias, como Hesíodo, sino la primera".
3. Ahora bien, independientemente de las importantes diferencias
observadas entre Banquete y Cuestiones Convivales en el grado de apropiación de
Trabajos como hipotexto, si no más numerosa sí más regular en su distribución,
así como más extensa y detallada, a la par que mucho más diversicada, tanto
en su morfología como en su función, en la segunda de las piezas simposíacas
con respecto a la primera, hay algunos aspectos del uso de las citas en los que
ambas obras muestran una cierta coincidencia.
3. 1. El primero se reere al ya apuntado gusto por el juego de palabras
aparentemente polémico que se observa en la introducción de algunas de las
citas hesiódicas de Banquete mencionadas (Mor. 156E: Op. 744, Mor. 157F:
Op. 45 s.) y que, lejos de cualquier intento de desmarcamiento de la doctrina
hesiódica, lo que hacen es conrmar su homenaje a esta mediante una vuelta
de tuerca del ejercicio evocador; algo así encontramos en la citación de Op.
368 s. ("Hartarse cuando se empieza y se termina la tinaja...") en Cuestiones
Convivales, Mor. 701D, la cual es recusada con el argumento de que lo mejor
del vino es lo del medio: pero la recusación es puesta en boca del suegro de
Plutarco (mencionado solo aquí por el autor), del cual dice este que se mofaba
de Hesíodo por ello, sin darse cuenta, podemos añadir nosotros, de algo de lo
que sin duda Plutarco sí se daba cuenta y es que el dicho hesiódico no se reere
a la calidad del vino, sino que funciona como metáfora del ahorro15 ; parece ser,
15 Como bien ha explicado Plutarco en su Comentario a Trabajos y Días, ad loc. y pace
Teodorsson y los comentaristas antiguos Geop. VII 6, 8 y Macrob. Sat. VII 12, 13, que no lo han
25
Trabajos y Días como hipotexto de las obras simposíacas de Plutarco
pues, una refutación sarcástica y de ahí que el autor termine diciendo "dejemos
en paz a Hesíodo"; o en la citación de Op. 405 en Mor. 738A, donde, para
enfatizar que los fenicios consideraban al buey la primera de las cosas necesarias,
hace una recusatio sesgada ("no la segunda ni la tercera de las cosas necesarias,
como Hesíodo") y en todo caso deudora de la rotunda y no incompatible
declaración hesiódica "la primera cosa, casa, mujer y buey de arada".
3. 2. Un segundo punto de coincidencia en el manejo de las citas entre
las dos obras simposíacas en estrecha relación con este es el procedimiento
de citación en general, el cual constituye uno de los rasgos denitorios en la
caracterización de las citas como hecho de intertextualidad16 . A diferencia de
lo que ocurre, sin ir más lejos, con las citas plutarqueas de un autor nada dudoso
de la estima del Queronense como es Homero, a juzgar por el ejemplo de De
audiendis poetis, donde de unos 136 casos solamente 12 se hacen acompañar
por el nombre del poeta o por una perífrasis del mismo (en dos casos)17 , las citas
de Trabajos en Banquete son todas introducidas bajo la mención del nombre
de Hesíodo, ya se trate de las cuatro citas literales o ligeramente parafrásticas
(Mor. 156E-157F), o bien del bloque de alusiones subsiguiente (Mor. 158B),
de modo que el número no elevado de citas se ve de alguna forma compensado
por la memoria expresa (probablemente más necesaria en este caso que en el
de Homero) que Plutarco hace de las enseñanzas del poema.
De las doce citas de Trabajos diseminadas a lo largo de Cuestiones
Convivales, solamente tres son inidenticadas, y para eso la segunda de ellas
(Mor . 675E), una alusión erudita a los juegos de Andamante que se supone
es cita-testimonio de Op. 654 sqq., no menciona a Hesíodo pero añade que
este y Homero, según una fuente no hesiódica18 , tomaron parte en aquellos;
la primera (Mor. 618F) y la tercera (Mor. 737C) son sendos hexámetros (el
segundo no completo) de las secciones inicial y nal del poema de "Trabajos"
propiamente dicho, sumamente sonoros y lo sucientemente bien conocidos
probablemente para poder halagar los conocimientos del lector plutarqueo sin
necesidad de proporcionarle más datos; eso mismo se deduce de los términos
en que es introducido el segundo hexámetro por el senador que lo pronuncia
("como si no supieses y hubieses leído eso de que..."), términos que también
indican que la fuente es escrituraria (y no de tradición oral, en el caso de una
supuesta proverbialización del verso). Otras cuatro citaciones (Mor. 657D,
701B, 701D y 738A) mencionan el nombre de Hesíodo (o el adjetivo derivado,
en Mor. 657D) en términos algo más que neutros, si bien su triple mención en
Mor. 701D y su mención en Mor. 738E son aparentemente polémicas, como
hemos dicho. De las cinco citaciones restantes dos se confían abiertamente a
la autoridad hesiódica (Mor. 692B "como recomendaba Hesíodo" y Mor.707C
"obedeciendo principalmente a Hesíodo"), las otras tres además la ensalzan
entendido así, cf. S.-T. T, 1996, comm. ad loc.
16 Cf. J. M. D L, 1994, pp. 684 sqq. Sobre las citas como elemento intertextual cf.
N. P-G, 1996, pp. 45 sqq., 95 sqq. y bibliografía citada supra en n. 6.
17 Cf. J. M. D L, 1994, p. 684.
18 Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi 60 sqq.
26
José Antonio Fernández Delgado
en términos que conocemos por su empleo con estructuras retórico-literarias
anes a la cita, como la chreía, la sentencia o la propia fábula19 , elogiando la
última citación, en lugar de al autor, el comienzo propiamente dicho del poema
(Mor. 703D "con razón Hesíodo no permite", Mor. 725D "hermosamente
Hesíodo alabó", Mor. 736E "el principio de los Trabajos...lo alabó como muy
adecuado al momento").
3. 3. Precisamente esta última cita se halla íntimamente ligada al tercer
punto de anidad, de orden composicional y semántico, que puede observarse
entre las dos obras plutarqueas al respecto, por encima de sus diferencias. Ya
hemos dicho cómo la primera cita de Trabajos en Banquete se reere al tipo de
simposio, en este caso el de los Sabios, y la última ensalza el valor educativo-
literario del poema hesiódico a través de la fábula, aun cuando la ubicación de
las citas en la pieza plutarquea no coincide con su comienzo y nal, sino que
se agolpan en dos capítulos centrales de esta. De un modo paralelo, aunque en
este caso dispersas a lo largo de los Libros I al IX y último de las Cuestiones
Convivales, la primera cita de Trabajos en esta obra se reere a la colocación
de los simposiastas en el banquete y las tres últimas, correspondientes a las
Cuestiones 1 y 2 del Libro IX y último, pueden calicarse, como su homóloga
de Banquete, de educativo-literarias. Con lo cual la aplicación de dichas citas
tanto en una como en la otra obra parece seguir una trayectoria que comienza
evocando el simposio de eruditos, recorre los diversos temas o "cuestiones"
tratados y termina con una alusión más o menos explícita al importante papel
que las citas de Trabajos desempeñan no solo en estas obras de Plutarco sino en
algo para nosotros y para él mismo mucho más trascendente, que es el sistema
educativo y sociocultural en el que su producción literaria, y la propia técnica
de la cita, en gran medida se inserta.
Las tres últimas citas de Trabajos en Cuestiones Convivales, en efecto, tienen
lugar dos en la Cuestión primera y una en la Cuestión segunda de las quince
de que, en lugar de las diez habituales, originariamente constaba, en razón de
la importancia de su temática, el Libro IX, consagrado a las Musas, con cuyo
número coincide y es eco de las conversaciones mantenidas en su esta ateniense;
ya hemos dicho cómo, además de estas, la Cuestión decimocuarta del Libro,
que es la propiamente dedicada al número de las Musas, contiene tres citas de
Teogonía y la Cuestión decimoquinta una de Teogonía y otra de Eeas20 . La cita
de la Cuestión segunda es aplicada, según dijimos, a la explicación cadmea de
por qué la alfa es la primera de las letras, cuestión lológica, como un buen
número de las del libro, suscitada en la esta de las Musas entre geómetras,
gramáticos, rétores y músicos (Mor. 737D-E), es decir, entre los representantes
de los cuatro pilares en los que se asentaba la educación intelectual griega21 .
Las dos citas de la Cuestión primera son la primera y la penúltima de una serie
19 Cf. J. A. F D, 2007, p. 745 y n. 30.
20 La nómina de las citas hesiódicas en esta obra se cierra con otra cita de Teogonía en
la Cuestión quinta (Mor. 678F) más una cita de Teogonía y otra de la Boda de Céix (fr. 267
M.-W.).
21 Cf. H. I. M, 1970, pp. 195-214; R. C, 2001, 185-230.
27
Trabajos y Días como hipotexto de las obras simposíacas de Plutarco
de nueve22 de las cuales la primera "Sin duda no fue uno solo el linaje de las
disputas" (comienzo del poema de Trabajos propiamente dicho) constituye el
tema del canto con que el músico Eratón da comienzo al simposio ofrecido por
Amonio, el maestro de Plutarco, siendo estratego en Atenas, a los alumnos y
profesores de las disciplinas indicadas, tras una prueba escolar exitosa, cuando
la rivalidad entre los maestros se había puesto ya de maniesto.
Alabado el verso por Amonio como muy adecuado al momento, a
continuación este hizo recaer la conversación nada menos que "Sobre las
citas de versos hechas oportuna o inoportunamente", consciente de que estas,
nos informa el autor, tienen "no solo encanto (χάρις) sino utilidad (χρεία) a
veces grande", es decir, adelantando en muchos siglos la actual clasicación
funcional de la cita en sus dos tipos fundamentales (de ornato y lógica)23 . El
resto de las ocho citas aparte la segunda de Trabajos ya indicada ("Ningún
rumor muere totalmente", última gnome de la parte del poema que precede a
los Días y tándem simétrico por tanto de la otra cita hesiódica de la Cuestión
IX 1 en cuanto a su ubicación no solo en esta sino también en el poema)
ilustra la oportunidad o inoportunidad de las mismas poniéndolas en boca de
dos rapsodos, del lósofo Anaxarco compañero de Alejandro Magno, de un
niño de Corinto a quien el cónsul romano que destruyó la ciudad le mandó
escribir un verso para averiguar qué niños libres sabían escribir, de la esposa de
un actor dirigiéndose a este, de la hija de Pompeyo Magno leyéndosela a este
por indicación de su profesor al regreso de aquel de la guerra, y de un asistente
a una exhibición de un gramático en un teatro en Rodas respondiendo a su
demanda de un verso. No solo los dos de Trabajos sino todos los ejemplos son
a cual más ingeniosos, a la vez que una demostración brillante y compacta
de la pericia con que Plutarco domina el arte de la cita, así como del grado
de incidencia que esta presenta en la educación y en la vida escolar y social
grecorromana al mismo tiempo.
4. Esta insistencia por parte de Plutarco en conectar las citas, y las citas
de Trabajos en particular, con la escuela y las clases intelectuales, así como el
amplio y rico despliegue no desde el punto de vista numérico sino de destrezas y
estrategias en el manejo de las mismas en sus obras simposíacas, se entiende muy
bien en un contexto educativo como aquel en el que se formó tanto Plutarco
como sus lectores y oyentes, y del que, si no exactamente una teoría de la cita, sí
conocemos la teoría de ejercicios prerretóricos, o progymnásmata, más o menos
anes, como la chreía, la sentencia o la fábula24 . En el otro cabo de la etapa escolar
del grammatikós, es decir, al comienzo de la equivalente a lo que es nuestra segunda
enseñanza, estaba la lectura y asimilación de los grandes prosistas y poetas de la
22 Cuatro de Homero, una de una tragedia desconocida, otra del Orestes de Eurípides y otra
de la Electra de Sófocles.
23 Cf. J. M. D L 1994, pp. 690 s.; J. B, 1958, pp. 382-404: "Les
citations".
24 Cf. eón 62, 65, 70: L. S (ed.), 1854, pp. 57-130; M. P & G. B,
1997, L-LX.
28
José Antonio Fernández Delgado
historia de la literatura griega, entre los cuales Hesíodo era un puntal seguro en
todas las listas canónicas25 , como atestigua asimismo el importante número de
papiros, no solamente de Trabajos, conservados, algunos de ellos escolares26 . A
ello hay que añadir el particular feeling que sin duda suscitó en el moralista de
Queronea el poema gnómico de su paisano beocio, como demuestra el hecho de
que Plutarco le haya dedicado un amplio comentario en cuatro libros27 , en cierta
medida conservado por Proclo, Tzetzes y Moscópoulos.
bi b l i o g r a f í a c i T a d a
A, J., "Procédés de citation et de raccord", REL , 26 (1948) 268-93.
B, G. C, A. (eds.), Esiodo: cent'anni di papiri. Atti del
convegno internazionale di studi. (Firenze, 7-8 Giugno, 2007). Studi e
Testi di Papirologia, N.S.10, Firenze, 2008.
B, J., Lucien écrivain. Imitation et création, Paris, 1958.
B, E., "Plutarch's Habits of Citation. Aspects of Dierence", in A. G.
N (ed.), e Unity of Plutarch's Work. Acta 7th International
Plutarch Society Congress (Rethymno, 2005), Berlin, 2008, pp. 143-
57.
C, A., La seconde main ou le travail de la citation, Paris, 1979.
C, R., Gymnastics of the Mind. Greek Education in Hellenistic and Roman
Egypt, Princeton/Oxford, 2001.
D L, J. M., "Tipología y función de las citas homéricas en el De
audiendis poetis de Plutarco", in M. G V (ed.), Estudios
sobre Plutarco: ideas religiosas. Actas del III Simposio Internacional de
la Sociedad Española de Plutarquistas (Universidad de Oviedo, 1992),
Madrid, 1994, pp. 680-96.
D'I, G., L'approccio intertestuale alla poesia. Sondaggi da Vergilio e dalla
poesia cristiana greca di Gregorio e di Sinesio, Palermo, 1985.
F D, J. A., "Genealogía como pretexto, Teogonía como
hipotexto y escuela como contexto en Plutarco", in J. M. N I
& R. L L (eds.), El amor en Plutarco. IV Simposio Internacional
de la Sociedad Española de Plutarquistas, (Universidad de León, 2006),
León, 2007, pp. 735-46.
25 Cf. R. C 2001, 197 s. Según Libanio, Ep. 1036, 4 "Homero, Hesíodo y los otros
poetas" eran de lectura obligatoria para las personas educadas.
26 Ibidem y cf. G. B A. C, 2008, p. 8.
27 Gell. XX 8. El comentario plutarqueo de Trabajos y Días, cuya referencia aquí intenta
servir solamente como ulterior argumento in cauda en pro del enorme interés de Plutarco en la
obra del moralista paisano, es actualmente objeto de investigación especíca por nuestra parte.
29
Trabajos y Días como hipotexto de las obras simposíacas de Plutarco
H, W. C. ON, E., Plutarch's Quotations. e American
Philological Association, 1959.
M, H.-I., Historia de la educación en la antigüedad. Madrid, 1970. (trad.
de la 3ª ed. francesa, Paris, 1955: 1ª ed. 1948).
M, S., "e basic function of quotation", in A. J. G (ed.), Sign,
Language, Culture, e Hague-Paris, 1970, pp. 690-705.
P, M. B, G. (eds.), Aelius éon. Progymnasmata, Paris,
1997.
P J, A., "El Hesíodo de Plutarco", in I. G (ed.), La biblioteca
di Plutarco (Atti del IX Convegno plutarcheo, Pavia, 13-15 giugno
2002), Napoli, 2004, pp. 37-46.
P-G, N., Introduction à l'Intertextualité, Paris, 1996.
S, L. (ed.), Rhetores Graeci, II, Leipzig, 1854.
T, S.-T., A Commentary on Plutarch's Table Talks, I-III, Uppsala,
1996.
31
Moderación en el simposio en Sobre la vida y poesía de Homero de Pseudo-Plutarco
mo d e r a c i ó n e n e l s i m p o s i o e n
So b r e l a v i D a y p o e S í a D e Ho m e r o d e ps e u d o -pl u T a r c o
J F Z
Universidad de Murcia
Abstract
is study analyses the defense of moderation in eating and drinking in the Essay on the Life
and Poetry of Homer ascribed to Plutarch, looking at the author's use of quotations from the Iliad
and the Odyssey. Food and wine are considered necessary and benecial but, when consumed to
excess, can have adverse eects on human health. e text forms part of a well-known tradition,
as is evidenced by parallels with ancient medicine and Plutarch himself.
Este estudio pretende analizar la defensa de la necesidad de moderación
en la comida y bebida en Sobre la vida y poesía de Homero (Περὶ τοῦ βίου καὶ
τῆς ποιήσεως τοῦ Ὁμήρου), atribuida a Plutarco. Para ello, se parte del uso de
las citas de la Ilíada y la Odisea del autor del tratado, que demuestra que los
excesos tienen efectos adversos en la salud humana. Ilustramos la tradición en
la que se encuadra esta idea a partir de los paralelismos con la medicina antigua
y el propio Plutarco.
El interés del propio Plutarco por los estudios homéricos se demuestra en
una obra de la cual desgraciadamente sólo conservamos algunos fragmentos,
y que aparece en el catálogo de Lamprias como Ὁμηρικῶν μελετῶν βιβλία δ',
los cuatro libros de las Cuestiones Homéricas. A pesar del atractivo que revisten
estos fragmentos, no se corresponden con Sobre la vida y poesía de Homero, que
no ha podido ser relacionada con ningún otro título plutarqueo y que, además,
según demuestran estudios de lengua y estilo, se data a nales del siglo II d.C.
y no fue escrita por el de Queronea1 . Eso no impide que el anónimo autor
parezca conocer las ideas de Plutarco, y que se hayan señalado paralelismos que
pueden deberse a préstamos tomados directamente de él2 . El autor de Sobre la
vida y poesía de Homero es un grammaticus, un profesor, ya que el objetivo de
la obra es demostrar la armación de que "todo está en Homero", que en los
versos de la Ilíada y Odisea ya encontramos todos los saberes.
En este interés tan propio del mundo antiguo por descubrir el "primero",
el descubridor, el εὑρετής de cada aspecto de su cultura, Homero es el
"inventor" por excelencia. Por ejemplo, aunque sea simplemente en germen,
en él encontramos todos los géneros literarios griegos. Cualquier aspecto de
la vida cotidiana se rastrea en el épico griego y, además, se llega más allá y,
según una concepción trascendental, los versos homéricos esconden bajo su
supercie enigmas. Esta idea aparece en la Cueva de las ninfas de Porrio3 ,
1 Cf. B. W, 1994.
2 Coincidencias ya señaladas en G. N. B, 1896. Sobre las Cuestiones Homéricas y
la Vita Homeri, cf. H. S, 1899.
3 Edición de A. N , Porphyrii philosophi Platonici opuscula selecta, iterum recogn. Augutus
Nauck, Leipzig, 18722 (1860). Cf. A. B, 1968.
32
Josefa Fernández Zambudio
donde encontramos una doctrina metafísica y cósmica escondida tras los nueve
elementos de la descripción de la cueva en el libro XIII de la Odisea 4 .
En el tratado Sobre la vida y poesía de Homero se estudia, en primer lugar,
brevemente las tradiciones sobre la biografía del épico, para pasar a un análisis
de su obra desde diferentes puntos de vista. Así, se observan las guras retóricas,
las particularidades de la lengua homérica, las diversas clases de discursos, y
otras cuestiones que podemos denominar varia. En este apartado aparece la
medicina, que es el tema que nos ocupa, y que se trata en los capítulos 200 y
siguientes.
Homero no se ha limitado a un interés teórico, sino que también en su
obra se encuentran referencias a la práctica médica, τὸ δὲ πρακτικὸν μέρος τῆς
ἰατρικῆς5 . En este ámbito, además de cómo ha de ser el ejercicio saludable6 ,
Homero ha tratado la dietética, es decir, cómo y, sobre todo, cuánto, se ha de
comer y beber.
El autor de Sobre la vida y poesía de Homero utiliza citas de la Ilíada o de la
Odisea7 para ilustrar los temas de los que se ocupa Homero en sus poemas. En
los capítulos objeto de nuestro análisis (205 y 206), comienza Pseudo-Plutarco
reriéndose a la δίαιτα, que sólo será saludable (ὑγιεινή) cuando sea λιτή. Los
héroes homéricos no se interesan por la comida, se alimentan de carne cocida
y no les gustan los grandes banquetes, pues son conscientes de la necesidad de
moderación. Sin embargo, la excesiva frugalidad no es tampoco buena, pues sólo
los dioses pueden comer sólo ambrosía. Los héroes, en cuanto mortales, necesitan
la energía proporcionada por los alimentos: ἡ γαστὴρ ἀεὶ δεῖται προληρώσεως.
Esta necesidad de llenar el estómago se concreta a través de algunos
términos que encontramos en los ejemplos homéricos de textos de la Odisea:
κελεύω, ἀνάγκη, πίμπλημι. Las dos citas para este pasaje pertenecen al libro
VII, donde Ulises pide que le dejen cenar tranquilo antes de preguntarle quién
es, según las leyes de la hospitalidad8 :
ἀλλ' ἐμὲ μὲν δορπῆσαι ἐάσατε κηδόμενόν περ·
οὐ γάρ τι στυγερῇ ἐπὶ γαστέρι κύντερον ἄλλο
ἔπλετο, ἥ τ' ἐκέλευσεν ἕο μνήσασθαι ἀνάγκῃ
(Od. 7.215-217)
ὡς καὶ ἐγὼ πένθος μὲν ἔχω φρεσίν, ἡ δὲ μάλ' αἰεὶ
ἐσθέμεναι κέλεται καὶ πινέμεν, ἐκ δέ με πάντων
ληθάνει, ὅσσ' ἔπαθον, καὶ ἐνιπλησθῆναι ἀνώγει.
(Od. 7.219-221)
4 En ella introduce Atenea a Ulises para transformarlo en pordiosero y tramar así la venganza
contra los pretendientes.
5 Vit. Hom. 204.
6 En Vit. Hom. 207.
7 Sobre las citas de Homero en la Segunda Sofística, cf. J. F. K, 1973; en Plutarco,
cf. J. M. D L, 2001.
8 Cf. A. M P, 2002.
33
Moderación en el simposio en Sobre la vida y poesía de Homero de Pseudo-Plutarco
Encontramos también en estos versos una referencia a πίνω, que Pseudo-
Plutarco aprovecha para pasar a hablar de la bebida y de cómo precisa igualmente
de moderación: se tiene que beber vino con mesura, pues el vino μέτριος es
ὡφέλιμος, benecioso, pero si se bebe πολύς, será βλαβερός, peligroso.
En los poemas homéricos se describen varios benecios proporcionados
por el vino:
- Proporciona fuerza a los héroes. Esta armación se concreta en el tratado
con la expresión δυνάμεως ποιητικός, apoyada por algunos términos de las
citas homéricas: μένος, ἀέξει, θαρσαλέον:
ἀνδρὶ δὲ κεκμηῶτι μένος μέγα οἶνος ἀέξει
(Il. 6. 261 9)
ὃς δέ κ' ἀνὴρ οἴνοιο κορεσσάμενος καὶ ἐδωδῆς
ἀνδράσι δυσμενέεσσι πανημέριος πολεμίζῃ,
θαρσαλέον νύ οἱ ἦτορ ἐνὶ φρεσίν, οὐδέ τι γυῖα
(Il. 19. 167-170 10)
- Ayuda a la φιλοφροσύνη, pero sólo cuando es ἡδύς. Pseudo-Plutarco
recoge el verso que introduce las dos ocasiones en que Pontónoo prepara la
mezcla del vino a instancias de Alcínoo.
ὣς φάτο, Ποντόνοος δὲ μελίφρονα οἶνον ἐκίρνα
(Od. 7. 182; 13. 53)
- Hasta puede curar, convertirse en una medicina. Así ocurre con el vino
de Pramno, el que Macaón herido bebe en la tienda de Néstor11 .
Sin embargo, estos benecios sólo se producen si está presente la
moderación. Por ello, cuando el vino es fuerte y deja de ser ἡδύς y στυφώς, si
es un vino σφοδρός y καρωτικός, se convierte en perjudicial. Este es el vino
que Ulises da a Polifemo, y que le permite engañar y cegar al cíclope12 .
En resumen, el tema de este texto es la necesidad de moderación tanto
en la dieta como al tomar vino: una dieta ligera es sana, pero comer no deja
de ser una necesidad para el hombre, incluso si es un héroe homérico. Sólo los
dioses se han librado de la esclavitud del estómago13 . Por otra parte, el vino es
9 Hécuba ofrece vino a su hijo Héctor para aumentar su ardor, pero él lo rechaza, temiendo
que tenga el efecto contrario, y le quite el que ya tiene. Pseudo-Plutarco sólo utiliza el consejo
de Hécuba, "olvidando" citar también los temores del héroe troyano.
10 Ulises convence a Aquiles de la conveniencia de preocuparse de comer y beber antes de
aprestarse al combate, pues el ayuno puede quitar vigor al guerrero. También en esta ocasión el
autor obvia los reparos que expresa Aquiles.
11 En Ilíada 9. 639. Néstor saca de la batalla a Macaón y lo agasaja en su tienda. La esclava
en realidad prepara un brebaje, añadiendo al vino de Pramno queso de oveja rallado y harina. El
vino de Pramno también lo utiliza Circe en el libro X de la Odisea para que los compañeros de
Ulises se olviden de su patria.
12 En el libro IX de la Odisea.
13 Cf. el célebre verso de la Teogonía de Hesíodo, "ποιμένες ἄγραυλοι, κάκ' ἐλέγχεα, γαστέρες
34
Josefa Fernández Zambudio
perjudicial si se bebe de más, o si es un vino fuerte, pero siempre y cuando sea
dulce y suave proporciona energía y valor, ayuda a la φιλοφροσύνη, e incluso
puede curar a los enfermos.
La idea de la moderación, de la necesidad de un comportamiento
μετριότης en todos los ámbitos de la vida se resume en la consigna "nada en
demasía", μηδὲν ἄγαν. Esta idea se aplica a la dieta, a los hábitos de comida y
bebida, tanto en los textos médicos conservados como en el propio Plutarco.
Se trata de una concepción que cuenta con una tradición bien conocida y por
ello me limitaré a exponer algunas ideas generales y textos signicativos, donde
además de las correspondencias de contenido encontramos también un léxico
similar al que aparece en Sobre la vida y poesía de Homero.
La medicina antigua se basa en la búsqueda del equilibrio en el cuerpo
humano: las enfermedades se deben a excesos y la salud es el equilibrio entre
todos los componentes14 . En los textos cientícos se estudia la dieta que cada
enfermo debe seguir para recuperar la salud, y cuándo el vino es perjudicial, pero
también encontramos remedios en los que el vino es uno de los ingredientes15 .
En el Corpus Hippocraticum ya tenemos un tratado que ha sido titulado Περὶ
διαιτῆς ὑγιείνης y proporciona normas para la δίαιτα según el momento del
año y el carácter de cada persona.
Se trata de la misma idea de la necesidad de una dieta sana y la moderación,
que aparece en este texto del Protréptico de Galeno:
ὡς Κόροιβ<ος> ἀνοήτως κατεγνωκότες. ὃ μὲν γὰρ ὑγιεινὴν δίαιταν
ὑποτιθέμενος ἔλεγε πόνοι σιτία ποτὰ ὕπνοι ἀφροδίσια, πάντα μέτρια (17)
El de Queronea también participa de una tradición que era bien conocida
en los círculos cultos de su época. Recordemos que en las Vidas la ación por la
borrachera se tolera sólo cuando sus consecuencias se producen en la intimidad,
pero es inadmisible en la vida pública. Así, Alejandro es ποτικός (4.7), aunque
se le deende de su fama de bebedor porque no descuida los asuntos públicos16 .
Además, Plutarco se recrea en mostrar los efectos de los excesos del vino a
través de anécdotas, y también trata el tema de la moderación teóricamente,
como en este conocido texto del De tuenda sanitate praecepta 17 . Después de
hablar someramente de la dieta, el de Queronea dirige su mirada a los líquidos,
y más concretamente al vino:
πρὸς δὲ τὸν οἶνον ἅπερ Εὐριπίδης πρὸς τὴν Ἀφροδίτην διαλεκτέον
εἴης μοι, μέτριος δέ πως
εἴης, μηδ' ἀπολείποις
οἶνον" (26).
14 Cf. W. D. Smith, 1979.
15 Cf. J. J, 1996.
16 C. A M, 1999.
17 Sobre la comida y la bebida en Plutarco cf. J. F. M M, 1999.
35
Moderación en el simposio en Sobre la vida y poesía de Homero de Pseudo-Plutarco
καὶ γὰρ ποτῶν ὠφελιμώτατόν ἐστι καὶ φαρμάκων ἥδιστον καὶ ὄψων
ἀσικχότατον, ἂν τύχῃ τῆς πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν εὐκρασίας μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς πρὸς τὸ
ὕδωρ. (Mor. 132B)
El tema de la necesidad de moderación reaparece en las Quaestiones
convivales o Charlas de sobremesa a propósito de los usos convenientes en el
banquete. Además, en el libro V la cuestión cuarta discute precisamente un
verso homérico, relativo al vino que Aquiles ofrece a sus amigos en el libro
IX. A pesar del desprecio por la comida y la bebida del que se hace eco Sobre
la vida y poesía de Homero, como hemos visto, el héroe ofrece a sus mejores
amigos un vino ζωρότερον κέραιε, un vino con una mezcla más fuerte. Aquiles
tenía conocimientos de medicina y como tal sabía cuál era la importancia de la
moderación en la dieta en ocasiones, como con los caballos enfermos, pero para
recuperar el vigor tras pasar el día luchando, preere ofrecer un vino fuerte18 :
Ἀχιλλεὺς τῶν θ' ἵππων πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν οἰκείως ἐπεμελεῖτο καὶ τῷ σώματι
τὴν ἐλαφροτάτην δίαιταν, ὡς ὑγιεινοτάτην ἐν τῷ σχολάζειν, παρεσκεύαζεν·
ἄνδρας δ' ἐν μάχῃ καὶ ἀγῶνι δι' ἡμέρας γεγενημένους οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀξιῶν
διαιτᾶν τοῖς ἀργοῦσιν ἐπιτεῖναι τὴν κρᾶσιν ἐκέλευσε.
(Mor. 678A 7-B 1)
La idea subyacente en Sobre la vida y poesía de Homero del vino como
φάρμακον aparece desarrollada en la medicina y en Plutarco: el vino puede ser
tanto un veneno como un remedio19 . La diferencia estriba precisamente en cuál es
la justa medida, en beber (y comer) con moderación. Del mismo modo que en Sobre
la vida... se decía que el vino μέτριος es ὠφέλιμος, Galeno arma que un modo de
vida sano (ὑγιεινή δὶαιτα) incluye la moderación en todos los aspectos, incluidos la
comida y la bebida (σιτία, ποτά). En las Quaestiones Aquiles cura a los caballos, así
como Macaón se reconstituía con vino en la Ilíada según Pseudo-Plutarco.
En conclusión, el texto que hemos presentado pertenece a una tradición
que también encontramos en Plutarco y la medicina griega, y que en último
lugar se relaciona con la famosa sentencia "nada en demasía". Comer y beber
es necesario, incluso tiene efectos beneciosos, pero una cantidad excesiva es
siempre perjudicial.
bi b l i o g r a f í a c i T a d a
A M, C., "Usos indebidos del vino en las obras de Plutarco", in
J. G. M C . (eds.), Plutarco, Dioniso y el vino. Actas del
VI Simposio Español sobre Plutarco (Cádiz, 14-16 de Mayo, 1998),
Madrid, 1999, pp. 83-92.
18 S.-T. T, 1989-1996.
19 Cf. E. C D, 1999.
36
Josefa Fernández Zambudio
B, A., "Porrio: La gruta de las ninfas. Introducción, traducción y
comentario", Percit, 1/18-19 (1968) 403-31.
B, G. N., Plutarchi Chaeronensis Moralia, Leipzig, 1896.
C D, E., "El vino, la medicina y los remedia ebrietatis en los
Moralia de Plutarco", in J. G. M C . (eds.), Plutarco,
Dioniso y el vino. Actas del VI Simposio Español sobre Plutarco (Cádiz,
14-16 de Mayo, 1998), Madrid, 1999, pp. 119-28.
D L, J. M., Las citas de Homero en Plutarco, Cáceres, 2001.
J, J., "Le vin et la médecine dans la Grèce ancienne", REG, 109 (1996)
410-34.
K, J. J. & L, R., Essay on the Life and Poetry of Homer, Atlanta,
1996.
K, J. F., Homer in der Zweiten Sophistik, Uppsala, 1973.
_____ De Homero, Leipzig, 1990.
M P, A., La hospitalidad en la poesía griega arcaica: análisis y valoración
del concepto xénos en Homero, Hesíodo y Píndaro, Murcia, 2002.
M M, J. F., El tema del placer en la obra de Plutarco, Zaragoza,
1999, pp. 109-18.
S, H., De Plutarchi Chaeronensis OMHRIKAIS MELETAIS et de
eiusdem qui fertur Vita Homeri, Gotha, 1899.
S, W.D., e Hippocratic Tradition, Itaca & London, 1979.
T, S.-T., A commentary on Plutarch's Table Talks, I-III, Göteborg,
1989-1996.
W, B., La lingua di Plutarco di Cheronea e gli scritti pseudoplutarchei,
Napoli, 1994.
37
Plato's Symposium and Plutarch's Alcibiades
pl a T o ' s Sy m p o S i u m a n d p l u T a r c h 's al c i b i a D e S
T E. D
University of Reading
Abstract
is paper examines Plutarch's exploitation of Plato's Symposium in chs. 4-7 of the Life of
Alcibiades. It aims to demonstrate that the Symposium is much more than a "source" for the
Alcibiades. Rather the Alcibiades invites an intertextual reading with the Symposium, and
becomes more meaningful when read with the Symposium in mind. In particular, knowledge of
the Symposium reveals how Plutarch has constructed Socrates' attitude to and relationship with
Alcibiades as that of the ideal lover with his beloved.
Plato's Symposium oers perhaps the most vivid, and certainly the most
inuential, picture of Alcibiades to survive from classical antiquity. It is no
surprise, then, that Plutarch should in his Life of Alcibiades draw heavily on
it, as well as on other Platonic texts such as the First Alcibiades and Republic
Book 61 . A full analysis would attempt to trace Plutarch's use in this Life
of all the Platonic texts; indeed it is the way the Alcibiades uses allusions to
multiple Platonic texts, together with material drawn from non-Platonic
sources, especially ucydides and the rhetorical tradition, that makes it so
rewarding and so complex. But the aims of this paper are more limited. I
shall focus solely on the Symposium and shall attempt to show not only the
depth of Plutarch's engagement with that text, especially in chs. 4-7, but also
how the Alcibiades becomes richer and more meaningful if it is read with the
Symposium in mind2 .
e importance of Alcibiades' relationship with Socrates and of the
Platonic texts is made clear right at the start of the Life, where, after dealing
briey with Alcibiades' family, Plutarch makes the surprising claim that
Alcibiades' fame was owed "in no small part" to Socrates' kindness to him; a
little later he cites Plato as a source for the name of Alcibiades' tutor (1.3)3 .
In ch. 3 Plutarch mentions a scandalous story of Alcibiades' running away
from Pericles' house to one of his lovers (3.1); the kind of precocious sexual
behaviour exhibited there might suggest to readers the story of Alcibiades'
failed seduction of Socrates in Smp. 218b-219d4 . At any rate it provides a nice
1 ere are allusions to numerous other Platonic texts in the Alcibiades, including the
Phaedrus, Gorgias, and Apology. Important discussions are in D. A. R, 1966, pp. 39-41
(= repr. 1995, pp. 195-8); C. B. R. P, 1996, pp. xlvii-xlix; 2005, pp. 116-25; D. G,
1999, pp. 270-6; T. E. Du, 1999, pp. 224-7; and, on the use made of both Plato and other
Socratic writers, F. A, 2005.
2 Cf. C. B. R. P, 2005, p. 125: "In Alcibiades, then, pervasive intertextuality with Plato
lends depth and resonance to the sort of associations which we saw in Plutarch's other works,
and draws the reader into tracing how rich is the possibility of learning from Socrates' example
– and also how dicult it can be". Cf. also C. B. R. P, 2008, p. 548.
3 e reference is to Alc. 1, 122b.
4 Alcibiades' reference to Marsyas, the inventor of the ute, in 2.6 may recall his comparison
link to the theme of the rivalry between Socrates and Alcibiades' other lovers,
who compete for inuence over him, which lls chs. 4-7 of the Life.
Plutarch begins by noting the strong contrast between the motivations of
the two groups: they are "awestruck" (ἐκπεπληγμένοι) at his beauty5 , whereas
Socrates does not stop merely at such external attributes; indeed Socrates' love
is evidence of Alcibiades' "potential for virtue" (τῆς πρὸς ἀρετὴν εὐφυΐας ),
which he could see "hinted at in his appearance and shining through". is
contrast, between those interested in a beautiful boy for his looks alone and
those interested in fostering his moral development, is central in Platonic and
post-Platonic discussions of love, and exemplied in Socrates' behaviour to
Alcibiades in the First Alcibiades, which is clearly in mind here6 .
Plutarch now describes, in a passage heavily inuenced by Republic 6, how
Socrates tried to protect Alcibiades from the corrupting atteries of his other
lovers (4.1)7 . Plutarch continues, giving Socrates motivation: "For" [sc. Socrates
thought] fortune never so surrounded or fenced anyone o with so-called good
things8 that he becomes invulnerable to philosophy and unreachable by words
which have boldness and bite" (ὥστ' ἄτρωτον ὑπὸ φιλοσοφίας γενέσθαι καὶ
λόγοις ἀπρόσιτον παρρησίαν καὶ δηγμὸν ἔχουσιν)9 . e metaphor of biting
to describe the eect of outspoken criticism, is known from elsewhere in
Plutarch10 . Its use here might make one think of the story of Alcibiades' literal
biting of his opponent in a wrestling match in 2.2-3; this time it is he that is
bitten, by philosophy. But it also draws on Alcibiades' claim in Smp. 217e-218a,
of Socrates to Marsyas in Smp. 215a-216c. e story of Alcibiades' killing one of his attendants
(ἀκολουθούντων mss) or servants ( ἀκολούθων Cobet) at a wrestling ground (3.1) might also
bring to mind Alcibiades' wrestling with Socrates before his attempted seduction, as well as the
attendant who used to accompany him on his meetings with Socrates (217a) and the ἀκόλουθοι
mentioned at his entrance to the party (212c-d); cf. also the ἀκόλουθοι in . 6.28 who inform
on Alcibiades' profanation of the Mysteries.
5 is recalls Alcibiades' words in Smp. 215d, where he declares that he and everyone else
are awestruck (ἐκπεπληγμένοι) by Socrates' words; the interests of Alcibiades' lovers are in a
less high-minded direction. ere may also here be an allusion to the reaction of Charmides'
admirers to his physical beauty (Charm. 154c), suggesting a parallel between Alcibiades and
Charmides.
6 For Socrates as interested in improving Alcibiades' soul rather than merely possessing his
body, see e.g. Alc. 1 131e; Aeschines, Alc. fr. VI A 53.26-27 Giannantoni = 11 Ditmar; cf. Plato,
Prt. 309c. Xenophon states this as a general principle of Socrates in Xen., Mem. 4.1.2 and has
Socrates himself argue that love of the soul is more noble than love of the body in Xen., Smp .
8.1-41.
7 See Rep. 491d-492a and 493e-5b: see below, nn. 9, 30, 35, 44, and C. B. R. P, 1996,
p. xlviii; 2005, pp. 120-1; T. E. D, 1999, pp. 224-7; D. G, 1999, pp. 219-20, 272-3.
8 Τοῖς λεγομένοις ἀγαθοῖς: an allusion to Rep. 6: the philosophical nature is corrupted and
diverted from philosophy by τὰ λεγόμεθα ἀγαθά, dened rst as "beauty, wealth, strength of
body, inuential family connections in the city and all such things" (491c) and later as "wealth
and all such paraphernalia" (495a).
9 Possibly also an allusion to Smp. 219e, where Alcibiades notes that Socrates was
invulnerable (ἄτρωτος) to money; Socrates knows that no-one is invulnerable to the superior
power of philosophy.
10 "Biting" παρρησία : De aud . 47a; De adul. 55c-d; 59d; 68f-69a; Phoc. 2.3; Per . 15.1 (with P.
A. S, 1989, ad loc.); Praec. ger. 810c; fr. 203 Sandbach.
39
Plato's Symposium and Plutarch's Alcibiades
that the eect of Socrates' words on him was worse than a snake-bite: only one
who has been bitten by a snake can imagine the pain. "I have been bitten by
a more painful creature and in the most painful way one could be bitten - in
my heart or soul or whatever one should call it, wounded and bitten by the
words of philosophy" (πληγείς τε καὶ δηχθεὶς ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λόγων ).
Such words, he declares, "adhere more ercely than a viper, whenever they grip
the soul of a young and not untalented (μὴ ἀφυοῦς) man". Plato's Alcibiades
goes on to appeal to his fellow-symposiasts, naming six of them, who had
all experienced what he calls "philosophic madness and frenzy". Memory of
that passage underlines how painful Alcibiades' experience of being exposed
to Socrates' philosophic probing was. It also explains and lends more force to
Plutarch's Socrates' belief that no-one is invulnerable to philosophy.
Plutarch now talks, in a passage enriched by further allusions to the
Republic, of the eorts of Alcibiades' atterers to prevent him from listening
to Socrates, though in fact, despite this, Alcibiades did let Socrates approach
him (4.2). Alcibiades, Plutarch continues, "listened to the words of a lover
who was not hunting unmanly pleasure (ἡδονὴν ἄνανδρον) nor begging for
kisses and touches . . ." (4.3). e insistence that Socrates was not interested
in Alcibiades' body is probably meant to bring to mind Socrates' rebung of
Alcibiades' sexual advances in the Symposium. e phrase "unmanly pleasure"
recalls Alcibiades' wonder, after his rejection, at Socrates' "nature, self-control
and manliness (ἀνδρείαν)" (Smp. 219d). It invokes a set of ideas, common in
ancient thought, which associated love of pleasure with the feminine. Plutarch's
words are perhaps not to be taken as implying a criticism of pederasty per se;
rather the point here is about the goal for which a relationship with a boy is
pursued: the courting of a free-born boy for sexual gratication alone, without
any educational or moral intent, was in the Classical period, as in Plutarch's
own, seen as unacceptable and had in fact been condemned in no uncertain
terms by Pausanias in his speech in the Symposium (183d-185b). Socrates,
then, was not interested in Alcibiades merely for physical pleasure; instead he
wanted to improve Alcibiades morally. e claim that Socrates was not seeking
"unmanly pleasure" is also a point about the eects of Socrates' love on Alcibiades.
Socrates' love was not one that "unmanned" him, through encouraging soft-
living, love of pleasure and luxury – the kind of things that his other lovers
oered (cf. 6.1, πολλὰς ἡδονὰς ὑποβάλλουσιν). Rather, it toughened and
hardened him. Plutarch will return to the hardening eect of Socrates' love in
ch. 6, where he compares Socrates' treatment of Alcibiades, when he returns
from his other lovers, to thrusting iron which has been softened by heat into
cold water. He will also demonstrate in ch. 7, when he deals with Socrates
and Alcibiades' service together on campaign, that Socrates' love really did
encourage Alcibiades to be a man, to ght bravely in the battle-line and not
shirk from danger11 .
11 e notion that a lover might want to keep his beloved from being a man — a reversal
of the usual justications of pederasty for its educational benets — is set out in Socrates' one-
sided attack on love in his speech in Phaedrus 238e-241d: a lover will want to make his beloved
Plutarch is here, then, making explicit what emerges implicitly from
Alcibiades' narrative in the Symposium: that Socrates' love, unlike that of his
other suitors, neither sought pleasure as its goal nor unmanned its object.
Instead, Plutarch continues, Socrates was a lover, " . . . who tried to expose the
cracked elements of Alcibiades' soul and squeeze his empty and foolish pride"
(ἐλέγχοντος τὰ σαθρὰ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτοῦ καὶ πιεζοῦντος τὸν κενὸν καὶ ἀνόητον
τῦφον). is is loosely based on Smp. 215c-216a, where Alcibiades speaks of the
powerful eects of Socrates' λόγοι on him, which made him cry and reduced
him to a feeling of inadequacy and shame, and implanted desires both to listen
and to run away. e word ἐλέγχοντος is particularly appropriate for Socrates
and suggests his question-and-answer method of teaching, which often resulted
in the ignorance of his interlocutor being exposed, as it does to Alcibiades in the
Platonic First Alcibiades 12 . e wrestling metaphor implied in πιεζοῦντος (cf.
2.2) is also particularly appropriate; it brings to mind the wrestling of Socrates
and Alcibiades in the Symposium, which Alcibiades hoped would lead to his
seduction; instead of sex he gets a psychological going-over at Socrates' hands13 .
Despite this rough treatment, Plutarch goes on, "Alcibiades thought that
Socrates' business (πρᾶγμα) was in reality a service of the gods directed towards
the care and salvation of the young" (4.4). e phrasing brings to mind, and
implicitly refutes, the charges on which Socrates was tried and condemned,
that he corrupted the young and denied the existence of the gods14 ; it also
recalls Socrates' own claim in the Apology, "I think that there has never been
a greater good in the city than my own service to the god" (Ap. 30a). But
the word πρᾶγμα alludes to the lead-up to the failed seduction scene in the
Symposium, where Alcibiades says that he invited Socrates to dinner to nd
out "what his business (πρᾶγμα) was" (Smp. 217c)15 . In the rest of Alcibiades'
speech in the Symposium we have a picture of a man profoundly aected by
Socrates, though it is not quite clear how deep this goes; Plutarch is here
a little more clear and explicit. Alcibiades himself now recognises the divine
nature of Socrates' mission, and this not only shows the profound spiritual and
intellectual eect that Socrates had on the young man, but also conrms, as
Plutarch puts it, Alcibiades' own "potential for virtue" (4.1, 4.2).
weaker, poorer and more isolated, so he can master him more fully. Cf. esp. 239c-d: "We should
now see how he who has been forced to pursue pleasure rather than good will care for the
body of whomever he masters. He will plainly pursue someone soft (μαλθακόν) and weak, not
brought up in the clear sunshine but under a mingled shade, accustomed not to manly toils and
healthy sweat but a soft and unmanly way of living (ἁπαλῆς καὶ ἀνάνδρου διαίτης) . . . In war
and in other important crises such a body makes the enemy take heart but makes friends and
even lovers afraid." Cf. Amat. 749f.-750a.
12 C. B. R. P, 2005, p. 118.
13 T. E. D, 1999, pp. 217-8; C. B. R. P, 2005, p. 118. e language of wrestling
can also be used metaphorically for sex and that may add to the resonance here: e.g. Ar., Peace
896-898; Eccl. 964-5; ps.-Luc., Golden Ass 7-11; AP 12.206, 222.
14 Plato, Ap. 23c-d; 24b-26b; 30b; 33c-34b. Cf. Xen., Mem. 1.1.1; 1.2.1, 8; Ap. 10.
15 It also recalls the question asked by the young Alcibiades in the Platonic First Alcibiades
(104d) about why Socrates kept bothering him, "For I really do wonder what your business is"
(ὅ τι ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ σὸν πρᾶγμα ). For Socrates' πρᾶγμα, cf. also cf. Ap. 20c; Crito 53c-d.
41
Plato's Symposium and Plutarch's Alcibiades
at we are meant to be thinking here of the Symposium, and of the failed
seduction scene, is conrmed by Plutarch's description immediately afterwards
of how Alcibiades "despised himself, but admired him, loved his friendliness
but was ashamed in the face of his virtue" (καταφρονῶν δ' αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ,
θαυμάζων δ' ἐκεῖνον, ἀγαπῶν δὲ τὴν φιλοφροσύνην, αἰσχυνόμενος δὲ τὴν
ἀρετήν). is is based on the emotions that Alcibiades confesses to feeling
in the Symposium after his failure (219d-e): he thought himself "insulted, and
yet was amazed at this man's nature, chastity and manliness" (ἡγούμενον μὲν
ἠτιμάσθαι, ἀγάμενον δὲ τὴν τούτου φύσιν τε καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ ἀνδρείαν).
But Plutarch has made explicit what is implicit in Alcibiades' words in the
Symposium, that is, his self-loathing, and has also drawn the notion of Alcibiades'
shame before Socrates from earlier in his speech (216a-b). Indeed, in the
Symposium Alcibiades had described how Socrates "despised", i.e. counted as
unimportant, his beauty (216e; 219c). Here Alcibiades extends that to a more
thorough-going self-despising.
e Symposium, as we have noticed, leaves it unclear to what extent
Alcibiades' feelings went beyond passionate obsession, curiosity and mortication
at having his beauty held at nought, though his speech in praise of Socrates does
suggest that he had some appreciation for Socrates' uniqueness and wisdom.
Plutarch is much more denite in his assertion that Alcibiades really did love
Socrates back, claiming (4.4) in a quotation from the Phaedrus (255d), that
Alcibiades acquired "an image of love . . . in return for love". Socrates' love, then,
was a true, moral and educative one, and Alcibiades, to his credit, returned that
love16 . "e result", Plutarch continues, "was that everyone was amazed when
they saw him dining with Socrates, and wrestling with him and camping with
him (συνδειπνοῦντα καὶ συμπαλαίοντα καὶ συσκηνοῦντα), while to all his
other lovers he was harsh and hard to get to grips with . . ." In the Symposium
Alcibiades had talked of his wrestling and eating with Socrates as part of his
strategy of seducing him (συνεγινόμην. . συνημερεύσας . . . συγγυμνάζεσθαι
. . . συνδειπνεῖν: 217b-d)17 . Here Plutarch uses this shared life as evidence of
Alcibiades' love for Socrates, which causes the amazement of everyone else18 .
Plutarch thus transforms what in Alcibiades' mouth had been a tale of sexual
desire and failed seduction into evidence of a life lived together.
Plutarch goes on to contrast Alcibiades' love for Socrates, and his humility
in his presence, with his arrogant behaviour to other lovers, citing two examples
of such arrogant behaviour (4.4-5.5)19 . One of the examples which Plutarch
16 e Symposium makes clear Alcibiades' love for Socrates (cf. 222c). But there it is a
passionate, obsessive and shocking love, in which Alcibiades takes the role of the erastes, though
much younger than Socrates. Here the suggestion is of a more calm and chaste love. Cf. C. B.
R. P, 2005, p. 119.
17 e notion that Socrates did not regard himself as above his pupils but lived alongside them
seems to have been an important one: cf. An seni. 796d, συμπίνων καὶ συστρατευόμενος ἐνίοις
καὶ συναγοράζων.
18 Note the sequence: they were rst awe-struck at Alcibiades' beauty (4.1); now they are
amazed that he hangs around with Socrates (4.4).
19 e thought is familiar from the First Alcibiades, where, as here, there is a contrast between
mentions, the incident of Alcibiades' outrageous treatment of Anytus (4.5-6),
may have been partly inspired by the description of Alcibiades' entry in the
Symposium. e setting is the same: a symposium, to which Alcibiades arrives late
and drunk, "stands at the door" (ταῖς θύραις ἐπιστάς; cf. Smp. 212d, ἐπιστῆναι
ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας), and interrupts proceedings by his outrageous behaviour (cf.
esp. Smp. 212d-e)20 . But whereas his entry in the Symposium was greeted with
indulgence, the consequences here are much more serious: the other guests talk
of Alcibiades' hubris and arrogance (ὑβριστικῶς καὶ ὑπερηφάνως) – the rst
appearance of accusations which will later in the Life become more frequent;
and Anytus, though he indulges Alcibiades now, will later (as the readers are
presumably meant to know) be one of Socrates' accusers. One can certainly
see how Alcibiades' behaviour here might have lent weight to accusations that
Socrates corrupted the young men under his tutelage. And that the mention
of Anytus might bring these associations to mind is suggested by the fact
that, when Plutarch tells the same story in his Dialogue on love, direct allusion
is made to Anytus' later role as Socrates' prosecutor (Amat. 762c-d)21 . is
anecdote, then, like the next one in which Alcibiades forces a lover to bid for
an expensive tax-farming contract (5.1-5), shows, as Plutarch makes clear in
ch. 6, that Socrates' inuence on Alcibiades was limited and did not aect
a complete transformation; indeed, Alcibiades' arrogant behaviour may have
contributed to his teacher's prosecution and death.
In 6.1 we return to Socrates' love for Alcibiades. Here, as in 4.1-2,
Alcibiades wavers between devotion to Socrates and the attractions of his other
lovers, who oer him pleasure and play on his ambition. Plutarch is once again
drawing heavily on the Republic and First Alcibiades, but the clearest allusion
is to Alcibiades' speech in the Symposium on the eect which Socrates had
on him (esp. 215d-216c). Despite his many rivals for Alcibiades' aections,
Plutarch begins, "Socrates' love would sometimes master (ἐκράτει) him, when
because of his good nature (δι' εὐφυΐαν) Socrates' words would touch him
and twist his heart and force out tears" (ἁπτομένων τῶν λόγων αὐτοῦ καὶ
τὴν καρδίαν στρεφόντων καὶ δάκρυα ἐκχεόντων). is is an adaptation of
Alcibiades' attitude to Socrates and to his "other lovers": Alc. 1 103a-104c; cf. Plu., Alc. 4.1; 4.4;
5.1; 6.1.
20 e theme of Alcibiades' drunken processions was a familiar one in declamation,
inuenced ultimately, one assumes, by the Symposium, and by the accusations that he was
involved in the mutilation of the herms and profanation of the mysteries (. 6.28, which
mentions drinking). Libanius, Decl. 12.20 has him arrive drunk to see Timon (πρὸς ἑσπέραν
ἐπέστη μεθύων Ἀλκιβιάδης), and going on a komos with "torches from the mysteries" (Decl. fr.
50, title). Several speeches imagine him being prosecuted for hubris after going on a komos to
where the Spartan prisoners from Sphacteria are held (Apsines, RG 1.348.4-7 [= 242 6 Spengel
and Hammer]; Syrian, Scholia ad Hermogenis librum Περὶ στάσεων 4.601.15-17 Walz). Cf. R.
K, 1915, pp. 35-6.
21 Cf. C. B. R. P, 1996, p. xlviii; 2005, pp. 123-4; R. L. H, 2004, pp. 103-4. As
Pelling notes, the reminiscence of Ap. 30a (Socrates' speech at his trial) in 4.4 ensures that the
trial is in our minds. Both Socrates' detractors and defenders claimed that Socrates was executed
for the behaviour of his pupils, especially Alcibiades and Critias, as much as for anything he
himself said or did (e.g. Xen., Mem. 1.2.12-48).
43
Plato's Symposium and Plutarch's Alcibiades
Alcibiades' words at Smp. 215e, "For my heart leaps, and tears pour out under
the inuence of his words" (ἥ τε καρδία πηδᾷ καὶ δάκρυα ἐκχεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν
λόγων τῶν τούτου)22 , but Plutarch has added στρεφόντων ("twisting"), which
gains particular force because of the wrestling metaphor which follows in 6.2
(cf. also πιεζοῦντος in 4.3); it also looks back to the earlier story of Alcibiades'
wrestling in 2.2-3: though in real wrestling Alcibiades could beat his opponent
through a trick, emotionally and intellectually Socrates outwrestled him23 .
Plutarch has also added from the Republic the notion of Alcibiades' εὐφυΐα,
prominent already in ch. 4 (cf. Smp. 218a, μὴ ἀφυοῦς). Here, as in ch. 4, it
provides an explanation for why Socrates took such an interest in Alcibiades;
it also explains why Socrates' words had such an eect on Alcibiades: it was to
his credit that he allowed Socrates to master him.
In ch. 4, when discussing the tough treatment Alcibiades received at
Socrates' hands, Plutarch had quoted a line of a lost play, probably by the
tragedian Phrynichos, "a cock, he crouched down like a slave, lowering his
wing"24 . e image is of a defeated bird in a cock-ght, which seems to have
been called a δοῦλος (4.4)25 . Now Plutarch presses the metaphor of slavery
further: "ere were times", he continues (6.1), "when Alcibiades surrendered
himself to his atterers too, who oered many pleasures, and he would slip
away from Socrates and like a runaway slave (δραπετεύων) would be quite
simply hunted down, only towards Socrates having the experience of shame
and fear" (πρὸς μόνον ἐκεῖνον ἔχων τὸ αἰδεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι) (6.1). e
notion of Alcibiades as a runaway slave draws on his speech in the Symposium,
where he describes himself as "in a state of slavery" to Socrates (215e: ὡς
ἀνδραποδωδῶς διακειμένου), and as trying to avoid listening to him but
to ee instead. When he is in Socrates' presence, he admits his deciencies
and feels ashamed: "I experienced only with this man, what no-one would
have thought me capable of – shame before anyone. Only before him am
I ashamed"26 . But when he leaves Socrates' presence he is "defeated by the
honour which comes from the multitude". "So I run away from him and ee
(δραπετεύω οὖν αὐτὸν καὶ φεύγω ), and when I see him I am ashamed as I
think of my former admissions" (216b-c)27 . But whereas Plato left it vague
22 Noted by D. A. R, 1966, p. 40 (= repr. 1995, 196). Plutarch also paraphrases this
passage in Prof. in Virt. 84d, Quomodo adulat. 69f, and Cat. Ma. 7.1
23 Στρέφω can be used of inicting pain in general (e.g. Plato, Rep. 330e), but also of twisting
an adversary in wrestling: e.g. Pollux 3.155; M. B. P, 1982, pp. 140-1. ἀπωλίσθανε in
6.1 ("used to slip away") may suggest slipping out of an opponent's grip in wrestling. e word
is frequent in Plutarch though otherwise always used literally, but cf. Epict. 3.25.1 (ἀνάλαβε
κἀκεῖνα ὧν ἀπώλισθες).
24 Or, "he crouched down like a slave-cock . . .": ἔπτηξ' ἀλέκτωρ δοῦλος ὣς κλίνας πτερόν.
25 Cf. Ar., Birds 71-72, ὄρνις ἔγωγε δοῦλος, with N. D, 1995, p. 158. Its application
to the young Alcibiades suggests both his strutting and preening (cf. 1.8; 16.1) and the totality
of his humiliation at Socrates' hands. For cocks seen as symbolising strutting condence, cf.
Dem. 54.9.
26 πέπονθα δὲ πρὸς τοῦτον μόνον ἀνθρώπων, ὃ οὐκ ἄν τις οἴοιτο ἐν ἐμοὶ ἐνεῖναι, τὸ
αἰσχύνεσθαι ὁντινοῦν· ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦτον μόνον αἰσχύνομαι.
27 D. A. R, 1966, p. 40 (= repr. 1995, p. 196) notes the parallels with 216b.
where Alcibiades runs o to (though the mention of the honour which comes
from the multitude is suggestive), Plutarch is specic: to his other lovers, "who
suggest many pleasures" (6.1).
But was pleasure all they oered? Plutarch has already hinted that it
was not merely pleasure when he calls them "atterers" (κόλαξι). He now
explores this, and the contrast with what Socrates oers, further. First he
quotes a saying of the Stoic philosopher Cleanthes, that he used words to
attract his beloved, whereas his rivals could use the physical pleasures of the
body. As before, knowledge of Alcibiades' speech in the Symposium deepens
the implications of this passage: Cleanthes, Plutarch says, claimed that
"someone loved by him [i.e. Cleanthes] had to be mastered by the ears, but
provided many holds to his rivals in love which were out of bounds to him
. . ." (6.2). e image is once again of wrestling28 . But Cleanthes' saying also
recalls Alcibiades' words in Smp. 216a: if he were willing to "lend Socrates
his ears" (παρέχειν τὰ ὦτα) he would not be able to resist his arguments, and
would have to admit that "I neglect myself while attending to the aairs of the
Athenians". "erefore", Alcibiades said, "I withhold my ears (ἐπισχόμενος
τὰ ὦτα) as from the Sirens and make o, in order not to grow old, sitting
here beside him". We have already heard of the attempts of Socrates' rivals
to prevent Alcibiades from listening to Socrates (4.2)29 . Memory of the
Symposium passage conrms that Alcibiades was not an altogether willing
or cooperative beloved. It also suggests the emotional turmoil in which
Alcibiades found himself: he is deeply aected by philosophical talk and
deeply attracted to Socrates; he wants to listen but, like Odysseus before
the Sirens, he knows how dangerous listening to Socrates is30 . Furthermore,
memory of the Symposium passage also makes clear that it was Alcibiades'
political ambitions which pulled him away from Socrates; thus although
Plutarch has talked of the "pleasures" his other lovers oered (6.1), and the
saying of Cleanthes was about the pleasures of the esh providing rival
attractions to the words of the philosopher, we know that the stronger pull
was Alcibiades' political ambition, which he feared Socrates would make him
want to give up. Indeed Plutarch now makes this point explicitly: "Alcibiades
was of course susceptible to pleasures too" (ἦν μὲν ἀμέλει καὶ πρὸς ἡδονὰς
ἀγώγιμος); however (οὐ μὴν ἀλλά) it was rather through taking hold of his
love of honour and glory that those who were trying to corrupt him began
28 An anecdote about Zeno uses the same metaphor: "the right hold to use on a philosopher
is by the ears (ἐκ τῶν ὤτων). So persuade me and drag me o by them" (Diog. Laert. 7.24 =
SVF 1.278). ere is perhaps here a punning reference to a type of kiss, associated particularly
with parents and children, which involved holding by the ears: De aud. 38c; Pollux 10.100; Tib.
2.5.92; Aristaenetus, Ep. 1.24; Clem. Alex., Strom. 5.1.13.1.
29. . . ἀποκλειόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν πρὸς χάριν ἐξομιλούντων εἰσακοῦσαι τοῦ νουθετοῦντος καὶ
παιδεύοντος, which alludes to Rep. 494d and 559d-560a.
30 Plutarch himself hints that Alcibiades might be seen as Odysseus by applying the
word πολύτροπος to his fortunes (2.1) and his cleverness (24.5). Like Odysseus Alcibiades
will wander in exile and desire to return home (cf. 32.1). Coriolanus was compared directly to
Odysseus (Cor. 22.4). Cf. D. G, 1999, pp. 26-7; 269-70.
45
Plato's Symposium and Plutarch's Alcibiades
thrusting him prematurely into grandiose thinking, convincing him that, as
soon as he entered upon public life . . ." (6.3)31 .
e result of such attery was that Alcibiades was made conceited, and
Socrates was forced to do some tough-talking and to humble and crush him
(6.5). As we have already noted, the metaphor which Plutarch uses here, of iron
which has been softened in the re and is then condensed and hardened in cold
water, suggests very well both the painfulness of Socrates' shock-treatment of
Alcibiades, but also that his love had the eect of toughening Alcibiades and
making a man of him (cf. 4.3). Socrates, Plutarch continues, made Alcibiades
understand "how much he lacked and how incomplete he was in virtue"
(ἡλίκων ἐνδεής ἐστι καὶ ἀτελὴς πρὸς ἀρετήν ). e reference to Alcibiades'
incompleteness in virtue recalls 4.1 where Socrates had recognised Alcibiades'
"potential for virtue" (εὐφυΐα πρὸς ἀρετήν). e return to this notion here not
only provides a sense of closure to the section before we move on to a cluster
of anecdotes, but also expresses neatly the Socratic method; the rst and most
important step for the gifted pupil was for him to acknowledge how truly
ignorant he really was32 . e wording also recalls Alcibiades' speech in the
Symposium, where he had declared, "He forces me to admit that, although I am
sorely in need (πολλοῦ ἐνδεής 33 ), yet I neglect myself . . ." (216a)34.
Several anecdotes follow, which seem to show Alcibiades' desire for
learning, but also his arrogance and ambition (7.1-3). We then hear two stories
about Socrates and Alcibiades at Potidaea and Delium, the source for which is
once again Alcibiades' speech in the Symposium (7.3-6 ~ 220d-221c). e two
campaigns were actually separated by some eight years, and Delium (424 BC)
postdates Alcibiades' marriage, which is discussed in the next chapter (ch. 8)35 .
But in the Symposium Alcibiades talks about Delium directly after Potidaea, and
Plutarch follows that order. He has, however, made some signicant changes36 .
31 Plutarch cites in evidence ucydides' famous words about the "παρανομία of Alcibiades'
lifestyle as regards his body" (6.3 ~ . 6.15.4). For Plutarch's use of this quotation, see C. B. R .
P, 1992, pp. 18-9; 1996, pp. xlix-li.
32 Contrast Coriolanus at Cor. 18.2-3, 21.1, who refuses to be humble when some humility
would help.
33 ἐνδεής can also mean "inferior" (LSJ b.3): the atterers persuade Alcibiades that he will
"put in the shade" other generals and orators, and "surpass" even Pericles (6.4) but Socrates
shatters his illusions.
34 It also recalls the start of the First Alcibiades, where Socrates tells a younger Alcibiades
"you say that you are not in need of anyone for anything" (οὐδενὸς φῂς ἀνθρώπων ἐνδεὴς εἶναι
εἰς οὐδέν; 104a). Both parallels are noted by D. A. R, 1966, p. 40 (= repr. 1995, p. 196).
ere is also allusion to Rep. 491d: if a plant lacks the proper food and environment, the stronger
it is the more it falls short of perfection (ἐνδεῖ τῶν πρεπόντων); so with talented men deprived
of philosophical education. Cf. Cor. 1.3, alluding to the Rep. passage: a good nature which is
lacking in education (παιδείας ἐνδεής) is unstable.
35 e battle associated with the Potidaea campaign is probably the one fought in 432 before
the siege of Potidaea began, in which the Athenians lost their general and 150 hoplites, not
counting allies (. 1.62-63). See K. J. D, 1980, p. 165.
36 He has also introduced some parallels with the Coriolanus. e mention that Socrates
and A. "distinguished themselves" (ἠρίστευσαν) and the discussion of the prize (ἀριστεῖον)
recall the description of the young and ambitious Coriolanus, who is said to have "joined
He describes Socrates as Alcibiades' tent-mate and comrade in the battle-line
(σύσκηνον...καὶ παραστάτην ) (7.3; cf. 4.4, συσκηνοῦντα). is is Plutarch's
embellishment; in Symp 219e Alcibiades says merely that they ate together;
indeed, they were from dierent tribes, so may have had to camp separately
and were almost certainly brigaded in dierent hoplite units37 . But having
them ght together perhaps draws on another part of the Symposium, before
Alcibiades' entry: Phaedrus' speech in Smp. 178e-179b. ere, in arguing for
the blessings that pederastic love brings, Phaedrus imagines pairs of erastai and
paidika ghting side by side, defending each other on the battleeld. Plutarch
thus assimilates Alcibiades and Socrates to this kind of idealised pederastic
couple38 .
Plutarch's description of Socrates' saving Alcibiades at Potidaea, and of
the award of the prize for valour to Alcibiades (7.4-5), is close to Alcibiades'
words in the Symposium (220d-221c)39 . But Plutarch's version is more vivid,
as he creates a picture of Socrates standing guard (προέστη καὶ ἤμυνε) over
a fallen Alcibiades. Furthermore, the term ἤμυνε recalls 4.1, where Socrates
wanted to protect Alcibiades and not allow him to be corrupted (ἀμύνειν καὶ
μὴ περιορᾶν . . .). Here Socrates' protective role, exercised in the physical rather
than spiritual dimension, is made concrete40 . Plutarch's version of the award
of the prize is also more vivid and dramatic than the Platonic original41 ; the
exploits to exploits (ἀριστείαις ἀριστείας) and added spoils to spoils" (4.3). e eagerness of A.'s
commanders to give him the crown and suit of armour and Socrates' testimony on his behalf
recalls Coriolanus' commanders, who were "always striving with their predessors to honour
him and to surpass in their testimonials (marturiva")". "From none of the numerous conicts
in which Rome was involved did Coriolanus return uncrowned or without a prize". Alcibiades,
then, under Socrates' inuence, is as brave on the battleeld and as decorated as the soldierly
Coriolanus. For other parallels, see nn. 32, 34, 40 and 46.
37 Cf. P. K, 2007, p. 164.
38 Plutarch is here of course making more explicit what was implicit already in Plato:
Alcibiades' description of Socrates saving him in Smp. 220d-e would itself have brought
Phaedrus' speech to mind. e notion of pairs of lovers ghting side by side became reality
in the early fourth century (i.e. around the time when Plato was writing the Symposium) in
ebes' so-called Sacred Band; Xen., Smp. 8.32 mentions the Sacred Band in his discussion
of pederasty; Plutarch in his discussion of the Sacred Band in Pel. 18-19 refers to Phaedrus'
speech (Smp. 179a), as well as to the Phaedrus itself (255b) (18.6); in Pel. 17.13 he quotes from
Phaedrus' speech (Symp. 178d): after Leuctra the other Greeks realised that it was not Sparta
which produced good ghters, but wherever young men αἰσχύνεσθαι τοῖς αἰσχροῖς καὶ τολμᾶν
ἐπὶ τοῖς καλοῖς. Cf. Amat. 761b.
39 In particular, Plutarch's τοῦ δ' Ἀλκιβιάδου τραύματι περιπεσόντος ὁ Σωκράτης προέστη
καὶ ἤμυνε, καὶ μάλιστα δὴ προδήλως ἔσωσεν αὐτὸν μετὰ τῶν ὅπλων is closely based on Smp.
220d-e: οὐδεὶς ἄλλος ἐμὲ ἔσωσεν ἀνθρώπων ἢ οὗτος, τετρωμένον οὐκ ἐθέλων ἀπολιπεῖν,
ἀλλὰ συνδιέσωσε καὶ τὰ ὅπλα καὶ αὐτὸν ἐμέ.
40 Contrast Coriolanus' lonely death without any one to protect him: προσήμυνεν οὐδεὶς
τῶν παρόντων ( Cor. 39.8). For other parallels between Alc. 7 and the Coriolanus, see T. E. D,
1999, pp. 217-8.
41 Plu., Alc. 7.5: ἐπεὶ δ' οἱ στρατηγοὶ διὰ τὸ ἀξίωμα τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ σπουδάζοντες ἐφαίνοντο
περιθεῖναι τὴν δόξαν, ὁ Σωκράτης βουλόμενος αὔξεσθαι τὸ φιλότιμον ἐν τοῖς καλοῖς αὐτοῦ,
πρῶτος ἐμαρτύρει καὶ παρεκάλει στεφανοῦν ἐκεῖνον καὶ διδόναι τὴν πανοπλίαν. Plato, Smp.
220e: καὶ ἐγὼ μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ τότε ἐκέλευον σοὶ διδόναι τἀριστεῖα τοὺς στρατηγούς ...
47
Plato's Symposium and Plutarch's Alcibiades
imperfects ἐμαρτύρει καὶ παρεκάλει draw the reader into the scene, as though
we were watching it happen – a device typical of Plutarchan narrative42 . e
idea that the generals were inuenced by Alcibiades' "rank in society" (ἀξίωμα)
is in Plato, but in Plutarch it gains extra point as it, like ἤμυνε, recalls 4.1,
where Socrates' desire to protect Alcibiades comes from his fear of the eect of
Alcibiades' "wealth and rank" (ἀξίωμα), and of those who, as Plutarch puts it,
"rushed to lay hold of him with atteries and favours"43 . us for Plutarch the
generals' desire to curry favour with Alcibiades becomes part of this process
of attery.
Plutarch has introduced two other changes44 . First, he omits Alcibiades'
claim that he himself had urged the generals to award Socrates the crown. is
may be because Plutarch simply judged Alcibiades' claim unreliable (he would
say that, wouldn't he?). At any rate, in Plutarch's telling, the sequence and its
implications are simpler: Socrates deserved the prize but urged the generals
to give it to Alcibiades; Socrates is the protector, educator and champion,
Alcibiades the recipient of Socrates' kindness (cf. 1.3) and protection45 . Secondly
Plutarch inserts a motive for Socrates' championing of Alcibiades' cause: he
"wanted his [Alcibiades'] ambition in ne things (τὸ φιλότιμον ἐν τοῖς καλοῖς
αὐτοῦ) to increase". at is, he wanted to direct in a worthy direction the
ambition which has been such a feature of the early chapters of the Life (esp.
2.1) and which his atterers played on (6.4)46 . e phrase thus presupposes
that Alcibiades' ambition might well be aimed at an unworthy goal, and
ἀλλὰ γὰρ τῶν στρατηγῶν πρὸς τὸ ἐμὸν ἀξίωμα ἀποβλεπόντων καὶ βουλομένων ἐμοὶ διδόναι
τἀριστεῖα, αὐτὸς προθυμότερος ἐγένου τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐμὲ λαβεῖν ἢ σαυτόν.
42 E.g. Alc. 5.5; 14.12; 20.1; 25.2; 32.3; Pyrrh. 28.1-3, 5-7; 29.5-6. Smyth §1898 labels this
the "imperfect of description': "e imperfect often has a dramatic or panoramic force; it enables
the reader to follow the course of events as they occurred, as if he were a spectator of the scene
depicted". On Plutarch's tendency to use imperfects in narrative, see T. E. D, forthcoming.
43 φοβούμενος δὲ τὸν πλοῦτον καὶ τὸ ἀξίωμα καὶ τὸν προκαταλαμβάνοντα κολακείαις καὶ
χάρισιν ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων καὶ συμμάχων ὄχλον (4.2), itself an allusion to Rep. 494c, προκαταλαμ-
βάνοντες καὶ προκολακεύοντες τὴν μέλλουσαν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν. Alcibiades' αξίωμα ("rank in
society": LSJ 3), was owed in large part to his noble birth (. 5.43.2, ἀξιώματι προγόνων
τιμώμενος; 6.15.3). Later in Plutarch's Life his noble birth and wealth will "open great doors"
(μεγάλας κλισιάδας ) to his political career (10.3.)
44 He has also specied that the award consisted of a crown and suit of armour, a detail
which he probably took from Isoc. 16.29. Crowns were regularly awarded for valour (e.g. Hdt.
8.124; Aesch. 2.169; Plato, Rep. 468b: W. K. P, 1974, ii, pp. 276-90); it is not clear
whether at this period they might be of gold or of e.g. laurel. ere is no other evidence for the
award of armour, though the use of the article suggests that Plutarch might have thought it well
known: ibidem, pp. 289-90.
45 Cf. C. B. R. P, 2005, pp. 122-3 n. 41: keeping attention focused on Socrates' action
rather than Alcibiades ts the larger theme of the struggle of Socrates and the atterers for
inuence over Alcibiades.
46 is seems to nd a parallel in the discussion of the eect of honour gained in war
upon the young Coriolanus in Cor. 4.1-4 (see above, n. 36). Honour gained too early in life,
Plutarch argues, may extinguish the desire for honour in "lightly ambitious souls". But in the
case of "weighty and rm spirits" (i.e. like Coriolanus) the honours impel them to "the apparent
good" (πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον καλόν). e contrast between "the apparent good" and Alcibiades'
"ambition ἐν τοῖς καλοῖς" is suggestive.
shows Socrates combating the malign inuence of Alcibiades' atterers. It also
shows Socrates not only playing a pedagogical role but playing this role in the
practical context of the battleeld; his love was not enervating or corrupting,
as was theirs (cf. 4.3), nor was his instruction merely theoretical47 .
But the phrase "ambition in ne things" also alludes specically to Phaedrus'
speech in the Symposium (178c-179b). Phaedrus speaks of love bringing the
greatest blessing a man can have. What love brings, Phaedrus claims, cannot
be obtained by "kinship, honours or wealth" (all advantages that Alcibiades
had)48 ; it provides a moral principle for life, that is, feeling "shame at shameful
things, and ambition for ne things" (τὴν ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς αἰσχροῖς αἰσχύνην,
ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς καλοῖς φιλοτιμίαν) (178d); thus, Phaedrus argues, lovers defend
and never desert each other on the battleeld. By alluding to this passage,
Plutarch makes more explicit what is implicit in Alcibiades' description of the
Potidaea campaign in the Symposium, namely, that Socrates and Alcibiades on
campaign are to be seen as an ideal pederastic couple, with the older exercising
an educational and protective role over the younger, and inspiring him towards
ne conduct49 .
e success of Socrates' tutelage is revealed in the next incident, the
story of how Alcibiades, in the aftermath of the Athenian defeat at Delium,
despite being on horseback, refused to leave Socrates and make his own
escape (7.6). is is closely based on Smp. 220e-221a, though Plutarch focuses
attention more squarely on Alcibiades' actions in defending Socrates rather
than on Socrates' calmness under attack. But this incident gains extra point
in Plutarch from its placing immediately after Socrates' attempt to nurture
Alcibiades' "ambition in ne things" (τὸ φιλότιμον ἐν τοῖς καλοῖς αὐτοῦ); in
Plutarch's account Alcibiades' defence of his teacher seems to show Socrates'
success in stirring Alcibiades to noble action, and thus conrms Alcibiades'
good nature and that he really did love Socrates50 . Phaedrus in the Symposium
imagined that no lover would desert his beloved, and at Potidaea Socrates
had defended Alcibiades. Now Alcibiades, the beloved, defends Socrates,
suggesting a mutuality in their love, a mutuality which Plutarch himself had
emphasised in ch. 4, with a quotation from the Phaedrus itself (Alcibiades
acquired "an image of love . . . in return for love"). Indeed Plutarch's
παρέπεμψε καὶ περιήμυνεν ("escorted and protected him")51 recalls Socrates'
47 Cf. D. A. R, 1966, p. 41 (= repr. 1995, p. 197); C. B. R. P, 1996, p. xlvii; D.
G, 1999, pp. 273-6.
48 See 4.1-2; 10.3; Plato, Rep. 494c; Alc. 1.104a-b. Cf. Lys. 14, 18, 38; Dem. 21.143; Diod.
12.84.1.
49 Plutarch is possibly inuenced by Lys. 14.42, where Alcibiades' son accuses his opponents
of ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς καλοῖς αἰσχύνεσθαι, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς κακοῖς φιλοτιμεῖσθαι.
50 Antisthenes had Socrates deserving a prize for bravery here too but giving it to Alcibiades
(Antisthenes fr. V A 200 Giannantoni=FGrH 1004 F 4).
51 But περιήμυνεν, the reading of Υ, is doubtful; περιαμύνω is attested only here in Greek
literature. Ziegler's apparatus suggests προσήμυνεν ("came to the aid of "), which may be right
(cf. Fab. 16.5, ἀπολιπὼν τὸν ἵππον πεζὸς τῷ ὑπάτῳ προσήμυνε, and Holden on em. 9.3). N.'s
περιέμεινεν ("waited for") seems bland, but may also be right.
49
Plato's Symposium and Plutarch's Alcibiades
protection both moral (4.1: ἀμύνειν) and physical (7.4: προέστη καὶ ἤμυνε).
Here Alcibiades is able to return Socrates' protection52 .
To conclude, my point in this paper has been a simple one. at is, that
the Alcibiades draws heavily on Plato's Symposium, and that knowledge of the
Symposium enriches the experience of reading the Alcibiades; the chapters that
we have examined (4-7), in which Plutarch frequently uses phraseology drawn
from the Symposium, and frequently makes explicit what had been implicit
there, become more meaningful when approached with the Symposium in
mind. is is dierent from saying merely that the Symposium was used as
a "source" for the Alcibiades; rather these chapters of the Alcibiades invite an
intertextual reading with the Symposium, and for their full eect presuppose
a reader who is familiar with it53 . is has important implications for the way
we might approach Plutarch's use of other texts and other authors, both in the
Alcibiades and elsewhere, where we might look not for a one-sided exploitation
of source texts but for a creative dialogue with them.
W o r k s c i T e d
A, F., "Fonti socratiche e stoiche nella Vita Alcibiadis", in L. D B
. (eds.), e Statesman in Plutarch's works, vol. II: e statesman in
Plutarch's Greek and Roman Lives, Leiden, 2005, pp. 187-97.
D, K. J., Plato: Symposium, Cambridge, 1980.
D, T. E., Plutarch's Lives : exploring virtue and vice, Oxford, 1999.
_____ "e language of narrative in Plutarch", forthcoming in Quaderni di
Acme.
D, N., Aristophanes' Birds, Oxford, 1995.
G, G., Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae, iv, Naples, 1990.
G, D., Alcibiades and Athens: a study in literary presentation, Oxford, 1999.
H, H. A., Plutarch's Life of emistocles with introduction, critical and
explanatory notes, indices and map, Cambridge, 18923 .
H, R. L., Plato's Symposium, Oxford, 2004.
K, R., De scholasticarum declamationum argumentis ex historia petitis ,
Paderborn, 1915.
52 C. B. R. P, 2005, p. 123.
53 Cf. the similar remarks made by C. B. R. P, 2007 about the emistocles – Camillus,
a text which presupposes a reader familiar with Herodotus, esp. p. 155: "By now Herodotus
should seem much more than a simple "source" for Plutarch's Life: he oers a repertoire of
possibilities, one which Plutarch knew extraordinarily well, and assumed his audience knew well
too; and an author whose themes and subtleties he thoroughly understood".
50
Timothy E. Du
K, P., "War", in P. S . (eds.), e Cambridge history of Greek and
Roman warfare, vol. I, Cambridge, 2007, pp. 147-85
P, C. B. R., "Plutarch and ucydides", in P. A. S (ed.), Plutarch
and the historical tradition, London and New York, 1992, pp. 10-40.
Reprinted with revisions in C. B. R. P, Plutarch and history:
eighteen studies, London, 2002, pp. 117-41.
_____"Prefazione", in F. A (ed.), Plutarco. Vita di Coriolano. Vita di
Alcibiade, xx-lviii, Milan, 1996.
_____ "Plutarch's Socrates", Hermathena, 179 (2005) 105-39.
_____ "De Malignitate Plutarchi. Plutarch, Herodotus and the Persian Wars",
in E. E. B . (eds.), Cultural responses to the Persian Wars:
antiquity to the third millennium, Oxford, 2007, pp. 145-64.
_____ "Parallel Narratives: the liberation of ebes in De Genio Socratis and
in Pelopidas", in A. G. N (ed.), e unity of Plutarch's Work:
Moralia themes in the Lives, features of the Lives in the Moralia, Berlin,
2008, pp. 539-56.
P, M. B., Studies in the Terminology of Greek Combat Sports, Königstein,
1982.
P, W. K., e Greek State at War (ve volumes), Berkeley, 1974-
1991.
R, D. A., "Plutarch, 'Alcibiades' 1-16", PCPhS, 192 (1966) 37-47.
Reprinted in B. S (ed.), Essays on Plutarch's Lives, Oxford,
1995, pp. 191-207.
S, H. W., Greek Grammar (revised by G. M. M), Cambridge,
Mass., 1956.
S, P. A. (ed.), A Commentary on Plutarch's Pericles, Chapel Hill, NC,
and London, 1989.
51
"In Learned Conversation". Plutarch's Symposiac Literature and the Elusive Authorial Voice
"I ". P'
F E. B
Pontical Biblical Institute of Rome
Abstract
e Symposiacs oer a good entry point for understanding Plutarch's dialogues. Plato's, such
as the Symposion, are often used as a model to interpret Plutarch's without consideration of
the changed circumstances in the Imperial period. Also, toward the end of Plato's life, his
dialogues became treatises in which the interlocutors are hardly important. Plutarch used no
single character throughout his dialogues. Like Cicero he wanted to present the opinions of the
philosophical schools, and often his own position is dicult to discern. e role and importance
of various persons in the spirited intellectual discussions of the Symposiacs oer a clue to his
intentions in the dialogues. At the same time, unlike his dialogues, his own persona appears
frequently and with a surprising assertiveness. In some Symposiacs, especially the Ninth Book, as
in e E at Delphoi and the Erotikos, he appears as fairly young, possibly a distancing technique.
e Symposiacs in any case oered an opportunity to present his views in various shapes and
sizes.
Μισέω μνάμονα συμπόταν
I hate a fellow drinker with a good memory.
(opening of the Symposiacs ) 1
is citation from an unknown poet, used to open the Symposiacs ,
pretty well destroys our approach to the theme of the symposion if not of
philanthropia. Perhaps we should not try to remember what occurs in a
drinking party2 . However, with a good memory for Plutarch's Symposiacs
(Quaestiones convivales ), one can possibly come closer into the circle of his
friends and get a better understanding of the authorial voice not only in the
Symposiacs but also in his major dialogues3 . Perhaps none of the personae
who appear in Plutarch's dialogues, not even the persona Plutarch, completely
represents his thought. For example, in the Erotikos , by presenting himself as
a newlywed, many years before, he is able to convey to his readers a certain
distance between himself and the persona 4 . roughout his writings Plutarch
indicates that he is searching for the true voice of Plato among his dierent
speakers and dialogues. Undoubtedly Plutarch's readers, too, were searching
1 Symposiacs 612C; D. A. C, 1993, p. 405, Anonymous, no. 1002. He lists three
other authors who cite it, including Lucian, Symposion 3, and notes an allusion to the saying
in Martial, 1.27.7. See the indispensable commentary of S.-T. T, 1989-1996, I., pp.
31-2.
2 Actually at 6.1 (686D) Plutarch gives just the opposite advice, the necessity of remembering
the discussions, something which justies his own writing of the Symposiacs.
3 On Plutarch's friends, see F. F, 1966, pp. 65-7; B. P, 1992; S.-T. T,
1989-1996; and E. N. O'N, 2004.
4 Here the views of S. Goldhill, 1995, and J. M. Rist, 2001, represent rather opposite ends of
the spectrum of interpretation.
for guidance, and the present tendency in Plutarchan scholarship, as in the
recent work of Jan Opsomer, is to try to identify his own position. Plato's
dialogues, such as his Symposion, are often used as the model with which to
interpret Plutarch's, but Plutarch's often require a dierent methodology5 .
Oddly enough, Plato composed even one of his latest works, the Timaios , a
long treatise which turns into a monologue and in which Socrates has only
a minor part, as a symposion 6 . In general, at least during his early and middle
periods, Plato's Socrates remained his principal spokesman. Moreover, the
speeches of the minor characters seem to work together with his to form an
artistic whole7 . Toward the end of Plato's life, his dialogues became treatises
in which the interlocutors change and lose importance. On the other hand,
Plutarch used no single character as his spokesman, so that his own position
is dicult to discern. Where he wrote treatises without the pretense of a
dialogue, his position is clear. However, the dialogues remain very problematic.
His Symposiacs are a good example of lively discussions of dierent opinions
among many speakers, often without necessarily indicating his own belief.
As so often in studying authors of the Imperial period, we have in our minds
the literature of the fth or fourth centuries B.C., without always taking
into account the great changes that took place by the Imperial period. Not
only did Plutarch not use a single main speaker like Socrates through several
dialogues, but those who do appear often make no second appearance. On
one rare occasion when he appears himself as a persona and as the principal
speaker in a dialogue, in the Erotikos ( Dialogue on Love , Amatorius), even the
views of his own persona are very problematic8 . In contrast to the dialogues,
though, in the Symposiacs Plutarch often appears as a nal or principal speaker.
In fact, his own role is astoundingly forceful. His voice seems particularly
strong in the opening of the books of the Symposiacs, where, after the preface
to the dedicatee, Sosius Senecio, we nd rather long "questions", really small
treatises. However, apart from the opening questions there are other quite
extensive ones, perhaps for variety, or perhaps because they needed more
development. At any rate an advantage of the genre is the possibility to craft
a particular question as brief or long as desired, and to inject or omit the
author's persona at any point.
Cicero's philosophical dialogues bear a striking lack of resemblance to
Plato's and in many respects are much closer to some of Plutarch's. is may
be partially due to the philosophical allegiance of both to "the Academy". In
5 For Plato, see, e.g., R. B. R, 1995, pp. 180-205, 305-6; C. G, 2002, esp. pp.
147-9 and 161-4; R. H, 2004; and C. J. R , 2007. For Xenophon, see D. L. G ,
1993, pp. 132-54. An excellent discussion of Plutarch's relationship to Plato and the use of
characters to develop his own views can be found in J. M. R, 2001, esp. 558-61.
6 See the excellent contribution of M. T, 1990, esp. p. 243. She discusses Plato's
changing attitude toward the value of the symposion (esp. pp. 244, 246, 255-60).
7 D . B, 1992 repr. in D. B, 1994, pp. 457-501. F. F, 2006, has criticized the
approach of F. I for an interesting twist in interpreting Plato, see F. C. W, 2008,
who holds that Alkibiades' speech is more important than that of Diotima.
8 So S. G, 1995, pp. 159-60.
53
"In Learned Conversation". Plutarch's Symposiac Literature and the Elusive Authorial Voice
Cicero the principal thrust seems to be presenting the opinions of the major
philosophical schools, favoring and criticizing certain views on the way, but
in general allowing the representatives of the schools to speak their minds9 .
Langlands, who attributes it to the rhetorical tradition, has noted how fond
Romans were of being subjected to contradictory opinions before choosing the
best or coming to their own solution10 . We must imagine that the dedicatee of
the Symposiacs, who also participates as a persona in them, Sosius Senecio, was
one of these Romans. is practice contrasts at times with Plutarch's voice in
the Symposiacs where his own persona often goes on at length or decides the
question, and is similar to his tractates, such as On the Generation of the Soul in
the Timaios ( De animae procreatione in Timaeo), where his position is crystal
clear. We have something similar to the Symposiacs in Aulus Gellius, Athenaios,
and in the parody of the genre in Lucian's Symposion (or Dinner of the Lapiths) 11.
Evidently one of the major purposes of the philosophical symposion was to
introduce the reader to the most prominent philosophical views of the time and
discuss them, often in a critical fashion. In more philosophical dialogues such
as Cicero's the reader would then be given guidance on how to evaluate the
opinions. ough Lucian's Symposion is a rather sadistic farce, reading between
the lines one can imagine a serious philosophical symposion of the time12 .
Where we have something like Cicero's extended philosophical dialogues
is in individual tractates, where Plutarch writes in his own person. In this case
he clearly states his views (and often, naturally, misrepresents those of the
adversary). Often more polemical than Cicero, he usually defends the Platonic
position and attacks Stoic or Epicurean ones. He belongs in these cases to his
time, reecting the debates between the well-established schools. On the Face
in the Moon (De facie in orbe lunae) begins very much in dialogue form, with
the presentation of various opinions. But then it branches out into a treatise,
with one speaker developing the central view or thesis and accompanying it
with an eschatological myth. In this case, which resembles Plato's Timaios in
its format, the main speaker is Plutarch's brother Lamprias. We are thus left
wondering again about what might have been Lamprias' contribution13 .
9 See e.g., P. G. W, 2000, esp. p. xvi, who speaks of Cicero's "intensive reection" on
the central concerns of the Hellenistic schools as viewed by their spokesmen. e Tusculan
Disputations, something like Plutarch's Symposiacs, supposedly took place each on a dierent day.
For the complexities of his presentation of the Hellenistic schools, see C. L, 2008, pp. 1-5,
and in the same volume, pp. 5-20.
10 R. L, 2009, esp. pp. 160-3.
11 Gellius claimed that his discussions were a shortcut to a general education for those too
busy for much study, Preface, 11-12. On Aulus Gellius, see L. H-S, 1988, esp.
27-32 (27) (rev. ed., 2003); W. H. K, 2009, pp. 2-14, 240, 253, 279, 282, 288-92, 300,
stressing the dierence between the Roman and Greek intellectual worlds at the time. She
rejects (p. 8) what she sees in S. S, 2004, pp. 17, 20, 35 as a "deating picture of Latin
intellectuals".
12 On the contrast between this and Plutarch's Symposiacs, see J. H, 1981, esp. pp. 204-5;
C. P. J, 1986, pp. 28-41; R. B B, 1989, pp. 108-10; I. M, 2000. F.
F, 1994, pp. 125-30, takes a much harsher view of Lucian than Bracht Branham.
13 On Lamprias, see D. A. R, 1973, pp. 4, 69, 71-3; and C. P. J, 1971, pp. 9-10.
In the very rst book of the Symposiacs, Plutarch remarks that if only
philosophically inclined persons are present, philosophy would be a suitable
topic, but if not, many would be excluded. For this reason, the topics must be
familiar, simple, and easy (614D)14 . Petronius' "Dinner of Trimalchio" in his
Satyrica ( Satyricon) can give valuable insights, in spite of it being satirical. e
work was written earlier than Plutarch's Symposiacs but within his lifetime,
satirizing the attempt of nouveau-riches, who ape intellectual discussions and
presumably in the attempt to carry on a kind of symposion. Several of the
themes satirized are similar to those we nd in the Symposiacs, ranging over
natural phenomenon, religion, what we might call pseudo-science, popular
philosophy, and the like15 . In any case, Plutarch's Symposiacs do not descend
to the level of a "commonplace book" such as typies much of Aulus Gellius
and Athenaios, nor are they anything like the sadistic farce of Lucian's
Symposion. Examination of the dialogues of Aulus Gellius, Athenaios, and
Lucian quickly reveals how distant they are not only from Plato, but even
from Plutarch16 . At the same time these works give us good insights into the
genre Plutarch used.
e novel creation of the persona, the newly married Plutarch as recounted
by his son, in the Erotikos, allowed him more freedom to present provocative
and problematic views. ese contrast with his own traditional views of love
and marriage elsewhere and permitted him, intentionally or not, to gain an
enviable place in "the history of sexuality". But even in this dialogue, where
the nal views are presumably those of the author, other speakers initially
have their say. eir speeches on heterosexual or homosexual love are quite
aggressive, but one could perhaps point to their "propedeutic" function rather
than their "tonality"17 . As in the Symposiacs, such a strong projection of opposing
views seems to have satised a desire in the readers to participate vicariously
in spirited, contemporary intellectual discussion. e views presented here
raise serious problems, enough so as to wonder whether Plutarch is not just
being ironic, or problematic, or over-inuenced by other genres, such as that
of comedy18 .
14 O . M, 1990, p. v, citing Moralia 629D, notes the dierence between sympotika (talk
about the symposion) and symposiaka (talk suitable for the symposion).
15 See, e.g., F. D, 2002, pp. 61-114, popular, but covering the major works.
16 Gellius had read Plutarch and mentions him at the beginning of his work 1.1.1. On
Gellius, see L. H–S A. V (eds.), 2004, esp. pp. 10-4; and in the same
volume A. V, esp. pp. 183-6. On Athenaios see A. L, 1990, esp. pp. 265-7; D.
B & J. W (eds.), 2000, esp. J. W, pp. 23-40; L. R, pp. 256-71; and
G. A, pp. 316-27; also S.-T. T, 1989-1996, I, p. 12, who nds the closest
parallels to be Athenaios, Deipnosophists and Macrobius Saturnalia, the latter of which he takes
to be an imitation of Plutarch.
17 See, e.g., J. M. Rist, 2001, esp. pp. 560-61.
18 J. M. R, 2001, esp., p. 558, sees Plutarch building up, through the speeches, a very
complicated and sophisticated conception of love. is in Rist's view represents a kind of
"commentary" on Plato's theories, which he sees primarily as those of the Phaidros. I am grateful
to Ann Chapman for having seen her forthcoming dissertation. She treats Plutarch's views as
not very favorable toward women. See also F. E. B, 2007.
55
"In Learned Conversation". Plutarch's Symposiac Literature and the Elusive Authorial Voice
For this reason, a good place to start is Plutarch's Symposiacs (or Table Talk,
Quaestiones convivales), where we also have the dominant persona of Plutarch,
including that of his youth. With the exception of his Symposiacs few of his
works have a symposiac setting in the strict sense. e notable exception is
the Symposium (or Dinner of the Seven Sages ( Septem sapientium convivium ) 19 .
However, the themes treated are not normal, at least for the extant Classical
or Imperial symposia, and may be too traditional in scope to say much about
Plutarch's originality or emphasis. Nonetheless, Mossman nds a number of
original elements, such as the selection of Sages, the introduction of Aesop and
the women (the clever Kleoboulina and Melissa), and probably the story of
Arion and the dolphin, not to speak of the deliberate omission of homosexual
themes and substitution of heterosexuality20 . To Mossman's list one could add
the emphasis on divine providence at the end of the work. She points out
that the Dinner of the Seven Sages and e Daimonion of Socrates ( De genio
Socratis) are the only works which Plutarch set in the distant past. e Erotikos,
a very late dialogue of Plutarch, might qualify as a Platonic symposion if we
consider its theme. But the mise-en-scène is not a symposion , daimones do not
appear, there is only a hint of love being directed to the intelligible world, the
denouement involves heterosexual love, and a very unusual marriage is played
out before one's eyes. In e Daimonion of Socrates, the principals are in an
indoor setting and daimones, so prominent in Plato's Symposion, play a major
role, but the occasion is never called a symposion, or even a dinner, and the
participants' major purpose for being there is their involvement in a bloody
revolt against the Spartan overlords at ebes21 .
Perhaps we can look at some particulars at the end of the Symposiacs, the
Ninth Book from Plutarch's student days. ese are the last Symposiacs he wrote,
though the recollections, whether ctional or real, chronologically would come
rst. ey may recall real discussions held at the time, possibly in the Academy,
but some topics seem suspiciously generic. e speakers appear to be real persons
and possibly at least some of the speeches may represent what they actually said22 .
As in other Symposiacs, though, it is impossible to determine, especially if the
topic is a common theme, whether any speech is an invention or real23 . In some
other Symposiacs Plutarch is presented as quite young, appearing in what should
be the commanding company of Ammonios, his philosophy professor, with his
father, or even his grandfather. Most of the Symposiacs are not very philosophical
by our standards, often resolving folkloric questions about natural phenomena
19 On this see the excellent study by J. M. M, 1997; also D. E. A, 1972; S.
J, 1997, review, F. E. B F. L C, 2000; A. B, 2002; and D. L.
L, 2005.
20 J. M. M, 1997, esp. pp. 124-6, 133-4.
21 Perhaps to contrast with the dinner (deipnon) in which Archias, the commander, is
assassinated (588B). Phyllidas uses wine and food as part of his trap for Archias (596C), "at the
hour when most people are at dinner".
22 See S.-T. T, 1989-1996, III, pp. 299-300, on the unusual qualities of this book
of the Symposiacs compared to his others.
23 S.-T. T, 1989-1996, I, pp. 12-5, stresses the element of authenticity.
or presumed natural phenomena, with, to us, pseudo-scientic guesswork24 .
Eleni Kechagia has suggested that through them Plutarch was instructing the
reader to think like a philosopher. Certainly there is a methodology at stake:
verication of the data, exploration of various possibilities, citation of the experts
(like Aristotle), testing and debating of the data and opinions, subjection of the
result to common sense, and attestation of parallel phenomena. Sometimes the
result seems ridiculous, but some of the Symposiacs, for example, on whether sh
or meat is better for one's health could stand up well today.
e Symposiacs oer information on the speakers and their importance,
and, thus, on the possible authorial voice of Plutarch in his other dialogues.
Most surprising is his own commanding role. Of a total of 72 Symposiacs
useful for this purpose, Plutarch astoundingly, is the principal speaker in 33,
or almost half, at least in the sense of having the nal word. In 39 cases either
he is absent or yields the ground to another speaker who has the principal or
nal word. In a couple of them Plutarch has a rather extensive speech, as in
2.1, which goes on for 15 (Loeb) pages25 . However, in the later books the rst
question becomes much shorter. Sometimes he defers to important personages
such as Sosius Senecio, to whom these books and the Lives were dedicated,
or to his former teacher Ammonios26 . ough invited to do so by Ammonios,
he has no complexes about developing a long and rather convincing counter-
argument to his teacher's proposition about ivy being hot (3.2). He also has no
qualms about taking on a respected physician on a medical matter (7.1). Nor
does he go completely unopposed. In Symposiac 1.9, his friend eon comes
close to calling him "full of baloney". us, half the time, we search for the
authorial voice, looking for Plutarch in disguise. But would his own persona
utter opinions he never subscribed to, even the brilliant nonsense of his youth
in e E at Delphoi ( De E apud Delphos)? At times he seems sympathetic to a
principal speaker's views. Sometimes his persona even says so. In most cases,
though, his mind remains a little inscrutable.
Several of the speakers who appear in later dialogues make possibly their
rst appearance in the Symposiacs. Among these are his brother Lamprias and
two friends named eon, one of whom is called his "companion". en there is
Ammonios, and naturally, Plutarch himself. In the dialogues, Plutarch appears as
a young student in e E at Delphoi, as a philosophy professor in at Epicurus
Actually Makes Life Impossible, and as a young married man in the Dialogue on
Love. e eon who is a grammarian from Egypt appears in e Face on the
Moon. e other, the "companion" — and according to Puech, Plutarch's most
constant friend in the Moralia — is a participant in both e E at Delphoi and e
24 S.-T. T, 1989-1996, III, pp. 299-300, notes that the 9th book is an exception in
treating only musical, literary and philological question, and that all the discussions take place
during the festival of the Muses in Athens.
25 Perhaps he thought Senecio might read the rst question but not the others.
26 On Sosius Senecio, spelled Sossius by Plutarch, see B. P, 1992, pp. 4883-5; on
Ammonios, 4835-6; and C. P. J, 1966, pp. 205-11.
57
"In Learned Conversation". Plutarch's Symposiac Literature and the Elusive Authorial Voice
Oracles at Delphoi (De Pythiae oraculis)27 . In the latter he is the principal speaker,
whose speech takes up 20 pages of the dialogue. He appears as well in A Pleasant
Life is Impossible (Non posse suaviter vivere secundum Epicurum). Plutarch's brother
Lamprias has a minor role in e E at Delphoi. It is easy to forget that here,
though the young Plutarch is reprimanded for a little wisdom being a dangerous
thing, he has a longer speech than the sublime one of his teacher Ammonios,
which concludes the dialogue. In e Obsolescence of Oracles (De defectu oraculorum)
Ammonios plays quite a prominent role. He guides the conversation and prefers
the theory that daimones are souls. Nonetheless, Lamprias is the principal speaker
and oers the nal solution to the cause of the prophecy. is involves, strangely,
a physical emanation coming from the ground at Delphoi. He also appears in e
E at Delphoi ( De E apud Delphos) and is, amazingly, the narrator and principal
speaker in e Face on the Moon. us, the cast of characters of the dialogues bears
a strong resemblance to some of the Symposiacs. Lamprias has the last word in
three of them (1.2, 2.5, 4.5, and 8.6) is the main speaker in three or four (2.9, 5.9,
and 7.5, and possibly in 7.10). Most remarkably, Ammonios is a relatively minor
character in the Symposiacs, considering his intellectual and political stature in
real life and his enormous theological role in e E at Delphoi. He is the principal
speaker in only two Symposiacs (9.1 and 9.14) and is only one among others in
another two (9.2 and 9.5).
Plutarch's readers, like all Greeks and Romans, as we are often told, had
better memories than we, whose computers do our remembering for us. us,
judging by the Symposiacs alone, Lamprias lacks prestige and is sometimes on
the wrong side. He might have been the author of the materialistic solution
to the functioning of prophecy in e Obsolescence of Oracles, but how could
he be responsible for the great scientic exposition in e Face on the Moon?
Certainly Plutarch's friends would have immediately recognized him behind
the mask of Lamprias. More problematic is how to interpret Ammonios,
the great Alexandrian theologian who pronounces such sublime doctrine at
the end of e E at Delphoi, identifying God with Being and the Good28 .
He is not such a commanding gure in the Symposiacs, but his philosophical
stature would permit him to have a commanding voice. In this case there
might have been something of a compromise. Reading his speech in the E at
Delphoi, Plutarch's friends would certainly expect to nd some resemblance to
Ammonios' real teaching. ey might have wondered, too, why Plutarch left
him on the sidelines so long. One suspects an attempt to keep some distance
between his philosophy and Ammonios'29 .
27 See B. P, 1992, p. 4886. Others are less certain about their roles; see P. A. C,
1969, pp. 48-9, note b.
28 J. O, 2007, sees the topics of the Platonic Questions being picked up and developed
in the dialogues, e.g. e E at Delphoi, including the deliberate introduction of errors to be
corrected. In this case, Ammonios carries on the role that Plutarch had in the Platonic Question
(5). In the end useful or worthy aspects of the false views will be incorporated into the nal,
superior solution, at times one original with Plutarch (esp. ms. pp. 17-20). For the position of
the Symposiacs in this, see ms. p. 17.
29 See my forthcoming article, "Proceeding to Loftier Heights': Plutarch the eologian and
e role of eon, the Egyptian grammatikos, who appears in only two
Symposiacs (1.9 and 8.8), might barely allow him to be a speaker in e Face on
the Moon. e other eon, the "companion" of Plutarch, whom we nd in only
three Symposiacs (1.4, 4.3, 8.6), surprisingly appears in the E at Delphoi , e
Oracles at Delphoi, and at Epicurus Makes a Pleasant Life Impossible. at he
should be such an authoritative gure in e Oracles at Delphoi, with the nal and
denitive speech of 18 pages, comes as a great surprise. Certainly the suspicions
of Plutarch's readers and friends would also be aroused by Kleombrotos, the
Spartan friend, who describes the daimones in such horrendous terms in e
Obsolescence of the Oracles, and receives 17 pages30 . He appears in no other work,
including the Symposiacs, but his Frankensteinian exposition has captivated
the imagination of great religious scholars (410C-F, 414F-418D). e Stoic
Sophist, Philippos of Prousias on the Hypios in Bithynia is responsible for the
story of the death of the Great Pan o the Island of Paxos (near the present
Corfu) in the Ionian Sea (419B-E)31 . He is the only speaker in 7.7 and has a
few words in 7.8, but appears nowhere else in Plutarch's works32 . What goes for
Kleombrotos applies as well for Demetrios of Tarsos, a grammarian friend of
Plutarch's, responsible for the story of the "Great Souls" dying o the coast of
the British Isles (6 pages) (419E-420A). He, too, is absent from the Symposiacs
and appears nowhere else in the Moralia 33 .
In conclusion a bad memory may be a plus for drinking partners, who
usually have bad memories anyway and sometimes even complete amnesia.
But let us opt for Plutarch in Symposiac 6.1, where he champions the necessity
to remember the philosophical discussions which occur in symposions and even
to record them. us justifying the reason for their existence, he has passed on
the Symposiacs to posterity, including us, even if leaving the vague impression
that all was not, strictly speaking, "recorded".
W o r k s c i T e d
A, G., "e Banquet of Belles-Lettres: Athenaeus and the Comic
Symposium", in D. B & J. W (eds.), 2000, pp. 316-27.
A, D. E., "Septem Sapientium Convivium", in H. D. B (ed.), Plutarch's
eological Writings and Early Christians Literature, Leiden, 1972, pp.
51-105.
the Philosophy of His Time", in E. K (ed.), Plutarch and Philosophy. Scholarship and/or
Dilettantism?, forthcoming.
30 B . P, 1992, p. 4843, presumes he was a companion, in the ephebeia, of the Philippos
who was ephor of Sparta in 87/89 A.D.
31 Prousias, not Prousa. O'Neil's index for the Moralia still gets it wrong.
32 Evidently the same person, though in 418A described only as an historian (συγγραφεύς).
See B. P, 1992, pp. 4869-70, but her remark (p. 4870) about him mentioning Bithynia in
On the Oracles at Delphoi seems to be mistaken.
33 B. P, 1992, pp. 4844-5, has a long entry on Demetrios.
59
"In Learned Conversation". Plutarch's Symposiac Literature and the Elusive Authorial Voice
B, D., "La composition des Dialogues de Plutarque et le problème de leur
unité", JS 27 (1992) 187-234.
_____ Parerga. Choix d'articles de Daniel Babut (1974-1994), Lyon, 1994.
B B, R., Unruly Eloquence. Lucian and the Comedy of Traditions,
Cambridge, Mass., 1989.
B, D. & W, J. (eds.), Athenaeus and His World. Reading Greek
Culture in the Roman Empire, Exeter, 2000.
B, F. E. & L C, F., Review of S. J, Il convitato sullo
sgabello. Plutarco, Esopo ed i Sette Savi, Pisa/Rome, 1997 in CR, 50
(2000) 286-87.
B, F. E., "'Uttering Unperfumed Words, Yet Reaches to a ousand Years
with Her Voice.' Plutarch and His Age", in idem (ed.), With Unperfumed
Voice. Studies in Plutarch, in Greek Literature, Religion and Philosophy, and
in the New Testament Background, Stuttgart, 2007, pp. 17-51. (Italian
version: "'Parlando senza profumi raggiunge con la voce mille anni.'
Plutarco e la sua età", in P. V C F. F (eds.),
Plutarco e la cultura della sua età, Naples, 2007, pp. 11-38.)
B, A., Les Sept Sages de la Grèce Antique. Transmission et utilisation d'un
patrimoine légendaire d'Hérodote à Plutarque, Paris, 2002.
C, D. A., Greek Lyric Poetry V. e New School of Poetry and Anonymous
Songs and Hymns, Cambridge, Mass., 1993.
C, P. A., Plutarch's Moralia VIII, Cambridge, Mass., 1969.
D, F., Le plaisir et la loi. Du Banquet de Platon au Satiricon, Paris, 2002.
F, F., "Deux images des Banquets de Lettrés: les Propos de Table de
Plutarque et le Banquet de Lucien", in A. B (ed.), Lucien de
Samosate, Lyon, 1994, pp. 125-30.
_____ Review of F. I, Dialogues pythiques. L'E de Delphes, Pourquoi la
Pythie ne rend plus ses oracles en vers, La disparition des oracles, Paris, 2006,
in Ploutarchos, 5 (2007-2008) 114-21.
F, F., "Les amis romains de Plutarque d'après les Propos de table",
REL, 44 (1966) 65-67.
G, D. L ., Xenophon's Cyropaedia. Style, Genre, and Literary Technique,
Oxford, 1993.
G, C., "Dialectic and the Dialogue Form", in J. A & C. R (eds.),
New Perspectives on Plato, Modern and Ancient, Cambridge, Mass., 2002,
pp. 145-72 .
G, S., Foucault's Virginity. Ancient Erotic Fiction and the History of
Sexuality, Cambridge, 1995.
H, J., Lucian's Satire, New York, 1981.
H-S, L., Aulus Gelius, Chapel Hill, 1988.
_____ Aulus Gellius. An Antonine Scholar and his Achievement, Oxford, 2003
(rev. ed.).
_____& V (eds.), A., e Worlds of Aulus Gellius, Oxford, 2004
H, R., Plato's Symposium, Oxford, 2004.
J, S., Il convitato sullo sgabello. Plutarco, Esopo ed i Sette Savi, Pisa
and Rome, 1997.
J, C. P., "e Teacher of Plutarch", HSCP, 71 (1966) 205-11.
________ Plutarch and Rome, Oxford, 1971.
_____ Culture and Society in Lucian, Harvard, 1986.
K, W. H., Gellius the Satirist. Roman Cultural Authority in Attic Nights,
Leiden, 2009.
L, R., "'Reading for the Moral' in Valerius Maximus: e Case for
Severitas", CCJ, 54 (2009) 160-87.
L, D. F., "Plutarco e a tradição dos Sete Sábios", in M. J .
(eds.), Plutarc a la seva època: Paideia i societat. Actas del VIII Simposio
español sobre Plutarco (Barcelona, 6-8 de Noviembre, 2003), Barcelona,
2005, pp. 235-42.
L, C., "Présentation", in C. L (ed.), Cicéron, Paris, 2008 (=Revue de
Métaphysique et de Morale 1 [2008]), pp. 1-5.
_____"Cicéron, le moyen platonisme et la philosophie romaine: à propos de la
naissance du concept latin de qualitas", in C. L (ed.), Cicéron, Paris,
2008, pp. 5-20.
L, A., "e Play of Reection between Literary Form and the
Sympotic eme in the Deipnosophistae", in O. M (ed.), 1990, pp.
263-71.
M, I., "What Can Go Wrong at a Dinner Party: the Unmasking
of False Philosophers in Lucian's Symposium or the Lapiths", in K.
P (ed.), Double Standards in the Ancient and Medieval World,
Göttingen, 2000, pp. 247-59.
M, J. M., "Plutarch's Dinner of the Seven Wise Men", in J. M.
M (ed.), Plutarch and His Intellectual World, London, 1997,
pp. 119-40.
M, O. (ed.), Sympotica. A Symposium on the Symposion, Oxford, 1990.
O'N, E. N., Plutarch, Moralia XVI. Index, Cambridge, Mass., 2004.
61
"In Learned Conversation". Plutarch's Symposiac Literature and the Elusive Authorial Voice
O, J., "Plutarch on the One and the Dyad", in R. S & R. W.
S (eds.), Greek and Roman Philosophy 100 BC—200 AD,
London, 2007, pp. 379-95.
_____ "Sur les arguments non rectilignes et la pensée par cercles. Forme et
argumentation dans les Quaestiones Platonicae", in X. Brouillette and A.
Giavatto (eds.), Les dialogues platoniciens chez Plutarque. Stratégies et
méthodes exégétiques, Leuven, University Press (Ancient and Medieval
Philosophy. Series 1) forthcoming.
P, B., "Prosopographie des amis de Plutarque", ANRW II.33.6 (1992)
4831-93.
R, L., "e Λογόδειπνον: Athenaeus between Banquet and Anti-
Banquet", in D. B & J. W (eds.), 2000, pp. 256-71.
R, J. M., "Plutarch's Amatorius: A Commentary on Plato's eories of
Love?", CQ 51 (2001) 557-75.
R , C. J., Plato and the Art of Philosophical Writing, Cambridge, 2007.
R, D. A., Plutarch, New York, 1973.
R, R. B., e Art of Plato, London, 1995.
S, S., "Bilingualism and Biculturalism in Antonine Rome: Apuleius,
Fronto, and Gellius", in L. H-S A. V (eds.),
2004, pp. 3-40.
T , M., "Logos Sympotikos: Patterns of the Irrational in Philosophical
Drinking: Plato Outside the Symposium", in O. M , Sympotica. A
Symposium On e Symposion, Oxford, 1990, pp. 238-60.
T, S.-T., A Commentary on Plutarch's Table Talks I-III, Göteborg,
1989-1996.
V, A., "Genre, Conventions, and Cultural Programme in Gellius' Noctes
Atticae", in L. H-S & A. V (eds.), 2004, pp.159-
86.
W, P. G., Cicero. On Obligations (De Ociis), Oxford, 2000.
W, F. C., "Beauty of Soul and Speech in Plato's Symposium", CQ, 58
(2008) 69-82.
W, J., "Dialogue and Comedy: e Structure of the Deipnosophistae", in
D. B & J. W (eds.), 2000, pp. 23-40.
63
Plutarch's Techne Rhetorike for the symposium in Quaestiones Convivales
pl u T a r c h ' s T e c H n e r H e T o r i k e f o r T h e s y m p o s i u m i n
Qu a e S T i o n e S co n v i v a l e S : T h e i m p o r T a n c e o f s p e a k i n g W e l l
T o c u l T i v a T e f r i e n d s h i p
L G J
University of Barcelona
Abstract
is paper discusses the advice on rhetorical matters that Plutarch gives in the Quaestiones
Convivales to stress the importance of good conversational skills in establishing fruitful
relationships with other people during after-dinner table talk. Reecting the association
between education and the symposiac context under the Roman Empire, Plutarch suggests
procedures for choosing and discussing the best themes for conversation, and for interacting
in an appropriate manner with the other guests. Rhetoric thus takes up a central position in
situations in which friendships may be made or strengthened.
e banquet in Ancient Greece was one of the favourite occasions for
the transmission of values and knowledge. e conversations held after the
meal, accompanied by wine – the nal part of the gathering, known as the
symposion – ranged over the most topical themes of the moment and helped
their participants to build up links of friendship based on common interests
and beliefs. Praise for bravery and youth centred the conversation in the circles
of Callinus and Tyrtaeus, while slightly later, Alcaeus and eognis celebrated
the membership of a political faction which trained the young in the traditional
values that they will need to perpetuate their status. Plato described another
kind of banquet that emerged during the Classical Era, a banquet where the
philosophical conversation of the most distinguished citizens helped the guests
to understand the world around them. In the Empire, the banquet was retained
as a space for encouraging fellowship and the exchange of ideas. However, as
betted the times of the Second Sophistic, the subjects addressed were more
trivial: the pepaideumenoi, cultivated men educated in the system of the egkyklios
paideia, showed o their knowledge in erudite debates in which every participant
could learn something new regarding the theme under discussions1 .
Rhetoric was also a fundamental ability for those cultivated men seeking
to hold interesting table talks with their friends. After several centuries in
which the dedication to laudatory and deliberative rhetoric predominated,
in the Empire the importance of forensic rhetoric gradually increased2 . A
rhetor of the Second Sophistic would not only have trained pupils for careers
in political councils or the courts where they would make declamations or
representations in front of auditoria, but would also have had pupils who did
1 F. P P, 1999 stresses the literary character of the banquets of the Empire,
and E. S T, 2005, pp. 472-9 places Plutarch's symposia inside the environment
of academic and cultural circles.
2 Plutarch (QC IX 14.3, 744d) considers this form of rhetoric to be the rst to have
developed.
not wish to devote themselves professionally to sophistry but were interested
in learning the ways of good speaking for its own sake3 . At school, then, pupils
studied everyday situations in which an educated man could gain distinction
by demonstrating his oratory skills. Weddings, births, anniversaries, farewells
or funerals were occasions for showing one's knowledge of oratory and
rhetoric. In the classroom, teachers used small manuals which described the
most appropriate themes for each occasion and how they should be presented.
In the Techne rhetorike (attributed to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, but thought
to date from the third century AD4 ) are seven examples of these manuals,
known as μέθοδοι; they advise that speeches to celebrate births should begin
by mentioning the day the subject was born, the time of year, and the place, and
then should speak of the qualities of the newborn and prophesize a promising
future (D. H., Rh. III)5 . Likewise, even if not in a systematic way, but rather by
means of interspersed comments often found in the prefaces, or in the form
of personal observations during the discussions between the guests, Plutarch
establishes in Quaestiones Convivales ( QC hereafter) a theory of rhetoric for
speeches and conversations at banquets, which would not have been out of
place in any rhetorical handbook of his time.
Rhetoric was the third and last stage in the Graeco-Roman educational
system and completed the acquisition of knowledge of cultivated people. In
parallel to its technical specicity, the learned men belonging to educated circles
such as Plutarch's, found in the teachings of rhetors the essential elements of their
culture6 . "Matière de base de la paideia , la rhétorique ne cessait de fournir des
cadres de pensée aux pepaideumenoi "7 , and, therefore, rhetoric was not excluded
from their table talks, as well as they discussed many other subjects from the other
two previous educational levels. Certainly, Plutarch's QC contains many passages
that deal with the subjects of the rst stages of the education given to the young
of the Empire8 . For instance, some questions discuss the nature of the letters of
the alphabet: one discussion enquires about the numerical proportion between
the quantity of vowels and semivowels (QC IX 3, 738c-739a), and another why
the alpha is placed rst among the letters (QC IX 2, 737c-738c). Plutarch claries
3 T. W, 2001, p. 5 describes a society that marked its prestige in terms of its
knowledge and immersion in the Greek paideia, not only among those who devoted themselves
actively to literature but also in society in general.
4 Cf. G. K, 1972, p. 320 and A. M, 2005, p. 18 for the attribution and the date
of composition of the work.
5 In spite of this ancient interest in speeches delivered in private occasions, there is not any
extant treatise on the rhetoric of conversations; cf. L. P, 1993b for a reection about the
lack of a conversational theory in rhetorical texts,
6 e theory and practice of rhetoric in other treatises by Plutarch have been studied in
depth in the collective volume of L. V S, 2000 and in H. M. M J., 2001.
Specic studies of the theme in the QC are G. M, 1991 and S.-T. T, 1996.
7 F. F, 2000b, pp.188-89.
8 H. I. M, 1948, pp. 389-421 and R. C, 2001, pp. 160-245 describe a three-
stage educational process in which the young learnt to read and write with the grammatistes ,
studied and discussed literary authors with the grammatikos, and practised techniques of
composition with the rhetor.
65
Plutarch's Techne Rhetorike for the symposium in Quaestiones Convivales
that the answer proposed by Hermeias was the stock reason given in the
schools (QC IX 2.2, 737e). Words, and especially their use and their etymology,
constitute an object of discussion in their own right. Among the numerous
examples we nd throughout the nine books, two cases apply directly to the
context of the symposium. First, Lamprias defends the etymology of the term
used in Latin to designate the "supper" (coena-κῆνα) as the meal that is taken
along with friends, thus deriving from the word κοινωνία ("fellowship") (QC
VIII 6.5, 726e)9 . e second example is a question that debates the meaning
of the expression Achilles uses to ask Patroclus for more wine: "ζωρότερον
δὲ κέραιε" ( QC V 4, 677c-678b). Among the replies, Niceratus rejects the
traditional interpretation of "unmixed" for the term ζωρός and proposes the
meaning of "hot" for the word ζωρότερον, suggested by words such as ζωτικοῦ
("life-giving") or ζέσεως ("boiling"); but the poet Sosicles argues that the term
means "well-mixed", given the relation between the expression and a sentence
in Empedocles.
In the schools of the grammarians, the verses of the poets were discussed
and interpreted exhaustively in order to teach the pupils their meaning and
the methods of expression they used. Indeed, the commentary of literary
passages (especially texts by Homer) was an endless source of themes for
after-dinner table-talk. e QC presents many examples in which the
diners debate matters such as why the poet used a particular epithet for
each particular liquid, but called oil only liquid (QC VI 9, 695e-696d), or
which of Aphrodite's hands Diomedes wounded (QC IX 4, 739a-d). Literary
quotations10 are found throughout the discussions, and are mostly from
authors who made up the core of the school syllabus11 . On one occasion
Plutarch himself states that some of the issues that come up in the discussions
of the literary passages, such as the question of the antinomy of the third
book of the Iliad, should be studied by rhetoricians, who are well skilled in
this eld (QC IX 13.1 742a-b). So rhetoric was of considerable importance
in the banquet context; it served not only to resolve doubts presented in
trivial questions, but had a key role in ensuring that diners could enjoy the
company and the conversation to the full. Ammonius12 claims that everybody
needs culture and speeches (QC IX 14.2, 743e-f ), just after Herodes the
9 Cf. M. C, 1986 and B. R, 1997, pp. 239-41 for an outline of Plutarch's
use of Greek and Latin. B. R, 1997, p. 261 specically studies the discussion of the
etymology of κῆνα .
10 e use of literary quotations in speeches was a demonstration of the speaker's learning
and erudition, but they were also an important rhetorical device that could enhance the speech's
elegance and charm: ἔπειτα περὶ στίχων εὐκαιρίας ἐνέβαλεν λόγον, ὡς μὴ μόνον χάριν ἀλλὰ
καὶ χρείαν ἔστιν ὅτε μεγάλην ἐχούσης. 736e IX 1, 2; cf. Demetr., Eloc. III 150 and Quint., Inst. I
6.39. For a discussion of the use of quotations from Homer in Plutarch, see J. M. D L,
1994 and I. S, 2004-2005.
11 T. M, 1998 analyses the content, number, and importance of the literary texts used
in the schools of the Empire.
12 Ammonius had organized a banquet for some teachers to celebrate the end of the exams
at the Diogeneion; there they talked about the appropriate occasion to quote ancient books (QC
IX 1.1, 736d), which shows a close relation between education and some banquets.
rhetor has praised the function of rhetoric in conversation, attributing to
rhetoric the same importance in conversation as it has in front of the jury or
in deliberations (IX 14.1, 743d).
For Herodes, the ideal diner was a good ὁμιλητικός, a person able to
speak well when attending an "entretien " 13. roughout the QC, the success of
a banquet depends not so much on the food served but on the conversation
and the company. Plutarch tells Sosius Senecio of a comment once made by
an amiable man:
Χαρίεντος ἀνδρός, ὦ Σόσσιε Σενεκίων, καὶ φιλανθρώπου λόγον ἔχουσι
Ῥωμαῖοι διὰ στόματος, ὅστις ἦν ὁ εἰπών, ἐπεὶ μόνος ἐδείπνησεν, 'βεβρωκέναι,
μὴ δεδειπνηκέναι σήμερον', ὡς τοῦ δείπνου κοινωνίαν καὶ φιλοφροσύνην
ἐφηδύνουσαν ἀεὶ ποθοῦντος. (QC VII Praef. 1, 697c).
e Romans, Sossius Senecio, are fond of quoting a witty and sociable person
who said, after a solitary meal, 'I have eaten, but not dined to-day,' implying
that a 'dinner' always requires friendly sociability for seasoning.14
For this man, the banquet context always represented tolerance and
cordiality. Plutarch also explains that the most important aspect of the banquet
is the presence of a friend, family member or acquaintance – not to eat and
drink with us, but to take part in the give-and-take of conversation (QC VII,
Praef., 1, 697d)15 . In fact, the rst of the questions posed in the second book tries
to establish whether it is better for the food at a banquet to be served to each
guest or on common trays from which each guest should serve himself (QC
II 10, 642e-644e). Hagias favours the use of common trays, since, in his view,
the banquet is an occasion that invites the company to general fellowship (QC
II 10.1, 642f-643a), manifested not only in sharing a common meal but also
in singing, entertainments and conversation (QC II 10.1, 643b). Conversation
is the sustenance that feeds the soul once the body has had its ll of food and
drink (QC V Praef., 1, 673a); men of wit and taste devote themselves to it and
feed the soul once they have eaten, in order to enjoy the pleasure that derives
from talk (QC V Praef., 1, 672e).
So it is not only the body that should be satised at the banquet. Guests
come to share not only meat, wine and dessert, but also entertainments such as
conversation and the amiability that leads to friendship (QC IV Praef., 660b).
For Dicaearchus, it is important to obtain the empathy of all, especially that
of well-bred people; the banquet is a better setting than the market place – a
place where people go to discuss their business – since people normally attend
parties in order to make new friends or to give a good time to the old (QC IV
Praef., 659e-660a). Dicaearchus is not alone; signicantly, in the preface to the
13 Cf. L. P, 1993b, pp. 428-29.
14 Translation taken from E. L. M ., 1961, p. 5.
15 P. A. S, 1999 stresses the importance of conversation in the banquet, which
Plutarch compares with the enjoyment of ne food (see also L. R, 2002, pp. 183-9).
67
Plutarch's Techne Rhetorike for the symposium in Quaestiones Convivales
rst book Plutarch repeats the common belief that eating together encourages
friendship (QC I Praef. , 612d)16 . Later, one of the norms established for the
celebration of the banquet is the prohibition of doing or saying anything
that may impede its principal function: that is, to heighten fellowship, or to
engender it through pleasure (QC I 4.3, 621c). At a banquet it is better to run
out of wine than to take away the pleasure of conversation (QC V 5.2, 679a),
because this would imply the division of the party into separate groups and
would destroy the idea of community (QC V 5.2, 679b). Alexander the Great,
whose deeds and sayings acquired the category of chreiai 17 in the Empire, is
also praised in the QC as a model of a wise man who spent a great deal of time
in banquets, but drank little, preferring to spend his time conversing talking
with friends (QC I 6.1, 623d)18 .
But, how should these conversations technically be according to Plutarch?
e rst question of the rst book seems to be a declaration of intentions, as
Plutarch sets out the types of theme that are suitable for table talk (QC I 1.4,
614a-b). He also summarizes them in the preface to the fth book (QC V
Praef. 1, 673a). In general, they are themes taken from history or from everyday
life, which allow reections on life itself, history, or unusual subjects. Among
the questions discussed in the QC are the appropriateness of talking about
politics (QC VII 9, 714a-d and QC VII 10, 714d-716c) or about philosophy
(QC I 1, 612e-615c). Politics and philosophy, it is concluded, have their place
at the banquet, providing they do not interfere with the main object of the
occasion19 . Philosophical themes should be sought that do not cause angry
confrontations or are so dicult or technical that non-specialists are unable
to take part in the conversation20 and begin singing or telling foolish stories
(QC I 1.5, 614f-615a). Plutarch concludes that pedantry has no place at the
banquet (QC I 1.5, 615b). All the diners must be included and, whether or not
they speak, must feel that they are participants in the conversation (QC VI
Praef. 1, 686c). is is the basic norm for the choice of a theme at a banquet
(QC VII Praef. , 697e).
"What, according to Xenophon, are the most agreeable questions and
jokes to make at table?" (QC II 1, 629d-634f) is the rst question of the second
book: the answer is not very dierent to the one Plutarch gives for philosophy:
16 Plutarch represents friendship as one of the most important elements of society. e
multiple ways of representing and denoting it, both in the Lives and in the Moralia, have been
discussed by M. C, 1997, pp. 110-22; R. G A, 2000; M. L. D,
2001; R. M. A, 2002 and S.-T. T, 2007.
17 A chreia was an example of the words or deeds of a famous person which generally
contained a pedagogical or moral element. cf. R . C, 2001, pp. 223-5 and R. W, 2001,
pp. 294-6 on their rhetorical use as progymnasmata at school.
18 Cf. the contribution of P. G M. M in this volume and T. W, 2002,
pp. 182-3, on the use of the gure of Alexander in the banquet.
19 For an analysis of the themes addressed in the QC see E. S T, 2005, pp.
476-9 and F. M G, 1987, p. 26. S.-T. T, 1995 specically analyses the
inclusion of politics in the QC .
20 For this precise reason, Plutarch cannot include any systematical treatment of the
rhetorical theory in QC, and has to spread his opinions in several passages.
the most agreeable questions are the ones that are accessible to the greatest
number of the guests (QC I 1.5, 614e). ey should be simple, easy to answer,
and must deal with singular themes:
εἰ δὲ δοκεῖ καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπιθέσθαι τῷ λόγῳ, πρῶτον ἡδέως ἐρωτᾶσθαί μοι δοκοῦσιν
ἃ ῥᾳδίως ἀποκρίνασθαι δύνανται· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὧν ἐμπειρίαν ἔχουσιν. ἃ
γὰρ ἀγνοοῦσιν, ἢ μὴ λέγοντες ἄχθονται καθάπερ αἰτηθέντες ὃ δοῦναι μὴ
δύνανται, ἢ λέγοντες ἀπὸ δόξης καὶ εἰκασίας οὐ βεβαίου διαταράσσονται
καὶ κινδυνεύουσιν. ἂν δὲ μὴ μόνον ἔχῃ τὸ ῥᾴδιον ἀλλὰ καί τι περιττὸν ἡ
ἀπόκρισις, ἡδίων ἐστὶ τῷ ἀποκρινομένῳ. (QC II 1.2, 630a)
And yet if it is decided that we too apply ourselves to the problem, it seems
to me, in the rst place, that men are glad to be asked what they are able to
answer easily, that is, questions about matters in which they have experience;
for about what they do not know, either they say nothing and are chagrined
as though asked for what they cannot give or they reply with a guess and an
uncertain conjecture and so nd themselves in a distressing and dangerous
situation. However, if the answer is not only easy but somehow striking, it is
more agreeable to the answerer21.
It is important to ask about things that one's interlocutor will be pleased
to answer (QC II 1.2, 630c); one should not ask about wrongs or misfortune
suered (QC II 1.3, 630e), but should encourage people to speak about their
successes (QC II 1.3, 630f-631a). Similarly, the questions should not lead to
conict; they should elicit not anger or envy among the diners, but goodwill
(QC II 1.3, 631b). However, care is required with conversations that might
contain praise22 . It is important that the host should not drink to one guest
before another (QC I 2.2, 616b), since this may arouse envy and jealousy (QC I
2.3, 616e). And above all one must avoid praising oneself, as the company may
be irritated by the speaker's vainglory (QC II 1.2, 630d).
So, as well as determining which themes are acceptable at a banquet,
another point should be considered before starting to speak: one must bear in
mind who is present (QC I 1.3, 613d)23 . If the philosopher (or, by extension,
any speaker) sees that his dining companions are not interested in his words, he
should change his tone and his subject, in order to follow the others and nd
pleasure in their entertainments (QC I 1.3, 613f). An awareness of the right
occasion and the situation in which one nds oneself (καιρός ) 24 is especially
21 Translation taken from P. A. C H. B. H, 1969, p. 111.
22 L. P, 1993a, lists all the aspects that regulated the techniques of composing and
delivering speeches of praise. Despite dealing with epideictic oratory, they can be applied as well
to praises in conversations.
23 Knowing the audience to which one addresses a speech was a basic norm for the orators
in courtrooms and tribunals; by adapting their words to the occasion, their speech could achieve
its objective, according to Quint., Inst. XI 1.43.
24 Appropriateness is one of the basic virtues of the orator. A speech should be delivered in
the right place, at the right moment and in the right manner; cf. Arist., Rh. III 7 1408a-b and
Quint., Inst. XI 1.1.
69
Plutarch's Techne Rhetorike for the symposium in Quaestiones Convivales
important to avoid errors when speaking (QC I 1.1, 613a). As Simonides says
to one of his interlocutors who remained silent, it may even be preferable to
say nothing if one runs the risk of saying something inappropriate:
Σιμωνίδης ὁ ποιητής, ὦ Σόσσιε Σενεκίων, ἔν τινι πότῳ ξένον ἰδὼν
κατακείμενον σιωπῇ καὶ μηδενὶ διαλεγόμενον, 'ὦ ἄνθρωπ'' εἶπεν, 'εἰ μὲν
ἠλίθιος εἶ, σοφὸν πρᾶγμα ποιεῖς· εἰ δὲ σοφός, ἠλίθιον.' 'ἀμαθίην γὰρ ἄμεινον'
ὥς φησιν Ἡράκλειτος [fr. 95] 'κρύπτειν'. (QC III Praef. 1, 644e)
When the poet Simonides at some drinking-party, my dear Sossius Senecio,
saw a guest sitting in silence and holding no conversation with anyone, he said,
'Sir, if you are a fool, you are doing a wise thing; but if wise, a foolish thing.' As
Heraclitus remarks, 'it is containly better to conceal ignorance'25.
When one is ready to speak and is sure that the inuentio 26 is correct, the
elocutio27 of the speech must also conform to certain basic precepts. In the fourth
question of the rst book, Plutarch examines the qualities of the ideal director
of the feast. One of them is the ability to give brief and concise instructions
(QC I 4.1, 620b). In fact, brevitas/βραχύτης 28 is one of characteristics stressed
most by treatises on rhetoric. It is required especially in the narrations of events
and the presentation of arguments: in the rst case, so that the explanations
should not be excessively long and the thread of the story be lost, and in the
second, so that the presentation should be energetic, vigorous, clear, and direct.
Although Plutarch does not mention the point explicitly, his reproduction of
the conversation of his dining companions suggests that the most important
features of their interventions are moderation and brevity. is brevity
should not be considered as a lack of expressiveness, but as the need to avoid
superuity or irrelevance to the theme under discussion29 and to make sure
that a single speaker should not turn the conversation into a monologue and
thus defeat the point of the banquet. In the arguments presented during the
symposiac gathering, Plutarch also recommends that speakers try to persuade
their audiences rather than to demonstrate things to them; they should reserve
the use of methods such as enthymemes or syllogisms30 for situations that
require a more energetic and direct type of argumentation (QC I 1.4, 614c).
25 Translation taken from P. A. C H. B. H, 1969, p. 199.
26 e inuentio ( εὕρεσις) is the part of rhetoric that analyses the elements that should be
included in speeches; cf. Quint., Inst. III 3.1 and Hermog., inv. 1.65.
27 e elocutio (λέξις) is the part of rhetoric that analyses how the thought and ideas in the
speech are expressed in language; cf. Arist., Rh. III 1 1403b, Quint., Inst.VIII 1.1.
28 Brevity is one of the main virtues of speeches in the simple style; cf. Demetr., Eloc. IV
197-198, Cic., Inv. 1.28 and Quint., Inst. IV 2.31.
29 Quint., Inst. IV 2.42 notes that brevity does not imply speaking little, but that the speech
should not last longer than is strictly necessary. However, excessive brevity is considered an
error: the speaker may leave out important details.
30 Enthymemes and syllogisms are variations on the method of argumentation which
proceeds from deductions made on the basis of logical and dialectical premises and conclusions;
cf. Arist., Rh. I 2 1356a-b and Quint., Inst.V 14.5.
Menander, whose works were among the main instruments used to teach Greek
to schoolchildren, was a model for the ideal style that should be used in the
speeches and his works were appropriate at the banquet as well (QC VII 8.3,
712b). is seems to mean that the style of a table talk must be agreeable and
simple31 , without great ornamentation or metrical rhythms more characteristic
of grander occasions, and must use simple, sensible sentences. And nally, to
heighten the pleasure, seriousness and light-heartedness should be combined32 ,
as Plutarch notes in other passages (QC I 4.3, 621d). e place of jokes at
the banquet is discussed in detail in the QC, though the instructions given
concerning their use are the same as those that refer to serious interventions33 .
One should only use jokes that give pleasure. Just as one should be aware of the
aptness of what one is about to say, one should consider whether it is better to
make the joke or to remain silent (QC II 1.4, 631c); one must be alert to the
opportune moment (QC II 1.10, 633e). A successful joke is one that emerges
naturally from the conversation, one that has an unaected tone, and does not
appear to be premeditated or forced (QC II 2.13, 634d-e). In summary, then,
jokes should be used with discretion, in the same way as good sense is applied
to avoid problems in other situations such as the market place, the arena, or the
courtroom (QC I 5.2, 622b).
e harmony of the meeting will be maintained if all these rules of protocol
are followed. However, the director of the feast must know what to do and what
to say on occasions in which this harmony is threatened. e main dangers that
the host may face are disputes between his fellow diners and the excesses caused
by wine. Some, who have little interest in maintaining friendship, raise topics of
conversation that may bring to light the imperfections in the character of the
others (QC III Praef. 2, 645b). Quite often diners may argue with each other,
or with a servant or with the host himself. is situation is unbecoming among
friends and in the banquet context (QC II 10.2, 644a)34 . So the host should
be careful to seat the guests at table in such a way as to reduce rivalries as far
as possible; dicult guests should be kept apart so as to avoid ghts between
poets and sophists (QC I 2.6, 618e) or teachers (QC IX 1.1, 736e). In general,
then, the host must also create a cordial atmosphere among the diners to avoid
situations of tension (QC I 4.2, 621a). Wine is an excellent instrument for
helping people to relax, to speak to the other guests and to strike up friendships
(QC IV Praef., 660c)35 ; but excess may lead to inappropriate behaviour and may
31 For Dionysius of Halicarnassus (D. H., . 48) the skill in the application of the virtues
of expression should be present both in courtrooms and tribunals and in conversations between
friends.
32 e importance of laughter as a fundamental part of the banquet and as a counterpoint
to the seriousness of philosophical conversations has been stressed by P. G M. J,
1999 and F. F, 2000a, pp. 487-9.
33 Cf. M. A. B, 2007 for a detailed study of the conception of jokes in Plutarch's QC.
34 P. G, (in press), analyses the vision given by Lucian, in the Symposium or the Lapiths ,
of a banquet disrupted by the ghts between sophists and philosophers caused by excessive
drinking.
35 As explained by L. R, 2002, pp. 172-6, S.-T. T, 1999 and F. B. T,
71
Plutarch's Techne Rhetorike for the symposium in Quaestiones Convivales
cause men to chatter about matters that should remain concealed (QC III Praef.
2, 645b). Excessive drinking also reduces the ability to speak correctly (QC III
5.2, 652d)36 , a skill that is of vital importance to the success of the banquet.
Indeed, there is nothing more imprudent or out-of-place than a conversation
produced by excessive drinking (QC VIII Praef. , 716e)37 . Finally, if nothing can
be done to resolve a conict or to calm a squabble more typical of the market
place than of a feast, the discussion should stop and make way for musical
entertainment (QC VII 8.4, 713e-f ). But music should not be introduced if it is
unnecessary: the diners should take their main pleasure from conversation (QC
VII 8.4, 713d), because conversation should be the centre of the banquet at all
times (QC VII 8.4, 713b-c).
So appropriate conversation helps to create a congenial atmosphere and to
establish bonds of empathy and fellowship feeling between the guests. Talk is
the most important element of the banquet, its foundation. As a rhetor would
have done, Plutarch details the themes that should be discussed at banquets,
how one should speak and even what one should do if the conversation ags.
ough scattered throughout the QC rather than brought together in a
cohesive whole, Plutarch's descriptions are sucient to show the reader that
even at the dinner table, an intimate and relaxed meeting, the techne rhetorike
help guests to participate in a suitable manner in the conversation and help
them to make and maintain friendships.
W o r k s c i T e d
A, R. M., "La amistad según Plutarco: los Moralia", in L. T
(ed.), Scritti in onore di Italo Gallo, Napoli, 2002, pp. 7-26.
B, M. A., "Amor hacia el prójimo: el difícil arte de la broma según Plutarco",
in J. M. N I (ed.), El amor en Plutarco. Actas IX Simposio
Internacional de la Sociedad Española de Plutarquistas (León, 28-30
de Septiembre de 2006), León, 2007, pp. 105-12.
C D, E., "El léxico de la embriaguez en Plutarco," in A. P
J, & F. C B (eds.), Estudios Sobre Plutarco
Misticismo y Religiones Mistéricas en la Obra de Plutarco. Actas del
VII Simposio Español sobre Plutarco. (Palma de Mallorca, 2-4 de
Noviembre, 2000), Madrid, 2001, pp. 473-82.
C, M., "Plutarco en la encrucijada lingüística greco-romana", Scriptura,
2 (1986), pp. 117-23.
1999, wine occupies a key function in the banquet, as the name sym-posion itself shows; in
moderate amounts, it animates diners and helps them to participate actively in conversation.
36 Quint., Inst. XI Praef., 1 identies the eects of wine on the ability to speak as poor
pronunciation, a mannered air, tomfoolery, or the trembling characteristic of old age.
37 e vocabulary that Plutarch uses to denote excessive drinking and its consequences for
the drinker is the key feature of the study of E. C D, 2001.
_____ Plutarco. Virtudes y vicios de sus héroes biográcos, Lleida, 1997.
C, P. A. H, H. B., Plutarch's Moralia, VIII, Cambridge, Mass.,
1969.
C, R., Gymnastics of the mind: Greek Education in Hellenistic and Roman
Egypt, Princeton, 2001.
D, M. L., "Amis/amitié", in F. H (ed.), Plutarque. Vies parallèles ,
Paris, 2001, pp. 1952-4.
D L, J. M., "Tipología y función de las citas homéricas en el De
audiendis poetis de Plutarco", in M. G V (ed.), Estudios sobre
Plutarco: ideas religiosas. Actas del III Simposio Español sobre Plutarco,
Madrid, 1994, pp. 681-96.
F D, J. A., "El sentido del humor de Plutarco", in J. A.
F D & F. P P (eds.), Estudios
sobre Plutarco: Aspectos Formales. Actas del IV Simposio Español sobre
Plutarco (Salamanca, 26-28, Mayo, 1994), Madrid, 1996, pp. 381-
404.
F, F. (a), "Rires et rieurs dans l'oeuvre de Plutarque", in M. L. D
(ed.), Le Rire des Grecs. Anthropologie du rire en Grèce ancienne, Grenoble,
2000, pp. 469-94.
____ (b), "La rhétorique contemporaine sous le regard de Plutarque", in L.
V S (ed.), Rhetorical eory and Praxis in Plutarch. Acta of
the IVth International Congress of the International Plutarch Society
(Leuven, July 3-6, 1996), Louvain, Namur, 2000, pp. 183-202.
G A, R., "La parole dell'amicizia. Prassi retorica nel De
amicorum multitudine", in L. V S (ed.), Rhetorical eory
and Praxis in Plutarch. Acta of the IVth International Congress of
the International Plutarch Society (Leuven, July 3-6, 1996), Louvain,
Namur, 2000, pp. 225-36.
G, P., "Llucià a taula: aliments i simposi", in F. M . (eds.),
Llucià de Samòsata: escriptor grec i ciutadà romà, Barcelona (in press).
G, P. & J, M., "La risa y el vino en los escritos simposíacos de
Plutarco", in J. G. M C . (eds.), Plutarco, Dioniso y El
Vino. Actas del VI Simposio Español Sobre Plutarco (Cádiz, 14-16 de
Mayo, 1998), Madrid, 1999, pp. 255-68.
K, G., e Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World, Princeton, 1972.
M, A., I discorsi per le feste e per i giochi (Ars Rhet. I et VI Us.- Rad.) ,
Roma, 2005.
M, H. I., Histoire de l'éducation dans l'antiquité, Paris, 1948.
73
Plutarch's Techne Rhetorike for the symposium in Quaestiones Convivales
M J., H. M., "Plutarch", in S. E. P (ed.), Handbook of Classical
Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period (300 B.C.-A.D. 400), Leiden, 2001, pp.
715-36.
M G, F., Plutarco. Obras morales y de costumbres IV. Charlas de
sobremesa, Madrid, 1987.
M, G., "Strutture retoriche e colloquiali nelle Quaestiones convivales",
in G. D'I, & I. G (eds.), Strutture Formali Dei Moralia
Di Plutarco. Atti del III Convegno Plutarcheo (Palermo, 3-5 Maggio,
1989), Napoli, 1991, pp. 295-314.
M, E. L. ., Plutarch's Moralia, IX, Cambridge, Mass., 1961.
M, T., Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman worlds, Cambridge,
1998.
P, L. (a), La rhétorique de l'éloge dans le monde gréco-romain, Paris, 1993.
_____ (b), "Un rendez-vous manqué", in L. P, Rhétoriques de la
conversation, de l'Antiquité a l'époque moderne, Rhetorica XI.4, 1993, pp.
421-437.
P P, F., "El banquete de Plutarco: ¿cción literaria o realidad
histórica?", in J. G. M C . (eds.), Plutarco, Dioniso y El
Vino. Actas de VI Simposio Español Sobre Plutarco (Cádiz, 14-16 de
Mayo, 1998), Madrid, 1999, pp. 379-92.
R, B., Le latin dans le monde grec, Bruxelles, 1997.
R, L., Philosophes entre mots et mets: Plutarque, Lucien, Athénée autour de
la table de Platon, Grenoble, 2002.
S, I., "Homer in the dining room: an ancient rhetorical interpretation
of the duel between Paris and Menelaus (Plu., Quaest. conv. 9, 13)", CW,
598 4 (2004-2005), pp. 379-96.
S, P. A . , "Drinking, Table Talk, and Plutarch's Contemporaries", in J.
G. M C . (eds.), Plutarco, Dioniso y El Vino. Actas del
VI Simposio Español sobre Plutarco (Cádiz, 14-16 de Mayo, 1998),
Madrid, 1999, pp. 481-90.
S T, E., "Diálogo, losofía y simposio en Plutarco", in M.
J . (eds.), Plutarc a la seva època: Paideia i societat. Actas del
VIII Simposio Internacional de la Sociedad Española de Plutarquistas
(Barcelona, 6-8 de Noviembre, 2003), Barcelona, 2005, pp. 463-84.
T, S.-T., "La politica nelle Questioni conviviali", in I. G & B.
S (eds.), Teoria e Prassi Politica nelle Opere di Plutarco. Atti del
V Convegno plutarcheo (Certosa di Pontignano, 7-9 Giugno, 1993),
Napoli, 1995, pp. 433-8.
74
Lluís Gonzàlez Julià
_____ "Principles of composition in the Quaestiones Convivales", in J. A.
F D & F. P P (eds.), Estudios
sobre Plutarco: Aspectos Formales. Actas del IV Simposio Español sobre
Plutarco (Salamanca, 26-28 de Mayo, 1994), Madrid, 1996, pp. 39-48.
_____ "Dionysus moderated and calmed: Plutarch on the connvival wine", in
J. G. M C . (eds.), Plutarco, Dioniso y El Vino. Actas del
VI Simposio Español sobre Plutarco (Cádiz, 14-16 de Mayo, 1998),
Madrid, 1999, pp. 57-69.
_____ "Four terms of friendly emotion in Plutarch: φιλανθρωπία, φιλία, ἔρως,
φιλοστοργία", in J. M. N I (ed.), El amor en Plutarco. Actas
IX Simposio Internacional de la Sociedad Española de Plutarquistas
(León, 28-30 de Septiembre, 2006), León, 2007, pp. 209-19.
T, F. B., "Everything to do with Dionysus: banquets in Plutarch's
'Lives'", in V S, L. (ed.), Rhetorical eory and Praxis in
Plutarch. Acta of the IVth International Congress of the International
Plutarch Society (Leuven, July 3-6, 1996), Louvain, Namur, 2000.
W, R., "e Progymnasmata as Practice", in Y. L. T (ed.), Education in
Greek and Roman World, Leiden, 2001, pp. 289-316.
W, T., "Alexander's Hellenism and Plutarch's Textualism", CQ, 52.1
(2002), pp. 174-92.
_____ Greek Literature and the Roman Empire. e Politics of Imitation, Oxford,
2001.
75
Inuencia de los progymnasmata en la composición de los symposia de Plutarco
in f l u e n c i a d e l o s p r o g y m n a S m a T a e n l a c o m p o s i c i ó n d e l o s
S y m p o S i a d e pl u T a r c o : e l c a s o d e e l b a n Q u e T e D e l o S S i e T e S a b i o S
A V S
Universidad de Zaragoza
Abstract
In the ancient schools of rhetoric some exercises (called progymnasmata) were practiced in
order to teach the students how they should write literary compositions. is training had
some inuence on the composition of the Septem Sapientium Convivium. ese "preliminary
exercises" are preserved in some textbooks of prose composition and rhetoric. In this case,
the earliest collection of exercises has been used: eon's Progymnasmata Handbook, which
probably dates from the rst century after Christ. e three progymnasmata analysed in this
study are: χρεία ( chreia or anecdote ), μῦθος ( fable) and διήγημα (narration). ey are present
in the Septem Sapientium Convivium in many dierent ways. e aim of this study is to
specify them, to compare their form to eon's Handbook, and to explain how Plutarch used
them.
Como reza el título de este trabajo1 se va a estudiar la presencia y uso
de algunos ejercicios preparatorios propios de las escuelas de retórica en
El banquete de los Siete Sabios. Evidentemente nos encontramos ante una
composición literaria que, como tal, no va a reproducir con exactitud esos
προγυμνάσματα, pero sí pueden vislumbrarse las huellas de la formación
retórica: unas características y unos rasgos que inequívocamente nos
remiten a ellos2 . Dada la extensión de este trabajo, se va a limitar el análisis
a tres tipos de progymnasma : χρεία , μῦθος y διήγημα; y, por el mismo
motivo, sólo se expondrá algún ejemplo representativo de cada ejercicio.
El punto de partida de estas comparaciones va a ser el manual de Teón,
el primero que se nos ha conservado3 , probablemente contemporáneo4 de
Plutarco.
1 Realizado bajo los auspicios del Proyecto de Investigación H 2007-64772 de la
Dirección General de Enseñanza Superior e Investigación Cientíca.
2 Vide otros trabajos que desarrollan esta relación entre los progymnasmata y la técnica
compositiva de Plutarco: M. B, 2005 y 2005b; J. A. F D, 2000 y 2005; L.
M C, 2005; F. P P, 2005; A. V S, 2005.
3 El propio autor comenta que existen manuales anteriores: eon, p. 59: περάσομαι
παραδοῦναι, οὐχ ὡς οὐχὶ καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν συγγεγραφότων περὶ τούτων, ἀλλ' οὐ μικρόν τι
καὶ αὐτὸς ελπίζων συλλήψεσθαι τοῖς λέγειν προαιρουμένοις. Se ha utilizado la edición de M.
P, 1997, conservando la numeración de la canónica de L. S, Rhetores Graeci, vol.
II, Leipzig, 1854.
4 Compuesto quizá este manual de ejercicios en el siglo I o entre nales del siglo I y
principios del II; cf. R. F. H & E. N. O'N, 1986, p. 10; M. P , 1997, pp. VII sqq.,
G. A. K, 1972, pp. 615 s., y 1983, pp. 54 sqq. y 2003, p. XII s. y 1. Para una datación más
tardía, vide M. H, 2000, pp. 129 sqq., aunque la crítica en general – y también este trabajo
– preere esa datación en torno al siglo I.
I. Χρεῖαι. Las siguientes seis χρεῖαι pronunciadas en El banquete 5 pueden
conformar una idea de su forma y uso en este tratado6 , si bien son muchas más
las que contiene la obra7 .
nº 1 y 2. 147A-B: ὡς ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ Μολπαγόρου τοῦ Ἴωνος τί
παραδοξότατον εἴης ἑωρακώς, ἀποκρίναιο 'τύραννον γέροντα', καὶ πάλιν ἔν
τινι πότῳ, περὶ τῶν θηρίων λόγου γενομένου, φαίης κάκιστον εἶναι τῶν μὲν
ἀγρίων θηρίων τὸν τύραννον, τῶν δ' ἡμέρων τὸν κόλακα.
nº 3. 147B-C: πρὸς δὲ τὴν μετάθεσιν τὸ τοῦ νεανίσκου πέπονθα τοῦ
βαλόντος μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν κύνα πατάξαντος δὲ τὴν μητρυιὰν καὶ εἰπόντος 'οὐδ'
οὕτω κακῶς.'
nº 4. 148A: ὅθεν ἄριστα Χίλων, καλούμενος ἐχθές, οὐ πρότερον
ὡμολόγησεν ἢ πυθέσθαι τῶν κεκλημένων ἕκαστον. ἔφη γὰρ ὅτι σύμπλουν
ἀγνώμονα δεῖ φέρειν καὶ σύσκηνον οἷς πλεῖν ἀνάγκη καὶ στρατεύεσθαι·
πρὸς δὲ τὸ συμπόταις ἑαυτὸν ὡς ἔτυχε καταμιγνύειν οὐ νοῦν ἔχοντος ἀνδρός
ἐστιν.
nº 5. 152A: τοὺς νόμους ὁ Σόλων ἔφη μετακινητικοὺς εἶναι.
nº 6. 153E: ὁ δὲ προπίνων τὴν θάλατταν Ἀμάσιδι βάρβαρος ἐδεῖτο
τῆς Πιττακοῦ βραχυλογίας, ᾗ πρὸς Ἀλυάττην ἐχρήσατο προστάττοντά τι
καὶ γράφοντα Λεσβίοις ὑπερήφανον, ἀποκρινάμενος οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ μόνον
κελεύσας κρόμμυα καὶ θερμὸν ἄρτον ἐσθίειν.
La chreia es, según el manual de Teón, un breve dicho o acción atribuidos
a un personaje generalmente conocido8 , como es el caso de la mayoría que
5 El texto procede de la edición de J. D ., Plutarque. Oeuvres morales, II, París,
1985.
6 Sobre su presencia en De tuenda sanitate praecepta, vide M. B, 2005, pp. 209 sqq. y
2005b, pp. 176 sqq.; sobre su uso en otras obras, vide M. B, 2005b, pp. 325 sqq. (agradezco
a la autora, Mariangela Bellu, su gentileza al permitirme consultar su tesis doctoral).
7 Además de las estudiadas en este trabajo, pueden citarse las siguientes χρεῖαι pronunciadas
por los personajes: 147C (Tales se sirve de una armación de Pítaco), 149A-B (Tales reprocha
a Alexídemo mediante las palabras de un lacedemonio anónimo), 155 D (Quilón sustenta su
parecer a través de una contestación de Licurgo), 158C (Cleodoro cita una opinión de Tales),
160A-B (Solón utiliza unos versos homéricos). A éstas podrían añadirse las χρεῖαι que Plutarco,
a través de la narración de Diocles, se permite utilizar: 147A (una armación de Nilóxeno),
150B-C (réplica de Bías a Tales), 152A-D (χρεῖαι de los sabios respondiendo a la propuesta
de Periandro sobre reyes y tiranos; a ellas se añade la aportación de Periandro a petición de
sus comensales), 152D (intervenciones de Quilón y Esopo), 154D-E (opiniones de los sabios
y de Periandro sobre el gobierno igualitario, a petición de Mnesílo), 155C-D (opiniones de
los sabios acerca de la mejor casa, a petición de Diocles), 157B (Cleobulo, para contestar a una
demanda de Quersias, cuenta una fábula cuyo "enlace" - vide infra - consiste en una χρεία), 157
C (primera parte de la contestación de Cleobulo a Cleodoro), 157D (intervención de Tales
sobre la persona de Epiménides).
8 eon, p. 96: χρεία ἐστὶ σύντομος ἀπόφασις ἢ πρᾶξις μετ' εὐστοχίας ἀναφερομένη εἴς τι
ὡρισμένον πρόσωπον ἢ ἀναλογοῦν προσώπῳ, p. 97: ἡ μὲν γὰρ σύντομος. Puede hacer referencia,
por otra parte, tanto a lo particular como a lo general (eon, p. 96: καὶ τῷ ποτὲ μὲν τὸ καθόλου,
ποτὲ δὲ τὸ ἐπὶ μέρους ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὴν χρείαν), y se caracteriza también especialmente por
ser útil o graciosa o ambas cosas a la vez (eon, p. 96: ἔτι δὲ τῷ χαριεντίζεσθαι τὴν χρείαν
ἐνίοτε μηδὲν ἔχουσαν βιωφελές, p. 97: εἴρηται δὲ χρεία κατ' ἐξοχήν, ὅτι μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων
πρὸς πολλὰ χρειώδης ἐστὶ τῷ βίῳ). Sobre la denición y uso de la chreia en la retórica, vide M.
77
Inuencia de los progymnasmata en la composición de los symposia de Plutarco
incluye Plutarco en El banquete de los Siete Sabios; las atribuidas a personajes no
determinados son muy poco frecuentes, como la del joven de la χρεία nº 39 .
Respecto de las clases de chreia, tenemos representados en El Banquete de
los Siete Sabios casi todas las que Teón propone: verbales, de acción y mixtas.
Así, siguiendo su clasicación, tiene el opúsculo chreiai verbales10 - las que
sólo contienen un dicho - tanto enunciativas de tipo espontáneo11 y de tipo
circunstancial (así las chreiai nº 2 y 5), como del género llamado "de respuesta",
de cuyos tipos utiliza especialmente Plutarco el de indagación y el interrogativo-
causal: uno consiste no sólo en armar o negar, sino en una respuesta extensa12
(nº 1) y el otro en añadir a la respuesta una causa, un consejo o algo similar13
(nº 6)14 . Asimismo habla Teón de un último tipo dentro de las verbales que
serían las dobles15 , por contener armaciones de dos personajes16, aunque una
de ellas sola ya puede considerarse una chreia. Otro género de chreiai son las
acciones que sin palabras muestran un pensamiento17 . Y, por último, habla
Teón de chreiai mixtas18 , mezcla de las anteriores y ejemplicadas en nº 3 y 4.
Por otra parte las χρεῖαι tienen distintos modos de enunciación según
Teón (τρόποι, eo, p. 99) y en El banquete tenemos representados casi todos
esos modos, de los que aquí vamos a reejar algunos mediante los seis ejemplos
seleccionados. Un modo de enunciación ciertamente frecuente es la sentencia
(γνωμολογικῶς , eon, p. 99), como puede apreciarse en la armación de
Solón acerca de las leyes (nº 5). Igualmente reiterada es la expresión de una
χρεία con forma de demostración (ἀποδεικτικῶς, eon, p. 99), como la
de Quilón respecto de los compañeros de banquete (nº 4). Muy apreciadas
B, 2005b, pp. 65 sqq.
9 Anónima es también la pronunciada por un lacedemonio en 149A-B.
10 eon, p. 97: τῶν δὲ λογικῶν εἴδη δύο, ἀποφαντικὸν καὶ ἀποκριτικόν· τοῦ δὲ ἀποφαντικοῦ
αἱ μέν εἰσι καθ' ἑκούσιον ἀπόφασιν, οἷον (…)̣· αἱ δὲ κατὰ περίστασιν, οἷον Διογένης (…)·
οὐ γὰρ ὁ Διογένης ἁπλῶς ἀπεφήνατο, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν εἶδεν. ἔτι καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀποκριτικοῦ εἰσιν
εἴδη τέσσαρα, τό τε κατ' ἐρώτησιν, καὶ τὸ κατὰ πύσμα, καὶ τὸ κατ' ἐρώτησιν αἰτιῶδες, καὶ τὸ
ὁμωνύμως τῷ γένει λεγόμενον ἀποκριτικόν.
11 Como la de Pítaco en 147C, o la de Tales en 158C.
12 eon, p. 97 s.: τὸ δὲ πύσμα μακροτέραν ἀπαιτεῖ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν.·
13 eon, p. 98: αἱ δὲ κατ' ἐρώτησιν αἰτιώδεις εἰσίν, ὅσαι χωρὶς τῆς πρὸς τὴν ἐρώτησιν
ἀποκρίσεως καὶ αἰτίαν τινὰ ἔχουσιν ἢ συμβουλὴν ἤ τι τοιοῦτον.
14 Otros ejemplos son las opiniones de los sabios y de Periandro sobre el gobierno de reyes y
tiranos en 152A-D, la chreia de 157B, las opiniones sobre el gobierno igualitario de 154D-E y
sobre el de una casa 155C-D, opiniones todas ellas que responden a algún comensal que así lo
ha pedido (a petición de Periandro en 151E-F, de Quersias en 157A, de Mnesílo en 154C-D
y de Diocles en 154F, respectivamente).
15 eon, p. 98: ἔστι δὲ παρὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλο εἶδος ἐμπῖπτον εἰς τὰς λογικὰς καλούμενον
διπλοῦν, διπλῆ δέ ἐστι χρεία ἡ δύο προσώπων ἀποφάσεις ἔχουσα, ὧν καὶ ἡ ἑτέρα μεθ' ἑνὸς
προσώπου χρείαν ποιεῖ.
16 Como las intervenciones de Quilón y Esopo en 152D.
17 eon, p. 98: πρακτικαὶ δέ εἰσιν αἱ χωρὶς λόγου ἐμφαίνουσαί τινα νοῦν. De ellas hallamos
en el Banquete de los Siete Sabios el tipo activo (eon, p. 98: τῶν δὲ πρακτικῶν αἱ μέν εἰσιν
ἐνεργητικαί, αἱ δὲ παθητικαί, ἐνεργητικαὶ μὲν ὅσαι δηλοῦσί τινα ἐνέργειαν ) de estas πρακτικαὶ
χρεῖαι en la armación de Nilóxeno acerca de la relación de Bías con los reyes (147A).
18 eon, p. 99: μικταὶ δέ εἰσιν ὅσαι τοῦ μὲν λογικοῦ καὶ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ κοινωνοῦσιν, ἐν δὲ
τῷ πρακτικῷ τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσιν.
son las χρεῖαι pronunciadas con gracia ( κατὰ χαριεντισμόν , eon, p. 99)
y en El banquete ese es el resultado de la respuesta de Tales a Molpágoras
acerca de lo más extraordinario que ha visto: "un tirano viejo" (nº 1)19 . La
enunciación puede hacerse de forma gurada (τροπικῶς, eon, p. 100), y así
se expresa Tales al identicar a los tiranos con la peor de las eras salvajes, y
a los aduladores, con las domésticas (nº 2). Cuando se emite una respuesta
distinta a la pregunta realizada, dice Teón que se trata del modo denominado
metalepsis20 , algo que utiliza sabiamente Pítaco para replicar a Aliates cuando
éste de un modo soberbio escribió y envió ciertas órdenes a los lesbios, y
Pítaco no le contestó otra cosa que animarle a comer cebollas y pan caliente
(nº 6). Por último hay un modo que baraja los anteriores, con la posibilidad de
múltiples combinaciones21 , y así, por medio del ejemplo (κατὰ παράδειγμα ,
eon, p. 100) y compuesto con gracia (κατὰ χαριεντισμόν, eon, p. 99),
menciona Tales la χρεία de un joven (nº 3): "Y en relación con esta situación,
he experimentado lo del joven que tirando a su perra, le dio a su suegra y dijo:
"no está mal así tampoco"22 .
A la hora de componer las chreiai pueden ejercitarse una serie de pasos
(γυμνάζονται , eon, p. 101), comenzando por una exposición clara (καὶ ἡ
μὲν ἀπαγγελία φανερά ἐστι, eon, p. 101), algo que, como puede apreciarse
en la selección de textos, Plutarco cumple a la perfección. En segundo lugar,
como es natural en un ejercicio escolar, se recomienda practicar los distintos
números y casos23 en cada chreia, y también Plutarco ilustrará esta práctica:
así pasa en la enunciación del singular al plural en nuestros ejemplos nº 2,
4 y 524 , o manteniendo el singular en nº 1, 3 y 6. En cuanto a los casos, tal y
como lo indica Teón25 , el nominativo no presenta ninguna dicultad y todas
19 Si bien a continuación Tales atribuye esta χρεία a Pítaco, mencionando, además, que la
dijo en broma (147B: 'ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μέν', εἶπεν ὁ Θαλῆς, 'Πιττακοῦ ἐστιν, εἰρημένον ἐν παιδιᾷ
ποτε πρὸς Μυρσίλον'.
20 eon, p. 100: κατὰ μετάληψιν δέ ἐστιν, ὅταν τὸ λεγόμενον καὶ τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἐπ' ἄλλο
τις ἀποκρινόμενος μεταλαμβάνῃ.
21 eon, p. 100: ὁ δὲ συνεζευγμένος τρόπος οὐκ ἄδηλός ἐστιν, ὅτι πολλαχῶς γίνεται· ἢ
γὰρ γνωμικῷ χαριεντισμῷ συμπλακήσεται, ἢ παραδείγματι συμβολικῷ ἢ ἀμφιβολίᾳ καὶ
μεταλήψει ἢ ἁπλῶς καθ' ὅσους καὶ ἄλλους τρόπους δύναται συγγενέσθαι συζυγία, ἤτοι δυοῖν
ἢ καὶ πλειόνων τρόπων εἰς μίαν χρείαν παραλαμβανομένων. Es frecuente esta miscelánea en
el Banquete: con gracia y de forma alegórica (συμβολικῶς, eon, p. 100 – según el uso que Teón
le da a este modo συμβολικῶς; vide M. P, p. 23, n. 142 y D. Eloc. 99 sqq.) le replica Bías
a Tales acerca de su capacidad de discusión bajo los efectos de Dioniso (150B-C); sentencia
más demostración encontramos en la chreia de Cleobulo en 157B; o sentencia más ejemplo en
157C.
22 La misma combinación aparece en las palabras del lacedemonio anónimo de 149A-B.
23 eon, p. 101: ἡ δὲ κλίσις ἐστὶ ποικίλη. τὰ γὰρ ἐν τῇ χρείᾳ πρόσωπα εἰς τοὺς τρεῖς
ἀριθμοὺς ἐναλλάττομεν, καὶ τοῦτο οὐχ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλ' οἷον ἑνὸς πρὸς ἕνα καὶ πρὸς δύο, καὶ πρὸς
πλείους, καὶ πάλιν δυοῖν πρὸς ἕνα καὶ πρὸς δύο, καὶ…
24 También en 147A, 154D-E, 157C, 160A-B, y en 152A-D y 155C-D combina ese paso
con chreiai de singular a singular, que también tiene lugar en 147C, 149A-B, 150B-C, 152D,
155D, 157B, 157D y 158C.
25 eon, p. 101: ἡ μὲν οὖν ὀρθὴ οὐδεμίαν ἔχει δυσκολίαν· κατὰ γὰρ αὐτὴν ἑκάστη τῶν
χρειῶν εἴωθε προφέρεσθαι.
79
Inuencia de los progymnasmata en la composición de los symposia de Plutarco
las chreiai suelen enunciarse con dicho caso, como ocurre con la mayoría que
utiliza Plutarco (nº 4 y 5 de la selección26 ), aunque también incluye alguna
chreia enunciada en vocativo (κλητική, eon, p. 102 s.; nº 1 y 2), genitivo
(γενικὴ πτῶσις , eon, p. 101 s.; nº 3 y 6) y acusativo27 . A continuación puede
añadirse un epifonema que demuestre de modo apropiado y breve que la chreia
es verdadera, hermosa, útil, de acuerdo con la opinión de hombres reputados28 ,
como en la nº 3, que se corrobora mediante otros personajes - Solón y Pítaco -,
dignos de mención por compartir el mismo punto de vista29 ; y puede replicarse
a partir de los contrarios30 : tras las χρεῖαι nº 1 y 2, como epifonema de réplica,
se critica lo poco agradable de la actitud de Tales31 ; en la nº 5 se considera
la imposibilidad de tal armación tildándola de "ridícula"32 . En quinto lugar
puede ampliarse o abreviarse la chreia (eon, p. 103), siendo esta última opción
la preferida de Plutarco, parco en casi todas ellas33 . Y, por último, se pueden
refutar las chreiai desde diversos puntos de vista (eon, p. 104 s.), aunque
no todos son siempre posibles. Esta parte del desarrollo de la chreia, dada la
brevedad hacia la que tiende Plutarco, no es muy frecuente en El banquete ,
pero aun así encontramos algún ejemplo como el de la inconveniencia (ἐκ
δὲ τοῦ ἀσυμφόρου , eon, p. 104 s.) de las chreiai nº 1 y 234 . Por otro lado,
también pueden conrmarse (eon, p. 105) a partir del argumento contrario
de lo defectuoso (ἐκ τοῦ ἐλλείποντος, eon, p. 104), como en la conrmación
de la χρεία nº 6 (148A: ὅθεν ἄριστα χίλων) antes de enunciarla35 . Entre
otros elementos amplicadores de la chreia, propone Teón también añadir un
proemio (eon, p. 105 s.), pero dado que Plutarco emplea las chreiai como un
elemento más en su narración, evidentemente ha de prescindir de incluir todas
las partes de que puede constar según el manual de ejercicios retóricos.
26 También en 147A, 147C, 149A-B, 150B-C, 152A-D, 152D, 154D-E, 155C-D, 155D,
157B, 157C, 157D, 158C.
27 eon, p. 102: ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς αἰτιατικῆς, por ejemplo en 160A-B.
28 eon, p. 103: ἐπιφωνεῖν δὲ ἔστιν ἀποδεικνυμένους οἰκείως καὶ συντόμως τὸ εἰρημένον
διὰ τῆς χρείας, ἢ ὡς ἀληθές ἐστιν, ἢ ὡς καλόν, ἢ ὡς συμφέρον, ἢ ὡς καὶ ἄλλοις τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο
ἔδοξεν ἀνδράσι δεδοκιμασμένοις.
29 147C: διὸ καὶ Σόλωνα σοφώτατον ἡγησάμην οὐ δεξάμενον τυραννεῖν. καὶ Πιττακὸς
οὗτος εἰ μοναρχίᾳ μὴ προσῆλθεν, οὐκ ἂν εἶπεν ὡς 'χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι'. También puede
mencionarse como epifonema el uso de una fábula de Esopo por parte de Cleobulo (157B:
ὥσπερ ὁ Αἰσώπου κύων…), o la actitud del propio Cleodoro que ha suscitado en 157C la chreia
de Cleobulo, quien a continuación la va a comparar con el proceder del médico (157C: καὶ σὺ
καθάπερ τῷ νόμῳ τῷ λόγῳ τρέφων καὶ διαιτῶν καὶ φαρμακεύων τοὺς κάμνοντας οὐκ ἴσον
ἑκάστῳ, τὸ δὲ προσῆκον ἀπονέμεις ἅπασιν).
30 eon, p. 103: ἀντιλέγομεν δὲ ταῖς χρείαις ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων.
31 147B: τοιαῦτα γάρ, εἰ καὶ πάνυ προσποιοῦνται διαφέρειν οἱ βασιλεῖς τῶν τυράννων, οὐκ
εὐμενῶς ἀκούουσιν.
32 152A: καὶ ἐγώ· 'γελοῖος', ἔφην, 'ὁ λόγος· οὕτω γὰρ ἔδει πρῶτον ἀποποιεῖσθαι τὸν
Λυκοῦργον αὐτοῖς νόμοις ὅλην μετακινήσαντα τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείαν'.
33 Quizá se extiende un poco más con las explicaciones Cleobulo en 157B y Tales añade los
versos de su antriona en Éreso para explicar el dicho sobre Epiménides en 157D.
34 147A: ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἔφην, διεβλήθης μισοβασιλεὺς εἶναι, καί τινες ὑβριστικαί σου περὶ
τυράννων ἀποφάσεις ἀνεφέροντο πρὸς αὐτόν.
35 Y a partir de lo conveniente en 149A-B.
II. Μῦθοι. A continuación ilustraremos el segundo progymnasma estudiado
a través de uno de sus ejemplos36 , la fábula del lobo y los pastores (156A)37 .
Según el progymnasma Περὶ μύθου es la fábula una composición falsa pero
que representa la verdad38 y que a pesar de ser falsa e imposible, sin embargo,
es verosímil y útil39 . Puesto que Plutarco las emplea como un elemento más
dentro de su composición, no tendremos las fábulas como tal ejercicio retórico
con todas sus partes y secciones40 , pero aun así pueden observarse algunas de
las características que propugna la progymnasmatica, como su exposición, su
declinación, su enlace a un relato, su abreviación y, en ocasiones, su conrmación.
La exposición (ἀπαγγελία, eon, p. 74) debe hacerse de una forma sencilla
y natural y, a ser posible, sin ornato41 , tal y como nos la presenta Plutarco
(156A):
Τοῦ δὲ Πιττακοῦ γελάσαντος ὁ Αἴσωπος λόγον εἶπε τοιοῦτον· "λύκος ἰδὼν
ποιμένας ἐσθίοντας ἐν σκηνῇ πρόβατον ἐγγὺς προσελθών, 'ἡλίκος ἂν ἦν,'
ἔφη, 'θόρυβος ὑμῶν, εἰ ἐγὼ τοῦτ' ἐποίουν.'
El caso empleado en su declinación (κλίνομεν, eon, p. 74) es el
nominativo únicamente (λύκος ...)42 y pasa de singular a plural. Por otra parte
se inserta la fábula (συμπλέκομεν, eon, p. 75)43 tras unos comentarios sobre
beber vino (155D-156A) y tras plantearse la cuestión de por qué no bebía
vino en ese momento Solón. Anacarsis explica que en realidad teme una ley
de Pítaco que sin embargo él se atrevió a transgredir, momento que aprovecha
Esopo para contar una graciosa fábula. A continuación le responde de nuevo
36 Otras fábulas que aparecen en El banquete son: 150A-B, 155B-C, 157A-B, 157B.
37 Sobre la presencia de la fábula esópica en la obra de Plutarco vide C. G G, 1994,
pp. 605 sqq., y sobre la inuencia de la preceptiva escolar, vide J. A. F D, 2005,
pp. 77 s.; acerca de la fábula y del papel de los animales en el Banquete de los siete sabios, vide M.
A. D L, 2005, pp. 112 sqq.
38 eon, p. 59 y 72: μῦθός ἐστι λόγος ψευδὴς εἰκονίζων ἀλήθειαν. G.-J. V D, 1997,
pp. 47 sqq., analiza la información que acerca de la fábula proporciona Teón, cuya denición es
la más antigua conservada.
39 eon, p. 76: (...) αὐτὸς ὁ μυθοποιὸς ὁμολογεῖ καὶ ψευδῆ καὶ ἀδύνατα συγγράφειν,
πιθανὰ δὲ καὶ ὠφέλιμα.
40 eon, p. 74: καὶ γὰρ ἀπαγγέλλομεν τὸν μῦθον καὶ κλίνομεν καὶ συμπλέκομεν αὐτὸν
διηγήματι, καὶ ἐπεκτείνομεν καὶ συστέλλομεν, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐπιλέγειν αὐτῷ τινα λόγον, καὶ
αὖ λόγου τινὸς προτεθέντος, μῦθον ἐοικότα αὐτῷ συμπλάσασθαι. ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις
ἀνασκευάζομεν καὶ κατασκευάζομεν.
41 eon, p. 74: (...) ἐν δὲ τοῖς μύθοις ἁπλουστέραν τὴν ἑρμηνείαν εἶναι δεῖ καὶ προσφυῆ,
καὶ ὡς δυνατόν, ἀκατάσκευόν τε καὶ σαφῆ.
42 Como ocurre en las fábulas de 150A-B, 155B-C; en 157A-B se declina en acusativo; y en
157B pasa de nominativo a acusativo.
43 De modo que se enlaza esta fábula a su relato a continuación de éste, como en 157A-B,
mientras que otros ejemplos del Banquete realizan un enlace tanto a lo anterior como a lo posterior.
Así en 150A-B Esopo cuenta una fábula referida a la actuación de Alexídemo (148E-F, asunto
mencionado de nuevo a partir de 149F) - que abandona airado el banquete al considerar que se
le había adjudicado una posición deshonrosa -, pero Plutarco hace que sirva igualmente respecto
del propio Esopo gracias al posterior comentario de Quilón: Ὁ δὲ Χίλων λακωνίσας τῇ φωνῇ·
'καὶ τούνη', ἔφη, 'βραδὺς καὶ <κατ>τρέχεις τὸν ἡμίονον'.
81
Inuencia de los progymnasmata en la composición de los symposia de Plutarco
Quilón, que va a aplaudir su intervención - 156A: καὶ ὁ Χίλων· 'ὀρθῶς',
ἔφη, 'Αἴσωπος ἠμύνατο, μικρὸν ἔμπροσθεν ἐπιστομισθεὶς ὑφ' ἡμῶν, εἶτα
νῦν ὁρῶν ἑτέρους τὸν Μνησιφίλου λόγον ὑφηρπακότας'-, de modo que se
convierte en la conrmación (κατασκευή, eon, p. 76 s.), pues Quilón alaba
la conveniencia de la fábula en ese momento. Ante la doble posibilidad de
ampliación o abreviación de la fábula (eon, p. 75) se decanta Plutarco en sus
ejemplos de fábula por la abreviación44 .
III. Διηγήματα. Finalmente vamos a ver la puesta en práctica de otro
progymnasma igualmente repetido en El banquete de los Siete Sabios 45 , el del
relato. Y nos va a servir de ejemplo el primero que Diocles reere, el relato de
Gorgo y el citaredo Arión (160D - 161B y 162A - 162B). Según la denición
del manual, un relato debe tratar hechos acaecidos o como si hubieran
acaecido46 , y Plutarco se las ingenia para conseguir estos efectos, si bien en este
análisis únicamente se va a hacer referencia a las dos partes clave en el ejercicio
del relato, que son los elementos básicos y las ἀρεταί de la narración, puesto
que el resto de indicaciones ofrecen cierta libertad de seguimiento y más bien
consisten en una clasicación de las posibilidades que un relato presenta.
Diocles nos informa a la entrada de Gorgo en el banquete de lo siguiente:
quién es, cuándo llega, adónde había sido enviado, el motivo, el hecho y la
forma de llevarlo a cabo47 ; mientras que a través de las palabras de Gorgo nos
enteraremos, además, del momento y del modo de la acción. De esta manera
quedan cubiertos los elementos necesarios para constituir un relato, como bien
especica Teón48 : el personaje es Gorgo al mando de una expedición religiosa;
el asunto es llevar a cabo una θεωρία y sacricios a Posidón; la acción tiene lugar
en el Ténaro; la expedición religiosa había sido motivada por unos oráculos; el
momento de la acción es durante la noche del último día de los tres que duró
la expedición; y, por último, según las indicaciones de Teón49 , podemos decir
que el modo de la acción es involuntario por azar, ya que ellos no esperaban
encontrarse lo que sucedió en la playa (160F sqq.), o por necesidad, puesto que
son unos oráculos divinos los que han inspirado la expedición junto al mar50 .
Por lo tanto ya se han expuesto los elementos necesarios para que el relato sea
completo, siguiendo las instrucciones de Teón51 .
44 Parece ser esta una tendencia general en el uso de la fábula por Plutarco, vide J. A.
F D, 2005, p. 80 s.
45 Y en otras partes de la obra plutarquea, vide F. P P, 2005, p. 130.
46 eon, p. 78: διήγημά ἐστι λόγος ἐκθετικὸς πραγμάτων γεγονότων ἢ ὡς γεγονότων.
47 160 D: Ἔτι δὲ τοῦ Σόλωνος λέγοντος εἰσῆλθε Γόργος ὁ Περιάνδρου ἀδελφός· ἐτύγχανε
γὰρ εἰς Ταίναρον ἀπεσταλμένος ἔκ τινων χρησμῶν, τῷ Ποσειδῶνι θυσίαν καὶ θεωρίαν
ἀπάγων.
48 eon, p. 78: στοιχεῖα δὲ τῆς διηγήσεώς εἰσιν ἕξ, τό τε πρόσωπον (εἴτε ἓν εἴη εἴτε πλείω)
καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ πραχθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ προσώπου, καὶ ὁ τόπος ἐν ᾧ ἡ πρᾶξις, καὶ ὁ χρόνος καθ' ὃν
ἡ πρᾶξις, καὶ ὁ τρόπος τῆς πράξεως, καὶ ἕκτον ἡ τούτων αἰτία.
49 eon, p. 79: τῷ δὲ τρόπῳ ἀκουσίως ἢ ἑκουσίως· ἑκάτερον δὲ εἰς τρία διαιρεῖται, τὸ μὲν
ἀκούσιον εἰς ἄγνοιαν καὶ τύχην καὶ ἀνάγκην.
50 Después comenta Gorgo que la divinidad parece estar detrás de todo el asunto (162B:
ὄντως οὖν ἐοικέναι θείᾳ τύχῃ τὸ πρᾶγμα).
51 eon, p. 78: τούτων δὲ ὄντων τῶν ἀνωτάτω στοιχείων, ἐξ ὧν συμπληροῦται, ἡ τελεία
Y respecto de la segunda de las claves que mencionábamos, las ἀρεταὶ
διηγήσεως, en ellas se basa la ecacia del relato y, en la medida de lo posible,
deben estar presentes en toda narración: claridad, concisión y verosimilitud52 .
Siguiendo las indicaciones de Teón, puede decirse que este relato de El banquete
se ha compuesto con claridad en cuanto al tema y al estilo (eon, p. 80): por
una parte en cuanto al tema53 , puesto que ni siquiera la actuación de los delnes
resultaría ajena al auditorio54 y solamente se narra un hecho55, sin mezclarlo
con otros simultáneos, además de hacerlo con orden56 y sin digresiones57 ;
por otra parte, en cuanto al estilo58 , deben evitarse las nuevas creaciones y
los términos poéticos, los metafóricos, arcaicos, extranjeros y homónimos, la
ambigüedad en la expresión, el hipérbaton (suave se permite), las digresiones
extensas, la falta de nombres o utilizar un caso que puede hacer referencia a dos
nombres distintos dando lugar a confusión: la única excepción que aparece en
este pasaje de El banquete la constituiría el término (161A) συνεποκείλαντες59 .
También la concisión va a surgir de los hechos y del estilo. Lo primero60 se
consigue cuando no se incluyen muchos asuntos, no se insertan unos en otros,
se dejan de lado los que se sobreentienden, no se empiezan los asuntos desde
lejos, etc. Y para ser conciso en cuanto al estilo hay que evitar sinónimos,
perífrasis, elementos superuos, compuestos, y decantarse por los nombres más
διήγησις, ἐξ ἁπάντων αὐτῶν συνέστηκεν καὶ τῶν συνεδρευόντων αὐτοῖς, ἐλλιπὴς δέ ἐστιν ἥ
τινος τούτων ἐπιδέουσα.
52 eon, p. 79: ἀρεταὶ δὲ διηγήσεως τρεῖς, σαφήνεια, συντομία, πιθανότης. διὸ μάλιστα
μέν, εἰ δυνατόν ἐστιν, ἁπάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν διήγησιν. Vide su antecedente en
Anaximen. Rh. 1438 a 3-1438 b 13.
53 eon, p. 80: ἐκ μὲν οὖν τῶν πραγμάτων, ὅταν λεγόμενα τὰ πράγματα μὴ τὴν κοινὴν
ἐκφεύγῃ διάνοιαν.
54 Son animales de frecuente aparición, además de en otros ámbitos artísticos, en la literatura
griega, como en Ilíada 21. 22 sqq. (se emplea el delfín para comparar el temor que provoca en
los peces pequeños a los que sin duda va a devorar, con la actitud de los troyanos en el río Janto
huyendo de un Aquiles enfurecido); famosos por su rapidez, como señala Píndaro en Nemea VI
64; conocidos por sus danzas marinas (Eurípides, Helena, v. 1455); y son numerosas las fábulas
esópicas con delnes, como la 62, 73, 113 o la 145 (edición de B. E. P, Aesopica, I, Urbana,
1952).
55 eon, p. 80: ἢ ὅταν μὴ πολλὰ ὁμοῦ διηγῆταί τις, ἀλλὰ καθ' ἕκαστον.
56 eon, p. 80: φυλακτέον δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ συγχεῖν τοὺς χρόνους καὶ τὴν τάξιν τῶν πραγμάτων,
ἔτι τε καὶ τὸ δὶς τὰ αὐτὰ λέγειν.
57 eon, p. 80: παραιτητέον δὲ καὶ τὸ παρεκβάσεις ἐπεμβάλλεσθαι μεταξὺ διηγήσεως
μακράς.
58 eon, p.81: Κατὰ δὲ τὴν λέξιν φυλακτέον τῷ σαφηνίζοντι τὸ ποιητικὰ ὀνόματα λέγειν
καὶ πεποιημένα καὶ τροπικὰ καὶ ἀρχαῖα καὶ ξένα καὶ ὁμώνυμα, etc...
59 A partir de las formas ὀκέλλω y ἐποκέλλω, habituales en la lengua griega, crea Plutarco
el compuesto συνεποκέλλω; simplemente añade Plutarco a una forma conocida el preverbio
συν- para reforzar la imagen de que los delnes realizaban el depósito de Arión conjuntamente
y todos a la vez sobre la playa (véase también el uso inmediatamente anterior de συναγαγόντες ,
161A).
60 eon, p. 83: ἐκ μὲν οὖν τῶν πραγμάτων, ὅταν μήτε συλλαμβάνωμεν ἅμα [τὰ] πολλὰ
πράγματα, μήθ' ἑτέροις ἐπεμβάλλωμεν, παραλείπωμέν τε ὅσα συνυπακούεσθαι δοκεῖ, μήτε
πόρρωθεν ἀρχώμεθα, etc...
83
Inuencia de los progymnasmata en la composición de los symposia de Plutarco
breves, sin llegar a caer ni en la vulgaridad ni en la oscuridad61. Todos estos
requisitos los cumple Plutarco con cierta seriedad en su relato. Por último,
pone gran cuidado en preservar la tercera ἀρετὴ διηγήσεως, la verosimilitud.
La conversación privada de Gorgo con Periandro llama la atención de nuestro
narrador Diocles por las reacciones que en el tirano provoca. Tanto es así que
Periandro termina por dirigirse alegremente a los comensales para hacerles
partícipes de la historia que acaba de oír. Pero antes se cuestiona el tirano la
conveniencia de hacerlo público dado que no cree que parezca verdadero y
mucho menos posible (160D: 'βούλομαι μέν', ἔφη, 'πρὸς τὸ παρὸν φράσαι
τὸ προσηγγελμένον· ὀκνῶ δ' ἀκούσας Θαλέω ποτ' εἰπόντος ὅτι δεῖ τὰ μὲν
εἰκότα λέγειν, τὰ δ' ἀμήχανα σιωπᾶν'). El planteamiento de esta cuestión se
debe probablemente a que, tal y como se especica en los manuales escolares,
un relato debe tratar hechos acaecidos o como si hubieran acaecido, según la
denición de Teón que citábamos al principio. La verosimilitud es, además, uno
de los medios para realizar la conrmación de un relato (eon, p. 93 s.), que
es parte importante en el desarrollo de cualquier progymnasma (eon, p. 65),
y el narrador, evidentemente, tratará de reforzar esa credibilidad al máximo62 .
Por ello, la mayor preocupación de Plutarco antes de pasar a la narración,
es sustentar de alguna manera esa credibilidad de cara a los comensales y a
los lectores. Pero Bías va a echarle un cable a Periandro igualmente a través
de otra máxima también de Tales, con la intención de no dar por sentada la
posible inverosimilitud demasiado a la ligera (160E): ὑπολαβὼν οὖν ὁ Βίας
'ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτ'', ἔφη, 'Θαλέω τὸ σοφόν ἐστιν, ὅτι δεῖ τοῖς μὲν ἐχθροῖς καὶ
περὶ τῶν πιστῶν ἀπιστεῖν, τοῖς δὲ φίλοις καὶ τὰ ἄπιστα πιστεύειν, ἐχθροὺς
μέν, ἔγωγ' ἡγοῦμαι, τοὺς πονηροὺς καὶ ἀνοήτους, φίλους δὲ τοὺς χρηστοὺς
καὶ φρονίμους αὐτοῦ καλοῦντος'. Así pues, por medio de esta conrmación,
queda un tanto salvaguardada la verosimilitud del relato y Periandro puede ya
ceder la palabra a su hermano Gorgo.
En este trabajo se han utilizado tres (χρεία , μῦθος y διήγημα) de los distintos
ejercicios que se practicaban en las escuelas de retórica y que sirven, según las
indicaciones de Teón, en cualquier tipo de composición (eon, p. 60 s., 70 s.),
cuya corrección depende en gran medida del empleo de estos progymnasmata , de
los que proporciona ejemplos presentes en autores consagrados como Heródoto,
Tucídides, Platón, Demóstenes, etc. (eon, p. 66 s.). A través de los casos aquí
estudiados se ha podido constatar la coincidencia entre esa preceptiva escolar
y algunos aspectos de El banquete de los Siete Sabios, de modo que podemos
comprender mejor la técnica compositiva de Plutarco: por una parte, trabaja en
buena medida de acuerdo con las teorías retóricas de la época, y, por otra parte,
61 eon, p. 84: ἐν δὲ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν λέξιν παρατηρητέον καὶ τὸ μήτε συνωνύμοις χρῆσθαι· (...)
μήτε λόγον ἀντὶ ὀνόματος ποιεῖν (...) ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ συνυπακουόμενα πάντως συμπεριαιρετέον
τῷ συντόμως ἀπαγγέλλειν βουλομένῳ, χρηστέον δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἁπλοῖς ὀνόμασι μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς
συνθέτοις, καὶ τοῖς βραχυτέροις μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς μακροτέροις...
62 Teón señala que se conrma y refuta un relato a través de los mismos medios que ha
explicado para la fábula – a los que puede añadirse algún otro -, y también en ese progymnasma
comienza destacando la importancia de la defensa de la verosimilitud para raticar cada fábula
(eon, p. 76).
puede observarse que, además de un trasfondo losóco-moral-religioso, la forma
está sumamente cuidada, pues lo contrario sería un grave error, como advierte
Teón en las primeras líneas de su manual (cf. eon, p. 59).
bi b l i o g r a f í a c i T a d a
B, M., "La chreia en el De tuenda sanitate praecepta de Plutarco", in M.
J . (eds.), 2005, pp. 209-16.
____ La Chreia en los Moralia de Plutarco, Tesis Doctoral, Universidad de
Salamanca, 2005B.
D L, M. A., "Los animales en las imágenes de Plutarco", in J.
B (ed.), Les Grecs de l'Antiquité et les animaux. Le cas remarquable
de Plutarque, Lille, 2005, pp. 111-19
F D, J. A., "Le Grillus, une éthopée parodique", in L. V
D S (ed.), Rhetorical theory and praxis in Plutarch. Acta of the
IV International Congress of the I.P.S. (Leuven, July 3-6), Lovaina-
Namur, 2000, pp. 171-81.
____ " La fábula en Plutarco: de la historieta ejemplicante al ejercicio
progimnasmático", in M. J . (eds.), 2005, pp. 77-84.
G G, C., "Esopo en Plutarco", in M. G V (ed.), Estudios
sobre Plutarco: ideas religiosas. Actas del III Simposio Internacional sobre
Plutarco (Oviedo, 1992), Madrid, 1994, pp. 605-14.
H, M., "eon and the history of the Progymnasmata", GRBS, 43 (2000)
129-60.
H, R. F. & O'N, E. N., e chreia in ancient rhetoric. vol. I, e
Progymnasmata, Atlanta, 1986.
H, H., Die Hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzantiner. Erster Band:
Philosophie, Rhetorik, Epistolographie, Geschichtsschreibung, Geographie,
Múnich, 1978.
J, M. . (eds.), Plutarc a la seva època: paideia i societat. Actas del
VIII Simposio español sobre Plutarco (Barcelona, 6-8 de Noviembre,
2003), Barcelona, 2005.
K, G. A., e art of rhetoric in the Roman world, 300 B. C. - A. D. 300,
Princeton, 1972.
____Greek rhetoric under christian emperors , Princeton, 1983.
____Progymnasmata. Greek textbooks of prose composition and rhetoric , Leiden/
Boston, 2003.
85
Inuencia de los progymnasmata en la composición de los symposia de Plutarco
M C, L., "La teoría de la ekphrasis en Plutarco", in M. J
. (eds.), 2005, pp. 379-86.
P, M., Progymnasmata. Aelius éon, París, 1997.
P , F., "Los papeles escolares y Plutarco", in M. J
. (eds.), 2005, pp. 117-32.
P, S. E. (ed.), Handbook of classical rhetoric in the hellenistic period 330 BC
- AC 400, Leiden/Nueva York/Colonia, 1997.
V D, J.-G., Αἶνιοι, λόγοι, μῦθοι . Fables in Archaic, Classical & Hellenistic
Greek literature. With a study of the theory & terminology of the genre,
Leiden-Nueva York-Colonia, 1997.
V S, A., "Plutarco, Sobre si es más útil el agua o el fuego: una tesis
progymnasmatica", in M. J . (eds.), 2005, pp. 507-16.
87
Simposio e losoa: il problema del "Dio geometra"
S : "D "
F F
Università di Salerno
Abstract
According to Plutarch, philosophical questions could be treated in the table talks, but with
caution. e most philosophical problem concerns the meaning of Plato's dictum that the God
is always doing geometry (Quaest. conv. VIII 2. 718 B-720 C). e text proposes four solutions,
all in the spirit of Platonic philosophy. e rst one is epistemological, the second ethical and
political, the third cosmological and nally the fourth is cosmological and metaphysical. e
correct answer is the fourth, according to which the meaning of the dictum is that the creation
of the world can be equated to the solution of a geometrical problem, namely the problem to
construct, given two gures, a third gure which is materially identical to one and formally
similar to the other. In this context, Plutarch introduces a theory based on three principles: God
(as demiurge), matter (as substrate) and the world of ideas (as model).
La questione dell'opportunità di trattare argomenti losoci nel contesto
dei simposi dovette essere avvertita da Plutarco come estremamente importante,
se egli si sentì in dovere di aprire le Quaestiones convivales proprio proponendo
il seguente problema: Εἰ δεῖ φιλοσοφεῖν παρὰ πότον; (I 1, 612E-615 C).
La soluzione che sembra emergere dalle sue riessioni appare, come
spesso accade nel caso di questo prolico intellettuale greco dell'impero
romano, improntata a un sano buon senso. Come è noto, egli respinge tanto
l'atteggiamento serioso di chi ritiene che la losoa debba essere bandita
da simili contesti, quanto quello di coloro che pretendono di arontare nei
simposi questioni losoche eccessivamente ardue e complesse. Del resto,
se la losoa è τέχνη περὶ βίον, ossia ars vitae, la sua completa esclusione
dalle conversazioni conviviali non sarebbe davvero ammissibile; d'altra parte,
risulterebbe fuori luogo la presenza di dispute intrise di tecnicismi e dicili
problemi logici, quei προβλήματα διαλεκτικά ai quali appartiene, per esempio,
il celebre "argomento dominatore" di Diodoro Crono. Occorre insomma sapere
scegliere i temi adatti, e dimostrarsi in grado di trattarli in modo appropriato,
senza escludere i partecipanti non loso, ma nello stesso tempo senza cadere
nella banalità1 .
Nel delineare i contorni generali del συμποτικὸν γένος Plutarco sembra
stabilire l'esigenza che il metodo in vigore nei simposi sia quello degli exempla ,
ossia dei παραδείγματα, e dei racconti o esposizioni narrative (μυθολογίαι)
piuttosto che quello della dimostrazione (ἀπόδειξις), certamente più adatto
alle discussioni logiche e losoche in senso stretto (si pensi ai trattati
polemici contro stoici ed epicurei, oppure a uno scritto come il De animae
procreatione in Timaeo). Inoltre egli invita a proporre argomenti che si fondino
sulla plausibilità o probabilità piuttosto che sulla rigida conseguenzialità
1 Sull'integrazione di Plutarco nella tradizione della letteratura simposiaca, e sull'esigenza di
mescolare nel simposio "speculazione seria e ironia", cf. M. V , 2000, p. 221 e passim.
logica (διὰ τοῦ πιθανοῦ μᾶλλον ἢ βιαστικοῦ). In generale vanno proposte
questioni che possano suscitare la riessione e perno l'acume intellettuale
dei partecipanti al simposio, ma va evitata l'introduzione di problemi intricati,
che richiedano approfondimenti ai quali possono accedere solo gli specialisti
di losoa. Insomma la losoa non va aatto bandita dalle discussioni
simposiache, ma va praticata, per così dire, cum grano salis, avendo di mira tanto
il coinvolgimento di tutti i partecipanti quanto il particolare contesto emotivo
in cui essi si trovano2 .
II
Una rapida lettura delle Quaestiones convivales sembra in eetti confermare
le indicazioni programmatiche schizzate da Plutarco in apertura dello scritto.
Gli argomenti, anche quando richiamano tematiche di carattere losoco,
vengono arontati in modo relativamente lieve, per mezzo di esemplicazioni
prese dalla vita di tutti i giorni, e comunque con l'evidente obiettivo di non
allontanare il lettore che non sia losofo in senso stretto (simile in questo ai
partecipanti a un simposio).
Un'eccezione a questa prassi abbastanza consolidata sembrerebbe venire
fornita dalla seconda quaestio dell'VIII libro (VIII 2, 718 C-720 C), che
intende arontare il problema del perché Platone avrebbe aermato che il
Dio geometrizza sempre (Πῶς Πλάτων ἔλεγε τὸν θεὸν ἀεὶ γεωμετρεῖν). In
eetti, sia l'interrogativo proposto sia lo sviluppo della quaestio non mancano
di sottigliezza losoca; nel corso della discussione vengono toccate tematiche
importanti e complesse, che attengono all'ambito dell'epistemologia, della
losoa morale e politica, della teologia platoniche (senza dimenticare che al
lettore è richiesto anche un minimo di competenza matematica, necessaria alla
comprensione tanto dell'andamento della discussione quanto della soluzione
nale avanzata da Plutarco). Tuttavia il tono complessivo adottato da Plutarco
evita di indulgere in eccessivi tecnicismi. Inoltre l'intera quaestio, e in particolare
l'interrogativo alla quale intende fornire una soluzione, vengono presentati
come un omaggio reso a Platone nel giorno in cui ricorre il suo compleanno3 .
Quest'ultimo aspetto dovrebbe contribuire a integrare la conversione nel
contesto simposiaco, allontanandola dalle dispute tecniche proprie dei seminari
specialistici rivolti agli "addetti ai lavori".
Plutarco dimostra di essere perfettamente consapevole del fatto che
l'autore dei dialoghi non ha mai formulato espressamente la sentenza che gli
viene attribuita. Essa tuttavia si adatta molto bene al punto di vista di Platone,
risulta cioè, per usare le parole di Plutarco, Πλατωνικοῦ χαρακτῆρος, di
carattere platonico4 . Si tratta di un eccellente tema intorno al quale discutere
2 Su tutta la prima quaestio cf. il commento ad locum di S.-T. T, 1989, pp. 38-63
e A. S, 1998, pp. 253-80.
3 Si veda M. B, 1996, p. 360.
4 Sulla corrispondenza della formula non alla lettera bensì al pensiero di Platone cf. R. S,
1981, p. 109, S.-T. T, 1996, p. 162, e soprattutto M. B, 1996, p. 360, il quale
osserva che "der Wortlaut dieses Ausspruchs in Platons Dialogen nirgends zu nden ist".
89
Simposio e losoa: il problema del "Dio geometra"
nel giorno del compleanno di Platone, in modo da rendere omaggio al grande
maestro, ricordando alcune delle sue concezioni, accennando a importanti
elementi della sua losoa, e discutendo in modo amichevole e "privo di
invidia". E in eetti, come vedremo, l'intero zetema costituisce un omaggio a
Platone, come dimostra la semplice constatazione che tutte le risposte fornite
all'interrogativo iniziale si richiamano a concezioni eettivamente formulate da
Platone. Insomma, se si vuole onorare Platone nell'ambito di un simposio, non
sembra esserci modo migliore di quello scelto da Plutarco in questo zetema .
III
Nel corso della quaestio vengono suggerite quattro soluzioni all'interrogativo
relativo al perché Dio opera sempre in modo geometrico. Esse vengono
assegnate rispettivamente a Tindato, Floro, Autobulo e a Plutarco stesso, che
è anche il narratore dell'incontro. Non c'è dubbio che la risposta corretta è
quella fornita da Plutarco in conclusione della discussione. Tuttavia, anche
le altre tre soluzioni possiedono una loro validità, soprattutto perché esse, in
forma diretta o indiretta, riprendono importanti concezioni platoniche, come
lo stesso Plutarco riconosce introducendo il suo intervento. Egli spiega infatti
che le opinioni espresse nora sono autoctone (εἰρημένας δόξας ὡς ἰθαγενεῖς
καὶ ἰδίας), ossia appartengono alla scuola di provenienza, quella platonica. E
così deve essere, perché, secondo Plutarco, non bisogna né disprezzare se stessi
(ἑαυτῶν μὴ καταφρονῆτε), ossia la propria scuola, né rivolgersi completamente
al di fuori (μηδ' ἔξω βλέπητε παντάπασιν), cioè ad altri orientamenti losoci,
ma occorre ricercare la soluzione all'interno degli insegnamenti forniti dalla
scuola platonica (719 F)5 .
Del resto, le risposte avanzate dai partecipanti alla conversazione non sono
veramente in conitto tra di loro, non si escludono cioè a vicenda, ma risultano
in qualche modo complementari, e in ogni caso possono venire integrate in un
quadro relativamente unitario. Come, per altro, è naturale che sia, trattandosi
in tutti i casi di soluzioni conformi allo spirito della losoa di Platone6 .
Dunque le risposte suggerite dai protagonisti della discussione simposiaca
sono tutte di matrice platonica. Ciascuna di esse mette in luce un aspetto
particolare della funzione che la geometria esercita nell'ambito della riessione
di Platone. E' vero che solo una, quella suggerita da Plutarco, risponde in
modo corretto e appropriato all'enigma iniziale; ma è altrettanto vero che tutte
colgono un importante aspetto della losoa di Platone, e in questo modo
contribuiscono a rendere omaggio al grande pensatore.
Il primo a prendere la parola è Tindaro, il cui tentativo di soluzione
consiste nel richiamo alla funzione epistemologica della geometria, la quale
è in grado di allontanarci dalle cose sensibili indirizzandoci verso la natura
noetica ed eterna (ἀποστρέφουσα ἐπὶ τὴν νοητὴν καὶ αἰδίον φύσιν), ossia verso
il mondo delle idee (718 C-D). Il signicato del detto attribuito a Platone
5 Cf. per questo punto M. B, 1996, p. 361.
6 Ha richiamato l'attenzione sulla natura non conittuale di queste risposte S. P, 2005,
p. 150.
consiste dunque, secondo Tindaro, nella particolare funzione che occorre
assegnare, conformemente alle indicazioni platoniche contenute nel libro
VII della Repubblica, alla geometria, la quale è in grado di puricare l'anima,
allontanandola dalle cose sensibili per indirizzarla verso il pensiero vero e
proprio, cioè verso la conoscenza intelligibile7 . Per poter assolvere in modo
compiuto al suo ruolo di avviamento alla conoscenza del mondo intelligibile,
la geometria deve abbandonare ogni approccio empirico, meccanico e
costruttivista, quel tipo di approccio al quale indulsero invece, secondo il
rimprovero di Platone (condiviso da Plutarco), autori quali Eudosso, Archita
e Menecmo (718 E-F)8 .
Tindaro aggiunge poi (718 E) che nelle discipline matematiche (e negli
oggetti delle stesse) si manifestano, come in specchi regolari e lisci, tracce
e immagini della verità degli enti intelligibili (τῆς τῶν νοητῶν ἀληθείας
ἴχνη καὶ εἴδωλα), alludendo in questo modo alla concezione, sviluppata da
Plutarco in altri scritti, che assegna agli enti matematici lo statuto di δεύτερα
νοητά ο δεύτερα εἴδη, ossia di "secondi intelligibili", copie e immagini dei
"primi intelligibili", costituiti naturalmente dalle idee9 . In quanto copie e
immagini delle idee, cioè della realtà intelligibile vera e propria, gli enti
matematici e le discipline a loro relative (prima fra tutte le geometria)
rappresentano un'eccellente via di accesso alla conoscenza intelligibile, in
virtù del principio secondo il quale la copia riproduce in qualche misura
la perfezione dell'originale. Non c'è dubbio, in ogni caso, che la soluzione
prospettata da Tindaro possa venire considerata di tipo epistemologico perché
pone l'accento sulla funzione propedeutica e introduttiva che la geometria
svolge nell'ambito del processo epistemico che conduce l'anima dalle cose
sensibili alle realtà intelligibili.
Dopo Tindaro prende la parola Floro, il cui intervento si apre con
un'esplicita confutazione della risposta precedente (719 A). Egli ha infatti
buon gioco nell'osservare che la soluzione di Tindaro è sbagliata perché non
spiega aatto il motivo per cui Dio geometrizza, ma si limita a indicare la
ragione per la quale la geometria risulta necessaria a noi uomini non agli dèi
(μὴ θεοῖς ἀλλ' ἡμῖν ἀναγκαίαν τὴν γεωμετρίαν). E del resto, obietta Floro,
Dio non ha bisogno di un mathema come di uno strumento per orientare il
pensiero dalle cose generate agli esseri (ἀπὸ τῶν γενητῶν ἐπὶ τὰ ὄντα), dal
7 Per i paralleli platonici, tratti soprattutto dal VII libro della Repubblica, cf. S.-T. T,
1996, p. 163 e S. P, 2005, p. 145.
8 Analogo rimprovero si legge in Vit. Marc. 14,9 sqq. Sull'accusa rivolta a Eudosso,
Archita e Menecmo di avere trasformato la geometria in una disciplina "meccanica" cf. S.-T.
T, 1996, pp. 166-7. Sulla strategia plutarchea volta a puricare la geometria da ogni
aspetto meccanico, per farne una disciplina unicamente teoretica, si veda A. G, 1992,
passim.
9 Cf., per esempio, Plat. quaest. III 1001 C. Per una discussione più approfondita della
collocazione ontologica degli enti matematici e del loro status di "secondi intelligibili" devo
rinviare a F. F, 1995, pp. 156-8 e 1996, p. 138 sqq.; si veda anche C. S, 1994, pp.
203-7, che intende molto giustamente gli enti matematici in termini di vermittelnde Instanzen
zwischen den Ideen und den πράγματα , e ora S. P, 2005, p. 146.
91
Simposio e losoa: il problema del "Dio geometra"
momento che questi esseri, cioè le idee o gli intelligibili, si trovano già "in
lui, sono con lui e intorno a lui" (ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐκείνῳ καὶ σὺν αὐτῷ καὶ
περὶ αὐτόν)10 .
Il signicato di questa aermazione dovrebbe essere il seguente: Dio non
ha bisogno di ricorrere alla geometria come strumento per indirizzare l'anima
dalle realtà sensibili alle idee per la semplice ragione che egli si trova già presso
le idee, facendo parte, insieme ad esse, della sfera intelligibile e suprema della
realtà (Dio si trova ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς per usare la formula di Plat. quaest . III
1002 B). La sua conoscenza delle idee non rappresenta il frutto di un percorso
epistemico, ma risulta in qualche modo già da sempre data. Non è mancato
chi ha voluto vedere in questa misteriosa precisazione di Floro un'allusione alle
celebre concezione delle idee come pensieri di Dio, molto diusa tra gli autori
platonici contemporanei di Plutarco11 . Non è questa la sede per arontare
ed eventualmente dirimere la questione. In ogni caso l'obiezione di Floro
contro la soluzione epistemologica avanzata da Tindaro funziona bene anche
postulando che tra gli ὄντα, cioè le idee, e Dio esista una relazione molto
stretta (di vicinanza e appartenenza al medesimo ambito ontologico, appunto:
θεὸς ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς), senza che si debba per forza ipotizzare che tale relazione
si conguri nella forma della famosa dottrina delle idee come pensieri di Dio.
Confutata la risposta di Tindaro, Floro avanza la sua personale soluzione
all'enigma, richiamandosi alla funzione etica e politica della geometria, che
troverebbe espressione nella preminenza della proporzione geometrica rispetto
a quella aritmetica (719 A-C). Nel ragionamento di Floro la proporzione
assume un valore simbolico che gli consente di collegare la matematica a motivi
extra-matematici, di natura politica e giuridica12 . Egli può infatti menzionare
a sostegno della sua risposta l'apprezzamento di Platone nei confronti di
Licurgo, il quale estromise dalla Laconia la proporzione aritmetica (solidale
alla democrazia) per sostituirla con quella geometrica, adatta alla oligarchia
moderata e alla monarchia legislativa (ὀλιγαρχίᾳ σώφρονι καὶ βασιλείᾳ
νομίνῃ). Del resto, aggiunge Floro, Dio stesso si serve della proporzione
geometrica come parametro per giudicare le azioni; egli infatti privilegia il
criterio dell'onore (κατ' ἀξίαν) rispetto a quello della mera uguaglianza, il
quale trova invece espressione matematica nella proporzione aritmetica.
Con quest'ultima considerazione Floro può saldare il motivo etico a quello
politico; ai suoi occhi la frase attribuita a Platone si spiega dunque sulla base di
considerazioni di natura etico-politica (ricavate in forma diretta o indiretta da
dialoghi quali la Repubblica e le Leggi ) 13 .
Dopo Floro prende la parola Autobulo, quasi certamente uno dei gli di
Plutarco, il quale si riuta di entrare direttamente in polemica con l'interlocutore
10 L'interpretazione esatta di questo passo, e in particolare la corretta identicazione degli
ὄνταcon le idee e non con gli enti matematici, si trova in Ch. S, 1994, p. 147 n. 32.
11 Per esempio S.-T. T, 1996, p. 168 e io stesso in F. F, 1995, pp. 242-7.
12 Del tutto condivisibili le considerazioni svolte da S. P, 2005, pp. 146-7.
13 Per l'indicazioni dei passi platonici ai quali dovrebbe alludere Floro cf. S.-T. T,
1996, pp. 169-70.
che lo ha preceduto, come gli aveva chiesto di fare Tindaro. Egli riconosce
comunque che la sua proposta di soluzione si muove su un altro terreno. Ai suoi
occhi, infatti, l'aermazione relativa al Dio geometra si spiega in riferimento
alla funzione della geometria all'interno dell'impianto cosmologico ricavato,
anche qui in forma diretta o indiretta, dalla lettura del Timeo (719 C-E). Per
Autobulo l'oggetto della geometria è costituito dalle proprietà e dai caratteri
dei limiti (τῶν περὶ τὰ πέρατα συμπτωμάτων καὶ παθῶν), dei quali Dio si è
servito allo scopo di ordinare la materia illimitata (ὕλη ἄπειρος). Egli spiega
infatti, rifacendosi in modo indiretto alle aermazioni platoniche contenute
nel Timeo (specialmente 53 C), che linee, superci e solidi (geometrici)
forniscono le prime εἴδη καὶ διαφοράς per la generazione dei corpi semplici,
ossia aria, terra, acqua e fuoco. Queste entità costituiscono in un certo senso la
prima forma di ordinamento del sostrato indeterminato, dal momento che la
loro presenza scandisce l'inizio del processo di organizzazione razionale della
materia, in se stessa dominata dal disordine (ἀταξία) e dallo sconvolgimento
(πλημμέλεια ). Non ci sono dubbi che il contesto nel quale si muove Autobulo
è di carattere cosmologico e rinvia al Timeo, interpretato anche alla luce della
riessione tardo-pitagorica ben nota a Plutarco14 .
Questa rapida panoramica sulle prime tre soluzioni al problema del
"Dio geometra" induce a proporre la seguente considerazione: Tindaro, Floro
e Autobulo presentano risposte platoniche all'interrogativo della quaestio e
per questo vanno lodati; nessuna di esse è veramente corretta (dal momento
che nessuna risponde in modo appropriato all'interrogativo iniziale), ma
tutte mettono in luce un importante aspetto della concezione platonica della
geometria, contribuendo a rendere omaggio a Platone, secondo lo spirito della
conversazione simposiaca.
IV
Plutarco prende inne la parola per fornire la soluzione esatta
all'interrogativo iniziale, mostrando come la cosmogenesi operata dalla divinità
assuma le vesti della soluzione a un problema geometrico, e precisamente
quello di costruire, date due entità (la materia e il paradigma ideale), una terza
realtà che sia materialmente uguale a una e formalmente simile all'altra, cioè
uguale al sostrato indeterminato, ossia alla materia, e simile al modello, cioè al
mondo delle idee (720 A-C). Egli dichiara di richiamarsi alla διαίρεσις, che
sarebbe contenuta nel Timeo (48 E e soprattutto 52 D)15 , dove Platone descrive
il processo che ha portato alla generazione del mondo, e i cui "protagonisti
metasici" sarebbero, nell'interpretazione plutarchea, il più disordinato dei
sostrati, cioè la materia (ὕλη), il più bello dei modelli, ossia il mondo delle
idee (qui nella forma di un singolare collettivo: ἰδέα), e la migliore delle cause,
cioè Dio. Come è noto, il problema al quale allude Plutarco era ben conosciuto
14 Sulla valenza cosmologica dell'intervento di Autobulo cf. S.-T. T, 1996, pp.
172-4, R. S, 1981, pp. 109-10 e soprattutto S. P, 2005, pp. 147-8.
15 Sui riferimenti testuali platonici cf. S.-T. T, 1996, pp. 177-8 e soprattutto M.
B , 1996, p. 362 sqq.
93
Simposio e losoa: il problema del "Dio geometra"
a Platone (probabilmente grazie al circolo di Archita)16 e viene menzionato
anche da Euclide (VI, 25); esso consiste nel costruire, date due gure, una terza
che sia uguale alla prima e simile alla seconda (τῷ μὲν ἴσον τῷ δ' ὅμοιον ).
L'atto per mezzo del quale Dio genera il cosmo sensibile rappresenta
dunque agli occhi di Plutarco la soluzione a un problema simile a quello
geometrico appena menzionato. Il cosmo infatti è uguale dal punto di vista
dell'estensione materiale alla ὕλη (il che signica che esso esaurisce tutta la
materia esistente), mentre è simile dal punto di vista formale al παράδειγμα ,
cioè alla totalità unicata del mondo delle idee: esso è οἶον ἡ ἰδέα καὶ ὅσον
ἡ ὕλη, per usare le parole di Plutarco. Questa risposta fornisce eettivamente
la soluzione corretta all'enigma di partenza perché spiega la ragione per la
quale Platone avrebbe sostenuto che Dio geometrizza, ossia opera in modo
geometrico. La generazione del mondo, ossia l'atto fondamentale della divinità,
viene infatti assimilata alla soluzione di un problema geometrico.
Come detto, Plutarco dichiara di riprendere questa diairesis dal Timeo .
Tuttavia nel dialogo platonico non si trova una classicazione immediatamente
riconducibile a quella plutarchea, neppure nei passi ai quali Plutarco sembra
alludere. Platone parla di tre generi (48E sqq.), l'essere intelligibile, la sua copia,
e un terzo genere, oscuro e misterioso, che egli chiama in diversi modi – χώρα ,
πανδεχές, ὑποδοχὴ πάσης γενέσεως, ecc. – e che Plutarco, conformemente
all'uso aristotelico ormai diuso tra i platonici, assimila alla "materia" (ὕλη ) .
Quindi, alla ne della descrizione della genesi ontologica dei corpi sici (52
D), Platone si riferisce a questi tre principi con i termini "essere" (ὄν), "spazio"
(χώρα ) e "divenire" (γένεσις). Come si vede, dalla presentazione platonica
sembra del tutto assente Dio, cioè il demiurgo. L'operazione esegetica di Plutarco
non è però del tutto priva di plausibilità e aderenza al testo. Egli identica
in modo immediato e non problematico la χώρα platonica con la ὕλη; poi,
sdoppia il principio intelligibile e noetico in due entità, il modello (ἰδέα) e la
divinità demiurgica (θεός); inne equipara, implicitamente, la γένεσις al cosmo
sensibile, ossia al prodotto dell'atto cosmopietico17 . Quasi seguendo il testo
platonico (che alla descrizione delle entità che preesistono alla generazione del
mondo fa seguire l'introduzione degli enti matematici, cioè numeri e gure, di
cui il demiurgo si serve per ordinare il sostrato), Plutarco dichiara che Dio si
serve di λόγος καὶ μέτρον καὶ ἀριθμός allo scopo di κοσμῆσαι τὴν φύσιν, ossia
di ordinare la natura indeterminata18 . Accennando alla funzione strumentale
degli enti matematici (i quali costituiscono appunto gli "strumenti" per mezzo
dei quali il demiurgo attua il processo cosmopoietico), Plutarco riprende in
qualche modo la tesi avanzata nell'intervento precedente da Autobulo, il quale
16 Per questo cf. S.-T. T, 1996, p. 176.
17 Quest'ultima assimilazione non può venire operata esplicitamente da Plutarco per
la semplice ragione che altrove egli identica la genesis di Ti . 52 D con l'anima precosmica
irrazionale, ossia con il principio del movimento disordinato che sconvolge la materia prima
della generazione del cosmo: cf. An. procr. 1024 B-C. Sulla teoria dei principi di Plutarco (Dio,
materia, anima precosmica) e sull'identicazione dell'anima precosmica con la genesis di Ti. 52
D cf. F. F, 1995, pp. 72-90 e M. B , 1996, pp. 399-402.
18 Il riferimento platonico è a Ti. 53 A-B (cf. anche 69 B); si veda M. B, 1996, p. 363.
aveva richiamato l'attenzione sul ruolo giocato dalle linee, dalle superci e
dai solidi geometrici nel processo di ordinamento e razionalizzazione della
materia indeterminata19 .
La soluzione avanzata da Plutarco risulta dunque largamente dipendente dal
Timeo, interpretato naturalmente secondo la particolare prospettiva dell'autore.
Detto ciò, vale comunque la pena di spendere due parole sulla concezione
metasico-cosmologica che emerge da questo intervento e in particolare dalle
parole con le quali Plutarco risolve l'interrogativo della quaestio. E' universalmente
noto che Plutarco venga considerato come il massimo rappresentante, almeno
tra gli autori medioplatonici, dell'interpretazione letterale, cioè temporale, della
cosmogenesi descritta nel Timeo. Contrariamente agli interpreti accademici
(Speusippo e Senocrate) e alla maggior parte dei suoi colleghi medioplatonici
(Eudoro e Alcinoo), egli intende in senso letterale le parole di Platone relative
alla nascita del mondo (il famoso γέγονε di 28 B). Ai suoi occhi, infatti, la
generazione del cosmo dipende da un atto unico compiuto dalla divinità e
non può venire interpretata come la descrizione metaforica di un rapporto di
dipendenza perpetuo, ossia nel senso della cosiddetta creatio continua 20 .
Tuttavia le parole con le quali egli fornisce la soluzione all'interrogativo
di partenza, e la forma stessa di questo interrogativo (nel quale ricorre
l'avverbio ἀεί), inducono a ritenere, come alcuni studiosi non hanno mancato
di osservare, che egli tenti una sorta di conciliazione tra le due prospettive,
quella letterale (per la quale la genesi del cosmo è un atto unico operato
da Dio) e quella metaforica (per la quale tale genesi allude al fatto che il
cosmo costituisce un'entità generata, cioè costantemente soggetta a un
processo di generazione)21 . In eetti Plutarco ribadisce la tesi dell'unicità
dell'atto divino (consistente appunto nella soluzione di un problema simile a
quello geometrico), ma poi aggiunge che Dio φυλάττει διὰ παντὸς τὸ ἴσον
τῇ ὕλῃ καὶ ὅμοιον τῇ ἰδέᾳ τὸν κοσμόν, vale a dire si impegna a preservare
per la totalità del tempo la condizione per cui il cosmo risulti uguale alla
materia e simile all'idea. Aggiunge poi che il cosmo è sempre (ἀεί), cioè
incessantemente, sottoposto al processo di generazione e sconvolgimento
prodotto dalla σύμφυτος ἀνάγκη τοῦ σώματος, ossia dalla necessità
connaturata all'elemento corporeo, e che viene aiutato dal padre e demiurgo,
cioè da Dio, il quale rivolgendosi al modello denisce la sostanza, cioè la
materia (πρὸς τὸ παράδειγμα τὴν οὐσίαν ὁρίζοντος).
Con la generazione del cosmo il compito di Dio non è dunque terminato.
Egli deve preservare l'integrità dell'universo costantemente messa a repentaglio
19 L'idea che gli enti matematici (numeri e gure geometriche) costituiscano gli strumenti
di cui Dio si serve nella sua azione di ordinamento di un'entità indeterminata (corpo o anima)
ritorna numerose volte nelle opere losoche di Plutarco: cf. An. procr. 1013 C; 1015 B; 1017 B;
1023 D; 1029 E; Plat. quaest. IV 1003 A. Si veda S. P, 2005, pp. 151-2 nota 121. Sugli enti
matematici come "misure quantitative" cf. C. S, 1994, pp. 204-7 e F. F, 1996,
p. 139.
20 Sull'esegesi letterale (cioè temporale) della cosmogenesi del Timeo in Plutarco cf. M.
B , 1998, pp. 406-14.
21 Per esempio S.-T. T, 1996, p. 162 e 180.
95
Simposio e losoa: il problema del "Dio geometra"
dall'azione della σύμφυτος ἀνάγκη, ossia della condizione che appartiene
costitutivamente alla corporeità, secondo il celebre mito cosmologico del
Politico (269 C-274 E). E' noto, inoltre, che Plutarco assimila la σύμφυτος
ἐπιθυμία di cui si parla nel dialogo platonico all'anima precosmica irrazionale,
cioè al principio del disordine e del male. In realtà, la tesi secondo la quale
l'intervento di Dio non si limita all'atto di cosmogenesi ma prosegue per
sempre, rappresenta la risposta di Plutarco a un importante problema legato
all'esegesi del Timeo. Si tratta della questione di spiegare come sia possibile che
un'entità generata, come è secondo Plutarco il cosmo sensibile, risulti eterna,
ossia destinata a non perire mai. Attraverso un'ardita interpretazione del passo
41 A del Timeo (dove il demiurgo dichiara che le cose da lui generate sono
indissolubili, a meno che lui stesso non voglia dissolverle), Plutarco (seguito
poi da altri platonici) pone l'accento non sulla prima parte dell'aermazione
platonica, bensì sulla seconda, e, probabilmente sulla base di Pol. 270 A, intende
il passo nel senso che il mondo, preso in se stesso, è destinato a perire; tuttavia
l'azione provvidenziale del demiurgo gli trasmette una sorta di ἐπισκευαστὴ
ἀθανασία, ossia di immortalità restaurata, rifatta, prodotta cioè dall'esterno22 .
Tutto ciò non viene espressamente detto da Plutarco, ma non sembra davvero
azzardato ipotizzare che la concezione qui ricostruita agisca alle spalle delle
aermazione contenute nella parte conclusiva di questo zetema.
La risposta plutarchea comporta dunque la conseguenza che l'attività
(geometrica) di Dio non si limiti all'atto di cosmogenesi, ma prosegua
incessantemente per tutto il tempo in cui il cosmo persiste, ossia per sempre.
Per fare in modo che il mondo costituisca sempre una realtà quantitativamente
identica alla materia e formalmente simile al modello intelligibile, Dio deve
operare sempre in modo geometrico, anche perché gli strumenti con i quali egli
può attuare quest'opera di conservazione sono esattamente i princìpi di natura
geometrico-matematica, come Autobulo aveva dimostrato nell'intervento
precedente.
Anche in un contesto simposiaco, dunque, Plutarco non rinuncia ad
accennare a importanti tematiche losoche: in questo caso cosmologiche
e metasiche. Abbiamo visto, poi, come la sua interpretazione del Timeo si
appoggi in larga misura sulla lettura del grande mito cosmologico del Politico .
A suggello di questa rapida panoramica sulla più losoca delle
Quaestiones convivales, credo che si possa proporre la seguente considerazione.
La seconda quaestio dell'VIII libro si presenta come un eccellente esempio del
modo di fare losoa παρὰ πότον teorizzato in apertura di questa raccolta. I
partecipanti alla conversazione, e l'autore della medesima, orono un omaggio
a Platone, e lo fanno nel modo più appropriato: discutendo πλατωνικῶς, cioè
sia servendosi di concezioni platoniche (intorno a un interessante enigma
platonico), sia ricorrendo alla forma dialogica.
22 Su questa nozione cf. M. B, 1998, p. 422 sqq. e 525.
96
Franco Ferrari
ri f e r i m e n T i b i b l i o g r a f i c i
B, M., Der Platonismus in der Antike, Bd. IV, Stuttgart/Bad Cannstatt,
1996.
_____ Der Platonismus in der Antike, Bd. V, Stuttgart/Bad Cannstatt, 1998.
F, F., Dio, idee e materia. La struttura del cosmo in Plutarco di Cheronea,
Napoli, 1995.
_____ "La teoria delle idee in Plutarco", Elenchos, 17 (1996) 121-42.
G, A., "e Corruption of Geometry and the Problem of two
Mean proportionals" in I. G (ed.), Plutarco e le scienze. Atti del IV
Convegno plutarcheo, Genova, 1992, pp. 147-64.
P, S., Tetraktys. Numero e losoa tra I e II secolo d.C., Pisa, 2005.
S, A., Plutarco. Conversazioni a tavola, libro primo, Napoli, 1998.
S, C ., Plutarchs Interpretation der Ideenlehre Platons, Münster/
Hamburg, 1994.
S, R., Die mathematischen Stellen bei Plutarch, Dissert. Regensburg, 1981.
T, S.-T., A Commentary on Plutarch's Table Talks, vol. I (Books 1-3),
Göteborg, 1989.
_____ A Commentary on Plutarch's Table Talks, vol. III (Books 7-9), Göteborg,
1996.
V , M., "Plutarco e il 'genere simposio'", in I. G & C. M
(eds.), I generi letterari in Plutarco. Atti del VIII Convegno plutarcheo,
Napoli, 2000, pp. 217-29.
97
Riddling at table: trivial ainigmata vs. philosophical problemata
R
T r i v i a l a i n i g m a T a v S . p H i l o S o p H i c a l p r o b l e m a T a
S B
University of Siena
Abstract
In his work On Proverbs, Clearchus writes that "the solution of riddles (griphoi) is not alien to
philosophy, and the ancients used to make a display of their knowledge by means of them. For
in propounding riddles in their drinking-bouts they were not like the people of today who ask
one another, what is the most delightful form of sexual commerce, or what sh has the best
avour". Symposiastic riddles were in fact a very popular sub-literary genre, as is witnessed
by some epigrams of the Greek Anthology (book 14th ) and by the Latin Aenigmata Symposii or
Symphosii, but in order to nd the 'philosophical riddles' mentioned by Clearchus we must turn
to literary banquets. e topics dealt with in Plato's and Xenophon's Symposia (the praise of the
god of Love; the denition of the most beautiful thing in the world) are in fact philosophical
questions (what is love? What is the most beautiful thing in the world?).
is paper deals with Plutarch's position regarding the riddles (griphoi and aenigmata) banqueters
were asked to solve in real symposia and the questions (problemata) banqueters were addressed
in literary symposia; particular attention is devoted to two of Plutarch's works, the Quaestiones
convivales and the Convivium septem sapientium.
In the rst book of his work On Proverbs, the Peripatetic philosopher
Clearchus of Soli writes the following lines: "e solution of riddles (γρῖφοι)
is not alien to philosophy, and the ancients used to make a display of their
knowledge by means of them. For in propounding riddles in their drinking-
bouts they were not like the people of today who ask one another, what is the
most delightful form of sexual commerce, or what sh has the best avour or
is at the height of excellence at that season, or what sh is to be eaten chiey
after the rising of Arcturus or of the Pleiades or of the Dog-star"1 .
We owe this quotation to Athenaeus, the Egyptian erudite who, in his
most famous work, the Deipnosophistai, makes the wise protagonists of his
long dinner quote a good number of the typical symposiastic conundrums
Clearchus seemed to regard with disdain2 . ese riddles were a sub-literary
genre that happened to be very popular in real banquets, as is witnessed by
many Greek and Latin authors, starting with Aristophanes, continuing with
some fty epigrams of the Greek Anthology, and reaching late antiquity with the
hundred Latin aenigmata written by the mysterious Symphosius or Symposius 3 .
Plato did not like this kind of riddle either: in the fth book of his Republic,
while hinting at the famous riddle of the eunuch (the 'man who is not a man')
1 Clearchus, fr. 63 Wehrli.
2 Athenaeus, e Deipnosophists, 10.457 CD. All Athenaeus' passages are quoted according
to G's translation, 1930.
3 Aristophanes, Wasps 20 sqq.; Greek Anthology, book XIV. e last edition of Symphosius'
riddles is B, 2005. On riddles in classical literatures, see F, 1860; O,
1886, 19122 ; S, 1909, 19122 ; S, 1914. On the fty-three riddles quoted in the
fourteenth book of the Greek Anthology, see F. B, 1970.
and the bat (the 'bird that is not a bird'), he denes this typical 'drinking-bout
riddle' an αἴνιγμα τῶν παίδων (a 'childish riddle')4 .
Not all these riddles were so stupid as Clearchus and Plato seem to say,
though. is might be true of some funny and gross quizzes, such as those
attested by the poets of the Middle comedy Eubulus and Diphilus – although
their solutions (πρωκτός and πέος respectively) tted in with the loose
atmosphere that marked some quite inebriated symposia5 . But other questions
were more serious. For instance, the riddle of the cupping-glass ("I saw a man
gluing bronze upon another man with re so closely as to make them of one
blood"), quoted by Athenaeus and Plutarch, who attributed it to Cleobulina,
was considered by Aristotle an example of both a clever riddle (αἴνιγμα) and
a good metaphor (μεταφορά): in his Rhetoric, the philosopher states that
"metaphor is a kind of enigma, so that it is clear that the transference – the
etymological meaning of the word μεταφορά – is clever"6 .
But which were the riddles whose solution was, according to Clearchus,
"not alien to philosophy"? In the second part of Athenaeus' quotation, the
philosopher says that "the ancients preferred such problems as these: answering
the rst guest who recited an epic or iambic line, each one in turn capped it
with the next verse; or, if one recited the gist of a passage, another answered
with one from some other poet to show that he had spoken to the same eect;
further, each in turn would recite an iambic verse". And, later on, "similarly to
what has been described, they would tell the name of each leader against Troy,
or of each leader among the Trojans, or tell the name of a city in Asia – all
beginning with a given letter; then the next man and all the rest would take
turns in telling the name of a city in Europe, whether Greek or barbarian, as
prescribed. us their very play, being not unreective, became a revelation of
the friendly terms with culture on which each guest stood; and as a reward
for success they set up a crown and bestowed applause, by which, more than
anything else, mutual friendship is rendered sweet"7 .
Since Clearchus' quotation ends here, we are uncertain as to the
philosophical nature of such pastimes: it's hard to tell whether this play with
words and letters had the gravity real philosophy should have.
erefore I must put for a second time the question I have just asked: which
were the philosophical riddles praised by Clearchus? In order to answer this
question, we must turn to other banquets – not real, but literary banquets.
4 Plato, Republic 479 BC. A fuller version of this riddle is quoted by Athenaeus (10.452 C)
and attributed to Panarces; Athenaeus has drawn it from Clearchus' work (fr. 94 Wehrli). e
most complete version of the riddle can be read in Schol. ad Plat. Resp. 479 C (p. 235 Chase
Greene).
5 Eubulus, fr. 106 Kassel-Austin (with the interesting remarks of R.L. H, 1983), and
Diphilus, fr. 49 Kassel-Austin. ese riddles are quoted by Athenaeus as well (10.449 EF; 451
BC).
6 'Cleobulina' fr. 1 West; Athenaeus 10 452 B; Plutarch, Convivium septem sapientium 154B;
Aristoteles, Rh. 1405a37 and Po. 1458a29; Demetrius, De elocutione 102. A slightly dierent
version of the same riddle can be read in the Greek Anthology (XIV 54).
7 Athenaeus 10 457 EF.
99
Riddling at table: trivial ainigmata vs. philosophical problemata
Let us start with the most celebrated one, Plato's Symposium. If we consider
the main topic dealt with in this work, namely, the seven speeches in praise
(ἐγκώμια ) of the god of Love uttered by Phaedrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus,
Aristophanes, Agathon, Socrates and Alcibiades, what else are these seven
speeches other than dierent answers to the philosophical question "what is
love?". e philosophical dimension of this πρόβλημα is strengthened by the
philosophical earnestness of the answers – and, if we may doubt whether all
the answers were really earnest, we must admit that Socrates' surely was.
e same considerations can be made about the other Socratic symposium:
in their dierent (and sometimes amusing) denitions of what is the personal
feature they are most proud of, the banqueters of Xenophon's Symposium do
answer a kind of philosophical question ("what is the most beautiful quality
of a man?"); the fact that some answers are provocative and ridiculous (for
instance, Socrates asserts he is proud of his being a pander) does not wipe out
the philosophical side of the overall discussion.
Other interesting information can be gained from the two symposiastic
works of Plutarch, the Συμποσιακῶν προβλημάτων βιβλία θ' ( Quaestionum
convivalium libri novem) and the τῶν ἑπτὰ σοφῶν συμπόσιον ( Septem
sapientium convivium), where we nd many useful remarks about this subject.
e Συμποσιακῶν προβλημάτων βιβλία as a whole are a crystal-clear
indication of Plutarch's opinion concerning this topic. Its very generic
title has led modern translators to choose a more precise expression and to
underline the conversational side of the work ('table-talk', 'propos de table',
'conversazioni a tavola', and so on). But the Latin translation (quaestiones) is
more akin to the Greek word used by Plutarch to dene the subject of each
'talk' (πρόβλημα). Plutarch mentions it right at the very introduction of his
work, when he states that "each of the nine books contains δέκα προβλήματα "
('ten questions')8 . But what does πρόβλημα precisely mean? Its most common
English translation, problem, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, is
glossed as "a thing thrown or put forward; hence, a question propounded for
solution"9 ; in Greek literature as well, πρόβλημα is a 'question' that covers a
broad range of meanings, since it can be a mere synonym of 'riddle' but can also
mean something deeper such as a real philosophical problem10 . In Clearchus'
denition, the word πρόβλημα appears twice: "A riddle (γρῖφος) is a problem
put in jest (πρόβλημα παιστικόν), requiring, by searching the mind, the answer
to the problem (τὸ προβληθέν) to be given for a prize or forfeit"11 . In the
introduction to the sixth book of the Quaestiones convivales, while he says to
his friend Sossius Senecio that one of the valuable privileges guaranteed by
8 Quaestiones convivales 612 E.
9 OED, vol. VIII, p. 1403.
10 e OED makes a similar distinction: problem is either "a dicult or puzzling question
proposed for solution; a riddle; an enigmatic statement", or "a question proposed for academic
discussion or scholastic disputation", or "a doubtful or dicult question; a matter of inquiry,
discussion, or thought; a question that exercises the mind".
11 Athenaeus 10 448 C ( = Clearchus, fr. 86 Wehrli).
Plato to the guests of his Symposium was that of recalling afterwards what
had been said over the drinks, Plutarch uses the expression προβλημάτων δὲ
καὶ λογῶν φιλοσόφων ὐποθέσεις for indicating "the topics of philosophical
inquiry and discussion"12 .
Many of the Quaestiones convivales are in fact signicant philosophical
topics that could be (and possibly really were) discussed by learned people
during a symposium: this is for instance the case of the rst of the 'table-
talks' ("Whether philosophy is a tting topic for conversation at a drinking-
party"), where Plutarch states that the only questions that should be posed and
answered during a literary banquet must be – if I may borrow the Clearchean
expression – "not alien to philosophy"13 .
But, in spite of the fact that in this work (his longest one) he hardly
mentions a single symposiastic riddle (apart from the quotation of a line that
was part of a very popular αἴνιγμα ) 14 , Plutarch did not spurn that kind of
προβλήματα. In the introduction to the fth book, he says to Sossius that
"after dinner even common, unliterary people allow their thoughts to wander
to other pleasures, as far away as possible from the concerns of the body":
when their belly is full, they "take up conundrums and riddles (αἰνίγματα καὶ
γρίφους), or the Names and Numbers game"15 .
is attitude can be better seen in the other Plutarchean symposium,
the Septem sapientium convivium. e nine questions put by Amasis to the
Ethiopian Pharaoh and discussed by the seven wise men are real philosophical
questions (as a matter of fact, they are called προβλήματα ). ey are the
following: "What is the oldest thing? What is the most beautiful? What
is the greatest? What is the wisest? What is the most common? What is
the most helpful and the most harmful? What is the strongest and the
easiest?"16 .
12 Quaestiones convivales 686 C (English translation by H. B. H, 1969).
13 If one skims through the index of the Quaestiones convivales, he will nd other philosophical
questions (or questions about philosophy), such as question three in book two ("Whether the
hen or the egg came rst", a question that is much more philosophical that it appears) or
questions seven and eight in book eight (two προβλήματα about Pythagorean precepts).
14 Quaestiones convivales 660 D, that is the second line of a riddle quoted in full by Athenaeus
10 457 B. On the peculiarities of Plutarch's quotation, see M. S. C, 1984, pp. 293-296;
on the riddle, see also E. F, 2003.
15 Quaestiones convivales 673AB. In his note in the Loeb edition, after having said the "the
letters of the alphabet were regularly used as numerals (alpha being 1, beta 2, etc.)", H,
1969, writes that "in a game called isopsepha the sum of the values of the letters of a name was
equated with the sum comprised in another name" and refers to the many examples in verse that
can be found in the sixth book of the Greek Anthology (321 sqq.). D. L. P, 1981, p. 504, in
the section dedicated to the isophepha epigrams of Leonidas of Alexandria, writes that "there is
a curious example in a Bithynian epitaph of the second century A.D., Peek 1324: the deceased
invites the reader to guess his name, giving clues including the sum of the nine letters". Galen's
father, the mathematician and architect Aelius Nico, was very keen on such riddles (see H.
D, 1936).
16 Convivium septem sapientium 152 F. Because of the signicance of the topics, the answers
given by the Ethiopian king are discussed at length by the banqueters in the following chapters
of the dialogue. On these riddles, see I. M. K, 2004 and 2005.
101
Riddling at table: trivial ainigmata vs. philosophical problemata
But in this symposium it is also possible to nd less philosophical riddles.
Cleobulus, one of the seven sophoi, who was famous for his conundrums,
goes to the dinner oered by Periander together with his daughter Eumetis,
better known by the surname 'Cleobulina' and not unequal to her father in
the cleverness of her riddles. Two of the most celebrated Cleobulina's riddles
are explicitly quoted in the dialogue. In the fth chapter, Aesop mentions the
riddle of the Phrygian ute ("Full on my ear with a horn-bearing shin did a
dead donkey smite me"); here the verb used to indicate the creation of this
riddle is αἰνίττομαι (connected with the noun αἴνιγμα )17 . In the tenth chapter,
the same Aesop mentions the riddle of the cupping-glass; here the action of
propounding the riddle is indicated through the verb προβάλλειν (connected
with the noun πρόβλημα )18 .
e mention of this conundrum (and of conundrums in general) is
caused by the intervention of the master of the house after the discussion
of the king's riddles: Periander recalls the famous game of riddles between
Homer and Hesiod held at Chalcis during the funeral of Amphidamas19 . At
this point, one of the banqueters, the physician Cleodorus, asks a question
that, in a certain sense, summarizes the topic of this paper: "What dierence
is there between things like this (that is, riddles like those asked by Homer
and Hesiod) and Cleobulina's riddles? Perhaps it is not unbecoming for her
to amuse herself and to weave these as other girls weave girdles and hair-nets,
and to propound them to women, but the idea that men of sense should take
them at all seriously is ridiculous"20 .
In other words, Cleodorus seems to deny the possibility of a distinction
between trivial αἰνίγματα and philosophical προβλήματα. Cleobulina blushes
and does not answer the question; Aesop takes her part and asks the physician
if it is not even more ridiculous not to be able to solve riddles such as the one
of the cupping-glass (a riddle which, as Aesop points out, ought to be very easy
for a doctor like Cleodorus who owed his reputation as a good physician to the
use of cupping-glass as a form of treatment).
Between these two extreme positions, Plutarch prefers to take a much more
balanced stand. Such a position is expressed at best by the words uttered by ales,
one of the seven sapientes, at the beginning of the dialogue: when Neiloxenus of
Naucratis pays Cleobulina a compliment for the popularity of her riddles in
Egypt and praises her for the cleverness and the skill shown in them, ales says
that she uses those conundrums "like dice, as a means of occasional amusement.
(...) But she is also possessed of wonderful sense, a statesman's mind, and an
amiable character, and she has inuence with her father so that his government
of the citizens has become milder and more popular"21 .
17 Convivium septem sapientium 150 EF; 'Cleobulina' fr. 3 West (English translation by
B, 1928).
18 Convivium septem sapientium 154 B.
19 is famous game is the subject of the Contest of Homer and Hesiod.
20 Convivium septem sapientium 154 AB (B's translation).
21 Convivium septem sapientium 148 DE (B's translation).
102
Simone Beta
ese words acknowledge that the ability to construct trivial riddles good
enough to make people enjoy themselves during a banquet is as important as
the capacity to solve more dicult questions that involve signicant spheres
such as literature, politics, science and, last but not least, philosophy.
W o r k s c i T e d
B, F. C., Plutarch. Moralia II , Cambridge, Mass., 1928.
B, M. (ed.), Aenigmata Symposii. La fondazione dell'enigmistica come
genere poetico, Firenze, 2005.
B, F., Anthologie grecque, première partie, Anthologie Palatine, tome XII,
livres xiii-xv, Paris, 1970.
C, M. S., "Five Men and Ten Ships: A Riddle in Athenaeus", Greek,
Roman, and Byzantine Studies 27 (1984) 285-296.
D, H., "Nikon (18)", in RE , vol. XVII.1, 1936, coll. 507-8.
F, E., "Il fatale approdo di cinque uomini su dieci navi: un enigma in
Athen. X 457b – c", Klio 85 (2003) 399-410.
F, J. B., Geschichte des Räthsels, Dresden, 1860.
G, C. B., Athenaeus. e Deipnosophists. Cambridge, Mass., 1930.
H, H. B., Plutarch. Moralia VIII, Cambridge, Mass., 1969.
H, R. L., Eubulus. e Fragments, edited with a commentary by R.L.
Hunter, Cambridge, 1983.
K I. M., "Trial by Riddle: e Testing of the Counsellor and
the Contest of Kings in the Legend of Amasis and Bias", Classica et
Mediaevalia 55 (2004) 85-137.
______ "Amasis, Bias, and the Seven Sages as Riddlers", Würzburger Jahrbücher
für die Altertumswissenschaft 29 (2005) 11-46.
O, K., Rätsel und Rätselspiele der alten Griechen, Berlin, 1886, 19122
(reprint Hildesheim and New York, 1979);
P , D. L., Further Greek Epigrams, Cambridge, 1981.
S, W., Rätsel aus dem hellenischen Kulturkreise, Leipzig, 1909, 19122 .
_____ "Rätsel", in RE, vol. IA, 1914, coll. 62-125.
103
e reading of texts at the Graeco-Roman symposium and in the Christian gathering
T G-R
C
V A
University of Leiden
Abstract
Classical scholars who researched the topic of the activities taking place at Graeco-Roman
banquets, extensively described the artistic presentations that accompanied eating and drinking.
ey have paid much attention to the singing, dancing and dramatic performances given at
banquets. Less attention has been given to the subject of public reading in the context of the
after-dinner symposium. e custom of reading literary works at symposia is well attested in the
symposiastic literature of the rst and the second centuries CE. Plutarch's Moralia are one of the
more important sources that attest the reading of literature at the Graeco-Roman symposium.
In the late 90s it has been argued by several scholars that the early Christian communities during
their weekly gatherings followed the same pattern of Graeco-Roman dining. is paper seeks to
argue that the reading of texts in the early Christian gathering is the historical counterpart of
the reading of texts at the Graeco-Roman symposium.
Introduction
Classical scholars have carefully investigated the activities that
accompanied Graeco-Roman banquets and the entertainment and artistic
contributions that surrounded the eating and drinking.1 ey have paid
much attention to the singing, dancing and dramatic performances given at
banquets2 . However, they have taken less interest in the subject of the public
reading of literary texts in the context of the after-dinner symposium.3
e custom of reading literary works at symposia is well attested in the
symposiastic literature of the rst and second centuries CE. Plutarch's
Moralia is one of the more important sources for our knowledge about the
reading of literature at the symposium. In the late 90's of the last century,
several scholars have convincingly shown that the weekly gatherings held by
early Christian communities conformed to the custom of many voluntary
associations in the Graeco-Roman world which would gather periodically for
a supper and a symposium4 . However, it has not been argued suciently and
in detail that various elements of the Christian gatherings such as reading of
Scripture, preaching and singing have their origins in customs practised at
Graeco-Roman banquets. is paper tries to argue that the reading of texts
in the early Christian gathering is the historical counterpart of the reading
of texts at the Graeco-Roman symposium.
1 K. D, 1998, pp. 81-101; E. S-H, 2005, pp. 220-52.
2 K. D, 1996, pp. 66-80.
3 Discussions of reading at the symposium are found in R. S, 1990-1991, pp. 337-43;
Ch. J, 1991, pp. 191-92.
4 M. K, 1996, pp. 269-378; H. J. J, 2001, pp. 209-37; D. S, 2003.
e Reading of texts at the Graeco-Roman Symposium
Public reading in antiquity could be performed in various social settings.
Dio Chrysostom describes how, walking through the hippodrome, he
encountered people playing the ute, dancing, performing tricks, reading
out a poem, singing, and recounting a history or tale5 . e most common
context, however, was the after-dinner symposium.6 Numerous Greek and
Roman authors give descriptions of banquets at which the reading of texts
played a prominent role. e reading of texts at a symposium usually served
two purposes. First, it provided entertainment for the guests. Juvenal writes
in his Satirae: "My party today will oer other forms of entertainment. We'll
have a recitation from the author of Iliad and from the poems of Virgil which
challenge Homer's supremacy. With poetry like this, it hardly matters how it
is read"7 . Second, the reading of texts at banquets could give the impulse for a
good conversation and, according to Plutarch, also help "to raise morals to a
higher standard of fairness and kindness"8 .
At the symposium various types of texts could be read: philosophy,
scientic treatises, history, poetry, and comedy. According to Aulus Gellius,
at a banquet of the philosopher Taurus the Symposium of Plato was read.9 At
the dinner of the philosopher Favorinus "there was usually read either an old
song of the lyric poets, or something from history, now in Greek and now
in Latin"10 . Gellius once heard the reading of a passage from the treatise of
Gavius Bassus On the Origin of Verbs and Substantives 11 . Plutarch notices that,
as entertainment at a banquet, the dialogues of Plato could be recited and even
performed12 . According to Lucian, the blessed ones who live on the Isle of the
Blest enjoy a symposium accompanied by poetry and songs. Here, mostly the
poems of Homer are read or recited13 . In Lucian's Symposion, the grammarian
Histiaios recited a combination of verses of Pindar, Hesiod and Anacreon14 .
Plutarch states that the comedian Menander is particularly t to be read at
symposia15 .
e reading at symposia could be performed by persons of various statuses.
First, the person who read the literary text could be the author of the text
himself, who by reading his composition hoped to elicit the comments and
reactions of the participants in the banquet16 . Petronius relates that Trimalchio
5 D. Chr., XX 10.
6 Plu., Quaest. conv. 7.711b-712c; Plin., Epist. 1.15.2.
7 Juv., Sat. 11.180.
8 Plu., Quaest. conv. 7.712d.
9 Gell., NA 17.20.
10 Gell., NA 2.22.
11 Gell., NA 3.19.
12 Plu., Quaest. conv. 7.711c.
13 Luc., VH 2.15.
14 Luc., Symp. 17.
15 Plu., Quaest. conv. 7.712b.
16 E. J. K, "Books and Readers in the Roman World", in E. J. K & W. V. C
(eds.), e Cambridge History of Classical Literature Volume II: Latin Literature, Cambridge, 1982,
105
e reading of texts at the Graeco-Roman symposium and in the Christian gathering
at his banquet read his last will and also some poetry of his own making.17
Second, the reading could be performed by the host of the banquet. ird,
the task of reading could be assigned to a special reader (ἀναγνώστης , lector).
Such readers would often be educated slaves, whose duty in Roman houses
was to entertain their master and his guests at table by a recitation in Greek
and/or Latin18 .
Atticus, for instance, had very good readers, whom he thought
indispensable at dinner parties19 . Gellius relates that a slave usually stood by
the table at dinner with the philosopher Favorinus20 . Plutarch states that slaves
could be charged with the recitation and performance of Plato's dialogues21 .
e evidence cited so far may suce to warrant the conclusion that reading of
literary compositions at symposia was a widely spread custom.
e Reading of texts in the Gatherings of Christians
Generations of scholars have traced the reading of Scripture in early
Christian communities back to the reading of the Law of Moses in the Jewish
synagogue. In this traditional and still current view, it is taken for granted that
the reading of Scripture in Christian assemblies goes back to the reading of
the Law in the synagogue if only for the fact that it was the Jewish Scriptures
that were read in the Christian gatherings22 . e earliest Christians, who were
Jews, would have taken over not only the custom of meeting weekly to read and
interpret the Law and the Prophets but also the practice of singing psalms and
saying prayers and thanksgivings. Jews would have held their scrolls in great
veneration, a respect that was enhanced by the ritualized reading in a religious
setting. In time, the reverence for the word of God and the use of sacred books
in religious gatherings would have become characteristic of Christians as well23 .
is argument for tracing back the reading of Scripture among Christians to
the synagogue prots from the fact that there are no clear-cut or convincing
parallels for the cultic reading of texts in other religions than Judaism, apart
from religions that have been inuenced by Christianity itself. us, on the
assumption that there was historical continuity between Jewish and Christian
cultic practices, scholars inferred and still infer that the reading of Scripture
in the Christian gathering has its roots in Judaism or has been inuenced by
Judaism in one way or another24 .
However, the view that the reading of texts in Christian communities
derives from the practice of reading and studying the Law in Jewish
p. 11; R. S, 1987, p. 213.
17 Petron., Satyr. 71.4; 55.
18 See J.W. D and A. J. S. S, "anagnostes," in OCD3 , p. 80.
19 Nep., Att. 13.3; 14.1.
20 Gell., NA 3.19.
21 Plu., Quaest. conv. 7.711c.
22 F. Y , 2004, p. 91.
23 Ibid., 92.
24 G. R, 2002, p. 305.
communities does not seem to be conrmed by the data contained in early
Christian literature.
To clarify the origin of the reading of Scripture in the gatherings of
Christians it is necessary to look at the context of reading in the Christian
Church during the rst and second centuries.
In the last ten years there has been a substantial shift in the way scholars
viewed the periodical gatherings of the early Christians. is shift began
with the publication of Gemeinschaftsmahl und Mahlgemeinschaft by Matthias
Klinghardt (1996)25 and became stronger through studies by H. J. de Jonge
(2001) and D. Smith (2003)26 . e essence of these authors' new approach can
be formulated as follows: the local early Christian community, as a sociological
phenomenon, functioned as a voluntary religious association just like many
other associations in the Graeco-Roman world of the rst century CE.
ere is rm evidence from the rst two centuries CE to support this view.
For instance, in 55 CE Paul compares the local Christian community with
pagan religious associations in Corinth27 . In 112 CE Pliny does the same in
his correspondence with the Roman Emperor Trajan28 . Lucian in the second
century CE calls the leader of a Christian community a thiasarches, that is,
leader of a cult association29 . About 200 CE Tertullian compares meals of the
Christian communities with meals of various other religious associations such
as the collegia Saliorum and the Dionysus and Sarapis cults30 .
Recent scholarship mostly accepts and subscribes to the view that,
sociologically, early Christian communities functioned as Hellenistic cult
associations. Such associations, whether pagan, Jewish, or Christian, held
periodical gatherings that had a bipartite structure: a meal (deipnon) and
a drinking party (symposion) afterwards. Most descriptions of Christian
gatherings in the rst three centuries present these gatherings as banquets that
took place weekly on Sunday evening (Paul, Pliny, Justin Martyr, Clement of
Alexandria, Municius Felix, Tertullian). Basically, the early Christian gathering
was a supper with a drinking party, not a meeting for the study of the Bible,
as was the synagogue meeting on Sabbath. e early Christians met in private
houses on Sunday evening and held their symposia more or less the same way
as other groups did in those days. During the symposium part of the evening,
Christians not only engaged in such oral communication as prayer, singing,
speeches, homilies, lessons and revelations, they also practised public reading
of texts.
It may seem exaggerated to seek the roots of the reading of texts in
the gatherings of Christians one-sidedly and exclusively in the Hellenistic
symposium, and not both in synagogue and symposium. ere are, however,
25 M. K, 1996, pp. 269-378.
26 H. J. de J, 2001, pp. 209-37; D. S, 2003.
27 1 Cor. 10:16-21.
28 Luc., Peregr. 11.
29 Plin., Epist. 10.96.
30 Tert., Apol. 39.
107
e reading of texts at the Graeco-Roman symposium and in the Christian gathering
strong reasons to trace the Christians' reading exclusively to the symposium.
e meeting in the synagogue took place on Saturday in the morning did
not comprise a meal or a symposium. e literary evidence from Philo and
Josephus suggests that the synagogue was used primarily for reading and
interpreting the Law of Moses31 . Christians did not read the Torah or the Law
of Moses as was the custom in the synagogual meeting. Moreover, during the
rst century, Christians read texts without any interpretation that followed the
reading. ere simply no continuity: neither between the ceremonies involved,
nor between the texts read.
e rst Christian texts to be read in Christian gatherings were apostolic
letters, for instance, those of Paul. ese were read from the middle of the rst
century onwards. is can be inferred from the Pauline correspondence and the
Book of Acts32 . At rst, the reading of the apostles' letters was not yet a liturgical
practice; rather these letters were read just as letters received. In certain cases,
the messenger who brought them could read such letters to the audience.33
Many early Christian letters were intended to be heard by all members of the
community to which they were addressed; this means that they had to be read
aloud in that community's weekly gathering at the symposium.
It should be admitted that reading at the Hellenistic symposium could
have dierent functions and goals, and that various genres were read. But
one function could certainly be the instruction or edication of the audience,
which comes close to that of the reading of apostolic letters among Christians.
Plutarch said that one should read moral stu, especially Plato's dialogues.34
Moreover, one should not conceive of the apostolic letters read in the Christian
communities as documents of high canonical, holy or divine status. At rst,
they were no more than messages from contemporary teachers, and documents
almost of the level of every-day life; nothing particularly special. Furthermore,
it is already signicant of and in itself that reading occurred at the Christian
symposium: why would one suppose that this has other roots than reading at
symposia in general. at the genres that were read could vary, both within
paganism and between paganism and Christianity, does not alter the fact
that reading at symposia was the continuation of the reading at symposia in
general.
Around 100 CE the author of 1 Timothy admonishes his addressee to
devote himself to the public reading of the Scriptures.35 Since there is no
evidence that there existed special meetings intended only for the reading of
Scripture and preaching, it is probable that 1 Timothy means that portions
of the Old Testament in Greek should be read at the symposium on Sunday
evening. Until the third century36 there is no indication that Christians in their
31 Philo, Som. 2.127; Jos., Ant. 16.2.4.
32 1 ess. 5:27, Acts 15:31; Col. 4:16.
33 Luc., Symp. 21.
34 Plu., Quaest. conv. 7.711.c.
35 1 Tim. 4:13.
36 Or., Hom. Josh. 4.1; Hom. Gen. 12.1. According to Melito of Sardes, On Pascha, he read
gatherings read the Law of Moses; it is most probable, therefore, that they read
other books of the Old Testament, for example, the Prophets or the Psalms.
In the second century, in addition to letters and Prophets, the writings
read at Christian symposia included sermons, apocalypses and accounts of
Christian martyrdoms37 .
Explicit information about the reading of Gospels in the gatherings of
Christians is provided by Justin Martyr (ca. 155):
On the day called Sunday, all who live in cities or in the country gather together
in one place, and the memoirs of the apostles or the writings of the prophets are
read, as long as time permits. en, when the reader has nished, the president
in a discourse instructs and exhorts to the imitation of these good things38.
us, in Justin's Church in Rome, the reading of Gospels and/or Prophets
was followed by a speech, including ethical exhortations, and prayers. Only
then would the supper begin.
Some decades later, the reading of Gospels in gatherings of Christians is
attested by the Acts of Peter, written between 180 and 190 CE. Here Peter is said
to have entered the house where the Christians had gathered. When he came
into the dining-room (triclinium ), "he saw that the gospel was being read. And
rolling it up he said, 'Men, who believe in Christ and hope in him, you shall
know how the holy scriptures of our Lord must be explained …. Now I will
explain to you that which has been read to you.'"39 e reading and exposition of
Scripture are concluded with a supper (ch. 22). e course of things described
here must be that of the Roman Church in the late second century.
In about 200 CE, Tertullian gives a brief description of the Christian
gathering in North Africa. With respect to the reading of Scripture in this
gathering he observes:
We assemble to read our sacred writings, if any peculiarity of the times makes
either forewarning or reminiscence needful. However it be in that respect, with
the sacred words we nourish our faith, we animate our hope, we make our
condence more steadfast; and no less by inculcations of God's precepts we
conrm good habits40.
Interestingly, in Tertullian's view the reading has a pastoral purpose. e
hearing of Scripture strengthens the listeners' faith, hope and morality.
Whereas at Graeco-Roman symposia the reading of texts normally took
place after the supper, the evidence in Justin and Tertullian suggests that, in
Ex. 12 on Easter day, but this is of course a special case; it is not the reading in a regular Sunday
gathering.
37 2 Clem. 19.1.; Rev. 1:3-8, 11; Herm., Vis. 2.8.4; Canon Muratori, lines 71-78; M. Polyc.
20. 38 Just., 1 Apol. 67.3.
39 Acta Petri 20.
40 Tert., Apol. 39.3.
109
e reading of texts at the Graeco-Roman symposium and in the Christian gathering
the second century, Christians reversed the order and put the reading before
the communal meal. e easiest explanation of this reversal is that it allowed
those who were not yet full members of the community, the catechumens, to
participate in the gathering until the supper began, from which moment on
they were excluded41 . If the reading of Scripture took place after the supper
it was dicult to arrange for the catechumens to arrive precisely in time
to hear the reading. It was, thus, much more practical to put the reading,
together with the exposition, before the supper.
e oce of "reader" or "lector" has arisen in the Church at the end of the
second century: Tertullian in North Africa is the rst to attest the existence
of the function of reader42 . The oce originated certainly some time before
Tertullian makes mention of it.
Before the oce of reader originated, the reading of Scripture in
Christian gatherings must have been performed by ordinary members of the
community. is earlier practice is reected in Revelation 1:3, where a blessing
is pronounced over "the one who reads" the Book of Revelation out loud in
Church. Obviously, this reader does not yet have an ocial capacity, for he is
designated with the participle ἀναγνώσκων, not with the noun ἀναγνώστης .
On the other hand, in 1 Timothy 4:13, the responsibility for the reading of
Scripture is assigned to the leader of the community. Apparently, around the
turn of the rst to the second century, practices as to who performed the
reading still varied.
Towards the middle of the second century we encounter someone who
reads his own composition in a Christian congregation, namely the author of
the homily known as 2 Clement. is author concludes his homily by stating:
"Brothers and sisters, … , I am reading to you an exhortation to pay attention
to that which is written, that you may save both yourselves and the one who
reads among you"43 . Obviously, "reading" is the delivering of the homily; it is
read aloud by the author himself.
Justin's account of the Sunday gathering mentions "the person who reads
[namely, a passage from a Gospel or a Prophet]"44 . But Justin does not use a
noun designating the reader and it cannot be inferred from this passage that
he already knew the oce of lector. Tertullian, however, as already stated, is
acquainted with the reader as an ocial of the Church.45 From the third century
onwards the reader regularly appears as an ocial functionary who, at various
places, assists bishops and other clergy in conducting the service of Christian
congregations. e ceremony of the appointment of a reader is mentioned
in a mid-third-century manual on Church practice from Rome, the Apostolic
Tradition; it states: "A reader is installed as the bishop hands him a book. He
41 Did. 9.5.
42 Tert., Praescr. 41.8.
43 2 Clem. 19.1.
44 Just., 1 Apol. 67.4.
45 Tert., Praescr. 41.8.
has no laying on of hands"46. Around the same time, the appointment of lectores
is attested by other authors in Rome and Carthage47 . In the Syriac Didascalia
(ca . 215 CE?) it is not a reader, but the bishop himself who performs the
reading from the Scriptures.48
One may nd it dicult to accept that readers in Christian communities
are analogous with the slave lectors at Graeco-Roman symposia. However, as
it has been stated in the beginning of this article the reading at symposia could
have been performed by various persons provided they have ability to perform
the reading. As long as Christian communities conducted theirs gatherings
in the evening following the standard pattern of meal plus symposium the
reading of various texts could be performed by host himself, his educated slave
or any member of the community who could do it. Christian communities
may have lacked educated slaves who read texts at Hellenistic symposia, but
with time they began to appoint some members of their congregations to
perform reading of authoritative texts in their gatherings. In any case the oce
of reader in Christian Church can be best traced back to reader at symposia in
the Graeco-Roman world in general.
Conclusion
Christians in the rst and second centuries met in private houses on
Sunday evening. ey held their symposia in the same way as other, non-
Christian, groups did in those days. Accordingly, they practised public reading
of texts at their symposia and had special readers to do the reading, at least from
some point of time in the second century onwards. e reading of authoritative
writings took place in the social gathering that followed the supper. is was
the context in which apostolic and other important letters, Prophets, Gospels
and other genres were read aloud to the community. ere is a close analogy
between the reading of texts at non-Christian banquets and the reading of
texts in the weekly gatherings of Christians. is analogy cannot be incidental.
We are witnessing here one and the same phenomenon in both non-Christian
and Christian contexts. e analogy challenges the current view, recently
upheld by some scholars, according to which the reading of the Scriptures in
the gatherings of Christians should be traced back to the Jewish practice of
reading and studying the Law of Moses on Sabbath in the synagogue. ere is
no continuity between the reading in the synagogue and that in the Church.
e public reading of Scripture in Christian communities goes back, not to
the reading of the Law in the synagogue, but to the reading of literature at the
Hellenistic banquet in general.
46 Trad. ap. 11.
47Eus., Hist. 6.43.11 (Rome, 251 CE); Cypr., Epist. 29.1 (Carthage, ca. 250 CE).
48 Did. ap. 2.58. e bishop is supposed to perform the reading in a sitting position.
111
e reading of texts at the Graeco-Roman symposium and in the Christian gathering
W o r k s c i T e d
A, P., "Omne Verbum Sonat: e New Testament and the
Oral Environment of Late Western Antiquity", JBL, 109 (1990), pp.
3-27.
D, Katherine. "Convivial Spaces: Dining and Entertainment in the
Roman Villa", JRA, 9 (1996) 66-80.
––––––––– "Ut Graeco more bibetur: Greeks and Romans on a Dining
Coach". In I. N & H. S. N (eds.), Meals in a Social Context,
Aarhus, 1998, pp. 81-101.
G, D., "Menander's Comedies Best with Dessert and Wine (Plut. Mor .
712C)", Athenaeum, 65 (1987), pp. 511-16.
J, Ch. ,"Dinner eater", In W. S (ed.), Dining in a Classical Context,
Michigan, 1991, pp. 191-92.
J, de H. J., "e Early History of the Lord's Supper". In J. W. van H
& A. H (eds.), Religious Identity and the Invention of Tradition,
Assen, 2001, pp. 209-37.
K, E. J., "Books and Readers in the Roman World". In E. J. K
& W. V. C (eds.), e Cambridge History of Classical Literature
Volume II: Latin Literature, Cambridge, 1982, pp. 3-32;
K, M., Gemeinschaftsmahl und Mahlgemeinschaft. Soziologie und
Liturgie frühchristlicher Mahlfeiern. Tübingen/Basel, 1996.
M, D., "Performing the Book". Classical Antiquity, 19 (2000), p. 138-
179.
R, L., Philosophes entre mots et mets. Plutarque, Lucien et Athénée autour de
la table de Platon. Grenoble, 2002.
R, G., "e Reading of Scripture in Early Christian Liturgy". In L.
R (ed.), What Athens has to do with Jerusalem. Essays on Classical,
Jewish, and Early Christian Art and Archaeology in Honor of Gideon
Foerster, Leuven, 2002, pp. 305-31.
S, Wiliam J. (ed.), Dining in a Classical Context. Michigan, 1991.
S, D. E., From Symposium to Eucharist. e Eucharist in the Early Christian
World. Minneapolis, 2002.
S, R., "e Circulation of Literary Texts in the Roman World". CQ, 37
(1987) 213-223.
––––––––– "Reading Aloud: Lectores and Roman Reading", CJ, 86 (1990-
1991) 337-43.
112
Valeriy Alikin
S-H, E. Das römische Gastmahl. Eine Kulturgeschichte ,
München, 2005.
Y, F., "Christian Teaching", in F. Y & L. A (eds.), Cambridge
History of Early Christian Literature, Cambridge, 2004, pp. 91-104.
113
Plutarco e la lettura nel simposio
P
G D'I
Università di Palermo
Abstract
In the symposium, by then merged into the banquet, Plutarch practises, in accordance with the
rules of his "ethical anthropology", the collective reading of poetry and prose writers not only
for mere entertainment but as a stimulus for a debate of high cultural dignity, always directed to
improve man. Refusing many authors of popular convivial praxis, e. g. Aristophanes, he prefers
Plato among the prose writers and Homer and Menander among the poets.
Rispetto al simposio greco del periodo arcaico e classico e al banchetto-
spettacolo romano, il simposio greco d'età postclassica non godeva di molta
attenzione da parte degli studiosi sia per un'obiettiva carenza di fonti sia
per la falsa idea che esso avesse perduto d'importanza. Ma negli ultimi anni
sono apparsi diversi lavori1 che hanno ribadito, anche per l'età alessandrina e
romana, il suo ruolo come istituzione sociale e come luogo di presentazione di
letteratura attraverso letture o esibizioni attoriali2 .
Fra gli autori greci della prima età imperiale, a Plutarco si devono le
testimonianze più importanti sul simposio. Esse ci dimostrano la sua vitalità
ed insieme la sua trasformazione3 .
Com'è noto, a parte gli episodi simposiaci che s'incontrano nelle Vite e
contribuiscono alla caratterizzazione morale dei personaggi4 , due dei Moralia
sono proprio dedicati al simposio: uno è il Συμπόσιον τῶν ἑπτὰ σοφῶν (cito
secondo il Catalogo di Lampria), l'altro i Συμποσιακά. Il primo, il Septem
sapientium convivium5 , ci riporta, col tipico gusto nostalgico di Plutarco e sulla
scia dei due Simposi precedenti, di Platone e di Senofonte, ad un simposio
arcaico e indubbiamente inventato, dove si segue l'esempio di Platone, centrato
sulla discussione, piuttosto che quello di Senofonte, che, dando rilevanza
allo spettacolo, con le sue performances meliche, orchestiche, drammatiche,
mimiche o acrobatiche, riproduceva più fedelmente il costume conviviale greco.
I Συμποσιακά, che opportunamente, nella edizione napoletana del Corpus
Plutarchi Moralium, vengono presentati come Conversazioni a tavola6 , in eetti
1 Mi riferisco soprattutto al capitolo III ("e symposium": pp. 71-103) del volume
callimacheo di A. C, 1995, e ad una serie di convegni sull'argomento (O. M ,
1990; W. J. S, 1991; O. M M. T, 1995).
2 In un volume sulla lettura nel mondo ellenistico L. D C, 2005, dedica un paragrafo
(pp. 114-25) a "La lettura in gruppo e il simposio", non trascurando Plutarco.
3 Sul simposio in Plutarco cf. A. M. S, 1998, pp. 117-33, F. P P,
1999 e M. V, 2000.
4 Cf. A. B, 2008.
5 Cf. F. L C, Plutarco. Il convito dei sette sapienti (introduzione, testo critico, traduzione
e commento a c. di F. L. C.), Napoli, 1997.
6 Editi nora solo i libri I-IV: A. M. S 1998 e I, Plutarco. Conversazioni
a tavola. Libro quarto (introduzione, testo critico, traduzione e commento a c. di A. M. S.),
documentano già una trasformazione, cui non è estranea l'inuenza romana. Se
prima symposion e deipnon erano nettamente distinti, le due situazioni adesso
appaiono confuse: così il termine symposion vale a indicare anche il deipnon 7 ,
che talora è detto συνδεῖπνον, mentre il momento del bere, nell'ambito del
banchetto, spesso viene espresso dal generico πότος "8 .
Pur considerando la letterarietà delle descrizioni simposiali di Plutarco, non
v'è dubbio che le sue parole lascino trasparire la realtà contemporanea9 . Accanto
alla sopravvivenza e all'incremento di un simposio di puro intrattenimento, le
testimonianze plutarchee convergono nel difendere soprattutto un simposio
serio, losoco, di ascendenza sostico-platonica, dove si pratica la lettura
collettiva di poeti e prosatori, ma in genere non solo per motivi ricreativi, bensì
come stimolo per avviare una discussione di alta dignità culturale.
Per quel che concerne le testimonianze speciche sulla lettura, e in
particolare sulla lettura nel simposio, Plutarco porta la nota inconfondibile
della sua ideologia profonda, che altrove ho denito "antropologia etica"10 e
che si caratterizza per una amorevole attenzione per l'uomo e per una costante
propensione a migliorarlo.
Secondo Plutarco, la pratica di leggere ad alta voce, consigliata in genere
come esercizio atto a migliorare la respirazione (De tuenda sanitate praecepta,
16, 130A-D), a tavola, nel corso dei pasti, è giovevole sia al corpo sia allo spirito,
purché gli argomenti non provochino discussioni accese (ib., 20, 133B-C). Ma
su questo tema egli mantiene la sua preferita posizione di medietà.
E dice: "Le parole dei massaggiatori e i discorsi dei maestri di ginnastica,
pronti a ripetere ad ogni occasione che un dotto ragionare durante il pranzo
rovina il pasto e appesantisce la testa, si devono temere solo se a pranzo vogliamo
risolvere 'il problema indiano' o discutere 'l'argomento dominante'11 . ... Ma se
costoro non ci consentono di svolgere durante il pranzo qualche altra ricerca o
discutere di losoa o leggere testi che, nell'ambito del bello e dell'utile, orano
un elemento di attrattiva e di gradevolezza che dà piacere, li inviteremo a non
importunarci ed a tornare, invece, nelle gallerie dei ginnasi e nelle palestre e
discutere di questi argomenti con gli atleti: sono loro che li allontanano dai libri e
li abituano a trascorrere l'intera giornata fra scherzi e buonate, e così li rendono,
come diceva l'arguto Aristone, lucidi e duri come le erme del loro ginnasio".
Napoli, 2001; A. C, Plutarco. Conversazioni a tavola. Libro secondo (introduzione, testo
critico, traduzione e commento a c. di A. C.), Napoli, 2001; I. C, Plutarco. Conversazioni
a tavola. Libro terzo (introduzione, testo critico, traduzione e commento a c. di I. C.), Napoli,
2001. Sull'opera cf. S.-T. T, 1989-1996. Una 'conversazione a tavola' è pure il Περὶ
μουσικῆς, dialogo di discussa atribuzione, che si conclude richiamando l'utilità della musica nel
convito.
7 Cf. A. M. S, 1998, pp. 121-5.
8 Cf., per es., il titolo del primo problema del Libro I delle Quaestiones convivales (612E): Εἰ
δεῖ φιλοσοφεῖν παρὰ πότον.
9 Cf. F. P P, 1999.
10 G. D'I, 2005, pp. 898-9.
11 Non sappiamo esattamente che cosa voglia dire, ma di certo allude a problemi in sommo
grado ardui e complessi.
115
Plutarco e la lettura nel simposio
Plutarco si cura di indicare i testi che conviene leggere e commentare.
Anche se il simposio plutarcheo è soprattutto luogo della discussione losoca,
non cessa per questo di essere pure un luogo privilegiato per ascoltare poesia.
Accanto, però, all'uso di testi destinati specicamente al convito, soprattutto
epigrammi12 , è diusa ormai la ripresa di generi classici, concepiti a suo tempo
per fruizioni dierenti.
Ma Plutarco, vedremo, per il suo banchetto pone dei veti che lo allontanano
dal costume corrente.
Le indicazioni sono discusse in Plu., Quaest. conv. 711A-713F: si tratta
dell'ottavo πρόβλημα del libro settimo, che così viene enunciato: Τίσι μάλιστα
χρηστέον ἀκροάμασι παρὰ δεῖπνον, cioè Quali audizioni ammettere nel corso del
banchetto. Da notare due termini: ἀκρόαμα, che privilegia l'udito rispetto alla
vista, e δεῖπνον, che sta ad indicare come all'intrattenimento e alla discussione
comunitaria non sia più specicamente destinata la parte nale del banchetto,
il tradizionale simposio. La discussione continua ed integra la precedente, che
si occupava della convenienza o meno dell'uso della musica, in particolare di
αὐλητρίδες, durante il banchetto. Gli interlocutori sono ospiti di Plutarco a
Cheronea: l'amico Diogeniano di Pergamo, che, come vedremo, è portavoce
delle idee dell'autore, ed inoltre due stoici abbastanza diversi, il primo dei
quali è un sosta anonimo, dalla lunga barba (βαθυπώγων), che si adombra
perché si vuol sonare il auto o la lira in un banchetto, e si rende ridicolo col
manifestare disgusto per i piaceri più innocenti, mentre il secondo è Filippo
di Prusa, che al contrario è convinto che il banchetto sia il momento migliore
per concedersi una pausa e una distrazione sotto il segno di Dioniso. Ma
l'anonimo esponente del Portico insiste proponendo un passatempo venuto da
Roma e non ancora molto diuso: si tratta di utilizzare i dialoghi drammatici
di Platone per recite adate agli schiavi davanti ai convitati di un banchetto.
Allora Filippo taglia corto e, con un discorso perfettamente in linea con le
idee di Plutarco altrove manifestate, ammette che anche lui è contrario a chi
pretende di ridurre Platone a servire da passatempo ai bevitori e di consumare
i suoi dialoghi tra leccornie e profumi. E del resto anche la lettura delle poesie
di Sao o di Anacreonte sarebbe fuori luogo.
E tuttavia Plutarco parla (Quaest. conv. 700C) di Πλατωνικαὶ
συναναγνώσεις, di "letture in comune" dei testi di Platone. E in Cato Minor
67 si ricorda che Catone "andò a tavola con un bel gruppo di persone ... tutti
i suoi compagni e le autorità di Utica" e che "dopo la cena, il simposio (πότος)
fu assai colto e gradevole, e si passarono in rassegna argomenti losoci, uno
dopo l'altro, nché la discussione cadde sui cosiddetti paradossi stoici, in
particolare su quello per cui solo l'uomo onesto è libero e invece i malvagi sono
tutti schiavi".
Qui va osservato che Plutarco, nel negare la opportunità di certe letture
durante un convito alla sua maniera, lascia intravvedere che appunto queste
letture ricorrevano durante i banchetti contemporanei.
12 Sulle antologie poetiche destinate ai simposi cf. F. F, 1988 e F. P
P , 2001.
Rincara la dose Diogeniano soggiungendo (Quaest. conv. 711E) che "certo
bisogna radiare dalla lista la più parte delle audizioni, e in primo luogo la
tragedia, i cui clamori non sono aatto adatti al convito, ma troppo severi,
rappresentando azioni che smuovono passione e pietà". Dunque, contro la
tragedia Plutarco non riprende gli argomenti di Platone, ma tuttavia giudica il
suo tono incompatibile con l'atmosfera del convito13 . Ed in questo ci fa arguire
che almeno Euripide fosse oggetto non raro di lettura.
Quindi lo stesso Diogeniano passa ad arontare il tema della commedia14 ,
e distingue nettamente fra l'antica e la nuova (Quaest. conv. 711F). "Quanto alle
commedie, io dico che l'archaia, a causa della sua disomogeneità, non è adatta
ai simposiasti: infatti nelle parti che si chiamano parabasi la gravità e la libertà
di parola presentano troppa violenza e tensione; e la propensione agli scherzi
e alle buonerie è terribilmente nauseante quando si scatena infarcendosi di
espressioni volgari e parole scurrili". Per di più sarebbe necessario, per intendere
bene il testo, che ciascuno avesse accanto, oltre al coppiere, all' οἰνοχόος, anche
un maestro di scuola, un γραμματικός, il quale gli spiegasse il signicato di
questo o quel nome legato ad una attualità sociopolitica vecchia di cinque
secoli, sicché il convito diventerebbe un γραμματοδιδασκαλεῖον, una scuola.
Secondo lo stilema ilomorco della σύγκρισις 15 , Plutarco fa seguire al
rigetto della commedia antica l'elogio della commedia nuova, della quale aerma
Diogeniano (Ib. 712B-C): "Essa è così legata ai conviti, che sarebbe oggi più
agevole progettare un convito senza vino piuttosto che senza Menandro".
Infatti lo stile che accompagna l'azione è gradevole e semplice, e perciò non
può essere spregiato dai sobri né mai annoierà gli ebbri. Le riessioni oneste
e sincere, penetrando dentro, addolciscono anche i caratteri più duri come
in un fuoco e li piegano ad una maggiore moderazione; parallelamente la
mescolanza di serio e faceto per nulla sembrerebbe essere stata realizzata se
non per il piacere ed insieme per il protto di quelli che hanno bevuto e si
sono rasserenati.
Non ultima delle qualità della poesia menandrea – aggiunge ancora
Plutarco per bocca di Diogeniano – è la trattazione della tematica erotica
sempre in maniera conforme all'etica della famiglia: le seduzioni si concludono
ordinariamente col lieto ne del matrimonio, e mai si indulge alla licenza e
all'amore pederotico16 : parlando di eros, perciò, la commedia nuova appaga la
morale dei convitati, che dopo il banchetto si andranno a coricare accanto alle
mogli, rilassati dal vino e dalla piacevolezza di Menandro.
L'elogio di Menandro non è però fondato su un giudizio relativo e
contingente, legato al momento particolare del simposio: Diogeniano esprime
qui anche un giudizio in termini assoluti di valore artistico, che riette le idee di
13 Su Plutarco e la tragedia cf. A. M. T, 1960, L. D G, 1976 e F.
J , 2002.
14 Su Plutarco e la commedia cf. R. M. A, 1997, G. Z, 2000 e O. I,
2004; su Menandro, in particolare, A. C, 2005 e M. D F, 2005.
15 Cf. G. D'I, 1996.
16 Cf. G. D'I, 2007.
117
Plutarco e la lettura nel simposio
Plutarco medesimo, come assicura la fondamentale concordanza col giudizio,
ancor più severo, pronunciato nella Aristophanis et Menandri comparatio
(853A-854D)17 . Già all'inizio in un tricolon di aggettivi sostantivati vengono
sinteticamente ssate le ragioni di una scelta. "Τὸ φορτικόν," φησίν, "ἐν λόγοις
καὶ θυμελικὸν καὶ βάναυσον ὥς ἐστιν Ἀριστοφάνει, Μενάνδρῳ δ' οὐδαμῶς.
"Il linguaggio volgare, la teatralità, il cattivo gusto come sono in Aristofane, in
Menandro non lo sono mai".
Dirà più avanti (854A-B): "Menandro, al contrario, con la sua eleganza si
mostra assolutamente sodisfacente: nei teatri, nelle conversazioni, nei simposi,
presenta la sua poesia come oggetto più accettato di lettura (ἀνάγνωσμα), di
studio e di rappresentazione drammatica fra le cose belle che la Grecia ha
prodotto". E qui, insieme con l'esaltazione della poesia menandrea, fa capolino
"un certo orgoglio nazionale", proprio di un greco che, ormai politicamente
soggetto alla potenza romana, "rimane comunque consapevole della grandezza
del suo popolo nel campo dei valori spirituali"18 .
Testimonianza ulteriore di un'apprezzata presenza di Menandro nel
convito è in De vitioso pudore 531B, dove un attore strapazza (ἐπιτρίβει) il
poeta davanti ai simposiasti, e per questo applaudirlo sarebbe un peccato di
δυσωπία, cioè di "esagerazione di pudore" (ὑπερβολή τοῦ αἰσχύνεσθαι).
Tirando le la del discorso, mentre spesso si può essere incerti sulla modalità
della presenza di un autore nei banchetti, se essa, cioè, si risolva in una lettura di
gruppo o nella declamazione attoriale di un testo memorizzato, tuttavia nessun
dubbio permane almeno nel caso di Platone, Menandro ed Omero: per il primo,
infatti come abbiamo visto, Plutarco parla di (συν ) αναγνώσεις, mentre per gli
altri due usa il termine ἀνάγνωσμα 19 .
Così, Ὅμηρος ἦν ἀνάγνωσμα, Omero era la lettura per eccellenza (De
Alexandri magni fortuna aut virtute 328D), e non solo per Alessandro. Ce lo
conferma Plutarco, De garrulitate 504D:
Di tutti i giudizi espressi nei riguardi del poeta Omero il più esatto è che solo
lui riesce veramente a vincere la noia dei suoi lettori, perché è sempre nuovo e
al colmo della leggiadra vigoria espressiva.
Inne, in Quaest. conv. 683B-C Plutarco introduce nel convito la
declamazione di Omero, riportando un verso e un emistichio
17 Cf. O. I, 2004, pp. 192-3.
18 M. D F, 2008, p. 116 n. 48.
19 Lingue moderne indicano con lo stesso termine – l'italiano con "lettura", il francese con
lecture, lo spagnolo con lectura, il portoghese con leitura, l'inglese con reading, il tedesco con
Lektüre – i due concetti che in greco, ancora oggi, vengono indicati con due parole: ἀνάγνωσις "
e ἀνάγνωσμα sono i due termini che designano il primo la "lettura" come azione del leggere,
coerentemente col valore del susso -σις", che indica nomen actionis, il secondo la "lettura"
come testo destinato alla lettura, d'accordo col susso -μα, che indica nomen rei actae. Anche il
latino usa lectio per indicare sia l'azione di leggere sia il testo letto, ma mentre qui si distingue
fra lettura privata, lectio, e lettura pubblica, recitatio, il greco usa per entrambe le accezioni il
termine ἀνάγνωσις.
"συκέαι τε γλυκεραὶ καὶ μηλέαι ἀγλαόκαρποι
καὶ 'ἐλαῖαι τηλεθόωσαι"
derivati da due versi omerici, Od. 7. 115-116:
ὄγχναι καὶ ῥοιαὶ καὶ μηλέαι ἀγλαόκαρποι
συκέαι τε γλυκεραὶ καὶ ἐλαῖαι τηλεθόωσαι.
peri e granati e meli con splendidi frutti,
e chi dolci e ulivi rigogliosi.
Va osservato che Plutarco non riferisce i versi omerici così come
tramandati, bensì opera uno spostamento di emistichi, mostrando in tal modo
che Omero, oltre ad essere lettura preferita nei conviti, veniva anche declamato
a memoria.
Concludendo, tra autori bocciati ed autori promossi la testimonianza
di Plutarco è importante non solo perché chiarisce qual era il tipo di letture
che riteneva preferibile nel suo convito ideale ma anche perché, attraverso
la polemica, apre uno spiraglio su quella che era la prassi conviviale alla sua
epoca.
ri f e r i m e n T i b i b l i o g r a f i c i
A, R. M.ª, "Plutarco y la comedia ateniense", in C. S .
(eds.), Plutarco y la historia. Actas del V Simposio Español sobre Plutarco
(Zaragoza, 20-22 de Junio, 1996), Zaragoza, 1997, pp. 3-28.
B, A.,"Plutarque et la scène du banquet", in A. G. N (ed.),
e Unity of Plutarch's Work. Moralia emes in the Lives, Features of the
Lives in the Moralia, Berlin /New York, 2008, pp. 577-88.
C, A., Callimachus and His Critics, Princeton/New Jersey, 1995.
C, A., "Plutarco e Menandro", in A. C (ed.), Plutarco e l'età
ellenistica. Atti del Convegno Internazionale di Studi (Firenze, 23-24
Settembre, 2004), Firenze, 2005, pp. 105-18.
D C, L., La lettura nel mondo ellenistico, Roma-Bari, 2005.
D F, M., "Usi e riusi menandrei in Plutarco", in A. C (ed.),
Plutarco e l'età ellenistica. Atti del Convegno Internazionale di Studi
(Firenze, 23-24 Settembre, 2004), Firenze, 2005, pp. 119-40.
_____ Plutarco. Il confronto tra Aristofane e Menandro, compendio (introduzione,
testo critico, traduzione e commento a c. di M. D. F.), Napoli, 2008.
D G, L.,"Plutarco e la tragedia greca", Prometheus, 2 (1976) 151-74.
119
Plutarco e la lettura nel simposio
D'I, G.,"Stilemi ilomorci nel macrotesto plutarcheo", in J. A.
F D F. P P (eds.), Estudios sobre
Plutarco: Aspectos formales. Actas del IV Simposio Español sobre Plutarco
(Salamanca, 26 a 28 de Mayo, 1994), Madrid, 1996, pp. 17-29.
_____ "Plutarco e l'antropologia", in M. C. R (ed.), Le parole dei giorni.
Scritti per Nino Buttitta, Palermo, 2005, (II) pp. 890-9.
_____ "Omosessualità e pederastia in Plutarco", in J. M.a N I & R.
L L (eds.), El amor en Plutarco. Actas del IX Simposio español
sobre Plutarco (28-30 Septiembre, 2006), León, 2007, pp. 467-76.
F, F., "P. Berol. Inv. 13270: i canti di Elefantina", SCO, 38 (1988) 181-
227.
I, O., "I comici a simposio: le Quaestiones Convivales e la Aristophanis
et Menandri Comparatio di Plutarco", in I. G (ed.), La biblioteca di
Plutarco. Atti del IX Convegno plutarcheo (Pavia, 13-15 Giugno, 2002),
Napoli, 2004, pp. 185-96.
J, F., "Quelques réexions sur Plutarque et la tragédie", SIFC, s. III, 20
(2002) 186-96.
M, O. (ed.), Sympotica. A Symposion on the Symposion, Oxford, 1990.
M, O. & T, M. (eds.), In vino veritas, London 1995.
P P, F., "El Banquete de Plutarco: ¿Ficción Literaria o
Realidad Histórica?", in J. G. M C . (eds.), Plutarco,
Dioniso y el vino, Actas del VI Simposio Español sobre Plutarco (Cádiz,
14-16 de Mayo, 1998), Madrid, 1999, pp. 379-92.
_____"Les Anthologies de P. Tebt. I 1 et 2", in I. A . (eds.), Atti
del XXII Congresso Internazionale di Papirologia. (Firenze, 23-29 Agosto,
1998), Firenze 2001, pp. 1077-93.
S, A. M., Plutarco. Conversazioni a tavola. Libro primo (introduzione,
testo critico, traduzione e commento a c. di A. M. S.), Napoli, 1998.
S, W. J. (ed.), Dining in a Classical Context, Michigan, 1991.
T, A. M., "Plutarco e la tragedia greca", Dioniso, 34 (1960) 124-42.
T, S.-T., A Commentary on Plutarch's Table Talks, Göteborg I 1989,
II 1990, III 1996.
V , M., "Plutarco e il genere simposio", in I. G C. M
(eds.), I generi letterari in Plutarco. Atti dell'VIII Convegno plutarcheo
(Pisa, 2-4 Giugno, 1999), Napoli, 2000, pp. 217-29.
Z, G., "Plutarco e la commedia", in I. G C. M (eds.),
I generi letterari in Plutarco. Atti dell'VIII Convegno plutarcheo (Pisa,
2-4 Giugno, 1999), Napoli, 2000, pp. 319-33.
S 2
e Symposion as a Space for Social and Political
Gatherings
123
Leading the party, Leading the City: the Symposiarch as politikos
le a d i n g T h e p a r T y , l e a d i n g T h e c i T y
T h e s y m p o s i a r c h a s p o l i T i k o S
P A. S
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Abstract
Plutarch's outline of the aims and duties of the symposiarch at Quaest. Conv. 1.4 (620A-
622B) and the conversations he reports oer many similarities to the political program of his
Precepts for Politicians, notably his focus on concord and the obstacles to it. is paper explores
the implications of these parallels for Plutarch's thinking on the polis and on leadership. e
symposium as a community of friends is a kind of idealized polis, but nevertheless the host and
symposiarch must be alert at all times to the potential for divisiveness and ill-feeling. Wine
may reveal both good and bad qualities in the members of the party, which will need to be
guided and harmonized by the leader. Even seating or the distribution of food at the dinner
preceding may be a cause of ill-will, and the most innocent-seeming topics iname the spirits
of the participants. In the Precepts, Plutarch outlines the goals of political activity, the means a
leader should use, and the obstacles he will encounter. e chief goal is civic concord; the chief
obstacle rivalry among the city's elite, prompted by ambition, competitiveness, and greed. e
potential for discord at the symposium mimics in a restricted situation the potential discord of
the polis. In both cases the leader must use great skill in facilitating an atmosphere of good will
and harmony.
e Symposiaca, Plutarch's longest non-biographical work, is also the most
puzzling. e diculty lies in discovering unity and purpose in the ninety-ve
reported conversations from many dierent dinner parties, distributed among
nine books1 . is paper will trace one important theme which runs through
the work and helps unify it: the nature of the civil society which this work
describes, the leadership which it requires, and the parallels with the needs of
political leadership in Plutarch's day.
e political context of this work is an empire still remembering the
revolts and civil wars of the rst century. At the local level, cities ruled by
an elite backed by Rome frequently suered from aristocratic rivalry, which
destabilized their economies and not infrequently led to factional ghting and
violent Roman intervention.
Within this world of political conict, Plutarch sought by his essays and
biographies to encourage self-knowledge and virtue in his contemporaries,
especially those who were responsible for the governance of cities, provinces,
and the empire itself. His two great biographical projects, the Lives of the Caesars
and the Parallel Lives, examine political leadership through narrative studies of
the emperors and of outstanding Greek and Roman statesmen. His Rules for
1 Nine of the conversations, with fragments of three others, (4.6b-10 and 9.6b-12a) have
been lost. I have found especially helpful F. F, 1996; S.-T. T, 1989-96 and
A. C, 2001. An earlier version of this paper was read at the 'Plato and Platonism'
conference, University of South Carolina, Columbia SC (March 20-22, 2008). I am grateful for
the comments of Melissa Lane to that version of this paper, and to the respondent Mark Beck
and others present then, as well as to the anonymous reader of this paper for generous advice.
Politicians sets out practical advice for conducting oneself as an eective leader
in a Greek city under Roman rule. ere Plutarch advises his young addressee
to seek concord for his city and avoid the ambition, competitiveness, and greed
- philotimia , philonikia , philokerdia - which have cost his city and its political
class so much grief.
e Symposiaca
e Symposiaca are dedicated to Sosius Senecio, the same extremely
distinguished member of Trajan's court to whom were dedicated the Parallel
Lives, and they share a central purpose with the Lives, to make moral discourse
concrete through narrative. e Symposiaca create a narrative model of
community and interpersonal relationships within the limited compass of the
symposium.
e central theme of the Symposiaca is to philopoion, 'friend-making'
(612D)2 . In the words of Plutarch's friend eon, the aim of a symposium is
"through pleasure to produce or heighten friendship among the participants"
(621C). But friend-making is not automatic.
In the very rst conversation of the Symposiaca, Sosius Senecio raises
the question: how is it possible at a drinking party to avoid wrangling and
self-display (tous erizontas kai sophistiôntas)? Plutarch's Symposiaca respond to
this question, modeling good drinking parties, in implicit opposition to the
degenerate variety often documented in our sources3 . Senatorial and imperial
dinner parties often served to assert the power and wealth of those who gave
them. Plutarch rejects this attitude. Instead he focuses on the strategies which
may be used by the host, the symposiarch, and the guests to foster friendship.
I will treat these strategies under three heads: the guests at the party, the role
of the symposiarch or host, and the topics proposed for discussion. At the end
I will consider parallels with political life.
e guests at the party
Ideally, the guests should know the host and each other, so that they can be
comfortable together. When they do not, there is a risk of misunderstandings.
For this reason, a particular diculty arises when one guest invites other
guests, the so-called shadows (Symposiaca 7.6). On the plus side, this practice
2 Plutarch's work deliberately operates at a lower plane than Plato's Symposium. It diminishes
the erotic charge which energizes Plato's masterpiece, discussing eros in only a few of the
conversations (the major treatments are in Quaest. Conv. 1.5, 2.1, and 7.8, with other references
in 5.7, 7.7, and 9.14). On Plato's blending of banquet practice with philosophical argument, see
D. B, 1994.
3 I have treated this topic more fully in "Drinking, Table Talk, and Plutarch's Contemporaries",
in J. G. M C . (eds.), 1999. For recent discussions of Greek dining, see P.
S-P 1992, and for symposia in particular see S 1991 and the bibliography
cited there; for Roman banquets, see the special number of AJPh 124, 3 (2003) on Roman
dining; K. V, 2004 and E. S-H, 2005.
125
Leading the party, Leading the City: the Symposiarch as politikos
allowed friends to introduce new members into the group, or to have a favorite
companion present, as we nowadays regularly will include a spouse, partner, or
companion in a dinner or party invitation. Plutarch recommends that when
possible a guest should invite those who are already friends of the host, or
share common interests with him, whether in philosophy, literature, or politics.
(In Plato's Symposium, Socrates himself had invited such a friend to Agathon's
party.) But such was often not the case. In Plutarch's day the desirable friendly
atmosphere could be compromised when a Roman governor, senator, or other
imperial or civic ocial had been invited to a dinner party. e political world,
with all its stresses, intruded into the social. Besides the tension caused by the
presence of one person more powerful and wealthier than the other guests,
the great man would expect to bring some of his friends or sta, and the host
had no choice in the matter. Such a party became a quite dierent occasion
from a simple meeting of friends (708B), and the risks of oense, ill-temper,
or hostility were correspondingly higher.
e symposiarch
In Plato's Symposium, the drunken Alcibiades burst into the party and
appointed himself symposiarch, that is, the man chosen by the group to
regulate the drinking of the party. He immediately ordered that all drink
heavily, as he had already (213E). For Plutarch such behavior is unsuitable and
contrary to the goal of the symposium. He is more inuenced by Plato's Laws ,
in which the symposium is a site of moral education, where the young may
learn to resist the temptation of pleasure under the watchful eye of a wise ruler
(archon ) who will see that the drinking is orderly and follows rules. us the
properly regulated symposium will encourage not just amusement (paidia), but
also temperance (to sôphronein), under the supervision of a sober, older leader
(Laws 2.673e, cf. 1.639c-641c, 649d-650b, 2.671 c-d).
e qualities of Plutarch's ideal symposiarch, less severe than Plato's, and
not expressly moralistic, are set out in one of the early conversations (Quaest.
Conv. 1.4). He must be neither reluctant to drink nor given to drunkenness,
but rather sympotikotatos, "especially symposiastic". e unusual superlative,
Plutarch explicitly states, was suggested by Plato's discussion of the guardians
in the Republic, where he asserts that the commanders (archontes) of the
guardians should be phylakikôtatoi, 'especially protective' of the city (R. 412C).
us Plutarch insists that we compare the role of his ideal symposiarch with
that of the guardians in Plato's ideal state. e symposiarch should have a
relation of philia with those in his care, as the Platonic guardian must love,
philei, the city and do what is best for it (R. 412 D-E). Plutarch goes on to
make the parallel of symposiarch and ruler yet more precise with an anecdote
of Pericles, found also in Rules for Politicians (813 E, cf. Apophth. Reg. 186 C).
Pericles used to say to himself, as he assumed his duties as general, "Remember,
Pericles, that you rule free men, you rule Greeks, you rule Athenians". e
symposiarch, Plutarch explains, should remember that "he rules friends", and
thus should do what is best for them, and neither allow them to become rowdy
nor deprive them of their pleasure. As the symposiarch himself should seek a
mean in his drinking, so also in his governance of others he should observe a
mean between dull sobriety and drunken carousing.
Unlike Plato's Alcibiades, the symposiarch should be sensitive to the
physical and psychological state of the guests, exactly to avoid drunkenness
(Quaest. Conv . 1.4, 620E-621A). e symposiarch must, in Plutarch's words,
know what change drinking produces in each person, into what emotional state
he is liable to fall, and how he carries strong drink. . . . Like a musician adjusting
a lyre, he should give one a little more (wine) and another a little less, to bring
their dispositions (physeis) into evenness and concord (symphonia) from their
original diversity4.
If the symposiarch does not know the guests as intimately as this ne
tuning requires, he should at least use general criteria: old men and gloomy
ones get drunk more quickly than the young and the cheerful, for example.
is knowledge permits the symposiarch to regulate the harmony and good
behavior of the party. He will foster the blend of seriousness and play, spoudê and
geloion, necessary for a good party. is blend will reect that of a good wine,
which warms the austere and charms the more lively. e party guests are the
citizens of his little city, and he should govern them like Plato's guardians, not
for his prot, but thinking of the best for them, always aiming at a harmonious
concord. is is the ideal.
Topics that avoid hostility and violence
However, as someone observes early in the Symposiaca, parties are often
shipwrecked by mockery and insults, and engender hostility and anger, unless
they are guided rightly (621C-622B). I will touch on some general points
regarding this guidance that emerge from the conversations Plutarch records.
ose who have lived through rancorous political campaigns will
appreciate the total avoidance of contemporary politics in the Symposiaca .
Such conversations did occur at parties, of course: one concerning items
coming before the Athenian assembly is eetingly mentioned at the beginning
of a chapter before a new subject is introduced5 . Plutarch considers a proper
selection of topics for discussion essential, but politics is not one of them. Topics
must t the occasion, the kairos, as he illustrates in the very rst discussion (1.1,
4 is requirement recalls Plato's insistence that the orator know dierent types of souls
and the arguments proper to each (Phaedrus 271a-272b). Compare also Plato's discussion in the
Laws of the proper ages for wine, noting that Dionysus had given wine as "a helpful medicine
for the austerity of old age" (2.666b).
5 Quaest. Conv. 7.9, 714A. Just before, at the end of 7.8 (713F), Plutarch had noted that
musical performances could divert a conversation moving toward political controversy. eon's
strictures against turning the party into a democratic assembly or sophist's school (621B)
indicate Plutarch's aversion to such subjects. Cf. S.-T. T, 1995, pp. 433-7.
127
Leading the party, Leading the City: the Symposiarch as politikos
613A-C) and often throughout the work. Stories from history or everyday
life are especially suitable (614A), for they allow a more relaxed presentation,
and provide examples of admirable behavior, without requiring a rigorous
philosophical demonstration. If philosophical topics are raised, Plutarch
remarks, gentle persuasion works more eectively then ironbound proof (614
CD). Bringing up a topic suitable to a given guest requires skill, thought, and
respect for the person addressed. In the rst conversation of the second book,
Plutarch gives examples of well-chosen questions which permitted a guest
both to entertain the company and win admiration by discussing subjects he
knows and loves. For instance, travelers are glad to be questioned about the
distant places they have visited, or statesmen about missions they have served
on or posts they have held (630A-631C).
Guests regularly entertained themselves by setting requirements or
challenges to one another, or teasing them for habits or predilections. Plutarch
warns (621D-622B, cf. 631C-F) that too often these carry a degree of
maliciousness or mockery which is not playful but hybristic. Ideally a challenge
should give someone a chance to show his talent, not ridicule his incapacity.
e object of the symposium is kindness and friendship (philophrosyne), not
self-assertion or scorn.
e entire ninth book of the Symposiaca, some fteen chapters, is devoted to
a single party given by Plutarch's teacher Ammonius in Athens for the teachers
at a school for young men, to which Plutarch and other friends were invited
as well. Very soon the underlying tensions between the teachers of dierent
disciplines, and between those whose pupils had done well or poorly, made
itself apparent, and it is all that Ammonius and his friends can do to dispel
the contentious atmosphere. In this case Plutarch focuses on Ammonius' adroit
redirection of the conversation through addressing questions to dierent people
and suggesting topics for discussion. Once, when a discussion broke down into
a competitive wrangle of claims and counterclaims, Ammonius invited a guest
to sing some poetry. As with Alcinous' similar request in the Odyssey, the singing
introduced a pause and permitted the talk to resume on a dierent subject
(736E, cf. Od . 8.250-55). Later, Ammonius required that professors of the same
discipline may not question each other, but only someone in a dierent area,
thus avoiding boring or contentious 'shop-talk' (737DE). He reinforced this by
urging Plutarch to respond to a question on grammar (738A). Other guests also
tried to help, not allowing a professor who had fared badly in the competitions
to sit grumpily, for instance, but teasing a good-humored response from him
(739E, 741A). e symposium is brought into harmony not only by controlling
the ow of wine, but by channeling the conversation into suitable topics. e
'tuning' of the society depends on 'tuning' of the discourse.
Fittingly, the ninth book, and the Symposiaca, ends with two speeches on
the role of the Muses. In the rst (746B-747A), Plutarch asserts that both
the desire for pleasure and the desire for the good, cited by Plato as the two
principles of action (cf. Phaedrus 237D), require the divine guidance of the
Muses. ese goddesses can direct human desires to their proper fulllment
in a noble pleasure, free from anything disorderly, debauched or violent. is
speech expresses the ideal of the symposium, and of civil society. In the second
speech (747B-748D), Ammonius explains how the art of dance is able to
delight the divine in men. e dancer's body creates a kind of silent poetry,
a discourse leading men to noble pleasure6 . In these nal conversations, as
throughout the Symposiaca, the presence of the Muses, representatives of
harmony, limit, and rened pleasure, protect conviviality and drinking from
degenerating into insults, violence, and debauchery.
Politics
Plutarch's desire for peace and harmony at a symposium is parallel to his
view of the ideal society founded on concord. e guests at a symposium may
be compared to the citizens of a city or state: both are the raw material from
which a civilized society is constructed7 . Each group shares, at least ideally, a
common aim, the happiness of the whole, and accepts that they all individually
have a role in reaching that goal. Moreover, they recognize a ruler or leader,
either imposed on them or chosen by them, who has the responsibility of
fostering the unity of the assemblage and enabling its movement toward the
common goal. Ideally, they will all be friends or friendly to each other, but
in fact there will usually be dierences of rank, wealth, temperament, and
personal objectives which tend to divide them.
e quality of self-control so basic to Plutarch's symposiarch was necessary
to a leader as well. In addition, the political leader, like the symposiarch, must
understand men's natures and recognize their dierences, either individually
or according to general classes. In his Rules for Politicians, Plutarch explains
how the politician must know his fellow citizens and adjust his behavior to
their qualities. e politician who wishes to alter the êthos of the citizen body
must move slowly, rst accommodating himself to the people's pre-existing
character, then gradually modifying it (799B), as the symposiarch does when
adjusting the doses of wine. e politician should not assimilate himself to the
popular character, as atterers do, but "understand it and employ for each kind
that by which it can be won over" (800A). Once he has become inuential and
trusted, then the politician can try to lead the character of the citizens toward
a better state, one of harmony and concord, and bring them into tune as a
musician does his lyre (cf. e.g. 809E). e statesman needs the same knowledge
of character, individually and in classes, as the symposiarch.
In a city as in a symposium, small matters may lead to major disruptions
in a city. In his Rules for Politicians, Plutarch observes that:
6 e speech reects back to earlier in the book, when some of the students had performed a
dance for the guests. e dance is given a higher role than just entertainment by Ammonius.
7 e parallel is armed early in the Symposiaca through the anecdote of Aemilius Paullus,
who asserted that the same man could organize both fearsome armies and delightful dinner
parties, since both required good order (eutaxia , Quaest. conv. 1.2, 615 E-F, cf. Aem. 28.9,
Apophth. reg . 198B, already in Polyb. 30.14, Livy 45.32.11).
129
Leading the party, Leading the City: the Symposiarch as politikos
Violent civil conict is not always kindled by disputes on public matters, but
frequently private dierences prompted by personal oences aect public life
and throw the whole state into disorder (Praec. rei publ. ger. 825A).
e same sort of small oences which can disrupt a drinking party can
disrupt a state as well. A poorly guided party will lead to anger and enmity, as
a poorly ruled city degenerates into civil war and tyranny.
Like the leader of a symposium, a political leader must consider carefully
what topics are suitable for which people, and the proper moment to introduce
them. In speeches as at parties, stories are usually better than logical argument
to persuade an audience. As serious philosophical discussion may be out of
place at a convivial party, moral rigidity in a politician may not t the times,
and as with Cato of Utica, be like fruit ripening out of season, attractive but
useless (Phoc. 3.2). Overall, a sense of limit and harmony is necessary to achieve
the consensus needed in a civil society.
e tension between theoretical ideal and political practice means that
neither a party nor a polis is ever in a stable state: each needs constant care by
both its leaders and the individuals which comprise it to maintain the concord
and harmony essential to its function, under the protection of the Muses8 .
e Symposiaca describe gatherings that at rst reading seem
commonplace and tame, far removed from the brilliance of Plato's imagined
drinking party. Nevertheless, these unremarkable dinner parties speak to the
ethical underpinnings of society. Contemporary political life, in Plutarch's
view, required the self-examination and principles of action of his own brand
of moral and political philosophy, with its emphasis on self-improvement,
conscious control of the passions, and goodwill and concord among friends
and in states. e Symposiaca, in the concern of a good-natured and sensitive
leader to respect the individuality and dignity of each participant and in the
goodwill and harmony of their conversations, express an ideal of humanity
and friendship which we can still admire and recognize as the basis of human
society9 .
W o r k s c i T e d
B, D., "Peinture et dépassement de la réalité dans le Banquet de Platon",
Parerga, CMO 24, Litt. 6, 1994, 171-95 (reprinted from REA 82, 1980,
5-29).
C, A., Plutarco , Conversazioni a tavola, libro II, Naples, 2001.
8 e necessity of constant care by a leader to maintain a city or state is a frequent theme in
Plato, e.g. in the shepherd analogy of Republic 1 and the ancient tale in the Statesman. Cf. the
analysis by M. S. L, 1998.
9 In a vignette, Plutarch presents King Cleomenes III of Sparta as just such an ideal ruler in
his simplicity and graciousness at table, where he won friends by conversation, not gifts (Cleom .
13.4-9).
130
Philip A. Stadter
F, F., Plutarque , Propos de Table, Livres VII-IX, Paris, 1996.
L, M. S., Method and Politics in Plato's Statesman, Cambridge 1998.
S P, P., La cité au banquet. Histoire des repas publics dans les cités
grecques, Rome 1992.
S, W. J., Drinking in a Classical Context, Ann Arbor 1991.
S, P . A., "Drinking, Table Talk , and Plutarch's Contemporaries", in
J. G. M C . (eds.), Plutarco, Dioniso, y el Vino. Actas
del VI Simposio español sobre Plutarco (Cadiz, 14-16 de Mayo, 1998),
Madrid, 1999, pp. 481-90.
S-H, E., Das römische Gastmahl. Eine Kulturgeschichte, Munich,
2005.
T, S.-T., A Commentary of Plutarch's Table Talks, 3 vols., Göteborg,
1989-96.
_____ "La politica nelle Questioni conviviali", in I. G & B. S
(eds.), Teoria e Prassi Politica nelle opere di Plutarco. Atti del V. Convegno
Plutarcheo (Certosa di Pontignano, 7-9 de Giugno, 1993), Naples,
1995, pp. 433-7.
V, K., Mensa Regia. Das Bankett beim hellenistischen König und beim
römischen Kaiser, Munich/Leipzig, 2004.
131
A 'barbarian' symposium and the absence of philanthropia ( Artaxerxes 15)
a "b a r b a r i a n " S y m p o S i u m a n d T h e a b s e n c e o f p H i l a n T H r o p i a
(ar T a x e r x e S 15)*
E A
e Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Abstract
is paper studies a unique symposium scene in the Artaxerxes and aims to understand its
narratological signicance in the biography. It is a "barbarian" banquet, which in many respects
is the complete opposite of its Greek counterpart. Yet familiar features of the symposium are
nevertheless discernible in it. During the feast, Mithridates, an inebriated Persian, is tricked
into telling a certain truth, which contradicts the ocial royal version. As a result he is brutally
punished by Artaxerxes, in a deed that essentially removes the trait of philanthropia from the
monarch. e paper presents how, on the one hand, the wine imbibed at the party can be
regarded as revealing the true character of the king, and how, on the other, the symposium is
crucial in altering the ethos of Artaxerxes. Like Mithridates at the banquet, the reader is also
baed by the interplay of ethnic stereotypes, and by the thin line between the real and the
apparent, artistically presented by Plutarch.
e Greek Symposium, according to Plutarch, should produce Philanthropia
and friendly feeling among its participants1 . By contrast, in a non-Greek
setting found in the biography of Artaxerxes (15.1-7), a "barbarian" symposium ,
as it were, is portrayed by Plutarch as leading to the eective removal of the
trait of Philanthropia from the Persian king. It is the aim of this paper to show
the manner in which this reverse outcome is created, and to demonstrate the
narratological signicance of the Greek symposium in this Life 2 .
e context is a feast taking place in the aftermath of the battle of Cunaxa
(401 BC), which saw the victory of Artaxerxes over his rebellious brother,
Cyrus the Younger3 . e guests in this dinner are barbarian, including a young
Persian named Mithridates, who was responsible, according to one version,
for striking Cyrus in the temple with his spear4 . He was not the only one who
* I am grateful to Profs. C. Pelling and D. Gera for commenting on earlier drafts of this
paper.
1 Quaest. conv. 1.4.3.621c, 4.Proem. 660ab; Cons. ad ux. 610a; Sept. sap. conv. 156cd, 158c.
Cf. S.-T. T, 1989, p. 102; 1999, pp. 66-9; A. G. N, 1999, p. 342 n.17.
2 e banquet is not presented as typically Persian. In the Quaest. conv. Plutarch sometimes
discusses special features of the Persian dinner, which do not specically appear here. E.g.,
1.1.613a (Persians drink and dance with their concubines rather than with their wives); 1.4.620c
(the ability of Cyrus the Younger to hold his wine; cf. Reg. et imp. apophth. 173e); 2.1.629e-630a
(many questions posed at the Persian banquets of Cyrus the Great; cf. X., Cyr . 5.2.18 ); 7.9.714a,
d (deliberation on issues of state over wine, a custom no less Greek than Persian; cf. Hdt. 1.133;
Str. 15.3.20). A rather dierent approach to the text of Plutarch and to this scene in particular is
presented by Binder, C., Plutarchs Vita des Artaxerxes: Ein historischer Kommentar, Berlin, 2008,
244 ("reine Fiktion")
3 On this battle see J. K, 1924; J. K. A, 1974, pp. 106 sqq.; P. A. R,
1980; J. M. B, 1983; G. W, 1992; R. B. S, 1997, pp. 84-93; P. B,
2002, pp. 627-30.
4 Art . 11.5: καὶ παρατρέχων νεανίας Πέρσης ὄνομα Μιθριδάτης ἀκοντίῳ βάλλει τὸν
injured the prince in the course of the combat. Another person, a Carian slave
from the city of Caunos, is reported to have stabbed Cyrus from behind, in
the back of the leg, and the wounds inicted by the two men brought about
the death of the prince5 . During the dinner, Mithridates relates his part in the
event and instantly causes his own downfall, since the facts revealed by him
contradict the ocial royal version. Even though Artaxerxes himself was not
involved in the killing of Cyrus, as the king was quickly removed from the
battle after incurring an injury (Art. 11.2-3) and was not even present at the
ensuing clash (Art. 11.4-10, 12.2, 13.1), he nevertheless appropriated the glory
for it. Before the feast, the king gave Mithridates gifts; but these were allegedly
for another deed – namely, presenting the monarch with the blood-stained
saddle-cloth of Cyrus, which had fallen from the prince's horse6 .
Mithridates received the gifts silently and walked away (Art. 14.7). Still,
at the banquet, he is induced to disclose his feelings by Sparamizes, the chief
eunuch of the queen mother, Parysatis, who wishes to avenge the death of her
son Cyrus7 . e ill-advised conduct of Mithridates at the dinner party leads
to his brutal execution by Artaxerxes, which is detailed in the next chapter of
the biography8 . is scene is an adaptation of a story recounted in the Persica
of Ctesias, the Greek physician at the court of the Great King (FGrH 688 F
16.67)9 .
κρόταφον αὐτοῦ παρὰ τὸν ὀφθαλμόν, ἀγνοῶν ὅστις εἴη. Cf. the description of Xenophon (An .
1.8.27), who does not name Mithridates but merely claims ἀκοντίζει τις and locates Cyrus'
wound below the eye (ὑπὸ τὸν ὀφθαλμόν). It is most probable that Xenophon relied on Ctesias'
account. Cf. S. R. B, 1999, who seems to infer too much from the minor dierences
between the two authors.
5 Art . 11.9-10: ἐν δὲ τούτῳ Καύνιοί τινες ἄνθρωποι...τῇ τοῦ βασιλέως στρατιᾷ
παρακολουθοῦντες, ἔτυχον συναναμειχθέντες ὡς φίλοις τοῖς περὶ τὸν Κῦρον...εἷς οὖν
ἐκείνων ἐτόλμησεν ἀγνοῶν ἐξόπισθεν βαλεῖν τὸν Κῦρον ἀκοντίῳ. τῆς δὲ περὶ τὴν ἰγνύαν
φλεβὸς ἀναρραγείσης, πεσὼν ὁ Κῦρος ἅμα παίει πρός τινι λίθῳ τὸν τετρωμένον κρόταφον,
καὶ ἀποθνῄσκει. It should be noted that both Mithridates and the Carian struck Cyrus without
knowing his identity.
6 Art. 14.5: οἰόμενος [scil. βασιλεὺς] δὲ καὶ βουλόμενος δοκεῖν καὶ λέγειν πάντας
ἀνθρώπους, ὡς αὐτὸς ἀπεκτόνοι Κῦρον, Μιθριδάτῃ τε τῷ βαλόντι πρώτῳ Κῦρον ἐξέπεμψε
δῶρα καὶ λέγειν ἐκέλευσε τοὺς διδόντας ὡς "τούτοις σε τιμᾷ [ὁ] βασιλεύς, ὅτι τὸν ἐφίππειον
Κύρου πῖλον εὑρὼν ἀνήνεγκας". Cf. 11.6: τὸν δ' ἐφίππειον πῖλον ἀπορρυέντα λαμβάνει τοῦ
τὸν Κῦρον βαλόντος ἀκόλουθος αἵματος περίπλεω.
7 It is possible that the whole banquet was organized by Parysatis in order to trap Mithridates,
the queen mother wanting to avenge Cyrus' death by causing the noble Persian to bring harm
on himself. e resigned demeanour of Mithridates upon receiving the gifts from the king had
not suited her intentions, and she may have plotted to engineer his ruin. Cf. her manipulations
in getting rid of other persons in Art. 17.1-8, 23.1.
8 Mithridates was punished by the torture of the boats (ἀποθανεῖν σκαφευθέντα: 16.2), a
method of execution that inicts a horrendous death. e condemned man is placed between
two boats (σκάφαι), one on top of the other, and is force-fed until he incurs severe diarrhea.
While his intestinal waste accumulates in the boats, worms and other creatures breed in it and
devour his esh.
9 On the Persica see F. J, 1922, pp. 1640-66; R. D, 1973, pp. 103-16. On its
shortcomings see J. M. B, 1976, 1978, 1983 (errors, questionable numbers, faulty
geography, bias, simplication, confusion, duplication, anachronisms, etc.). See also R. B.
133
A 'barbarian' symposium and the absence of philanthropia ( Artaxerxes 15)
e feast portrayed here is very dierent from a Greek symposium, and
one could say that it is its complete opposite10 . To begin with, this is not an all-
male gathering11 , as some of the participants are eunuchs, a problematic group
in Greek imagination12 , and the chief gure is a eunuch belonging to a woman,
the queen mother. Nor is this an event of aristocratic and free members, since
the eunuchs are slaves. Moreover, the dinner betrays no social equality among
the guests, and this fact is reected in the garments Mithridates chooses to wear
to the banquet. ese clothes, which were gifted to him before the banquet
with the intention of exalting him above the others, are indeed admired by the
rest of the company13 .
e setting too is unlike that of a Greek banquet. Strictly speaking, there
is no clear distinction between eating and drinking, as was customary in the
Classical symposium 14 . In addition, drinking seems to take place before the
prayer that generally accompanied the libation in the Hellenic ritual, marking
the beginning of the banquet15 . No entertainment is mentioned, neither music
nor dance. e participants do not sing or recite16 . ough there is no direct
reference to drinking wine neat, in the barbarian manner, a word play on the
unrestrained (akrates), intoxicated Mithridates alludes to the unmixed (akratos)
wine17 .
S, 1997, pp. 3-9; D. L, 2004, pp. vii-xxiv. ough lost, a short summary of the
work was made in the 9th century AD by the patriarch Photius and is included in his Bibliotheca
(Codex 72). e parallel passage to Plutarch's description is extremely short: ὡς Ἀρτοξέρξης
παρέδωκεν αἰτησαμένηι Μιτραδάτην Παρυσάτιδι, ἐπι τραπέζης μεγαλαυχήσαντα ἀποκτεῖναι
Κῦρον, κἀκείνη λαβοῦσα πικρῶς ἀνεῖλε. On the value and reliability of Photius' summary
of Ctesias see G. G, 1950, p. 519, J. M. B, 1976, pp. 2-5. e discrepancies
between the versions of Plutarch and Photius may point to an adaptation of the original account
of Ctesias by the biographer, or, alternatively, reveal that the patriarch's epitome is not accurate.
ere is no need to suppose that Plutarch used a dierent source here.
10 On the actual form of the oriental symposia see W. B, 1991.
11 On the symposium as a drinking party intended for males only see O. M , 1982;
1983, p. 199; 1990, p. 6; M. J. V, 1984, p. 5. e female ute players, dancing-girls (Ar.,
Ach. 1093, X., Smp. 2.1) and hetairas attended the symposium solely to entertain the men.
12 Cf. Athen. 10.452c (ἀνήρ τε κοὐκ ἀνήρ). Cf. Pl., R. 5.479b-c.
13 By contrast, sympotic participants all wore wreaths (cf. gn. 1001; Ar., Ach.1091, 1145;
Ec. 844; Menander, Pseuderacles, Fr. 451.15 Kassel-Austin; Athen. 15.669c), which not only was
a ritual act signifying initiation into a new reality (see W. R, 1995, p. 108) but probably
also highlighted the aspect of equality and commensality. Cf. D. T, 1943, pp. 28-9.
14 e host openly exhorts the guests "πίνωμεν ἐν τῷ παρόντι καὶ ἐσθίωμεν". On the
distinction between deipnon and symposium see A. H, 1931, pp. 1266-7; O. M, 1990,
p. 6; 1995, p. 225. Cf. G. P , 1991, p. 158 on its gradual erosion in Hellenistic and Roman
times.
15 Cf. Pl., Smp. 176a; X., An. 6.1.5; Cyr. 4.1.6; Smp. 2.1; Athen. 4.149c, e; Ar., Eq. 105. Cf. F.
L, 1990, p. 25-6. e sequence here may t a Sassanian custom, in which a prayer
for the gods and the king apparently comes after the banquet. is practice is known from a
document published by J. C. T, 1935, pp. 11, 19, 89.
16 Nevertheless, the practice of asking riddles (αἰνίγματα or γρῖφοι) is hinted at. For this
custom see Athen. 10.448b; Plut. Sept. sap. conv. 152f; Quaest. conv. 5.proem. 673ab; Ar. V. 20,
1308-13; Pl. Smp. 215a. Cf. gn., 681-2.
17 An observation made by T. D, 1999, p. 92 n. 76 with regard to the double meaning
e banquet proceeds contrary to the code of behaviour appropriate to a
symposium. ere are instances of paroinia, that is, irresponsible and oensive
drunkenness, insolent talk, or hybris 18 . No feelings of ease and joy are felt,
no friendship, or euphrosyne 19 . ere is no calm and civilized conversation,
nor, for that matter, any evidence of talk owing freely. Quite the reverse is
evident; the other participants are silent upon perceiving Mithridates' calamity
(Art . 15.7). eir silence is a sort of behaviour depicted by classical authors
as inappropriate20 . e only discourse presented in the scene – namely that
between Mithridates and Sparamizes – concerns war or conict, topics that
early poets21 banned as themes unsuitable to a symposium. e dialogue is
lethal. Note the mention of a knife in the rst act (15.2). e very presence
of weapons, in the form of the Persian akinakes, symbolizes strife in what is
supposed to be a peaceful context22 . All in all, the atmosphere is one of mistrust,
lack of transparency and treachery. Mithridates is seduced into exposing his
thoughts and harming himself, and he is isolated, as the rest of the guests let
him bring about his own destruction. ough this picture supposedly describes
a real party, it seems to present a thought experiment, so to speak, a suggestion
of what could happen if the institution of the symposium were to fall into the
hands of non-Greeks23 .
It is in these barbarian circumstances that the notion of the Greek
symposium is introduced, enfolded in the words of Sparamizes the eunuch on
the question of truth, "ἐπεὶ δέ φασιν Ἕλληνες οἶνον καὶ ἀλήθειαν εἶναι" (15.4).
of ἀκρασία.
18 On paroinia see X., Smp. 6.2 with B. H, 1999, pp. 333-4 ad loc. and S.-T. T,
1999, p. 63-64. Cf. Hsch. s.v. παροινίαι (π 968 Schmidt): κραιπάλαι. ὕβρεις ἀπὸ οἴνου Cf.
Plu., Quaest. conv. 2.10.2.644a. On avoiding hybris at dinner parties by doing "what is right"
(τὰ δίκαια ) see Xenophanes, B1 West 15-17. Cf. Plu., Quaest. conv. 2.1.629e and W. J. S,
1990, pp. 214-5.
19 On euphrosyne in banquets see Anacreon, Eleg. Fr. 2 West; Cf. H. O, 1984, pp.
103-7; W. J. S, 1990, p. 213. For examples of discordant behaviour at symposia, disrupting
the ideal pleasant atmosphere, see G. P , 1991; F. T, 1999, pp. 492-4. Cf. another
banquet where things go wrong in Plut. Alex. 51.
20 See X., Smp. 6.2 and B. H, 1999, pp. 334-5. Cf. Plu., Quaest. conv. 3.prooem. 644f.
21 See Anacreon, Eleg. Fr. 2 West; Xenophanes, B1 West 21-24; cf. gn., 763-4. Cf. W. J.
S, 1981.
22 See W. J. S, 1990, pp. 215-6. Cf. the humorous allusion to Il. 2.381 (νῦν δ' ἔρχεται
ἐπὶ δεῖπνον ἵνα ξυνάγωμεν Ἄρηα) in Plu., Quaest. conv. 1.1.613c. Cf. Hdt. 5.20 on the
concealment of daggers in the Macedonian banquet.
23 Much more than a garbled adaptation of Hellenic practices, as in Crass. 33.1-7 (on which
see in this volume J. C, pp. 185-7), this scene indicates a mismatch of Greek institutions
and a non-Greek context. e description ts the image of the Persians in Greek literature as
not free, slaves either to the king or to their passions, and suits the portrayal of the Persian court
as a scene of decadence, corruption, arbitrary decisions, hypocrisy, betrayal of trust and brutality.
In accordance with the prevailing orientalist image of the Eastern Empire, men are depicted
as eeminate and women as dominant. Persia is seen as a place which breeds creatures on the
fringes of human society, such as eunuchs, and on the other hand blurs the distinction between
a human king and divine beings. See H. S-W, 1987; W. N, 2002, p.
290; D. L. G, 2007.
135
A 'barbarian' symposium and the absence of philanthropia ( Artaxerxes 15)
is saying, connecting wine and truth, which is known from other sources24 ,
is, according to some scholars, the very essence of the Greek symposium 25 . It
reects the obligation of the participants to disclose their thoughts openly and
completely, as well as encapsulating the symbolic transition to a new state of
existence, in which full understanding and communication are present. Yet
the employment of this proverb in the present context not only evokes the
Hellenic practice of the banquet but also does it in a manner considered to be a
Greek way of action, one involving cunning, and an indirect scheming instead
of outright savagery26 .
e mention of truth entails a play on Persian religion and royal ideology. In
the Zoroastrian Avesta, the world is divided between drug (the Lie, or disorder)
and aŝa (Truth, or cosmic, social and ritual order)27 . e drug corresponds to
the evil spirit (Angra Mainyu) and the aŝa is championed by the good spirit
(Ahura Mazda), who will eventually prevail28 . Ahura Mazda upholds Truth
(Yasna 31.8), is a friend of the truthful ones or believers (aŝanan : c f. Yasna 47.5)29
and punishes liars. is belief was familiar to Greek readers - and certainly to
Plutarch himself - from the portrayal of the Persians in Greek literature, with
its emphasis on telling the truth as a key concept in the education of the
young30 , and with the depiction of lying and dishonesty as being in Persia the
most despicable of evils31 . In the royal Achaemenid ideology the Lie (drauga)
is considered a serious oence against the king32 ; it is tantamount to rebellion,
as "those following the Lie" are regarded as lawbreakers33 . But by persuading
24 Alcaeus, F. 366 Lobel-Page: οἶνος, ὦ φίλε παῖ λέγεται καὶ ἀλάθεα; Ion of Chios, F 26.12
West; Pl., Smp. 217e; eoc., Idyll 29.1; Ath. 2.37f; Zenobius, Paroem. 4.5, Diogenianus, Paroem.
4.81 (ἐν οἴνῳ ἀλήθεια); Diogenianus, Paroem. 7.28 (οἶνος καὶ ἀλήθεια). Cf. Alcaeus, F. 333
Lobel-Page (οἶνος γὰρ ἀνθρώπῳ δίοπτρον); gn. 500; A., TrGF F 393; Pl., Lg. 649a-650b.
Cf. Horace, Sat. 1.4.89; Carm. 3.21.14-16; cf. Pliny, Nat. 14.141. Cf. the treatment of this view
in Plu., Quaest. conv. 3. Proem. 645a-c and 7.10.715d-f.
25 See W. R, 1995; W. J. H, 2000, p. 17.
26 See M. D & J. P. V, 1978.
27 On the centrality of this opposition between truth and lie in the Indo-Iranian religious
setting prior to the emergence of the Zoroastrian belief see H. L, 1930, pp. 40-52; M.
S, 2002, pp. 91-5.
28 Cf. Yasht 19.92-96; Cf. M. B, 1975, pp. 200-1, 283; 1982, pp. 120-1. In the Gathas ,
the oldest stratum of the Avesta, drug appears more frequently than the evil spirit itself. See M.
B, 1982, p. 123.
29 Cf. XPh. 46-56: e king demands respect for the law Ahura Mazda has established in
order to be blessed (artava-). Cf. M. B, 1982, pp. 174-7.
30 Hdt. 1.136 (ἀληθίζεσθαι). Cf. Strabo, 15.3.18 (ἀληθεύειν).
31 Hdt. 1.138; cf. 7.102, 7.209. Interestingly, cf. Plu., De vit. aer. alien. 829c, who claims that
they were the second worst things in Persia.
32 Cf. DB 4.33-5: "Darius the King says: ese are the provinces which became rebellious.
e Lie made them rebellious, so that these (men) deceived the people"; cf. DB 4.36-39: "Darius
the King says: You who shall be king hereafter, protect yourself vigorously from the Lie; the man
who shall be a Lie-follower, him do you punish well" (trans. by R. G. K, 1953, p. 131). Cf.
DB 1. 34, 4.63; cf. DNb.12. e supposed pretenders in the Behistun text are presented as liars.
cf., 1.39, 1.78, 3.80. See P. B, 2002, pp. 126-7, 138.
33 e Liars are habitually punished in Greek depictions of Persia. See Ctesias, FGrH 688 F
9.1 (ὅτι ἐψεύσατο ἀγνοεῖν εἰπὼν ἐρευνώμενον Ἀστυίγαν.); cf. Hdt. 3.27.
Mithridates to tell the truth about the incidents that occurred during the
battle, the king's own version turns out to be a lie; Artaxerxes becomes a liar,
while the truthful Mithridates is made to seem a rebel34 . ere is also irony
in the employment of deceit to bring out the truth35 . After all, it is stated
clearly that Sparamizes, the eunuch of the queen mother, was not ignorant
of the truth (οὐκ ἀγνοῶν τὸ ἀληθὲς: 15.5) but pretended to be so in order to
manipulate Mithridates.
Before the feast Mithridates kept his account of the events to himself. It is
the false presentation of a frank and friendly fellowship typical of a symposium
that leads him to divulge everything. Mithridates seems convinced that in
accordance with the Greek sympotic ethical code ‒ apparently introduced by
Sparamizes' allusion to the banquet ‒ his vulnerable state will not be abused
by any other participant at dinner and that his words will not harm him later36 .
He is unable to see the plot against him. Just as he missed (τοῦ … ὀφθαλμοῦ
μικρὸν ἥμαρτον: 15.6) Cyrus' eye and struck him elsewhere, he cannot perceive
that his words about the prince's destruction in fact harm another person,
namely, himself. e ploy is therefore successful. Mithridates is tricked into
relating his part in slaying Cyrus, thus proving false the ocial version, which
had Artaxerxes as the sole killer.
But the report of the events is not the only truth revealed by the unfortunate
inebriated Persian. e true character of Mithridates is also disclosed through
wine, and this is what Sparamizes is trying to uncover. Mithridates shows
signs of excessive philotimia. Not satised with the rewards given him by the
king, he also wishes to gain the glory of being Cyrus' killer, a title ocially held
by Artaxerxes. In fact, Mithridates presents himself as competing with the
king, and Plutarch shows this ambition in various ways. Mithridates' arrival
at the dinner wearing the clothes and jewellery he received from Artaxerxes37
alludes to a previous scene in the biography, in which Tiribazus wore the
king's robe and necklace, although forbidden to do so38 . e contrast made
by Mithridates between idle talk about the saddle-cloth and his own actual
deed39 matches Artaxerxes' distinction between the general liberty to speak
34 On the Orwellian overtones of this passage see B. L, 2007, p. 94.
35 Notwithstanding n. 33, Greek authors do not hesitate to point at Persian hypocrisy,
and the question of truth is often found to be the subject of ironic descriptions. For instance,
according to Herodotus, the Magus' reign as king involves a deceit (3.61-3), and it also takes
a lie to overthrow him. Cf. Darius' saying that sometimes the lie is necessary (ἔνθα γάρ τι δεῖ
ψεῦδος λέγεσθαι, λεγέσθω: Hdt. 3.72). When Cambyses does tell the truth, the nobles do not
believe him (Hdt. 3.66). On deceitfulness versus truthfulness as a Leitmotiv in Herodotus' third
book see S. B, 1969, pp. 69-98. Cf. also Hdt. 8.142 (ὡς βαρβάροισί ἐστι οὔτε πιστὸν
οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὐδέν).
36 Cf. gn, 309-312.
37 Art. 15.1: ἧκεν ἐσθῆτι καὶ χρυσῷ κεκοσμημένος οἷς ἔλαβε παρὰ βασιλέως.
38 Art . 5.3-4: οὕτως ἐποίησεν εἰπών· "δίδωμι μὲν ὦ Τιρίβαζε, σοὶ τοῦτον, φορεῖν δ'
ἀπαγορεύω." τοῦ δὲ Τιριβάζου μὴ φροντίσαντος … ἀλλὰ τόν τε κάνδυν εὐθὺς ἐκεῖνον ἐνδύντος
καὶ δέραια χρυσᾶ [καὶ γυναικεῖα] τῶν βασιλικῶν περιθεμένου, πάντες μὲν ἠγανάκτου· οὐ γὰρ
ἐξῆν.
39 Art . 15.6: "ὑμεῖς μὲν ὅ τι βούλεσθε πίλους λέγετε καὶ φλυάρους· ἐγὼ δ' ὑμῖν λέγω
137
A 'barbarian' symposium and the absence of philanthropia ( Artaxerxes 15)
as one wishes and the monarch's unique privilege to act40. Finally, when the
young Persian claims that what he did "on that day is worthy of great things"41 ,
he appears to allude to Tiribazus' words of advice to the king at the scene of
the battle to "remember this day, for it is unworthy of forgetfulness"42 . What
seems to be insinuated here is a war of versions between that of Artaxerxes and
that of Mithridates. e young Persian gives the impression that it was he who
saved the crown of Artaxerxes on that fateful day, that his acts were powerful
enough to decide the feud over the monarchy, and by implication – that his
power surpasses that of the king.
Upon hearing these alarming words, Artaxerxes sends Mithridates to
his horrible death. is outcome causes the words of the intoxicated Persian
noble to appear as conveying yet another truth, for his claim that he felled
"the man" (κατέβαλον τὸν ἄνδρα, Art . 15.6), ostensibly referring to Cyrus,
also seems to predict the downfall of Mithridates himself43 . As in the battle
he missed Cyrus' eye yet fatally injured the prince, now his words deliver an
unintended and no less deadly blow to himself. It is the king, however, who
turns this description into reality, by interpreting this utterance as disobedient
and deserving of punishment. With its focus on wine and truth, the Greek
symposium envisioned the human body as if it were a sort of instrument for
processing liquid and transforming it into truthfulness44 . Analogous to that
practice, the body of Mithridates is expected to function as a similar device
when he incurs the torture of the boats: into his mouth are poured uids (milk
and honey)45 and this punishment is meant to prove Artaxerxes' account as
accurate46 . In fact, through the disintegration and complete destruction of the
young Persian's body, the king establishes once and for all his version of the
διαρρήδην ὑπὸ ταύτης ἀνῃρῆσθαι Κῦρον τῆς χειρός."
40 Art. 5.2: "σοὶ μὲν ἔξεστιν εἰπεῖν ἃ βούλῃ, ἐμοὶ δὲ καὶ λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν".
41 Art. 15.3: "μειζόνων γὰρ ἐγὼ καὶ καλλιόνων βασιλεῖ τὴν ἡμέραν ἐκείνην ἄξιον ἐμαυτὸν
παρέσχον".
42 Art. 10.1 : "ὦ βασιλεῦ, μέμνησο τῆς ἡμέρας ταύτης· οὐ γὰρ ἀξία λήθης ἐστί".
43 On Dionysus giving the gift of prophecy see E., Ba. 298-301.
44 P. D, 1991, pp. 68, 75-91 (and passim) shows how, in the Greek mind, truth was
conceived of as an inaccessible, buried secret within the body, which had to be brought to
the surface, even by coercion. Presumably, one such means was liquids. Plato, Lg. 1.648a-c,
649e proposes that wine should be used, rather than some other test (βάσανος), to reveal true
facts about the character of a person. Cf. P. D, 1991, pp. 108-10. Note that Diogenianus
(7.28) explains the phrase οἶνος καὶ ἀλήθεια in a manner which suggests that the Persians
substituted tortures (βάσανοι) for wine with the aim of extracting the truth: Εὔανδρος παρὰ
τοῖς Πέρσαις φησὶν οὐ βασάνοις ἐξετάζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μεθυσκομένους. In his Indica ( FGrH 688
F 45.31) Ctesias describes a liquid obtained from a spring, which acts as wine; when someone
drinks it, he ἐξαγγέλλει πάντα ὅσα ἔπραξε. Ctesias adds that the king makes use of it whenever
he wishes to nd the truth concerning an accusation. One would assume that here again torture
is being replaced by a beverage.
45 Art. 16.4: φαγόντι δὲ πιεῖν μέλι καὶ γάλα συγκεκραμένου ἐγχέουσιν εἰς τὸ στόμα...
46 Art . 16.2: ἐβούλετο [scil. βασιλεὺς] γὰρ βαρβάρους ἅπαντας πεπεῖσθαι καὶ Ἕλληνας,
ὡς ἐν ταῖς ἐξελάσεσι καὶ συμπλοκαῖς δοὺς καὶ λαβὼν πληγήν, ἐτρώθη μὲν αὐτός, ἔκτεινε δ'
ἐκεῖνον.
events as the 'true' one47.
is cruelty exhibited by the king is not at all what we would expect
from the foregoing narrative. Earlier on (Art. 4.4), he is described as one who
appears φιλάνθρωπος and mild. Specically, it is stated that the king seems no
less generous and kind as a recipient of favours than when he bestows favours
upon others48 . But here, Artaxerxes emerges as ungrateful to Mithridates, the
man who struck down Cyrus and eectively handed him power. Seemingly,
by his action the monarch demonstrates that the former description was
false49 . Up to this point in the story, the king had never tortured or sentenced
anyone to death. He released Cyrus even though his brother was suspected of
having attempted assassination (Art. 3.5-6); he ignored Tiribazus' insolence
with respect to the royal robe and its mutinous overtones, in a way that could
have only been interpreted as weakness on the king's part (Art. 5.4); towards
Euclides, who admonished him publicly, he was temperate (Art. 5.2); he was
relatively lenient with defectors during the war (Art. 14.3-4); even the Carian
who, like Mithridates, claimed the glory for Cyrus' death, was not punished
by Artaxerxes himself, but was handed over to Parysatis, the queen mother
(Art . 14.9-10). e punishment meted out to Mithridates constitutes therefore
a turning point in the revelation of the king's character. We begin to doubt
whether the former Greek traits describing the barbarian monarch were
accurate, especially regarding the application of the essentially Hellenic quality
of φιλανθρωπία 50 . Artaxerxes is now seen as a brutal, despotic oriental ruler,
whose real personality is exposed by his resort to torture.
e narratological signicance of the symposium is thus immediately seen.
It has already been shown that wine proverbially reveals truth, but Plutarch
appears to play with the idea of in uino ueritas. Here it is not merely Mithridates'
own truth that his drinking reveals, but also Artaxerxes' truth. It is the wine
imbibed by Mithridates that reveals the true nature of the king, the truth of
what the king is 51 .
Yet this is only one way of seeing the importance of the Greek banquet
in the Life and the role it plays in the characterization of the hero. Another
view is possible: our symposium may not, after all, lead the way to the truth,
47 According to B. L, 2007, pp. 87-94, the punishment of Mithridates was in fact a
Zoroastrian "judicial ordeal", involving a careful examination of its outcome and the application
of pressure in order to disclose the inner moral nature of the accused. If Mithridates was guilty,
he would have to be destroyed in the process, and his physical decay would demonstrate his
moral corruption.
48 ἐν ἀρχῇ δὲ καὶ πάνυ ζηλοῦν ἔδοξε τὴν Ἀρτοξέρξου τοῦ ὁμωνύμου πραότητα ... ἐν <δὲ> τῷ
δέχεσθαι χάριτας οὐχ ἧττον τοῖς διδοῦσιν ἢ τοῖς λαμβάνουσιν ἐν [δὲ] τῷ διδόναι φαινόμενος
εὔχαρις καὶ φιλάνθρωπος. Cf. Reg. et imp. apophth. 172b.
49 is may also be seen in the use of the word ἄνθρωπος ( Art . 16.7) at the end of the torture
portrayal to mark the gap between the previously attributed trait and reality.
50 Cf. Phil. 8.1; Flam. 5.7; Lys. 27.7; Pyrrh. 1.4. See H. M. M J., 1961, pp. 166-8, 174;
Cf. R. H, 1912, p. 25; J. D R, 1979, pp. 279, 303-4; A. G. N, 1986, pp.
239-40.
51 is notion is an expansion of the idea that wine discloses the true character of the
drinker, on which see T. D, 1999, pp. 15 n. 6, 32 n. 56.
139
A 'barbarian' symposium and the absence of philanthropia ( Artaxerxes 15)
but rather deviate from it, creating a new reality altogether. Plutarch seems to
take great pains in creating the strong impression that truth is absent from
the description of the "barbarian" feast. He does it with the help of an array
of literary devices. Sparamizes is explicitly presented as deceiving his fellow
drinker (15.5). e act of casting their eyes downward attributed to the guests
(εἰς τὴν γῆν ἔκυψαν : 15.7) 52 echoes a Platonic image concerning the limited
vision of people who shy away from true reality53 . Even the young Persian's
story is only partially true, since, as will be recalled, Cyrus died as a result of
injuries inicted by two men, a Carian as well as Mithridates. Leaving the
Carian out of the account is not telling the whole truth. Moreover, in the
last two parts of the dialogue between Sparamizes and Mithridates the king
himself is omitted: First, he is not mentioned as the recipient of the saddle-
cloth54 ; second, he is neglected in the report of the battle (Art. 15.6). Contrary
to the picture given earlier, in which Artaxerxes did try to aim a blow at his
brother before being wounded himself55 , here mention is made only of the
attempt by the commander of the Cadusians, Artagerses, to strike Cyrus (Art .
9.3)56 . e struggle of the brothers and their entourages (Art. 11.1-2) is skipped
over. ese are clear cases where aletheia gives way to lethe 57 . Noteworthy also
is the absence of truthfulness indicated by the imagery of failure to hit the
mark, which is prominent in the speech of Mithridates (Art. 15.6), since truth
signies correspondence with reality, like a spear hitting the target, not missing
it58 . To the same eect is perhaps the recurring motif of utterances that miss
a real correspondence in the closing picture of the scene (15.7: λόγους δὲ
μείζους ἢ καθ' ἡμᾶς) and in the Mithridates' description of an empty throw
(15.6: Ἀρταγέρσης ἠκόντισα κενὸν καὶ μάταιον), where Plutarch is probably
alluding to Demosthenes' idiom in the second Olynthiac oration (12) about
words being vacuous and vain if unaccompanied by deeds59 .
52 Plutarch employs this expression elsewhere (Brut. 27.5: κύφαντας εἰς γῆν ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν;
Ages. 12.5: κύπτοντας εἰς τὴν γῆν). e context in the Agesialos is the Spartans' reaction to
the complaints of Pharnabazus on the destruction done by them to his land. In this case, the
biographer's intervention in the text can be ascertained by a comparison of this description with
its probable source, X., HG. 4.1.34. Cf. D. H. S, 1997, pp. 184-5.
53 Pl., R. 9.586a: Οἱ ἄρα φρονήσεως καὶ ἀρετῆς ἄπειροι... ὑπερβάντες δὲ τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ
ἀληθῶς ἄνω οὔτε ἀνέβλεψαν πώποτε οὔτε ἠνέχθησαν...ἀλλὰ βοσκημάτων δίκην κάτω ἀεὶ
βλέποντες καὶ κεκυφότες εἰς γῆν καὶ εἰς τραπέζας βόσκονται χορταζόμενοι καὶ ὀχεύοντες...
54 Art ., 15.4: τί λαμπρὸν ὦ τᾶν ἢ μέγα, πῖλον εὑρεῖν ἵππου περιρρυέντα καὶ τοῦτον
ἀνενεγκεῖν;
55 Art ., 11.2: βασιλεὺς δ' ἀφεὶς τὸ δόρυ Κύρου μὲν οὐκ ἔτυχε, Σατιφέρνην δὲ πιστὸν ἄνδρα
Κύρῳ καὶ γενναῖον ἔβαλε καὶ κατέκτεινε.
56 Cf. X., An. 1.8.24
57 On the ancient understanding of truth as something that is perceived or transmitted
without any gaps caused by forgetfulness, neglect or ignorance, that is, complete and with no
omissions, see B. S, 1975; T. C, 1983.
58 Cf. T. C, 1983, pp. 13-6 on the meaning of the archaic word νημερτής denoting
Truth, as something not failing to strike the target. Vide supra, on the correspondence between
Mithridates' missing the mark in battle and his failure to grasp the situation at the symposium.
59 ...ἅπας μὲν λόγος, ἂν ἀπῇ τὰ πράγματα, μάταιόν τι φαίνεται καὶ κενόν... Plutarch also
uses this phrase in the Philop. 9.7; Quom. adolesc. 28b.
What the 'barbarian' symposium lacks in truthfulness, it gains in passion.
Traditionally, the unrepressed barbarian, especially Scythian, consumption
of wine was conceived of as the counterpart of the Greek banquet60 . It was
set as a sort of limit, one not to be transgressed by members of the civilized
community61 . However, in the reverse world depicted here by Plutarch, it is the
Greek way of drinking that is presented both as a model to be followed by the
barbarians and as having no restraints. Mithridates is encouraged to abandon
his self-control and act "as the Greeks do". Ironically, while it was usually the
Greeks who regarded the barbarians as uninhibited and unconstrained in their
demeanour62 , here it is the other way around: the Hellenes are seen as basically
licentious and lacking in restraint.
Passions appear to be uncontrolled when the Greek symposium is situated in
a barbarian context63 . In his retort, Sparamizes questions the greatness involved
in bringing a saddle-cloth to the king64 . He implicitly doubts the merit of a
form of restraint, in this case, applicable to a horse but symbolically relevant
to the behaviour of Mithridates. e reader will recall at once the Platonic
imagery of the soul in the Phaedrus as a chariot driven by a team of winged
horses (246a)65 . Now it is the black, unrestrained steed, evidently representing
the passionate part of the human soul66 , that drags down its driver67, far away
from the plain of Truth and from beholding the true being (248bc)68 . e
soul then sheds its wings and plummets to earth, only to be incarnated in a
60 Anacr., Fr. 11b Page = PMG 356; Hdt. 6.84; Pl., Lg. 1.637e; Arist., Pr. 3.7.872a3-9;
Athen. 10.427a-c; 11.499f. Cf. F. H, 1988, pp. 169-70; M. C. M, 1991, p. 68.
61 is sentiment may provide a clue for the occasional appearances of symposiasts in
typically oriental dress, including the tiara cap, found painted on vases. Cf. F. L,
1990, pp. 11-3, who argues that these images signify the search for otherness experienced in the
symposium, an escape from social restrictions. For other interpretations, which suggest that the
gures represent foreign guests at dinner parties or else wealthy Athenians aping Eastern ways
and dress, see K. D V, 1973, p.39 and M. C. M, 1991, pp. 69-71.
62 E. H, 1989, pp. 79-84, 101 sqq.; E. A, 2005, pp. 50-2. In Plutarch's writing, the
barbarians are known for their lack of temperance. ey engage in acts of savagery and cruelty
(A. G. N, 1986, pp. 241-2; T. S. S, 1999, pp. 27-67), indulge in luxury (A. G.
N, 1986, pp. 237-8; T. S. S, 1999, pp. 107-139), are generally untrustworthy
(T. S. S, 1999, pp. 203-12) and hold superstitious beliefs (A. G. N, 1986, pp.
234-35; T. S. S, 1999, pp. 224-34), to name but a few their negative traits.
63 Cf. Hdt. 5.18-20. Compared with these depictions, Xenophon's descriptions in the
Cyropaedia of the Persian banquets as devoid of drunkenness (cf. C. J. T, 1990, p. 26; D. L.
G, 1993, pp. 150-1) would seem a literary idealization.
64 Vide supra n. 54.
65 Cf. Ant. 36.2. Cf. C. B. R. P, 1988, p. 217; T. D , 1999, pp. 78-9, 85. Cf. M. B.
T , 1990 on the popularity of this image in second century AD literature.
66 On the exact nature of this correspondence see R. H, 1952, p. 72; C. J. R,
Plato. Phaedrus, with Translation and Commentary, Warminster, 1986 ad loc. 246b1-3; cf. D. A.
W, 1993, pp. 89-93; E. B, 2006.
67 247b: βρίθει γὰρ ὁ τῆς κάκης ἵππος μετέχων, ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν ῥέπων τε καὶ βαρύνων ᾧ μὴ
καλῶς ἦν τεθραμμένος τῶν ἡνιόχων. Other souls strive to follow the gods in seeing the true
being, which provides pasturage proper for their noblest part, but none has a full vision of it.
68 Cf. Plu., De def. orac. 422b.
141
A 'barbarian' symposium and the absence of philanthropia ( Artaxerxes 15)
mortal body and embedded in the cycle of births69. While basing his account
on Ctesias' description, Plutarch seems to skillfully combine this imagery of
passion as an unbridled horse, deviation from truth, and a general movement
downward, manifested in the action of the banquet participants, whose eyes
are cast earthward70 .
At the end of the dinner scene, the host, assuming one of the key functions
of a symposiarch71 , tones down emotions by urging the participants to keep their
dierences within bounds as they eat and drink, and to prostrate themselves
before the king's daimon 72 . Here a play of stereotypes is manifest, since it is
one thing, a very Greek thing, to be a calming symposiarch but quite another
to do so by recommending this most non-Greek of actions. is play has a
bearing on the character of the monarch. e appeal to this deity seems to
fulll a restrictive role; it is now expected of the king to restrain the passions so
recklessly exhibited during the feast73 . But instead of curbing passions with a
measure of self-control as he has done on previous occasions, Artaxerxes sties
them in another manner.
It would seem that the insertion of the potentially disorderly Greek
symposium into barbarian circumstances, inherently devoid of the Hellenic rules
and codes for self-control - which consist of trust, cooperation and equality -
produces a new situation. e king chooses to react with unprecedented cruelty
to the misbehaviour of Mithridates and to suppress passion with even greater
passion. Since this unbridled conduct is directly linked with the loosening of
control begun at the banquet and caused by it, the symposium appears not so
much as revealing the king's true character but as totally altering it from its
previous portrayal.
At this juncture in the narrative, the reader is not sure as to the correct
interpretation of the ethos of Artaxerxes74 . One possibility is that his inner
69 248c: ὅταν δὲ ἀδυνατήσασα ἐπισπέσθαι μὴ ἴδῃ, καί τινι συντυχίᾳ χρησαμένη λήθης τε
καὶ κακίας πλησθεῖσα βαρυνθῇ, βαρυνθεῖσα δὲ πτερορρυήσῃ τε καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν πέσῃ...e
souls are incarnated in several types of men, ranging from the philosopher to the tyrant, in
accordance with the measure of the truth seen by them (248d).
70 It is also manifested in the statement of Mithridates κατέβαλον τὸν ἄνδραν (15.6).
71 See Quaest. conv. 1.4, 620a-622b. Cf. S.-T. T, 1999, p. 61.
72 A signicant question is whether the host is the same person as Sparamizes, as both
use the relatively uncommon phrase ὦ τᾶν when addressing Mithridates (15.4, 15.7). Several
scholars have already been baed by this diculty or have confounded the two. (Cf. F. E.
B, 1977, p. 151). W.W. T , 1928, p. 209, claims to have formerly equated the two and
then changed his opinion after a conversation with A. D. Nock. Did Plutarch mean to confuse
his readers? It should be noted that one of the characters aims to restrain passion while the other
aspires to give vent to it. Attributing these two conicting roles to the same gure may point to
the two possible routes of action expected of the king with regard to the oence of Mithridates,
and even to an innate inconsistency within the ethos of Artaxerxes, which is also displayed by
the mention of the daimon and which constitutes a recurring motif in the biography to its very
end (culminating in 29.11).
73 I deal with the literary signicance of the king's daimon in a forthcoming paper.
74 ree scholars suggest dierent portrayals of the king. Orsi (in M. M O,
1987, pp. xxvii – xxviii) stresses a positive characterization emerging from the biography; D. C.
H, 1967, pp. 68-85, on the other hand, emphasizes a negative image. T. S. S, 1999, p.
savagery, so far concealed, has been nally unmasked. Another is that he has
degenerated from a mild and philanthropos monarch to a cruel and harsh despot75 .
e banquet scene plays an important role in this uncertainty. For wine itself is
an ambiguous beverage. Sweet and dangerous, it reveals as much as it distorts,
making the real apparent and the apparent real. It discloses the truth as much
as it leads to forgetfulness, generates civilized fellowship and philanthropia
but at the same time may cause the lowest form of brutal behaviour. One
would assume that what is needed is moderation, or nding the right measure,
which Mithridates and Artaxerxes, being barbarians, are clearly shown to lack.
Or is it so? Plutarch does not simply adopt ethnic stereotypes. He plays on
them and exploits various familiar ethnic themes to create a complex interplay.
e diculty of interpreting what is happening in this "barbarian" symposium
reects how disconcerting it is when familiar features from the Greek banquet
combine in a new and disorienting way. Eventually the evasiveness of the
categories makes understanding of the situation a complicated matter for the
reader, just as it proves to be for Mithridates.
Works cited
A, E., "Who Is a Barbarian? e Barbarians in the Ethnological and
Cultural Taxonomies of Strabo", in D. D . (eds.), Strabo's
Cultural Geography, Cambridge, 2005.
A, J. K., Xenophon, London, 1974.
B, S. R., "e Death of Cyrus the Younger", CQ, 49 (1999) 473-83.
318-24, in his research into the representation of barbarians in Plutarch's Lives, advances a more
attractive and balanced approach by combining both views. He depicts Artaxerxes as better than
other barbarians, including the minor characters in this biography, though he argues that his
portrait reveals more negative traits. Perhaps the development of the presentation of Artaxerxes'
character should also be considered in the evaluation of his personality; notice, then, should be
taken of the story-line of this Life.
75 Plutarch was long seen as ascribing a static ethos to his heroes, thus making ostensible
dramatic changes, such as cruelty, to be understood as the revelation of true character traits,
which were concealed for various reasons (cf. Philip's case in Aratus, 49.1, another non-parallel
Life). Nevertheless, this approach has been challenged by scholars who believe that Plutarch
espoused a belief in the possibility of an altered character. See F. E. B, 1977, pp. 176-81; S.
S, 1989. Cf. De sera, 559bc. According to this modied view, Plutarch holds that a person
confronted with great changes in circumstances, or vitiated by undeserved calamities, may lose
his internal balance between the rational and irrational. Compare the notable case of Sertorius
(Sert. 25.6). See D. A. R, 1966, p. 146; B. B-I, 1972, pp. 79-80, for the opinion
that Plutarch believes in the constant nature (physis) of a hero, i.e., his inborn qualities, as
opposed to his changeable character. Cf. De tranq. an., 475d-476a. Yet cf. C. G, 2006, pp.
412-21, who advances the possibility of a collapse of character in Plutarch's Lives, consistent
with the biographer's Platonic-Aristotelian view (cf. C. G, 1983 for an earlier formulation of
this idea, based on a conceptual contrast between 'character' and 'personality', on which cf. C. B.
R. P, 2002, pp. 283-329).
143
A 'barbarian' symposium and the absence of philanthropia ( Artaxerxes 15)
B, E., "Dancing with Gods: e Myth of the Chariot in Plato's
Phaedrus", AJPh, 127 (2006) 185-217.
B, S., Herodotean Inquiries, e Hague, 1969.
B, J. M., "Ctesias'Account of the Revolt of Inarus", Phoenix, 30 (1976)
1-25.
_____"Ctesias as Historian of the Persian Wars", Phoenix, 32 (1978) 19-41.
_____"e Ancient Accounts of the Battle of Cunaxa", AJPh, 104 (1983) 340-
57.
B, M., A History of Zoroastrianism, vol. 1, Leiden, Cologne, 1975.
_____ A History of Zoroastrianism, vol. 2, Leiden/Cologne, 1982.
B, F. E., In Mist Apparelled: Religious emes in Plutarch's Moralia and
Lives, Leiden, 1977.
B, P., From Cyrus to Alexander, Winona Lake, IN, 2002.
B-I, B., Norm und Individualität in den Biographien Plutarchs, Bern,
Stuttgart, 1972.
B, W., "Oriental Symposia: Contrasts and Parallels", in W. J. S
(ed.), 1991, pp.7-24.
C, T., "Archaic Truth", QUCC, 42 (1983) 7-28.
D, M. & V, J.-P. (eds.), Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture
and Society (trans. J. L), Hassocks, 1978.
D, R., e Greek Accounts of Eastern History, Cambridge, MA, 1973.
DB, P., Torture and Truth, New York, London, 1991.
D, T., Plutarch's Lives: Exploring Virtue and Vice, Oxford, 1999.
G, D. L., Xenophon's Cyropaedia: Style, Genre and Literary Technique,
Oxford, 1993.
_____"Viragos, Eunuchs, Dogheads, and Parrots in Ctesias", in G.
H & I. S (eds.), Greeks between East and West:
Essays in Greek Literature and History in Memory of David Asheri,
Jerusalem, 2007.
G, C., "e Question of Character-Development: Plutarch and Tacitus",
CQ, 33 (1983) 469-87.
_____ e Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman ought, Oxford, New York,
2006.
G, G., "Le sommaire des Persica de Ctésias par Photius", RBPH , 28
(1950) 513-21.
H, R., Plato's Phaedrus, translated with introduction and
commentary. Cambridge, 1952.
H, E., Inventing the Barbarian, Oxford, 1989.
H, T. (ed.), Greeks and Barbarians, New York, 2002.
H, F., e Mirror of Herodotus (trans. J. Lloyd), Berkeley/Los Angeles,
London, 1988.
H, W. J., "Aspects of the Ancient Greek Symposium", Akroterion ,
45 (2000) 6-26.
H, R., Plutarch, Leipzig, 1912.
H, D. C., Plutarch and the Persians, PhD diss. University of Southern
Califonia, 1967.
H, A., "Symposion", RE, 4. A 1 (1931) 1266-70.
H, B., Xenophons Symposion : Ein Kommentar, Stuttgart, Leipzig, 1999.
J, F., "Ktesias", RE, 11.2 (1922) 2032-73.
K, R.G., Old Persian: Grammar, Text, Lexicon, New Haven, 1953.
K, J., "Kunaxa", in J. K & G. V (eds.), Antike
Schlachtfelder, Berlin, (1924-1931), pp. 222-42.
L, D., Cetsias de Cnidos, Paris, 2004.
L, B., Religion, Empire and Torture: e Case of Achaemenian Persia, with
a Postscript on Abu Ghraib, Chicago, 2007.
L, F., e Aesthetics of the Greek Banquet: Images of Wine and Ritual
(trans. A. S M), Princeton, 1990.
L, H., Die Religion Zarathustras nach dem Awesta dargestellt, Tübingen,
1930.
M, M. O, D. P., Plutarcho, Le Vite di Arato et di Artaserse,
Rome, 1987.
M J., H. M., "e Concept of Philanthropia in Plutarch's Lives", AJPh,
82 (1961) 164-75.
M, M. C., "Foreigners at the Symposium?", in W. J. S (ed.), 1991,
pp. 59-81.
M, A., "Tradizione e invenzione in Ctesia", Atena e Roma, n.s. 12
(1931) 15-44.
M C, J. G. . (eds.), Plutarco, Dioniso y El Vino. Actas del
VI Simposio Español Sobre Plutarco (Cádiz, 14-16 de Mayo, 1998),
Madrid, 1999.
145
A 'barbarian' symposium and the absence of philanthropia ( Artaxerxes 15)
M, O., "Symposium and Männerbund", in P. O & A. F
(eds.), Concilium Eirene, Prague, 1982.
_____ "e Symposium as a Social Organization", in R. H (ed.), e
Greek Renaissance of the Eighth Century BC: Tradition and Innovation.
Stockholm, 1983.
_____ (ed.), Sympotica. A Symposium on the Symposium, Oxford, 1990.
_____ & T, M. (eds.), In Vino Veritas, London, 1995.
N, A. G., "Hellenikos-Barbarikos: Plutarch on Greek and Barbarian
Characteristics", WS, 20 (1986) 229-44.
_____"Plutarch's Attitude to Wine", in J. G. M C . (eds.),
1999, pp. 337-48.
N, W., "e construction of the 'Other'" (trans. A. Nevill), in T. H
(ed.), 2002, pp. 278-310.
O, H., Euripides' Bacchae: e Play and Its Audience, Leiden, 1984.
P , G., "Symposia and Deipna in Plutarch's Lives and in Other Historical
Writings", in W. J. S (ed.), 1991, pp. 157-69.
P, C. B. R., Plutarch: Life of Antony, Cambridge, 1988.
_____ Plutarch and History, London, 2002.
R, P. A., "e Military Situation in Western Asia on the Eve of Cunaxa",
AJPh, 101 (1980) 79-96.
D R, J., La douceur dans la pensée grecque, Paris, 1979.
R, W., "Wine and Truth in the Greek Symposion", in O. M &
T (eds.), 1995, pp. 106-12.
R, D. A., "On Reading Plutach's Lives", G&R, 13 (1966) 139-54.
S-W, H., "Decadence in the Empire or Decadence in the
Sources? From Source to Synthesis: Ctesias", AchHist 1 (1987) 33-46.
S, T. S., Plutarque et les Barbares: la rhétorique d'une image, Louvain,
1999.
S, A. S., "An Achaemenid Symbol I. A Farewell to 'Fravahr and
Ahuramazda' ", AMI, 7 (1974) 135-44.
_____ "An Achaemenid Symbol II. Farnah '(God given) Fortune' Symbolised",
AMI, 13 (1974) 119-47.
S, D. R., A Commentary on Plutarch's Life of Agesilaos, Oxford, 1997.
S, W. J., "Peace, Symposium, and the Poet", ICS, 6 (1981) 205-14.
_____ "Sympotic Ethics in the Odyssey", in O. M (ed.), 1990, pp.
146
Eran Almagor
213–20.
_____ (ed.), Dining in a Classical Context, Ann Arbor, 1991.
S, B., "Aletheia", Würzburger Jahrbucher für die Altertumswissenschaft, 1
(1975) 9-17.
S, M., Die Religion Zarathushtras. vol. I & II, Stuttgart, 2002.
S, R. B., Persica, Edinburgh, 1997.
S, S., "Character Change in Plutarch", Phoenix, 43 (1989) 62-8.
T, W. W., "e Hellenistic Ruler-Cult and the Daemon", JHS, 48 (1928)
206-19.
T, J. C., "Sūr Saxvan: A Dinner Speech in Middle Persian", JCOI, 29
(1935) 1-99.
T, L. R., "e 'Proskynesis and the Hellenistic Ruler Cult", JHS, 47
(1927) 53- 62.
T, S.-T., A Commentary on Plutarch's Table Talks, vol. I, Göteborg.
1989.
_____ A Commentary on Plutarch's Table Talks, vol. III, Göteborg. 1996.
_____"Dionysus Moderated and Calmed: Plutarch on the Convivial Wine",
in J. G. M C . (eds.), 1999, pp. 57-69.
T, F. B., "Everything to Do with Dionysus: Banquets in Plutarch's
Lives", in J. G. M C . (eds.), 1999, pp. 491-99.
T, D., e Banquet Libations of the Greeks, Ann Arbor, 1943.
T, M. B., "Plato's Phaedrus in Second-Century Greek Literature", in D. A.
R (ed.), Antonine Literature, Oxford, 1990, pp. 141-73.
T, C. J., "Persian decor in Cyropaedia: some observations", AchHist, 5
(1990) 17-29.
V, M. J., Greek Symposia, London, 1984.
D V, K., "East Meets West at Dinner", Expedition, 15 (1973) 32-9.
W, D. A., Rhetoric and Reality in Plato's Phaedrus, Albany, NY, 1993.
W, G., "Cunaxa and Xenophon", AClass, 61 (1992) 119-34.
147
Cena apud Catones: ideology and sympotic behavior
ce n a a p u D ca T o n e S : i d e o l o g y a n d s y m p o T i c b e h a v i o r
M B
University of South Carolina, Columbia
Abstract
In this paper I will analyze the ideological ramications of the sympotic behavior of Cato
Censorious and Cato Minor as exhibited in their respective Lives. In particular their treatment
of slaves or other participants at the symposia will be discussed. I will demonstrate that Plutarch
is at pains to contrast their behavior negatively with that of Socrates who gures in all four Lives
of the two pairs as an extraneous foil. Ultimately I will examine the primary target of Plutarch's
literary attack; Cicero's highly idealized portraits of both of these Roman exemplars. I will
show that Plutarch is pursuing an ideological agenda that seeks to negatively evaluate two great
symbols of Roman virtue against the truly philosophical Socratic paradigm.
Our earliest sources of information in the history of Greek literature
and culture characterize the symposium as a place of relaxation for the elite
members of society. Dining, drinking, sexual activity, all of this and more took
place with regularity. It was also a social function in which an individual's
"civilized behavior patterns" or lack thereof could be scrutinized behind "a
pretence of entertainment"1 . From the gross transgressions of Penelope's
suitors to Alcibiades' encomium to his would-be-erastes Socrates, the attention
to social norms or their violation could be represented in great works of
literature that depict such scenes. Socrates, for Plato, as well as for Plutarch,
was the exemplar, the canon, whose public behavior mirrored his philosophic
principles. As Plutarch writes: "He was rst to show that life at all times and
in all parts, in all experiences and activities, universally admits philosophy"
(An seni ger. r. p. 796D)2 . is paper will explore Plutarch's use of the Socratic
paradigm in several biographies that touch on sympotic behavior3 .
e Lives of Aristides, Cato the Elder, Phocion, and Cato the Younger all
contain explicit and implicit references to the Athenian. e gure of Socrates
functions as an extraneous foil in all of these Lives 4 . In the Life of Aristides,
Socrates is mentioned comparatively early on in the section discussing Aristides
alleged poverty (Arist. 1.9)5 . e linkage of Socrates with Aristides appears to
be a natural one for Plutarch elsewhere. Aristides is mentioned in the same
breath with Socrates as an example of moderation in the De cohibenda ira
(458C-D), both of whom exemplify the qualities of "mildness (πραότητος)
and forgiveness (συγγνώμης), and moderation in passion (μετριοπαθείας)".
1 T. W, 2005, p. 32.
2 Translation by H. N. F, Plutarch's Moralia X, LCL.
3 See C. B. R. P, 2005b. Pelling focuses in particular on the Life of Alcibiades.
4 I treat this topic in greater detail in a forthcoming article, "Contrasting Catos: e Socratic
Paradigm in Plutarch's Lives".
5 See also the reference to the book by Demetrius of Phalerum entitled Socrates in the proem
(Arist . 1.2).
Phocion underwent philosophic training in the Academy that informed to
some extent his political behavior, and his mode of death recalled Socrates' end
(Phoc . 5.4-56 ; 32.6-77, 38.5)8. e contrast of the two Catos with Socrates is
distinctly dierent and, for obvious reasons, much less natural.
We know that when Plutarch penned the Censor's Life he had the
Younger Cato in mind since he makes explicit reference to him saying that
he was "the best and most illustrious man of his time" (Cat . Ma. 27.7). is
statement comes at the close of the Life, just prior to the synkrisis. Plutarch's
lavish praise of the Younger Cato at the conclusion of the Censor's Life makes
us immediately realize that no such comparably enthusiastic assessment of
the Censor has been made in his Life that we have just read. In contrast we
discern in it the exploration of several realms of activity that nd no parallel in
the Life of Aristides and that Plutarch construes quite negatively. ese same
themes, moreover, appear to link the Life of Cato the Elder to the Life of Cato
the Younger, a linkage reinforced by references to Socrates and by the explicit
reference to the Censor at the beginning of the Younger Cato's Life and twice
thereafter (Cat. Mi. 1.1; 5.1; 8.2-3). ey include the treatment of slaves,
women, and frugality. e intertwining of the theme of the treatment of slaves
with the Socratic paradigm is particularly crucial, as we shall see.
e Elder Cato, whom I shall call the Censor to avoid confusion, explicitly
rejects Socrates, the blameless symbol of Greek culture in the eyes of Plutarch9 .
Plutarch portrays the Censor's criticism as an attempt "to discredit Greek
civilization and culture as a whole":
After all, even Socrates was, according to him [sc. Cato] a chatterbox and
coercive, whose intention it was to lord it over his homeland by using whatever
means he could, namely by undermining traditional values and by compelling
his fellow citizens to modify their views so that they were no longer in
conformity with the laws (Cat. Ma. 23.1)10.
e allusion to Plato's Apology and the charges against Socrates presented
therein is evident in Plutarch's paraphrase of the Censor's critique of Socrates
cited above.
Early in the Life the Censor's oratorical ability is favorably compared with
Socrates' (Cat. Ma. 7. 1). is is Plutarch's own assessment, since the general
6 Cf. Pl., Prt. 342a-343d.
7 Cf. Pl., Grg. 469c; 474b .; Crit. 49b; R. 335d; Ap. 30c-d; 41d.
8 See M. B. T, 1999, pp. 487-98. See also H.-J. G, 1976, pp. 139-41; L. T,
1988, pp. 30-3; C. A M, 1999, pp. 159-71, T. D , 1999, pp. 131-58, and C. B.
R. P, 2005b, 115-6.
9 A. E. A, 1978, p. 339 thinks that the Censor's remarks about Socrates may be derived
from the Ad lium.
10 Translation D. S with some modication.
149
Cena apud Catones: ideology and sympotic behavior
viewpoint is that Cato's brand of oratory resembles that of Lysias, as he himself
informs us (Cat Ma. 7.2). Socrates is not the man one would normally expect
to be mentioned as a rhetorical paragon. e youth of Rome emulate him and
associate with him (Cat. Ma. 4.2-5; 8.6; cf. also 19.7, and 25.3). e Censor is
their role model. e Censor's only positive remark about Socrates concerns his
role as father and husband. As Plutarch relates, Cato used to say that "the only
thing he admired about him [sc. Socrates] was his abiding civility and restraint
in his dealings with a shrewish wife and retarded children" (Cat. Ma. 20.3)11 .
e Censor, we are informed, enjoyed dinner parties at which the topic of
virtuous conduct was aired. Plutarch comments on this (Cat . Ma. 25.3-4):
He tried to outdo himself also with the feasts that he provided on his farm.
He would always invite his friends from the neighboring farms and the
surrounding areas and would have a delightful time with them. Nor was it
only his contemporaries who found his company pleasant and who sought
him out. He appealed also to the young, since he had, after all, undergone so
many valuable experiences and since he was familiar with so many writings
and important speeches. He regarded the table as the very best creator of
friendships and, while considerable praise of ne and upstanding citizens was
allowed, considerable neglect of those who were worthless and wicked was the
order of the day, since Cato would permit neither censure nor commendation
of such men to gain admittance to the party.
His role as exemplar for the youth, it will be noted, is brought out by
Plutarch in this passage. is is an important theme throughout the Life 12 .
Apparently he had some less successful imitators like Socrates (Pl., Apol .
23c-d) who were know as "left-handed Catos" (Cat . Ma. 19.7). Early in the
Life the frugality of Manius Curius, who is visited by an embassy from the
Samnites while is boiling turnips for dinner, inspires the Censor's own brand
of frugality, according to Plutarch (Cat . Ma. 2.1-3). Manius Curius' example
has a profound impact on the young man:
With his head full of these things Cato would return home and, when he
contemplated instead his own house, his estate, his slaves, his way of life, he
would exert himself all the more and would cut back inessential expenses (Cat .
Ma. 2.3)13.
is is the rst mention of slaves (θεράποντας) in the life, another very
signicant theme, as we shall see, and one that is interlocked with the frugality
11 Translation by D. S.
12 On the Elder Cato as a moral example in Plutarch see A. P J, 2002, pp.
109-11.
13 Translation by Sansone with a slight modication. On Plutarch's source for this anecdote
see D. S, 1989, p. 205 ad loc who thinks, with F. P, 1933, p. 57, that Plutarch
found it in Cato's Origines.
theme. Use of Cicero's De senectute has been detected in this anecdote14 .
While Manius Curius's meeting with the Samnite embassy is referred to in
other ancient sources15 , only Cicero in De senectute 16 connects it explicitly with
the Censor's visit to the great Roman statesman's farm.
Immediately after this passage we encounter the introduction of another
major theme, the Censor's rst encounter with Greek philosophy, his training
in Pythagorean doctrine by Nearchus:
In the course of conversation he heard from him those doctrines which Plato
too had formulated, namely that the greatest enticement to wrongdoing is
pleasure, that the soul's chief encumbrance is the body, that those exercises
of reason that most successfully sunder and divorce the soul from corporeal
sensation are the true liberators and puriers of the soul. is caused him to
espouse still more fondly the life of simplicity and self-discipline (Cat . Ma.
2.3-4)17.
e references to the Phaedo (64e-65d) and the Timaeus (69d) are
unmistakable18 . As David Sansone in his commentary notes, the only other
source that mentions this most likely ctitious encounter is Cicero in his
De senectute 12.41 and it is most likely of Cicero's own invention. In his
commentary on De senectute, Powell also thinks that Plutarch draws on Cicero
here, but is less inclined to think that Cicero is "indulging in completely
unfounded invention at this point"19 . We know that Plutarch was familiar
with this work of Cicero's because he explicitly cites it (De senectute 12.42) in
his Life of Titus Flamininus (18.10) and in his Life of Cato the Elder (17.5)20 .
e scene in the Life of Titus Flamininus (18.3-19.6) dramatizes the cruel
execution of a prisoner at a symposium by Titus' brother Lucius to gratify a
young male lover. e scene, which is also depicted even more lavishly in the
Life of Cato the Elder (17.1-6) also serves to introduce the Censor's successful
expulsion of Lucius from the Senate for this horric spectacle committed at
14 On Plutarch's use of De senectute in general, see J. G. F. P, 1988, p. 19, n. 50 and on
this passage in particular 218-219, ad loc.
15 Plu., Mor. 194f, Apophth . Rom. Curius 2, Ath. 10.419a (=Megacles, FGH 4,443), Plin.,
Nat. 19.26 (87), Flor. 1.13.22, V. Max. 4.3.5a.
16 He also makes very brief reference to the Censor's connection with Manius Curius in De
rep. 3.40.
17 Translation by D. S.
18 C f. D. S, 1989, p. 206 ad loc., who only notes here the reference to Plato's Timaeus
69d.
19 J. G. F. P (ed.), 1988, p. 182 ad loc. notes : "…it seems highly likely that this
passage of Plutarch derives from Cicero, and so cannot be used as independent corroboration."
20 See E. V, 1982, p. 291, in reference to the close correspondence of Plu., Cat.
Ma. 2.5 and Cic., Sen. 1.3, who acknowledges the possibility that Plutarch used De senectute,
but thinks it probable that Plutarch used another (unnamed) source, yet nevertheless concedes
(p. 299) the signicance of Cicero as an important source for Plutarch in general: "Cicerone
è fonte autorevole per Plutarco". Valgiglio appears to be unaware of the direct citation of De
senectute in the Life of Titus Flamininus. See also the suggestive remarks of A. E. A, 1978,
p. 300.
151
Cena apud Catones: ideology and sympotic behavior
the banquet. ere can be little doubt that Plutarch has his eye on Cicero's
representation of the Censor as he composes his Life.
Cicero's idealized portrait of the Censor not only makes him out to be a
sapiens, a proto-philosopher in a pre-philosophic era in Rome, it also explicitly
contrasts him positively with Socrates21 . For Cicero at any rate Cato's
superiority as a paradigm derives not just from his words, as in the case of
Socrates, but from his deeds as well22 . Especially in De senectute, Cicero holds
up the Censor's behavior in old age as exemplary and praiseworthy. e vigor
in old age that Cicero praises is an ambiguous trait for Plutarch because it leads
to immoderate behavior, actions never mentioned or even misrepresented by
Cicero. For example, one immediate consequence of his wife's death is that
the Censor takes a young slave girl as his concubine (Cat . Ma. 24.1-10). is
act is the23 source of estrangement between father and son. Cato attempts to
eradicate the problem by contracting a marriage with a young woman of lower
status who is a fraction of his age. His explanation to his son that he wishes
to sire more sons is branded a boldfaced lie by Plutarch, who evidently regards
the old man's inability to master his passion in old age as reprehensible (Cat .
Ma. comp. 33/6.1-2). is entire chain of events is related in great detail by
Plutarch who does not always delve into his subject's private lives with the
enthusiasm and graphic detail of a Suetonius24 . Both the Censor and Cato the
Younger lie to their sons, according to Plutarch!
Clearly however Plutarch adopts his most critical stance with respect to
the Censor's treatment of slaves. We are informed initially that he works
alongside them in summer and in winter, eating the same bread and drinking
the same wine as they do (Cat. Ma. 3.2)25 . We are also told that he never paid
more than 1,500 drachma for a slave as a general rule and was accustomed
to sell o the aged and inrm ones (4.5-6). is latter habit elicits one of
the most decidedly critical discussions in the entire Life, in which Plutarch
maligns the unfeeling attitude (ἀτενοῦς ἄγαν ἤθους) that he thinks must be
responsible for this practice (Cat. Ma. 5.1-7)26 .
21 See in particular F. P, 1933; R. G, 1936; U. K, 1964.
22 Amic. 2.6-10.
23 Cf. Cicero's Censor (Sen. 14.47).
24 See, e.g, Plutarch's Life of Julius Caesar in comparison with Suetonius's Divus Julius. On
male sexual behavior in Plutarch in general see P. A. S, 1995, P. W, 1998, T. D ,
1999, pp. 94-7, J. B, 2003 and M. B, 2007a, pp. 53-66. See also H. G, 1977, pp.
73-95, for a detailed analysis of the category Erotika in Suetonius' biographies.
25 is was not a typical Greek desiderium. Cf P. C, 1998, p. 12: "…the Pagan
Greeks were mostly agreed that working for one's living was not an intrinsic good, and their
term for hard physical toil, ponos, is generally pejorative; to be without ponos was, according to
Hesiod, to live like the blessed immortal gods." See also Cat . Ma. 1.9.
26 See P. A. S, 1997, pp. 77-8, M. B, 2000, pp. 15-32 and B. A 2005,
pp. 220-2. is same adjective atenes (indicating in Plutarch rigid, inexorable, and inexible
behavior) recurs in the Life of the Younger Cato several times (2.3; 4.1-2), where it appears
to characterize Cato's unbending pursuit of justice (dikaiosune) in association with the Stoic
Later in the Life the Censor's commitment to frugality is called into
question. We are told he possessed many slaves (Cat . Ma. 21.1). Cato, we
are told, regularly subjected those slaves who delivered less than attentive
service at the dinner table to a postprandial lashing (Cat. Ma. 21.4). e fear
of severe punishment was the determinant of his slave Paccius' suicide (Cat.
Ma. 10.6)27 . We can infer this from Plutarch's later description of the harsh
discipline and complete control the Censor appears to maintain over his slaves,
even restricting even their sexual behavior in a way that generates increased
revenue for himself (Cat . Ma. 21.1-3). He contrived to foment divisiveness
among them as a prophylactic measure against any suspected concord which
he feared (Cat . Ma. 21.4). ose slaves whom he found guilty of some serious
oence he executed in front of the other slaves, presumably as a warning (Cat .
Ma. 21.4). e repeated evocation of this theme in the Life of the Elder Cato
nds no corresponding parallel in any of the other Lives with perhaps one
exception. Generally slaves are mentioned in their expected roles, as incidental
participants in various events28 . Only in the Life of Antony do we nd frequent
reference to slaves and slave-like behavior that appears to be thematic, though
in a very dierent way29 .
In the context of our discussion, his punishment of slaves at symposia
requires further scrutiny because Plutarch describes a transformation in the
Censor's behavior over time:
Now, at rst, when Cato was still poor and serving in the army he was not at
all fastidious about his meals. Instead, he made it clear that it was singularly
reprehensible to bicker with a slave for the sake of one's belly. Later however,
philosopher Antipater of Tyre. It is no accident that this same adjective is applied to Aristides
(Arist . 2.2), in contrast to emistocles, to describe his characteristic unwavering pursuit of
justice.
27 "…when Cato found out about it he hanged himself rather than face him." (trans. D.
S) Cf. K. R. B, 1994, p.111: "It seems that Paccius was so afraid of Cato and
his powers of correction that forestalling certain punishment by the act of suicide was all that
he could do."
28 See, e.g. Lyc. 2 (enslavement of helots), 11, 16, 24 (helots), 28 (the killing of helots during
the krupteia, etc,), Sol. 7, Arist. 10 (Spartans accompanied by 7 helots each), em. 30, Aem. 22,
TG. 2, 8, CG. 37(16), Mar. 2, 5, 37, 43-44, Sull. 9, 28, 37, Pomp. 49, 75, Caes. 46.
29 Antony is depicted as dressing like a slave (Ant. 10). He changes into a slave's clothes to
avoid detection (Ant. 14). Slave boys resembling Eros accompany Cleopatra, as Aphrodite, on
her yacht as she sails to Antony, as Dionysus (Ant. 26). Both Antony and Cleopatra dress like
slaves to walk the streets of Alexandria (Ant. 29). e role of various slaves is foregrounded in
the nal phase of the Life, as their master and mistress become increasingly passive and helpless
(Ant . 63, 67, 75, 76). Antony and Cleopatra die as slaves among their slaves (Ant. 75-87).
Perhaps telling in this context of Plutarch's underlying motives is the depiction of Antony's
virtual enslavement of freeborn Greeks, including Plutarch's great-grandfather Nicarchus, by
forcing them with whips to carry grain to the harbor, after having taken their money, slaves, and
yoke-animals (Ant. 68). e negative paradigmatic value of the Lives of Demetrius and Antony is
of course explicit (Dem. 1). Here the criticism is directed at those who behave in slavish ways,
hinting at a lack of self-mastery.
153
Cena apud Catones: ideology and sympotic behavior
as his circumstances improved, when he entertained friends and colleagues, no
sooner was dinner over than he would punish those who had been the slightest
bit negligent in any aspect of the service or preparation of the feast by beating
them with a leather strap (Cat . Ma. 21.4).
It is unclear whether the Censor's guests were still present to witness this
unsightly spectacle. e important point is that it is not the mark of a sapiens to
behave in this manner. is passage needs to be read with the one cited above
that follows about the discussions permitted at the Censor's dinner parties
(Cat . Ma. 25.3-4) 30 . is type of behavior would be unthinkable for Socrates
who also preferred edifying topics of conversation at the dinner table. As we
can well imagine, Cicero does not refer to the Censor's punitive treatment
of slaves in De senectute (14.46). Nevertheless De senectute may be Plutarch's
source for the Censor's custom of hosting edifying dinner parties31 . Notably
Cicero has the Censor quote a remark of Socrates related in Xenophon's
Symposium (2.26). Plutarch's insertion violently disrupts the Socratic illusion.
In Plutarch's Life of Cato the Elder, self-mastery vis-à-vis his own slaves seems
to be a central issue32 .
is same question is raised in the Life of the Younger Cato. If we turn
to that Life we encounter a dramatic scene that abruptly calls into question
the Younger Cato's self-mastery and treatment of his slaves33 . I am referring
to the prelude to his suicide and the depiction of his death. is scene has
recently been closely analyzed by several scholars so I will be brief34 . We are
rst made aware of Cato's state of mind at a symposium the night prior to
his death. Cato rises to the defense of one of the paradoxes of the Stoic
position that "the good man alone is free, and that all the bad are slaves" which
has been opposed by an unnamed Peripatetic35 who is present (Cat. Mi. 67)36 .
Cato's long reply is delivered in a tone that is loud, harsh, and astonishingly
contentious (σφοδρὸς ἐμπεσὼν ὁ Κάτων, καὶ τόνον προσθεὶς καὶ τραχύτητα
φωνῆς, ἀπέτεινε πορρωτάτω τὸν λόγον, ἀγῶνι θαυμαστῷ χρησάμενος). e
vehemence of this verbal onslaught, we are informed, signals to the onlookers
that Cato has decided to take his own life. is type of behavior at a symposium
is obviously unacceptable and unphilosophic in the extreme. His emotional
30 Read this also with his prosecution of Lucius for disrupting a symposium with violence
(Cat . Ma. 17.1-6).
31 See J. G. F. P, 1988, p. 19, n. 50.
32 T. W, 1988, p.182, in citing this passage, notes: "Even in antiquity, Cato
was seen as an example of a cruel master, and his attitude towards his slaves was considered
inhumane."
33 Cf. also Cato's reluctance to free the slaves in an emergency situation (Cat. Mi. 60. 3-4).
34 See J. G, 1999, M. B. T, 1999; A. V. Z, 2007 and M. B
(forthcoming, see n. 4).
35 Presumably Demetrius. Cf. Cat. Mi. 65.11 and G's note, 1993, p. 514 n. 458, in her
edition.
36 Perrin's translation. e intensity of Cato's reaction would appear to contradict Plutarch's
earlier (Cat . Mi. 1.5-6) assessment of Cato's slowness to anger.
volatility is again underscored when, later that night, he begins to raise his
voice (μᾶλλον ἐνέτεινε τὴν φωνὴν) at his slaves who do not bring him his
sword and ends by striking one of them on the mouth with his st so hard that
he injures his hand, now in a state of anger and shouting loudly (χαλεπαίνων
καὶ βοῶν ἤδη μέγα) (Cat. Mi. 68.4-5). is type of behavior towards slaves
is explicitly rejected by Plutarch (De coh. ira 459B-460C; 461A-462A; 463B)
and Seneca (De ira 2.25.4; 3.1.4; 3.24.2; 3.35.1-3; 3.39.2-4) in their treatises
on restraining rage37 .
Here in the nal moments of his life Cato clearly does not embody the
calm and serene Stoic sage38 . In the world of Socrates, as portrayed to us by
Plato, Cato's behavior is more like that of a rasymachus or Callicles. is
comportment unbecoming of a philosopher is juxtaposed with the eminently
philosophic pastime of reading Plato's Phaedo, bearing here its ancient title of
On the Soul39 . We are informed no less than four times that Cato is reading
or returning to his reading of this dialogue, the classic portrait of philosophic
death (Cat. Mi. 68.2; 68.3; 68.4; 70.2)40 . is striking contrast reects the
culmination of the Socrates-motif, a motif alluded to in the Life (cf. Cat . Mi.
46.1, where Cato is implicitly compared to Socrates). rough mention of this
dialogue an educated audience is prompted to recollect and contrast Cato's
agitated nal moments with Socrates' calm bearing to the detriment of our
image of the former41 . Cato's bloody mode of death is equally divergent (Cat.
Mi.70). Returning to his reading of the Phaedo, we are informed that he has
managed to read it through twice completely. After sleeping for a while he
summons his freedmen Butas and doctor Cleanthes. Cleanthes bandages his
hand. Left alone he then attempts to kill himself with his sword, but because
of his injured hand the thrust is not lethal and his bowels sag out of the wound.
In his death throes (δυσθανατῶν) he falls to the oor overturning a geometric
37 W. V. H, 2001, pp. 317-36 provides an excellent survey.
38 Plutarch also related that Cato shifts the focus of the conversation (which has now stalled
thanks to his outburst) to those who are attempting to escape by sea, etc. At this juncture Cato
expresses his fear (δεδιώς repeated twice) for their safety, another inappropriate emotion for a
Stoic sage to confess (Cat. Mi. 67.4). Cf. also Phaedo's assessment of Socrates's fearlessness
(ἀδεῶς ) and nobility (γενναίως) in confronting death that nds conrmation in the subsequent
dramatization of the condemned philosopher's death (Pl., Phaed. 58e). I nd it impossible to
follow T. D , 1999, pp. 143-4) here who writes: "e calm of both men [sc. Phocion and
Cato] at crises, and particularly at their deaths, is another Sokratic feature…Like Sokrates, both
men remain calm despite the emotions of others." T. D, 1999, p.151) later seems to notice
the incongruity of Cato's behavior.
39 Plato (R., 8. 548e-549a) associates the harsh treatment of slaves with the uneducated
man.
40 Cf. T. E, 2004, p. 7: "Das Bild des philosophischen Todes, das Platon seinen Lesern
im Phaidon vorstellt, hat diesen Dialog über die Jahrhunderte zu dem klassischen Beispiel einer
consolatio philosophiae werden lassen."
41 e exemplum Socratis includes inter alia the restraint of anger. Cf. e.g., Sen., De ira
3.13.3 and Plu., De coh. ira 455B. Socrates' calm and jovial bearing is frequently alluded to in
the Phaedo.
155
Cena apud Catones: ideology and sympotic behavior
abacus that stood near him42. His servants, summoned by the noise, discover
him still alive. His doctor tries to replace his bowels and sew up the wound
but Cato thrusts him away, rips open the wound and claws at his bowels with
his hands and so dies. Only Plutarch's account provides us with details such
as the striking of the slave and the repeated references to Cato's resumption
of reading the dialogue until he has read it through twice. e other major
accounts of this event that we possess lack these details43 .
is Socrates-motif44 , as I said, is found in the Life of Phocion too45. e
dierence is that Phocion's death reminded the Athenians of Socrates' end and
was not antithetical to it (Phoc. 38.5). Cato and Phocion may both go around
barefoot in public as Socrates46 customarily did (Phoc. 4.4; Cat. Mi. 6.6; 44.1;
50.1), both underwent philosophic training which informed in some way their
political activities (Phoc. 3.1 (referring to Cicero's critique of Cato acting as
though he lived in Plato's commonwealth47 ); 4.1-2; 5.4-548; 32.6-749 , Cat. Mi.
4.2; 10.1-3; 46.1), but, in a crisis situation, only Phocion maintains delity
to the behavioral guidelines his training in philosophy advocates and thus
faces death with admirable calmness and élan (ἐθαύμαζον τὴν ἀπάθειαν καὶ
μεγαλοψυχίαν τοῦ ἀνδρός) (Phoc. 36.1)50 . Cato's behavior in contrast appears
to cast doubt on the depth of his commitment to philosophy and successful
internalization of its precepts51 . e contrast in the Life of Phocion, as we
have indicated, focuses on the retention of emotional control under trying
circumstances. e possession of inner calm founded on conviction so vividly
depicted in the Phaedo is reduplicated in Phocion's death scene. e Younger
Cato lacks this inner calm born of conviction. His frenetic reading and rereading
of the Phaedo in the nal moments of his life may serve to underscore this.
His overt display of immoderate grief at the death of his half-brother Caepio
42 On the symbolic nature of this see A. V. Z, 2007, p. 219, and Plato, Phaedo
108d with B's, 1911, p. 128 and 150) note and Appendix II.
43 Appian, b. c. 2.99; Cassius Dio, 43.11.4-5; Florus, 2.13.71-2; Livy, Per . 114; [Caes.], b.
Afr. 88.3-4. On the provenance of this account see J. G, 1979 and below.
44 e parallels and dierences between Cato's suicide and Socrates's execution are recounted
in detail by M. B. T, 1999.
45 See H.-J. G, 1976, pp. 139-41; L. T, 1988, pp. 30-3; C. A M,
1999, pp. 159-71, and T. D , 1999, pp. 131-58.
46 Cf. Pl., Phdr. 229a and Smp. 220b supported by Aristophanes, Clouds 103 and 363.
47 Cicero, Att. 2.1.8.
48 Cf. Pl., Protagoras 342a-343d.
49 Cf. Pl., Grg. 469c; 474b .; Crit. 49b; R. 335d; Ap., 30c-d; 41d.
50 Cato appears to possess this quality too in better times (Cat. Mi. 65. 10).
51 We remember Plutarch's early judgment that Cato's apparent "reluctance to be persuaded
made his learning more laborious" (Cat. Mi.1.8). His rereading of the Phaedo in such a short
time span might seem to allude to this defect. Another problem that may have troubled Cato
(at least in Plutarch's conceptual world) is that Socrates in the Phaedo (61c-62c) appears to
forbid suicide explicitly. On suicide in the Phaedo see J. W, 2001, pp. 91-106. On the
Stoic conception of suicide as permissible for rational reasons in certain exigencies (εὔλογος
ἐξαγωγή) see SVF 3.757-768 with G's, 1951, p. 476) note in his edition of the Tusculan
Disputations, M. G, 1986, pp. 72-5, and J. W, 2001, pp. 100-1.
is interpreted by Plutarch as signaling a failure in his philosophic training
(Cat. Mi. 11. 3-8)52 , a failing shared by another contemporary Roman devotee
of Greek philosophy, Cicero, whose overwhelming grief at the death of his
daughter Tullia is regarded by Plutarch as a sign of the statesman's philosophic
insuciency (Cic. 41.8)53 .
Michael Trapp has rightly pointed out that Socrates is an intermediary
foil sharing resemblances that allow comparison of Cato and Phocion in
a way that obviates the need for a formal synkrisis at the end, which this
pair lacks54 . He also notes (correctly in my opinion) that the message –
whatever it may be – that Plutarch is seeking to communicate "bears more
closely on Cato than on Phocion"55 . Trapp then suggests that Plutarch's
intent was to critique subtly earlier Roman writing on Cato known (?) from
Cicero's Tusculan Disputations (1.71.); Cicero had employed the Cato-
Socrates comparison to embellish the man's legend56 . For Cicero, Cato in
particular exemplied the principle that the philosopher's way of life is really
a preparation for death. In a particularly telling passage a comparison of
Cato's with Socrates's mode of death serves to introduce a paraphrase of
Plato's Phaedo 57 ( Tusc. 1.71-75). Undoubtedly there was more of this in
Cicero's lost work Cato, in response to which Caesar penned his scathing
Anti-Cato, also lost to us58 . is book, as Goar notes, "established Cato as
52 [sc. Κάτων] ἐμπαθέστερον ἔδοξεν ἢ φιλοσοφώτερον ἐνεγκεῖν τὴν συμφοράν. Cf. Consol.
ad uxor. 608c, 609b, 611a. See also T. D , 1999, p. 151. We are informed in the Life ( Cat . Mi.
6.2-4) that Cato's civic duties kept him from literary pursuits (philologein) and that he spent his
nights drinking and conversing with philosophers (νύκτωρ καὶ παρὰ πότον συγγίνεσθαι τοῖς
φιλοσόφοις). Early in the Life we are led to question Cato's pursuit of literature in a passage
that stresses his excessive love of dice-throwing and overindulgence in drinking: "At suppers he
would throw dice for the choice of portions [. . .] At rst, also, he would drink once after supper
and then leave the table; but as time went on he would allow himself to drink very generously,
so that he often tarried at his wine till early morning. His friends used to say that the cause of
this was his civic and public activities; he was occupied with these all day, and so prevented from
literary pursuits, wherefore he would hold intercourse with the philosophers at night and over
the cups. For this reason, too, when a certain Memmius remarked in company that Cato spent
his entire nights in drinking, Cicero answered him by saying: 'Shouldn't you add that he also
spends his entire days throwing dice?'"(Cat . Mi. 6.2-5)
53 Cf. also Cicero's reaction to his exile (32.5-7). S. S, 1990b/1995, p. 242f. sees excessive
grief in Plutarch as symptomatic of "ineective education". For Plutarch's attitude towards how
one ought to mourn the death of a loved one see the Life of Fabius Maximus 24.6.
54 M. T, 1999, p. 495: "And Socrates, ultimately the Socrates of the Phaedo, is the
principle medium through which the comparison is developed. Plutarch uses him as a 'third
man', a tertium comparationis whose resemblances to both of the other two individually allow
them to be compared not only with him but with each other." e only other pairs lacking a
formal synkrisis are the Lives of emistocles and Camillus, Pyrrhus and Marius, and Alexander the
Great and Caesar.
55 M. T, 1999, p. 496.
56 M. T, 1999, p. 496 (Trapp himself does not in the end subscribe to this view). See
also J. G, 1999, pp. 357-64 on the subsequent tradition of the Cato/Socrates coupling.
57 Cf. Pl., Phaedo 67d and 80e
58 On Cicero's role in establishing the Cato legend and Caesar's response see R. G, 1987,
157
Cena apud Catones: ideology and sympotic behavior
the Roman model of the Stoic sage — a fact of great importance for later
adherents of Stoicism"59 . Seneca's frequent juxtaposing of the deaths of Cato
with Socrates attests to this60 . Much of the material critical of Cato that
Plutarch presents in the Life appears to be drawn from the Anti-Cato 61 . It is
notable that Plutarch, in his Life of Julius Caesar (54.6), mentions that both
of these works continued to have many eager readers in his own day because
of Caesar and Cato. e presentation of this material in the Life and the
nature of the juxtaposed portrait of Phocion, in my opinion, are expressive
of Plutarch's opposition to Cicero's idealized image of the man qua Stoic
sage and its survival into the imperial period, especially in the writings of
Seneca62 . Plutarch's portraits go a long way towards undermining this image
of the proto-Stoic Censor and his grandson Cato, the paradigmatic Stoic
sage.
In conclusion it appears that Plutarch inserted the gure of Socrates into
the Lives of Aristides, Cato the Elder, Phocion, and Cato the Younger to discredit
the ideologically motivated comparison of the Censor and Cato the Younger
with Socrates that Cicero presented to posterity. Both men are portrayed
as disrupting the civilized and civilizing atmosphere of the symposium with
reproachable behavior. While Aristides and Phocion are positively compared
to Socrates who clearly functions as a positive canon, the Censor and Cato
the Younger fall short. Supercially they resemble Socrates. eir virtue is
admired in certain circles. ey function as role models for the youth. ey
dress modestly. e younger Cato even goes barefoot in public. Both however
deviate most strongly from the Socratic paradigm in their violent treatment
of slaves. Not surprisingly the treatment of women, children, slaves, and
animals is constantly mentioned by Plutarch in De cohibenda ira as indicative
of a man's self-control. Ability in this area is for Plutarch directly related to
education (paideia), specically philosophical training. Plutarch, in adopting
this rhetorical strategy, invites us to contrast the Censor with the Younger Cato
and both with Socrates. He wants us to realize that Late Republican Rome
had made some progress that could be directly attributed to their increasing
assimilation of Greek culture but that even their best representatives still were
not fully trained in the philosophic arts as the comparison with the Socratic
paradigm fully reveals. e Ciceronian idealization of the two men is thus
repudiated.
pp. 13-8.
59 R. G, 1987, p.15.
60 See Sen., Ep. 67.7; 71.17; 98.12; 104. 28f.; Prov. 3.4; 3.12.; Tranq. 16.1; Marc. 22.3
(collected by J. G, 1979, p. 64-5, n. 61).
61 See, e.g., J. G, 1979, pp. 54-6. I disagree with Geiger's skeptical conclusion (p. 56)
that questions Plutarch's direct acquaintance with both the Anticato and Cicero's Cato. Just the
opposite would likely be true, i.e., that the availability and continued popularity of both works
in Plutarch's own time (cf. Caes. 54.6) would virtually ensure that he read them.
62 See especially J. G, 1999 on this.
W o r k s c i T e d
A, A., "Die politische Bedeutung des jüngeren Catos", Classica et
Mediaevalia, 4 (1941) 100-203.
A, B., Prüfstein der Gemüter. Untersuchungen zu den ethischen
Vorstellungen in den Parallelbiographien Plutarchs am Beispiel des Coriolan,
Hildesheim, Zurich/New York, 2005.
A M, C., "Rasgos socráticos de la personalidad de Foción en la
Vida de Plutarco", in A. P J . (eds.), Plutarco, Platón
y Aristóteles. Actas del V Congreso Internacional de la I.P.S. (Madrid-
Cuenca, 4-7 de Mayo, 1999), Madrid, 1999, pp. 159-72.
A, A. E., Cato the Censor, Oxford, 1978.
B, D., Plutarque et le stoïcisme, Paris, 1969.
B, H., "Interne Synkrisis bei Plutarch", Hermes, 130 (2002) 467-89.
B, M., "Anecdote and the Representation of Plutarch's Ethos", in L. V
D S (ed.), Rhetorical eory and Praxis in Plutarch. Acta of the
IV International Congress of the I.P.S. (Leuven, July 3-6), Louvain,
2000, pp.15-32.
______ "Eroticism, Power, and Politics in the Parallel Lives", in J. M. N I
R. L. L (eds.), El amor en Plutarco. Actas del IX Simposio español
sobre Plutarco (28-30 Septiembre, 2006), León, 2007a, pp. 457-66.
______ "e Story of Damon and the Ideology of Euergetism in the Lives of
Cimon and Lucullus", Hermathena, 182 (2007b) 53-69.
B, J., "No Time for Love: Plutarch's Chaste Caesar", GRBS, 43 (2003)
13-29.
B, K. R., Slavery and Society at Rome, Cambridge, 1994.
B, J., Plato's Phaedo (edited with introduction and notes by J. B.),
Oxford, 1911.
C, P., "e economy (economies) of ancient Greece", Dialogos:
Hellenic Studies Review, 5 (1998) 4-24.
C, C. P., "Cicero's Stoicism and the Understanding of Cicero's Speech for
Murena", TAPhA, 116 (1986) 229-39.
D, A., "Ein Streit um die rechte Sokrates-Nachfolge", in Hortus Litterarum
Antiquarum: Festschrift für Hans Arnim Gärtner zum 70. Geburtstag,
Heidelberg, 2000, pp. 93-105.
D, K., Exemplum Socratis: Studien zur Sokratesnachwirkung in der
kynischstoischen Popularphilosophie der frühen Kaiserzeit und im frühen
Christentum, Wiesbaden, 1979.
159
Cena apud Catones: ideology and sympotic behavior
D, T., Plutarch's Lives: Exploring Virtue and Vice, Oxford, 1999.
E, T., Platon Phaidon (translation and commentary by . E.), Göttingen,
2004.
E, H., "Die Bedeutung der Synkrisis in den Parallelbiographien Plutarchs",
Hermes, 84 (1956) 398-424.
F, R., Cato Uticensis, Darmstadt, 1983.
F, F., "Synkrisis", Hermes, 58 (1923) 327-68.
F, M., "e Philosopher", in J. B & G. E. R. L (eds.),
Greek ought: A Guide to Classical Knowledge, Cambridge, Mass., 2000,
pp. 3-19.
F, B.-P., "An Interpretation of Plutarch's Cato the Younger", History of
Political ought, 18 (1997) 1-23.
F, S., Plutarco Vite Parallele: Cimone (introduzione, traduzione e note
di S. F., Lucullo, introduzione e note di B. S, traduzione di B.
M), Milan, 1989.
G, H.-J., Phokion: Studien zur Erfassung seiner historischen Gestalt ,
Munich, 1976.
______ "Römischer mos und griechische Ethik. Überlegungen zum
Zusammenhang von Akkulturation und politischer Ordnung im
Hellenismus", HZ, 258.3 (1994) 593-622.
G, J., "Munatius Rufus and rasea Paetus on Cato the Younger",
Athenaeum, 57 (1979) 48-72.
______ "Plutarch's Parallel Lives: the Choice of Heroes", Hermes, 109 (1981)
85-104, (reprinted in B. S, 1995, pp. 165-90).
______ Cornelius Nepos and Ancient Political Biography, Stuttgart, 1985.
______ "Nepos and Plutarch: From Latin to Greek Political Biography", ICS,
13 (1988) 245-56.
______ "Plato, Plutarch, and the Death of Socrates and of Cato", in A. P
J . (eds.), Plutarco, Platón y Aristóteles. Actas del V Congreso
Internacional de la I.P.S (Madrid-Cuenca, 4-7 de Mayo, 1999), Madrid,
1999, pp. 357-64.
______ "Felicitas Temporum and Plutarch's Choice of Heroes", in P. A.
S & L. V S (eds.), Sage and Emperor: Plutarch,
Greek Intellectuals, and Roman Power in the Time of Trajan (98-117
A.D.), Leuven, 2002, pp. 93-102.
______ "Plutarch's Choice of Roman Heroes: Further Considerations", in
A. P J & F. T (eds.), Historical and Biographical
Values of Plutarch's Works. Studies devoted to Professor Philip A. Stadter by
the International Plutarch Society, Málaga, 2005, pp. 231-42.
G, L., Plutarco Vite parallele: Focione (introduzione, traduzione e note di
C. B), Catone Uticense (introduzione di J. G, traduzione e
note di L. G), Milan, 1993.
G, O. (ed.), Cicero: Gespräche in Tusculum, Munich, 1951.
G, R., Die Bedeutung des Marius und Cato maior für Cicero, Berlin, 1936.
G, R., e Legend of Cato Uticensis from the rst Century B.C. to the Fifth
Century A.D., Bruxelles, 1987.
G, M., "Philosophy, Cato, and Roman Suicide: I and II", G&R, 33
(1986) 64-77, 192-202.
G, E. S., Culture and National Identity in Republican Rome, London,
1992.
G, H., Studien zur biographischen Technik Suetons, Vienna/Cologne/Graz,
1977.
H, T. N., e Politics of Latin Literature: Writing, Identity, and Empire
in Ancient Rome, Princeton/Oxford, 1998.
H, P., Introduction aux Pensées de Marc Aurèle, Paris, 1997².
______ What is Ancient Philosophy, translated by Michael Chase from
the French original Qu'est-ce que la philosophie antique, Paris, 1995/
Cambridge, Mass., London, 2002.
H, W. V., War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70 BC, Oxford,
1979.
______ Restraining Rage: e Ideology of Anger Control in Classical Antiquity ,
Cambridge, Mass., London, 2001.
H, J. P., "Plutarch's Portrait of Socrates", ICS, 13.2 (1988) 365-81.
______ "Plutarch and Stoicism", ANRW, 2. 36.5 (1992) 3336-52.
H, K.-J., "Exempla und mos maiorum: Überlegungen zum kollektiven
Gedächtnis der Nobilität,", in H.-J. G & A. M (eds.),
Vergangenheit und Lebenswelt: Soziale Kommunikation, Traditionsbildung
und historisches Bewußtsein, Tübingen, 1996, pp. 301-38.
H, V., "Pittalacus and Eucles: Slaves in the Public Service of Athens",
Mouseion, 6 (2006) 1-13.
K, U., Untersuchungen zu Ciceros Bild von Cato Censorius, Frankfurt,
1964.
K, K., "Scurra Atticus. e Epicurean View of Socrates", in P. C
161
Cena apud Catones: ideology and sympotic behavior
(ed.) Suzetesis. Studi sull'Epicureismo Greco e Romano oerti a Marcello
Gigante, Naples, 1983, pp. 227-53.
K, F., Römische Geisteswelt, Munich, 1961.
L, D. H. J., "Making Parallels: 'Synkrisis' and Plutarch's emistocles
and Camillus", ANRW, 33.6 (1992) 4154-200.
L, A. A., "Socrates in Hellenistic Philosophy", CQ, 38.1 (1988) 150-71.
______ Epictetus: a Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life, Oxford, 2002.
M, J. M., "Plutarch, Pyrrhus, and Alexander", in P. A. S (ed.),
Plutarch and the Historical Tradition, London and New York, 1992, pp.
90-108.
P, F., Cicero und Cato Censorius, Bottrop, 1993.
P, C. B. R., "Synkrisis in Plutarch's Lives", in F. B I. G
(eds.), Miscellanea Plutarchea, Quad. Giorn. Fil. Ferr., 8 (1986) 83-96.
______ "e Moralism of Plutarch's Lives", in D. I . (eds.), Ethics
and Rhetoric: Classical Essays for Donald Russell on his Seventy-Fifth
Birthday, Oxford, 1995, pp. 205-20.
______ "Is Death the End? Closure in Plutarch's Lives", in D. H. R &
F. M. D (eds.), Classical Closure: Reading the End in Greek and Latin
Literature, Princeton, 1997, pp. 228-50.
______ "Rhetoric, paideia, and psychology in Plutarch's Lives", in L. V
S (ed.), Rhetorical eory and Praxis in Plutarch. Acta of the IV
International Congress of the I.P.S. (Leuven, July 3-6) 2000, Leuven,
pp. 331-39.
______ Plutarch and History, London, 2002.
______ "Synkrisis Revisited", in A. P J & F. T (eds.),
Historical and Biographical Values of Plutarch's Works. Studies devoted to
Professor Philip Stadter by the International Plutarch Society, Málaga,
2005a, pp. 325-40.
______ "Plutarch's Socrates", Hermathena, 179 (2005b) 105-39.
P J, A., "e Paradigmatic Education of the Ruler", in P. A .
S & L. V S (eds.), Sage and Emperor: Plutarch,
Greek Intellectuals, and Roman Power in the Time of Trajan (98-117
A.D.), Leuven, 2002, pp. 105-14.
P, M. (ed.), M. Tullius Cicero: Tusculanae Disputationes, Stuttgart,
1918.
P, J. G. F. (ed.), Cicero Cato Maior De Senectute, Cambridge, 1988.
R, K., "Born to Be Wolves? Origins of Roman Imperialism", in R. W.
W & E. M. H (eds.), Transitions to Empire: Essays Greco-Roman
History, 360-146 B.C., in Honor of E. Badian, Norman, 1996, pp. 273-314.
S, D., Plutarch: e Lives of Aristeides and Cato (edited with translation
and commentary by D. S.), Warminster, 1989.
S, B. (ed.), Essays on Plutarch's Lives, Oxford, 1995.
S, P . A., "Plutarch's Comparison of Pericles and Fabius Maximus", GRBS,
16 (1975) 77-85 (reprinted in B. S, 1995, pp. 155-64).
______ "e Proems of Plutarch's Lives", ICS, 13.2 (1988) 275-95.
______ "Subject to the Erotic: Male Sexual Behavior in Plutarch", in D. C.
I . (eds.), Ethics and Rhetoric: Classical Essays for Donald Russell
on his Seventy-Fifth Birthday, Oxford, 1995, pp. 221-36.
______ "Anecdotes and the ematic Structure of Plutarchean Biography", in J.
A. F D F. P P (eds.), Estudios sobre
Plutarco, IV, Aspectos formales. Actas del IV Simposio Español sobre Plutarco
(Salamanca, 26-28 de Mayo de 1994), Madrid, 1996, pp. 291-303.
______ "Plutarch's Lives: e Statesman as Moral Actor", in C. S
. (eds.), Plutarco y la historia. Actas del simposio español sobre
Plutarco (Zaragoza, 20-22 de Junio, 1996), Zaragoza, 1997, pp. 65-
81.
S, G., "Plato's Socrates and the Stoics", in P. A. V W (ed.),
e Socratic Movement, Ithaca/London, 1994, pp. 241-51.
S, S., "Character Change in Plutarch", Phoenix, 43 (1989) 62-8.
______ "Plutarch's Lives of Cicero, Cato, and Brutus", Hermes, 118 (1990a)
192-203.
______ "Hellenic Culture and Roman Heroes of Plutarch", JHS, 110 (1990b)
126-45. (reprinted in B. S, 1995, pp. 229-64).
______ "Plutarchan Synkrisis", Eranos, 90 (1992) 101-11.
______ Hellenism and Empire: Language, Classicism, and Power in the Greek
World AD 50-250, Oxford, 1996.
______ "Plato, Plutarch, Athens and Rome", in J. B M. G
(eds.), Philosophia Togata ii: Plato and Aristotle at Rome, Oxford, 1997,
pp. 165-87.
T, M. B., "Socrates, the Phaedo and the Lives of Phocion and Cato the
Younger", in A. P J . (eds.), Plutarco, Platón y Aristóteles.
Actas del V Congresso Internacional de la I.P.S. (Madrid-Cuenca, 4-7
de Mayo, 1999), Madrid, 1999, pp. 487-500.
T, L., Phocion the Good, London/New York/Sydney, 1988.
163
Cena apud Catones: ideology and sympotic behavior
V, E., "Alcuni aspetti di Cicerone come fonte di Plutarco", in Studi in
onore di Aristide Colonna, Perugia, 1982.
W, P., "Plutarch on Sex", G&R, 45 (1998) 166-87.
W, J., "Socratic Suicide", JHS, 121 (2001) 91-106.
W, T., e Second Sophistic, Oxford, 2005.
W, T., Greek & Roman Slavery, London/New York, 1988, reprint
of 1981.
Z, A. V., "Cato's Suicide in Plutarch", CQ, 57 (2007) 216-30.
165
Banquet and Philhellenism in the Lives of Flamininus and Aemilius Paullus
ba n q u e T a n d p h i l h e l l e n i s m i n T h e li v e S o f fl a m i n i n u S
a n d ae m i l i u S pa u l l u S
M T
University of Coimbra
Abstract
e Lives of Flamininus and Aemilius Paullus are good examples of Plutarch's tendency to judge his
Roman heroes according to their Hellenic qualities and benefactions to Greeks. While modern
scholars rightly stress that both politicians were mainly driven by Roman interests and personal
ambition, the biographer chooses primarily to highlight their philanthropic nature as well as
their favourable attitude to Greek liberty and culture. Conspicuously, his praise is particularly
generous in two episodes related to feasts and spectacles. Following the proclamation of liberty
at the Isthmian Games, Flamininus' policies are celebrated in the course of a banquet, with his
achievements being judged equal or superior to those of the most eminent Greek statesmen of
the past (Flam. 11). In the Aemilius, it is the protagonist himself who organises splendid feasts
in a way that inspires profound admiration on the part of the Greeks (Aem. 28). While Livy's
account suggests that the victory celebrations at Amphipolis should primarily be seen as a show
of Roman power, Plutarch essentially describes the event as a pleasant entertainment with a
view to revealing Aemilius' personal qualities. Greek-style festivals and banquets thus provide a
most suitable background for presenting the 'liberators' of Greece as exemplars of philhellenism
and philanthrôpia.
While much attention continues to be devoted to the signicance of the
Parallel Lives as an expression of a shared Graeco-Roman identity among the
imperial élite, recent scholarship has tended to stress the essential Greekness
of Plutarch's outlook and criteria of judgement1 . Evidently, this does not imply
that the Greek heroes are systematically presented as superior to their Roman
pairs2 , yet it is important to acknowledge that the great men of the res publica
are often accorded praise and blame on the basis of their attitude to Hellenic
culture and their benefactions to Greeks3 . us, the representatives of Rome
are expected to prove their worth on a playing eld dened by the norms and
values of Greek civilisation, and it is by displaying πρᾳότης, φιλανθρωπία ,
and other qualities cherished by Second Sophistic authors that they earn
recognition and acclaim4 .
1 Cf. T. E. D, 1999, pp. 287-309; R. P, 2001, pp. 97-109; S. G, 2002, pp.
254-71; G. R, 2004, pp. 255-64; also G. D'I, 2005, pp. 182-6; M. A. O. S,
2007.
2 Rather the protagonists are treated as equals, as can be seen most clearly in the synkriseis .
Cf. T. E. D, 1999, pp. 257-62, who argues that this is meant to focus the reader's attention
on the moral issues involved. Also note J. B, 1994, pp. 62-9; idem, 2000, who thinks
of a cultural programme.
3 In particular, this applies to their Hellenic education. Cf. C. B. R. P, 1989; S. S,
1990; also idem, 1996, pp. 139-144; further L. A. G M, 1995, pp. 136-47; idem,
2002.
4 On Plutarch's use of these concepts cf. H. M. M J., 1960; idem, 1961; C.
P, 1977, pp. 216-22; J. R, 1979, pp. 275-307; F. F, 1996, pp.
231-9.
e Lives of Flamininus and Aemilius Paullus may be particularly relevant
in this respect since the two protagonists were not only benefactors but also
conquerors of Greece5 . Both of them are commonly viewed as exponents of
philhellenism, yet it is perfectly clear that this concept cannot be separated from
the parameters of Roman power, public relations, and political manoeuvring6 .
In the case of Aemilius Paullus, it is surely signicant that the sources place at
least as much emphasis on his devotion to mos maiorum as on his admiration
for Greece, but the actions of Flamininus, too, must be understood primarily
with reference to the pursuit of glory, honour, and dignity in the competitive
culture of Republican Rome7 .
is less romantic perspective is by no means absent from Plutarch's
biographical portraits. However, the two statesmen's commitment to Roman
values and the armation of Roman power is not viewed as a serious
limitation on their philhellenic inclinations and policies. In the Flamininus ,
the two spheres are to a large extent structurally separated: while political
machinations do play a certain rôle in the account of the general's command
in Greece (Flam. 7.1-3; 13.1-4), they are clearly secondary to the focus on
Flamininus' 'Hellenic' qualities and his φιλοτιμία to confer benefactions (12
and passim). Later on, his return to Rome marks the beginning of excessive,
unreasonable, and untimely ambition both in destructive conicts with his
peers and in the relentless hunt for Hannibal (18.3-21.14)8 . Consequently,
Plutarch's overall judgement of the 'liberator' of Greece is by no means wholly
attering or uncritical9 , but this does not diminish his generous praise for the
protagonist's philhellenism.
Contrary to the biographer's usual practice of ascribing both positive
and negative qualities to his heroes, the Life of Aemilius provides an
exceptionally favourable portrait of the victor of Pydna, which Alberto
Barzanò has even called a piece of "pagan hagiography"10 . Above all, the
protagonist is depicted as a wise educator of those around him in matters
5 On Plutarch's attitude to the 'liberators' of Greece cf. J. M. B, 2005.
6 On the political dimension of Roman philhellenism cf. esp. J.-L. F, 1988, pp. 96-
117 and passim. Consequently, the impact of 'sentimental' considerations and deference to
Greek culture should not be overestimated. Cf. E. B, 1970, pp. 53-7; E. S. G , 1984,
pp. 267-72; R. M. E, 1999; also N. P, 1974, pp. 105-11.
7 Cf., e.g., H. B, 2005, pp. 368-93; R. P, 2005, pp. 325-42 and passim.
8 On the dual structure of the Life cf. C. B. R. P, 1997, pp. 309-18; also idem, 1989,
pp. 208-14; J. J. W, 1992, pp. 219-21.
9 Cf., e.g., R. F & E. C, 1969, pp. 163 sq.; C. P. Jones, 1971, p. 99; pace J.
M. B, 2005, p. 257 (see following note). Nor is the biographer's assessment consistently
more favourable than that advanced by Polybius. Cf. C. B. R. P, 1997, pp. 299-309. Also
note H. T, 1977, pp. 162-4.
10 Cf. A. B, 1994: "agiograa pagana" (p. 406); also idem, 1996, pp. 97-9. However,
this view is partly based on a misreading of Aem. 1, which Barzanò takes to indicate a deliberate
choice on the part of Plutarch to "eliminare dal suo racconto tutti gli aspetti negativi" (A.
B , 1994, p. 404). For a similar appraisal, cf. W. R, 1988, pp. 97-106. Further note J.
M. B, 2005, p. 257, who suggests that both the Flamininus and the Aemilius "come close
to hagiography".
167
Banquet and Philhellenism in the Lives of Flamininus and Aemilius Paullus
of ancestral customs (Aem. 3.2-7), in political and military affairs (11;
17.4)11 , and as regards the vicissitudes of fortune (26.8-27.6; 36)12 . At
Rome, he admirably succeeds in overcoming the common divide between
Senate and people, acting as a champion of the aristocracy while at the
same time winning the affection of the multitude (38.1sq.; 38.6)13 . Beyond
the capital, too, Aemilius is represented as being held in high esteem even
among his enemies (39.7-9), whereas his order to pillage the cities of
Epirus is excused as being "contrary to his good and kind nature (παρὰ
τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν, ἐπιεικῆ καὶ χρηστὴν οὖσαν)" (30.1)14 . In contrast to the
vile and cowardly figure of Perseus15 , the Roman general thus emerges as
a paradigm of wisdom and excellence.
is paper takes a closer look at two spectacular events that epitomise the
relationship between Flamininus and Aemilius Paullus on the one hand and
the Greek public on the other: the proclamation of liberty at the Isthmian
Games in 196 and the victory celebrations at Amphipolis in 167. In both
cases, Plutarch not only takes the opportunity to stress the Roman statesmen's
'Hellenic' qualities but also chooses to highlight the concomitant admiration
and amazement on the part of the Greeks. Conspicuously, this is expressed in
the context of banquets: while Flamininus' policy of liberation is praised by
dining Greeks, Aemilius excels as the courteous and attentive host of a Greek-
style feast.
In the Life of Flamininus, the account of the celebrated proclamation of
liberty is focused not so much on the protagonist himself as on the historical
signicance of the declaration and the consequent gratitude of the Greeks.
is does not mean that the impact of Flamininus' personality and philhellenic
disposition is lost on the reader. For one thing, the episode is preceded by a
clear statement to the eect that it was the proconsul himself who insisted
on withdrawing the Roman garrisons from the whole of Greece (Flam. 10.1-
11 Also note 31.4-10 on the education of the people by the consular M. Servilius.
12 Cf. S. S, 1989, pp. 323-7; also M. P, 1961, esp. pp. 602-4 and 609 sq. on Plutarch's
elaboration of Aemilius' speeches on τύχη. In addition, note P. D, 1989, pp. 204-9. More
generally, cf. L. L. H, 2005 for Plutarch's Aemilius as a philosopher statesman. However,
also note V. P, 1997, pp. 56-8 on the rejection of passionate impulses as an element of
Aemilius' family tradition.
13 For the antithesis between βουλή and δῆμος in the Roman Lives cf. esp. C. B. R. P,
1986, pp. 165-87/ 2002, pp. 211-25; also L. B, 1992 passim; M. M, 1995, esp. pp.
264-8; K. S-J, 2000, pp. 66-9.
14 On Aemilius' harshness and cruelty towards (some of) the Greeks cf. R. V,
1972, pp. 87-9; A. B, 1994, pp. 417-9; , 1996, pp. 110-2. Also note the emphatic
statement in W. R, 1988, pp. 141 sq.: "amidst the ruins of seventy cities and one hundred
and fty thousand lives, there is no room for the image of Aemilius as a man of benevolence and
humanity". For a balanced assessment, cf. J.-L. F, 1988, pp. 547-53.
15 Cf. R. S, 2004/05 with references. Citing the prominence of the Macedonian king,
A. B, 1994, pp. 405 sq.; , 1996, pp. 87-90 argues that Aemilius is not even the real
protagonist of the Life, but this goes too far. On the elaboration of the theme in the historical
tradition beyond Plutarch cf. G. L, 2003.
3)16 . For another, Plutarch subsequently resumes the narrative by praising
Flamininus' actions as being consonant with the pledges made at Corinth
(Flam . 12.1).
As for the event of the proclamation itself, the protagonist is mainly
viewed and characterised through the eyes of the Greek audience17 . Thus,
the assembled multitude is described as watching the athletic contests, as
listening to the words of the herald, and as reacting first with tumultuous
confusion and then with a vocal outburst of joy, extolling Flamininus
as "the saviour and champion of Greece (τὸν σωτῆρα τῆς Ἑλλάδος
καὶ πρόμαχον)" ( Flam . 10.4-7). While the Roman statesman himself
is reported to have retired from the scene, the Greeks are said to have
gathered together, shouting about Flamininus' tent until nightfall (Flam .
11.1sq.).
Up to this point, Plutarch's narrative is broadly in agreement with
Polybius, who similarly focuses on the expectations and reactions of the
crowd before, during, and after the proclamation (Plb. 18 F46.1-12). In
his account, which is likely to be Plutarch's main source, this leads on to
a number of authorial reflexions on the wider significance of the episode
and on the generosity of Flamininus and the Romans (18 F46.13-15).
Livy, too, describes the event primarily from the perspective of the Greek
audience, though he also makes an observation regarding the joy of the
young Flamininus at reaping the concomitant reward of gloria (Liv.
33.32.3-33.3). Moreover, he relates that expressions of gratitude continued
for many days, and goes on to depict the Greeks as praising Rome's
commitment to the promotion of justice, right, and law (33.33.4-8: ius ,
fas, lex)18 .
What follows in Plutarch is something quite different. Having shown
enthusiastic appreciation for Flamininus, the multitude continues its
celebrations in the Greek fashion: "with greetings and embraces for any
friends and fellow citizens whom they saw, they turned around to eat and
drink with one another. And here, their pleasure naturally increasing, it
occurred to them to reason and discourse (λογίζεσθαι καὶ διαλέγεσθαι )
about Greece" (Flam. 11.2sq.). The event is thus characterised as a
spontaneous feast involving an exchange of thoughts and ideas. Significantly,
this is an entirely Greek activity, in which the Romans merely figure as
objects of reflexion and evaluation. This perspective is further reinforced
16 Cf. the fuller accounts in Plb. 18 F45.7-12; Liv. 33.31.7-11. In actual fact, this may be
quite misleading. Cf. R. P, 2005, pp. 285-302, who suggests that the discrepancies
between the policies favoured by Flamininus and the senatorial commission, respectively, were
rather minor. By contrast, the personal factor is stressed by A. M. E, 1987, pp. 294-302;
J. J. W, 1996, pp. 355-8.
17 On the various functions of public opinion in Plutarch's biographical technique cf.
generally F. F, 1996, pp. 110-24.
18 E. M. C, 1988, pp. 231 suggests that Livy is here "inuenced by an annalistic
tradition in which the treachery of the allies was given greater emphasis, and Flamininus, for
his futile crusade, was held to blame". is may or may not be true.
169
Banquet and Philhellenism in the Lives of Flamininus and Aemilius Paullus
at the beginning of the next chapter, which concludes the deliberations
of the Greeks while at the same time shifting the narrative focus to the
subsequent actions of Flamininus (Flam. 12.1).
In the actual debate about the meaning of the proclamation, the name
of the proconsul is conspicuous by its absence. In fact, the whole discussion
is concerned with the general characteristics of Greece and Rome rather than
with the virtues of any individual leader19 . To be sure, Flamininus is on the
reader's mind when Plutarch mentions a number of outstanding generals from
Greek history as exemplars of valour and wisdom (ἀνδρεία καὶ φρόνησις) who
fell short of the ideal of the just man (ὁ δίκαιος , Flam. 11.4-6). By implication,
the Roman politician is thus judged to be superior to statesmen as eminent
as Agesilaus, Lysander, Nicias, and Alcibiades, and his achievements stand
comparison with the great victories over the Persians in the rst half of the
fth century.
Notwithstanding, the main point of the considerations ascribed
to the participants in the banquet is a history lesson about Greece and
Rome. Instead of achieving freedom on their own, the Greeks are said to
have fought most of their battles to bring servitude (ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ) upon
themselves, chiefly due to the baseness and contentiousness (κακίᾳ καὶ
φιλονικίᾳ) of their leaders (Flam. 11.6). This observation is all the more
instructive as φιλονικία is the central characteristic of Flamininus' pair
Philopoemen, "the last of the Greeks" (Phil. 1.7)20 . Owing to this lack of
common purpose, the liberation of Greece is seen as depending on the
intervention of foreigners who would undergo the greatest dangers and
hardships in order to set her free from the harshest and most tyrannical
despots (Flam. 11.7). Thus, the Greek admirers of Flamininus and the
Romans take a remarkably negative view of the whole of Greek history21 ,
though Plutarch's readers may well be expected to remember at this point
that Rome herself was later to be torn apart by war and civil strife22 .
Evidently, this is not merely a point about the past. In his political
writings, Plutarch insists that bickering, rivalry, and excessive ambition
ought to be avoided at a time when concord and consensus appear to serve
the interests of the Greek poleis and the local aristocracy under the Roman
Empire23 . As Christopher Pelling has pointed out, he is much more reluctant
19 is point has also been made regarding the pair as a whole. Cf. C. B. R. P, 1997,
pp. 148-53 and 254-258; also J. J. W, 1992, pp. 212-8.
20 Cf. Phil. 3.1; 17.7; Flam. 22.4; 22.7, with the analysis in C. B. R. P, 1997, pp. 129-
35; also J. J. W, 1992, pp. 209-12. Both studies emphasise the relevance of the theme to the
pair, on which cf. further C. B. R. P, 1986a, pp. 84-9/ 2002, pp. 350-3. However, also note
S. S, 1988, pp. 343-5, who stresses the similarity between Philopoemen's φιλονικία and
Flamininus' φιλοτιμία, concluding with regard to Flam. 11.6 that "it is unlikely that Plutarch is
here stigmatizing Philopoemen" (p. 345).
21 Cf. E. G, 2004, p. 313: "un ragionamento che è di fatto una visione del tutto negativa,
o almeno fortemente restrittiva, dell'intiera storia greca classica e dei suoi protagonisti".
22 I am grateful to Philip Stadter for suggesting this reading to me.
23 Cf. esp. Mor. 814e-825f (Praecepta gerendae rei publicae), with the discussions in P.
in the Lives, most notably in the Philopoemen – Flamininus, to spell out moral
lessons for his own present24 . Undoubtedly, the contemporary resonance
matters, yet much is left to the reader's interpretation25 . Interestingly,
the following chapter of the Flamininus draws a comparison with Nero's
proclamation of liberty in 67 A.D. (Flam. 12.13), which plainly made a
strong impression on the Greeks of Plutarch's generation. is reference
is preceded by some considerations regarding the appeal of the Romans
and the rapid growth of their power, to which everything became subject
in the end (Flam. 12.8-10). As for Flamininus himself, however, it is not
the subjection but the liberation of Greece which the biographer chooses
to underscore, citing the proud inscriptions recording his dedications at
Delphi (Flam. 12.11sq.)26 .
While these nal remarks do not alter the fact that Plutarch's treatment
of the Isthmian Proclamation is primarily concerned with Greece and
with Greek perceptions of Rome, it would obviously be wrong to conclude
that the episode is only marginally relevant to the portrait of Flamininus.
For one thing, the proconsul is ennobled by the emotional response of
the Greek audience and by the favourable comparison with some of the
greatest generals of Greek history. For another, the reexions voiced in the
course of the banquet serve to characterise him as a just man and generous
benefactor. What is more, his subsequent actions closely match the hopes and
expectations of the Greeks as he endeavours to establish among them good
order, great justice, concord, and mutual friendliness (Flam. 12.6: εὐνομίαν
ἅμα καὶ δίκην πολλὴν ὁμόνοιάν τε καὶ φιλοφροσύνην πρὸς ἀλλήλους.)27 .
Beyond these political benefactions, Flamininus is also reported to have
performed the rôle of ἀγωνοθέτης for the Nemean Games (Flam. 12.5),
where liberty was proclaimed to the Argives28 .
is latter aspect of the protagonist's active involvement in the organisation
of spectacles emerges much more prominently in the second passage to be
discussed in the present paper. In the wake of his victory at Pydna, Aemilius
Paullus, too, is described as a benefactor of the Greeks, whose perspective is
again highly relevant to the evaluation of a Roman general's actions. Unlike in
the account of the Isthmian Proclamation, however, the biographer's focus is
mainly on the proconsul himself and on Roman behaviour in front of a Greek
audience.
D, 1986; S. S, 1996, pp. 161-86.
24 Cf. C. B. R. P, 1995, esp. pp. 213-7/ 2002, pp. 243-7.
25 us, P. D, 1998, pp. 934 sq. suggests that the Flamininus serves to express the
idea of a "consortium imperii", in which the Greeks provide "una legittimazione del dominio
romano ... in cambio di un privilegio di libertà, anche se non illimitata" (p. 935).
26 e distinction between Rome and Flamininus is heavily stressed by S. S, 1988, pp.
342 sq.; idem, 1996, pp. 148 sq.
27 Cf. also Liv. 34.48.2 and Flamininus' advice to the Greeks at 34.49.9sq.
28 Cf. Liv. 34.41.1-3. Plutarch decontextualises the event and misleadingly suggests that
liberty was once more proclaimed to the whole of Greece. Cf. C. B. R. P, 1997, pp. 384
sq., n. 116.
171
Banquet and Philhellenism in the Lives of Flamininus and Aemilius Paullus
Following the surrender of Perseus, Aemilius embarked on an extensive tour
of Greece, which Plutarch mainly describes in terms of his hero's philhellenism
and benefactions (Aem. 28.1-5). Having praised the commander's conduct as
honourable and humane (ἔνδοξον ἅμα καὶ φιλάνθρωπον), the biographer goes
on to record that Aemilius restored political order, oered gifts from the king's
stores, and expressed admiration for the Zeus sculpted by Phidias. Apart from
this, Plutarch does not fail to mention the general's order to put his own statue
on the great monument that was meant to honour Perseus at Delphi (Aem .
28.4)29 . is demonstration of power as well as Aemilius' interventions in the
aairs of the Greek states unmistakably indicate that the trip was not merely
a sightseeing tour designed to pay homage to Hellas30 . As Ulrich Eigler has
convincingly argued, Livy actually describes the journey as an act of Roman
dominance over Greek culture (Liv. 45.27.5-28.6)31 . By contrast, the emphasis
in Plutarch's narrative is clearly on the protagonist's φιλανθρωπία rather than
on the expression of Roman supremacy.
Subsequently, even the harsh conditions imposed on the defeated
Macedonians are interpreted as generous benefactions; for the biographer
stresses that the former subjects of Perseus received liberty and independence,
with their nancial burden being less than half the amount due to the
Antigonid kings (Aem. 28.6)32 . Prior to his departure, moreover, Aemilius is
depicted as wisely exhorting them to preserve their freedom by good order
and concord (Aem. 29.1: δι' εὐνομίας καὶ ὁμονοίας). As emerges from Livy's
account, the announcement of the terms regarding the future of Macedon
formed part of the lavish victory celebrations at Amphipolis (Liv. 45.29-33)33 ,
which Plutarch essentially reads as a delightful event organised by the Roman
general to please his Greek guests34 .
us, the biographer relates that Aemilius "held spectacles of all sorts
of contests and performed sacrices to the gods, at which he gave feasts and
banquets, making use of abundant supplies from the royal stores, while in the
arrangement and ordering of them, in seating and greeting his guests, and
in paying to each one honour and friendliness (τιμῆς καὶ φιλοφροσύνης )
according to their dignity (κατ ' ἀξίαν), he showed such accurate and
29 Cf. L.-M. G, 1995, who reads this act as a "machtbewußte Siegerpose, keine
sympathieheischende Geste philhellener 'paideia'" (p. 84).
30 is point should not be overstated, however. Cf., e.g., the categorical statement in E.
F, 2000, p. 138: "Mit Philhellenismus hatte das nichts zu tun", which may be contrasted
with J.-L. F, 1988, pp. 554-60, who speaks of "une véritable oensive de charme" (p.
556), as well as with E. S. G, 1992, p. 246. Further note P. B, 1974/75 (1979), pp.
167 sq., who suggests that Aemilius chiey sought to acquire foreign clientelae.
31 Cf. U. E, 2003: Livy "inszeniert vielmehr die Tour als einen Akt ideeller
Besitzergreifung Griechenlands" (p. 262).
32 Cf. the more detailed and similarly apologetic treatment in Liv. 45. 29.4-30.8 and 32.1-7,
which serves to celebrate the just order established by Rome. Also note D. S. 31 F8.1-9.
33 On Amphipolis as a place on Livy's 'mental map' of the Roman Empire cf. U. E-
G, 2006, pp. 49-51.
34 According to C. L, 1935, p. 223, Plutarch's failure to identify the locality
indicates that his version is based on the work of a compiler, but this is not cogent.
thoughtful perception that the Greeks were amazed (θαυμάζειν), seeing that
not even their pastimes were treated by him with neglect, but that a man
involved in such great aairs gave even to small things their due attention"
(Aem . 28.7sq.).
Just as in the case of the Isthmian Proclamation, it is conspicuous that
Plutarch views the event through the eyes of the Greeks present on the
occasion. Not only are the guests amazed at Aemilius' organisational skills,
but their reactions are also thought to show that the Roman general himself
provides them with the most pleasant enjoyment and spectacle (Aem. 28.9).
While these remarks evidently serve to eulogise the proconsul, it should also
be noted that the quality the Greeks admire most of all is his extraordinary
attention to detail – a trait that the biographer has earlier associated with his
hero's concern for ancestral customs and ceremonies at Rome (Aem. 3.2-7).
Accordingly, Aemilius appears successfully to apply skills developed in a
Roman context to impress a Greek audience. is point is actually reinforced
by his dictum that the same spirit is required to do well both in marshalling a
line of battle and in presiding at a symposium (Aem. 28.9).
While Plutarch fails to elaborate on this statement, which corresponds
to a Polybian fragment (Plb. 30 F14)35 , the laudatory context clearly suggests
that it signals the biographer's approval of the carefully arranged order of the
banquet36 . However, it may be more appropriate to read Aemilius' comment
not simply as a witty bon mot, let alone as an innocent remark regarding an
enjoyable festival, but as a reminder of Roman supremacy in the military
sphere and beyond37 . Signicantly, a much less harmonious picture of the
victory celebrations emerges from the more comprehensive account given by
Livy, who represents the event primarily as a show of Roman maiestas and
power38 . us he describes the setting of the ceremony as frightening to the
audience (Liv. 45.29.2: novi in<perii> formam terribilem praebuit tribunal), and
stresses that Aemilius chose to announce the decisions of the Senate in Latin
before having them translated into Greek (45.29.3)39 .
35 Cf. also Liv. 45.32.11; further D. S. 31 F8.13. According to F. W. W, 1979, p.
437, Polybius thus intends "to point the contrast with the victory games given by L. Anicius" at
Rome, which are judged by him to have been disorderly and utterly uncivilised (Plb. 30 F22).
is may be true but hardly constitutes the sole function of the statement.
36 Cf. G. P, 1991, p. 160. Also note Plu., Mor. 198b (Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata);
615e-f (Quaestiones convivales).
37 Pace R. F E. C, 1966, p. 69, who call it a "boutade". Further note C.
L, 1935, p. 236: Aemilius "wil als het ware een tweede Achilles zijn, die behalve een
verwoed strijder de organisator was van de grootse lijkspelen ter ere van Patroclus".
38 Cf., e.g., E. S. G, 1992, pp. 245-7. E. F, 2000, pp. 139 sq. puts it more crudely:
"Die Feier von Amphipolis war ein römisches Spektakel, eingerahmt von römischer politischer
Symbolik, welche die Griechen und ihre Athleten zu Statisten degradierte" (p. 139). A dierent
perspective is provided by J.- L. F, 1988, pp. 560-5; J. C. E, 1999, pp. 78-81
and passim, who both stress the importance of Hellenistic precedents and parallels.
39 Cf. Plu., Cat. Ma. 12.5-7 on Cato's speech to the Athenians in 191. Also note V. Max.
2.2.2. J. K, 1979, p. 100 suggests that Aemilius' choice was made with a view to producing
a "dramatic eect".
173
Banquet and Philhellenism in the Lives of Flamininus and Aemilius Paullus
What is more, Livy highlights Roman interference in the internal aairs
of the Greek polities and records the severe punishment of those who had
actually or supposedly been aligned with the losing side in the war (45.31). As
for the ensuing festival, the admiration of the Greeks is related not so much
to Aemilius as to the Romans in general, who were then inexperienced (rudes)
in giving spectacles (45.32.10). Consequently, it appears as though a Roman
proconsul can outdo the Greeks even in organising Greek-style games and
banquets – if he so chooses40 . While Livy does not fail to mention the gifts
handed out to the participants from the royal stores, it is quite revealing that
the event is concluded by the dedication of spoils from the enemy and by the
display of the booty to be carried o to Rome (45.33.1-7). us, the celebrations
of Amphipolis are presented to the reader as an eloquent manifestation of the
Roman conquest of Greece.
Evidently, this interpretation is rather dierent from Plutarch's version.
Instead of exploring the implications of the event in terms of Roman power,
the biographer's narrative goes on to highlight Aemilius' ἐλευθεριότης and
μεγαλοψυχία as evidenced by his supposed disinterest in the gold and silver
of the royal treasuries (Aem. 28.10)41 . At the same time, Plutarch obviously
approves of his hero's decision to appropriate Perseus' library as an invaluable
resource of Greek learning for the benet of his sons (Aem. 28.11) 42 . Howe ver,
it should not be overlooked that the king's books were undoubtedly of great
material and symbolic value as items of booty43 . What Plutarch reads as
enthusiasm for Greek erudition appears simultaneously to reect a selective
and power-conscious approach in claiming and using objects of Hellenic
culture44 . e analysis of the victory celebrations of 167 thus leads back to
the issues raised at the beginning of this paper regarding the interrelation
between philhellenism and the pursuit of individual and collective interests by
the representatives of Rome.
In the Plutarchan accounts of the Isthmian Proclamation and the festival
at Amphipolis, there is a deliberate, though hardly surprising, emphasis on
'Hellenic' qualities and benefactions to Greece. In the case of Flamininus and
the declaration of 196, it has been seen that the focus is on Greece and Greek
history rather than on the protagonist himself, yet Plutarch's narrative also
serves to praise the proconsul's justice as being equal or superior to that of
40 Cf. U. E-G, 2006, p. 52 with further considerations.
41 For the theme of Aemilius' poverty and indierence to wealth cf. also Aem. 4.4sq.; 39.10;
Tim. 41.8; Mor. 198b-c ( Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata) as well as Plb. 18 F35.4-6; 31
F22.1-7; Liv. Per. 46.14; D. S. 31 F26.1 sq.; D. C. 20 F67.1; Zonar. 9.24.4; Cic., O. 2.76;
Orat. 232; V. Max. 4.3.8; Vir . ill. 56.6. Cf. I. S, 1975, pp. 243 sq. for an estimate of his
property.
42 Cf. also Isid., Etym. 6.5.1.
43 us, rightly, A. B, 1994, p. 413; idem, 1996, pp. 106 and 218, n. 181.
44 Hence the often stressed dierence between Aemilius' outlook and that of Cato (cf., e.g.,
J.-L. F, 1988, pp. 535-9) may not be all that great. On the meaning and limitations of
Cato's anti-Hellenism cf. D. K, 1954, pp. 101-16; A. E. A, 1978, pp. 157-81; E. S.
G, 1992, pp. 52-83; H.-J. G, 1994, pp. 599-607; M. J, 1999.
the most eminent statesmen of the Greek past. By contrast, the biographer's
treatment of the victory celebrations after Pydna is mainly concentrated on
Aemilius Paullus' courteous behaviour and outstanding skills in entertaining
his guests. What both episodes have in common is not only the context of
feasts and spectacles, but also the crucial rôle assigned to the Greek audience
and its expressions of admiration and amazement. Consequently, the two
Roman statesmen are judged with reference to Greek values, on the basis of
their attitude to Greece, and according to their ability to impress the Greek
public. Greek-style festivals and the world of the banquet thus provide a most
suitable background for presenting the 'liberators' of Greece as exemplars of
philhellenism and φιλανθρωπία 45.
W o r k s c i T e d
A, A. E., Cato the Censor, Oxford, 1978.
B, E., Titus Quinctius Flamininus. Philhellenism and Realpolitik ,
Cincinnati/Ohio, 1970.
B, A., "Biograa pagana come agiograa. Il caso della vita plutarchea
di Lucio Emilio Paolo", RIL, 128 (1994) 403-24.
_____"Introduzione" (Emilio Paolo), in . (eds.), Plutarco: Vite
parallele. Emilio Paolo – Timoleonte, Milano, 1996, pp. 87-116.
B, H., Karriere und Hierarchie. Die römische Aristokratie und die Anfänge des
cursus honorum in der mittleren Republik, Berlin, 2005.
B, P., "Alcune questioni sulla carriera politica di L. Emilio Paolo",
Index, 5 (1974/75 [1979]) 155-78.
B, J., Plutarque. Un aristocrate grec sous l'occupation romaine, Villeneuve
d'Ascq, 1994.
_____"Les ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΕΙΣ de Plutarque. Une rhétorique de la ΣΥΝΚΡΑΣΙΣ [!]",
in L. V S (ed.), Rhetorical eory and Praxis in Plutarch.
Acta of the IVth International Congress of the International Plutarch
Society, Leuven, 2000, pp. 33-44.
B, J. M., "Plutarch and the 'Liberation of Greece'", in L. D B
. (eds.), e Statesman in Plutarch's Works. Proceedings of the Sixth
International Conference of the International Plutarch Society, vol. 2:
e Statesman in Plutarch's Greek and Roman Lives (Nijmegen/ Castle
Hernen, May 1-5, 2002), Leiden, 2005, pp. 257-67.
45 For their paradigmatic function cf., e.g., Plu., Sull. 12, where their philhellenic benefactions
are favourably contrasted with the cynical policies pursued by Sulla. I am grateful to Lukas de
Blois for pointing out to me the signicance of this passage.
175
Banquet and Philhellenism in the Lives of Flamininus and Aemilius Paullus
C, E. M., "Graecia Liberata and the Role of Flamininus in Livy's
Fourth Decade", TAPhA, 118 (1988) 209-52.
D B, L., "e Perception of Politics in Plutarch's Roman 'Lives'", ANRW,
2.33.6 (1992) 4568-615.
D R, J., La douceur dans la pensée grecque, Paris, 1979.
D, P., "La vita politica cittadina nell'Impero. Lettura dei Praecepta
gerendae rei publicae e dell'An seni res publica gerenda sit", Athenaeum, 64
(1986) 371-81.
_____"Teoria e prassi storiograca di Plutarco. Una proposta di lettura della
coppia Emilio Paolo – Timoleonte", Maia, 41 (1989) 199-215.
_____"L'Impero bilingue e il parallelismo greci/romani", in S. S
(ed.), I greci. Storia – cultura – arte – società, vol. 2.3: Una storia greca.
Trasformazioni, Torino, 1998, pp. 909-38.
D L, G., "Tra Polibio e Livio. Diodoro e la presunta avarizia di Perseo", in
D. A (ed.), ΣΥΓΓΡΑΦΗ. Materiali e appunti per lo studio della
storia e della letteratura antica, vol. 5, Como, 2003, pp. 89-105.
D'I, G., "Filantropia, ellenocentrismo e polietnismo in Plutarco", in
A. P J & F. T (eds.), Historical and Biographical
Values of Plutarch's Works. Studies Devoted to Professor Philip A. Stadter by
the International Plutarch Society, Málaga, 2005, pp. 179-96.
D, T. E., Plutarch's Lives. Exploring Virtue and Vice, Oxford, 1999.
E, A. M., Senate and General. Individual Decision Making and Roman
Foreign Relations, 264-194 B.C., Berkeley/Cal., 1987.
E, J. C., "e Cultural Politics of Public Spectacle in Rome and the
Greek East, 167-166 BCE", in B. B & C. K (eds.),
e Art of Ancient Spectacle, Washington, D.C., 1999, pp. 77-95.
E-G, U., "Der triumphierende Leser. Die Siegesfeier von
Amphipolis in der Geschichtserzählung des Livius", in D. E
O . (eds.), Texte als Medium und Reexion von Religion
im römischen Reich, Stuttgart, 2006, pp. 41-61.
E, U., "Aemilius Paullus. Ein Feldherr auf Bildungsreise? (Liv. 45, 27-
28)", in . (eds.), Formen römischer Geschichtsschreibung von den
Anfängen bis Livius. Gattungen – Autoren – Kontexte, Darmstadt, 2003,
pp. 250-67.
E, R. M., "Philhellenismus und praktische Politik", in G. V-
S B. R (eds.), Rezeption und Identität. Die kulturelle
Auseinandersetzung Roms mit Griechenland als europäisches Paradigma,
Stuttgart, 1999, pp. 149-54.
F, J.-L., Philhellénisme et impérialisme. Aspects idéologiques de la conquête
romaine du monde hellénistique. De la seconde guerre de Macédoine à la
guerre contre Mithridate, Rome, 1988.
F, R. & C, E., "Vie de Paul-Emile. Notice", in (eds.),
Plutarque: Vies, vol. 4, Paris, 1966, pp. 59-71.
_____"Vie de Flamininus. Notice", in (eds.), Plutarque: Vies, vol. 5,
Paris, 1969, pp. 159-73.
F, E., "Lucius Aemilius Paullus – militärischer Ruhm und familiäre
Glücklosigkeit", in K.-J. H & E. S-H
(eds.), Von Romulus zu Augustus. Große Gestalten der römischen Republik ,
München, 2000, pp. 131-46.
F, F., Histoire et morale dans les Vies parallèles de Plutarque, Paris, 1996.
G, E., "Plutarco e Polibio", in I. G (ed.), La biblioteca di Plutarco. Atti
del IX Convegno plutarcheo, Napoli, 2004, pp. 311-6.
G M, L. A., "Roma y los protagonistas de la dominación romana
en Grecia en las Vidas paralelas de Plutarco", in E. F F. G
(eds.), Graecia capta . De la conquista de Grecia a la helenización de Roma ,
Huelva, 1995, pp. 129-47.
_____"Filohelenismo y moderación. Garantías según Plutarco de una dominación
estable del mundo griego por Roma", in J. R. F (ed.), Actas do
Congresso Plutarco Educador da Europa, Porto, 2002, pp. 261-80.
G, H.-J., "Römischer mos und griechische Ethik. Überlegungen zum
Zusammenhang von Akkulturation und politischer Ordnung im
Hellenismus", HZ, 258 (1994) 593-622.
G, S., Who Needs Greek? Contests in the Cultural History of Hellenism ,
Cambridge, 2002.
G, E. S., e Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome, 2 vols., Berkeley/
Cal., 1984.
_____Culture and National Identity in Republican Rome , Ithaca/N.Y., 1992.
G, L.-M., "L. Aemilius Paullus und 'sein' Pfeilerdenkmal in Delphi",
in C. S & K. B (eds.), Rom und der griechische Osten.
Festschrift für Hatto H. Schmitt zum 65. Geburtstag, Stuttgart, 1995, pp.
81-5.
H, L. L., "Plutarch's Aemilius Paullus and the Model of the Philosopher
Statesman", in L. D B . (eds.), e Statesman in Plutarch's
Works. Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference of the
International Plutarch Society, vol. 2: e Statesman in Plutarch's Greek
and Roman Lives (Nijmegen/ Castle Hernen, May 1-5, 2002), Leiden,
2005, pp. 269-79.
177
Banquet and Philhellenism in the Lives of Flamininus and Aemilius Paullus
J, M., "Cato und die Bewahrung der traditionellen res publica. Zum
Spannungsverhältnis zwischen mos maiorum und griechischer Kultur
im zweiten Jahrhundert v.Chr.", in G. V-S B. R
(eds.), Rezeption und Identität. Die kulturelle Auseinandersetzung Roms
mit Griechenland als europäisches Paradigma, Stuttgart, 1999, pp. 115-
34.
J, C. P., Plutarch and Rome, Oxford, 1971.
K, J., e Romans and the Greek Language, Helsinki, 1979.
K, D., Cato, der Zensor. Seine Persönlichkeit und seine Zeit, Heidelberg,
1954 (repr. Darmstadt, 1979).
L, C., Plutarchus' biographie van Aemilius Paullus. Historische
commentaar, Utrecht, 1935.
M J., H. M., "e Concept of Praotes in Plutarch's Lives", GRBS, 3
(1960) 65-73.
_____"e Concept of Philanthropia in Plutarch's Lives", AJPh, 82 (1961)
164-75.
M, M., "Plutarco e la politica romana. Alcune riconsiderazioni", in
I. G B. S (eds.), Teoria e prassi politica nelle opere di
Plutarco. Atti del V Convegno plutarcheo, Napoli, 1995, pp. 245-68.
P, C., "Vocabulaire et mentalité dans les Moralia de Plutarque",
DHA, 3 (1977) 197-235.
P, G., "Symposia and Deipna in Plutarch's Lives and in Other Historical
Writings", in W. J. S (ed.), Dining in a Classical Context, Ann
Arbor/Mich., 1991, pp. 157-69.
P , M., "Due discorsi di Lucio Emilio Paolo", StudRom, 9 (1961) 593-
613.
P, C. B. R. , "Plutarch and Roman Politics", in I. S. M .
(eds.), Past Perspectives. Studies in Greek and Roman Historical Writing ,
Cambridge, 1986, pp. 159-87 (in C. B. R. P, 2002, pp. 207-36).
_____"Synkrisis in Plutarch's Lives", in F. E. B I. G (eds.),
Miscellanea plutarchea. Atti del I Convegno di studi su Plutarco, Ferrara,
1986a, pp. 83-96 (in C. B. R. P, 2002, pp. 349-63).
_____"Plutarch: Roman Heroes and Greek Culture", in M. G J.
B (eds.), Philosophia togata. Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society,
Oxford, 1989, pp. 199-232.
_____"e Moralism of Plutarch's Lives", in D. I . (eds.), Ethics and
Rhetoric. Classical Essays for Donald Russell on His Seventy-Fifth Birthday,
Oxford, 1995, pp. 205-220 (in C. B. R. P, 2002, pp. 237-51).
_____"Introduzione" (Filopemene, Tito Flaminino), in E . M
(eds.), Plutarco: Vite parallele. Filopemene – Tito Flaminino, Milano, 1997,
pp. 87-166, pp. 249-331.
_____ Plutarch and History. Eighteen Studies, London, 2002.
P, N., Roman Attitudes to the Greeks, Athens, 1974.
P, V., "Deux gures héroïques de l'Histoire romaine de Tite-Live. Paul-
Emile père et ls", in G. F & L. P (eds.), Du héros
païen au saint chrétien, Paris, 1997, pp. 53-60.
P, R., Titus Quinctius Flamininus. Untersuchungen zur römischen
Griechenlandpolitik, Göttingen, 2005.
P, R., "Roman Questions, Greek Answers. Plutarch and the
Construction of Identity", in S. G (ed.), Being Greek under
Rome. Cultural Identity, the Second Sophistic and the Development of
Empire, Cambridge, 2001, pp. 86-119.
R, W., Aemilius Paullus. Conqueror of Greece, London, 1988.
R, G., "Plutarch on Self and Others", AncSoc, 34 (2004) 245-73.
S, R., "Perseo, ultimo sovrano di Macedonia, nella biograa plutarchea
di Emilio Paolo", ACD, 40/41 (2004/05) 55-64.
S, I., Senatorial Wealth and Roman Politics, Bruxelles, 1975.
S, M. A. O., "L'identità greca in Plutarco", in J. M. N I
R. L L (eds.), El amor en Plutarco, Actas del IX Simposio
español sobre Plutarco (28-30 de septiembre de 2006), León, 2007, pp.
839-46.
S-J, K., Von der Republik zum Prinzipat. Ursachen für den
Verfassungswechsel in Rom im historischen Denken der Antike, Stuttgart,
2000.
S, S., "Plutarch's Philopoemen and Flamininus", ICS, 13 (1988) 335-47.
_____"Plutarch's Aemilius and Timoleon", Historia , 38 (1989) 314-34.
_____"Hellenic Culture and the Roman Heroes of Plutarch", JHS, 110 (1990)
126-45.
_____ Hellenism and Empire. Language, Classicism, and Power in the Greek
World, A.D. 50-250, Oxford, 1996.
T, H., Livius und Polybios, Basel, 1977.
V, R., "Carattere e tendenza della tradizione su L. Emilio Paolo", in M.
S (ed.), Contributi dell'Istituto di storia antica, vol. 1, Milano, 1972,
pp. 78-90.
179
Banquet and Philhellenism in the Lives of Flamininus and Aemilius Paullus
W, F. W., A Historical Commentary on Polybius, vol. 3: Commentary on
Books XIX-XL, Oxford, 1979.
W, J. J., "Syzygy, eme and History. A Study in Plutarch's Philopoemen
and Flamininus", Philologus, 136 (1992) 208-33.
_____"Flamininus and the Propaganda of Liberation", Historia, 45 (1996)
344-63.
181
Crassus as Symposiast in Plutarch's Life of Crassus
cr a s s u s a s s y m p o s i a s T i n pl u T a r c h 's li f e o f cr a S S u S
J T. C
University of Manitoba, Winnipeg
Abstract
e references to Crassus as a host of, and a guest at, dinner parties in the Life of Crassus suggest
a complex persona. ree references appear in the early chapters, followed by the description
of the symposium at the Parthian court at the end of Life. is paper examines these four
passages. It argues that the simplicity of Crassus' repasts are carefully positioned by Plutarch
to contrast sharply Crassus' reputation as Rome's most famous plutocrat, and the debauched
Parthian symposium redeems partially Crassus for his failure as an imperialist.
e Romans say that the many virtues of Crassus
were obscured by the sole vice of desire for wealth;
it is likely that this one vice became stronger,
weakening the others. (2.1)1
is sentence reveals Nicias-Crassus to be a study of how a single negative
character trait can obscure good character traits, and the (very serious)
consequences of such a situation. In the case of Crassus, the vice of avarice
(φιλοπλουτία ) overshadows his many virtues. is is not the opinion of
Plutarch alone, since he reports what his (Roman) sources write. By the time
that Plutarch came to write the Later Roman Lives, avarice had been the
dening historical fact about Crassus for over a century2 .
Closer inspection of the Life of Crassus suggests that Plutarch problematises
his exploration of Crassus' love of wealth through the inclusion of well-placed
references to his moderation with respect to dinner parties. ree references
to Crassus as an abstemious host and guest serve to mediate the discussion of
his apparently insatiable taste (thirst?) for the acquisition of wealth3 . Plutarch
concludes the Life with an extensive description of a dinner party at the
Parthian court, where the debauchery of the Parthians serves to absolve partially
Crassus of his philoploutia and undertaking of the Parthian expedition.
I.
Plutarch frequently comments upon his subject's behaviour at dinner parties in
the early chapters of the Life4 . us in the third chapter one nds the following:
1 Translations are adapted from the Loeb Classical Library.
2 Cicero refers to Crassus' wealth several times: Att. 1.4.3 and 2.4.2; Tusc. 1.13; Div. 2.22;
O. 3.75-76. So too Sallust: Cat. 48.5. See B. A. M, 1976, p. 149; cf. idem, pp. 178-9.
3 E. S. G, 1977, p. 117 summarises Crassus thus: "an enigma indeed: fearsome and
unpredictable, greedy and benecent, ostentatious and temperate, aable and explosive" (italics are
mine).
4 Examples from the Roman Lives include: Sull. 2.2; Cic. 36.3 (there are earlier references
at 3.5 and 8.2 where Plutarch comments upon Cicero's delicate digestion); Pomp. 2.11-12; Cat.
Mi. 6.1.
When he entertained at table, his invited guests were for the most part plebeians
and men of the people, and the simplicity of the repast was combined with a
neatness and good cheer which gave more pleasure than lavish expenditure.
(3.2)
If Plutarch disapproved of Crassus, then this passage is unique in that
the author appears to express approval of one aspect of his subject's character5 .
Symposia comprise three elements: the meal (both food and drink), the guests,
and the conversation or entertainment; Plutarch expeditiously identies all
three in this sentence. Crassus appears to subscribe to the maxim of quality over
quantity: the success of his dinner parties is attributed to the entertainment (i.e.,
intelligent conversation) rather than the amount of food or drink provided6 .
e limited amount of wine ensures that the conversation is not adversely
aected7 . Given the tradition of Crassus as (one of) Rome's wealthiest
citizen(s), the placement of this passage early in the Life establishes Crassus as
a complex persona, since his tremendous wealth, the process by which he came
to acquire it Plutarch begins to describe in the previous chapter (see below, p.
184), does not automatically mean that he enjoys excessive indulgences. at
is, one might expect Plutarch to explain how Crassus became wealthy, then
explore how he uses his wealth for personal prot. Such an approach would
underline eectively Crassus' dominant negative character trait of philoploutia.
Rather, Crassus appears to be the opposite sort of person: he scolds those who
spend money on trivialities, dinner parties included, although his criticism of
others is not contained in this Life8 . His aversion to excessive expenditure
is revealed by his treatment of his philosopher-companion Alexander, who
was given a cloak for travelling only to have to return it upon the journey's
completion (3.8)9 .
e passage above introduces a section in which Plutarch catalogues
Crassus' positive attributes: his desire to be an eective public speaker; his
willingness to plead cases when those presumably more talented than he –
Pompey, Caesar and Cicero – are unwilling to serve as advocate; his warm
greeting towards those he meets in public, especially plebeians; and his strong
interest in history and philosophy (3.3-8). ese attributes extend from, and
feed back into, Crassus' eective execution of his role as symposiarch. e rst
and last of these – his desire to be an eloquent advocate and his historical and
5 F. T, 1999, p. 496.
6 F. T, 1999, p. 496: "a certain panache vis-à-vis banquet arranging was denitely
a mark in someone's favor, but the main attraction in Plutarch's view should be companionship
and conversation".
7 And his guests are not corrupted, as Plutarch writes that Catiline did (Cic. 10.5).
8 Pompey and Crassus criticise Lucullus for his extravagance (Luc. 38.5; Plutarch describes
Lucullus' dinner parties at 41). Both R. F, 1972, p. 302 and M. G. B, 1993,
p. 330 note the sharp dierences between Crassus and Lucullus in this respect.
9 Including an interjection from Plutarch or an indirect quotation from one of his sources:
"Alas the patience of this unfortunate man, for his philosophy did not regard poverty as an
indierent condition".
183
Crassus as Symposiast in Plutarch's Life of Crassus
philosophical predilections – are intellectual pursuits, and the latter reveal the
probable source of the "good cheer" (φιλφροσύμην) for which Crassus' guests
appreciate – and presumably seek out – his company10 .
Crassus' disinclination to host elaborate dinner parties is not a decision he
makes on his own, for, as Plutarch writes in the opening sentence of the Life,
Crassus' paideia shaped his attitudes in this area:
Marcus Crassus was the son of a man who had been censor and had enjoyed a
triumph; but he was reared in a small house with two brothers. His brothers
were married while their parents were still alive, and all shared the same table,
which seems to have been the main reason why Crassus was temperate and
moderate in his manner of life. (1.1-2)
e moderate appetite of Crassus' family is supported by a passage in
Macrobius' Saturnalia (3.17.7-9), which ascribes to Crassus' father a sumptuary
law in his tribunate of 103 BCE. By beginning the Life in this way, Plutarch
implies that his presentation of Crassus may not follow the historical tradition
established by his sources11 . Plutarch immediately establishes Crassus as
someone who eschews unnecessary ostentation, and the tautology "temperate
and moderate" (σώφρων καὶ μέτριος) situates Crassus in an exceptionally
advantageous position upon which he can draw or away from which he can
deviate. By how much he does the former or how quickly he does the latter
determines the nal verdict on Crassus' character.
A very illuminating perspective is oered by a passage which features
Crassus not as a host, but as a guest of Vibius Paciacus in Spain during Crassus'
self-imposed exile under Cinna:
Now, the meals were abundant, and so prepared as to gratify the taste and not
merely to satisfy hunger. For Vibius had made up his mind to pay Crassus
every sort of friendly attention, and it even occurred to him to consider the
young man his guest, and he was quite a young man, and that some provision
be made for the enjoyments appropriate to his years; the mere supply of his
wants he regarded as the work of one who rendered help under compulsion
rather than with ready zeal. (5.2)
Vibius is the attentive host by providing Crassus' needs and anticipating
his desires. Plutarch does not indicate whether Crassus partook of the extra
provisions, gastronomical and otherwise, but one might reasonably expect that
had Crassus refrained from so doing, it would be mentioned here. One might
postulate that Crassus' abstemiousness in this instance would have appeared
inappropriate; that is, while he became a good host, his behaviour as a guest
10 Table-Talk 6.14b indicates that history and contemporary events are appropriate topics
for a dinner party.
11 Pace C. B. R. P, 1979, I do not believe that Pollio (or the Pollio-source) was the
main source for Crassus. In my view, the most likely main source on Crassus available to Plutarch
in this instance was Livy.
was poor. e use of the same word – φιλοφροσύνη 12 – to describe the good
cheer of Crassus' symposia and Vibius' provision of Crassus' needs establishes
a connection between Vibius and Crassus as host. Crassus does not emulate
Vibius in terms of the kind of repast provided, but Vibius remonstrates the
need for being a convivial host. In other words, Vibius exerts a positive
inuence, helping to mould Crassus into the congenial symposiarch for which
he becomes famous. is passage appears as part of the only extended anecdote
in the Life; therefore, the decision to include it strongly suggests that Plutarch
believed it was important to establishing Crassus' character, which in turn
conrms the importance of the previous references to symposia in the Life13 .
II.
e three references to Crassus' as symposiast discussed above are
contained in the rst ve chapters of the Life; that is, they end approximately
one-sixth the way in. And these passages do not stand on their own, but are
surrounded by passages which indicate Crassus' avarice14 . e rst reference
follows directly from Plutarch's opening comments about Crassus' family in
the form of an anecdote of Crassus' suspected involvement with the vestal
Licinia (1.4). Seeking to acquire her substantial home cheaply, Crassus fell
under suspicion of corrupting her. Ironically, Crassus' avarice absolves him
of this serious accusation, that he does not have a more serious aw: deviant
sexual inclinations. Crassus' involvement with Licinia, it ought to be noted,
probably involved entertaining her or being her guest at dinner; it was the
frequency with which this occurred that brought Crassus under suspicion.
e most famous example of Crassus' philoploutia appears in the description
of his acquisition of property in the second chapter, where he takes advantage
of the misfortune of others when he buys homes on re (2.5). is was
clearly something of which Plutarch disapproved, since in the beginning of
the synkrisis (1.1), he declares that the manner through which Nicias became
wealthy was "more blameless" (ἀμεμπτοτέραν). Plutarch notes disapproval of
Crassus for his proscribing someone in order to acquire his property, which he
does without Sulla's permission (6.8). We might identify an additional passage
referring to Crassus as a good symposiarch in the sentence immediately prior,
which might be seen as partially negating the unwarranted proscription, when
Plutarch writes that Crassus on one occasion saves Sulla from military defeat,
an action for which his only request is to ask for dinner for his men (6.7,
δεῖπνον τοῖς στρατιώταις)15 .
12 e word is used for a third time at 12.3 (negated with οὐ μήν) to describe the absence of
friendship or spirit of co-operation between Crassus and Pompey during their rst consulship.
13 T. W. H, 1987, p. 23 calls it "outstanding". e source appears to be Fenestella,
identied by name at 5.6. See B. A. M, 1976, pp. 177-8.
14 See also T. S, 1999, pp. 303-4.
15 Plutarch mentions another large feast at 12.3 and Syn. Nic.-Crass. 1.4 (see below, n. 30),
where Crassus feeds the people (τὸν δῆμον), also providing them with grain for three months.
ese passages do not contradict the impression of Crassus for which I argue in section I. In
both instances, Plutarch makes the point that Crassus provided for a very large number of
185
Crassus as Symposiast in Plutarch's Life of Crassus
e passages identied here are deftly interwoven with the passages
on Crassus as symposiast, and, depending on one's perspective, Crassus'
abstemiousness as symposiast weakens the negative impression of his
philoploutia, or his philoploutia dilutes the positive impression of his moderate
provision and consumption of food and drink. It would seem preferable
to choose the former over the latter, since these early examples of Crassus'
avarice do not necessarily portray him in a negative light. e rst two are
similar in that they reveal Crassus' desire to achieve the maximum benet
for the minimum price. is is similar to what he does as a host: getting the
maximum benet (making friends and political allies) for the lowest possible
cost (oering a simple repast). And while Crassus desires to acquire property,
despite his immense resources (which in addition to money and land includes
a very large number of slaves, some of whom are builders and artists), he does
not construct himself a new (that is, a larger and more ostentatious) home. In
fact, Plutarch indirectly quotes a bon mot of Crassus that those who are fond of
building are their own worst enemies (2.6)16 .
Political actions – in as far as Crassus' political career is covered by
Plutarch – which one might expect to be presented as additional evidence of
Crassus' avarice in fact appear relatively innocuous. His plan to annex Egypt,
for instance, which Plutarch calls a "dangerous and violent policy" (13.2),
does not appear to have been undertaken out of the expectation of personal
prot. Most importantly, Crassus' tremendous joy at being assigned Syria as
his province is initially represented as the desire for recognition (philotimia ) ,
not nancial gain (16.1-2)17 .
III.
If the positive references to Crassus as symposiast do not obviate the
negative impression of his ineectiveness as a political gure and his failure
as imperialist in Mesopotamia, that is, his philoploutia remains the dominant
impression, then the biographer redeems partially Crassus through his intricate
construction of the nal episode of the Life: the dinner party at the Parthian
royal court (33.1-7). e positive generalities of Crassus' symposia weigh
favourably against the grotesque details of the Parthian party18 .
citizens; he does not necessarily provide luxurious repasts. In fact, that he provides bread (12.3,
σῖτον) implies that he provides basic sustenance only.
16 A similar thought appears to be expressed by Juvenal (10.105-09).
17 is is the approach taken by B. A. M, 1976, p. 177. Note Florus 1.46.1: "Both
gods and men were deed by the avarice (cupiditas) of the consul Crassus, in coveting the gold
of Parthia (dum Parthico inhiat auro), and its punishment was the slaughter of eleven legions and
the loss of his own life". But note the synkrisis of Nicias-Crassus (4.1-4), where Plutarch suggests
that Crassus ought not to be blamed for his Parthian failure, since he was only undertaking
an expansive military campaign; Pompey, Caesar, and Alexander were praised for the same.
Crassus receives criticism from Plutarch when he does not advance immediately but waits for
his son to arrive from Gaul. Instead of using that time productively by arranging for training
exercises for his soldiers, he devotes himself to counting the money he has been able to collect
in Syria and Palestine (17.8-9).
18 A. V. Z, 1995, p. 180: "Plutarch constructs his Parthia as a moral antiworld,
Most striking is Crassus' involuntary participation in this dinner party
through the presentation of his head19 during the staging of the nal moments
of Euripides' Bacchae 20 . In Crassus , then, intellectual discussion and drunken
revelry are mutually exclusive activities; Romans appear to do the former,
Parthians indulge in the latter. Granted, that the Parthians are drunk is not
stated explicitly by Plutarch, but reading between the lines it is clear that
Plutarch intends for them to be perceived as intoxicated. Plutarch therefore
redeems Crassus by representing him as the (Greco-Roman) ideal against
which the Parthians consciously position themselves. If "to Plutarch statecraft
was stagecraft"21 , then in Crassus the opposite is true also. Reading the narrative
of Crassus' Parthian misadventure as an extended metaphor for his (lack of )
leadership ability, the depravity of the Parthian symposium appears as a highly
condensed parallel which illustrates their inability to govern themselves, which
indirectly redeems both Crassus' political actions (including the Parthian
campaign itself) and (ironically) Roman politics of this period.
Crassus' lack of a clearly dened role as either host or guest in the
symposium endangers the Parthians, who, delighting and participating in the
spectacle, inadvertently cross the boundary from being spectators to Bacchants,
from dinner guests to entertainment, instead of redirecting their eorts
towards critical appreciation of dramatic art or serious political discussion.
In the case of Surena, his behaviour at the dinner party – grabbing Crassus'
head and completing the verse instead of the actor in an act of obeisance to
Hyrodes – abnegates the positive impressive of Surena and the Parthian troops
which Plutarch crafts in the previous chapters22 . Surena inadvertently engages
in amateur dramatics through which he seamlessly and instantaneously
downgrades his political and social position, from triumphant military
commander to mediocre actor (and shortly afterwards disenfranchised corpse;
see below). is contrasts very sharply a symposium hosted by Crassus, where,
to recall the main passage on Crassus' dinner parties, his guests were "for the
most part plebeians and men of the people" (τὰ πολλὰ δημοτικὴ καὶ λαώδις),
where the notion of philanthropia is unknown, or even deliberately challenged". Cf. G. P ,
1991, p. 157: "In Greco-Roman historiography accounts of symposia and deipna often have a
cautionary or admonitory eect. e incidents related may range from there merely disquieting
to the murderously dire but their eect is to disturb and dissipate the atmosphere of ease and
joy that the ideal symposium or dinner is expected to create". Plutarch revisits an Eastern
symposium in Artaxerxes: see in this volume E. A.
19 A.V. Z, 1995, p. 181: "I do believe, that nearly all the acts of the Parthians, like
cutting-o heads…that appear so cruel and perverted to Plutarch, are in fact ritual". Plutarch
thought the harsh treatment of the defeated enemy was a sign of βαρβαρικός: A. G. N,
1986, p. 241; D. B, 1993, p. 469.
20 Euripides' Bacchae permeates Plutarch's Crassus, with Crassus as a Pentheus gure: D.
B, 1993. Scholars point out the symmetry of Plutarch's references to Euripides at the end
of both Crassus and Nicias, but with very dierent results: M. G. A. B, 1993, p. 422; D.
B, 1993, p. 469; R. F, 1972, p. 310; A. V. Z, 1995, p. 180.
21 G. W. M. H, 2005, p. 59 calls this episode "melodramatic".
22 See the analysis of T. S, 1999, pp. 301-2. On murder and decapitation at a dinner
party, see G. P, 1991, pp. 164-66.
187
Crassus as Symposiast in Plutarch's Life of Crassus
Romans who may have courted Crassus' attention in order to advance their
own position in Rome's political and social circles, as well as to improve their
minds.
e most noticeable dierence between Roman and Parthian symposia
manifests itself in the performances of Hyrodes and Crassus as symposiarch,
where Plutarch intends for the men to be compared, and for Crassus to appear
the better person. Plutarch ascribes to both men an extensive knowledge of
literature, but only Crassus appears to derive a benet from this knowledge.
Plutarch suggests this through the placement of his description of the literary
tastes of each man in relation to the description of his behaviour as symposiarch.
Crassus is described as a good host with his knowledge of history and
philosophy noted several sentences later (see above, 182-3). Hyrodes' extensive
knowledge of literature is mentioned rst, followed by the description of the
Parthian party. Plutarch therefore establishes Hyrodes' literary expertise, and
by implication his cognizance of, and for the reader insists upon the expectation
of, the proper social conventions described therein, which presumably includes
symposia, before revealing his disregard for the same23 . By revealing Crassus'
literary predilections after describing his (repeated) successful performances
as symposiarch, there is no such expectation placed upon him, although the
statement reinforces Plutarch's judging Crassus' parties to be intellectually
edifying.
To recall a point made earlier, the quality of the company is the main
criterion by which a dinner party is judged in this Life. e Parthian dinner
party appears to meet this criterion, but Plutarch replaces pleasure with
treachery in the nal sentences of the Life (33.8-9), in which he describes
the deaths of Hyrodes and Surena. e death of the latter at the hands of
the former conrms the superciality of the camaraderie at the dinner party,
since to kill a guest during or after dinner is inappropriate (in narrative-time
Plutarch places the murder as immediately following the dinner party)24 .
e deaths of Hyrodes and Surena underline the degeneracy which Plutarch
describes in the earlier passage. e ultimate failure of a Parthian symposium,
then, is the fact that those in attendance quickly turn against each other, which
contrasts very sharply the conviviality of Crassus' symposia.
IV.
And Nicias? Nicias and Crassus share the dubious honour of being their
country's wealthiest citizens at a time when said wealth would presumably
enable them to achieve a political position far greater than their natural
abilities (or lack thereof) would normally allow, and thereby prove equal to, or
23 Plutarch notes that Crassus' soldiers were found to have erotic texts in their possession,
but this is mitigated by the Parthian reading of the Bacchae later: A.V. Z, 1997, pp.
181-2 and 2005, p. 120.
24 Plutarch elsewhere writes that Pompey considered eeing to Hyrodes' court after his
defeat at Pharsalus (Pomp. 76.6); ironically he is killed before being received as a dinner guest
by Ptolemy.
perhaps even eclipse, their more talented political rivals25. Nicias and Crassus
are similar in that neither spends money with the explicitly stated expectation
of earning political support.
e attitude of both men towards dinner parties reveals their characters,
and therefore for Plutarch marks a subtle yet importance point of divergence
in the pair. Crassus appears admirable because he refrains from oering lavish
dinner parties. Nicias appears excessively cautious by refusing to dine with
others for fear of being spied upon: "since [Nicias] was inclined to be wary of
public informers, he would neither dine with a fellow citizen, nor indulge in
general interchange of views or familiar social intercourse" (5.1)26 . Crassus'
parties contribute to maintaining the established, albeit indirect, avenues of
political discourse, in Rome27 ; Nicias' lack of dinner parties do the opposite in
Athens: they closing down, or at the very least severely limit, political discussion.
As argued above, Plutarch takes Crassus' abstemiousness as indicative of his
other positive qualities; Nicias' restraint points to his negative qualities, upon
which scholars note Plutarch appears to dwell28 . Reading Nicias, then, serves
to bring into sharper focus Crassus' positive attributes; or, Crassus' positive
attributes accentuate the perception of Nicias' shortcomings29 . at Nicias
comes rst in the pair indicates that the latter is probably the case30 .
V.
Twenty years ago the Life of Crassus was called "a particularly lightweight
and anecdotal Life"31 . While Crassus compares (very) unfavourably with
the Lives alongside which it was very likely composed, the intricacy of his
presentation of Crassus as symposiast enables us to appreciate better this
enigmatic text. e references to Crassus as a moderate symposiast juxtaposed
with the elucidation of his career as an ineective politician and failed
imperialist enables Plutarch to oer a complex portrait of his subject in a
short text. e apparent inconsistency between Crassus' moderate tastes and
his avarice may have been what attracted Plutarch, and therefore by studying
the description of Crassus' gastronomical preferences, one comes to a better
understanding why Plutarch wrote Crassus.
25 On Crassus' inferiority to Pompey and Caesar, which appears to be conveyed in the Lives
of all three men, see J. B, 2005, esp. pp. 320-25.
26 Cf. Per. 7.4.
27 On Crassus in Roman politics, see E. S. G, 1977, and A. M. W, 1977; on
Plutarch's treatment of Crassus' political career, see C. B. R. P, 1986, pp. 161-3. Plutarch
appears to imply that Nicias only used his wealth to advance his political career against the
actions of Cleon (Nic. 3.2).
28 A. G. N, 1988; J. E. A, 1995.
29 F. T, 1991, p. 158 suggests that Plutarch only wrote Nicias to provide a Greek
pair for Crassus.
30 A passage in the synkrisis (1.4) may suggest another view, at least when examining Crassus
from the perspective of his philanthropia: see in this volume the paper of A. G. N;
S.-T. T, 2008, p. 88. On the synkrisis of Nicias-Crassus, see A. G. N, 1988,
pp. 329-33; T. E. D , 1999, pp. 269-75.
31 C. B. R. P, 1986, p. 161.
189
Crassus as Symposiast in Plutarch's Life of Crassus
W o r k s c i T e d
A, J. E., "Nicias and the fear of failure syndrome", AHB, 9 (1995)
55-63.
B, J., "ematic Correspondences in Plutarch's Lives of Caesar, Pompey,
and Crassus", in L. B . (eds.), e Statesman in Plutarch's
Works, vol.2., Leiden, 2005, pp. 315-25.
B, M. G. A. ., Plutarco. Le vite di Nicia e di Crasso. Milan,
1993.
B, D., "Dionysiac Tragedy in Plutarch, Crassus", CQ, 43 (1993) 468-74.
D, T. E., Plutarch's Lives: Exploring Virtue and Vice. Oxford, 1999.
F, R., & C, É. (eds.), Plutarque. Vies Tome VII: Cimon-
Lucullus – Nicias-Crassus. Paris, 1972.
G, E. S., "M. Licinius Crassus. A Review Article", AJAH, 2 (1977) 117-
28.
H, G. W. M., "Plutarch the Dramaturg: Statecraft as Stagecraft in the
Lives", in L. B . (eds.), e Statesman in Plutarch's Works, vol.
2, Leiden, 2005, pp. 53-9.
H, T. W., "Plutarch's late-Republican Lives: between the lines",
Antichthon, 21 (1987) 19-48.
M, B. A., Crassus, A Political Biography, Amsterdam, 1976.
N, A. G., "Hellenikos-Barbarikos: Plutarch on Greek and Barbarian
Characteristics", WS, 20 (1986) 229-44.
_____ "Is Plutarch Fair to Nicias?", ICS, 13 (1988) 319-33.
P, G., "Symposia and Deipna in Plutarch's Lives and Other Writings", in
W. J. S (ed.), Dining in a Classical Context. Ann Arbor, 1991, pp.
157-83.
P, C. B. R. , "Plutarch's Method of Work in the Roman Lives", JHS, 99
(1979) 74-94.
_____"Plutarch and Roman Politics", in I. S. M ., (eds.), Past
Perspectives: Studies in Greek and Roman Historical Writing. Cambridge,
1986, pp 159-87.
____ "Childhood and Personality in Greek Biography", in C. B. R. P
(ed.), Characterization and Individuality in Greek Literature. Oxford,
1990, pp. 213-44.
S, T., Plutarque et les Barbares: La rhétorique d'une image. Leuven,
1999.
190
James T. Chlup
T, S.-T., "Health is Wealth: Plutarch on Contemporary Luxury",
Ploutarchos, 5 (2008) 81-90.
T, F., "Why did Plutarch write about Nicias?", AHB, 5 (1991) 153-
58.
_____"Everything to do with Dionysus: Banquets in Plutarch's Lives", in J.
G. M C . (eds.), Plutarco, Dioniso y el vino. Actas del
VI Simposio Español sobre Plutarco (Cádiz, 14-16 de Mayo de 1998),
Madrid, 1999, pp. 491-99.
W, A. M., Marcus Crassus and the Late Roman Republic. Columbia, MO,
1997.
Z, A. V., "Tragedy and Epic in Plutarch's 'Crassus'", Hermes, 125
(1997) 169-82.
_____"'Stabbed with Large Pens': Trajectories of Literacy in Plutarch's Lives",
in L. D B . (eds.), e Statesman in Plutarch's Works, vol. 2,
Leiden, 2005, pp. 113-37.
191
S 3
Disruptive Symposia
193
Drunken Violence and the Transition of Power in Plutarch's Alexander
dr u n k e n v i o l e n c e a n d T h e T r a n s i T i o n o f p o W e r i n
pl u T a r c h ' s al e x a n D e r
J B
University of Wisconsin, Madison
Abstract
is essay compares two episodes from Plutarch's Alexander: the wedding of Philip and
Cleopatra (9) and Alexander's attack on Cleitus (50-51). e wedding episode, in which an
angry, drunken Philip attacks Alexander, foreshadows Alexander's own attack on Cleitus, but
it also marks an important turning point in the development of the young Alexander. Prior
to the wedding episode, Plutarch portrays Alexander as highly rational, wise beyond his years,
and eager to rule. In creating this image, Plutarch uses Philip as a foil, showing how Alexander
was better suited than his father to be king and how he had grown restless in his role as heir.
us their clash over insults traded at the wedding party is the result of a rift in the father-
son relationship and is intimately tied both to the positive and negative aspects of Alexander's
character and to the transition of power between father and son1 .
e Life of Alexander ts quite well with the theme of the symposium,
since, according to Plutarch, Alexander was a drinker by nature and made a
habit of spending late nights at drinking parties. ere are two episodes in
particular that feature symposiastic settings and appear to be signicant to the
overall structure of the biography. e rst is the wedding party from chapter
nine, where a drunken Philip draws his sword on Alexander, and the second is
the drinking party in chapters 50 and 51, where a drunken Alexander attacks
and kills his friend Cleitus. Others, including Judith Mossman and John
O'Brien, have argued convincingly for a relationship between these episodes,
showing how Philip's attempt on Alexander's life pregures Alexander's
drunken assault on Cleitus later in the book2 . In this essay, I will take that idea
as a starting point and then argue further that Plutarch has used both episodes
to mark important transitions in Alexander's acquisition and use of power.
Let me begin by summarizing very briey the relevant details of both
episodes. Philip's wedding party is on the surface a relatively straightforward
aair. Philip has married a young Macedonian woman – too young perhaps,
since Plutarch says that Philip loved her παρ᾽ ἡλικίαν, contrary to his age. At
the wedding banquet, the bride's uncle, Attalus, urges the guests to pray that
this marriage produce a legitimate heir to the throne. Alexander is insulted by
the insinuation that he, the present heir, is illegitimate, and he verbally rebukes
Attalus and throws his cup at him. Philip immediately rises up, draws his
sword, and charges his son, but "luckily for both men Philip tripped and fell
on account of his anger and his drunkenness (διὰ τὸν θυμὸν καὶ τὸν οἶνον)".
en Alexander closes the scene with a cutting remark: "Look, men, this man
is making preparations to cross from Europe into Asia, but he's been tripped up
1 I would like to thank Craig Gibson, who read earlier drafts of this paper and provided
helpful comments and criticism.
2 J. M. M, 1988, p. 86 (= 1995, p. 215); J. M. O'B, 1992, p. 139.
crossing from one couch to another". Following this confrontation, Alexander
leaves Macedonia, moving his mother to Epirus and biding his time among
the Illyrians.
At its core, the second episode is quite similar to the rst in that it involves
drunkenness and anger, but there is an important dierence as well. At the
wedding, Philip and Alexander escaped disaster because they both were lucky
(εὐτυχίᾳ δ᾽ ἑκατέρου). But in the Cleitus aair, luck will not be on Alexander's
side. Plutarch writes that, "if we consider both the cause and the moment,
we discover that the king did not act according to a plan, but through some
misfortune (δυστυχίᾳ τινί) he oered his anger and drunkenness (ὀργὴν καὶ
μέθην) as an excuse to the daemon of Cleitus". e critical elements of the
story are as follows: at a drinking party, Alexander and Cleitus begin to ght
after Cleitus is oended by a song that ridicules some Macedonian generals;
he then goes on to mock Alexander for being subservient to the Persians; in a
rage, Alexander seeks his sword and calls his body guard, but these are withheld
and Cleitus is rushed from the room; he returns, however, chanting yet another
insult, and Alexander runs him through with a spear. As soon as Cleitus falls
dead, "the anger of Alexander left him immediately (εὐθὺς ἀφῆκεν ὁ θυμὸς
αὐτόν)" and he is barely kept from killing himself with the same spear.
Mossman rightly says that, "Philip's drunken attempt to attack Alexander
is a doublet of the death of Cleitus". Before making a forward comparison to
the Cleitus episode, however, I would like to look backward to the preceding
chapters on Alexander's youth. For the wedding scene represents not only a
foreshadowing of Alexander's own drunken and angry violence, but also the
culmination of a rather complex character portrait that Plutarch has been
sketching over the course of several chapters. e young Alexander whom we
meet at the wedding party has been cast as highly rational, wise beyond his
years, and ready to rule. In creating this image, Plutarch uses Philip as a foil,
showing how Alexander was better suited than his father to be king and how
he had grown restless in his role as heir apparent. us their clash over the
insults traded between Attalus and Alexander is the result of a much deeper
divide in the father-son relationship and is intimately tied to both the positive
and the negative aspects of Alexander's nature.
Plutarch introduces a fundamental element of his portrait of Alexander
in the well-known passage from chapter two, where Philip has a dream in
which he is closing his wife's womb with a seal that bears the image of a lion.
Aristander the seer interprets the dream correctly when others cannot: Philip's
wife Olympias is pregnant with a child who will possess a lion-like and a
spirited (θυμοειδής) nature (2.4-5). Plutarch adds depth to this prediction
in chapter four, where he explains the origins and implications of Alexander's
spiritedness, adds that he also possessed temperance (σωφροσύνη) with regard
to pleasures of the body, and introduces a discussion of Alexander's ambition
(4.7-11). Plutarch does not dwell on the rst two elements of Alexander's
nature, but he uses the remaining element, his ambition, to make two important
points. First, he asserts that the young Alexander's ambition was exceptional
195
Drunken Violence and the Transition of Power in Plutarch's Alexander
for his age and so kept his thought or purpose "weighty and high-minded"
(ἥ τε φιλοτιμία παρ᾽ ἡλικίαν ἐμβριθὲς εἶχε τὸ φρόνημα καὶ μεγαλόψυχον ).
Second and more important, he introduces a comparison between Alexander
and Philip that runs through several chapters, up to and including the wedding
episode in chapter nine.
Plutarch introduces this comparison ostensibly to support his point
about Alexander's high-mindedness, but it becomes the vehicle for a more
detailed sketch of his character. Plutarch begins by explaining that Alexander's
seriousness of purpose made him discriminating when it came to building his
reputation:
For Alexander did not love glory of every kind or from every source, as Philip
did, who adorned himself sophistically with cleverness of speech (λόγου τε
δεινότητι σοφιστικῶς καλλωπιζόμενος) and engraved his chariot victories at
Olympia on his coins; but when those around Alexander kept asking if he
wished to compete in the footrace at the Olympic games, since he was a fast
runner, he said, "Sure, if I would have kings as competitors" (4.9-10).
e comparison in this passage is somewhat surprising, because Plutarch
has claimed that Alexander's ambition was παρ᾽ ἡλικίαν, contrary to his age.
We might have expected an example of how Alexander surpassed one or more
of his young companions in high-minded and weighty thoughts. Instead, he
surpasses even his father, a point that Plutarch seems eager to press. He tells
us that Philip took pride in his success at the Olympic games; then he has
Alexander denigrate this sort of victory as being beneath a king. Plutarch is
referring to the years of Alexander's youth, and so his ambition is certainly
contrary to his age, but his high-minded remark also distinguishes him from
his father, the king that he will eventually replace. Comparing this passage to
the wedding episode, we cannot help but notice that Alexander was ambitious
παρ᾽ ἡλικίαν, while Philip was in love with Cleopatra παρ᾽ ἡλικίαν: the
young Alexander exceeds expectations, while the mature Philip fails to meet
them. Between these two points in the biography, Plutarch builds his case for
Alexander's superiority.
Philip, according to the passage above, not only celebrated his Olympic
victories, but he also "adorned himself sophistically with cleverness of speech".
Plutarch takes up this point again after the quip about kings as competitors,
going on to say that Alexander was generally disinterested "in the race of
athletes" but preferred instead to stage contests for tragedians, musicians,
hunters and men who fought with rods (4.11). Plutarch is creating an antithesis
here between displays of physical skill and intellectual skill, with Alexander
showing an obvious preference for the intellectual over the physical. Plutarch
does not claim that Alexander, who is fast enough to compete at Olympia, had
disdain for athletics, but only that he preferred to be around intellectual types.
Philip, on the other hand, eager for any type of glory, settled for sophistries,
just as he proudly won Olympic victories against lesser competitors.
is discussion leads directly to an anecdote, in chapter ve, that reinforces
the intellectual prowess of Alexander in comparison with Philip. An embassy
from the Persian king arrives in Macedonia while Philip is absent. Alexander
meets the visitors and does not question them as a young, inexperienced man
would, but he makes serious inquiries about the Persian king, his military
strength, and the geography of the Asian interior. As a result of his questioning,
the ambassadors "were amazed and thought that the legendary cleverness of
Philip (τὴν λεγομένην Φιλίππου δεινότητα) was nothing compared with the
boy's eagerness and his inclination to do great deeds". As with the example from
the previous chapter, this comparison with Philip is not automatic. Alexander
does not ask "any small or childish question", so the Persians might naturally
have compared him to other young men his age. But as Plutarch narrates
the anecdote, in their eyes Alexander is superior even to Philip, who is again
relegated to the intellectual backseat, enjoying a reputation for cleverness, but
as a leader paling in comparison with his son.
Plutarch rounds out this chapter by exposing the tension between
Alexander's "inclination to do great deeds" and his lack of real political power.
He describes him as agitated when he hears of Philip's victories in war, and
worried that his father will leave him nothing to conquer (5.4-6). He also
describes two of Alexander's teachers, pointing out that one, Leonidas, was
called Alexander's foster-father (τροφεύς) and the other, Lysimachus, referred
to himself as Phoenix, to Alexander as Achilles, and to Philip as Peleus (5.7-8).
ere is no doubting who is best in that trio, and so for a third time Alexander
is compared favorably to his father. Moreover, the description of both teachers
serves to emphasize that Alexander's education is making him independent
of Philip, and while being heir limits his opportunity to act, at least for the
moment, it does not limit the potential of his nature. is notion is reinforced
in anecdotes that appear in subsequent chapters, when Alexander is reported to
have said that he had life on account of Philip but a virtuous life on account of
Aristotle (8.4); and when the Macedonians, as a result of Alexander's military
success at age sixteen and his actions at the battle of Chaeronia, call Alexander
their king but Philip their general (9.4)3 .
ere is an additional anecdote that precedes the wedding episode and
that eshes out Alexander's rational nature and his relationship to Philip. is
is the famous taming of Bucephalas in chapter six. Philip Stadter and Tim
Whitmarsh have shown that the Platonic undertone of this passage ts well
with Plutarch's emphasis on the philosophical education of Alexander4 . All
Philip's men are unable to break the horse, and when Philip decides to send
the animal away, Alexander charges that the men are soft and inexperienced.
In response, Philip confronts his youthful son, saying, "Are you reproaching
your elders, as though you know more or are better able to control the horse?".
3 Looking even farther ahead, when Cleitus is insulting Alexander at the drinking party, he
accuses Alexander of rejecting Philip and promoting the idea that Zeus Ammon was his real
father (50.11).
4 P. A. S, 1996, pp. 293-4; T . W, 2002, pp. 180-1.
197
Drunken Violence and the Transition of Power in Plutarch's Alexander
Alexander does, in fact, know more than the others. Rather than try to
break the horse physically, as Philip's men had done, Alexander observes the
horse's behavior, recognizes that it fears its own shadow, and then turns the
horse (Platonically, as Whitmarsh says) toward the sun and masters it with
relative ease. Once he succeeds, Philip joins other characters of this Life in
acknowledging Alexander's superiority: "My son," he says, "seek a kingdom that
is your equal, because Macedonia cannot contain you!" It seems reasonable to
take Philip's words as prophetic and to look ahead to Alexander's war against
the Persian empire5 , and so this episode says something important about
Alexander's future campaigns as well as his nature: he will conquer Persia not
by force alone but mainly by wisdom, and he will succeed where Philip would
have failed. Taking Philip's declaration together with Alexander's cutting
remarks about racing at Olympia, the reaction of the Persian ambassadors,
and the Macedonians' praise of Alexander's leadership, we are encouraged to
conclude that Philip was a great general, but that Alexander was the king
who could compete with Darius. By the time we arrive at the wedding scene,
Alexander himself is impatient enough to confront Philip with the truth.
us the wedding scene is the culmination of an extended comparison
of Alexander to Philip. However, in addition to putting Philip in his place,
Alexander also reacts angrily and impulsively to the insult of Attalus. is
reaction is at odds with the portrait that Plutarch has been creating: apart
from describing Alexander's spirited and thirsty nature in chapter four,
he has presented his hero as rational and controlled. e discussion of his
philosophical interests and his training under Aristotle, which comes in
chapters seven and eight, between the taming of Bucephalas and the wedding
episode, only reinforces this point. Looking backward from the murder of
Cleitus, the precedent set by Philip's attack on Alexander is obvious, but the
embarrassment of Philip at the end of the scene overshadows Alexander's
anger, so that on its own, the wedding scene is not particularly foreboding.
ere is, however, an anecdote in the very next chapter that also
demonstrates Alexander's tendency to act out of anger and further complicates
the picture of a rational hero. e marriage of Philip to Cleopatra and the
insult of Attalus raised doubts for Alexander about his standing in the family.
When he hears that Pixodarus, the king of Caria, is planning to marry his
daughter to Philip's other son, Arrhidaeus, he becomes upset and he makes
arrangements to marry the daughter himself. Philip discovers his plan and
chastises him, explaining that such a marriage was beneath him. In contrast
to the disagreement over the taming of Bucephalas, Philip is right about
the Carian princess, and Alexander is wrong. More important, Alexander's
behavior reveals that when he is suspicious or feels slighted, his judgment may
be confused – διαταραχθείς, Plutarch writes – and he may act in an irrational
manner. In this case, he has acted more like Philip at the Olympic games,
seeking out the glory of a royal marriage even to the daughter of a lesser man.
5 Of the extant accounts, Plutarch is the rst to report Philip's prophecy; see A. R. A,
1930, pp. 17-21.
is scene, even more than the drunken ght with Philip, casts an ominous
shadow over Alexander's future, and both together serve as background for his
angry attack on Cleitus in response to a perceived insult6 .
Looking forward to the Cleitus episode, Plutarch has left no doubt that
Alexander is acting irrationally in attacking his friend: he says at the start
that the event was not premeditated (οὐκ ἀπὸ γνώμης) and at the end that
it was driven by Alexander's anger (θυμός). His spirited nature has proved
to be his Achilles' heel, but this episode also leads to a fundamental change
in Alexander's behavior and even his character. As Whitmarsh has written,
the Cleitus episode ushers in a reevaluation of Alexander's relationship to
philosophy, and it is therefore no coincidence that the murder takes place
in a symposiastic setting. "If Plato's and Xenophon's Symposia constitute the
paradigms of philosophical friendship, then the Clitus episode represents the
negative image of such serenity and self-control"7 . What better way to represent
Alexander's break with his philosophical past than an angry, lethal ght at a
symposium8 . Plutarch, in fact dwells for several chapters on philosophical
matters following the murder. In order to relieve Alexander's suering, the
philosopher Anaxarchus convinces him that he is a law unto himself and
therefore need feel no shame for killing Cleitus. is argument, according to
Plutarch, relieved Alexander's suering, but it also changed him, making "his
ethos in many respects chaunoteron and more lawless" (52.7). "Chaunoteron "
in this passage may mean "more frivolous" or "more conceited"9 , but in either
case, it represents a departure from the Alexander that we met in the early
chapters, whose ambition kept his thoughts weighty and high-minded. In
fact, Alexander has not only acted like Philip in attacking his friend; in heeding
Anaxarchus' sophistic justication for the murder and becoming chaunoteron ,
he has actually become more like Philip, whom Plutarch described as vain and
adorned with sophistic cleverness, and who Alexander charged was unt to
invade Asia as a result of his drunken stumble. As Alexander looks forward to
a new campaign in India, this is certainly not a positive development10 .
Plutarch also describes here the severing of ties between Alexander and
Aristotle, even though this happened at a later time. He writes that Alexander
6 E. D. C, 1992, examines both the wedding episode and the Pixodarus aair for their
historical accuracy but without tting them into Plutarch's larger narrative.
7 T. W, 2002, p. 183.
8 Excessive drunkenness was not a rare event at a typical Macedonian drinking party (see
E. N. B , 1983), and so we may view Alexander's behavior as not only a break with his
philosophical training but also a return to his more basic instincts.
9 See LSJ, χαῦνος II.
10 e Cleitus aair is by no means the rst irrational moment for Alexander following the
incident at Philip's wedding and the attempt to arrange a marriage with Pixodarus' daughter,
but like the wedding episode, it represents the climactic moment in an extended illustration of
Alexander's character. In Plutarch's narrative, Alexander becomes more violent and irrational
as his reign progresses, and he is always susceptible to rash behavior when he suspects an insult;
cf. 42.4: "And especially when slandered he would abandon good sense (καὶ μάλιστα κακῶς
ἀκούων ἐξίστατο τοῦ φρονεῖν) and would become cruel and obstinate, because he valued his
reputation above his life and his kingdom". See B. B, 2008, pp. 189-90.
199
Drunken Violence and the Transition of Power in Plutarch's Alexander
had a falling out with Callisthenes, the great-nephew of Aristotle, and eventually
Callisthenes was implicated in the pages conspiracy, for which Alexander put
him to death (53-55). Plutarch quotes from a letter in which Alexander vows
to punish not only Callisthenes, but also "those who sent him and who are
harboring in their cities conspirators against me". Plutarch says that by this
letter, Alexander "openly revealed himself as being against Aristotle" in whose
home Callisthenes had been raised (55.7-8). Alexander once said that Philip
gave him life, but Aristotle gave him a virtuous life; now he accuses Aristotle
of supporting a conspiracy to kill him, rejecting his philosophical father in
order to preserve the life that his ordinary father, Philip, had granted him.
All of this happens, as Plutarch admits, much later, but by narrating the
break with Aristotle immediately following the murder of Cleitus, Plutarch
encourages the reader to consider them together. And when Plutarch steers
his narrative thread back to the present, he does so with an anecdote that
ties the Cleitus aair back to the wedding scene and makes a point about
transitions in leadership. Following the confrontation at the wedding in
chapter nine, Alexander left Macedonia for Illyria. Straightaway, Demaratus
the Corinthian visits Philip and chides him for inquiring about the political
situation in Greece when he cannot keep his own household in order (9.12-
14). is counsel leads Philip to recall Alexander; then the very next chapter
narrates the aair with Pixodarus and Philip's murder. us Demaratus plays
a small but critical role in the transition of power from father to son.
Following the murder of Cleitus, Plutarch inserts the digression on
Callisthenes and Aristotle; then the wise Demaratus returns again in chapter
56, this time expressing pity for the Greeks who died before seeing Alexander
on the throne of Darius. en he also dies. is anecdote is poignant, but it
seems out of place, because Demaratus has already made this observation, in
chapter 37, when Alexander sat on Darius' throne for the rst time at Persepolis.
In his commentary, J. R. Hamilton remarks that the good treatment that
Demaratus receives from Alexander is meant to stand in contrast to the harsh
treatment of Callisthenes11 . is is no doubt true, but this nal appearance
by Demaratus leaves an ominous impression. As Plutarch has constructed
the narrative, Demaratus was on hand to facilitate or to mark Alexander's
surpassing of two kings, Philip and Darius. By returning a third time, after
Alexander has killed his friend Cleitus in anger, developed a more frivolous
character, and made a formal break with his philosophical past, he signals a less
hopeful transition: it seems that he can die now because he has seen Alexander
at his peak. e ascent toward high-minded glory began when Alexander
declared that the stumbling Philip was unt to invade Asia, and it has ended
with Alexander's own drunken assault on Cleitus, which serves as a warning
that he, too, may now be unt for the campaigns that lie ahead.
e very next chapter opens with Alexander's preparations to make a
crossing into India. He will accomplish amazing things, to be sure, but his
11 J. R. H, 1969.
200
Jerey Beneker
behavior will continue to deteriorate and he will eventually lose control of his
army. us both the wedding scene and the Cleitus aair signal important
transitions in the personality of Alexander and in the leadership of the
Macedonians. e ght at the wedding marks the ascendance of Alexander
while at the same time revealing a crack in his rational foundation. e violent
disruption of the symposium, and the concomitant rejection of philosophical
ideals, vividly illustrates the power of Alexander's θυμός and also marks the
beginning of his decline as king. In the Cleitus aair, Alexander has taken the
role that his father played in the wedding episode, but rather than yield to a
better man, as Philip did after his drunken mistake, Alexander gives way to a
lesser version of himself.
W o r k s c i T e d
A, A. R., "Bucephalas and his Legend", AJPh, 51 (1930) 1-21.
B , E. N., "e Symposium at Alexander's Court", Archaia Makedonia, 3
(1983) 45-55.
B, B., "Caesar's Ambition: A Combined Reading of Plutarch's
Alexander-Caesar and Pyrrhus-Marius", TAPhA, 138 (2008) 185-215.
C, E. D., "e Politics of Polygamy: Olympias, Alexander and the
Murder of Philip", Historia, 41 (1992) 169-89.
H, J. R., Plutarch: Alexander, A Commentary, Oxford, 1969.
M, J. M., "Tragedy and Epic in Plutarch's Alexander", JHS, 108
(1988) 83-93. (reprinted in S, B. (ed.), Essays on Plutarch's
Lives, Oxford, 1995, pp. 209-28)
O'B, J. M., Alexander the Great: e Invisible Enemy , London, New York,
1992.
S, P. A.,"Anecdotes and the ematic Structure of Plutarchean
Biography", in F D, J. A. P P, F.
(eds.), Estudios sobre Plutarco: Aspectos Formales. Actas del IV Simposio
Español Sobre Plutarco (Salamanca, 26-28 de Mayo, 1994), Madrid,
1996, pp. 291-303.
W, T., "Alexander's Hellenism and Plutarch's Textualism", CQ, 52
(2002) 174-92.
201
Política y confrontación en los banquetes macedonios en la obra de Plutarco
P
P
A I M M
Universidad de Murcia
Abstract
In the ancient world, the symposium was a way to make politics. Consequently, it is also
a reection of ancient society and its inherent conicts. ere is a very curious case that
surprisingly has not attracted much attention from specialists: Plutarch's mention of
Macedonian banquets. ese banquets were very much inuenced by the Homeric tradition,
and very dierent events happened there, for example, singers sang and the king gave gifts.
But it was even a suitable place to denigrate an enemy or to plan his murder. It was also a way
to win the support of the Macedonians, to introduce literary discussions or to talk politics.
It was even present in funeral rites. e versatile character of Macedonian banquets was due
to the fact that there were no assemblies or councils that met periodically. Moreover, the
Macedonians drank pure wine in their banquets, which was considered a barbarian act by
the Greeks. Many times Plutarch shows his condemnation of Macedonians' drunkenness.
For example, in his Lives he condemns Philip and Demetrius when they get drunk. By
contrast, he defends Alexander when he does it. is is because of the sources, but also, and,
above all, because of the admiration Plutarch feels for Alexander. Let us remember that
in one of his rst works (Moralia 329C) Plutarch had presented Alexander as a supporter
of Greek culture and philanthropy. All that had led to contradictions in his biography of
Alexander.
Convocar un simposio implica abrir las puertas del hogar, oíkos, al resto de
la ciudad, lo que, en denitiva, signica entremezclar lo público y lo privado.
Un banquete es por tanto algo más que un espacio de esparcimiento y de ocio,
sino también el el reejo de las tensiones que acucian la sociedad en la que se
celebra, puesto que implica una reunión.
Además, esta celebración en el mundo antiguo, como en todo encuentro,
no dejó de ser una forma de hacer política, y fue por tanto un reejo del tipo
de estado imperante.
El simposio es un universo en el que existe siempre un frágil equilibrio
entre el ciudadano con el ciudadano, el hombre con el dios o el súbdito con
su emperador. Todas estas tensiones están muy presentes siempre en la obra
de Plutarco de Queronea. Un caso curioso son las menciones que realiza a los
banquetes macedonios. Si bien los simposios aparecen con frecuencia en la obra
de Plutarco, son frecuentemente descripciones de eventos griegos o romanos1 ,
y muy pocos de pueblos bárbaros2 . El pueblo macedonio al ser considerado por
la mayoría de los griegos como un pueblo bárbaro3 , pero que al mismo tiempo
reivindicaba su helenidad a través de sus gobernantes4 es un caso diferente al
del resto y merece ser estudiado detenidamente.
1 Cf. Plu., es. 30; Lyc.10; 12; 26; Phoc.19; Dio 20; Lys. 4; Aem. 27; Cat. Ma. 17; Cor. 23.
2 Plu., Art.15.
3 D., Philippica III 31. Ep
4 Cf. N. G. L. H, 1992, p. 42.
202
Antonio Ignacio Molina Marín
Si en Atenas el banquete podía reejar formas políticas acordes con el
mundo democrático5 , en Macedonia la forma de gobierno era la monarquía,
lo que implicaba que el simposio fuese siempre mucho más jerarquizado con
un centro de autoridad muy denido, el soberano. Un monarca cuyo modelo
era el mundo homérico y que, por lo tanto, estará presente en las festividades
macedonias.
Al igual que Demódoco amenizaba con su música la comida a la que fue
invitado Odiseo por el rey Alcínoo, en Macedonia se perpetuó la costumbre
de banquetear acompañados con música. Esquines y Demóstenes con motivo
de su embajada a Filipo II tuvieron la oportunidad de ver a un jovencísimo
Alejandro mostrar sus habilidades con la citara durante una comida6 (Aeschin.,
Contra Timarco 168). Algo que le valió los reproches de su padre, Filipo, pues
a un verdadero rey le bastaba con ser un espectador y dejar que fuesen otros
quienes tocasen7 (Plu., Per. 1.6).
Un arte que sin duda el joven Alejandro dominaba debido a su admiración
por otro consumado músico su antepasado Aquiles (Il. 9.185-89). El propio
Plutarco nos cuenta la anécdota de como rechazó la lira de Paris en Troya,
porque prefería la de Aquiles (Plu., Alex. 15.9).
En cualquier caso no parece haber sido una costumbre únicamente del
reinado de Alejandro. Demetrio Poliorcetes gustaba de celebrar sus simposios
acompañado de autistas, como la célebre Lamia (Plu., Demetr. 16, 27).
Precisamente, eran exclusivamente las hetairas y las artistas las únicas
mujeres que tenían acceso al banquete8 . Heródoto (V.18-21) cuenta que los
embajadores del Gran Rey a su llegada a Macedonia pidieron que fuesen
atendidos por mujeres macedonias durante el transcurso de un banquete. Los
macedonios accedieron a regañadientes, porque no era costumbre que las
mujeres de condición libre estuviesen presentes en tales eventos. Cuando los
persas intentaron abusar de las mujeres, el príncipe Alejandro I con la excusa
de que tenían que arreglarse adecuadamente para sus huéspedes las recondujo
al gineceo, pero en lugar de devolvérselas introdujo a jóvenes macedonios
disfrazados con ropas de mujer que dieron muerte a los persas. La historia, aunque
falsa, muestra una práctica que era realidad entre los griegos, y seguramente
entre los macedonios, la exclusión de las mujeres de estos eventos9 .
Conocemos los nombres de algunas de las mujeres que acompañaron a los
macedonios en su expedición, como Antígona la amante de Filotas (Plu., Alex.
5 Pl., Smp. 177d.
6 Sobre el recital de Alejandro ante Demóstenes consúltese a I. P, 1993; quien
calica la escena descrita por Esquines de στιγμιότυπο, una "instantánea" de la vida del joven
macedonio.
7 Otro ejemplo de una actitud similar a la mostrada por Filipo hacia la música se encuentra
en Plu., em. 2.4. Cf. W. A, 1988, pp. 665-6.
8 Cf. W. W. T, 1948, p. 48, quien niega que en los banquetes macedonios participasen
autistas.
9 Plu., Pel. 11 cuenta una historia similar a la de Heródoto. Cuando Pelópidas y sus soldados
se introdujeron en un banquete para asesinar a los oligarcas tebanos lo hicieron disfrazados de
mujeres, de tal modo que nadie sospechó de ellos.
203
Política y confrontación en los banquetes macedonios en la obra de Plutarco
48.4-49.1) y Taíde la de Ptolomeo que tuvo un papel destacado en el incendio
de Persépolis:
Pero ocurrió que habiéndose entregado junto a sus compañeros a una esta
y celebración, también se unieron a ellos unas mujeres para beber junto a sus
amantes. Destacaba entre todas ellas Taíde, natural de Ática, compañera de
Ptolomeo, el que más tarde sería rey. En parte por elogiar cumplidamente a
Alejandro, en parte por gastar una broma, se dejó llevar en medio de la bebida
a hacer una propuesta muy propia del carácter de su patria, aunque de mayor
trascendencia de lo que a sí misma correspondía10.
Sin embargo, la presencia de mujeres no signicaba que las relaciones
homo-eróticas estuviesen excluidas del simposio. Se sabe que Alejandro y
Hefestión fueron amantes. El propio monarca macedonio besó públicamente
a su eunuco Bagoas en el transcurso de una esta, donde se había servido
abundante vino (Plu., Alex. 67.7-8).
El rey, por lo que cuenta Arriano (VII 11.8-9), debía de sentarse siempre
en el centro de la estancia al igual que lo hacía cuando administraba justicia (Cf.
Polieno IV 24). Una posición, el centro, que había sido un elemento vital en el
desarrollo del pensamiento griego. Tenía un matiz político y por supuesto tenía
un valor moral que la losofía supo emplear. Pero también servía para designar
lo común, lo cotidiano, a la comunidad11 . Siendo también el banquete un
lugar idóneo para recompensar a quienes se habían distinguido en el combate,
una forma sencilla de hacerlo era permitir que tomaran asiento junto al rey.
Cuanto más próximos estaban del soberano más claro quedaba que ocupaban
una posición importante. Esto quedó patente cuando el rey Antígono Dosón
invitó a un banquete a Arato de Sición, para mostrar que era muy estimado
por el rey fue sentado en un sitial más elevado que el suyo propio e incluso el
propio Antígono se encargó de arroparlo (Plu., Arat. 43). El modelo de este
protocolo vuelve a encontrarse en los poemas homéricos. Alcínoo sentó a su
lado a Odiseo porque era su huésped preferente (Od. 7.169), al igual que había
hecho Aquiles cuando recibió a los embajadores que encabezaba el Laertída
en su tienda (Il. 9.215-21).
Pero no sólo la situación en el banquete denotaba la importancia del
invitado, según la forma en la que éste se sentase podía revelar que se trataba de
un guerrero consumado. Ateneo (I 18a) nos recuerda que ningún macedonio
podía comer reclinado en un lecho sin haber matado, anteriormente, a un jabalí
con la única ayuda de su lanza. Una costumbre que tuvo que experimentar el
mismísimo rey Casandro en los banquetes macedonios.
Una de las escenas típicas de la Odisea es la entrega de regalos al invitado
durante el simposio (Od. 6.587-615). El banquete macedonio, un lugar donde
se reunían los guerreros, era el sitio indicado para que los soldados presumiesen
de sus hazañas ante una audiencia, y sobre todo delante del rey, que debía
10 Plu., Alex. 38.1-2.
11 J.-P. V, 1993, p. 198.
204
Antonio Ignacio Molina Marín
distribuir premios conforme al valor mostrado12. Plutarco (Alex. 39.2) cuenta
que el líder de los peonios, Aristón, le mostró la cabeza de un enemigo
pidiéndole el premio acostumbrado entre los suyos, una copa de oro. Alejandro
respondió entregándole una copa llena de vino puro y brindando por él.
El propio rey podía agasajar a uno de sus amigos con un banquete en
su honor. Esto fue lo que se hizo cuando Nearco retornó de su periplo (Alex .
75.4-5) o cuando Alejandro asesinó a Clito (Alex. 50.7). Los invitados debían
de ocupar un sitio cercano al del monarca como sus huéspedes de honor, puesto
que el macedonio habría querido oír detalles sobre el viaje de su almirante o
conversar con Clito, a quien no habría podido asesinar de no haberse sentado
cerca del monarca.
Durante el banquete se realizaban numerosos brindis en honor del huésped
principal. Una forma de honrar a los invitados y de que la alegría se extendiera
entre los comensales (cf. Plu., Demetr. 25; 36; Alex. 67.1-6; 69.9). Aunque
también podía ser el mejor medio para desprestigiar a un adversario. Átalo
realizó un brindis durante los festejos nupciales de Filipo II con su sobrina
Cleopatra para poner en duda la legitimidad de Alejandro como sucesor al
trono13 .
El rey Demetrio (Plu., Demetr. 25) disfrutaba en sus banquetes cuando
sus hombres realizaban brindis descalicando a sus adversarios. Un Filipo
ebrio, en las celebraciones que siguieron a la batalla de Queronea, cantó el
principio de un decreto de Demóstenes, llevando el compás con los pies y
las manos14 . Se habría tratado de un kómos epiníkios 15 similar al que realizó
Alejandro en el incendio de Persépolis, para vengarse de Jerjes (Plu., Alex .
37.5). Pausanias, el asesino de Filipo, fue también vejado por Átalo en el
transcurso de un banquete. Plutarco (Alex. 10.5) no especica el lugar, pero
Diodoro dice, rotundamente, que ocurrió en el transcurso de una cena en la
que fue emborrachado y violado por los hombres de Átalo16 . Los enemigos de
Arato aprovechaban los banquetes para menoscabar la conanza de Filipo V
en su persona (Plu., Arat. 48.7).
Incluso era el lugar idóneo para eliminar físicamente a un rival. Esto
fue lo que intentó Alejandro, el hijo de Casandro, inútilmente con Demetrio
Poliorcetes (Plu., Demetr. 36). Pirro aprovechó el momento contra su enemigo
Neóptolemo (Plu., Pyrrh. 5). Del mismo modo Alejandro dio muerte a
Clito en el transcurso de una cena (Plu., Alex. 51.9-10). El modelo mítico
que justicaba un asesinato durante la celebración de un banquete lo ofrecía
Odiseo, que había dado muerte a los pretendientes que acosaban a su esposa
(Od. 22.8-325).
El envenenamiento era otro de los métodos que podían ser empleados
para acabar con un rival en un simposio. La sombra de la sospecha podía caer
12 Plu., Alex. 48.5, Filotas fanfarroneaba como suelen hacer los soldados en la esta.
13 Plu., Alex. 9.7-11.
14 Plu., Dem. 20.
15 D. S. XVI 87.1.
16 D. S. XVI 93.7.
205
Política y confrontación en los banquetes macedonios en la obra de Plutarco
sobre el antrión cuyo huésped moría poco después de un festín. Esto fue lo
que le ocurrió a Medio de Larisa17 tras la muerte de Alejandro Magno (Plu.,
Alex. 75.4-5; OBRA CITADA Arr.VII 25.1) o a Filipo V tras la de Arato de
Sición (Plu., Arat. 52; Plb. VIII 12 1-6).
Pero también era un medio de aliviar el cansancio y de ganarse el apoyo
de los macedonios. Pocas cosas unen tanto a los hombres como el compartir la
misma comida y el mismo pan18 . El banquete que siguió a la victoria de Queronea
y el de la boda entre Filipo y Cleopatra tenía ese objetivo; Alejandro organizaba
muy frecuentemente juegos y representaciones teatrales para contentar a sus
soldados19 ; la bacanal de Carmania se realizó para celebrar la vuelta victoriosa
de Alejandro de la India, y paliar los padecimientos que había sufrido el ejército
en el desierto de Gedrosia20 . Los enemigos de Éumenes de Cardia intentaron
acabar con la creciente popularidad del griego entre los macedonios obsequiando
a sus tropas con numerosos banquetes (Plu., Eum. 13.5; 14.2).
Quizás el banquete más importante, que tuvo lugar buscando la concordia
y la lantropía entre griegos, macedonios y persas, fue el que se celebró poco
después del motín del Opis (Arr. VII 11.8-9).
Tal era la importancia del simposio en la vida cotidiana de la antigua
Macedonia que estaba presente hasta en los ritos funerarios. En una tumba
encontrada en Agios Athanasios, a unos 20km de Tesalónica, se ha hallado
un impresionante fresco donde se representa un banquete funerario21 . De
igual modo, se celebró un banquete funerario en honor de Cálano (Plu., Alex.
70.1-2; Ath. X 49), después de su inmolación.
Con la misma nalidad lúdica podían organizarse banquetes en el estado
macedonio en los que se podía disfrutar de discusiones literarias o losócas.
Calístenes se ganó la enemistad de la corte cuando según Plutarco (Alex. 53.3-4)
mostró sus dotes como orador defendiendo un argumento y posteriormente
su contrario, dejando entrever su animadversión por los macedonios. Duelos
dialécticos como los tenidos entre Anaxarco de Abdera y Calístenes de Olinto
pudieron entretener a los macedonios (Plu., Alex. 52.8-9).
Al ser el simposio el sitio donde solía encontrarse la cúpula del poder
era el lugar idóneo para practicar la política en un ambiente más distendido.
Los embajadores de la paz del 346 fueron agasajados con un banquete en
el transcurso del cual pudieron admirar las grandes dotes de Filipo como
bebedor (Plu., Dem.16). Alejandro cuando quiso introducir la Proskýnesis en el
ceremonial de su corte prerió hacerlo en la atmósfera del simposio22 .
Igualmente el rey podía presentarse públicamente vestido con el atuendo
persa (Plu., Mor. 329F-330A, Alex. 45.2; Ant. 54.8; Diod. XVII 77.5; Curt. VI
17 Cf. H. B, 1926, pp. 261-2; L. P, 1960, pp. 68-70; J. A, 2005, pp. 116-
22; A. I. M M, 2007, pp. 287-90.
18 X., Cyr. VIII 2.2-3.
19 Plu., Alex. 4.11, 10.2-4, 29.1-6, 47.7, 67.7-8, 72.1-2; Arr. VII 14.10; Ath. XIII 595.
20 Plu., Alex. 67.1-6.
21 M. T-A, 2006, p. 324.
22 Plu., Alex. 54.4-6.
206
Antonio Ignacio Molina Marín
6.4-5; Justin. XII 3.8; Arr. IV 7.4; 9.9, VII 6.2. 22.2-5; Ps.-Callisth. I 34.2) o
disfrazado en cenas con los atributos divinos de Heracles, Ártemis o Hermes
(Ath. XII 537e) para promover su adopción de las costumbres foráneas. El
banquete era un lugar más apropiado que las audiencias reales para sondear el
éxito que tendría su orientalización.
La necesidad de discutir y confrontar los problemas de la sociedad
macedonia en el transcurso de un banquete puede deberse a que al contrario
de lo que ocurría en otras ciudades como en Atenas, donde había un lugar
especico para las discusiones políticas, como la asamblea (ekklesía) y el consejo
(boulé ) que se reunían periódicamente, no existía un marco espacial denido en
el que poder solventar las tensiones que acuciaban a los macedonios. Es cierto
que los banquetes griegos no eran ajenos a estas tensiones, pero la existencia de
instituciones políticas provocaba que nunca fuesen tan serias como ocurría en
Macedonia. Por el contrario, los banquetes se celebraban más frecuentemente
y al ser un lugar donde se encontraba la plana mayor del ejército era normal
que se tomaran decisiones políticas, o que se produjesen discusiones. A lo
largo de la historia de Macedonia la autoridad siempre estuvo muy claramente
representada en la gura del rey, pero conforme los monarcas fueron ganando
poder, resultaba más difícil tener acceso a su persona (Plu., Demetr. 42).
Durante el banquete los dignatarios podían luchar por ganarse el favor del
rey23 , mediante el halago como Proteas (Plu., Alex. 39.6) o bien hacer alarde de
sus méritos o de los desméritos de sus rivales como hemos visto.
Los asesinatos, las violaciones y las disputas internas debieron de
escandalizar profundamente a los griegos. De igual modo, la presencia de
armas en los banquetes macedonios (Plu., Alex. 9.9; 51.9; Demetr. 36) no era
común desde el siglo VI a.C., entre los griegos. Pero lo que más debía disgustar
a los helenos era que los macedonios bebiesen el vino puro24 (ákratos ). Beber
vino simbolizaba el hacerse adulto para un griego, (Cf. Il. 9.485-95), y su
desconocimiento demostraba la falta de civilización de un pueblo. Aunque
beberlo en estado puro y de forma inmoderada era un signo de barbarie.
El ejemplo más claro nos lo ofrece Plutarco (es. 30) cuando describe la
embriaguez de los centauros. Los macedonios eran equiparables en las mentes
de los griegos a estos seres monstruosos cuando se emborrachaban.
Era costumbre de los macedonios organizar competiciones de bebedores
en las que llegaban a producirse varias muertes debido a las enormes cantidades
de vino puro que se ingerían. Prómaco murió tras haber bebido unos 4 congios
(13 litros) de vino sin mezclar (Plu., Alex. 70.1-2). Filipo aparece borracho
frecuentemente en nuestras fuentes (Plu., Dem. 16, 20; Alex. 9.9-10); De
Alejandro se dice que era capaz de vaciar la copa de Heracles (Plu., Alex. 75.5)
y Demetrio aparece muchas veces borracho en la vida de Plutarco (Demetr. 19,
52). En gran parte la pasión de los macedonios por el vino estaba originada
23 E. N. B, 1990, p. 242: "e symposium was the arena in which were played out the
sometimes deadly political games of the Macedonians".
24 E. N. B, 1983. La práctica de beber vino puro, ákratos, aparece dos veces en la vida de
Alejandro (Plu., Alex. 39.3; 70.2).
207
Política y confrontación en los banquetes macedonios en la obra de Plutarco
en la importancia que tenían los cultos orgiásticos a Dioniso en Macedonia,
que diferían profundamente de los del resto de Grecia por ser más brutales
(Plu., Alex. 2.9). El exceso de vino es siempre el responsable de numerosas
desgracias o errores a los ojos de Plutarco25 : Átalo insultó a Alejandro por el
vino (Alex. 9); Filipo intentó matar a su hijo porque estaba borracho (Alex .
9.9-10); Alejandro quemó Persépolis por los efectos del vino (Alex. 38.2); el
asesinato de Clito se produjo porque tanto Alejandro como él estaban ebrios
(Alex . 50.9); Calístenes insulta con su discurso a los macedonios tras haber
bebido (Alex. 53.3-4); el vino también está muy presente en la bacanal de
Carmania que Plutarco desaprueba (Alex. 67.1-6.); bebido besa a Bagoas (Alex .
67.7-8); mueren 41 personas por el concurso de bebedores (Plu., Alex. 70.1-2);
Hefestión muere tras beber una jarra de vino (Plu., Alex. 72.2). Solamente
parece haber sido el causante indirecto de una buena acción, el haberle rendido
honores a la estatua de Teodecto, un alumno de Aristóteles (Plu., Alex. 17.9).
Sin embargo, la valoración que tiene Plutarco de Alejandro es muy positiva
pese a su adicción, al contrario que en otras obras, en las que sus protagonistas
también se dejan vencer por los efectos del vino.
Sigue a Aristóbulo de Casandrea cuando dice que bebía por el mero placer
de la conversación (Plu., Alex. 23.1; Arr. VII 29.4), pero más adelante señala que
cuando lo hacía se convertía en un vulgar y jactancioso soldado que era presa
fácil de los aduladores (Plu., Alex. 23.7). La ación a la bebida (φιλοποσία) es
la responsable directa de que Alejandro pierda la moderación (σωφροσύνη)
que anteriormente se había encargado de destacar Plutarco (Alex. 22). Estas
contradicciones son debidas en parte a las distintas fuentes que emplea el
de Queronea de forma directa o indirecta26 . Fuentes totalmente hostiles a la
memoria del macedonio como Epo de Olinto27 que achacaba su muerte a
los excesos con el vino y positivas como Aristóbulo o Cares de Mitilene que
intentó justicar su abuso del alcohol atribuyéndolo a una costumbre india
(Cf. Ath. X 43). Con algunos héroes como Catón, se muestra comprensivo al
decir que su adicción al vino se debía a los asuntos de gobierno que le apartaron
del estudio y de la erudición (Plu., Cat. Ma. 6.1). No obstante, para Plutarco
el vino sería un elemento impuesto por la propia naturaleza de Alejandro. El
calor de su cuerpo es el responsable de que se produzca un buen olor corporal,
pero como contrapartida le obliga a beber en exceso28 .
La diferencia entre el macedonio y los otros protagonistas de las vidas
radicaba en que Plutarco siendo más joven, había escrito un discurso llamado
Sobre Fortuna o virtud de Alejandro. Siguiendo a Onesícrito de Astipalea había
alabado la lantropía del conquistador por haber extendido la paideia griega
entre los pueblos de Asia (328 c-d). Es llamativo que siendo considerado
Alejandro por sus contemporáneos un bárbaro fuese esgrimido como un
25 M. C M, 1999, p.171. Es el exceso el responsable de los vicios y no el vino,
pues Plutarco (Mor. 715 E) admite que puede ser benecioso para el alma de quien sabe beber.
26 J. E. P, 1939; A. E. W, 1955, p. 107.
27 H. B, 1926, p. 161; L. P, 1960, pp. 61-8.
28 Plu., Alex. 4.7.
208
Antonio Ignacio Molina Marín
representante del helenismo. No fue un hecho aislado, otro contemporáneo
de Plutarco, Dión Crisóstomo, ensalzó a Alejandro como un héroe griego29 .
Alejandro era griego porque su paideia lo era.
Se trataba de una visión más positiva de la que daría posteriormente
en su biografía y totalmente diferente de la de T. Livio (IX 17) que había
infravalorado las conquistas de Alejandro por haberlas hecho ante pueblos
afeminados. Mientras que el éxito de los romanos en De Fortuna Romanorum
radica en su virtus y en su fortuna, no en su paideia o lantropía30 .
El Alejandro de la Moralia 328 c-d fue un instrumento de Plutarco para
reivindicar la importancia de la civilización helena en el imperio romano. En el
imperio del macedonio todos los hombres, independientemente de su origen
o raza, podían ser integrados en él, simplemente a través de su educación, algo
que no ocurría en el imperio romano. Este es el motivo por el que Plutarco,
a diferencia de otros ilustres macedonios, muestre una mayor simpatía por
Alejandro, al considerarlo un lósofo que fue capaz de llevar la teoría a la
práctica, pero también al ser un símbolo político.
Si para los romanos era un modelo del emperador, para los griegos de la
segunda sofística era un ejemplo de lo que debía de haber sido un héroe heleno
y en cuyo reinado incluso los orgullosos romanos llegaron mostrarse sumisos
enviándole embajadores31 .
Esto no quiere decir que Plutarco negase el papel y la importancia del
Imperio Romano. Pese a todas sus críticas a los romanos, él mismo justica sus
conquistas y no puede escapar a trasladar su ideología a sus obras. De hecho la
concepción que muestra Plutarco de la lantropía está muy inuenciada por
el concepto romano de la humanitas 32 . La lantropía en el mundo helenístico
era solamente extensible a los súbditos del gobernante, pero en el caso de
Alejandro se dice que pretendía unir a todos los pueblos. Estando más cerca
del concepto romano de la humanitas 33 .
En denitiva, la admiración e importancia de Alejandro de Macedonia
para Plutarco hace que se intenten suavizar algunos rasgos de los banquetes
macedonios que en época clásica e imperial romana podían ser considerados
como propios de un pueblo bárbaro.
bi b l i o g r a f í a c i T a d a
A, W., "Alexander und Achilleus: Ein Bestandsaufnahme", in Zu
Alexander d. Gr. Festschrift G. Wirth, II, Amsterdam, 1988, pp. 657-92.
A, R. S., "Classicism and Romanitas in Plutarch's De Alexandri
Fortuna aut Virtute", AJPh, 126 (2005) 107-25.
29 G. Z, 1984.
30 S-T. T, 2005, pp. 435-6.
31 Arr.VII 15.5.
32 R. S. A, 2005.
33 R. S. A, 2005, p.119.
209
Política y confrontación en los banquetes macedonios en la obra de Plutarco
A, J. Les historiens d'Alexandre, París, 2005.
B, H., Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage, II, Múnich,
1926, pp. 261-2.
B, E. N. "e Symposium at Alexander's Court", AM, 3 (1983) 45-55.
_____ In the Shadow of Olympus. e Emergence of Macedon, Princeton, 1990.
C M, M., "Embriaguez y vida disoluta en las vidas", in J. G. M
C . (eds.), Plutarco, Dioniso y el vino. Actas del VI Simposio
Español sobre Plutarco (Cádiz, 14-16 de Mayo, 1998), Madrid, 1999,
pp.171-80.
H, N. G. L., Alejandro Magno. Rey, general y estadista, Madrid, 1992.
M M, A. I., Geógrafos y geografía en la empresa de Alejandro Magno ,
Tesis doctoral, Universidad de Murcia, 2007.
P, L., e lost histories of Alexander the Great, Nueva York-Oxford,
1960.
P, I., "Ἡ παιδεία τοῦ Μεγάλου Αλεξάνδρου", Parnassos, 35 (1993)
281-91.
P, J. E., "e Sources of Plutarch's Alexander", JHS, 59 (1939) 229-40.
T , W. W., Alexander the Great, II, Cambridge, 1948.
T, S.-T., "Plutarch, Amalgamator of Greece and Rome", in A.
P J & F. T (eds.), Historical and Biographical
Values of Plutarch's works. Studies devoted to Professor Philip A. Stadter by
the International Plutarch Society, Málaga-Utah, 2005, pp. 433-40.
T-A, M., "La tombe macédonienne d'Hagios Athanasios
près de essalonique", in A.-M. G-S . (eds.),
Rois, Cites, Necropoles. Institutions, Rites et Monuments en Macedoine,
MELETHMATA 45, Atenas, 2006, pp. 321-30.
V, J-P., Mito y pensamiento en la Grecia antigua, Barcelona, 1993.
W, A. E., "Plutarch and Alexander", CQ, 49 (1955) 96-107.
Z, G.,"Alessandro Magno nella cultura dell'eta Antonina", in M. S
(ed.), Alessandro Magno tra storia e mito, Milano, 1984, pp.195–212.
211
e Banquets of Alexander
T A
P G F M
University of Barcelona
Abstract
Banquet scenes are often described in Plutarch's Lives. In the Life of Alexander, Plutarch denes
the exemplary prole of the Macedonian king in his relations with others – his companions
and friends and his defeated enemies. e social institution of symposium, so deeply rooted
in the Greek tradition, is used as an instrument to highlight certain aspects of Alexander's
"Greekness", either to contrast them with the customs of the barbarians, or, alternatively, to
conrm that the conqueror fully adopted barbarian ways.
In spite of the fact that Alexander behaves immoderately at banquets, Plutarch neither criticizes
him openly nor censures him; the behaviour should not be taken as belonging to Alexander's
ἦθος, but to the changes that he introduces in the Greek tradition itself.
e ritualized act of sharing food and drink played an important role in
the social, political and religious cohesion of Archaic and Classical Greece,
since the banquet, either public or private, oered an occasion to strengthen
ideological links and friendships1 . Due to the economic outlay that it represented
and the time it required, the private symposium was associated above all with
an aristocratic lifestyle; it was a reunion inter pares in an exclusively masculine
environment2 .
Equally, the size of the group that participated in the symposiac gathering
– and the venue – had a direct eect on the nature of the loyalties inside
the group and on the formation of the corresponding ἑταιρεία, bearing in
mind that the symposium – "un spettacolo a se stesso"3 – became a space that
was outside the polis, with specic rules and norms of its own. Examples are
its distinct treatment of sexuality, both in terms of the homoerotic relations
established among the young in the closed setting of the banquet – in parallel
with the gymnasium and the palaestra –, the creation of a kind of free love
associated with the hetairae and artists who customarily attended symposia,
and the development of forms of ritual exhibitionism and violence inherent in
the event's nal κῶμος 4 .
From the fourth century onwards, the decline of the cities and the changes
in the forms of power were often attributed to the extreme luxury in which
the richest sectors of society lived. is impression was greatly reinforced by
the tales of the fabulous banquets of the Hellenistic monarchies, which were
obvious examples of the transformation that the institution of the symposium
had undergone. is explains why Plutarch speaks so highly of the private
1 Cf. P. S-P, 1992, pp. 13-117.
2 e Etruscans and Romans admitted their wives and daughters to their banquets; the
Greeks regarded this as a clear example of their lack of education and morality; cf. eopomp.
Hist. FGH 115 F 204; Cic., Ver . 2.1.64-66.
3 Cf. L. E. R, 1983.
4 Cf. E. P, 1990, pp. 182-3.
212
Pilar Gómez & Francesca Mestre
banquet as a privileged space where knowledge and friends could meet, a place
where diners come "to share not only meat, wine, and dessert, but conversation,
fun and the amicability that leads to friendship"5 .
e discussions and entertaining talk would take place during the
symposiac stage per se of the banquet6 , in which wine always played a central
role. e wine was not an end in itself but the prologue to speech – in particular,
of the philosophical speech that was an integral part of the symposium and
which brought to the banquet measure and appropriateness (τὸ μέτρον καὶ
τὸν καιρόν)7 . e wine should be mixed with water so that the conversation
and the entertainment could last as long as possible, and to prevent the
misbehaviour that might ensue from excess, distorting the true aim of the
banquet and disrupting the harmony of the meeting. Indeed, the drinking of
pure wine was considered to be a practice of barbarian peoples8 .
e controversial gure of Alexander the Great plays a key role in the
contraposition between the Greek and the non-Greek, and, to an extent,
constitutes a point at which this duality undergoes a change in direction. As
has been noted elsewhere9 , Plutarch's presentation of Alexander changes as his
oeuvre progresses: that is, he does not apply the same analytical parameters in
the Moralia as in his extensive biography of the Macedonian king. In treatises
such as On the fortune of Alexander, inuenced by the rhetorical tradition of
the conqueror and the ideology of the Flavian dynasty, Plutarch presents
a vindication of the Macedonian king whose mission is to carry out a vast
geopolitical project involving the fusion of various territories; later, while
writing the Life, Plutarch appears to enjoy greater freedom in his presentation
of Alexander as a model and reference point for Roman emperors.
In this article we explore the Life of Alexander in order to establish how
and to what extent the banquet – the place in which Plutarch's heroes may
display moral virtues such as φιλία or φιλανθρωπία 10 – contributes to dening
the exemplary prole of the Macedonian king in his relations with others, both
his companions and friends and his defeated enemies. In this way we aim to
determine whether Plutarch uses this social institution, so deeply rooted in the
Greek tradition, as an instrument to highlight certain aspects of Alexander's
"Greekness" and to contrast them with the customs of the barbarians, or,
alternatively, to conrm that the conqueror fully adopted barbarian ways.
5 Cf. Plu., Mor. 660 b: ὁ γὰρ σύνδειπνος οὐκ ὄψου καὶ οἴνου καὶ τραγημάτων μόνον, ἀλλὰ
καὶ λόγων κοινωνὸς ἥκει καὶ παιδιᾶς καὶ φιλοφροσύνης εἰς εὔνοιαν τελευτώσης. Translations
of Table Talks are by Clement & Hoeit (LCL).
6 From the Hellenistic era onwards, however, the contacts rst with Macedonia and later
with Rome linked erudite discussion to the meal; cf. Ath. IV.
7 Cf. Plu., Mor. 613 b. On the connection between wine and the word, see L. R, 2002,
pp. 171-89.
8 Cf. O. M, 1990, p. 6.
9 Cf. L. P, 2000, pp. 385-6.
10 Cf. F. F, 1996, pp. 233-6.
213
e Banquets of Alexander
Banquet scenes are often described in Plutarch's Lives and take on
a variety of functions11 . Following the tradition of Plato and Xenophon,
Plutarch is particularly interested in the ethics of the symposium, presided
over by controlled enjoyment, friendship, and the freedom of speech12 . With
its exibility and its duality (it may be public or private, formal or informal,
comic or tragic) the banquet becomes an appropriate setting for Plutarch's
narration of some of the episodes in the biographies. e banquet serves as
the backdrop for the discussion of political questions, for murdering one's
enemies, for impressing one's friends and one's adversaries – or making fun
of them, or drawing attention to their dierences –, as a meeting-place for
lovers, and so on. e symposium, then, oers Plutarch an ideal opportunity to
reveal the true characters of his heroes, perhaps because it is a context in which
individuals behave in consonance with their true nature13 . is may have been
why Pericles did not attend the banquets in the homes of his friends during
his political career: "Conviviality is prone break down and over power the
haughtiest reserve, and in familiar intercourse the dignity which is assumed
for appearance's sake is very hard to maintain"14 .
In the Life of Alexander banquet scenes appear time and again to highlight
the conduct, culture and character of its protagonist, whose liking for wine
in fact formed part of his legend15 . Plutarch devotes one of his Table Talks (I
6) to Alexander's drinking, and reports that the conversation with Philinus
and others was indeed on the πολυποσία of the Macedonian king, but in the
sense that "he did not drink excessively, but did spend much time in drinking
and conversing with his friends"16 . Nonetheless, Plutarch's Philinus denies
this, stating that in the royal Journal, compiled by Eumenes of Cardia and
Diodotus of Erithras, "it is written, 'after a bout of drinking Alexander slept
this day through', sometimes with the addition of 'and the following day also'.
Accordingly he was very lazy about love-making, though his bold and choleric
temperament indicated a hot-natured body"17 . Plutarch also states that one of
the reasons why Callisthenes earned himself the enmity of Alexander was that
he did not share the king's liking for pure wine, remarking "that he did not
wish to drink from Alexander's cup and so stand in need of Asclepius's"18 .
11 Cf. G. P, 1991 who presents a catalogue of anecdotes that took place during the
celebration of a banquet in the Parallel Lives; cf. also L. R, 2002, p.173.
12 Cf. T. W, 2002, p. 182.
13 Cf. F. T , 1999, p. 499.
14 Cf. Plu., Per. 7.5.
15 Cf. Ath. 434 b; Ael., VH 3.23.
16 Cf. Plu., Mor. 623 d: λόγος ἦν περὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ βασιλέως ὡς οὐ πολὺ πίνοντος ἀλλὰ
πολὺν χρόνον ἐν τῷ πίνειν καὶ διαλέγεσθαι τοῖς φίλοις ἕλκοντος.
17 Ibidem 623 e: ἀπεδείκνυεν δ' αὐτοὺς φλυαροῦντας Φιλῖνος ἐκ τῶν βασιλικῶν
ἐφημερίδων, ἐν αἷς συνεχέστατα γέγραπται καὶ πλειστάκις ὅτι 'τήνδε τὴν ἡμέραν ἐκ τοῦ πότου
καθεύδων' ἔστι δ' ὅτε 'καὶ τὴν ἐφεξῆς'· διὸ καὶ πρὸς τὰς συνουσίας ἀργότερος ἦν, ὀξὺς δὲ καὶ
θυμοειδὴς ἅπερ ἐστὶ σωματικῆς θερμότητος.
18 Ibidem 624 a: δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ Καλλισθένης ἐν διαβολῇ γενέσθαι πρὸς αὐτόν, ὡς δυσχεραίνων
συνδειπνεῖν διὰ τὸν πότον· ἐπεὶ καὶ κύλικα λεγομένην Ἀλεξάνδρου μεγάλην ἐλθοῦσαν ἐπ'
214
Pilar Gómez & Francesca Mestre
Let us look now at several particularly signicant episodes in Macedonia,
Persepolis and Samarkand.
In Plutarch's Life, the rst banquet that serves as the background to a
manifestation of Alexander's character is the one held at the Macedonian
court to mark the wedding of Philip to the young Cleopatra, after the king's
repudiation of Olympias on suspicion of indelity. In this symposiac scene
– devoid of any amicable conversation – it is Alexander's antagonists who
are inebriate. Despite his youth, Alexander reveals a passionate and spirited
nature (θυμοειδής )19 as he defends his legitimate status as heir to the
Macedonian throne; he insults Attalus and laughs at his father who is too
drunk to stand up, while he, Alexander, appears to be unaected by the wine.
Attalus, the uncle of the bride, "being in his cups" (ἐν τῷ πότῳ μεθύων ,
Alex. 9.7)20 , proposes an ill-chosen toast, urging the Macedonians to pray
to the gods to bless the union of Philip and Cleopatra with an heir to the
throne. Alexander, beside himself with fury (παροξυνθείς ), hurls a goblet at
him and shouts at him: "But what of me, base wretch? Dost thou take me
for a bastard?"21 . Hearing this insult, Philip stands up, his sword in his hand,
and makes for his son, but, "fortunately for both, his anger and his wine
made him trip and fall". Alexander, in his insolence (ἐφυβρίζων) exclaims
sarcastically: "Look now, men! here is one who was preparing to cross from
Europe into Asia; and he is upset in trying to cross from couch to couch"22 .
is scene conrms, then, that the explosiveness of Alexander's character is
due to his nature, not due to his liking for wine.
After describing Alexander's extraordinary triumph at the battle of
Issus (333 BC), Plutarch briey interrupts his narration of historical events
to highlight Alexander's exemplary treatment of the Persian royal captives –
Darius' mother, his wife, and his two unmarried daughters. With them the
Macedonian victor behaves chivalrously and keeps his word (τοῦ λόγου ταῖς
γυναιξὶν ἡμέρου καὶ χρηστοῦ φανέντος, Alex . 22.3), and is above all humane
in his actions (ἔτι μᾶλλον τὰ τῶν ἔργων ἀπήντα φιλάνθρωπα , ibidem). e
meeting takes place when Alexander is going to dine. Despite the daughters'
extraordinary beauty, the Macedonian treats them with respect and does not
even deprive them of honours, since – in the opinion of Plutarch – "it would
seem, considering the mastery of himself a more kingly thing that the conquests
of his enemies"23 . Alexander also shows presence of mind in his treatment of
the other captives, who also have a ne bearing: "Persian women were torments
to the eyes." – he says – but Plutarch adds that the king "displaying in rivalry
αὐτὸν ἀπεώσατο φήσας οὐκ ἐθέλειν Ἀλεξάνδρου πιὼν Ἀσκληπιοῦ δεῖσθαι. is anecdote is
also found in Athenaeus (X 434 d).
19 Cf. T. D , 1999, p. 85.
20 Translations of Life of Alexander are by Perrin (LCL).
21 Cf. Plu., Alex. 9.8.
22 Ibidem 9.10.
23 Ibidem 21.7.
215
e Banquets of Alexander
with their fair looks the beauty of his own sobriety and self-control, he passed
them by as though they were lifeless images for display"24 .
In this same context Plutarch devotes an entire chapter to Alexander's
conception of drinking and banqueting. In an echo of the Table Talk (I 6)
Plutarch now says that Alexander spent a long time on each drink, devoting
more time to talking than to drinking, and drinking only in times of leisure,
"for in the stress of aairs he was not be detained, as others commanders were,
either by wine, or sleep, or any sport, or amour, or spectacle"25 . So, Plutarch
presents Alexander as a perfect host, concerned that his guests be served as
equals and in abundance, and repeats that the drinking was spread over a long
period of time, for the sake of the conversation26 .
However, Plutarch recognizes in the next paragraph of the Life that
under the eects of wine the Macedonian conqueror acts like any other soldier
and abandons himself to boasting and adulation, to such an extent that the
success of the banquet is put at risk. is places the diners of a ner spirit in a
particularly awkward situation, wishing neither to compete with the atterers
nor to appear reticent in their praise, since the former course appears shameful
to them and the latter dangerous27 . After the bout of drinking, Alexander
would wash and sleep profoundly until midday, and on occasion would spend
the entire day asleep, as we saw in the Table Talk mentioned above28 .
Excessive drinking can lead to the death of somebody, as in the case of
Cleitus, in an episode which Whitmarsh29 considers emblematic of Alexander's
progressive decline into barbary and which reveals how Alexander has begun
his slide into decadence by renouncing Greek austerity for Eastern luxury. It
is no coincidence that the episode occurs after Alexander has begun to adopt
Persian dress and other attributes30 . In this scene, Alexander runs Cleitus
through with a spear; Cleitus, "who was already drunk and naturally of a
harsh temper and wilful" (ἤδη μεθύων, καὶ φύσει τραχὺς ὢν πρὸς ὀργὴν καὶ
αὐθάδης, Alex . 50.9), had rebuked the Macedonian king for allowing diners at
the banquet to sing verses mocking the Macedonian generals who had recently
been defeated by the barbarians at the siege of the acropolis of Maracanda31 . Far
from the camaraderie and relaxed atmosphere characteristic of a banquet, the
confrontation between Alexander and Cleitus, his loyal friend and companion
who had even saved his life at the battle of the Granicus, provokes uproar. e
24 Ibidem 21.10. e good treatment given by Alexander to the Persian captives is also
recorded in Ps.-Callisth. II 22.
25 Ibidem 23.1-2.
26 Ibidem 23.6. Plutarch (Mor. 620 a-622 b) devotes the fth question of the rst book of
the Table Talks to a discussion of the ideal nature of the director of a banquet, a gure who was
essential to the success of the celebration; cf. P. G M. J, 1999, pp. 261-3.
27 Ibidem 23.7.
28 Cf. Plu., Mor. 623 e; Ath. X 434 b.
29 Cf. T. W, 2002, p. 182.
30 Cf. Plu., Alex. 45.
31 Cf. Arr., An. IV 3.7.
216
Pilar Gómez & Francesca Mestre
king commands Cleitus to be silent, but Cleitus refuses, and invites Alexander
"to speak out freely what he wished to say, or else not to invite to supper men
who were free and spoke their minds, but to live with Barbarians and slaves,
who would do obeisance to his white tunic and Persian girdle"32 .
Plutarch places side by side the freedom of speech – the παρρησία as a
key component of the Greek symposium33 – and the verbal or physical violence
deriving from a lack of self-control in both Cleitus and Alexander. It is also
interesting to see how Cleitus celebrates this banquet context, understood as
a free conversation between equals, as the centre of "his" model of Hellenicity
which he refuses to abandon in order to follow his king. Cleitus formulates this
explicitly, speaking "in all boldness" (τοιαῦτα τοῦ Κλείτου παρρησιαζομένου ,
Alex. 51.3), and saying that he envies the Macedonians who died before seeing
Alexander give way to Persians and Medes. However, at the same time, Plutarch
seems to suggest that Alexander has his own model of Hellenicity which,
going beyond the norms of an ancient institution such as the banquet, consists
precisely in integrating new lands inside the Hellenic structure. Cleitus's death
at the hands of Alexander during the banquet is an example of excess against
the moderation, restraint, kindness and friendship which, for Plutarch, should
always preside over the relations between the participants at a symposium: a
death that represents everything that Alexander's model of Hellenicity wishes
to leave behind. It is clear that in this celebration it is not the word as a vehicle
for education that conditions action, but violence; but since Plutarch is not
excessively critical of this violence, what the episode in fact shows, in our view,
is the diculty of adapting the immutability of the Hellenic to the outside
world, to the context beyond the classical polis; a new context in which Greeks,
Macedonians and Barbarians act at the same level.
In Plutarch's account – the episode has not survived in the version by
Diodorus Siculus – it is Cleitus who provokes the king with words. Alexander
responds with actions, and there is no doubt that his reaction is excessive.
Plutarch, however, wishes to excuse Alexander: the act was performed in a
moment of fury, when he had lost control of his senses. So, like Ajax when he
realizes that he has not killed Odysseus, Alexander, when he realizes what he
has done and comes to himself (γενόμενος παρ' ἑαυτῷ , Alex. 51.11), tries to
commit suicide, only to be prevented by his companions and friends; he spends
the night weeping and the next day says not a word until the philosophers
Callisthenes and Anaxarchus of Abdera are brought to him to alleviate his
suering. Anaxarchus consoles Alexander for the murder saying that Zeus
also has Dike and emis seated next to him, so that all that is done by a king
appears legitimate and just34 . Nonetheless, in the treatise To an uneducated ruler
Plutarch presents Anaxarchus as an example of a attering philosopher; he
states that a sovereign should be more afraid of doing wrong than suering
32 Cf. Plu., Alex. 51.5.
33 Cf. W. R, 1995, pp. 108-9.
34 Plutarch's contemporary Dio of Prusa compares the government of a good king with that
of Zeus as well, cf. D.Chr. I 37-41, II 75-78, III 51-53, IV 40-43.
217
e Banquets of Alexander
it, while before Alexander "neither correct nor helpful were the means he
[Anaxarchus] took in endeavouring to heal the king's remorse for his sin, by
encouraging him to further acts of the same sort"35 . Underlying this anecdote,
however – and going beyond the strictly literal interpretation – we nd one of
the favourite themes not only of Plutarch but of other writers of the era: the
virtues of the good ruler. Naturally enough, one of the virtues of the good ruler
is the ability to impose his will when necessary, in spite of the opposition of
those around him36 , even if a certain amount of violence is required.
So, as we have seen, , Plutarch excuses Alexander of the murder of Cleitus,
which he considers to have occurred not "of set purpose, but through some
misfortune of the king" (οὐκ ἀπὸ γνώμης, ἀλλὰ δυστυχίᾳ τινὶ , Alex. 50.2). In
justifying the king's behaviour, then, Plutarch just links the king's misfortune
(δυστυχία ) to Cleitus' destiny (δαίμων). In the same way, Cleitus also had
attributed the defeat of the Macedonian generals sent to put down the revolt
in the Sogdian region to misfortune (δυστυχία ) 37 not to cowardice (δειλία ),
when he tried to restore the honour of the fallen in the face of the scorn
heaped on them by the other diners – which Alexander did nothing to stop
(Alex . 50.9-10). In so doing, Cleitus only brings on his own death38 .
e recognition of his murder leaves Alexander speechless and lled with
remorse. In this way, also, Plutarch maintains the link between philosophy –
that is, philosophical themes and the men who devote themselves to them
– and the banquet, understood as a space in which philosophy veries in
fact (ἔργῳ) what the word (λόγος) teaches, as proof of its value as a vehicle
for education, as it is presented in Table Talk I 39 . However, in the biography,
and facing such a problematic aair, Plutarch wishes to make clear that the
position of philosophers is not always convenient: Anaxarchus is blamed
for increasing Alexander's vanity and lawlessness, and for being indulgent
with his whims, whereas Callisthenes, after the death of Cleitus, alleviates
the king's pain by considerate and gentle methods, employing insinuations
and circumlocutions (ἠθικῶς ἐπειρᾶτο καὶ πρᾴως ὑποδυόμενος τῷ λόγῳ
καὶ περιϊὼν ἀλύπως λαβέσθαι τοῦ πάθους, Alex . 52.3)40 . us, Anaxarchus is
described as arrogant and inconsiderate towards his associates, a philosopher
who had always followed a path of his own – in clear contrast to Callisthenes,
who nally falls foul of the Macedonian king in spite of giving clear signs of
35 Cf. Plu., Mor. 781 b. However, in Mor. 331 e, Plutarch reports that Anaxarchus was
the friend that Alexander held in most esteem – precisely as an example of the king's love of
wisdom.
36 Cf. D.Chr. II 71-72.
37 Cf. F. M P. G, 2005, on the meaning of τύχη in the Parallel Lives.
38 Cf. Plu., Alex. 52.4. Nonetheless, on another occasion, Plutarch describes Cleitus as an
example of vainglory ("when he had scuttled three or four Greek triremes at Amorgos, caused
himself to be proclaimed Poseidon and carried a trident", Mor. 338 a), which he contrasts with
Alexander's sobriety in matters of state, "nor was he made drunk nor led to revelling by authority
and power" (Mor. 337 f).
39 Cf. Plu., Mor. 613 c; L. R, 2002, p. 275; E. S , 2005, p. 480.
40 Cf. J. M. M, 1988, pp. 88-90.
218
Pilar Gómez & Francesca Mestre
leading an ordered, dignied and independent life, and in spite of his renown
as an orator41 .
Perhaps for this reason Plutarch uses the gure of Callisthenes to question
Alexander's adoption of the Persian custom of προσκύνησις or obeisance. is
custom was an act of homage in recognition of the sovereign's rank, but it was
interpreted by the Greeks as an exaggerated act of veneration, treating the king
as a god. On the subject of the obeisance, Plutarch notes that Callisthenes
was the only man who in the presence of Alexander "rehearsed in public the
reasons for the indignation which all the oldest and best of the Macedonians
cherished in secret"42 . Like Cleitus, Callisthenes became the victim of his own
παρρησία by acting ill-manneredly, appearing to want to force the king, rather
than to persuade him, to give up this barbarian custom.
Callisthenes' open rejection of obeisance appears again during the banquet,
when Alexander, after drinking, hands the cup to a friend who takes it, makes
obeisance to the king, kisses him and resumes his place on the couch. All the
guests do the same, until it is Callisthenes' turn; he takes the cup, drinks, and
goes towards the king to kiss him. Informed by Demetrius that Callisthenes
had not honoured him, Alexander refuses the kiss –Plutarch notes that
Alexander had been distracted, conversing with Hephaestion.
Alexander's friends – men like Hephaestion, Lysimachus and Hagnon
– close ranks around him; Callisthenes is the object of slander and false
accusations and is implicated by his detractors in Hermolaus' failed conspiracy
against Alexander43 . Callisthenes's refusal to make obeisance "by refusing
sturdily and like a philosopher to perform the act" (ἰσχυρῶς καὶ φιλοσόφως ,
54.3), is interpreted by Whitmarsh not so much as an ethical analysis of
Alexander's conduct, already contaminated by barbarian practices, but as an
example of how philosophy resists submitting to power44 ; again we see how
the ancient model of the banquet, an ideal institution for "philosophy", seems
to have diculty in maintaining its position in a new context. Nonetheless,
on another occasion, Cassander incurs the wrath of Alexander by laughing at
some barbarians making obeisance to their king, since he "had been reared as
a Greek and had never seen such a sight as this before"45 . Again, Greek and
Barbarian customs are found in opposition in the context of the banquet.
An excess of wine is also present in Alexander's death. e king has
overcome his grief for the death of Hephaestion – also caused by drinking
"a huge cooler of wine"46 . In the biography, after participating in a splendid
41 Cf. Plu., Alex. 53.1.
42 Ibidem 54.3.
43 Hermolaus, son of Macedonian nobles, was a member of Alexander's bodyguard. He
was severely punished for outing protocol during a hunt. Seeking vengeance, he and his
companions agreed to kill the monarch while he slept. Hermolaus may also have been urged on
by the philosophers who disapproved of Alexander's orientalization (cf. Arr., An. IV 13.2).
44 Cf. T. W, 2002, p. 184.
45 Cf. Plu., Alex. 74.3.
46 Ibidem, 72.2.
219
e Banquets of Alexander
banquet in honour of Nearchus, Alexander is persuaded by Medius to attend
another feast where he drinks all night and the following day: Plutarch states
that Alexander did not nish "the bowl of Heracles", but fell victim to a high
fever, and felt a great thirst; he drank wine and became delirious, until nally
he died47 . However, Diodorus Siculus states that at this feast, which Alexander
attended in the company of his friend Medius, the king drank a large quantity
of pure wine48 , and drank a great bowl of Heracles, down to the last drop49.
e barbarization of Alexander mentioned in some of the passages
above – all of them related to the symposiac context: interdict of παρρησία ;
obligation of προσκύνησις; drinking pure wine, … – contrasts with the respect
for Greek tradition that, in Plutarch's account, the Macedonian king displays
in Persepolis, also during the course of a celebration. During a feast, the Attic
courtesan aïs proposed that they set re to the palace of Xerxes in order to
avenge the burning of Athens during the Persian invasion of the fth century
BC. Alexander is easily persuaded, and he himself "with a garland on his head
and a torch in his hand, led them the way"50 . Plutarch suggests that there were
several reasons for his action, among them the fact that burning the palace
and destroying it was a clear sign of the will of someone who is not intending
to settle in barbarian lands – perhaps it is no coincidence that the episode of
the palace re occurs just before Alexander adopts Persian dress51 . For this
reason, Plutarch states that the Macedonian king repented immediately and
ordered the re to be put out52 . Again, the version of Diodorus Siculus diers
here, as he presents Alexander in a much more exalted state because of the
drink consumed at the splendid feasts that he prepared for his friends, at the
head of a Dionysiac retinue which, led by aïs, set re to the Persian royal
palace53 .
Alexander's conduct in the symposiac context does not reveal an
exemplary paradigm of the Greek tradition. He is by no means a model guest
or a magnicent host. For Plutarch, the director of the feast must be a good
drinker, neither inclined to drunkenness nor an enemy of wine; he must be
aware that he is leading a group of friends; he must make it possible for the
guests to engage in serious discussion and jocular speech; and, like a pleasant
wine, without being sour, should have a natural tendency towards gravity
47 Ibidem 75.6. In the narration of the king's death, Plutarch explicitly mentions his source,
Aristobulus, as he considers that other versions have been invented by those who felt it necessary
to create a tragic end, worthy of a great drama.
48 Alexander also served pure wine at the wedding of his companions celebrated at Susa
with a splendid banquet for nine thousand guests, each one of whom was given a gold cup for
the libations; cf. Plu. Alex. 70.3
49 Cf. D.S. XVII 117.
50 Cf. Plu., Alex. 38.6.
51 Ibidem 45; cf. D.S. XVII 77.
52 Cf. Plu., Alex. 38.8.
53 Cf. D.S. XVII 72; Arr. An. III 8.
220
Pilar Gómez & Francesca Mestre
and austerity, which will make him respectable; but as the wine softens and
smooths him, his temper will be pleasant and agreeable54 .
For all these reasons, even though Plutarch repeatedly justies Alexander's
conduct in the symposium – so often lacking in restraint – it is signicant that
in one of the few symposiac scenes in the Life of Alexander in which drink
is associated with the moment after dinner when the conversation proper
begins55 (a discussion of climate and the temperature of the atmosphere), one
of the interlocutors should be Callisthenes56 , the king's friend, but also the
victim of his wrath.
As many scholars have noted57 , the historical value of the Life of Alexander
suers from a clear inconsistency. More than a biography, the account appears
to be dominated by a taste for adventure and character analysis of the hero,
whose successes Plutarch is keen to portray as due not to the whims of Fortune
but to the protagonist's eorts and character. In this biography, then, the writer
attempts to defend Alexander against his detractors even to the extent of
justifying inexcusable acts – as we have highlighted in the case of the death of
Cleitus or the king's animadversion towards Callisthenes – although on other
occasions his tone is openly critical58 .
e Life of Alexander, then, describes several occasions on which Alexander
behaves immoderately at banquets. Plutarch, however, neither criticizes him
openly nor censures him; the behaviour should not be taken perhaps as belonging
to Alexander's ἦθος , but to the changes that he introduces in the Greek tradition
itself. It is, in our opinion relevant, that, in his attempt to dene Alexander as
a king and as the man that has hellenized the world, Plutarch chooses the
frame of the banquet to show his signicant ἦθος , with all the hesitations and
contradictions that such an achievement involves. Alexander seems to be obliged
to kill Cleitus but immediately after he feels regret over the loss of a friend; he
imposes προσκύνησις as a sign of obeisance even if he knows that it is something
ridiculous for a Greek; he wants to burn the Palace of Xerxes to revenge the
burning of Athens but puts out the re immediately. It is as if Alexander were
forced to restrain his natural being in order to succeed in his hellenizing goal.
54 Cf. Plu., Mor. 620 a-622 b; and supra note 26.
55 Cf. P . A. S, 1999, for an analysis of how in the Table Talks Plutarch tells his
contemporaries of the advantages of those symposia in which the drinking of wine was
combined with good conversation, but does not directly attack the dissipation and drunkenness
that characterized certain circles in his times.
56 Cf. Plu., Alex. 52.8.
57 Cf. J. S, 2000, pp. 313-16.
58 Cf. Plu., Alex. 42.4, where Plutarch states that Alexander was increasingly preoccupied
with his fame rather than with his life or his kingdom, and therefore behaved cruelly and
inexorably; or 57.3, where he states that at the time of the preparations for the invasion of India,
Alexander was feared by his men because of the terrible punishments he meted out.
221
e Banquets of Alexander
In fact, these banquet scenes, in our view, stress two interrelated themes:
rst, the model of Hellenicity, and therefore of Hellenization, that Alexander
wishes to impose; and second, the virtues of the good ruler – an issue of
particular interest to the authors of the Empire59 . e banquet, then, can be
taken as a symbol of the ancient Hellenic institutions, the institutions which
Alexander will now adapt in his attempts to make the Hellenic universal.
W o r k s c i T e d
D, T., Plutarch's Lives. Exploring Virtue and Vice, Oxford, 1999.
F, F., Histoire et morale dans les Vies parallèles de Plutarque, Paris, 1996.
G, P. & J, M., "La risa y el vino en los escritos simposíacos de
Plutarco", in J. G. M C . (eds.), Plutarco, Dioniso y el
vino, Actas del VI Simposio Español sobre Plutarco (Cádiz, 14-16 de
Mayo, 1998), Madrid, 1999, pp. 255-67.
M, F. G, P ., "Tyche e individuo: ambigüedad de usos en las
Vidas Paralelas de Plutarco", in A. P J & F. T
(eds.), Valori letterari delle Opere di Plutarco. Studi oerti al Professore
Italo Gallo dall' International Plutarch Society, Málaga-Utah, 2005, pp.
295-306.
M, O. (ed.), Sympotica. A symposium on the Symposion, Oxford, 1990.
M, J. M., "Tragedy and Epic in Plutarch's Alexander", JHS, 108 (1988)
83-93.
P, G., "Symposia and Deipna in Plutarch's Lives and in Other Historical
Writings", in W. J. S (ed.), Dining in a Classical Context: Contrast
and Parallels, Ann Arbor, 1991, pp. 157-69.
P, E., "Outlines of a Morphology of Sympotic Entertainment", in O.
M (ed.), Sympotica. A symposium on the Symposion, Oxford, 1990,
pp. 177-83.
P, L., "L'Alessandro di Plutarco (Riessioni su De Al. Magn. Fort. e su
Alex.)", in L. V S (ed.), Rhetorical eory and Praxis in
Plutarch, Leuven, 2000, pp. 375-86.
R, L., Philosophes entre mots et mets. Plutarque, Lucien et Athénée autour de
la table de Platon, Grenoble, 2002.
R, W., "Wine and Truth in the Greek Symposion", in O. M & M.
T (eds.), In vino veritas, Oxford, 1995, pp. 106-12.
59 Alexander is in fact the protagonist of two of Dio of Prusa's speeches on kingship: one of
them (Or. II) is a dialogue between a young Alexander and his father Philip, while the other (Or .
IV) evokes a meeting between the king and Diogenes the Cynic.
222
Pilar Gómez & Francesca Mestre
R, L. E., "Il simposio greco arcaico e classico come spettacolo a se stesso",
in Centro di studi sul teatro medioevale e rinascimentale (eds.), Spettacoli
conviviali dall'antichità classica alle corti italiane del' 400. Atti del VII
Convegno di Studio, Viterbo, 1983, pp. 41-50.
S-P, P., La cité au banquet, Rome, 1992.
S, J., Plutarque, Paris, 2000.
S, P . A., "Drinking, Table-Talk, and Plutarch's Contemporaries", in J. G.
M . (eds.), Plutarco, Dioniso y el vino, Actas del VI Simposio
Español sobre Plutarco (Cádiz, 14-16 de Mayo, 1998), Madrid, 1999,
pp. 481-90.
S T, E., "Diálogo, losofía y simposio en Plutarco", in M.
J . (eds.), Plutarc a la seva època: paideia i societat. Actas del
VIII Simposio español sobre Plutarco, Barcelone, 2005, pp. 463-84.
T, F., "Everything to do with Dionysus", in J. G. M C
. (eds.), Plutarco, Dioniso y el vino. Actas del VI Simposio Español
sobre Plutarco (Cádiz, 14-16 de Mayo, 1998), Madrid, 1999, pp. 491-
99.
W, T., "Alexander's Hellenism and Plutarch's Textualism", CQ , 52
(2002) 174-92.
223
e disruption of an imperial banquet by angry soldiers in Plutarch's Otho
cr o s s i n g s T a T u s b a r r i e r s : T h e d i s r u p T i o n o f a n i m p e r i a l
b a n q u e T b y a n g r y s o l d i e r s i n p l u T a r c h 's oT H o
L B
Radboud University of Nijmegen
Abstract
In his Life of Otho, chapter 3, Plutarch describes a dinner that the emperor Otho had with 80
senators, some of whom had brought their ladies with them. e dinner was disturbed by soldiers
of the praetorian guard, who felt very uneasy and distrustful against the senators, and thought
that they had to save the emperor from a senatorial conspiracy after having seen weapons loaded
upon wagons. Violating the exclusivity of the imperial dinner, in other words breaking through
an important status barrier, they inverted the positive eect of this great banquet, and thus
damaged Otho's reputation among the upper classes beyond repair. In Plutarch's Galba and
Otho, which should be read as one opus, this dinner story negatively inverts an important means
of imperial representation and thus indicates how weak Otho's position really was. It presents as
well a clear symptom of the serious deterioration of military discipline that in this year of civil
strife (AD 68-69) manifested itself and may be seen as a consequence of bad leadership at the
top (by Galba and Otho) and at the second level of authority (by people such as Nymphidius
Sabinus, Vinius, Laco, Icelus and Otho's cronies). By choosing an imperial banquet, which should
be a place of friendship with high status amici Caesaris, a show-case of imperial power and
paideia, and a mirror of hierarchies within the urban Roman elite, as the scene where the utter
escalation of military misbehaviour and the total loss of imperial authority over the military mob
came to light, Plutarch accentuates the social and representational importance of such banquets.
In Otho 3.3-7 Plutarch tells us that near Rome soldiers of the praetorian
guard became suspicious when they noticed that weapons were loaded on
wagons (probably to equip soldiers who were to participate in the war against
the Vitellians, LdB). Some soldiers attacked the wagons, others killed two
centurions who opposed them, as well as Crispinus, the higher ocer in charge.
Apparently the soldiers thought that a coup against the emperor Otho was at
hand, which they wanted to prevent. e whole mob, putting themselves in
array and exhorting one another to go to the help of the emperor, marched to
Rome. Here, learning that eighty senators were at supper with Otho – some
of them with their wives – they rushed to the palace, declaring that now was a
good time to take o all the emperor's enemies at one stroke. In the palace there
was dire perplexity, which fell upon Otho and his guests, who kept their eyes
xed upon him in speechless terror. But he sent the prefects of the guard with
orders to explain matters to the soldiers and appease them, while at the same
time he dismissed his guests by another door; and they barely made their escape
as the soldiers, forcing their way through the guards into the great hall, asked
what was become of the enemies of Caesar. In this crisis, then, Otho stood
up on his couch, and after many exhortations, and entreaties, and not without
plentiful tears, at last succeeded in sending them away (Plutarch, Otho 3.4-7).
Is this just a minor episode in a chaotic year, the year of the four emperors,
which was full of usurpations, civil strife, killing and plundering? Why does
Plutarch give us this dinner story, in this very short biography of Otho, when he
could have opted for seemingly more important things, such as heroic episodes
in battles and sieges, or political upheavals, or other spectacular events? It is
well known that Plutarch in his Alexander 1.2 explicitly indicates that the
description of the ethos, the character, of his heroes was his primary goal, and
that trivial things sometimes showed this better than battles and sieges would
do. However, this episode is more than such a trivial detail. e suspicious
behaviour of some praetorians, who saw weapons being loaded on wagons, and
the ensuing disruption of Otho's banquet by soldiers of the praetorian guard
is also treated with some emphasis and in full detail by Tacitus, and is more
briey mentioned by Suetonius and Cassius Dio1 . So four important authors
or their sources considered this disruption of Otho's dinner an important event,
important enough to insert it in their account of Otho's reign. is should not
come as a surprise to us. Banquets were of great consequence in Roman social
life, they gave the rich and powerful opportunities to show o, to trumpet their
own standing, as John Donahue puts it (Donahue 2004, 113). e sharing of
food with people of lower status, with equals or among large numbers was a
constant feature of social and cultural elite life in Rome and other Roman towns
(ibid. 116) and attending dinners gave plenty of opportunities to communicate
with equals, or with people of higher or lower standing, to men as well as
women. As recently published works have shown, to Roman emperors dinners
were an important means to share opinions with senators and other important
people, and to show their good character. Imperial dinners were show-cases of
imperial gratia and paideia, and unveiled existing hierarchies within the upper
layers of society2 . To give dinners in the right and proper way was one of many
means through which emperors could enhance their reputation; it was one of
many ritualized standard practices that enabled emperors to show that they
were the right persons in the right place, in other words, could legitimize their
position. Other such standard practices were sessions of the senate presided
by the emperor, adlocutiones, adventus, or even better, triumphal processions,
which showed the emperors' military prowess. Yet other ones were salutationes,
receiving embassies, distributing congiaria or donativa and attending the games
at Rome. Some of those standard practices, such as adlocutiones, adventus, and
liberalitates, were regularly propagated on coins, in inscriptions, or even in
sculpture (think of Trajan's arch at Beneventum), but other ones, like imperial
dinners, stayed outside this form of imperial representation. e reason must be
that the elite audience that was involved could be present personally or could
hear about it rst hand, and that other people had nothing to do with it. In
this respect imperial dinners were an in-crowd form of imperial representation
1 Tacitus, Histories 1.80-82; Suetonius, Otho 8.1f.; Cassius Dio 64.9.2. See K. V, 2004,
p. 347 and E. S-H, 2005, p. 49.
2 See J. F. D, 2004, pp. 67-72; K. V, 2004, pp. 265-539; E. S-H,
2005, pp. 41-55. In general on Roman upper class banquets see J. D'A, 1999; K. M. D.
D, 2003; J. F. D, 2004, esp. 113 and 116; K. V, 2004, pp. 187-264; E.
S-H, 2005.
225
e disruption of an imperial banquet by angry soldiers in Plutarch's Otho
aiming at a very limited group of senators and other important high status
people. So in this case there was a status barrier, which precluded any other
people. General advertisement of this type of ritualized standard practice
would destroy its exclusive character and break the status barrier.
Ritualized standard practices can be transposed to dierent contexts,
or even inverted into their reverses, in a kind of dynamic of rituals. In this
way an author can attack and de-legitimize a ruler, by inverting the standard
practices through which he usually shows his prowess, eectiveness, liberality
and culture into their negative counterparts. Just one example. e author of
the Historia Augusta, who clearly wished to give an utterly negative image of
the emperor Elagabalus, portrays him giving an adlocutio to the prostitutes of
Rome, instead of to the military (HA, Vita Heliogabali 26.3-4). Adlocutio was an
important ritualized standard practice of emperors going to war3 , but instead
Elagabalus is portrayed as plunging into every kind of debauchery instead
after his oration to the prostitutes. In Historia Augusta 26.3-4 we read:
He gathered together in a public building all the harlots from the Circus, the
theatre, the Stadium, and all other places of amusement, and from the public
baths, and then delivered a speech to them, as one might to soldiers, calling
them 'comrades' (commilitones, LdB) and discoursing upon various kinds of
postures and debaucheries4 .
A second example is Nero's triumphal procession after his voyage through
Greece during which he won many prizes at the great Greek games. e
procession was about victories in Greek games, not about successful battles
and sieges. Soldiers forming a special guard, the augustiani, had to act as a
kind of claque, which had to praise Nero's qualities as a performer at the
Greek games. Nero may have staged the procession himself, thinking it would
enhance his reputation of a cultured and educated ruler, but if this was the case
it completely backred, for this triumphal procession is utterly condemned
by the literary sources in which it is described, which must echo upper class
feelings in Rome5 . In Nero 25.1 Suetonius tells us:
… but at Rome he (= Nero) rode in the chariot which Augustus had used in his
triumphs in days gone by, and wore a purple robe and a Greek cloak adorned
with stars of gold, bearing on his head the Olympic crown, and in his right
hand the Pythian, while the rest were carried before him with inscriptions
telling where he had won them and against what competitors, and giving the
3 A ne example of the propagation of an adlocutio in Severan times is depicted on a
medallion published by F. G, 1912, II, pl. 93,8. See M. C, 1997, p. 10.
4 HA, Vita Elagabali 26.3-4: Omnes de circo, de theatre, de Stadio, et omnibus locis et balneis
meretrices collegit in aedes publicas et apud eas contionem habuit quasi militarem, dicens eas
commilitones, disputavitque de generibus schematum et voluptatum. See on this emperor and his
image in ancient and modern literature M. I, "Heliogabalus, a Monster on the Roman
rone. e Literary Construction of a Bad Emperor", in I. S & R. M. R (eds.),
KAKOS. Badness and Anti-Values in Classical Antiquity, Leiden, 2008, forthcoming.
5 On Nero's voyage to Greece (AD 67) see Suetonius, Nero 22-26 and Cassius Dio 63.8-9.
titles of the songs or the subject of the plays. His car was followed by his claque
and by the escort of a triumphal procession, who shouted that they were the
attendants of Augustus and the soldiers of his triumphs6 .
In his Life of Otho, chapter 3, Plutarch gives us another example. Otho's
high status dinner with 80 senators and their ladies was disturbed by soldiers,
who felt very uneasy and distrustful, especially against the senators, and
thought that they had to save the emperor from a senatorial conspiracy as soon
as they had seen weapons loaded upon wagons. Violating the exclusivity of the
imperial dinner, in other words breaking through an important status barrier,
they inverted the positive eect of this great banquet, and thus damaged Otho's
reputation among the upper classes beyond repair. is is how Plutarch presents
the story to us. Giving this story relatively much space within this short Vita,
he emphasized how little authority Otho had and how weak his position really
was. In contrast, in Histories 1.82 Tacitus has the soldiery come to its senses
and return to discipline after speeches of the praetorian prefects. In 1.83 f. he
adds an oration to the praetorians, which is put into Otho's mouth, and in
which the existence of the senate is defended in very positive tones. Tacitus'
story is more optimistic about the soldiers of the guard than Plutarch's is, and
Tacitus sees t to use this event to insert a laudatory oration on the position
of the senate into his report.7 He thus gives us a much more positive image of
Otho than Plutarch does. So Plutarch must have deliberately painted Otho's
authority in very dark colours, in this way inverting an important, exclusive
representation of his power into its negative counterpart.
In my view this dinner story is not ctional. In Otho 3.3-7 Plutarch
gives us a clever rhetorical elaboration of a story that seems to be historical,
given the fact that three other literary sources tell it as well, however briey
or elaborately8 . I think that the account of the disruption of Otho's banquet,
which Plutarch must have found in his written sources or may have got from
6 Suetonius, Nero 25.1: "… sed et Romam eo curru, quo Augustus olim triumphaverat, et in
veste purpurea distinctaque stellis aureis chlamyde coronamque capite gerens Olympiacam, dextra
manu Pythiam, praeeunte pompa ceterarum cum titulis, ubi et quos quo cantionum quove fabularum
argumento vicisset; sequentibus currum ovantium ritu plausoribus, Augustianos militesque se triumphi
eius clamantibus.
7 I owe thanks to Christopher Pelling for pointing this out to me during the discussion that
followed my lecture at the eighth conference of the International Plutarch Society, Coimbra,
Portugal, 24 September 2008.
8 An common source of Tacitus, Suetonius, and Plutarch might have made up this story,
in which case it could be largely ctional. I do not believe this, because the story, especially in
the versions given by Tacitus and Plutarch, contains too many specic details and because this
source, if it had been historiographical, which it probably had, would have been a contemporary
of the events of AD 68-69. He would have had to take into account that many eye-witnesses
were still around, who would not easily have accepted a ctional story about emperors and their
praetorians that had been inserted into an historical work.[I am not so sure about this!] I owe
thanks to Philip Stadter, who brought this up during the discussion that followed my lecture at
the eighth conference of the International Plutarch Society, Coimbra, Portugal, 24 September,
2008.
227
e disruption of an imperial banquet by angry soldiers in Plutarch's Otho
hearsay, suited him well. In the opening lines of his Galba, Plutarch gives us
the main theme of his Galba and Otho, which should be read as one narrative9 .
is theme is the escalation of military misconduct in times of diminished or
missing leadership. In Galba 1 Plutarch observes:
Iphicrates the Athenian used to think that the mercenary soldier might well
be fond of wealth and fond of pleasure, in order that his quest for the means
to gratify his desires might lead him to ght with greater recklessness; but
most people think that a body of soldiers, just like a natural body in full vigour,
ought to have no initiative of its own, but should follow that of its commander.
Wherefore Paullus Aemilius, as we are told, nding that the army which he had
taken over in Macedonia was infected with loquacity and meddlesomeness, as
though they were all generals, gave out word that each man was to have his
hand ready and his sword sharp, but that he himself would look out for the rest.
Moreover, Plato (Resp. 376c) sees that a good commander or general can do
nothing unless his army is amenable and loyal; and he thinks that the quality of
obedience, like the quality characteristic of a king, requires a noble nature and a
philosophic training, which, above all things, blends harmoniously the qualities
of gentleness and humanity with those of high courage and aggressiveness.
Many dire events, and particularly those which befell the Romans after the
death of Nero, bear witness to this, and show plainly that an empire has
nothing more fearful to show than a military force given over to untrained and
unreasoning impulses10.
e disruption of Otho's banquet not only shows Otho's hopeless position,
but is also one of many examples of a deterioration of military discipline as a
function of bad leadership at the top (by the emperors Galba and Otho) and at
the second level of authority (by people such as Nymphidius Sabinus, Vinius,
Laco, Icelus and Otho's cronies). By now soldiers of the guard at Rome thought
that they could do anything they liked. In Plutarch's Galba the worst kind of
leadership is displayed by the emperor himself and by his close assistants, men
such as Vinius, Laco, and Icelus. ose second line leaders were rapacious and
acted in an arbitrary, selsh, tyrannical way. In practically all literary sources
9 On Plutarch's Galba and Otho being one story see C. B. R. P, 2002, p. 188 (+ 195
n. 68), and p. 383 n. 11.
10 Plutarch, Galba 1: Ὁ μὲν Ἀθηναῖος Ἰφικράτης τὸν μισθοφόρον ἠξίου στρατιώτην καὶ
φιλόπλουτον εἶναι καὶ φιλήδονον, ὅπως ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις χορηγίαν ἐπιζητῶν ἀγωνίζηται
παραβολώτερον, οἱ δὲ πλεῖστοι, καθάπερ ἐρρωμένον σῶμα, τὸ στρατιωτικὸν ἀξιοῦσιν ἰδίᾳ
μηδέποτε χρώμενον ὁρμῇ συγκινεῖσθαι τῇ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ. διὸ καὶ Παῦλον Αἰμίλιον λέγουσι
τὴν ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ δύναμιν παραλαβόντα λαλιᾶς καὶ περιεργίας, οἷον διαστρατηγοῦσαν,
ἀνάπλεων, παρεγγυῆσαι τὴν χεῖρα ποιεῖν ἑτοίμην καὶ τὴν μάχαιραν ὀξεῖαν ἕκαστον, αὐτῷ
δὲ τῶν ἄλλων μελήσειν. ὁ δὲ Πλάτων οὐδὲν ἔργον ὁρῶν ἄρχοντος ἀγαθοῦ καὶ στρατηγοῦ
στρατιᾶς μὴ σωφρονούσης μηδὲ ὁμοπαθούσης, ἀλλὰ τὴν πειθαρχικὴν ἀρετὴν ὁμοίως τῇ
βασιλικῇ νομίζων φύσεως γενναίας καὶ τροφῆς φιλοσόφου δεῖσθαι, μάλιστα τῷ πρᾴῳ καὶ
φιλανθρώπῳ τὸ θυμοειδὲς καὶ δραστήριον ἐμμελῶς ἀνακεραννυμένης, ἄλλα τε πάθη πολλὰ
καὶ τὰ Ῥωμαίοις συμπεσόντα μετὰ τὴν Νέρωνος τελευτὴν ἔχει μαρτύρια καὶ παραδείγματα
τοῦ μηδὲν εἶναι φοβερώτερον ἀπαιδεύτοις χρωμένης καὶ ἀλόγοις ὁρμαῖς ἐν ἡγεμονίᾳ
στρατιωτικῆς δυνάμεως. On this passage see for example R. A, 1997.
Galba is reproached with giving them too much latitude, whereas he refused
to give the soldiers their due. He never gave them a proper donative, not even
at the occasion of the adoption of an heir, Piso, and he tried in an exaggerated
way to be an example of old-fashioned severitas towards the soldiers, even if
they had more or less justied claims to make. Galba decimated, for example,
eet soldiers, and a band of German bodyguards, for no good reasons. Plutarch
tells us that the soldiers began to cherish a dire and savage hatred towards
Galba, because he was defrauding them and so doing laid down instructions
for succeeding emperors. By treating too positively some of Vindex' supporters,
and by not explicitly siding with the soldiers of Verginius Rufus, who had put
down Vindex' rebellion in Gaul in AD 67, Galba also lost the support of the
armies of the Germaniae, which ended up supporting the ensuing usurpation
of Vitellius11 .
Otho was really no better leader than Galba had been. In Otho 3.2-6
Plutarch tells us that Otho was placing his government on a sound basis and
took a number of wise decisions, but all available sources show that Otho was
not the master of the soldiers and their ocers, but their plaything. In Otho
5.3 Plutarch speaks of the disorderly and arrogant spirit of the soldiers, their
ataxia and thrasutès. Otho did not behave as a good, strong leader would have
done, and did not overcome the disciplinary problem. His best act seems to
have been his impressive suicide12 . In this context an elaborate story about the
disruption of Otho's banquet by the soldiery ts in well, showing how low
military discipline had become and to what depth Otho's authority over the
soldiers and their ocers had sunk.
In conclusion. In Plutarch's Galba and Otho, which in my opinion should
be read as one story, this dinner story negatively inverts an important means of
imperial self-representation and so indicates how weak, in Plutarch's opinion,
Otho's position really was. It is as well one of many examples of a serious
deterioration of military discipline as a function of bad leadership at the top
and at the second level of authority. By choosing an imperial banquet, which
should be a place of friendship with high status amici Caesaris, a show-case
of imperial power and paideia, and a mirror of hierarchies within the urban
Roman elite, as the scene where the extreme escalation of military misbehaviour
and the total loss of imperial authority over the military mob came to light,
Plutarch highlights the social importance of such banquets.
11 On Galba's reign see Tacitus, Histories 1.4-41; Suetonius, Galba 11-20; Plutarch, Galba
10-28; Cassius Dio 64.1-6. On the decimation of the eet soldiers see Suetonius, Galba 12.2 and
Plutarch, Galba 15.3-4. Cf. Tacitus, Histories 1.6. In the same paragraph, Galba 12.2, Suetonius
narrates that Galba also disbanded a cohort of Germans, whom the previous Caesars had made
their body-guard and had found absolutely faithful in many emergencies. On Galba, Otho, their
assistants, and the soldiers see L. D B, 2008.
12 On Otho's reign see Tacitus, Histories 1.44-47; 71-90; 2.11-56; Suetonius, Otho 7-12;
Plutarch, Otho 1-18; Cassius Dio 64.7-15. On Otho's suicide see Tacitus, Histories 2.48-49;
Suetonius, Otho 10-11; Plutarch, Otho 16-18 and Cassius Dio 64.13-15.
229
e disruption of an imperial banquet by angry soldiers in Plutarch's Otho
W o r k s c i T e d
A, R., "Severed Heads: Individual Portraits and Irrational Forces in Plutarch's
Galba and Otho, " in J. M. M (ed.), Plutarch and his Intellectual
World, London, 1997, pp. 189-214.
D B, L., "Soldiers and Leaders in Plutarch's Galba and Otho", in V.
H . (eds.), A Roman Miscellany. Essays in Honour of
Anthony R. Birley on his Seventieth Birthday, Gdansk, 2008, 5-13 or
http://www.phil-fak.uni-duesseldorf.de/geschichte/xaltegeschichte/
birley/fsbirley.html.
C, M., L'empire romain du IIIe siècle. Histoire politique (de 192, mort de
Commode, à 325, concile de Nicée), Paris, 1997.
D'A, J., "Performing Culture: Roman Spectacle and the Banquets of the
Powerful", in B. B & C. K (eds.), e Art of Ancient
Spectacle, Washington, 1999, pp. 301-19.
D, J. F., e Roman Community at Table, Ann Arbor, MI, 2004.
D, K. M. D., e Roman Banquet. Images of Conviviality, Cambridge,
2003.
G, F., I medaglioni Romani, Milan, 1912.
P, C. B. R. , Plutarch and History, London, 2002.
S, M.-T., "I soggetti politici e I conitti civili del 68/69 d.C. in
Plutarco", in L. B . (eds.), e Statesman in Plutarch's Works.
Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference of the International
Plutarch Society, vol. II, (Nijmegen/ Castle Hernen, May 1-5, 2002),
Leiden/ Boston, 2005, pp. 351-61.
S, R., "Le Vite Plutarchee di Galba e di Otone: Teoria e prassi politica
nella successione imperiale", in I. G & B. S (eds.), Teoria
e prassi politica nelle opere di Plutarco. Atti del V convegno Plutarcheo
(Certosa di Pontignano, 7-9 Giugno, 1993), Naples, 1995, pp. 399-
413.
S-H, E., Das römische Gastmahl, Munich, 2005.
V, K., Mensa regia . Das Bankett beim hellenistischen König und beim
römischen Kaiser, Munich/Leipzig, 2004.
W, T. E. J., "From Nero to Vespasian", in A. K. B ., e
Cambridge Ancient History X2 , Cambridge, 1996, pp. 256-82.
231
Festins de Sangue. A Tradição do Banquete aziago em Plutarco
F :
P
N S R
Universidade de Lisboa
Abstract
is paper's title evokes García Lorca's play Bodas de Sangre. In fact, the strong contrast we
can nd between the feast and the blood is used several times by Plutarch in his Vitae. But
the Author only follows an ancient literary tradition that can be found in mythological texts
as well as in epic and tragic poetry or even in historiography. So, Plutarch makes an important
contribution to what we call "pathetic History". Our aim is to demonstrate how well Plutarch
ts in this tradition, discussing his qualities and interests as Historian.
Na biograa que escreveu de Teseu, Plutarco assinala que, quando Pirítoo
desposou Deidamia, os centauros foram convidados para a boda. Nunca
tendo provado vinho antes, porém, quando o zeram, a natureza selvagem
dos centauros revelou-se e estes tornaram-se agressivos, desejando violentar as
mulheres presentes no festim1 . O que deveria ter sido uma festa, qual expressão
da ordem e da harmonia, terminou em agressões e sangue, acabando por
conferir ao banquete de casamento um carácter funesto e caótico.
Na vida do rei Artaxerxes II, Plutarco conta que Parisatis, a rainha-mãe,
envolvida nas teias e intrigas políticas da corte persa, decide eliminar a nora,
a rainha Estatira, dado o ciúme e a inveja que nutria por ela2 . Para o efeito,
organiza um banquete de reconciliação. Escreve Plutarco, baseado em Ctésias e
em Dínon, que, apesar de reconciliadas, as duas rainhas temiam-se mutuamente,
pelo que apenas comiam o que a outra também comia e que era servido sempre
pelas mesmas mãos. Mas ainda assim Parisatis conseguiu introduzir veneno na
refeição, oferecendo à nora um pedaço de carne contaminada. Estatira acabou
envenenada, no meio de fortes convulsões e grandes sofrimentos3 .
Segundo Plutarco, também a biograa de Alexandre-o-Grande foi
inuenciada pelo distúrbio ocorrido durante um banquete em que pai e lho se
defrontaram, ao ponto de Alexandre se ter retirado com a mãe da casa paterna
e refugiado na Ilíria, enquanto Olímpia era levada para o Epiro. Na sequência
destes acontecimentos, será relatada a morte de Filipe4 . Na mesma vida, um
outro banquete, em que Alexandre promove um concurso de bebida de vinho,
acaba por terminar na morte de quarenta e dois dos convivas5 .
1 Plu., es . 30, 3. Este é o tema que decorava o pedimento ocidental do templo de Zeus,
em Olímpia. Nesse conjunto escultórico, a gura de Apolo, ao centro, representa a reposição da
ordem, a que se deseja regressar após a experiência do caos. Sobre esta questão dissertou já G.
P, 1991, p. 160; sobre as funcionalidades do vinho neste contexto, ver o nosso estudo, 2001.
2 Plu., Art. 19. Sobre esta Vida, ver o estudo de C. S, 2008.
3 Plu., Art. 19, 7. Uma análise deste passo pode também ser lida no estudo de D. R
G, neste mesmo volume, pp. 255-60.
4 Plu., Alex. 9.
5 Plu., Alex. 70.
Na vida de Sertório, o autor das Vidas arma que o general romano
mantinha sempre um nível de austeridade e decoro nos banquetes em que
participava. Num desses festins, porém, os inimigos de Sertório decidiram
aproveitar-se da ocasião para lhe montar uma armadilha. Fingiram estar
embriagados e comportarem-se de forma desordeira, de modo a enfurecerem
o antrião. Sertório tentou ngir que nada o afectava. Ainda assim, os
conspiradores levaram o plano avante e assassinaram Sertório enquanto este,
impotente, se mantinha reclinado no seu leito6 .
Também na vida de Crasso, Plutarco informa que foi com um banquete
que Orodes, o rei dos Partos, comemorou, juntamente com Artavasdes, o
rei arménio, a derrota romana em Carras, no ano 53 a.C. Segundo o relato
plutarquiano, os reis orientais assistiam então a uma representação de As
Bacantes de Eurípides, viam a cena em que a rainha Agave surge com a cabeça
de Penteu. Terá sido precisamente nessa ocasião que um mensageiro entrou no
salão com a cabeça de Crasso, que foi aproveitada pelo actor que interpretava
Agave, de modo a conferir mais realismo ao momento7 . Mas os acontecimentos
deste festim pressagiam também o castigo que acabou por cair sobre Orodes e
a crueldade demonstrada ao longo da sua vida8 .
Os exemplos citados, a que poderiamos juntar alguns outros, comungam do
facto de serem relatos historiográcos, supostamente históricos, enquadrados
por um ambiente simposíaco, que confere um estilo patético à narração dos
acontecimentos9 . A utilização do banquete como tema narrativo ou eixo director
da descrição dos eventos foi já reconhecida como uma das características do
estilo plutarquiano, com particular presença nas Vidas. 10 A título de exemplo
da sua importância, podemos referir o inesquecível passo da vida de António ,
em que o autor descreve o ambiente no palácio de Cleópatra, em Alexandria, o
qual contribui para que o casal protagonista do texto fosse conhecido entre os
seus contemporâneos como "os da vida inimitável"11 .
O tema em si, porém, está longe de ser uma criação original do tratadista
de Queroneia. O motivo do festim maldito, em particular – aquele em que nos
centramos –, aparece nas literaturas antigas desde muito cedo. Apresentamos
alguns exemplos.
Já na Odisseia, no canto em que Circe recebe os companheiros de Ulisses,
lemos que a feiticeira os assentou e lhes serviu queijo, cevada, mel e vinho, aos
6 Plu., Sert. 26. Uma análise deste passo pode também ser lida no estudo de I. M
G, neste mesmo volume, pp. 245-257.
7 Plu., Crass. 33.
8 Plu., Crass. 33, 7-9.
9 Ver e.g. Plu., Pel . 9, 4-11; Dem. 36, 4-12; Pyrrh. 5, 7-14; Cleom. 7-8. Alguns destes banquetes
incluem o vinho como motivo desencadeador do conito.
10 A importância do banquete na obra de Plutarco foi reconhecida pelo facto de o autor
lhe ter dedicado uma obra, Symposiaka. As funções do banquete nas Vidas foram já destacadas
por G. P , 1991 e por F. B. T, 1999. Paul refere outros tratamentos da vida de
Alexandre, por exemplo, onde o banquete aziago está igualmente presente.
11 Plu., Ant. 28, 2.
233
Festins de Sangue. A Tradição do Banquete aziago em Plutarco
quais juntou terríveis drogas, cujo objectivo era transformá-los em porcos12 . O
banquete de Circe tem, portanto, um objectivo nefasto, anunciando a desgraça
que está para acontecer aos companheiros de Ulisses. No mesmo poema, o
desenlace da história do regresso de Ulisses a Ítaca dá-se com a organização de
um banquete, onde, desde o início, a tragédia espreita. O Poeta refere-se-lhe
do seguinte modo:
Mas nenhuma refeição podia ser mais desgraciosa do que aquela que uma deusa
e um homem forte estavam prestes a oferecer-lhes13.
É no contexto deste banquete que Penélope consegue que se realize a prova
do arco, na sequência da qual ocorre a mortandade dos pretendentes às mãos
de Ulisses, trazendo um desfecho inesperado e sangrento à festa14 . É ainda na
Odisseia que se conta uma variante do mito de Agamémnon. Segundo esta
versão, que difere da contada por Ésquilo, Egisto teria recebido o rei de Argos/
Micenas, regressado da guerra de Tróia, com um festim, que aproveitou para o
matar o atrida "como a um boi"15 . A mesma tradição será seguida por Séneca
que, na tragédia Agamémnon, traz o registo da morte do rei à cena recorrendo à
típica descrição coral, que evoca o motivo do banquete sangrento16 .
Radicado no mito de Agamémnon, conta-se o de Atreu, de quem aquele
rei é dito descendente. A maldição que na mitologia grega se cola à família
dos Atridas justica-se precisamente com um acontecimento, in illo tempore ,
cujo acme ocorre durante um banquete maldito. A história de Atreu, lho
de Pélops e Hipodamia, é preenchida pelo ódio deste ao irmão Tiestes, bem
como pelas vinganças que os dois irmãos planearam alternadamente um
contra o outro. Depois de Tiestes se ter tornado amante da cunhada, Aérope,
Atreu concebeu o plano de dar a comer ao irmão os próprios lhos dele, num
banquete propositadamente preparado para isso17 . O acto horrendo de Atreu
fez cair a vingança dos deuses sobre si e sobre todos os seus descendentes. O
mesmo enredo pode ser lido nos mitos de Tântalo, Licáon e Tereu.
O primeiro é tido como um dos ascendentes dos Atridas, o que transforma
a característica do festim maldito num topos familiar, que eventualmente
traduz a repetição de um mesmo motivo numa família mitológica18 . Segundo
a tradição mitológica, Tântalo teria imolado o seu lho Pélops para servi-
lo em forma de guisado, num banquete, aos deuses. A crer em alguns dos
autores antigos, Tântalo tê-lo-ia feito por piedade, numa época em que a
fome grassava na Hélade e não havia outra vítima para oferecer às divindades.
Outros consideravam que Tântalo quis pôr à prova a clarividência divina. Seja
12 Od. 10, 233-240.
13 Od. 20, 392-393, em trad. F. L.
14 Od. 21-22.
15 Od. 4, 519-537.
16 Sen., Ag. 875-909.
17 Sen., y.; A. A. 1590-1601.
18 I.e., poderemos estar perante uma mesma estrutura de um mito, que ganhou formas de
acordo com as variações locais-geográcas e temporais-cronológicas.
como for, todos os deuses reconheceram a carne que lhes estava a ser servida,
à excepção de Deméter, cuja fome não impediu que devorasse um ombro da
vítima19 . Mas os deuses acabaram por reconstruir o corpo de Pélops, a quem
foi assim concedida a ressurreição. No lugar do ombro devorado, foi colocada
uma prótese de marm.
Quanto a Licáon, contava-se entre os Gregos que este era um rei
piedoso e que por isso mesmo os deuses o visitavam amiúde. Os lhos do
rei, contudo, quiseram saber se as visitas da casa eram efectivamente deuses,
pelo que mataram uma criança e misturaram as suas carnes com as da vítima
que havia sido preparada para o banquete. Os deuses, horrorizados com o que
viram, fulminaram os culpados. Uma variante do mito, porém, reza que, tanto
Licáon como os lhos, eram ímpios e que, um dia, Zeus decidiu testar o grau
da impiedade do homem. Visitou-o, na forma de um camponês, e Licáon,
suspeitando de que poderia tratar-se de um deus, decidiu pôr o hóspede à
prova, servindo-lhe a carne de uma criança num banquete. A ira de Zeus levou
a que Licáon fosse fulminado20 .
O mito de Tereu contém igualmente o topos da criança sacricada e servida
num festim. Apesar de casado com Procne e desta ter um lho, Tereu inamou-
se de paixão pela cunhada Filomela. Tereu violou Filomela e, para evitar
que esta o denunciasse, cortou-lhe ainda a língua. Mas Filomela encontrou
forma de contar o que se havia passado, bordando a sua história num pano.
Conhecedora da verdade, Procne decidiu então vingar-se do marido, matando
o próprio lho, Ítis, cozinhando as carnes da criança e servindo-as ao marido,
que as comeu sem suspeitar de nada21 . Aquiles Tácio refere-se no seu romance
a este mito, numa écfrase, que termina do seguinte modo:
Era assim que o artista tinha concebido a cena bordada no tecido da tela.
Quanto ao resto do quadro, as mulheres mostravam a Tereu, numa cesta, os
restos do banquete: a cabeça e as mãos de seu lho; riam, mas ao mesmo tempo
estavam apavoradas. Tereu estava representado a saltar do leito e, sacando da
espada contra as mulheres, dava um empurrão à mesa com a perna; a mesa nem
estava de pé, nem estava por terra, dando antes a impressão de que era o quadro
que estava na iminência de cair22.
Outro mito em que ponticava o tema do banquete aziago era o das
Leucípides. A história destas lhas de Leucipo e sobrinhas de Tíndaro – primas
portanto de Helena e de Clitemnestra, as esposas dos Atridas – resume-se à
luta que, por sua causa, opôs os Dioscuros, seus primos, a dois outros primos,
lhos de Afareu. No festim que Castor e Pólux ofereceram em Esparta a Eneias
e Páris, quando estes visitaram Menelau com o objectivo de raptar Helena, os
19 Ov., Met. 6, 401-411.
20 Apollod., Bib. 3, 8, 1; Ov., Met. 1, 196; Paus., 8, 2, 1-2. Alguns autores consideram que
estas lendas estão relacionadas com antigos sacrifícios humanos, associados ao culto de Zeus
Licáon.
21 Paus. 1, 41, 8; 10, 4, 8; Apollod., Bib. 3, 14, 8; O., Met. 6, 426-674; Ach. Tat. 5, 3.
22 Ach. Tat. 5, 3, 7-8, em trad. A. N. Pena.
235
Festins de Sangue. A Tradição do Banquete aziago em Plutarco
lhos de Afareu, motivados pelo vinho que haviam ingerido, censuraram os
Dioscuros por se terem casado sem terem oferecido um dote ao tio. Insultados,
Castor e Pólux reagiram e a discussão acabou num violento confronto, que
levou à morte de um dos gémeos, bem como de dois dos seus primos23 .
Como se conrma, são vários os episódios mitológicos gregos que
aludem ao tema do festim maldito ou aziago. A sua pertinência é de tal modo
assinalável que até mesmo as bodas de Peleu e Tétis se celebram num banquete
cujo desfecho culmina naquela que veio a ser a mais sangrenta e simbólica das
guerras do imaginário grego24 .
Mas o tema em causa não surge exclusivamente na mitologia. Ele está
igualmente presente nas tradições históricas e historiográcas gregas, ainda
que com funcionalidades razoavelmente diferentes, como atestam os casos de
Simónides e de Heródoto25 . As Histórias de Hérodoto são, aliás, particularmente
ricas nesta temática. O autor inclui uma série de banquetes, supostamente
factuais – o que não é linearmente exacto –, em que a desgraça é a protagonista.
Independentemente da factualidade, interessa-nos destacar a pertinência da sua
presença na narrativa26 . A propósito da egípcia Nitócris, por exemplo, o "Pai da
História" refere que, depois de lhe terem matado o irmão e entregado o poder, a
rainha convidou os egípcios que considerava terem sido os assassinos do parente
a participarem num sumptuoso festim. Enquanto eles se banqueteavam, a rainha
fez cair sobre eles as águas do rio, através de uma conduta secreta27 . Em Heródoto,
encontramos também o relato de um banquete que evoca os mitos de crianças
cozinhadas, acima referidos. Concedamos voz ao próprio historiador, a propósito
de Astíages, rei dos Medos, que deseja vingar-se de Hárpago, por este não ter
matado Ciro quando ele era ainda criança, tal como lhe havia sido ordenado:
Ao ouvir estas palavras, Hárpago prostrou-se e, de regresso a casa, considerou uma
grande sorte que o seu erro tivesse acabado em bem e que, sob tão bons auspícios,
o tivessem convidado para jantar. Mal chegou, mandou a toda a pressa o único
lho que tinha, que andava pelos treze anos, com a recomendação de se dirigir ao
palácio de Astíages e fazer aquilo que o rei lhe ordenasse. Ele próprio, exultante de
alegria, contou à mulher o sucedido. Astíages, quando o lho de Hárpago chegou,
mandou-o degolar e esquartejar em pedaços; uma parte das carnes assou-a, outra
cozeu-a, e pôs tudo pronto a servir. Quando chegou a hora do jantar e Hárpago
e os outros convivas compareceram, a todos os presentes e ao próprio Astíages
foram servidas mesas repletas de carne de carneiro, a Hárpago, o corpo inteiro
do lho, menos a cabeça, mãos e pés; estas partes caram de lado, dentro de um
cesto, e cobertas. Logo que Hárpago pareceu satisfeito, Astíages perguntou-lhe se
23 eoc. 22; Apollod., Bib. 3, 11, 2.
24 Apollod., Bib. 3, 13, 4-5.
25 Isso porque o tema da criança cozinhada e oferecida em banquete parece ter tido um
objectivo especíco ou derivado de situações concretas, como a possibilidade de estar relacionado
com eventuais sacrifícios humanos antigos. Sobre esta problemática, ver L. N. F, 1996;
M. H-T, 20072 .
26 Do mesmo modo que nos interessa assinalar a inclusão de episódios como o de Giges e
Candaules ou o de Aríon e o golnho.
27 Hdt. 2, 100.
tinha gostado do festim. Perante a resposta de que tinha gostado muito, aqueles
que estavam incumbidos dessa missão trouxeram a cabeça, as mãos e os pés do
rapaz, ainda cobertos; dirigiram-se a Hárpago e convidaram-no a destapar o cesto
e a servir-se do que quisesse. Este obedeceu, e, ao destapá-lo, viu os restos do
lho. Mas, perante o espectáculo, não se perturbou nem perdeu o auto-domínio.
Astíages perguntou-lhe se sabia de que animal eram as carnes que tinha comido.
Ele respondeu que sim e que aceitava tudo o que o rei zesse. Depois desta
resposta, pegou no resto das carnes e voltou para casa28 .
Como facilmente se conclui, o banquete canibal de Astíages reecte os
dos mitos de Tântalo e Atreu, conrmando a contaminação da historiograa
grega pelas temáticas mitológicas29 . Mas a sua inclusão no relato funciona
sobretudo pelo dramatismo e pelo tom patético que lhe dá forma. No mesmo
livro, Heródoto relata também um plano de Creso e Ciro para aniquilar
os Masságetas, seus inimigos. Estes são neutralizados através de um lauto
banquete que lhes é oferecido. O abuso da comida e da bebida deixa-os
totalmente incapazes de reagir contra os Persas que os atacam30 . É ainda em
Heródoto que encontramos relato de um outro festim, igualmente marcado
pelo desfecho funesto, apesar de essa não ter sido uma intenção premeditada,
como acontece com outros casos. Trata-se do momento em que Amintas,
rei da Macedónia, convida os Persas a banquetearem-se na sua casa. Estes,
saciados de comida e de bebida, pedem ao antrião que, à maneira persa,
as mulheres do palácio se juntem aos convivas, ainda que esse não seja um
costume grego. Amintas acaba por anuir, mas os convidados, embriagados,
não se refreiam e começam a exceder-se no seu comportamento, em relação
às mulheres presentes. É então que Alexandre, o lho de Amintas, engendra
um plano para inverter a situação a seu favor: faz sair as mulheres do festim e
substitui-as por outros tantos mancebos, vestidos de mulheres e armados de
punhais. Estes acabam por matar os Persas, marcando o festim com sangue31 .
À semelhança de outros episódios herodotianos, também neste reconhecemos
a inuência da mitologia, mais concretamente do mito das bodas de Deidamia
e Pirítoo, acima referido. No livro IX do mesmo historiador, regista-se outro
episódio ainda particularmente revelador das contaminações temáticas na
historiograa antiga. Trata-se da história da túnica de Xerxes. Heródoto
conta que a rainha Améstris, mulher de Xerxes, teria oferecido ao marido
uma túnica feita pelas suas próprias mãos. O rei, porém, viu-se obrigado a
oferecê-la à nora, Artainte, por quem estava apaixonado, e que era também
lha da cunhada do rei, por quem ele se havia enamorado antes. Ao tomar
conhecimento do que se passara, Améstris elabora o seu plano de vingança
e para o efeito aproveita a festa de aniversário do rei, pois sabia que nessa o
28 Hdt. 1, 119, em trad. M. F. S in Heródoto, Histórias I, trad., introd. e notas de M. F.
S e J. R F, Lisboa, 1994.
29 Sobre este problema, ver o nosso estudo, 2007.
30 Hdt. 1, 207. Sobre este episódio, ver C. C, 1994, p. 63; S. F, 1987, pp. 42-3.
31 Hdt. 5, 19-20. Este banquete tem algumas semelhanças com o narrado em Plu., Pel . 9,
4-11, designadamente o elemento eonista.
237
Festins de Sangue. A Tradição do Banquete aziago em Plutarco
monarca estava obrigado a atender a todos os pedidos que lhe fossem feitos
nessa ocasião32 . Améstris decide pedir ao marido que lhe seja entregue a
cunhada, mãe de Artainte, que considerava ser a culpada daquela situação.
Améstris deixa então emergir a vingança de uma forma atroz sobre aquela
que considera sua rival, concretizada com a mutilação sádica e impiedosa do
nariz, das orelhas, dos lábios, da língua e dos seios da cunhada33 . A ocasião que
proporciona tamanha barbaridade é precisamente a do banquete real ou "Ceia
Real", como Heródoto lhe chama34 . Em contexto herodotiano, poderíamos
citar ainda o banquete aziago de Atagino, pouco antes da batalha de Plateias,
em que um persa prevê a desgraça dos seus conterrâneos no confronto que
se aproxima, permitindo o contraste entre a alegria da refeição tomada em
comum por Persas e Gregos e a morte que se anuncia e aproxima35 .
Em relação a Simónides de Ceos, há que assinalar a antiga tradição que
referia que o poeta, depois de ter estado presente num banquete na casa da
família de Escopas, teve de regressar ao local do festim para identicar os corpos
dos convivas que haviam sido soterrados, na sequência do desabamento do tecto
da sala. Um dos testemunhos do episódio é Cícero, que conta que o banquete se
realizou na casa de Crânon e que o tecto desabou pouco tempo depois de o poeta
de Ceos ter abandonado o local36 . O momento de festa foi, portanto, totalmente
ofuscado pela tragédia que se lhe seguiu. Na verdade, as opiniões acerca da
facticidade do episódio divergem, não faltando os autores que consideram que se
trata de uma mera tradição sem qualquer fundamento verídico37 .
Uma história muito semelhante pode ser lida em Tácito e Suetónio,
contemporâneos de Plutarco, a propósito do principado de Tibério. No
autor dos Annales, lemos que certo dia, enquanto Tibério jantava numa uilla
conhecida como "A caverna", pois localizava-se numa gruta natural, a abóbada
soltou-se e parte do tecto caiu, esmagando alguns dos servos. Tácito acrescenta
mesmo que terá sido Sejano, o prefeito do pretório, quem salvou o imperador,
sobrepondo-se sobre o corpo do príncipe38 . O mesmo relata Suetónio, sem no
entanto se referir explicitamente a Sejano39 . O que nos interessa destacar deste
episódio, porém, tenha ele efectivamente ocorrido ou não, é que uma vez mais
o festim foi marcado pela tragédia, sendo por isso signicativa a sua inclusão
na narrativa pelos historiadores antigos.
32 A. M. B, 2003, destaca o facto de este ser um tema oriental, uma vez que exalta o rei
e o seu poder enquanto indivíduo; ver ainda O. S, 2006.
33 Hdt. 9, 108-13. Ver C. S, 2003, pp. 353-9; E. W, 1964.
34 Hdt. 9, 110.
35 Hdt. 9, 16. Tema já salientado por C. C, 1994, p. 64. O passo em que Heródoto
conta uma das versões da forma como Cambises provoca a morte da sua esposa-irmã sugere que
tudo se terá passado durante um banquete, Hdt. 3, 32. Ver ainda Hdt. 3, 34-35; L. E,
1987.
36 Cic., Orat. 2, 86, 351-353; Quint., Inst. 11, 2, 11-16.
37 Uma discussão do passo pode ser lida em L. N. F, 2005, pp. 138-40.
38 Tac., Ann. 4, 59. Trata-se da célebre gruta de Spelunca, onde foram encontradas esculturas
alusivas à Odisseia.
39 Suet., Tib. 39.
É ainda da historiograa romana que nos chega o relato de pelo menos
mais quatro exemplos de festins fúnebres. O primeiro decorreu durante o
principado de Cláudio e diz respeito ao processo que desencadeou a execução
da sua mulher, a imperatriz Valéria Messalina. É na sequência de um banquete
orgíaco de características trágico-dionisíacas que Messalina é acusada de ter
praticado bigamia e conspirado contra o imperador. Estas acusações acabarão
por levar a imperatriz à morte, bem como muitos dos que com ela se envolveram
no festim báquico40 . O segundo exemplo data do nal do mesmo principado.
Ou melhor, marca o nal desse mesmo principado, dado que Suetónio levanta
a suspeita de Cláudio ter sido envenenado durante um banquete que se
realizou no Capitólio41 . O terceiro caso data do principado de Nero e refere-
se ao homicídio de Britânico, precisamente o lho de Messalina e Cláudio.
Tácito conta, pormenorizadamente, que foi durante um banquete que o jovem
príncipe foi envenenado por Nero, através de uma estratégia digna da que
Plutarco regista para o episódio de Parisatis e Estatira42 . É ainda através de
Tácito e Suetónio que camos a saber que o mesmo Nero maquinou a morte
da própria mãe, Agripina Menor, a quem atraiu a um banquete para depois a
fazer entrar num navio preparado para naufragar43 . Quatro situações fúnebres,
germinadas em outros tantos festins.
Estes são alguns exemplos que, quanto a nós, comprovam quão difundido
era o tema do festim maldito na literatura greco-latina, no tempo de Plutarco.
Mas o topos teve um êxito com ecos bem além desse universo. Efectivamente,
ele estava já presente nas literaturas orientais pré-clássicas e suas herdeiras.
Podemos encontrá-lo, por exemplo, nas culturas do mundo bíblico, em diversos
episódios e textos. Na história de José, a morte do padeiro-mor da corte egípcia
é decretada enquanto decorre o banquete de aniversário do faráo44 . No livro
dos Juízes, o relato da vida de Sansão, uma narrativa de forma deuteronomística
com contornos épico-trágicos, romanescos e folclóricos datada de entre os
séculos VIII e VI a.C.45 , recorre ao tema por duas vezes. A primeira enquadra
o relato do casamento do herói com uma listeia. Sansão oferece um banquete,
em que propõe um enigma a um grupo de jovens. Estes, incapazes de decifrar o
que lhes foi apresentado, decidem chantagear a mulher de Sansão, para que ela
obtenha do marido a resposta desejada. A listeia cede e trai o marido. Sansão
acaba por revelar-lhe a resposta e a mulher transmite-a aos interessados. Irado
por ter sido enganado, Sansão mata os jovens46 . A segunda vez contextualiza
o episódio da morte do herói. Conta-se que os príncipes dos Filisteus se
40 Tac., Ann. 11, 26-32. Analisámos já este episódio, bem como os ecos mitológico-literários
que nele podemos descortinar, em 2003.
41 Suet., Cl. 44.
42 Tac., Ann. 13, 16.
43 Suet., Nero 34; Tac., Ann. 14, 3-4.
44 Gn 40, 20-23. É esse mesmo acontecimento que faz com que o copeiro-mor não volte a
recordar-se de José, que cou na prisão; ver H. G, 1964 (1ª ed., 1901).
45 Ver R. G. B, 1975, pp. 30-1; J. N C, 1993, p. 211.
46 Jz 14, 10-20. No célebre lme de Cecil B. De Mille, de 1949, o argumentista nomeou a
mulher de Sansão como Semadar.
239
Festins de Sangue. A Tradição do Banquete aziago em Plutarco
reuniram para oferecer um sacrifício a Dagon e celebrar um banquete. É nesse
contexto que Sansão, já cego graças à traição de Dalila – o motivo de Dalila
como que repete o da mulher listeia na história do mesmo herói –, se coloca
sob as colunas do templo e fá-lo ruir, esmagando todos os que se encontravam
no seu interior47 .
Outro episódio bíblico em que o banquete proporciona a desgraça pode ser
lido no livro de Judite, texto judaico que nos chegou na sua versão grega. Apesar
de enquadrado no tempo de Nabucodonosor (secs. VII-VI a.C.), a composição
deste "romance" deverá datar do século II a.C., mais especicamente do tempo
de Antíoco IV Epifânio (168-163 a.C.)48 . O texto gira em torno de uma bela
judia, epónima dos próprios Judeus, que decide tomar parte activa no conito
que opõe Assiro-babilónios a Hebreus/Judeus, matando um dos generais
inimigos. Para isso, Judite aceita participar num banquete organizado pelo
inimigo Holofernes, que, vencido pelo vinho, acaba decapitado às mãos da
bela mulher49 .
No livro de Daniel, igualmente datado do período helenístico, encontramos
também um episódio que assume a forma do festim maldito. Trata-se do
banquete de Baltasar, no qual o rei babilónio, depois de ter abusado do vinho,
decide fazer introduzir no festim os vasos de ouro e prata que Nabucodonosor
havia tirado do templo de Jerusalém. Depois de todos os convivas terem
bebido pelos objectos referidos, decidem louvar os deuses de Babilónia. É
nesse momento que surge do nada uma mão humana que escreve nas paredes
do palácio uma frase enigmática. É o profeta Daniel quem acaba por decifrar o
seu signicado, por indicação da rainha. O enigma anunciava o m de Baltasar.
Diz o texto que "na mesma noite, foi morto Baltasar, rei dos caldeus"50 . Uma
vez mais, o banquete serve de pretexto para o anúncio da desgraça.
Há ainda dois outros banquetes bíblicos aziagos que não podemos deixar
de referir neste estudo, dada a pertinência do seu enquadramento e dos motivos
a que dão forma. O primeiro deles é o celebre "Banquete de Herodes", que
assinala o aniversário do tetrarca Herodes Ântipas e que motiva a execução de
João Baptista. Reconhecemos nesta história, aliás, vários motivos comuns à que
assinalámos acima, a propósito de Xerxes, Améstris e Artainte. São diversos
os elementos comuns entre o relato de Heródoto e o que encontramos nos
Evangelhos de Mateus e de Marcos. Estes referem que o tetrarca da Galileia
se comprometeu publicamente, no dia do seu aniversário, em oferecer à lha
de Herodíade o que a jovem pedisse como recompensa por ter dançado
nessa ocasião. A princesa, que Flávio Josefo identica como sendo Salomé, é
instigada pela mãe a pedir a cabeça do Baptista num prato51 . A forma como a
47 Jz 16, 23-31.
48 Ver J. A. R, 2005, pp. 45-6.
49 Jdt 12-13.
50 Dn 5, em trad. J. A. R in Nova Bíblia dos Capuchinhos, Lisboa/Fátima, 1998.
51Mt 14,3-12, Mc 6,17-29; J., AJ 18, 110-111, 136-137, 148, 240. O ódio de Herodíade por
João explica-se pelo facto de o profeta denunciar o casamento tido como incestuoso entre esta
princesa e o seu cunhado, Herodes Ântipas. Curiosamente, o nome da jovem permanece oculto
nos textos bíblicos.
narrativa é apresentada sugeriu já vários estudos, em particular de autores com
formação jungiana, que a relacionam com os antigos mitos telúricos, centrados
nas guras da mãe e da lha52 . Mas a sua estrutura recorda igualmente o
episódio herodotiano do livro IX, em que Ântipas se assume como alter-ego
de Xerxes, Herodíade de Améstris e Salomé de Artainte. A comunhão dos
dois casos faz-se com o banquete maldito, que acaba por suscitar a desgraça de
alguém. Se existe ou não relação entre ambos os textos, não o sabemos nem é
este o lugar para proceder a uma discussão em torno dessa problemática. Mas
o que nos parece indubitável é a semelhança tópica do leit motiv que dá sentido
à narrativa.
Foi já notado que o banquete de Herodes pregura uma inversão da Ceia
eucarística53 . Assim poderá ser entendido, se tivermos em conta a inclusão
de ambos os episódios nos mesmos Evangelhos, bem como a funcionalidade
de cada uma das narrativas na economia dos textos em que se inserem. Mas
consideramos que a Última Ceia, tal como vem narrada nos textos sinópticos e
apesar da sua funcionalidade etiológica no âmbito da instituição do cristianismo
como religião e ritual, congura igualmente um outro banquete aziago. Não
é em torno desse banquete que se anuncia, processa e concretiza a traição de
Jesus de Nazaré por Judas Iscariotes, que acaba com a prisão do Nazareno e sua
posterior condenação e execução?
Os textos e tradições assinalados são anteriores ou contemporâneos das
Vidas de Plutarco, o que nos leva a concluir que, no que diz respeito ao estilo,
ao método e à forma, o tratadista de Queroneia estava bem apoiado para
a composição das biograas que escreveu, tanto por exempla mitológicos,
como por tradições e topoi literários em geral, mas particularmente
associados à historiograa – não podemos esquecer que os textos bíblicos
são supostamente História, quer para a cultura judaica quer para a cristã.
Trouxemos à colação apenas alguns exemplos que o provam. Longe de se
associar exclusivamente ao banquete de tipo oriental54 , o carácter aziago,
nefasto ou maldito de alguns dos festins referidos por Plutarco parece antes
seguir uma tradição, cuja escolha não é isenta ou inocente55 . Efectivamente,
a opção de conferir um contexto a um momento que seria supostamente
festivo e que se transforma numa catástrofe para os que nele intervêm tem um
efeito retórico de signicativa ecácia poético-historiográca, uma vez que
a funcionalidade festiva e positiva é substituída pelo inesperado nal aziago
e negativo, produzindo o efeito contrário do que se espera56 . A sua utilização
poderá mesmo traduzir uma intencionalidade "suspensiva" na narrativa,
contribuindo para o que cou denido como historiograa patética e que
52 C. G. J & C. K, 2002, em especial as pp. 119-83. Ver ainda B. L. K,
1977.
53 Mt 26,17-29; Mc 14,12-25; Lc 22,7-20; M. D-O, 1998, p. 14.
54 A. M. B, 2003, p. 107.
55 Apesar de alguns dos exemplos citados sobressaírem pelo tema da criança sacricada, e
mesmo tendo em conta que esse é o tópico principal dessas narrativas, quisemos salientar que
outro elemento que lhes é comum na condução da narrativa é o do banquete aziago.
56 Sobre o uso do banquete em geral na historiograa, ver G. P , 1991, p. 158.
241
Festins de Sangue. A Tradição do Banquete aziago em Plutarco
dominou o estilo dos historiadores durante grande parte da Antiguidade
Clássica, particularmente a que oresceu durante o período da Segunda
Sofística. Além disso, o método repete-se com alguma frequência. Veja-se
como um passo do segundo livro dos Reis, por exemplo, é signicativamente
enriquecido, na paráfrase correspondente de Flávio Josefo, ao se acrescentar
um banquete aziago à narrativa em causa57 .
Note-se também como a maioria destas narrativas tem o vinho e a sua
introdução no ambiente do festim como agente catalisador da acção. É a partir
do momento em que os convivas o ingerem que estes cam inoperacionais ou,
em contrapartida e no extremo da acção, se revelam elementos perturbadores
do ambiente em que estão inseridos. Este é portanto um topos complementar
do motivo do banquete aziago58 . O vinho revela-se um dos instrumentos
que proporciona que o festim, cujo conceito se associa à ideia de comunhão
eucarística, logo de felicidade, se torne através de uma contrafacção no seu
próprio contrário e passe a simbolizar o mundo às avessas ou caos59 . A alegria
inicial e expectável é contradita pela fatalidade que se sucede. Ao revelar-se
negativo, o que deveria ser supostamente positivo enfatiza a desgraça. Ao
evocarmos a obra de Lorca no título deste estudo, pretendemos pois recuperar
a mesma força dos contrastes que o dramaturgo espanhol tão bem pressentiu
ao escrever o magistral Bodas de sangre. Por outro lado, este é um tipo de
banquetes que contrasta fortemente com o que Plutarco cultiva nos Symposiaka,
por exemplo. Por conseguinte, a utilização do tema do banquete acaba por ser
também um instrumento para expressar as mundividências antigas do caos e
do cosmos, da desordem e da ordem.
Ao considerarmos o trabalho de Plutarco como biógrafo-historiador, o
recurso a esta metodologia leva-nos necessariamente a colocar outras questões.
Se estamos perante a utilização de motivos literários e de topoi com funções
estéticas, que lugar há para a factualidade dos acontecimentos narrados pelo
autor? Quando pesquisou informação e a recolheu em autores precedentes,
tê-la-á Plutarco reproduzido acriticamente? E se o fez, terá sido de forma
intencional ou não intencional? Por outras palavras, terá Plutarco descrito e
registado acontecimentos tal como lhe foram dados a conhecer ou recriou-os e
enriqueceu-os, recorrendo a instrumentos sucientemente conhecidos na sua
época e providenciados por tradições literárias anteriores? Por conseguinte, é
Plutarco um historiador ou um erudito "contador de histórias"?60 Estas são
57 J., AJ 9, 233-235; 2Rs 15,25. Outros exemplos josécos podem ser lidos em G. P ,
1991.
58 Ver nosso estudo, 2001.
59 Idem. Efectivamente, já o Nícias de Plutarco confessava que os banquetes eram ocasiões
propícias a conitos, Plu., Nic. 5, 1.
60 Sobre o ambiente cultural e historiográco do tempo de Plutarco, ver J. S, 2000;
F. F, 1996; P. A. S, 1992; A. M, 1971. Como referiu A. L, 1995,
p. 862, a Plutarco nunca "preocuparam as conexões históricas ou a etiologia política no sentido
de Tucídides: só lhe interessam as grandes guras humanas, cujos traços característicos... se
manifestam não apenas nas grandes acções, mas também em gestos muito pequenos, e em
muitos ditos".
questões que naturalmente se colocam na sequência das nossas reexões, mas
cujas respostas exigem outro tempo e outro lugar de escrita61 .
bi b l i o g r a f i a c i T a d a
B, R. G., e Anchor Bible – Judges, New York, 1975.
B, A. M., "Fate may harm me, I have dined today: Near-Eastern Royal
Banquets in Herodotus", Pallas, 61 (2003) 99-109.
B, F. E., "Antony-Osiris, Cleópatra-Isis. e end of Plutarch's Antony", in
P. A. S (ed.), Plutarch and the historical tradition, London/New
York, 1992, pp. 159-81.
C, C., "Boire et manger dans l'Enquête d'Hérodote", BAGB, 41 (1994)
56-70.
D-O, M., "O banquete de Herodes", in M. D-O (ed.),
Salomé, Lisboa, 1998, pp. 13-68.
E, L., "eognis 815-18 and the Banquet of Attaginus", CPh, 82/4
(1987) 323-25.
F, L. N., Sacrifícios de crianças em Eurípides, Coimbra, 1996.
_____ Mobilidade poética na Grécia Antiga. Uma leitura da obra de Simónides ,
Coimbra, 2005.
F, S., e Archaic Smile of Herodotus, Detroit, 1987.
F, F., Histoire et Morale dans les Vies parallèles de Plutarque, Paris, 1996.
G, H., e Legends of Genesis. e Biblical Saga & History, New York,
1964 (1ª ed., 1901).
H-T, M., Cannibalisme et immortalité. L'enfant dans le chaudron en
Grèce ancienne, Paris, 20072 .
J, C. G. & K, C., Science of Mythology. Essays on the Myth of the
Divine Child and the Mysteries of Eleusis, London/New York, 2002.
K, B. L., "Herodias/Salome: Mother/Daughter Identication", in ,
Women in Myth, New York, 1977, pp. 87-110.
L, A., História da Literatura Grega, Lisboa, 1995.
M, A., e Development of Greek Biography, Cambridge/MA,
1993.
61 Esta problemática foi também abordada por F. E. B, 1992, e por nós próprios, 2002,
quando analisámos a presença do mitema de Ísis e Osíris na composição das biograas de
António e Cleópatra. Cumpre-nos agradecer ao Prof. Doutor José Augusto Ramos, com quem
discutimos várias das ideias que aqui apresentamos.
243
Festins de Sangue. A Tradição do Banquete aziago em Plutarco
N C, J., História antes de Heródoto, Lisboa, 1993.
P, G., "Symposia and Deipna in Plutarch's Lives and in other Historical
Writings", in W. J. S (ed.), Dining in a Classical Context, Ann
Arbor, 1991, pp.157-69.
R, J. A., "Judite. A heroína ctícia e a identidade nacional de Israel", in
D. F. L . (eds.), Mito clássico no Imaginário Ocidental, Coimbra,
2005, pp. 43-58.
R, N. S., "História, Filologia e Problemáticas da Antiguidade
Clássica", in M. F. R (ed.), Rumos e Escrita da História. Estudos em
Homenagem a A. A. Marques de Almeida, Lisboa, 2007, pp. 643-59.
_____ "Messalina ou Aphrodita Tragica in Vrbe", in A. V (ed.), Presença
de Victor Jabouille, Lisboa, 2003, pp. 513-34.
_____ "O Vinho, elemento do cosmos e do caos na cultura grega", in J.
M R (ed.), Actas do I Simposio de la Asociación Internacional
da Historia e Civilización de la Vid y el Vino I, Cádiz, 2001, pp. 243-56.
_____ "Plutarco, historiador dos Lágidas: o caso de Cleópatra VII Filopator",
in Actas do Congresso Plutarco Educador da Europa , Porto, 2002, pp. 127-
49.
S, J., Plutarque. Un philosophe dans le siècle, Paris, 2000.
S, C., "Decadência na corte persa: um soberano inconstante e uma
rainha-mãe vingativa na Vida de Artaxerxes", in C. S . (eds.),
Ética e Paideia em Plutarco, Coimbra, 2008, pp. 51-68.
_____ A morte em Heródoto. Valores universais e particularismos étnicos, Lisboa,
2003.
S, P. A. (ed.), Plutarch and the historical tradition, London, New York,
1992.
S, O., "Voiceless victims, memorable deaths in Herodotus", CQ, 56/2
(2006) 393-403.
T, F. B., "Everything to do with Dionysus: Banquets in Plutarch's
Lives", in J. G. M C . (eds.), Plutarco, Dioniso y el vino .
Actas del VI Simposio Español sobre Plutarco (Cádiz, 14-16 de Mayo,
1998), Madrid, 1999, pp. 491-500.
W , E., "Das Weib von Masistes", Hermes, 92 (1964) 51-8.
245
El banquete traicionero en las Vidas de Plutarco
el b a n q u e T e T r a i c i o n e r o e n l a s vi D a S d e pl u T a r c o
I M G
Universidad de Groningen
Abstract
e aim of this study is to explore the topic of the death during the banquet in Plutarch's
Vitae. e motif is frequent in classical literature and various authors provide us with numerous
examples and the question arises whether we are dealing with a literary topos or rather with
historical facts. Can we nd a structural relationship between the texts? By means of an analysis
of Alexander, Arquias-Pelopidas and others shorter quotations we will try to determine how
Plutarch saw these events and why the conjurers chose this occasion to full their objective.
En una obra, ya clásica, de Nicolae I. Barbu, Biographies de Plutarque 1 ,
se puso de relieve la importancia que en las Vidas adquieren las muertes y
los tipos de muerte descritos por Plutarco. De este modo, el paso a la otra
vida, minuciosamente narrado por su autor, parece estar en una interesante
simbiosis con las hazañas realizadas por sus protagonistas. En este sentido,
el de Queronea arma acerca de la muerte de Pericles: Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως
ἑτέρας δόξει πραγματείας εἶναι, corroborando con estas palabras que el nal
de la vida de los héroes es "una conrmación de sus hechos gloriosos", en el
que "Plutarco añade, a veces, sus pensamientos acerca de la vida del personaje
o sobre la vida humana en general"2 .
Algunas de las muertes que describe Plutarco, puntos nales de las
vidas ilustres de sus protagonistas, se desarrollan en un escenario concreto,
el banquete. En las siguientes páginas se analizarán estos casos de traición y
asesinato, documentados por Plutarco en las Vidas, con la intención de explicar
su signicado y la opinión que merecen a su autor.
1. Introducción: ¿era el banquete un evento lúdico?
El banquete en el mundo greco-romano ha sido tradicionalmente descrito
como "el encuentro privado que, con ocasión de una cena renada, reúne a una
serie de protagonistas de los ambientes de la política o del pensamiento"3 , en
cuya atmósfera íntima de juego y esparcimiento los personajes disfrutan del
vino, la comida, la música y la conversación.
Sin embargo, a pesar de la denición anteriormente expuesta, Plutarco no
sólo concibe el banquete como un momento de diversión, sino que también
arma categóricamente en sus Quaestiones romanae que la mesa es sagrada –
ἱερὸν δ᾽ ἡ τράπεζα4 . Este carácter sagrado es imprescindible para entender que,
1 N. I. B, 1933.
2 Idem, p. 15.
3 Quizá reminiscencia del círculo aristocrático en el que tiene su origen el simposio, cf. G.
P, 1991, p. 161.
4 Plu., Mor. 279E. Plutarco inserta esta información al tratar por qué una mesa no puede
encontrarse nunca vacía.
aunque se trata de un contexto lúdico donde los comensales pueden divertirse,
ciertas acciones de mal gusto, crueles u homicidas pueden corromper las
reglas del convite, ocasionando diversas consecuencias que sufrirán quienes las
infringieron.
Los banquetes relatados en las Vitae 5 ofrecen múltiples ejemplos en los
que se rompen sus características intrínsecas, el ambiente lúdico-festivo o su
carácter religioso. Sirva de ejemplo el mítico enfrentamiento surgido entre
lapitas y centauros, a propósito de las bodas de Pirítoo6 , o el anuncio de Catón
de su próximo suicidio, cuando en palabras de Plutarco7 :
μετὰ τὸν λόγον σιωπῆς καὶ κατηφείας γενομένης ἐν πᾶσιν
"tras su discurso, hubo un silencio y tristeza en todos".
Otro caso de mayor crudeza resulta el destino que corre el cadáver de
Craso, asesinado por los partos, cuya cabeza, lanzada por Silaces en medio del
banquete, sirvió como atrezo de una improvisada representación de Bacantes ,
embellecida por los versos del poeta Eurípides8 .
Igualmente son numerosos los casos de complots fallidos en las Vidas de
Plutarco, documento interesante para conocer las causas que llevan a elegir el
banquete como lugar adecuado para este tipo de acciones. Tanto es así que,
para el autor de las Vidas, una de las más importantes razones para declinar
una invitación es la posibilidad de que uno de los comensales pueda atentar
contra la vida de otro:
- Medea elige matar con uno de sus venenos a Teseo, quien se hacía pasar
por extranjero, durante la comida que celebraba su llegada a Atenas. Pero Egeo,
al reconocer la espada de su hijo "arrojó el vaso del veneno" - τὴν μὲν κύλικα
τοῦ φαρμάκου κατέβαλε9 .
- Parisátide, hija extramatrimonial de Artajerjes I, pone n a la vida de su
nuera, Estatira, quien, sin la advertencia de ninguno de los comensales, come
del ave envenenada que le ofrece su suegra10 .
- Alejandro V de Macedonia, tras intentar asesinar a Demetrio durante un
banquete en Dio, terminó su vida unos días después a la salida de otro convite,
a manos de los soldados enviados por Demetrio, sufriendo el mismo nal que
5 Frances B. Titchener explica la existencia de una dualidad, positiva y negativa, en los
banquetes descritos por Plutarco; cf. F. B. T, 1999, pp. 491-2.
6 Plu., es., 30. 3-4.
7 Plu., Cat. Mi., 67. Acerca de la posible relación existente entre la muerte de Catón y la de
Sócrates, cf. T. E. D, 1999, pp. 144-5.
8 Plu., Crass., 33. 1-4. Cf. N. S R, en este mismo volumen, p. 232.
9 Plu., es., 12. 3-4. Cf. D. R G, en este mismo volumen, pp. 257-58.
10 Plu., Art., 19; Dinon, FGrH 690 F 15b; Ctes., FGrH 688 F 29b. Eludimos abordar
en la presente comunicación los casos de asesinato en el banquete mediante la utilización de
veneno, tratados por D. R G en este mismo volumen, pp. 255-61. También, cf.
N. S R, en este mismo volumen, pp. 231-32.
247
El banquete traicionero en las Vidas de Plutarco
él había urdido11 .
- También Otón se vio envuelto en un enfrentamiento, en el que si
no hubiera sido por sus ruegos e incluso lágrimas, un grupo de exaltados
pretorianos habría dado muerte a ochenta senadores invitados a cenar al
palacio del emperador, ya que los soldados creían que de ese modo acababan
con los enemigos del César12 .
- Arato y Antonio consiguieron librarse del intento de asesinato de
Nicocles13 y Menas, respectivamente14.
Finalmente, el banquete puede ser el escenario para reconocer futuros
intentos de asesinato, como el de Lucio Terencio contra su compañero de
tienda, Pompeyo, el cual, enterado de lo que iba a ocurrir, mientras nge con
Terencio durante la cena, advierte a la guardia de las malas intenciones del
simposiasta, lo que acabará con éste15 .
Tras observar estos primeros ejemplos se puede adelantar ya que, lejos de
la idílica denición anteriormente aportada del banquete greco-romano, éste,
en la práctica, era una celebración llena de luces y sombras, en la que la traición
y el homicidio acompañaban al vino y a las conversaciones amistosas.
2. Muertes en banquete
Más interesantes para el tema que aquí se trata son los banquetes en los
que se lleva a cabo el peor acto traicionero, la muerte de uno de los convidados16 .
En este caso, el simposio ofrece unas posibilidades inmejorables para llevar a
cabo un asesinato. Así lo explica Plutarco en la Vida de Pelópidas17 :
εἰς δὲ τὴν ἡμέραν ἐκείνην ἐκ παλαιοῦ κατηγγελκὼς τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἀρχίαν
πότον τινὰ καὶ συνουσίαν καὶ γύναια τῶν ὑπάνδρων, ἔπραττεν ὅτι μάλιστα
ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ἐκλελυμένους καὶ κατοίνους μεταχειρίσασθαι παρέξειν τοῖς
ἐπιτιθεμένοις
desde hacía tiempo, había invitado para aquel día a Arquias y a los suyos a una
reunión para beber con mujeres casadas, se ocupó de dejarlos muy debilitados
por los placeres y beodos para entregárselos a los atacantes.
Plutarco detalla en las Vitae tres de estos asesinatos: el de Arquias en la
Vida de Pelópidas, el de Clito en el relato de la Vida de Alejandro y la muerte
de Sertorio. Las tres escenas resultan interesantes por los elementos comunes
11 Plu., Demetr., 36.4-12; el mismo nal, en semejantes circunstancias, sufre Neoptólemo,
a manos de Pirro, cf. Plu., Pyrrh., 5.7-14. Cf. D. R G, en este mismo volumen,
pp. 256-257.
12 Plu., Oth., 3.4.
13 Plu., Arat., 6.4-7.1.
14 Plu., Ant., 32.3.8; App., BC, 5.73, 308-11; Dio 48.38.
15 Plu., Pomp., 3.2.
16 Son numerosos los casos de complots fallidos; cf. F. B. T, 1999, pp. 492-3.
17 Plu., Pel., 9.4.
que el biógrafo ofrece18. Junto a estas tres, también se analizarán otras breves
noticias de la misma temática recogidas por Plutarco.
2.1. L A
La muerte de Arquias se inserta en un contexto concreto: el complot contra
los magistrados impuestos por Esparta en Tebas. La traición de Pelópidas
era un acto sabido y fácil de predecir, porque la oposición del pueblo tebano
era maniesta y conocida, incluso por algunos de los aliados de Arquias. No
obstante, fue la bebida, junto con otros disfrutes del banquete, la que hizo
que el tirano tomara la mala decisión de dejar para el día siguiente la carta en
que se le ofrecían los datos exactos de la conjura que se urdía contra él. Dice
Plutarco:
τὸν Ἀρχίαν ἀπαγαγὼν αὖθις εἰς ἄκρατον πολὺν κατέβαλε καὶ ταῖς περὶ τῶν
γυναικῶν ἐλπίσι διεπαιδαγώγει τὸν πότον
(scil . Fílidas) llevándose de nuevo a Arquias le sirvió buena cantidad de vino
puro y entretenía el festín con la esperanza de mujeres.
Así, Arquias y los suyos, beodos y perdidos, no pueden oponerse al ataque
de Pelópidas y los demás conjurados que, disfrazados de mujeres, entran en el
banquete armados y acaban asesinando a los comensales en la misma sala o
durante su huída a las casas vecinas.
El levantamiento de Pelópidas, tras una noche de enfrentamientos contra
la guardia, termina nalmente con el regreso de los exiliados desde Atenas y la
victoria del bando tebano.
Un caso semejante es el crimen de estado que Euriclidas cometió contra
los Éforos, por mandato de Cleomenes19 . La imagen del homicida, al igual que
la de Pelópidas, fue para Plutarco la del libertador de la patria, lo cual garantiza
una justicación ética, según la moral del biógrafo, al acto cometido.
Sin embargo, no todos los magnicidios son éticamente admisibles,
como se relata en la Vida de Cimón20 , en la que el autor relata cómo el joven
Damón Peripoltas de Queronea, importunado por un jefe de cohorte que
se había enamorado de él, se vio obligado a asesinarlo durante un sacricio.
Posteriormente, los magistrados romanos condenaron a muerte a éste y a sus
compañeros de complot, lo que produjo que los conjurados también acabaran
con éstos, eligiendo como escenario del crimen una cena.
En esta cita aparecen elementos comunes a la muerte de Arquias, a saber,
los conjurados se camuan, tiznándose los rostros con hollín, y "beben vino
puro" – ἐμπιόντες δ' ἄκρατον –, antes de cometer los asesinatos. Sin embargo,
18 En la cronología relativa establecida por C.P. Jones, las Vidas de Pelópidas y Marcelo
ocuparían una posición entre la II y la IV; Sertorio y Eumenes ocuparían un lugar difícil de
determinar, o bien II-IV, o bien XVI-XXIII; nalmente, Alejandro y César, serían XIII-XIV;
cf. C.P. J, 1966, p. 68.
19 Plu., Cleom., 7-8.
20 Plu., Cim., 1.5.
249
El banquete traicionero en las Vidas de Plutarco
el nal de Damón fue distinto al de Pelópidas y Euriclidas, pues sus crueles
desmanes por la región de Queronea, que no buscaban acabar con un gobierno
injusto para la polis, sino un bien personal, lo llevaron a ser asesinado en el
gimnasio de la ciudad.
Como se puede ver en estos ejemplos, Plutarco no muestra en todas las
ocasiones una visión negativa de las muertes en banquete, sino que simplemente
las trata como ocasiones favorables para cometer un asesinato. Son la moral y las
intenciones de los protagonistas las que le coneren al magnicidio traicionero
un valor positivo o negativo para la comunidad.
2.2. L C
El nal de Clito21 , famoso ya en tiempos de Plutarco por los numerosos
autores que lo habían tratado, comienza con la exculpación de Alejandro, pues,
en palabras del autor, este desgraciado hecho se produjo por dos elementos que
no suelen faltar en un banquete de esta índole, la cólera y la embriaguez:
δυστυχίᾳ τινὶ ταῦθ' εὑρίσκομεν πεπραγμένα το ῦ βασιλέως, ὀργὴν καὶ μέθην
πρόφασιν τῷ Κλείτου δαίμονι παρασχόντος
descubrimos que esta acción fue producto de una desgracia del rey, cuya cólera
y embriaguez fueron el pretexto del que se sirvió el mal démon de Clito.
Con esto Plutarco deja fuera de dudas quién es el culpable de la muerte de
Clito, el vino22 , no siéndolo, en ningún caso, el protagonista de su Vita que, en
último término, debe ofrecer un ejemplo de comportamiento moral.
Continúa el de Queronea comentando dos πονηρά σημεῖα, "malos
augurios", que anuncian la próxima muerte de Clito: "tres de las reses sobre las
que había vertido las libaciones lo siguieron" y la extraña visión que se presentó
a Alejandro en sueños.
Ya en el banquete, el autor describe cómo se había bebido gran cantidad de
vino y se cantaban canciones de escarnio contra los vencidos. La mezcla de ambos
ingredientes, sumados a la osadía de Clito, fueron los detonantes de una airada
discusión entre Alejandro y su general, en la que se pone en duda la valentía de
Clito, se bromea con la divinidad del soberano, se exalta el origen macedonio del
ejército frente a la barbarie de los pueblos sometidos y, nalmente, se acusa de
lobárbaro a Alejandro. Éste, sin poder contener su ira, le arroja unas manzanas
a Clito y, gracias a la entrada de la guardia, se consigue evitar el enfrentamiento
directo de los contendientes. No obstante, la posterior entrada de Clito en la
sala del banquete da la oportunidad a Alejandro de robar una lanza a uno de sus
guardias y clavársela en el costado al general macedonio.
21 Plu., Alex., 50-51. Cf. N. S R, en este mismo volumen, pp. 231-232.
22 Acerca de la importancia de esta bebida en la Vida de Alejandro, cf. C. A M,
1999, pp. 90-1. No obstante, también se debe tener en cuenta la distinta interpretación que
ofrece Plutarco de este hecho en Mor. 71 B: οἶμαι δὲ καὶ Κλεῖτος οὐχ οὕτω παρώξυνε διὰ τὸν
οἶνον, ὡς ὅτι πολλῶν παρόντων ἐδόκει κολούειν Ἀλέξανδρον.
Alejandro, apesadumbrado por sus actos, intenta suicidarse con la misma
lanza, pero, tras el impedimento de su propia guardia, se marcha a sus aposentos
en los que pasa la noche lamentándose.
A la mañana siguiente, los macedonios consiguen tranquilizarle
relativamente, pero éste no volverá a ser el mismo: τὸ δ' ἦθος εἰς πολλὰ
χαυνότερον καὶ παρανομώτερον ἐποίησεν, "su carácter se hizo, con mucho,
más vanidoso e injusto".
2.3. L S
Un tercer ejemplo de homicidio en un banquete es el de Sertorio23 , un
relato que Plutarco desarrolla ofreciendo, al igual que en el de Clito, gran
cantidad de detalles:
Comienza Plutarco planteando la situación en la que el protagonista de la
Vita se encontraba en aquel momento, sin un futuro claro, con la mayoría de
los hispanienses24 "dominados por la envidia" y con un Sertorio que, habiendo
abandonado las ἐπιεικεία y πρᾳότης –"moderación" y "paciencia"- propias de
su carácter, ha cometido una gran injusticia contra los hijos de los nobles íberos
que estudiaban en Osca.
En esta situación, que presagia el nal de Sertorio, un grupo de conjurados
hispanienses con Perpenna a la cabeza decide llevar a término un complot que
ya había planeado desde hacía tiempo: la muerte de Sertorio en un banquete.
El plan debe acelerarse por la falta de discreción de Manlio, de modo
que, inmediatamente, hacen llegar a Sertorio una carta en la que le proponen
celebrar una supuesta victoria militar.
Sertorio, antes del banquete, se encuentra curiosamente, al igual que Clito,
realizando un sacricio en agradecimiento de la buena noticia recibida.
Posteriormente, describiendo ya la preparación del convite de Perpenna,
Plutarco se permite un pequeño inciso para explicar cómo a Sertorio le gustaban
las comidas caracterizadas por el αἰδῶ y el κόσμον – "respeto" y "orden" –, algo
que lo diferencia radicalmente de las desenfrenadas celebraciones del ejército
macedonio. En ese momento, según el autor, Perpenna busca un "inicio de
confrontación" – ἀρχὴν ἁψιμαχίας – con palabras groseras y ngimiento de estar
bebidos. Esta actitud provocó que Sertorio diera la espalda a los conjurados,
circunstancia que es aprovechada por éstos para acabar con el general25 .
Un elemento curioso que ha suscitado una duda en la crítica es el siguiente:
la elección del banquete para llevar a cabo un asesinato se explica por sus
características esenciales antes mencionadas, es decir, se trata de un ambiente
privado de esparcimiento, en el que la víctima no debe esperar el ataque. Por
tanto, no se entiende por qué Perpenna y los conjurados provocaron a Sertorio,
lo que, sin duda, le pondría alerta. Konrad escribió literalmente: "a happy
victim is more easily dispatched than a resentful one who may be on edge and,
hence, on guard". Ante esta duda, el comentarista, basándose en el paralelo de
23 Plu., Sert., 26. Cf. N. S R, en este mismo volumen, p. 232.
24 Romanos del bando Sertoriano, ancados en Hispania.
25 Este mismo hecho aparece resumido por Plutarco en Pomp. 20. 3-4.
251
El banquete traicionero en las Vidas de Plutarco
la muerte de Cicerón, propone que provocando la ira de Sertorio se intenta
legitimar el homicidio, al demostrar el carácter despótico de éste. Ernst Badian
supone que Perpenna y los conjurados partían de un plan preconcebido, según
el cual darían muerte a Sertorio en la confusión de un enfrentamiento26 . Quizá
la respuesta a esta posible incongruencia se encuentre en la estructura que
Plutarco articula a la hora de describir las muertes en banquete.
3. Conclusiones
Si se analizan los relatos de las muertes de Arquias, Clito y Sertorio, se
observa que los tres siguen en paralelo detalles clave:
- Los trágicos asesinatos son predecibles antes de ocurrir el suceso, en el
caso de Arquias por una carta que anunciaba la próxima conjura, en el de Clito
mediante visiones en sueños y en el de Sertorio por la traicionera actividad de
sus aliados en Hispania.
- Los dos últimos banquetes se celebran por victorias, una cierta, la otra
cticia, de los ejércitos macedonio e hispaniense, respectivamente.
- Clito y Sertorio celebran un sacricio de agradecimiento a los dioses
antes del banquete.
- En todos los relatos se produce, previo a la muerte, un violento
enfrentamiento verbal y físico, en los que se vitupera el mal uso del vino y de
las palabras27 .
- Finalmente, aquellos que han cometido el homicidio cruel en un
banquete sufren unas consecuencias no deseadas, a excepción de Pelópidas
y los suyos. El futuro de Perpenna queda pronto cercenado por Pompeyo y
su ejército; mientras que el nal de Alejandro, según el relato de Plutarco se
vuelve a relacionar, por última vez con el vino: αὐτὸν πυρέττοντα νεανικῶς,
διψήσαντα δὲ σφόδρα, πιεῖν οἶνον, "le sube una alta ebre y, teniendo una
gran sed, bebe vino"28 .
De este modo se puede entender que Plutarco, al escribir los relatos de
homicidios en los banquetes, parte de unos elementos comunes que, de manera
consciente o inconsciente, estructuran la escena. En esta construcción el autor
parece hacer uso de unos hechos históricos y tradicionales que organiza y relata
para que cumplan sus propios nes morales29 . Así, compone vívidas escenas
de las que se extraen claras conclusiones: Plutarco, en este tipo de asesinatos,
advierte la posibilidad de que el banquete puede perder sus características
26 Cf. C.F. K, 1994, p. 212.
27 También paralelo al relato de la muerte de Clito es el enfrentamiento causado por la
denuncia de alcoholismo de Alejandro a su padre, Filipo; cf. F.B. T, 1999, p. 492.
28 Cf. Plu., Alex. 75. Cf. G. P, 1991, p. 162.
29 Resulta interesante observar los textos paralelos a los relatos de Plutarco. Sirvan de ejemplo
acerca de la muerte de Sertorio los textos de Salustio, Hist. III,81; Livio, Per.,96; Apiano, B.C.I. ,
113,528; Diodoro XXXVII,22; Veleyo II,31,1; Amiano Marcelino 30,1,23; Eutropio 6,1,3;
Orosio V,23,13. Especialmente curioso resulta el documento de Apuleyo, en el que se arma:
"(scil. Perpenna) tras haberle emborrachado a él (scil. Sertorio) y a su guardia, que rodeaba la sala
del banquete, le dio muerte al acabar la esta".
esenciales, para tornarse en una acción trágica y traicionera, cuando se conjugan
dos elementos como ὀργή y μέθη –"cólera" y "embriaguez"-; asímismo también,
que quien, aprovechando las circunstancias de este microcosmos, las rompe, en
primer lugar, no conseguirá aquello que busca con su acto cruel y, en segundo
lugar, acabará sufriendo un nal igualmente funesto –lo que parece responder
a la concepción religiosa que del banquete defendía Plutarco-. El ejemplo de
la muerte de Arquias ofrece un nal distinto, puesto que, a diferencia de los
anteriores, es un magnicidio legítimo: se trata de acabar con el poder dictatorial,
lo que da carta blanca moral a los conjurados.
A la luz de los contextos analizados se constata que Plutarco estaba muy
interesado en describir las luces y las sombras que rodeaban los banquetes30 . L a
inversión de aquellos elementos, que se suponen consustanciales al simposio,
como el ambiente de juego y esparcimiento, unido a su religiosidad, sirven a
Plutarco de exempla para advertir al lector del cruel nal que puede sufrir, si no
observa los sucesos premonitorios, anteriores al banquete, o si bebe en exceso.
Una buena solución la encuentra el de Queronea en el comportamiento de
Epaminondas, basado en la austeridad y discreción, pues "tal tipo de comida
no deja sitio a la traición"31 .
bi b l i o g r a f í a c i T a d a
A M, C., "Usos indebidos del vino", in J.G. M .
(eds.), Plutarco, Dioniso y el vino. Actas del VI Simposio Español
sobre Plutarco (Cádiz, 14-16 de Mayo de 1998), Madrid, 1999, pp.
83-92.
B, N. I., Les procédés de la peinture des caractères et la vérité historique dans
les Biographies de Plutarque, París, 1933.
D, T. E., Plutarch's Lives. Exploring Virtue and Vice, New York, 1999.
G, M. D., "Estado actual de los estudios sobre los simposios de
Platón, Jenofonte y Plutarco," CFC, 3 (1972) 127-92.
J, C. P., "Towards a Chronology of Plutarch's Works", JRS, 56 (1966)
61-74.
30 En contra de la opinión mantenida durante el Congreso por algunos de sus participantes,
no existen elementos de juicio que permitan armar que las muertes en el banquete siempre se
producían durante el ἄριστον. La ambigüedad terminológica de Plutarco se observa en el uso
de numerosos y diferentes términos con signicado relativamente diferente, pero para referirse a
contextos semejantes. A continuación reproducimos el rango de uso de los términos usados por
el autor al describir la muerte en banquete: δεῖπνον (10): es., 30.3, Cat . Mi., 67, Crass., 33.6,
Demetr., 36.4 y (ab), 36.11, Pyrrh., 5. 7-14, Ant., 32.3, Pomp., 3.2, Alex., 50.7, Sert., 26.7; πότον
(4): Crass., 33.1, Demetr., 36.4, Pel., 9.4, Sert., 26.8; δειπνεῖν (3): Oth., 3.4, Ant., 32.4, Cim., 1.5;
ἑστίασις (2): Crass., 33.1, Sert., 26.6; ἄριστον (2): Tes., 12.4, Arat., 6.4-7.1; συνουσίαν (1): Pel.,
9.4; συσσίτιον (1): Cleom., 7-8; συμπόσιον (1): Pel., 11.3; συνδειπνεῖν (1): Art., 19.1.
31 Plu. Lyc., 13, 3.
253
El banquete traicionero en las Vidas de Plutarco
K, C. F., Sertorius. A Historical Commentary, Chapel Hill and London,
1994.
N, A. G., "Plutarch's Heroes in Action: Does the End justify the
Means?", in I. G, B. S (eds.), Teoria e Prassi Politica
nelle Opere di Plutarco. Atti del V Convegno plutarcheo (Certosa di
Pontignano, 7-9 Giugno 1993), Napoli, 1995, pp. 301-312.
P, G., "Symposia and Deipna in Plutarch's Lives and Other Historical
Writings", in W. J. S (ed.), Dining in a classical context, Ann Arbor,
1991, pp. 157-169.
P, C ., "Is Death the End? Closure in Plutarch's Lives", in D. H.
R, D. H. (eds.), Classical Closure. Reading the End in Greek and
Latin Literature, Princeton, 1997, pp. 228-250.
T, F.B., "Everything to do with Dionysus: Banquets in Plutarch's
Lives", in J. G. M C . (eds.), Plutarco, Dioniso y el vino.
Actas del VI Simposio Español sobre Plutarco (Cádiz, 14-16 de Mayo
de 1998), Madrid, 1999, pp. 491-499.
255
Veneno simposíaco. Envenenamiento en los banquetes en la obra plutarquea
V :
D R G
Universidad de Birmingham
Abstract
In the festive environment of the banquet, it is possible to identify moments when this mood has
been broken, and Plutarch presents many examples of it in the Vitae and Moralia. One possibility
of disrupting this context is poisoning the guest, as Parysatis killed Stateira, or trying to do it, such
as Medea did with eseus or Neoptolomeus with Phyrrus. Apart from relating these deaths, or
failed attempts, by poison at the banquet, Plutarch also adds the consequences for the hosts of
breaking down this happy time and the reasons why they committed the murders.
Plutarco, consciente de que el envenenamiento era un crimen bastante
habitual, presenta numerosos ejemplos de esto en Vidas y, en menor medida,
en Moralia 2 . Ahora bien, esto no siempre tiene lugar en los banquetes y como
muestra de ello se encuentran los siguientes ejemplos, que, por no estar
encuadrados dentro del contexto simposíaco, quedan descartados: un primer
grupo son los envenenamientos por error de una persona3 ; un segundo, los
que se producen por la mezcla del veneno con un líquido4 o con un alimento
sólido5 y, nalmente, un tercero, en los que el queronense no da ninguna pista
que induzca a pensar que se realizan en un banquete6 .
I. Del complot al envenenamiento
La imagen que se tiene del banquete griego es, en general, idílica: se
presenta como la reunión en un ambiente amigable de un grupo limitado de
1 Agradezco a la Fundación Hardt (Ginebra) la beca que me concedió para consultar
su biblioteca y poder realizar esta comunicación. Parto como base del artículo de R M.ª
A, 2008, en el que se estudia la frecuencia y los sentidos de la palabra pharmakon en el
queronense.
2 Como R. M.ª A, 2008, pp. 754-5, 759 dice "en general, excepto si se trata de
alguna anécdota, el signicado (en Mor.) es el de remedio o medicamento, bien en sentido
recto o en el gurado. (...) De otra parte, el reparto de signicados resulta coherente con el tipo
de discurso. En los textos históricos el signicado de 'veneno' aparece porque el φάρμακον se
usa para ejecutar al enemigo o eliminarle ocultamente o, por n, en un suicidio como recurso
último ante la derrota. En cambio, en textos de carácter discursivo o losóco el signicado de
'medicamento' o 'remedio' muestra mayor frecuencia y, las más veces, guradamente".
3 Lúculo, quien murió por los supuestos ltros amorosos de su esclavo (Luc. 43.1-2).
4 Sinorix a manos de Camma ante el altar de Ártemis (Mor. 258B-C, 768C (la mezcla de
leche y miel – o también hidromiel).
5 Creso, aunque, gracias a la lealtad del panadero, no llegó a comer el pan envenenado que su
madrastra quería darle (Mor. 401 E-F); el asesinato de un padre por un hijo en un pastel (Cic.
26.5).
6 El intento de asesinato de Aretala a su marido Nicócrates y descubierto por su suegra
(Mor. 256 B-D), el de Hirodes por su hijo Fraates (Crass. 33,5) o el de Pirro por su médico
(Pyrrh. 21.1, Mor. 195B), Elisio (Mor. 109B), los invitados del padre de Tespesio (Mor. 566F).
256
Dámaris Romero González
personas, con una determinada vinculación entre ellos, que se reunían en salas
privadas de una casa7 , acompañados de ciertos divertimentos, como el disfrute
del vino y la comida, la recitación o la conversación, entre otros8 . De hecho, en
los ejemplos que dan origen a esta comunicación se cumplen gran parte de estos
requisitos: se evidencia el tipo de vinculación que unía a los asistentes, como la
familiaridad en el caso de Parisatis y Estatira, suegra y nuera respectivamente;
la política, así Gelón busca en Mírtilo un aliado "político" para Neoptólemo; y
la hospitalidad, cuando Teseo es agasajado como huésped de Egeo. También
se disfruta del vino y la comida, ya sea como divertimento de los convidados,
sirviendo como ejemplo los brindis que hubo en el banquete de Gelón o la
comida dispuesta para agasajo de Teseo, ya sea como instrumento de muerte,
así Teseo lleva el veneno en su copa y Estatira muere por el ave ryntakis
envenenado ofrecido por Parisatis.
Si bien es cierto que la mayoría de las veces el ambiente suele ser afable,
no signica que siempre sea así. Como dice F. B. Titchener, "un banquete
era un lugar sorprendentemente peligroso para estar, por norma general"9 :
los banquetes son propicios para los atentados o para planearlos. Plutarco,
conocedor de esta realidad, presenta tres ejemplos en Vidas de envenenamiento
en el banquete, que permiten seguir el recorrido del veneno desde los momentos
iniciales, en los cuales se urde el complot, hasta su nalización con la muerte
de la víctima elegida.
El primer paso para acabar con el adversario es tramar su muerte, en estos
casos, usando veneno. Plutarco lo ejemplica en Pyrrh. 5.7-14. Gelón, partidario
de Neoptólemo, encuentra una buena oportunidad de colaborar en la muerte de
su enemigo (Pirro) con el desplante que Pirro le hizo a su copero Mírtilo:
(scil. Gelón) le (scil. Mírtilo) invitó a un banquete en el que, como algunos
dicen, aparte de aprovecharse entre copas de la juventud de Mírtilo, le estuvo
aduciendo razones y exhortándole a que se uniera a Neoptólemo y asesinara a
Pirro mediante un veneno10.
Ideada la maquinación, ya sólo queda llevarla a cabo. Sin embargo, el tener
todos los movimientos planicados, no asegura el éxito, pues siempre hay que
considerar el elemento sorpresa. Plutarco lo muestra con los fracasos de Pirro
y Teseo.
En el primero de los envenenamientos fracasados, el de Pirro (Pyrrh.
5.10-14), dos fueron las causas por las que no tuvo lugar el emponzoñamiento.
Éstas fueron, por una parte, la lealtad de Mírtilo a Pirro, al que le descubrió
todo lo que Gelón tramaba, y, por otra, la excesiva conanza de Neoptólemo
en la aparente buena marcha del plan, de modo que bajó la guardia y comenzó
a hablar abiertamente de la asechanza.
7 P. G, 1999, p.131.
8 E. P, 1994, bosqueja los tipos de entretenimiento en el simposium.
9 F. B. T, 1999, p. 492.
10 Pyrrh. 5.8.
257
Veneno simposíaco. Envenenamiento en los banquetes en la obra plutarquea
El segundo de los envenenamientos fracasados es quizá uno de los más
conocidos en la literatura griega y es el de Teseo por parte de Medea en el
banquete en que éste se dio a conocer como hijo de Egeo.
(scil. Medea) lo persuadió (scil. a Egeo) para que, invitando al extranjero,
lo envenenara. Así pues, yendo Teseo al banquete, pensó que sería mejor
no descubrir de primeras quién era, sino que quiso dar una pista para ser
descubierto, y, cuando la carne se sirvió, sacando la espada para cortarla, se la
enseñó. Al instante Egeo se percató y dejó caer la copa de veneno...11
Medea quiso eliminar a Teseo con el inocente beneplácito de Egeo,
desconocedor en ese momento de que el extranjero al que homenajeaban era su
hijo. A diferencia del rey, Medea sí lo sabía, puesto que había indagado sobre Teseo
cuando éste llegó a Atenas, pero temía que fuera una amenaza para su posición,
ya que ella le dio a Egeo un hijo, Medo12 . Toda esperanza de matar a Teseo se
vio frustrada cuando Egeo reconoció como suya la espada que Teseo utilizó para
trinchar la carne del banquete, objeto con el que Medea no había contado.
El único ejemplo que Plutarco ofrece de envenenamiento exitoso es el de
Estatira por Parisatis (Art. 19.1-5). Ésta, que era la madre del rey Artajerjes,
recelaba de Estatira, esposa del mismo, por el gran inujo que estaba ejerciendo
sobre su hijo en detrimento de ella, de modo que decide matarla:
(scil. Parisatis) Tenía una esclava el llamada Gigis, con gran inuencia sobre
ella y quien, según Dinón, la ayudó a preparar el veneno, aunque, según Ctesias,
fue cómplice involuntaria... Después de un tiempo de sospechas y disensiones,
(scil. Parisatis y Estatira) habían empezado otra vez a visitarse y a cenar juntas,
aunque comían de los mismos alimentos y servidos por las mismas manos por
desconanza y precaución... Parisatis, según Ctesias, trinchó una de estas aves
con un cuchillo untado por un lado con el veneno, con lo que esa parte del ave
quedó emponzoñada; mientras ella se llevó a la boca para comérsela la que
estaba limpia de veneno, dio a Estatira la emponzoñada... Así pues la mujer
(Estatira) murió con grandes dolores y convulsiones...
II. De la risa a las lágrimas
Ahora bien, ¿por qué el banquete deja de ser lugar de divertimento para
convertirse en lugar de muerte? Porque las intenciones de los antriones no
son el esparcimiento de sus invitados, sino la muerte de ellos, y se valen del
despreocupado contexto festivo en el que se desarrolla el banquete para llevar
a cabo sus planes. Ni Teseo, Pirro o Estatira13 imaginan las intenciones de
11 es. 12.2-3.
12 Estos acontecimientos no los relata Plutarco, sino otros autores como Apollod. I.9.28,
Epit. 1.5-6, D.S. IV.55.4-6 o Paus. II.3.8.
13 Quizá Estatira podría imaginarlo de Parisatis pues Plutarco cuenta que ambas comían los
mismos alimentos servidos por las mismas manos, pero al ver que Paristis degustaba la misma
258
Dámaris Romero González
sus compañeros de mesa, ya que "las diversiones son terribles para mantener
cualquier actitud distante"14 .
De ese modo, al producirse la ruptura del ambiente lúdico y sagrado en el
que se celebra el simposio15 , se incumple el objetivo por el que éste se festeja y
que Plutarco pone en boca de Teón en sus Quaestiones Convivales :
...concederá un sitio sólo a aquellas conversaciones, espectáculos y bromas que
cumplan con la nalidad del banquete, y esto sería producir en los presentes,
por medio del placer, un robustecimiento o el origen de una amistad; pues
el banquete es un entretenimiento con vino que por el encanto acaba en
amistad16.
Ninguno de los tres banquetes pretende ese n, conseguir una nueva amistad
o robustecer una ya existente. Gelón, aprovechando el enfado de Mírtilo por el
desplante de Pirro, intenta beneciarse de la cercanía del copero para asesinar
a su adversario. Por su parte, Paristatis, que sentía aversión hacia Estatira y
estaba celosa del poder que ésta tenía sobre su hijo, reanuda sus relaciones
con su nuera para tramar contra ella. Finalmente, Medea, recurriendo a la
costumbre griega de la hospitalidad, quiere agasajar a Teseo para envenenarlo.
Sin embargo, este quebrantamiento no queda impune y, como apunta
I. Muñoz17 , quienes han tramado o cometido el envenenamiento, sufren las
consecuencias de este acto.
Neoptólemo, creyendo que la asechanza seguía adelante y rebosante de
alegría porque pronto vería muerto a su enemigo, acude a la invitación de Pirro
a un banquete, sin sospechar que éste conoce por partida doble sus planes,
primero por Mírtilo y luego por la mujer del mayoral. En ese banquete Pirro lo
mata, adelantándosele y teniendo de su parte a los principales de los epirotas18 .
Ahora bien, siguiendo la lógica de lo dicho en el párrafo anterior, Pirro
también tendría que haber muerto poco después. Sin embargo, la excepción
a esta posible regla, como el propio I. Muñoz señala, se incumple cuando el
asesinato se comete como solución a una situación tiránica, tal que sucede
aquí: "...debido al odio que les inspiraba la forma opresiva y violenta con que
Neoptólemo se conducía en su gobierno"19 .
Tras descubrirse el intento de envenenamiento de Teseo, Medea es
expulsada del Ática, junto con su hijo Medo, por Egeo20 .
comida que ella, le haría más conada. Cf. N. S R, en este mismo volumen, p.
251.
14 Per. 7.3.
15 Cf. I. M G, en este mismo volumen, p. 246.
16 Mor. 621C.
17 Cf. I. M G, en este mismo volumen, p. 251.
18 J. M. M, 1992, p. 94, al comparar los intentos de asesinato de Alejandro y Pirro
escribe: "Donde Alejandro es un rey que responde a las conspiraciones de hombres inferiores a
él, Pirro es un jugador más en un juego de intriga".
19 Phyrr. 5.2.
20 Cf. n. 12.
259
Veneno simposíaco. Envenenamiento en los banquetes en la obra plutarquea
Tanto Gigis como Parisatis son castigadas por el emponzoñamiento de
Estatira. La condena que recibió la esclava fue, como Plutarco recoge, según
la ley en Persia: machacar y moler con una piedra su cabeza, colocada en otra
piedra ancha, hasta que la cara y la cabeza quedan deshechas. Para la reina
madre, la condena fue más leve y dictada por Artajerjes: es exiliada, estando
ella de acuerdo, a Babilonia, ciudad que su hijo Artajerjes no volverá a visitar
mientras ella estuviese allí21 .
III. Conclusiones: Razones para el Envenenamiento
Plutarco, en su faceta de biógrafo, ha hecho acopio de sucesos que
pertenecen a la vida de los protagonistas de su obra, completando estas
semblanzas con anotaciones de carácter moral, de modo que el queronense no
se limita a exponer el envenenamiento de un personaje, sino también las razones
que condujeron a ello. Esto ocurre en los casos de Teseo y Estatira, porque en
el ejemplo de Pirro no se da ninguna razón para el intento de envenenamiento
por parte de Neoptólemo y sin embargo sí se dan muchas para su posterior
asesinato: la forma de gobernar de Neoptólemo y su conjura. No obstante,
éstas son una excusa de la verdadera razón del asesinato de Neoptólemo: la
ambición natural de Pirro (Phyrr. 5.1, 14).
La primera causa es el miedo a la usurpación del poder, como le ocurría a
Egeo. Plutarco cuenta que Egeo, a causa de sus años, estaba "lleno de celos y
sospechas, y temiendo cualquier cosa a causa de la facción que entonces estaba
en la ciudad"22 . Así pues, Egeo, anciano, estaba sometido a la presión de la
presencia de pretendientes al trono, de modo que se deja convencer por Medea
para, por una parte, tomar fármacos capaces de hacerle engendrar de nuevo y,
por otro, usar un veneno para matar al extranjero Teseo23 .
La segunda causa es la mezcla del odio y los celos que Parisatis sentía
hacia Estatira. El odio viene provocado por una acumulación de actuaciones
en clara oposición a Parisatis por parte de Estatira, quien tampoco sufría a
su suegra, como eran la acusación de ser la culpable del inicio de la guerra
fraticida, la muerte del eunuco que cortó la cabeza y la mano a Ciro muerto
y el cambio de decisión de Artajerjes respecto al destino de Clearco24 . Los
celos son reejo de la impotencia de Parisatis al ver que la inuencia sobre
su hijo era fruto del respeto y el honor que él tenía hacia ella, mientras que
21 Art. 19.6
22 es. 12.2.
23 H. J. W, 1995, pp. 87-8, observa que, en tan sólo dos frases yuxtapuestas, Plutarco
expresa los dos poderes antagonistas de los fármacos: "Pueden destrozar completamente a un
hombre y su casa (que es lo que Medea intenta hacer cuando Teseo llega) y son necesarios si un
hombre desea preservar su casa (que es la razón por la que Egeo tiene a Medea viviendo con
él)".24 Art. 6.5; 17.6; 18.3. Plutarco minimiza la opinión de Ctesias sobre la muerte de Clearco
por inuencia de Estatira y en contra de Parisatis, como causa nal y denitiva por la que
Parisatis, arriesgándose a dar muerte a la mujer legítima del rey y madre de sus hijos, preparó el
veneno contra Estatira.
260
Dámaris Romero González
la de su esposa era por el gran amor y la fuerte conanza existente entre
ellos25 .
La tercera, que por otra parte es la más evidente y concluyente, es que los
asesinados son, de una manera u otra, adversarios políticos que se cruzan en
el camino del personaje en cuestión: Pirro de Neoptólemo, Teseo de Medea y
Estatira de Parisatis. El banquete se presenta entonces como la escena donde se
revela una de las caras del poder, el de la violencia que se usa para conservarlo26 .
Ninguno de los personajes de estos banquetes duda en utilizar cualquier
método para eliminar a su adversario y, de ese modo, seguir conservando el
poder que temían perder o estaban perdiendo.
bi b l i o g r a f í a c i T a d a
A, R., "Pharmakon en Plutarco", in A. G. N (ed.), e Unity
of Plutarch's Work. Moralia emes in the Lives, Features of the Lives in the
Moralia, Berlin/New York, 2008, pp. 751-71.
B, A., "Plutarque et la scène du banquet", in A. G. N (ed.),
e Unity of Plutarch's Work. Moralia emes in the Lives, Features of the
Lives in the Moralia, Berlin/ New York, 2008, pp. 577-90.
G, P., Food and Society in Classical Antiquity, Cambridge, 1999.
M, J. M., "Plutarch, Pyrrus and Alexander", in P. A. S (ed.),
Plutarch and the Historical Tradition, London, 1992, pp. 90-108.
P, E., "Outlines of a Morphology of Sympotic Entertainment", in O.
M (ed.), Sympotika. A Symposium on the Symposion, Oxford, 1994,
pp. 177-84.
T, F. B., "Everything to do with Dionysus: Banquets in Plutarch's
Lives", in J. G. M C . (eds.), Plutarco, Dioniso y el vino .
Actas del VI Simposio Español sobre Plutarco (Cádiz, 14-16 de Mayo,
1998), Madrid, 1999, pp. 491-500.
W, H. J., eseus and Athens, New York, 1995.
25 Art. 19.1.
26 A. B, 2008, p. 578.
261
S 4
Philanthropia, Philia and Eros
263
La notion de philanthrōpia chez Plutarque: contexte social et sources philosophiques
la n o T i o n d e p H i l a n T H r ō p i a c h e z pl u T a r q u e :
c o n T e x T e s o c i a l e T s o u r c e s p h i l o s o p h i q u e s
F B
Université de Florence
Abstract
In a period in which some natural feelings, like philia and philanthrōpia, are disappearing, it
is natural that an intellectual, like Plutarch, asks for the reasons that have determined this
disappearance. e philosopher from Chaeronea identies them in the greed (pleonexia) and
in the insatiability (aplēstia) that have invaded the soul of the aristocracy of his time. Due to
these passions, which derive from wrong judgements and empty opinions, the soul has become
attached to goods that are foreign to itself and eventually loses the emotional impulse for
showing its proper virtues. Consequently, these passions end up wearing out human relations
in such a way as to make man no more familiar and friend to his fellows (oikeios), but a stranger
(allotrios).
Regarding the philosophical coordinates, Plutarch's philosophy of philanthrōpia as oikeiotēs
seems to nd its starting point in Aristotle's EN and, more in general, in Peripatetic philosophy
beginning with eophrastus.
… μή τι παυσώμεσθα δρῶντες εὖ βροτούς1
Au cours des premiers siècles de l'époque impériale, durant lesquels
l'éthique païenne et l'éthique chrétienne cohabitent et s'opposent2 , le sentiment
qui domine, est , semble-t-il, celui de la philia pour les biens matériels. La
riche aristocratie de cette période, qui est égoïste et égocentrique, est aussi
la proie facile des pires passions de l'âme3 , et apparaît dominée par le désir
des richesses (φιλοχρηματία), du pouvoir (φιλαρχία) et des honneurs
(φιλοδοξία ou φιλοτιμία 4 ), ainsi que par l'avidité (πλεονεξία) et par le désir
insatiable (ἀπληστία) de nourriture (γαστριμαργία), de vin (οἰνοφλυγία)
et de sexe (λαγνεία )5 . Ces passions malsaines de l'âme ont supplanté et fait
disparaître de l'esprit humain des sentiments naturels comme la φιλαδελφία ,
la φιλοστοργία, la φιλεταιρία ou φιλοφιλία et la φιλοξενία ainsi que la
φιλανθρωπία qui avaient caractérisé la civilisation hellénique en général et la
1 TrGF 2 F 410a Kannicht-Snell, cité par Plutarque dans An Seni resp. 791D et suav. viv.
Epic. 1099A.
2 Voir A. Postiglione dans Plutarco, L'amore fraterno, L'amore per i gli, Napoli 1991, p. 25: "Al
conne fra l'etica pagana e l'etica cristiana Plutarco dice che bisogna amare tutti gli uomini,…
non conoscendo, e tuttavia quasi presagendo quel comandamento più alto, che ormai si andava
diondendo per il mondo, di amare tutti gli uomini come fratelli". Sur ce point il faut rappeler
la recommandation de Plutarque (Soll. an. 984) à aimer l'homme καθ' ὃ ἄνθρωπός ἐστι.
3 Comme l'envie ou la colère, qui (Coh. ira 462F) est une douleur (λύπη) et un mélange des
semences de toutes les passions (πανσπερμία τῶν παθῶν).
4 Pour l'acception négative de φιλοτιμία voir Plu., Sull. 7. 1; Ages. 23. 33. Sur la notion de
φιλοτιμία chez Plutarque voir maintenant M. C. F, 2008, pp. 45-6.
5 Voir V. A. S, 1974, pp. 65-83; C. P. J, 1978, p. 104 sqq.; P. D, 1978, p.
353 n. 29.
civilisation athénienne en particulier6. Ainsi la dépravation humaine – comme
le commente Plutarque, non sans amertume, dans le De fraterno amore 7 – qui a
germé comme la zizanie au milieu du blé8 , a rendu impossible le fait de trouver
un rapport d'amitié qui soit sincère, pur et sans passions9 . À une époque où la
sophistique est en train de devenir prépondérante, il est plus facile de trouver,
semble-t-il, quelqu'un capable d'écrire des textes sur l'amitié que quelqu'un
qui la mette en pratique10 . Pourtant l'homme, qui est un être non seulement
sociable mais aussi rationnel (λογικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν ζῷον)11 , ne peut pas vivre
sans la philia, moins par son manque d'autonomie (αὐτάρκεια), que parce que
cela est contre nature. Dans la Vie de Solon 12 Plutarque présente une objection
à cette société avide et insatiable (ἀπλήρωτος), qui par ignorance semble avoir
abandonné la nature pour suivre la nature de ce qui est contre nature, avec la
conviction que le bonheur consiste à accumuler des richesses et à posséder des
biens matériels13 . Pour lui, l'âme humaine, qui par nature est portée à aimer
(φιλεῖν ), à sentir, à penser, à se souvenir et à apprendre, perd sa charge aective
au moment où elle par avidité ou par une ambition excessive perd l'amour pour
ce qui lui est propre (οἰκεῖον) et apparenté et s'attache aux biens matériels (τὰ
ἐκτός)14 . Alors, il est naturel que les rapports humains en soient compromis et
que la philanthrōpia disparaisse. Elle perd – pour citer l'introduction de la Vie
de Périclès15 – le sentiment naturel d'amour et d'aection que l'homme a en lui
et qu'il est appelé à manifester à l'égard de ses semblables. Ce sont en eet les
soucis dus au désir d'argent qui, entraînant pour l'âme des rides précoces et des
cheveux blancs, font aussi se faner la philanthrōpia (τὸ φιλάνθρωπον) selon le
De cupiditate divitiarum 16 .
En conrmant que le bonheur chez l'homme n'arrive pas de l'extérieur et
que ce n'est pas quelque chose que l'on peut acheter17 , le philosophe de Chéronée
ne se borne pas à rappeler l'idéal de la modération (πραότης et μετριότης) et
de l'autosusance (αὐτάρκεια) qui réduit au minimum le besoin des biens
6 Plu., Frat. am. 478C ; Cup. div. 523D; Comp. Arist. - Cat. Ma. 4. 2.
7 Plu., Frat. am. 481F οὔτε τὸ ἑταιρικὸν... εἱλικρινὲς καὶ ἀπαθὲς καὶ καθαρὸν ἔστιν εὑρεῖν
κακίας...
8 Voir Plu., Am. prol. 497CD.
9 Plu., Cap. ex inim. ut. 89B ; Luc. 41. 9.
10 Plu., Frat. am. 481BC.
11 Plu., Am. prol. 495C.
12 Plu., Sol. 7. 3.
13 Plu., Cup. div. 524B. On devrait pénser non seulement au petit traité de Plutarque
intitulé Περὶ φιλοχρηματίας ( De divitiarum cupiditate), mais aussi au texte de Galien Περὶ τῶν
φιλοχρημάτων πλουσίων ( Sur les riches amoureux de l'argent), que l'intellectuel de Pergame cite
dans le traité Περὶ ἀλυπίας ( Sur l'inutilité de se chagriner), récemment découvert au monastère des
Vlatades à essalonique et édité par Véronique Boudon-Millot (V. B-M .,
2008, pp. 78-123).
14 Plu., Sol. 7.3.
15 Plu., Per. 1. 1-2.
16 Pour la φιλαργυρία qui obscurcie la φιλανθρωπία voir Plu., Cup. div. 526F-527A; Tranq.
an. 468EF.
17 Plu., Fort. 99E; Cap. ex inim. ut. 92DE; Virt. et vit. 100C, 101B-D; Tranq. an. 466D,
477A.
265
La notion de philanthrōpia chez Plutarque: contexte social et sources philosophiques
matériels18 , mais il montre un nouveau modèle d'humanité aux hommes de son
époque, habiles à pratiquer la philia uniquement par les mots19 . Ce nouveau
modèle est caractérisé par la bienveillance et par la bonté, par la générosité
et par la clémence, des qualités qui, dans les rapports humains, trouvent un
champ d'application plus vaste que celui de la loi et de la justice20 . Dans la Vie
de Caton l'Ancien, en critiquant le comportement dur de Caton à l'égard de ses
vieux esclaves, comportement qui est celui d'un homme qui ne pratiquait pas
la philanthrōpia mais qui croyait seulement à l'existence de rapports humains
fondés sur l'utilité (χρεία), Plutarque arme que tout naturellement l'homme
est porté πρὸς εὐεργεσίας...καὶ χάριτας non seulement dans les rapports
humains, mais aussi vis-à-vis des animaux, si ce n'est pour une autre raison, du
moins pour s'exercer à la vertu de la φιλανθρωπία 21 .
L'accusation la plus grave que Plutarque adresse à la société de son époque
n'est pas seulement celle de la recherche du plaisir (φιληδονία), de l'avidité
insatiable et de la goinfrerie (ἀπληστία), dues à un jugement faux et irrationnel
(διὰ κρίσιν φαύλην καὶ ἀλόγιστον ) 22 , mais aussi celle de vivre contre nature
(παρὰ φύσιν ), d'une manière indigne d'un homme libre (ἀνελευθέρως), c'est-
à-dire inhumainement (ἀπανθρώπως ) 23 , sans jamais rien orir (ἀμεταδότως ),
en étant dur avec ses amis (πρὸς φίλους ἀπηνῶς) et indiérent à l'égard de ses
concitoyens (πρὸς πολίτας ἀφιλοτίμως )24 , comme si la nature humaine était
incapable d'aimer de façon désintéressée et sans y trouver son compte25 . Par
contre, parmi les liens sacrés, c'est celui naturel de l'amitié qui est le plus sacré
et le plus fort26 . La conformité avec la nature de ce sentiment de la philia, qui
est à la base de tous les rapports humains est démontré par les animaux27 qui,
ne possédant pas l' adaptabilité, ni l'excellence, ni la pleine autonomie de la
raison, suivent leur instinct et demeurent enracinés dans la nature28 , alors que
chez l'homme, la raison qui est la reine absolue et qui se trouve inuencée par
de nombreuses opinions et de nombreux préjugés, est sortie du droit chemin
signalé par la nature et a ni par n'en laisser aucune trace claire et visible29 .
18 Plu., Comp. Arist. - Cat. Ma. 4. 2.
19 Les opuscules qui nous sont parvenus où Plutarque développe le sujet de la φιλία sont au
nombre de trois: de adulatore et amico , de amicorum multitudine et de fraterno amore. À ceux-ci on
pourrait ajouter le Πρὸς Βιθυνὸν περὶ φιλίας (Cat. Lampr. nr. 83) et l' Ἐπιστολὴ πρὸς Φαβωρῖνον
περὶ φιλίας· ἐν ἄλλῳ δὲ Περὶ φίλων χρήσεως (Cat. Lampr. nr. 132). Cf. Plutarchus, Moralia VII,
Fragmenta 154 -166 Sdb.
20 Plu., Cat. Ma. 5. 2.
21 Plu., Cat. Ma. 5. 2-5.
22 Plu., Cup. div. 524D.
23 Cf. Plu., Dio 7. 5. Voir Plu., Frat. am. 479C (ἀφιλάνθρωπος).
24 Plu., Cup. div. 525C.
25 Plu., Am. prol. 495A κατηγοροῦσι τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως μόνης μὴ προῖκα τὸ στέργειν
ἐχούσης μηδ' ἐπισταμένης φιλεῖν ἄνευ χρείας;
26 Plu., Frat. am. 479D.
27 Plu., Am. prol. 493BC.
28 Sur l'idée que la nature ne fait jamais rien d'inutile (πανταχοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἀκριβὴς
καὶ φιλότεχνος καὶ ἀνελλιπὴς καὶ ἀπέριπτος) voir Plu., Am. prol. 495C.
29 Plu., Am. prol. 493DE.
Déjà à l'époque de Plutarque (καθ ' ἡμᾶς), la pratique de la philia, naturelle et
propre à un peuple pour les Anciens30 , était devenue plus rare que le phénix,
rare comme l'avait été la haine chez les Anciens (ἐπὶ τῶν παλαιῶν )31 ; de toute
façon, comme nous le conrme Lucien dans son dialogue Sur l'amitié, ce
sentiment était depuis longtemps bien loin de pouvoir être considéré comme
une exclusivité de la civilisation grecque, celle-ci étant désormais uniquement
habile à composer des discours sur l'amitié, mais non plus à la mettre en
pratique. Dans le dialogue de Lucien, le scythe Toxaris qui s'adresse à son
interlocuteur, le grec Mnésippe, arme :
Valons-nous mieux que les Grecs sous les autres rapports, sommes-nous plus
justes, plus respectueux qu'ils ne le sont envers nos parents ? Je ne prétends
pas entrer en contestation avec toi sur cette question. Toujours est-il que les
Scythes sont, plus que les Grecs, des amis tendres et dèles, et que l'amitié est
chez nous plus honorée que chez vous : ce serait un point facile à démontrer
[…] Vous me paraissez capables de faire sur l'amitié les plus beaux discours du
monde ; mais, loin que vos actions répondent à vos paroles, vous vous contentez
de la louer et de montrer quel grand bien elle est pour les hommes ; puis, au
moment d'agir, traîtres à votre langage, vous fuyez, je ne sais comment , la mise
en application de vos théories32 .
Ainsi, à ses lecteurs qui, comme Caton l'Ancien, ne semblent plus
croire à l'existence d'autres rapports que ceux dictés par l'utilité33 , Plutarque
ne perd aucune occasion de présenter, comme l'écrit Ziegler34 , des exemples
de bienveillance, de bonté, de philanthrōpia 35 ; cette dernière étant une vertu
profondément enracinée dans son caractère, une vertu qu'il recommanda là où
il la rencontra et dont il t preuve personnellement et non seulement à l'égard
de ses concitoyens et de toute créature à visage humain36 .
30 Pour la φιλανθρωπία des anciens voir Plu., Quaest. conv. II 643D; Soll. an. 970A; Cim.
10. 6.
31 Plu., Frat. am. 478C, 481F.
32 Luc., XLI 9.
33 Plu., Cat. Ma. 5. 1.
34 K. Z, 1965, p. 367. Cf. J. D R, 1979, p. 293: "la douceur ne semble pas, chez
Plutarque, une notion qu'il auraît reçue toute faite, en héritage doctrinal, mais plutôt une valeur
enracinée dans sa personalité et son caractère".
35 Plu., Aem. 28. 1, 39. 9; Ages. 1. 5; Alex. 58. 8; Ant. 3. 10, 25. 3; Arist. 23. 1; Brut. 30. 6 ;
Caes. 34. 7 ; Cat. Mi. 21. 10, 23. 1; 29. 4; Cim. 6. 2, 10. 7; Cleom. 34. 3-4; Crass. 3. 5; Demetr. 4.
1, 17. 1, 50. 1; Fab. 22. 8 ; Comp. Phil. - Flam. 3. 4 ; Galb. 11. 1, 20. 5 ; Luc. 18. 9, 29. 6; Marc. 1.
3, 10. 6, 20. 1 (Marcel est le premier des Romains qui ait fait preuve de φιλανθρωπία ); Pel. 21.
3; Per. 30. 3; Phoc. 5. 1 ; Publ. 1. 2, 4. 5 ; Pyrrh. 11. 8 ; Sol. 15. 3 ; es. 6. 4, 36. 4. Mais à côté
de ceux-ci il ne manque pas dans les Vies de Plutarque des exemples aussi d' ἀ-φιλανθρωπία et
d'ἀπανθρωπία : Cat. Ma. 5. 1, 5. 5; Dio 7. 5 ; Nic. 11. 2 ; Sull. 14. 8.
36 Voir Plu., Cat. Ma. 5. 2: "nous ne devons pas traiter les êtres vivants comme des chassures
ou des ustensiles, qu'on jette quand ils sont abîmés ou usés à force de servir, car il faut s'habituer
à être doux et clément envers eux, sinon pour une autre raison, du moins pour s'exercer à la
pratique de la vertu d'humanité (φιλανθρωπία)".
267
La notion de philanthrōpia chez Plutarque: contexte social et sources philosophiques
Philanthrōpia37 dans l'acception commune d' "humanité" ou de
"bienveillance" est un terme qui apparaît pour la première fois dans le monde
grec dans la première moitié du IV e siècle av. J.-C. avec les Discours d'Isocrate
et les Dialogues de Platon38 , même si l'adjectif philanthrōpos, qui durant la
période classique est l'un des trois termes "les plus couramment employés …
pour désigner la douceur"39 , est déjà connu d'Eschyle qui l'utilise dans son
Prométhée40 . Comme idéal civil, la φιλανθρωπία entendue comme φιλία πρὸς
πάντας ἀνθρώπους41 , à laquelle par nature nous sommes liés, car tout homme,
πολιτικὸν ...ζῷον ... καὶ κοινωνικὸν καὶ φιλόκαλον42 , est parent (οἰκεῖος)
et ami (φίλος), semble une création aristotélicienne et péripatéticienne plus
qu'une doctrine créée par les écoles de pensée modernes qui – en limitant la
φιλία ou aux sages, comme le stoïcisme ancien, ou aux membres du groupe,
comme l'épicuréisme – restèrent fondamentalement étrangères à cette philia
pour l'homme en tant qu'homme. Après l'idéal cicéronien de l'humanitas qui
naît comme terme et comme concept au Ier siècle, en tant que plein exercice de
la nature humaine, on assiste au début de l'époque impériale à la renaissance
et à la diusion du sentiment de φιλανθρωπία aussi bien chez les Grecs que
chez les Romains comme humanitas de la part d'intellectuels comme Philon,
Sénèque, Épictète et Dion ; avec eux la philanthrōpia ne s'identie plus avec le
plein exercice de la nature humaine, mais elle parvient à devenir "expression du
sentiment de la sociabilité"43 .
Parmi les intellectuels des premiers siècles de l'époque impériale, Plutarque
se révèle être l'auteur qui a fait un "usus frequentissimus" de la notion de
philanthrōpia aussi bien dans les Œuvres Morales que dans les Vies , où les
occurrences sont bien plus nombreuses qu'a dénombrées Tromp de Ruiter dans
la première moitié du XXe siècle dans une étude consacrée au sens et à l'emploi
de ce terme44 . Face aux 11 occurrences pour le substantif, 40 pour l'adjectif et
3 pour les formes adverbiales, que le chercheur a relevées dans tout l'opus de
Plutarque (Œuvres Morales et Vies), la banque de données du TLG signale
20 occurrences pour le substantif, 79 pour l'adjectif (dont 18 comme adjectif
substantivé) et 16 pour l'adverbe dans les Œuvres Morales, tandis que dans
les Vies sont enregistrées 36 occurrences pour le substantif, 96 pour l'adjectif
37 Pour une dénition générale de la notion de φιλανθρωπία voir D.L. III 98 Τῆς
φιλανθρωπίας ἐστὶν εἴδη τρία· ἓν μὲν διὰ τῆς προσηγορίας γινόμενον, οἷον ἐν οἷς τινες τὸν
ἐντυχόντα πάντα προσαγορεύουσι καὶ τὴν δεξιὰν ἐμβάλλοντες χαιρετίζουσιν. ἄλλο εἶδος,
ὅταν τις βοηθητικὸς ᾖ παντὶ τῷ ἀτυχοῦντι. ἕτερον εἶδός ἐστι τῆς φιλανθρωπίας ἐν ᾧ τινες
φιλοδειπνισταί εἰσι. τῆς ἄρα φιλανθρωπίας τὸ μέν ἐστι διὰ τοῦ προσαγορεύειν, τὸ δὲ διὰ τοῦ
εὐεργετεῖν, τὸ δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἑστιᾶν καὶ φιλοσυνουσιάζειν.
38 Pour l'idée platonico-académicienne de φιλανθρωπία voir Pl., [Def.] 412E Φιλανθρωπία
ἕξις εὐάγωγος ἤθους πρὸς ἀνθρώπου φιλίαν· ἕξις εὐεργετικὴ ἀνθρώπων· χάριτος σχέσις·
μνήμη μετ' εὐεργεσίας.
39 J. D R, 1979, p. 328; F. F, 1996, p. 231.
40 A., Pr. 11, 28.
41 Stob., II 120, 20 et 121, 22 W.: Ἔστι δὲ κοινή τις ἡμῖν ὐπάρχει φιλανθρωπία….
42 Voir Asp., EN, CAG XIX 1, ed. G. H, Berolini 1889, p. 23, 7-8.
43 Voir M. P, 19782, pp. 125, 212.
44 S. T D R, 1932, pp. 297-9.
(dont 22 comme adjectif substantivé) et 33 pour l'adverbe, pour un total de
280 occurrences environ pour les deux ouvrages45 .
La notion de philanthrōpia 46 au sein de l'opus plutarquien représente en
général une qualité naturelle ou une aptitude de l'âme humaine susceptible d'être
éduquée et transformée grâce à l'ἐθισμός dans une disposition permanente, au
point de devenir une vertu du caractère (ἦθος / habitus). Il s'agit d'un concept
à la fois variable et adaptable, selon les circonstances, il se teint des couleurs
des meilleures qualités du caractère47 comme la χρηστότης, l'ἐλευθεριότης,
la πραότης , l ' ἐπιείκεια 48 , l 'εὐγνωμοσύνη et la μεγαλοφροσύνη 49, vertu que
l'homme est appelé à mettre en pratique ne serait-ce que par humanité50 . Mais
cette qualité de l'âme51 , que Romilly a dénie comme une qualité "de sociabilité"
52 et Frazier d' "humanité" 53 se présente dans les Vies sous un aspect diérent
de celui qu'elle revêt dans les Œuvres Morales. Dans les Vies, la philanthrōpia
désigne surtout une qualité innée (σύμφυτος vel φύσει) de l'âme54 et propre
au peuple grec55 en général et athénien56 en particulier, tandis que dans les
Œuvres Morales, elle se présente le plus souvent comme une véritable vertu
du caractère. En eet, dans les Vies, l'adjectif philanthrōpos se circonscrit plus
étroitement à la vie de la cité et devient synonyme de ἑλληνικός 57 , πολιτικός 58 ,
δημοτικός59 et δημοκρατικός60 et philanthrōpia nit par caractériser la vertu du
45 Voir maintenant J.R F, 2008, p. 89 n. 5.
46 S. T D R, 1932, pp. 287, 295, 299 : "apud Plutarchum
φιλανθρωπία 11 locis invenitur
φιλάνθρωπος 40 " "
adverbialiter 3 " "
... Plutarchi locis allatis satis apparere mihi videtur vocem et notionem philantropiae
admodum orere apud illum auctorem".
47 Voir J. R F, 2008, pp. 78-84.
48 Plu., Nic. 9. 6.
49 Plu., Cap. ex inim. ut. 88C ; Alex. Magn. fort. virt. 336E..
50 Plu., Cat. Ma. 5. 5. Pour la critique de Plutarque à la conduite de Caton l'Ancien, qui
poussait la délité à ses principes d'austérité jusqu'à vendre ses esclaves, devenus vieux, pour ne
pas avoir à les nourrir sans prot voir supra n.36.
51 On pourrait dénir la philanthrōpia avec les mêmes mots employés par le Stagirite pour
caractériser dans l'EN (1155a) la philia : ἀρετή τις ἢ μετ' ἀρετῆς.
52 J. D R, 1979, p. 37.
53 F. F, 1996, p. 231.
54 Voir Plu., Marc. 10. 6 . Mais "une nature généreuse et bonne, quand elle manque
d'éducation, produit pêle-mêle des fruits excellents et des fruits détestables, comme un sol riche
resté sans culture" (Plu., Cor. 1. 3).
55 Plu., Pelop. 6. 5 ; Quaest. conv. II 643D.
56 Plu., Arist. 27.7 ; Cim. 10. 6-7 (τὴν παλαιὰν τῶν Ἀθηναίων φιλοξενίαν καὶ φιλανθρωπίαν);
Demetr. 22. 2 ; Pel. 6. 5 (οἱ μὲν οὖν Ἀθηναῖοι, πρὸς τῷ πάτριον αὐτοῖς καὶ σύμφυτον εἶναι τὸ
φιλάνθρωπον...); Soll. an. 970A : τὸ φιλανθρώπευμα τῶν παλαιῶν Ἀθηναίων).
57 Plu., Phil. 8. 2 (Ἑλληνικὴν καὶ φιλάνθρωπον πολιτείαν); Lys. 27. 7 (Ἑλληνικὰ καὶ
φιλάνθρωπα).
58 Plu., Demetr. 1. 5 (οὐ πάνυ φιλάνθρωπον οὐδὲ πολιτικήν...).
59 Plu., Ages. 1. 5; Crass. 3. 5; Galb. 11. 1; Oth. 1. 3.
60 Plu., Comp. Cim.-Luc. 1, 6; Nic. 11, 2; Agis et Cleom. 34. 3.
269
La notion de philanthrōpia chez Plutarque: contexte social et sources philosophiques
citoyen grec (ἀρετὴ πολιτική )61 – tout comme la φιλονικία caractérise la vertu
militaire (ἀρετὴ στρατιωτική) des Romains62 – au point d'être inséparable de
la notion de civilisation hellénique63 . Cependant, dans les Œuvres Morales la
philanthrōpia, considérée comme étant φιλία pour l'homme en tant qu'homme
(ἄνθρωπον ἀσπάζεται, καθ' ὃ ἄνθρωπός ἐστι ), comme l'arme le De sollertia
animalium64 , et assimilée à la φιλοκαλία 65, se révèle être une vertu divine ou
presque66 . Se modelant sur la perfection et sur l'amour que la divinité nourrit
pour les hommes (πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ φιλάνθρωπον ) 67 , elle s'explique dans
l'εὐεργετεῖν, dans l'εὖ ποιεῖν et dans le καλόν τι πράττειν 68 .
Convaincu de l'importance sociale et politique que revêt une telle vertu69 ,
tournée vers l'extérieur au point d'embrasser l'humanité entière70 mais qui exige
à son intérieur une éducation et une formation morale correcte, l'intellectuel de
Chéronée ne perd pas une occasion de recommander comme seule διδασκαλία71 ,
l'exercice (μελέτη) qui permet à la philanthrōpia de vertu naturelle qu'elle est à
s'élever au niveau de la sphère morale72 par le biais de l'ἔθος (vel ἐθισμός ) 73 ou
de la συνήθεια74 de ces qui sont les premiers liens humains que les hommes ont
61 Plu., Arist. 27. 7.
62 Cf. Plu., Phil. 3. 1; Marc. 20. 1.
63 Voir l'analisi di H. M. M J., 1961, p.167: "ese threee concepts – philantrōpia ,
civilization, Hellenism – seem almost inseparabile for Plutarch". Cf. D. D C, 1982, p.
15. 64 Plu., Soll. an. 984C ἔοικε τὸ φιλάνθρωπον ... θεοφιλὲς εἶναι. À propos de la dénition
de φιλάνθρωπος voir Plu., [Cons. ad Apoll.] 120A φιλοπάτωρ ... καὶ φιλομήτωρ καὶ φιλοίκειος
καὶ φιλόφιλος, τὸ δὲ σύμπαν εἰπεῖν φιλάνθρωπος.
65 À propos de la φιλοκαλία dans les textes de Plutarque voir Amat. 767A (φιλόκαλος καὶ
φιλάνθρωπος); Cum princ. philos. 776B (φιλοκάλων καὶ φιλανθρώπων); An seni resp. 783E (τὸ
φιλάνθρωπον καὶ φιλόκαλον), 791C (φιλοκάλως καὶ φιλανθρώπως ζῆν); Ad princ. ind. 781A
(τὸ καλὸν καὶ φιλάνθρωπον ). À propos de la φιλανθρωπία et de la φιλοκαλία en tant que
subordonnées à l'ἀρετή vd. [Arist.], VV. 1251b 33-36 (voir n. 92).
66 Cf. Pl., Lg. 713D: ...ὁ θεὸς φιλάνθρωπος ὤν. À propos de la vertu, qui est le bien le plus
grand et le plus agréable voir Plu., Sol. 7. 2. À propos de la vertu comme le seul bien divin à la
disposition de l'homme voir Plu., Arist. 6. 3-6 τὴν ἀρετήν, ὃ μόνον ἐστὶ τῶν θείων ἀγαθῶν ἐφ'
ἡμῖν.
67 Plu., Ad princ. ind. 781A ; An seni resp. 786C.
68 Vd. Plu., Pyth. orac. 402A (τὸν θεὸν ὡς καρπῶν δοτῆρα καὶ πατρῷον καὶ γενέσιον καὶ
φιλάνθρωπον); Gen. Socr. 593A (τὸν θεὸν οὐ φίλορνιν ἀλλὰ φιλάνθρωπον ); Amat. 758A; An
seni resp. 786B ; Stoic. rep. 1051E, 1052B.
69 Voir Plu., An seni resp. 791C λειτουργία γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ πολιτεία ..., ἀλλὰ βίος ἡμέρου καὶ
κοινωνικοῦ καὶ πολιτικοῦ ζῴου καὶ πεφυκότος ... πολιτικῶς καὶ φιλοκάλως καὶ φιλανθρώπως
ζῆν.
70 Voir F. F, 1996, p. 233: "la philanthrôpia , dèle à son étymologie, est tournée vers
l'extérieur et se dilate jusqu'à embrasser l'humanité entière".
71 Plu., Quaest. conv. VII 703B : φιλανθρωπίας διδασκαλία τὸ ἔθος ἐστίν.
72 Plu., Per. 1. 1; Virt. mor. 451E; Frat. am.482B.
73 Plu., Quaest. conv. VII 703B φιλανθρωπίας διδασκαλία τὸ ἔθος ἐστίν. Je crois qu'on
pourrait étendre à la φιλανθρωπία ce qu'écrit Plutarque à propos de la φιλία ( Quaest. conv. IV
660A), c'est à dire qu'elle est ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ καὶ δι' ἀρετῆς ἁλώσιμον.
74 Plu., Soll. anim. 960A (ἡ γὰρ συνήθεια δεινὴ τοῖς κατὰ μικρὸν ἐνοικειουμένοις πάθεσι
πόρρω προαγαγεῖν τὸν ἄνθρωπον); Es. carn. I 996A (ὁ πρὸς φιλανθρωπίαν ἐθισμὸς οὐ δοκεῖ
θαυμαστὸν εἶναι); Cat. Ma. 5. 5 (μελέτης ἕνεκα τοῦ φιλανθρώπου). Sur l'importance de la
entre eux (φιλανθρωπότατα καὶ πρῶτα κοινωνήματα πρὸς ἀλλήλους)75 . Pour
établir ces liens le banquet est un lieu privilégié76 : son but est moins de boire et
de jouir que de faire naître l'amitié et l'aection réciproque (μὴ πρὸς τὸ πίνειν
καὶ ἡδυπαθεῖν ἀλλὰ πρὸς φιλίαν καὶ ἀγάπησιν ἀλλήλων προτρέπεται)77 . En
eet, dans le Septem sapientium convivium 78 Plutarque arme que l'homme
judicieux (ὁ νοῦν ἔχων) ne prend pas part à un banquet en se présentant
comme un vase à remplir, mais pour trouver du plaisir à la conversation et dans
le premier livre des Quaestiones convivales, il souligne le caractère élitiste et
culturel du banquet, qui doit se tenir dans un climat de sobriété et de retenue,
d'équilibre et de mesure, en précisant également l'objectif (τὸ συμποτικὸν
τέλος) que l'on se propose d'atteindre. Comme activité (διαγωγή) qui aboutit à
l'amitié (εἰς φιλίαν τελευτῶσα ) 79 grâce au plaisir (δι' ἡδονῆς ... ὐπὸ χάριτος)80
le banquet vise à entraîner une amélioration du caractère81 et à consolider ou à
engendrer chez les participants la philia ( εἰς δὲ συμπόσιον οἵ γε νοῦν ἔχοντες
ἀφικνοῦνται κτησόμενοι φίλους)82 . En eet, si le vin83, tel un feu, adoucit les
caractères et ore l'occasion d' établir des relations réciproques d'amitié84 , c'est
cependant le λόγος qui, grâce à l'éducation des caractères (τὸ παιδεύειν τὰ ἤθη)
συνήθεια, qui est chose très grande, voir Plu., Aud. 37F, 47 BC; Prof. virt. 79D; Tuend. san.
123C; Virt. mor. 443C; Coh. ira 459B; Garr. 511E (μέγα πρὸς πάντα ὁ ἐθισμός); Curios. 520D
(μέγιστον ... πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πάθους ἀποτροπὴν ὁ ἐθισμός); Gen. Socr. 584E; Quaest. conv. V 682C;
Soll. an. 959F. Plutarque toutefois ne surestime pas l'importance de la doctrine des Stoïciens
pour la préférer au λόγος. Cf. Plu., Tranq. an. 466F-467A (οὐ γὰρ ἡ συνήθεια ποιεῖ ... τὸν
ἄριστον βίον ἡδὺν ..., ἀλλὰ τὸ φρονεῖν); Garr. 510CD; Exil. 602C.
75 Plu., Sept. sap. conv. 158C.
76 Sur le banquet dans son acception première de 'réunion conviviale' qui suit le banquet
proprement dit et à propos du banquet comme l'un des événements les plus singuliers de la
civilisation grecque, cf. M. M, 1989, pp. 94-5; P, 1998, p. 14 sqq.
77 Plu., Sept. sap. conv. 148AB; Quaest. conv. IV 660B (voir n. 86).
78 Plu., Sept. sap. conv. 147E oὐ γὰρ ὡς ἀγγεῖον ἥκει κομίζων ἑαυτὸν ἐμπλῆσαι πρὸς τὸ
δεῖπνον ὁ νοῦν ἔχων, ἀλλὰ καὶ σπουδάσαι τι καὶ παῖξαι καὶ ἀκοῦσαι καὶ εἰπεῖν ὧν ὁ καιρὸς
παρακαλεῖ τοὺς συνόντας, εἰ μέλλουσι μετ' ἀλλήλων ἡδέως ἔσεσθαι.
79 Plu., Cat. Ma. 25. 4 τὴν δὲ τράπεζαν ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα φιλοποιὸν ἡγεῖτο. Cf. Plu., Quaest.
conv. II 632E.
80 Plu., Quaest. conv. I 621C. Sur le rôle que joue la table pour faire naître la philanthropie
voir Plu., quaest. conv. I 612D (τῷ φιλοποιῷ λεγομένῳ τῆς τραπέζης), 618E, II 632E, IV 660A.
Sur la φιλάνθρωπος τράπεζα voir aussi Plu., Cons. ad uxor. 610A.
81 Plu., Quaest. conv. IV 660B, VII 712B: γνωμολογίαι τε χρησταὶ καὶ ἀφελεῖς ὑπορρέουσαι
καὶ τὰ σκληρότατα τῶν ἠθῶν ὥσπερ ἐν πυρὶ τῷ οἴνῳ μαλάττουσι καὶ κάμπτουσι πρὸς τὸ
ἐπιεικέστερον.
82 Plu., Quaest. conv. IV 660A, I 621C (φιλίας ἐπίτασιν ἢ γένεσιν δι' ἡδονῆς ἐνεργάσασθαι
τοῖς παροῦσιν). Sur la capacité qu'a le banquet de consolider de vieilles amitiés et d'en créer de
nouvelles cf. Plu., Quaest. conv. I 610 AB, 618E (πρὸς εὐνοίας ἐπίδοσιν ἢ γένεσιν), II 643E, IV
660B, 672E.
83 Sur le vin comme ποτῶν ὠφελιμώτατον ... καὶ φαρμάκων ἥδιστον vd. Plu., Tuend. san.
132B; Quaest. conv. III 647A, 655E.
84 Plu., Sept. sap. conv. 156D (ὁ Διόνυσος ὥσπερ ἐν πυρὶ τῷ οἴνῳ μαλάσσων τὰ ἤθη καὶ
ἀνυγραίνων ἀρχήν τινα συγκράσεως πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ φιλίας ἐνδίδωσιν) ; Quaest. conv. I
620DE (ὁ γὰρ οἶνος ἄξει τὸ ἦθος εἰς τὸ μέτριον μαλακώτερον ποιῶν καὶ ἀνυγραίνων), IV
660B (ταῖς δὲ φιλικαῖς λαβαῖς ὁ οἶνος ἁφὴν ἐνδίδωσι), VII 712B. Cfr. Athen., V 185C: δοκεῖ
γὰρ ἔχειν πρὸς φιλίαν τι ὁ οἶνος ἑλκυστικόν.
271
La notion de philanthrōpia chez Plutarque: contexte social et sources philosophiques
et à la modération des passions (παρηγορεῖν τὰ πάθη) engendre ce sentiment
d'aection qui nous lie l'un à l'autre (φιλοφροσύνην καὶ ... συνήθειαν πρὸς
ἀλλήλους)85 , c'est-à-dire la philanthrōpia 86. Celle-ci, tout comme le bien (τὸ
καλόν)87 , attire à soi de manière active (πρακτικῶς), elle pousse tout de suite à
l'action et, surtout, elle est capable de façonner le caractère (ἠθοποιοῦν )88 .
Déterminer, à la lumière de ce que nous avons évoqué, les sources
philosophiques de la doctrine plutarquienne de la philanthrōpia se révèle une
entreprise assez dicile et encore moins sûre, car la reprise de cet idéal, comme
nous l'avons vu, est – semble-t-il – moins le fruit d'une théorie élaborée dans le
cadre d'une école de pensée spécique, que la réponse personnelle et subjective
à des exigences sociales qui, à cette époque-là, étaient en train de s'enraciner
dans la conscience populaire89 . Ayant exclu l'inuence des écoles de pensée
modernes, la notion de philanthropie comme φιλία πρὸς πάντας ἀνθρώπους90 ,
dont le but est avant tout d'εὐεργετεῖν, liée à des vertus comme l'ἐλευθεριότης,
la χρηστότης , l' ἐπιείκεια et l'εὐγνωμοσύνη, et assimilée à la φιλοφιλία, à la
φιλοξενία et notamment à la φιλοκαλία se révèle une théorie qui trouve
ses prémisses dans l'EN d'Aristote (οἰκεῖον ἅπας ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ
φίλον...)91 - même si le Stagirite a recours à ce terme une fois seulement – et
trouve correspondance dans un texte pseudo-aristotélicien, le De virtutibus et
vitiis92 aussi bien que dans la doctrine théophrastienne de l' οἰκειότης 93, qui est
diérente de la doctrine stoïcienne de l' οἰκείωσις 94 .
De tout façon ce que l'analyse des textes plutarquiens fait apparaître de
manière très claire, c'est la conance d'un éducateur qui, en conit contre
les écoles de pensée modernes, croit encore à l'existence d'autres rapports
interpersonnels, sous-tendus par une grandeur d'âme et non pas dictés par
85 Plu., Sept. sap. conv. 156CD.
86 Plu., Quaest. conv. IV 660B (τὸ φιλάνθρωπον καὶ ἠθοποιὸν ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος
ἐποχετεύει καὶ συνδιαδίδωσιν). Vd. S.-T. T, 1990, p. 16: "e thought expressed in
this sentence is curious indeed: ‛Conversation channels and distributes by means of the wine its
kindliness and characterforming inuence from the body into the soul.' e assertion that wine
has a character-forming action is curious, stille more that this is produced in the body and must
be transported into the soul to be eective".
87 Plu., Ad princ. ind. 781A τὸ καλὸν καὶ φιλάνθρωπον.
88 Plu., Per. 2. 4 τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐφ' αὑτὸ πρακτικῶς κινεῖ καὶ πρακτικὴν εὐθὺς ὁρμὴν
ἐντίθησιν, ἠθοποιοῦν. Cf. Plu., Quaest. conv. IV 660B.
89 Cf. J. D R, 1979, p. 293.
90 Stob., II 120, 20; 121, 22.
91 Arist., EN 1155a 20 -22.
92 [Arist.], VV. 1250b 33 (φιλανθρωπία ἀκολουθεῖ τῇ ἐλευθεριότητι), 1251b 33-36
(ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ τῇ ἀρετῇ φιλάνθρωπον καὶ φιλόκαλον).
93 phr., Frr. L 91, L 195-196 Fortenbaugh. Que Plutarque se soit inspiré de la doctrine
de l'οἰκειότης πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους du chef de l'école péripatéticienne, éophraste, est une
hypothèse qui est conrmée, semble-t-il, aussi dans le deuxième logos du De esu carnium. Voir G.
S, 1999, p. 75: "Teofrasto fonda la communio iuris, il patto giuridico tra uomo e animale,
sul concetto di οἰκεῖον, su un legame originario che lega tra loro i viventi". Voir Plu., Frat. am.
428B et 490E = phr., Frr. L 96 et L 98 Fortenbaugh.
94 Sur la doctrine de l'οἰκείωσις et de l'οἰκειότης voir F. D, 1937, pp. 1-100 ; C. O.
B, 1955; S. G. P, 1971; P. M, 1973, p. 348; G. S, 1983.
la justice ou par l'utilité, convaincu que bien vivre signie aussi vivre avec un
sentiment d'amitié et de communauté avec les autres95 .
bi b l i o g r a p h i e
B-M, V. ., La science médicale antique. Nouveaux regards.
Études réunies en l'honneur de J. Jouanna, Paris, 2008.
B, C. O., "Οἰκείωσις and Οἰκειότης, eophrastus and Zeno on Nature in
Moral eory", Phronesis, 1 (1955) 123-45.
D C, D., Il demone di Socrate. I ritardi della punizione divina, Milano,
1982.
D, P. , Dione di Prusa. Un intellettuale greco nell'impero romano ,
Messina-Firenze, 1978.
D, F., "Die Oikeiosis-Lehre eophrasts", Philologus Supplementband
XXX (1937) 1-100.
F, M. C., "Sócrates e a Paideia falhada de Alcibíades", in C. S
. (eds.), Ética e paideia em Plutarco, Coimbra, 2008, pp. 31-48.
F, F., Histoire et morale dans les Vies Parallèles de Plutarque, Paris, 1996.
J, C. P., e Roman World of Dio Chrysostom, Harvard, 1978.
M J., H. M., "e concept of Philanthropia in Plutarch's Lives", AJPh,
82 (1961) 164-75.
M, M., Convivio, vol. I, Bari, 1989, pp. 94-95.
M, P., Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen von Andronikos bis Alexander
von Aphrodisias, Band I, Berlin, 1973.
P, S. G., "Oikeiōsis", in A. A. L (ed.), Problems in Stoicism ,
London, 1971, pp. 114-49.
P, M., La Stoa. Traduit en italien par O. D G, II, Firenze,
19782 .
R F, J., "O doce afago da philanthropia", in C. S .
(eds.), Ética e paideia em Plutarco, Coimbra, 2008, pp.85-97.
_____"Demotikos e Demokratikos na paideia de Plutarco", in C. S .
(eds.), Ética e paideia em Plutarco, Coimbra, 2008, pp. 69-84.
R, J. de, La douceur dans la pensée grecque, Paris, 1979.
S, G., Il cibarsi di carne, Napoli, 1999.
95 Plu., Adv. Col. 1108C : τὸ δ' εὖ ζῆν ἐστι κοινωνικῶς ζῆν καὶ φιλικῶς καὶ σωφρόνως καὶ
δικαίως.
273
La notion de philanthrōpia chez Plutarque: contexte social et sources philosophiques
S, A. M., Plutarco. Conversazioni a tavola, I, (testo, traduzione e
commento), A. Napoli, 1998.
S, V. A., Involuzione politica e spirituale nell'impero del II secolo, Napoli,
1974.
S, G., "e Role of Oikeiosis in Stoic Ethics", OSAPh, 1 (1983) 145-
67.
T, S.-T., A Commentary on Plutarch's Table Talks, vol. II (Books
4-6), Göteborg, 1990.
T D R, S., "De vocis quae est φιλανθρωπία signicatione atque
usu", Mnemosyne, 59 (1932) 271-306.
Z, K., Plutarco (trad. it.), Brescia, 1965.
275
Philanthropia as Sociability and Plutarch's Unsociable Heroes
pH i l a n T H r o p i a a s s o c i a b i l i T y a n d pl u T a r c h 's
u n s o c i a b l e h e r o e s
A G. N
University of Crete, Rethymno
Abstract
Although the words φιλανθρωπία and φιλάνθρωπος are pivotal terms of his ethical vocabulary,
Plutarch often attaches to these words meanings and nuances that appear to be ethically
indierent or neutral. One of these meanings is the sociability-nuance of philanthropia, which
seems to describe all sorts of rened modes of behaviour such as courtesy, aability, tactfulness,
friendliness, hospitality and the like. Plutarch appreciates and encourages these aspects of rened
conduct (mainly in the Moralia), for he believes that they conduce to good human relations and
promote social harmony. Yet, though some of his heroes (e.g., Phokion, Cato, Perikles) appear
to be rather unsociable, Plutarch, far from nding any fault with them, explicitly or implicitly
justies and even approves of their sternness and austerity. Sometimes because he is aware that
good manners and sociability, especially in the domain of politics, may be a deceptive façade that
often conceals crude ambition or devious schemes and machinations; other times because he
bows to the hero's moral excellence, which, under certain circumstances, seems to be somehow
incompatible with the usual manifestations of sociability.
According to Diogenes Laertios, Plato distinguished three kinds of
philanthropia: a) by way of salutations, i.e. by addressing everyone you meet on
the street and shaking hands with them, b) by way of helping everyone in need,
and c) by way of keeping an open house and oering dinner-parties. In other
words, philanthropia is manifested through salutations, through conferring
benets, and through oering dinners and promoting social intercourse1 .
Nobody recognizes Plato in this description, of course, since the four
occurrences of the words φιλανθρωπία and φιλάνθρωπος in the Platonic
corpus convey only the literal meaning of the words (love and lover of mankind),
which at most could be taken to underlie the second kind in Laertios' passage2 .
Plutarch would also have diculty, I think, in associating Plato with the three
kinds of philanthropia above, but for him Laertios' description would have
1 D. L. 3.98: Τῆς φιλανθρωπίας ἐστὶν εἴδη τρία· ἓν μὲν διὰ τῆς προσηγορίας γινόμενον, οἷον
ἐν οἷς τινες τὸν ἐντυχόντα πάντα προσαγορεύουσι καὶ τὴν δεξιὰν ἐμβάλλοντες χαιρετίζουσιν.
ἄλλο εἶδος, ὅταν τις βοηθητικὸς ᾖ παντὶ τῷ ἀτυχοῦντι. ἕτερον εἶδός ἐστι τῆς φιλανθρωπίας ἐν
ᾧ τινες φιλοδειπνισταί εἰσι. τῆς ἄρα φιλανθρωπίας τὸ μέν ἐστι διὰ τοῦ προσαγορεύειν, τὸ δὲ
διὰ τοῦ εὐεργετεῖν, τὸ δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἑστιᾶν καὶ φιλοσυνουσιάζειν. e above categorization is part
of the Διαιρέσεις ( Divisiones), the last section of D. L., book 3 (§§ 80-109), sometime attributed
to Aristotle (see V. R, 1971, p. 677).
2 Euthphr. 3D: Ἴσως γὰρ σὺ μὲν δοκεῖς σπάνιον σεαυτὸν παρέχειν καὶ διδάσκειν οὐκ
ἐθέλειν τὴν σεαυτοῦ σοφίαν· ἐγὼ δὲ φοβοῦμαι μὴ ὑπὸ φιλανθρωπίας δοκῶ αὐτοῖς ὅτιπερ ἔχω
ἐκκεχυμένως παντὶ ἀνδρὶ λέγειν, οὐ μόνον ἄνευ μισθοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ προστιθεὶς ἂν ἡδέως εἴ τίς
μου ἐθέλει ἀκούειν. Symp. 189C-D: ἔστι γὰρ θεῶν φιλανθρωπότατος (sc. Ἔρως), ἐπίκουρός
τε ὢν τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἰατρὸς τούτων ὧν ἰαθέντων μεγίστη εὐδαιμονία ἂν τῷ ἀνθρωπείῳ
γένει εἴη. Lg. 713D: … καὶ ὁ θεὸς φιλάνθρωπος ὤν, τότε γένος ἄμεινον ἡμῶν ἐφίστη τὸ
τῶν δαιμόνων. Def . 412E: Φιλανθρωπία ἕξις εὐάγωγος ἤθους πρὸς ἀνθρώπου φιλίαν· ἕξις
εὐεργετικὴ ἀνθρώπων· χάριτος σχέσις· μνήμη μετ' εὐεργεσίας.
276
Anastasios G. Nikolaidis
struck a familiar note. As a matter of fact, Plutarch's usage of philanthropia
and cognate words, pivotal terms of his ethical vocabulary, covers, as is well-
known, a much wider range of meanings and nuances than the three aforesaid
kinds3 ; more importantly, the concept of philanthropia in Plutarch is not simply
synonymous with sociability and its various ramications, as the rst and third
kind of Laertios' passage suggest, but perhaps constitutes the very kernel of his
moral outlook. One might aptly say that philanthropia for Plutarch is the lens
through which he sees, examines, judges and evaluates individuals and human
activities at large4 .
Nevertheless, there are many instances in his writings, both in Lives and
Moralia, where Plutarch employs the words φιλάνθρωπος and φιλανθρωπία
to describe nuances of sociability and all sorts of rened modes of behaviour,
such as courtesy, politeness, aability, tactfulness, discretion, friendliness,
hospitality, and so on. To put it otherwise, Plutarch uses these words in a
way that corresponds to Laertios' rst and third kind, thus endorsing and
recommending a philanthropia that, unlike the one of the second kind, seems
to be ethically indierent or neutral.
e rst kind (philanthropia through salutations) occurs mostly in the
Lives, where sociability is often a political device for gaining the favour of the
multitude. To this aspect I will return. e third kind (philanthropia through
dinner-parties and hospitality) is the sociability featuring equally in the Lives
and Moralia, and predominantly, perhaps, in the Table Talks. As for the second
kind (philanthropia through helping and benetting the needy), which carries
more pronounced ethical overtones and illustrates par excellence the moral
sense of philanthropia, it will not concern us here5 .
Before going to the Lives, I would like to discuss a few passages from the
Moralia, where the notion of sociability primarily occurs in the context of a
symposion; and for this aspect of philanthropia Plutarch's Table Talks oer an
excellent testimony. e man who, after a solitary meal, said: "today I ate; I did
3 See R. H, 1912, p. 25: "Plutarch hat…den Begri in den verschiedensten
Schattierungen verfolgt"; cf. also F. F, 1996, p. 234: "On ne peut qu'être frappé par
l'ampleur impressionnante de son champ d'action [sc. of philanthropia] dans les Vies".
4 Cf. also J. D R, 1979, p. 280: "La douceur est donc devenue un critère essentiel pour
juger un homme" (in Romilly's treatment 'douceur' mainly translates praotes, but also – almost to
the same extent – philanthropia). For the importance of philanthropia in P. see R. H, 1912,
pp. 23-32 (esp. p. 26: "Ich wüßte nicht, was sich mehr eignete für das Prinzip Plutarchischer
Moral in Leben und Lehre erklärt zu werden als eben die Philanthropie...die Summe aller
Tugenden"); B. B-I, 1972, p. 20 ("ein Zentralbegri"); F. F, 1996, pp. 233-36;
H. M. M J.; A. G. N, 2008, pp. XV-XVI; C. P, 1977, pp. 218
sqq., pp. 234-35; J. R F, 2008; J. D R, 1979, pp. 275-305, esp. 275-92;
K. Z, 19642 , pp. 306/943.
5 For some telling examples of this kind of philanthropia see Publ. 1.2, 4.5, Sol. 15.3, es .
36.4, Pel. 6.4-5, Marc. 20.1-2, Cleom. 32.5, Phoc. 10.7-8; see also Mor. 823A, 1051E, 1075E.
According to [Arist.], VV 1251b31 benecence belongs to virtue (ἔστι δὲ τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τὸ
εὐεργετεῖν τοὺς ἀξίους), and so philanthropia as benecence is one of the concomitants of virtue
(1251b34f.: ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ τῇ ἀρετῇ…εἶναι καὶ φιλόξενον καὶ φιλάνθρωπον…ἃ δὴ πάντα τῶν
ἐπαινουμένων ἐστί).
277
Philanthropia as Sociability and Plutarch's Unsociable Heroes
not have a dinner", is called χαρίεις and φιλάνθρωπος 6, since, according to
Plutarch, our witty and sociable man implied that a dinner always wants some
friendly companionship for seasoning (697C: "βεβρωκέναι, μη δεδειπνηκέναι
σήμερον", ὡς τοῦ δείπνου κοινωνίαν καὶ φιλοφροσύνην ἐφηδύνουσαν ἀεὶ
ποθοῦντος). In another Talk we are urged to emulate the philanthropia of the
old who, respecting companionship at large, held in honour not only those
who shared their hearth and roof, but also those who shared their meals7 . And
in the Banquet of the Seven Sages the hearth-re, the hearth itself, the wine
bowls and all entertainment and hospitality are described as φιλανθρωπότατα
καὶ πρῶτα κοινωνήματα πρὸς ἀλλήλους (158C), due to the belief that it was
these things that rst brought people closer to each other. Hence, in another
essay, even outside the sympotic context, the dinner-table is called philanthropos
(610A)8 . And if the symposion is a sociable institution because it brings people
together, Dionysos, one of the symposion's presidents (the other one is Hunger),
is even more sociable (philanthropos), because it is wine that stops the fellow-
drinkers jostling one another like hungry dogs over the food, and establishes a
cheerful and friendly atmosphere among them9 . By the same token, speech (ὁ
λόγος), through which men come close and communicate among themselves,
is called ἥδιστον καὶ φιλανθρωπότατον συμβόλαιον (De garrul. 504E)10 .
e Table Talks throw light on the ramications of sociability too. In one
Talk, for example, philanthropia is synonymous with courtesy or tactfulness, since
we hear of the Syrian prince Philopappos, the archon of Athens in Plutarch's
time, who, being among the guests of a banquet, joined in the after-dinner
discussion out of courtesy and graciousness not less than because of his eagerness
to learn (628B: τὰ μὲν λέγων τὰ δ' ἀκούων διὰ φιλανθρωπίαν οὐχ ἧττον ἢ διὰ
φιλομάθειαν). Similarly, the Persian king Artaxerxes was not only agreeable in
intercourse (Art. 4.4: ἡδίω θ' ἑαυτὸν παρεῖχεν ἐντυγχάνεσθαι), but also tactful
and gracious in giving as well as in receiving gifts (ibidem:…οὐχ ἧττον τοῖς
διδοῦσιν ἢ τοῖς λαμβάνουσιν φαινόμενος εὔχαρις καὶ φιλάνθρωπος)11 . e
above cases suggest that the courtesy-nuance of philanthropia manifests itself
6 According to the pseudoplatonic Denitions , χάρις is an aspect of philanthropia (see n. 2
s.f.). Hence the two concepts are often paired together. Cf. Mor. 517C, 660A, Art. 4.4 (below),
Cat. Mi. 26.1 (p. 281), Sol. 2.1.
7 643D: ...ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὴν τῶν παλαιῶν φιλανθρωπίαν ζηλοῦν, οὐ μόνον ὁμεστίους
οὐδ' ὁμωροφίους ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁμοχοίνικας καὶ ὁμοσιπύους τῷ πᾶσαν σέβεσθαι κοινωνίαν ἐν τιμῇ
τιθεμένων.
8 For the connection of the dinner-table with the notion of sociability/hospitality cf. also
GGr. 19.2, where we hear of Cornelia, the mother of the Gracchi, that she was πολύφιλος καὶ
διὰ φιλοξενίαν εὐτράπεζος.
9 680B: οὕτως ἡμᾶς ἐν ἀρχῇ συμπεφορημένους ὑπὸ τοῦ λιμοῦ κυνηδὸν ἄρτι παραλαμβάνων
ὁ Λυαῖος θεὸς καὶ Χορεῖος εἰς τάξιν ἱλαρὰν καὶ φιλάνθρωπον καθίστησιν. For the pairing of
philanthropos with hilaros see also 660C, Caes. 4.8 (p. 285), and Cleom. 13.3 (n. 38).
10 φιλάνθρωπος is again paired with ἡδὺς in Mor. 762D, Ant. 25.3, Cat. Ma. 3.7 (p. 286
below), Art. 4.4 (below).
11 In Reg. Apophth. 172B Artaxerxes holds that accepting small gifts with graciousness and
goodwill is equally βασιλικὸν καὶ φιλάνθρωπον as giving large gifts. For another instance of
philanthropos being combined with basilikos, see Ages. 1.5 (n. 24).
278
Anastasios G. Nikolaidis
particularly – and more meaningfully – in the behaviour of someone superior
towards an inferior; something that occurs again in 617B, where Alkinoos, by
asking his son to rise and seating Odysseus beside himself, wins our praise; for
it is exquisitely polite and gracious (ἐπιδέξιον ἐμμελῶς καὶ φιλάνθρωπον) to
seat a suppliant in the place of a loved one.
In another Talk we are warned that there should be limits even in hospitality.
For if one holds a dinner-party and invites every possible guest to his house as
though to some public show or recitation, his hospitality goes too far (678E:
ἔστι γάρ τις οἶμαι καὶ φιλανθρωπίας ἀκρασία, μηδένα παρερχομένης τῶν
συμποτῶν ἀλλὰ πάντας ἑλκούσης ὡς ἐπὶ θέαν ἢ ἀκρόασιν.)12 ; on the contrary,
the younger Scipio was criticized in Rome because, when he entertained his
friends at the dedication of the temple of Herakles, he did not invite Mummius,
his colleague in oce. us, although Scipio was otherwise an admirable man,
the omission of so slight an act of courtesy brought upon him the reputation of
haughtiness (Praec. ger. reip. 816C: μικρὸν οὕτω φιλανθρώπευμα παραλειφθὲν
ὑπεροψίας ἤνεγκε δόξαν).
See also 816D in the immediate sequel. For other instances of philanthropia
in the sense of courtesy or politeness cf. 513A, 517C, 645F, 749D, 762C, Alex .
58.8, Eum. 13,4, Oth. 1.1. See also Demetr. 22.1, where philanthropia conveys
– more precisely – the nuance of discretion or tactfulness. While Demetrios
was besieging Rhodes, the Rhodians captured the ship that carried bedding,
clothing and letters from his wife Phila and sent it to his enemy Ptolemy. us,
Plutarch comments, they did not imitate τὴν Ἀθηναίων φιλανθρωπίαν, who,
having captured Philip's letter-carriers during their war with him, read all the
letters except the one from Olympias, which, sealed as it was, they sent it back
to him. Occasionally, the various nuances mingle, as, for example, in 546E,
where philanthropia seems to denote all three kinds of Laertios' passage at the
same time. Some people, Plutarch shrewdly observes, are wrong to believe that
their self-glorication goes unnoticed when they report praises received from
others (…ὅταν βασιλέων καὶ αὐτοκρατόρων δεξιώσεις καὶ προσαγορεύσεις
καὶ φιλοφροσύνας ἀπαγγέλλωσιν, ὡς οὐχ αὑτῶν ἐπαίνους, ἀποδείξεις δὲ τῆς
ἐκείνων ἐπιεικείας καὶ φιλανθρωπίας διεξιόντες). For a similar combination
of Laertios' three kinds of philanthropia, cf. n. 23 below.
It is clear, therefore, that Plutarch attaches some importance to
sociability, and perhaps this is why he employs such a weighty ethical
term as philanthropia to express its various ramications. Especially in
the context of a symposion Plutarch appears to particularly favour and
recommend sociability, believing that these social gatherings did not simply
bring people together in a relaxed and cheerful atmosphere that might give
12 In De garrulitate P. transfers an example of excessive philanthropia found in Epicharmos
(οὐ φιλάνθρωπος τυ γ' ἐσσ', ἔχεις νόσον· χαίρεις διδούς – fr. 212 Kassel-Austin, PCG, v. I; and
for the liberality-nuance of philanthropia in P. see n. 25 below) to the idle talker (510C: …ἔχεις
νόσον· χαίρεις λαλῶν καὶ φλυαρῶν). More for this ἀκρασία λόγου see H.-G. I,
1971, pp. 135-6.
279
Philanthropia as Sociability and Plutarch's Unsociable Heroes
rise to new or conrm and strengthen older friendships13 but, owing to the
sympotic etiquette, they could also eect that the guests (or at least some of
them) acquire desirable habits and practices, such as self-discipline and self-
restraint, polite manners, consideration for others and so forth14 . In other
words, sociability could be regarded as belonging to those so-called minor
virtues, on which Plutarch would often discourse, convinced that, through
ensuring "die Heilung der Seele", they also conduced to social harmony and
individual fullment15 .
Plutarch, agreeing with Aristotle (EN 1103a17: ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ [sc. ἀρετὴ] ἐξ ἔθους
περιγίνεται, ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα ἔσχηκε μικρὸν παρεγκλῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους.
Cf. also Plato, Lg. 792E), does not overlook the importance and power of
habituation in acquiring and practising virtue, as several of his moral essays
testify (cf. De virt. mor. 443C-D, De coh. ira 459B ., De garrul. 510D, 511E-F,
512D-F, 514E, De curios. 520D ., 521A-E, 522B, De vit. pud. 532C, De sera
551E, De esu carn. 996A-B). See also Ingenkamps's pertinent remarks on pp.
99-102 and 105-115). Cf. further Cat. Ma. 5.5:…ἀλλ' εἰ διὰ μηδὲν ἄλλο,
μελέτης οὕνεκα τοῦ φιλανθρώπου προεθιστέον ἑαυτὸν ἐν τούτοις [sc. ζῴοις]
πρᾶον εἶναι καὶ μείλιχον. But the same relationship between habituation and
virtue seems to go back to Pythagoras and it is also highlighted by Zeno of
Elea. In De sollert. an. 959F we read that the Pythagoreans τὴν εἰς τὰ θηρία
πραότητα μελέτην ἐποιήσαντο πρὸς τὸ φιλάνθρωπον καὶ φιλοίκτιρμον. For
habituation (συνήθεια), by gradually familiarizing men with certain feelings,
is apt to lead them onward (δεινὴ τοῖς κατὰ μικρὸν ἐνοικειουμένοις πάθεσι
πόρρω προαγαγεῖν τὸν ἄνθρωπον. Cf. also Mor. 91C, 729E, 996A-B). And
at Per. 5.3 we see that Zeno would urge those who called Perikles' gravity
(σεμνότης ) thirst for reputation and arrogance to have a similar thirst for
reputation themselves, believing that even the mere assumption of a noble
demeanour might unconsciously produce some zeal for and habitual practice
of noble things (…ὡς τῆς προσποιήσεως αὐτῆς τῶν καλῶν ὑποποιούσης τινὰ
λεληθότως ζῆλον καὶ συνήθειαν).
is is the impression one gets from observing the sociability-nuance of
philanthropia in Plutarch's Quaestiones Convivales and the other passages we
have discussed16 . But when one examines sociability and its manifestations
13 Cf. 660A, C, 697D-E. Friendship, after all, is "le but du banquet", as Billault rightly
remarks (2008, p. 582). Cf. also J. S, 1993, pp. 170-1.
14 Cf. J. S, 1993, pp. 375-6, esp. 376, where it is maintained that the ancient
symposia cultivated not simply the savoir-vivre, but "cet art de communiquer" and "l'art de vivre
ensemble". Cf. also p. 378.
15 e foibles which those minor virtues cure are masterly discussed by H.-G. I.
e same virtues was also the topic of an international symposium organized by Luc Van der
Stockt at Delphi in September 2004: "Virtues for the People: Plutarch and his Era on Desirable
Ethics". Its proceedings are to be published next year.
16 In some cases the sociability-nuance of philanthropia, especially in the form of a kind
gesture or behaviour, overlaps with the notion of friendliness, as, e.g., when Phokion thinks
that the Athenians should accept Philip's friendly policy and kindly overtures to them (Phoc .
16.5: τὴν μὲν ἄλλην τοῦ Φιλίππου πολιτείαν καὶ φιλανθρωπίαν ᾤετο δεῖν προσδέχεσθαι). Cf.
280
Anastasios G. Nikolaidis
in connection with the moral status of several Plutarchean heroes, one
acquires a very dierent impression. Take Phokion and the younger Cato,
for example, perhaps the best paradigms of pure virtue, since Plutarch
does not simply admire the moral excellence of these men throughout
their respective Lives, but also avoids – almost completely – making the
slightest negative comment or remark concerning their character, especially
as regards the former. Phokion and Cato, however, were not at all sociable.
For example, although Phokion's nature was most gentle and most kind,
his countenance was so sullen that, with the exception of his intimates, it
discouraged everyone else from approaching and talking to him (Phoc. 5.1:
Τῷ δ' ἤθει προσηνέστατος ὢν καὶ φιλανθρωπότατος, ἀπὸ τοῦ προσώπου
δυσξύμβολος ἐφαίνετο καὶ σκυθρωπός, ὥστε μὴ ῥᾳδίως ἄν τινα μόνον
ἐντυχεῖν αὐτῷ τῶν ἀσυνήθων). Accordingly, we never see Phokion as a
guest at a dinner-party; in fact, there is not even one mention of a dinner-
party in the entire Life of Phokion 17 .
Cato's countenance was similarly sullen and his manners stern18 . But unlike
Phokion, the Roman did participate in banquets and would drink heavily to
boot19 . However, as Plutarch is quick to clarify, this was not a proof of his
sociability (Plutarch employs neither φιλανθρωπία nor any of the usual words
describing the sympotic activity, atmosphere and attitudes, e.g., φιλοφροσύνη ,
ἡδύτης, κοινωνία etc.), but it only showed Cato's desire to converse with
philosophers, something that he could not do during the day, because of his
pressing public activities (Cat. Mi. 6.3:…καὶ κωλυόμενον φιλολογεῖν, νύκτωρ
καὶ παρὰ πότον συγγίνεσθαι τοῖς φιλοσόφοις)20 . Otherwise, Cato was not at
all sociable, whether in connection with drinking – parties or politics. is is
why Cicero openly blames Caesar's prevalence in Rome on Cato, because at a
critical moment for the city, the latter, although he had decided to stand for the
consulship, he did not try to win the favour of the people by kindly intercourse
with them (Cat. Mi. 50.2: …οὐδὲ ὑπῆλθεν ὁμιλίᾳ φιλανθρώπῳ τὸν δῆμον);
on the contrary, desiring to preserve the dignity of his manners rather than to
acquire the oce by making the usual salutations, he forbade even his friends
also Cam. 17.2, Crass. 18.2, Demetr. 37.1, Dio 16.1, Sull. 43.5, Pomp. 79.1, Ant. 18.2, De Herod.
malign. 866F.
17 See also 4.3: Φωκίωνα γὰρ οὔτε γελάσαντά τις οὔτε κλαύσαντα ῥᾳδίως Ἀθηναίων εἶδεν,
οὐδ' ἐν βαλανείῳ δημοσιεύοντι λουσάμενον.
18 Cat. Mi. 1.3-6: Λέγεται δὲ Κάτων εὐθὺς ἐκ παιδίου τῇ τε φωνῇ καὶ τῷ προσώπῳ καὶ ταῖς
περὶ τὰς παιδιὰς διατριβαῖς ἦθος ὑποφαίνειν ἄτρεπτον καὶ ἀπαθὲς καὶ βέβαιον ἐν πᾶσιν….καὶ
τοῖς κολακεύουσι τραχὺς ὢν καὶ προσάντης…ἦν δὲ καὶ πρὸς γέλωτα κομιδῇ δυσκίνητος, ἄχρι
μειδιάματος σπανίως τῷ προσώπῳ διαχεόμενος… (cf. previous note about Phokion). Contrary
to the sullen look of Phokion and Cato, that of Flamininus was a winsome one (Flam. 5.7: τὴν
ὄψιν φιλανθρώπῳ).
19 is is conrmed by Martial 2.89 and Pliny, Epist. 3.12.2-3.
20 e philosophers with whom Cato would converse were the Stoics (Cato was in the circle
of the Stoic Antipatros of Tyros – cf. Cat. Mi. 4.2), to whose doctrines and general inuence
he especially owed his adherence to rigid justice (ibidem: τὸ περὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἀτενὲς καὶ
ἄκαμπτον εἰς ἐπιείκειαν ἢ χάριν). For Cato's relationship with Stoicism see D. B, 1969,
170-6) and cf. T. D, 1999, pp. 155-8.
281
Philanthropia as Sociability and Plutarch's Unsociable Heroes
to do the things by which the populace is courted and captivated; thus, he
failed to obtain the consulship21 .
Cat. Mi. 49.6:…ἀλλ' ἐν ἤθει, τὸ τοῦ βίου μᾶλλον ἀξίωμα βουλόμενος
φυλάσσειν ἢ προσλαβεῖν τὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς, ποιούμενος τὰς δεξιώσεις, μήτε τοὺς
φίλους ἐάσας οἷς ὄχλος ἁλίσκεται καὶ θεραπεύεται ποιεῖν, ἀπέτυχε τῆς ἀρχῆς.
Cato, however, was not always so rigid and inexible. As Romilly notes (p.
283 n.1), his proposal that the senate distribute grain to the populace as a
means to lure them away from Caesar who had taken refuge with them, was
an act of "douceur calculée" (Cat. Mi. 26.1: φοβηθεὶς ἔπεισε τὴν βουλὴν
αναλαβεῖν τὸν ἄπορον καὶ ἀνέμητον ὄχλον εἰς τὸ σιτηρέσιον…περιφανῶς δὲ
τῇ φιλανθρωπίᾳ ταύτῃ καὶ χάριτι τῆς ἀπειλῆς ἐκείνης διαλυθείσης). Similarly,
as Goar points out (p. 68), to avoid anarchy and civil bloodshed, Cato tempers
his rigidity and supports, contrary to his political principles, Pompey's sole
consulship in 52 B.C. (Cat. Mi. 47.2-4: τῷ μετριωτάτῳ τῶν παρανομημάτων
χρησάμενος ἰάματι τῆς τῶν μεγίστων καταστάσεως…συνεβούλευσεν πᾶσαν
ἀρχὴν ὡς ἀναρχίας κρείττονα). e special treatment of his brother-in-law
Silanus (Cato prosecuted only Murena for having become consul through
bribery, but let alone his accomplice Silanus δι' οἰκειότητα) is in fact a case
of mitigated severity and favouritism (Cat. Mi. 21.3-4). All this seems to tell
somewhat against Du 's opinion that Cato lacked Phokion's "ability to mix
sternness and gentleness" and was, therefore, "a failure" (p. 150). Goar rightly
maintains that, all things considered, Plutarch "does not seem to regard Cato as
a failure" (p. 69). Indeed, how can we regard Cato as a failure, even in political
terms, knowing that it was him and his virtues that delayed the collapse of the
Roman republic (ib. in connection with Phoc. 3.5)? True, by comparing the
ideal government with the curved course of the sun, Plutarch says that the
right statesman should be neither totally inexible and constantly opposed to
the people's desires nor yielding perforce to their whims and mistakes (Phoc .
2.6), but he nowhere says directly that Cato represented the inexible way of
government, though, admittedly, his political manners and methods resembled
it (but see above). True again, Cato is characterized ἄτρεπτος at Cat. Mi. 1.3,
but certainly not in a political context (see n. 18). Plutarch is not at all blind
to Cato's political blunders (see, e.g., Cat. Mi. 30-31), and indeed believes that
the ideal statesman should combine sterness with gentleness, a combination,
however, which he does nd in both Phokion and Cato. In the prologue to this
pair he tells us that the very similar virtues of these men demonstrate the great
similarity of their characters, ὥσπερ ἴσῳ μέτρῳ μεμιγμένου [sc. ἤθους] πρὸς τὸ
αὐστηρὸν τοῦ φιλανθρώπου… (Phoc. 3.8).
Somewhat similar was the case of Pompey and Crassus a few years earlier.
Owing to his dignied manners, Pompey would shun the crowds of the forum,
giving his assistance, if reluctantly, only to a few. Crassus, by contrast, by being
always at hand to oer his services and invariably easy to access, managed,
through his aability and kindness, to overpower Pompey's gravity.
21 Cato himself, however, had another explanation for his failure; see Cat. Mi. 50.3 and cf.
ch. 42 and 44.1.
282
Anastasios G. Nikolaidis
Crass. 7.3-4: …πολλάκις ἠλαττοῦτο [sc. Pompey] τοῦ Κράσσου, διὰ τὸν ὄγκον
καὶ τὸ πρόσχημα τοῦ βίου φεύγων τὰ πλήθη, καὶ ἀναδυόμενος ἐξ ἀγορᾶς,
καὶ τῶν δεομένων ὀλίγοις καὶ μὴ πάνυ προθύμως βοηθῶν…ὁ δὲ Κράσσος
ἐνδελεχέστερον τὸ χρήσιμον ἔχων, καὶ σπάνιος οὐκ ὢν οὐδὲ δυσπρόσοδος,
ἀλλ' ἐν μέσαις ἀεὶ ταῖς σπουδαῖς ἀναστρεφόμενος, τῷ κοινῷ καὶ φιλανθρώπῳ
περιεγίνετο τῆς ἐκείνου σεμνότητος. Cf. also earlier 3.4, where we again see that
Crassus was not at all overbearing or disdainful, but very condescending and
willing to plead for everyone who could not nd another advocate or had been
turned down by the advocate of his choice. us, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μᾶλλον ἤρεσκεν
ὡς ἐπιμελὴς καὶ βοηθητικός. By means of a similar conduct, Otho managed
to avoid envy too (Galb. 20.5: τῷ δ' ἀνεπιφθόνῳ περιῆν, προῖκα συμπράττων
πάντα τοῖς δεομένοις καὶ παρέχων ἑαυτὸν εὐπροσήγορον καὶ φιλάνθρωπον
ἅπασι). As for the pairing of philanthropos with koinos (above Crass. 7.4), cf. also
Publ. 4.5 below and Phoc. 10.7. Nevertheless, Crassus' aability and helpfulness
above is not to be matched, pace H. M. Martin Jr. (p. 170), with Publicola's
philanthropia, despite the apparent similarity (Publ. 4.5: …ὥρμησε πρὸς
τὸν Οὐαλέριον, μάλιστά πως τοῖς κοινοῖς καὶ φιλανθρώποις ἐπαχθεὶς τοῦ
ἀνδρός, ὅτι πᾶσιν εὐπρόσοδος ἦν τοῖς δεομένοις, καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν ἀνεῳγμένην
ἀεὶ παρεῖχε, καὶ λόγον οὐδενὸς οὐδὲ χρείαν ἀπερρίπτει τῶν ταπεινῶν); for,
unlike Publicola, an auent aristocrat, who used his eloquence ὀρθῶς καὶ μετὰ
παρρησίας ἀεὶ…ὑπὲρ τῶν δικαίων, and his riches τοῖς δεομένοις ἐλευθερίως
καὶ φιλανθρώπως ἐπαρκῶν ( Publ. 1.2; and cf. 25.7), Crassus did not come
from a noble and wealthy family (see Crass. 1.1) and, once in the political arena,
he acted like a true demagogue (see n. 22).
Crassus was particularly popular with the Romans, because he would
indiscriminately and unaectedly clasp hands with the people on the street
and return everyone's greeting, however obscure or lowly, calling him by name
at that22 . Such conduct, which Plutarch characterizes as to… philanthropon
autou kai demotikon, clearly illustrates philanthropia through salutations, but a
bit earlier we see that Crassus was philanthropos also by means of his hospitality
(Crass. 3.1-2: Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ ξένους ἦν φιλότιμος ὁ Κράσσος· ἀνέῳκτο
γὰρ ἡ οἰκία πᾶσι…ἐν δὲ τοῖς δείπνοις ἡ μὲν κλῆσις ἦν ὡς τὰ πολλὰ δημοτικὴ
καὶ λαώδης)23 . On the contrary, Nikias was, on the one hand, object of envy
because of his huge wealth and, on the other, unpopular because his own way
of life was neither philanthropon nor demotikon, but unsociable and aristocratic
22 Crass. 3.5: ἤρεσκε δὲ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰς δεξιώσεις καὶ προσαγορεύσεις φιλάνθρωπον
αὐτοῦ καὶ δημοτικόν. οὐδενὶ γὰρ οὕτως ἀπήντησε Ῥωμαίων ἀδόξῳ καὶ ταπεινῷ Κράσσος, ὃν
ἀσπασάμενον οὐκ ἀντιπροσηγόρευσεν ἐξ ὀνόματος. For the close relationship of philanthropos
with demotikos see also Nic. 11.2 and Ages. 1.5 (n. 24), Cim-Luc. Comp. 1.5 (dêmokratikos), and
Cat. Mi. 23,1 (p. 286 below).
23 Somewhat similar (but perhaps less calculated) was the philanthropia of Kimon and Lucullus
(cf. Cim. 3.3: ἡ περὶ τὰς ὑποδοχὰς καὶ τὰς φιλανθρωπίας [ταύτας] ὑγρότης καὶ δαψίλεια). And,
as in the case of Crassus above, Kimon's table was also dêmokratikê and philanthropos (Cim-Luc.
Comp. 1.5). On the other hand, if we take into account that Crassus was a diligent as well as
a powerful speaker, who promptly oered his advocacy to those who needed it (see Crass. 3.4
above), one might say that his conduct combined, seemingly at least, all 3 kinds of Laertios'
philanthropia (cf also 546E on p. 278).
283
Philanthropia as Sociability and Plutarch's Unsociable Heroes
instead24 . As has been said, Plutarch highly esteemed philanthropia, but he
admired neither the philanthropos/sociable Crassus nor Nikias who was
unsociable and, therefore, not philanthropos in this sense25 . However, between
the two, and from the moral point of view, he regarded Nikias as far superior
to Crassus (see Crass. 2.1-5, 6.8-9, 14.5). is is evident in the concluding
Synkrisis of this pair, where Crassus' character is described as abnormal and
incongruous, while his ways of amassing and squandering his money are
looked upon as emblematic of vice itself (Nic.-Crass. Comp. chs 1-2 and esp.
1.4…ὥστε θαυμάζειν εἴ τινα λέληθε τὸ τὴν κακίαν ἀνωμαλίαν εἶναι τινα
τρόπου καὶ ἀνομολογίαν, ὁρῶντα τοὺς αἰσχρῶς συλλέγοντας εἶτ' ἀχρήστως
ἐκχέοντας).
Perikles is another exemplary Life; and of him we also hear that, once
he entered public life, he consistently declined all invitations to dinner or
similar social occasions. So, during his long political career he participated
in not one dinner-party as a guest (Per. 7.5: …κλήσεις τε δείπνων καὶ τὴν
τοιαύτην ἅπασαν φιλοφροσύνην καὶ συνήθειαν ἐξέλιπε), except in his
nephew's wedding feast, which he did attend, but only until the libations were
made; for immediately afterwards he rose up and departed. In recognizing
that conviviality is apt to overpower any kind of pretentiousness, and that it is
very dicult for one to maintain an assumed gravity in the midst of familiar
intercourse (Per. 7.6: δειναὶ γὰρ αἱ φιλοφροσύναι παντὸς ὄγκου περιγενέσθαι,
καὶ δυσφύλακτον ἐν συνηθείᾳ τὸ πρὸς δόξαν σεμνόν ἐστι), Plutarch seems to
endorse Perikles' decision to keep away from dinner-parties.
In the immediate sequel, however, Plutarch contrasts Perikles' conduct with
that of truly virtuous men, whose goodness "fairest appears when most
appears" (Perrin's Loeb translation), and in whom nothing is so admirable
in the eyes of strangers as their daily life is in the eyes of their intimates26 .
From this one may gather that Plutarch denies the genuineness of Perikles'
gravity (and ultimately his virtue), which seems to be invigorated somehow
by his earlier observation that Perikles had decided to champion the poor
24 Nic. 11.2: τῆς διαίτης τὸ μὴ φιλάνθρωπον μηδὲ δημοτικόν, ἀλλ' ἄμικτον καὶ ὀλιγαρχικὸν
ἀλλόκοτον ἐδόκει. See also 5.1-2 where we hear of Nikias that, due to his fear of slanderers,
οὔτε συνεδείπνει τινὶ τῶν πολιτῶν…οὐδ' ὅλως ἐσχόλαζε ταῖς τοιαύταις διατριβαῖς. And when
free from public duties, δυσπρόσοδος ἦν καὶ δυσέντευκτος. Agesilaus, by contrast, thanks to
his public training as a common Spartan, acquired τῷ φύσει βασιλικῷ καὶ ἡγεμονικῷ…τὸ
δημοτικὸν καὶ φιλάνθρωπον (Ages. 1.5).
25 Although Nikias, owing to his huge wealth, gave money to a lot of people: to the base
(who could discredit him; see Nic. 5.1 previous note) out of cowardice; to the good (and those
deserving to receive) out of liberality (διὰ φιλανθρωπίαν – Nic. 4.3). For the liberality-nuance
of philanthropia see also Ant. 1.1, Arat. 12.1, Di. 52.1, Cim. 10.6-7; and for the association of
philanthropia with liberality see also H. M. M J., 1961, pp. 173-4. Further, the two words
are paired together in Pel. 3.3 and Publ. 1.2. See moreover Mor. 333E-F, 510C (n. 12 above)
and 527A. Note, nally, that, according to [Arist.], VV 1250b33-34, philanthropia is one of the
concomitants of liberality (ἐλευθεριότης), whereas, according to logic, it rather should be the
other way round.
26 Per . 7.6: τῆς ἀληθινῆς δ' ἀρετῆς κάλλιστα φαίνεται τὰ μάλιστα φαινόμενα, καὶ τῶν
ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν οὐδὲν οὕτω θαυμάσιον τοῖς ἐκτὸς ὡς ὁ καθ' ἡμέραν βίος τοῖς συνοῦσιν.
284
Anastasios G. Nikolaidis
and the many instead of the few and the rich, contrary to his own nature
which was anything but popular (Per. 7.3: …παρὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν ἥκιστα
δημοτικὴν οὖσαν). But when he mentions Ion's criticism of Perikles next to
his eulogy of Kimon27, he clearly disagrees with him (Per. 5.3: Ἀλλ' Ἴωνα
μὲν ὥσπερ τραγικὴν διδασκαλίαν ἀξιοῦντα τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχειν τι πάντως καὶ
σατυρικὸν μέρος ἐῶμεν). And by subsequently appealing to what Zeno used
to say to Perikles' critics (p. 279 above), Plutarch appears to understand and
justify Perikles' conduct, regardless of his personal predilections (as a wealthy
aristocrat he was in favour of dinner-parties and similar social gatherings)
and, perhaps, his belief that Perikles betrayed an ἔλλειμμα ἀρετῆς here; a
shortcoming, however, that Plutarch would ascribe to political necessity (ἐκ…
πολιτικῆς ἀνάγκης), as he tells us in the prologue to the Life of Kimon (2.5).
Further, one could even argue that the supposed arrogance and haughtiness
of Perikles might have been an inuence of Anaxagoras, who was ὁ…μάλιστα
περιθεὶς ὄγκον αὐτῷ…ὅλως τε μετεωρίσας καὶ συνεξάρας τὸ ἀξίωμα τοῦ
ἤθους (Per . 4.6; cf. also 5.1). For a somewhat similar inuence of the Stoic
Antipatros upon the younger Cato, see n. 20.
Half a century before Perikles, we nd the young emistokles declining
similar invitations to drinking-parties (em. 3.4: …καὶ τοὺς πότους
παραιτεῖσθαι τοὺς συνήθεις). In his case, the reason for this change of life
was Miltiades' trophy, which so monopolized his thoughts and interests that
he could pay attention to nothing else; emistokles could not even sleep
on account of his eagerness and constant thinking of how he would surpass
Miltiades' success28 . Perikles' motive was not essentially dierent, since both
men aimed at the same target: to govern Athens29 . us, the conclusion drawn
from both cases is the same too: drinking-parties apparently impair rather
than advance the image of a public gure. No wonder, therefore, that we
eventually come to realize that, with the exception of Aemilius Paulus (cf.
Aem. 28.7-9, 38.6) and Scipio Africanus (p. 286 below), sociable par excellence
are those heroes who are regarded, whether by Plutarch himself or by several
modern critics, as negative paradigms, as examples to be avoided rather than
to be imitated; such heroes that is, as Antony, Crassus, Demetrios and, to some
extent, also Alkibiades, Lucullus and Sulla30 .
27 Per . 5.3: μοθωνικήν φησι [sc. Ion] τὴν ὁμιλίαν καὶ ὑπότυφον εἶναι τοῦ Περικλέους,
καὶ ταῖς μεγαλαυχίαις αὺτοῦ πολλὴν ὑπεροψίαν ἀναμεμεῖχθαι καὶ περιφρόνησιν τῶν ἄλλων,
ἐπαινεῖ δὲ τὸ Κίμωνος ἐμμελὲς καὶ ὑγρὸν καὶ μεμουσωμένον ἐν ταῖς περιφοραῖς.
28 For a close examination of the Miltiades' trophy motif (literary function, didactic force,
political/ethical stimulus), see A. P J, 2008.
29 Unlike all others, emistokles believed that the Persian defeat at Marathon was not
the end of the war, but the beginning of even bigger struggles, ἐφ' οὓς ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς ὅλης
Ἑλλάδος ἤλειφε… πόρρωθεν ἤδη προσδοκῶν τὸ μέλλον ( em. 3.5). For Perikles' similar
foresight see Per. 8.7; and for his plan to govern Athens see chs 7 and 9.
30 Cf. Ant. 4.4-7, 9.5, 28; Demetr. 1.8, 2.3, 52.2-3; Alc. 16; Luc. 39-41, Sull. 2.5, 36.1-2,
41.5.
285
Philanthropia as Sociability and Plutarch's Unsociable Heroes
Time to conclude. ere is little doubt that Plutarch, as a wealthy Greek
aristocrat, was fond of dinner-parties. e symposion, after all, was traditionally
an aristocratic institution and as such also a tradition within Plutarch's own
family, as Quaestiones Convivales amply testify31 . At the same time, Plutarch's
moral outlook, fashioned partly on his own philanthropia in the literal sense
of the word32 , and partly on his peculiar practical spirit33, also inclined him
to be favourably disposed toward and endorse those social gatherings; for he
saw them not as occasions for a drinking-bout – this is very clear in his Table
Talks34 – but as splendid opportunities for sharing erudition35, practising self-
discipline, manifesting nesse, and, above all, tightening human relations with
the help of a relaxed and cheerful sympotic atmosphere. In the context of a
dinner-party, one should not only be on his guard against becoming drunk
or losing his temper and misbehaving, but should also reveal and exercise his
sociability at large. In other words, one ought to come out somehow of his
narrow self and prove his consideration for his fellows by showing, depending
on the particular circumstances, politeness, courtesy, tactfulness, aability,
friendliness and so on. For Plutarch, sociability and its ramications are not
negligible character-traits, but in fact aspects of a unied morality, if sociability
and its manifestations are genuine, or steps towards morality, if the sociability
is assumed (see p. 279 above).
On the other hand, Plutarch is also perfectly aware that these aspects
of rened conduct can be aected and articial. Especially in the context of
politics, sociability is usually a façade behind which may lurk crude political
ambition and a carefully studied design for winning popularity and establishing
one's inuence and power36 . We saw this kind of sociability in the case of
Crassus, and we see it again in the case of Caesar who was too ingratiating for
his age (Caes. 4.4: πολλὴ δὲ τῆς περὶ τὰς δεξιώσεις καὶ ὁμιλίας φιλοφροσύνης
εὔνοια παρὰ τῶν δημοτῶν ἀπήντα, θεραπευτικοῦ παρ' ἡλικίαν ὄντος). His
enemies believed, Plutarch tells us, that his increasing inuence would soon
vanish together with his resources, and so let it thrive without trying to check
it. Cicero, however, managed to see beneath the surface of Caesar's popular
policy and was the rst to discern and comprehend the powerful character
and the tyrannical purpose hidden under his kindly and cheerful exterior
(Caes . 4.8: τὴν ἐν τῷ φιλανθρώπῳ καὶ ἱλαρῷ κεκρυμμένην δεινότητα τοῦ
ἤθους καταμαθὼν…ἔλεγε [sc. Cicero] τοῖς…ἐπιβουλεύμασιν αυτοῦ καὶ
31 Cf. also R. H. B, 1967, pp. 13-7.
32 Barrow aptly remarks that, though P.'s mind was not a rst-rate one, "it was a mind
essentially kindly, unwilling to think ill of anyone, tolerant, though shrewd in the judgement of
character" (p. 147). Cf. also R. H, 1912, A. G. N, 2008, and K. Z, 19642
(all in n. 4 above).
33 Cf. A. G. N, 1991, pp. 175-86.
34 C f. Talks 1.4, 3.9, 4 proem, 8 proem. Occasionally, however, some fellow-drinkers did get
drunk (see 620A, 645A-C, 715D).
35 Cf. S.-T. T, 1989, p. 14. Cf. also J. S, 1993, pp. 389-90.
36 Cf. J. D R, 1979, pp. 281-3. is sham philanthropia (φιλανθρωπία προσποίητος)
is a feature of injustice (adikia), according to [Arist.], VV 1251b3.
286
Anastasios G. Nikolaidis
πολιτεύμασι τυραννικὴν ἐνορᾶν διάνοιαν). Similarly, on the basis of Caesar's
lenient speech in the senate with regard to the Catilinarian conspiracy, the
younger Cato openly had accused him of trying to subvert the state σχήματι
δημοτικῷ καὶ λόγῳ φιλανθρώπῳ ( Cat. Mi. 23.1)37 . In the case of Kleomenes,
by contrast, who would meet the various petitioners without mediators but
in person, conversing at length with those who needed his services and
devoting time cheerfully and kindly to them, we have no reason to question
the genuineness of the Spartan king's kindliness and sociability38 . Nor do we
need to suspect Scipio's philanthropia, who was agreeable in socializing with
friends at his leisure, without neglecting in the least matters of import related
to the preparation of his war with Hannibal.
Despite Cato's denunciations that in Sicily Scipio acted as a feast organizer
rather than as an army commander, the latter ἐν τῇ παρασκευῇ τοῦ πολέμου
τὴν νίκην ἐπιδειξάμενος [to the tribunes who came from Rome to nd
out what was happening], καὶ φανεὶς ἡδὺς μὲν ἐπὶ σχολῆς συνεῖναι φίλοις,
οὐδαμῇ δὲ τῷ φιλανθρώπῳ τῆς διαίτης εἰς τὰ σπουδαῖα καὶ μεγάλα ῥᾴθυμος,
ἐξέπλευσεν ἐπὶ τὸν πόλεμον ( Cat. Ma. 3.6-7). Demetrios also was, on the one
hand, ἥδιστος…συγγενέσθαι, σχολάζων τε περὶ πότους καὶ τρυφὰς and, on the
olther, most energetic, impetuous, persevering and ecient in action (Demetr.
2.3). Gaius Gracchus was another man who, πᾶσιν ἐντυγχάνων μετὰ εὐκολίας,
at the same time preserved τὸ σεμνὸν ἐν τῷ φιλανθρώπῳ (GGr. 6.4).
It follows then that, unlike Nikias and to some extent Pompey, Crassus,
Kleomenes and Scipio enjoyed popularity thanks to their philanthropia, namely,
by being aable and agreeable in their intercourse with people and by meeting
their needs39 .
Finally, reservations and warnings concern sociability even outside the
domain of politics. Earlier (p. 278), we saw a case of hospitality going too far;
and in De vitioso pudore we nd an example of courtesy going similarly too
far, since Plutarch admonishes us that social courtesy should not be carried
to the extent of destroying one's individuality. When, for instance, a citharode
sings badly at a friend's banquet, we must set aside the attering equation
"compliance equals politeness" (529D: κολακεύουσα τὸν εὐδυσώπητον ὡς
37 Another example of pretended philanthropia (if momentarily in this case) can be seen
in the deceitful trick which Alkibiades played on the Spartan delegation in Athens during the
years of Nikias' peace. In front of the popular assembly Alkibiades asked the delegates πάνυ
φιλανθρώπως with what powers they had come, and when the Spartans answered exactly as
they had been instructed by Alkibiades himself, the latter assailed them μετὰ κραυγῆς καὶ ὀργῆς,
ὥσπερ οὺκ ἀδικῶν, ἀλλ' ἀδικούμενος, calling them faithless and unreliable (Alc. 14-7-12).
38 Cleom. 13.3: … οὐδ' ὑπ' ἀγγέλων ὄχλου καὶ θυρωρῶν ἢ διὰ γραμματέων χρηματίζοντα
χαλεπῶς καὶ μόλις, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν ἐν ἱματίῳ τῷ τυχόντι πρὸς τὰς δεξιώσεις ἀπαντῶντα καὶ
διαλεγόμενον καὶ σχολάζοντα τοῖς χρῄζουσιν ἱλαρῶς καὶ φιλανθρώπως…
39 Note that P. employs the word ἀφιλάνθρωπος (an hapax in his works) to describe the
Epicureans, who led a life ἀνέξοδον (secluded) καὶ ἀπολίτευτον καὶ ἀφιλάνθρωπον καὶ
ἀνενθουσίαστον (with no enthusiasm, i.e. "untouched by any spark of the divine", according to
the brilliant translation of B. E P. L in Loeb – Non posse 1098D).
287
Philanthropia as Sociability and Plutarch's Unsociable Heroes
φιλάνθρωπον) and, consequently, not feel compelled to join in the others'
applause and admiration, contrary to our own judgement (531B-C). ese
examples demonstrate that philanthropia for Plutarch is not a passive quality,
but always presupposes initiative and action on the part of the philanthropos . A
meek and submissive person, for instance, who is unable to do harm to anyone,
but at the same time apt to tolerate everything and, therefore, cannot ght or
simply resist baseness, is not philanthropos, because for Plutarch philanthropos
is only one who could also be not simply unkindly, but outright harsh on
his fellows when the latter act wrongfully; in other words, a philanthropos
ought to be also a misoponêros, a hater of vice. is is why he puts us on our
guard against attery that calls prodigality "liberality", cowardice "caution",
stinginess "frugality", the irascible and overbearing "brave", the worthless and
meek "kindly"40 (cf. also 529D above).
It seems that philanthropia as a positive virtue must include the hatred of
wickedness, which is among the things we praise (De inv. et od. 537D: καὶ
γὰρ ἡ μισοπονηρία τῶν ἐπαινουμένων ἐστί). Plutarch, therefore, approves of
Timoleon's gentleness, however excessive, because it did not prevent him from
hating the base (Tim. 3.4: πρᾶος διαφερόντως ὅσα μὴ σφόδρα…μισοπόνηρος).
On the contrary, he is not impressed by the gentleness of the Spartan King
Charilaos, but agrees with his royal colleague's remark: Πῶς δ' ἂν [οὐκ] εἴη
Χαρίλαος ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς ὃς οὐδὲ τοῖς πονηροῖς χαλεπός ἐστι; (Lyc . 5.9; cf. also
Mor. 55E, 218B, 223E). According to the Peripatetic tradition, after all, justice
involves this hatred of wickedness (cf. [Arist.], VV 1250b 24: ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ τῇ
δικαιοσύνῃ…καὶ ἡ μισοπονηρία), which is also one of the characteristics of
virtue itself (1251b 31: ἔστι δὲ τῆς ἀρετῆς…καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς καὶ τὸ
μισεῖν τοὺς φαύλους).
As in so many other things, Plutarch strikes again the middle course.
Despite his indisputable loyalty to Plato, in matters of practical ethics, the
practical Plutarch espouses the Aristotelian principle of the golden mean.
W o r k s c i T e d
B, R. H., Plutarch and his Times, London, 1967.
B, A., "Plutarque et la scène du banquet", in A. G. N (ed.),
2008, pp. 577-89.
B-I, B., Norm und Individualität in den Biographien Plutarchs ,
Stuttgart, 1972.
40 De adul. et am. 56C: ἐν δὲ ταῖς κολακείαις ὁρᾶν χρὴ καὶ παραφυλάττειν ἀσωτίαν μὲν
ἐλευθεριότητα καλουμένην καὶ δειλίαν ἀσφάλειαν…μικρολογίαν δὲ σωφροσύνην… ἀνδρεῖον
δὲ τὸν ὀργίλον καὶ ὑπερήφανον, φιλάνθρωπον δὲ τὸν εὐτελῆ καὶ ταπεινόν.
288
Anastasios G. Nikolaidis
D, T., Plutarch's Lives. Exploring Virtue and Vice, Oxford, 1999.
F, F., Histoire et Morale dans les Vies Parallèles de Plutarque, Paris,
1996.
G, R. J., e Legend of Cato Uticensis from the First Century B.C. to the Fifth
Century A.D., Bruxelles, 1987.
H, R., Plutarch, Leipzig, 1912.
I, H.-G., Plutarch's Schriften über die Heilung der Seele, Göttingen,
1971.
M J., H. M., "e Concept of philanthropia in Plutarch's Lives", AJP,
82 (1961) 164-75.
N, A. G., "Plutarch's Contradictions", C&M, 42 (1991) 153-86.
_____ "Introduction", in A. G. N (ed.), e Unity of Plutarch's Work.
Moralia emes in the Lives, Features of the Lives in the Moralia, Berlin/
New York, 2008, pp. XIII-XVII.
P, C., "Vocabulaire et mentalité dans les Moralia de Plutarque",
DHA, 3 (1977) 197-235.
P J, A., "El trofeo de Maratón: Adaptación y desarrollo de un
tópico ético en Plutarco", in A. G. N (ed.), 2008, pp. 591-
600.
R F, J., "O doce afago da philanthropia", in C. S .
(eds.), Ética e Paideia em Plutarco, Coimbra, 2008, pp. 87-97.
D R, J., La douceur dans la pensée grecque, Paris, 1979.
S, J., Plutarque, Paris, 1993.
T, S.-V., A Commentary of Plutarch's Table Talks, vol. 1, Göteborg,
1989.
Z, K., Ploutarchos von Chaironeia, Stuttgart, 2 1964/1949 (= RE 21.1
[1951], pp. 636-962).
289
È il dio degli Stoici lantropo?
È S
P V C
Università di Salerno
Abstract
Many passages of Plutarch's De Stoicorum repugnantiis are devoted to the refutation of Stoic
beliefs about gods. Chrysippus' theological doctrine is qualied as 'extravagant', because of the
'extravagant' function the philosopher attributes to the gods: from them come only 'indierent'
things like health or wealth, but they do not provide men with the supreme virtue. What is
more, they usually provide bad men with more things than good men, and rich men with more
things than poor men. Zeus, the supreme god, the god of justice who has created the city of men
and gods, is thus unfair, cruel and ruthless. He creates the world but he destroys it by war. He
is by no means a philanthropist, and this conclusion, Plutarch asserts, is a contradictory topic
of Stoic doctrine.
"O Zeus, il più nobile degli dei immortali, dai molti nomi, sempre
onnipotente, / signore della natura, che governi ogni essere secondo
la legge, / salve! È abitudine di tutti i mortali rivolgersi a te (…) /
Ti dedico il mio canto e sempre inneggerò alla tua potenza. / A te
obbedisce tutto il cosmo che ruota intorno alla terra; / dovunque
lo conduci, ti si sommette volentieri, / perché tu hai nelle tue mani
invincibili uno strumento: / la folgore forcuta, infuocata, sempreviva.
/ Sotto il suo colpo tutti gli eventi naturali si compiono. / Con esso
tu regoli il Logos comune (…) che dovunque / si aggira (…) senza
di te, o dio, niente avviene sulla terra / (…) tranne i disegni che i
malvagi con le loro follie mettono in atto / (…). Così, tu hai reso in
unità, il bene e il male, / aermando un unico Logos eterno per tutte
le cose (…)" (Cleanth. apud Stob. Ecl. I 1, 12, p. 25, 3 = SVF I 537,
pp. 121-122 = p. 236 Radice).
L' Inno a Zeus di Cleante trova eco in un frammento di Crisippo,
allorquando egli denisce la natura di dio: "dio è un essere vivente immortale
(ἀθάνατον ), razionale (λογικόν), perfetto (τέλειον) ovvero intelligente nella
sua beatitudine (νοερὸν ἐν εὐδαιμονίᾳ), esente da ogni male (κακοῦ παντὸς
ἀνεπίδεκτον), è la provvidenza del cosmo e delle cose che in esso vi sono
(προνοητικὸν κόσμου τε καὶ τῶν ἐν κόσμῳ ) (...)" (D. L., VII 147 = SVF II
1021, p. 305 = p. 886 Radice).
Zeus è colui che dà vita, è signore dell'etere in quanto Atena, dell'aria perché
è Era; a Zeus, dunque, appartiene ogni qualità trascendente ed immanente.
Ciò appare una vistosa contraddizione a Plutarco, che si chiede in def. or. 29,
426B come possano gli Stoici considerare gli dei ovvero il dio alla stregua di
eventi atmosferici, privi di ogni libertà ed autonomia, "rinserrati e inchiodati
alla loro corporeità", e che in de E ap. Delph. 19-20 aveva condiviso la posizione
di Ammonio, che attribuiva al dio un'eternità atemporale ed immobile (393A).
In tal modo erano evidenti il netto "riuto della sica stoica e la ripresa del tema
290
Paola Volpe Cacciatore
platonico della separazione tra essere e divenire, riformulata attraverso l'implicita
identicazione tra essere e dio e l'accentuazione del carattere divino"1 .
È questo il problema che la ricerca losoca deve arontare (Chrysipp.
in Philon., de mun. I, p. 216 M. = SVF II 1010, p. 300 = p. 876 Radice), e
cioè se dio esiste e qual è la sua essenza. Pur avvertendo la dicoltà di tale
dimostrazione, Crisippo, ricorrendo ad immagini di vita quotidiana, paragona
dio ad un artista e il mondo ad un'opera d'arte:
"(…) Chi, alla vista di una statua e di un quadro, non risale allo scultore e al
pittore? (…) E così quando noi arriviamo in questa autentica megalopoli che
è il mondo, e vediamo valli e montagne lussureggianti di piante ed animali
e le correnti dei umi, di sorgenti lontane (…) e poi ancora il sole e la luna,
signori l'uno del giorno, l'altra della notte (…) non siamo forse autorizzati, anzi
costretti a farci un'idea di un padre creatore, e anche reggitore (ἡγεμών)? E
infatti non esiste opera d'arte che si produca da sé e il mondo è opera quanto
mai artistica: dunque, deve essere creato da un artece di somma sapienza e
perfezione".
Dio, dunque, esiste perché creatore e perché ha saputo fare cose superiori
all'intelligenza umana; circa poi la sua sostanza, dio è "pneuma dotato di
intelligenza, igneo, privo di una forma propria, ma che riesce a trasformarsi
in tutto ciò che vuole, facendosi uguale ad ogni cosa" (Aet., Plac. I 6 = SVF II
1009, p. 299 = p. 874 Radice)2 .
È evidente la prima dierenza tra gli Stoici e Plutarco, perché per i primi
dio è immanente alle cose di cui è padre, per il secondo è trascendente a quelle
stesse cose. "Quando Plutarco riassume la sua concezione della natura divina
con la formula οὐ γὰρ ἄνουν οὐδ' ἄψυχον οὐδ' ἀνθρώποις ὁ θεὸς ὑποχείριον,
è il terzo termine che è essenziale e che condiziona, in certa maniera, gli altri
due: è perché dio non può essere "a portata di mano dell'uomo", per il fatto che
"non si mescola in nessun modo con noi" non più di quanto si comprometta
con il mondo, che la sua essenza non può essere materiale, né mortale come
nella sica stoica.
È proprio qui, in denitiva, che sta il vero punto di rottura con il Portico,
secondo il quale, invece, la natura divina è diusa attraverso la totalità del
cosmo ed è inseparabile dalla materia che anima "3 . È quanto Ammonio aveva
detto nel de E ap. Delph. circa il dio-essere immutabile, al quale Plutarco
contrapponeva "un altro dio o meglio un demone" al quale poter attribuire i
mutamenti di un cosmo sensibile. Si opponeva in tal modo al monismo stoico,
ripercorrendo in de Is. (370D-371A) le posizioni dei loso antichi – Eraclito,
1 F. F, 1995, p. 61.
2 Cf. SVF II 1075, p. 314 = p. 904 Radice; SVF II 1080, p. 316 = p. 908 Radice: "(…) il dio per
natura si riferisce a ciascuna cosa: Cerere alla terra, Nettuno al mare e poi altri dei ad altre realtà.
È ravvisabile negli stoici e in Crisippo una volontà chiara di tendere da un lato ad un sincretismo
religioso e dall'altro ad un monoteismo che non contrastasse con le credenze popolari" (Cf. D.
B, 2003, p. 492).
3 D. B, 2003, p. 515.
291
È il dio degli Stoici lantropo?
Empedocle, i Pitagorici – no a giungere ad Anassagora, che distingue
Mente ed Innito, ad Aristotele che distingue Forma e Privazione ed, inne,
Platone, che "talora con espressioni vorrei dire velate e segretamente allusive,
dà ai due principi contrapposti il nome di Identità e Diversità. Ma nelle
Leggi, ormai vecchio, non si esprime più in maniera metaforica e simbolica,
bensì in termini molto chiari: il cosmo, egli dice, non è mosso da un solo
spirito; probabilmente sono molti, e certamente non meno di due, lo spirito
che opera il bene e quello avversario che opera il male. Platone ammette
anche un terzo spirito, una natura intermedia che non è di per sé priva di vita,
di pensiero, di movimento, come alcuni ritengono, ma deriva da entrambi i
principi suddetti (…)"4 .
La concezione plutarchea, che è – come dice Ferrari5 – originale, deriva
dalla lettura di un passo del libro X delle Leggi (896d-e) in cui "Platone accenna
in modo non del tutto chiaro a un'anima contrapposta all'anima buona, senza
però chiarire se si tratta di un principio cosmico o precosmico, o di che cosa.
Quest'anima rappresenta, per Plutarco, il fondamento dell'indeterminazione,
del disordine e, di conseguenza (per un platonico) del male"6 .
È indubbio che il problema del male dovesse essere centrale nella
speculazione del losofo di Cheronea, ed egli lo risolve (de Is. 369A) opponendo
ad Osiride, il bene, Tifone, il male, ossia colui il quale tiranneggia imponendosi
con la forza. Si stabiliva così un dualismo da lui aermato drasticamente; ma
allora è possibile spiegarlo in un contesto dove dio è causa di tutto il male?
Plutarco percorreva una terza via, quella della presenza dei demoni che
"possiedono una forza superiore a quella umana (…) ma l'elemento divino che
è in loro non si presenta mai puro e omogeneo, bensì determinato sia dalle
caratteristiche intrinseche dello spirito, sia dalle attitudini sensoriali del corpo
e come tale passibile di percezioni piacevoli e dolorose" (de Is. 360E)7 .
Sono queste le premesse che animano la polemica antistoica di Plutarco
nei due opuscoli de Stoicorum repugnantiis e de communibus notitiis, nella parte in
cui egli tratta della teodicea e della teologia e che si potrebbe sintetizzare nella
domanda: "Si Deus est, unde malum?". È questo l'interrogativo che si pongono
gli Stoici e che risolvono alla luce di un dio immanente alla natura e nella
convinzione che anche il male – al pari del bene – ha una sua giusticazione
in quanto esso si realizza secondo la ragione della natura e, per così dire, si
realizza non inutilmente in rapporto al tutto, giacché non vi sarebbe, senza di
esso, neppure il bene" (Stoic. rep. 1050F - comm. not. 1065B).
4 Trad. it. di M. C, 1995.
5 F. F, 1995, p. 75. Cf. Ser. num. vind. 550D: "(…) anche la natura del tutto che era
priva di ordine, cominciò a mutare e a diventare cosmo, grazie alla somiglianza e a una certa
partecipazione al complesso eidetico e alla virtù che appartengono al divino (…)".
6 F. F, 1995, p. 61.
7 Il dualismo plutarcheo è espresso chiaramente anche in Def. or. 428B, dove si parla delle
due nature, una intellegibile e l'altra sensibile, e in Def. or. 428F, in cui si ricordano l'Uno e la
Diade indeterminata. Tale coppia di principi è ricondotta alla generazione del numero (429A);
cf. anche Plac. phil. 881E.
292
Paola Volpe Cacciatore
È la stessa domanda che si poneva Seneca nel De providentia. Egli "evita
di spiegarne l'origine, la sua causa eciente (unde malum? ) concentrandosi
sulla causa nale (cur malum? ) (…). Da dio non può venire alcun male per gli
uomini, anzi egli ha allontanato da loro (precisamente, dai buoni) ogni male
(omnia mala ab illis removit – sc. Deus –, scelera et agitia et agitationes improbas et
avida consilia et libidinem caecam et alieno imminentem avaritiam [6,1])8 . L'unico
male per Seneca e per l'etica stoica è il male morale, tutto il resto rientra nella
categoria degli ἀδιάφορα, ovvero "quelle cose che stanno a mezzo fra i beni e
i mali (…) <che> in eetti posseggono un pregio che invita alla scelta, oppure
un disvalore che invita al riuto, anche se non inuiscono sulla felicità della
vita" (Stob., ecl. II 79,1 W. = SVF III 118, p. 128 = p. 1024 Radice). In tale
denizione Plutarco evidenziava una contraddizione manifesta e aermava che
"ciò che è suscettibile di un uso buono e cattivo, non è – a loro giudizio – né un
bene né un male. Della ricchezza, della salute e della vigoria sica tutti gli stolti
fanno un uso malvagio. E pertanto nessuno di questi può essere un bene" (Stoic.
rep. 1048C). Il discorso plutarcheo è dialetticamente incalzante, perché se tutti
sono in possesso degli ἀδιάφορα 9 , l'unico elemento che distingue il buono dal
cattivo è la virtù che, secondo Crisippo, non nasce senza la malvagità (comm. not.
1065C-D); e allora se gli dei possono donare la virtù e non lo fanno, di certo
essi non possono considerarsi benevoli e allora – conclude Plutarco – "gli dei
non arrecano giovamento agli uomini più di quanto ricevano giovamento da
essi" (Stoic. rep. 1048E). Il male può essere connaturato nella divinità? Crisippo
risponde di sì, sostenendo che male e bene non possono esistere se non in
connessione reciproca – come la luce non può esistere senza le tenebre – e che il
male stesso dà al bene il suo signicato. Di certo un platonico come Plutarco non
poteva in alcun modo accogliere tale tesi, e neppure poteva accettare che uomini
potessero competere con gli dei o essere ritenuti pari a loro10 . Gli sembrava,
inoltre, oltremodo incredibile che mentre "il vignaiuolo elimina i tralci quando
i germogli sono piccoli e deboli (…) Zeus dopo che non solo ha permesso
per la sua trascuratezza che gli uomini divenissero adulti, ma anche li ha lui
stesso generati e cresciuti, li distrugge macchinando pretesti di rovina e morte"
(Stoic. rep. 1049C-D). Può allora considerarsi lantropo un dio di tal genere,
detto pure dio della giustizia e della pace? Un dio che è suscitatore di guerre
che non nascono dal bene, ma piuttosto dall'amore del piacere, dall'avidità del
possesso, dall'amore sfrenato della gloria e del potere. E allora, se è proprio
la divinità a causare le guerre, essa stessa è causa di malvagità! Ma Crisippo,
pur aermando ciò, "nel II libro dell'opera Sugli dei <dice> che 'non è opinione
ragionevole che la divinità sia concausa delle azioni turpi; come infatti né la
8 N. L, 2008, p. 25.
9 Tra il bene e il male, tra il vizio e la virtù, vi è tutta una regione nel mezzo, nella quale
si trovano i ni e il progresso. Gli ἀδιάφορα sono tali solo in rapporto al bene e al male. In sé
dieriscono gli uni dagli altri: alcuni sono neutri, altri sono preferiti e sono quelli che hanno
valore, altri ancora sono respinti e sono quelli che hanno disvalore (cf. D. L. VII 105 = SVF III
126, p. 30 = p. 1028 Radice).
10 Cf. M. P, 1967.
293
È il dio degli Stoici lantropo?
legge potrebbe essere concausa della violazione della legge né gli dei dell'azione
empia rivolta contro di loro, così è ragionevole che nemmeno di alcuna azione
moralmente turpe essi siano concausa'" (Stoic. rep. 1049D-E). Dunque – ribatte
Plutarco – nel momento stesso in cui esclude la corresponsabilità del male da
parte della divinità, Crisippo ribadisce che tutto è da ascriversi a dio, lodando
al contrario i versi di Euripide "se gli dei fanno qualcosa di turpe non sono
dei" (fr. 286b, 7 Kn.) e "la parola più comoda tu hai detto, che si accusino gli
dei" (fr. 254, 2 Kn.). Il paradosso consiste nel fatto che "la malvagità non solo
si realizza conformemente alla ragione di Zeus, ma anche conformemente
alla ragione di Zeus viene punita" (Stoic. rep. 1050E)11 . E dunque, se il male è
condizione del bene, sembrerebbe allora quasi ovvio – ironizza Plutarco – che
non vi possa essere un Socrate senza Meleto, o un Pericle senza Cleone. Alla
luce di quanto detto da Crisippo – continua Plutarco – "la consunzione sica è
venuta all'uomo al ne della buona salute e la gotta al ne della celerità" (Comm.
not. 1065C). E cosa dice di quel paragone con il riso suscitato dagli epigrammi
comici all'interno di una commedia "frutto più piacevole dell'eleganza e della
persuasività di Crisippo"12 ?
Ma può il male considerarsi "un intermezzo piacevole e spiritoso e può
attribuirsi alla provvidenza il male così come al poeta la composizione di
un'opera? E può considerarsi Provvidenza un dio che scatena le guerre, che
manda sulla città disgrazie e catastro e che scatenò la guerra di Troia per
"riassorbire" la massa eccessiva dell'umanità? Questo scrive <Crisippo> nel
terzo libro dell'opera Sugli dei: "Come le città sovrabbondanti di popolazione
espellono nelle colonie la moltitudine eccedente e intraprendono guerre contro
qualcuno, così dio suscita occasioni di distruzione". E adduce come testimoni
Euripide e coloro che aermano che la guerra di Troia scoppiò per opera degli
dei al ne di diminuire la gran moltitudine degli uomini" (Stoic. rep. 1049A-
B)13 . Un dio allora – quello di Crisippo – che mentre appare verso gli uomini
benevolo e giusto, poi contro quegli stessi uomini commette azioni selvagge
e barbare degne dei Celti, senza considerare se essi siano buoni o malvagi.
Si trattava cioè di giusticare le condanne di Socrate e di Pitagora, le sorti di
Zenone e di Antifonte; si trattava di dare una spiegazione alle soerenze di
uomini illustri. E Crisippo la dà nel libro III del Περὶ οὐσίας, allorquando egli
parla di negligenze possibili nonostante la buona amministrazione del tutto
e dell'azione dei demoni malvagi. Ma non sono tali demoni creati da dio essi
che sono "superiori agli uomini per forza, ma già invischiati nel mondo dei
sensi e accessibili alla gioia e al dolore. Sono dei subalterni della divinità, che li
impiega per agire direttamente sugli uomini"14 .
11 Il concetto è espresso pure, con qualche dierenza lessicale, in Comm. not. 1065.
12 "Come le commedie – egli dice – presentano versi capaci di suscitare il riso, i quali di per
sé sono di nessun valore, ma aggiungono all'opera intera una qualche grazia, così la malvagità
potrebbe essere biasimata presa a parte, ma non è senza utilità per il tutto" (Comm. not .
1065D).
13 Crisippo, per quanto riguarda la testimonianza euripidea, si riferiva ad Hel. 36-40, El .
1282-3 e Or. 1639-42.
14 M. P, 1967, p. 189.
294
Paola Volpe Cacciatore
Se è così – come il losofo stoico dice – anche la malvagità dei demoni
non è da ascriversi a dio. È allora veramente lantropo il dio degli Stoici, per
giunta limitato nel suo agire dall'εἱμαρμένη? La risposta del platonico Plutarco
non poteva che essere negativa, e degli Stoici sottolineava le contraddizioni
all'interno del loro pensiero, convinto com'era dell'esistenza degli dei, del loro
interesse per le sorti dell'umanità e della loro incorruttibilità. "Quale divinità è
mai Zeus, intendo dire lo Zeus di Crisippo che punisce una realtà la quale non
si realizza da sé né senza utilità?" Secondo il discorso di Crisippo, infatti, "la
malvagità è assolutamente non biasimevole, Zeus invece deve essere biasimato,
sia che abbia prodotto, benché nociva, la malvagità, sia che, pur avendola non
senza utilità introdotta, la punisca?" (Stoic. rep. 1051A). E allora è lantropo
il dio degli stoici, quel dio che Cleante cantava come il più nobile degli dei
immortali, ma che "ha reso in unità il bene e il male, aermando un unico
Logos eterno per tutte le cose"? Quel dio che invece "secondo Platone (…) ha
posto se stesso come paradigma di tutte le cose belle e concede la virtù umana
che è in certo senso assimilazione a sé, coloro che sono capaci di seguirlo" (s er.
num. vind. 550D); quel dio che è "puro ed eterno pensiero, anzi "pensiero di
pensiero" <e che con> la forza del suo pensiero genera e governa e denisce
tutti i moti dell'universo e i fenomeni, qui sulla terra e lassù nei cieli. Il dio
dei loso è autómatos: si muove da sé e muove tutto il resto"15 , ma perché
tutto tenda verso il Bene. "Oltre che nel proprio intimo l'uomo trova il bene
nel logos universale, nella comunità degli esseri razionali, senza la quale egli
non può esistere né manifestarsi sul piano morale conformemente alla propria
essenza"16 . Il bene – canta Cleante (Clem. Al., Protr. VI 72, p. 61 P. = SVF I 557,
p. 126 = p. 247 Radice) – "consiste in ciò che è ben disposto, secondo giustizia,
santità e pietà; / in quello che è padrone di sé, giovevole, bello, conforme al
dovere, / austero, schietto e sempre propizio; / in quello che è senza paura,
che non ha né causa dolore, anzi che reca vantaggio./ E' l'utile, il gradito, il
sicuro, l'amico, / ciò che è degno di stima e di grazia; è la coerenza,/ la gloria,
la modestia, la sollecitudine, l'amorevolezza, lo zelo (…)".
Restava comunque l'interrogativo: "si est Deus, unde malum?" E Plutarco
così si chiedeva (Plac. phil. 881 C-D): "se esiste dio, grazie alla cui prudenza e
opera le cose umane sono amministrate, perché ai mali succedono i beni e ai
beni tutte le avversità?" cercando di dare a se stesso una risposta, ipotizzando
l'esistenza – come si è detto – di una ἄνους ψυχή "perfettamente identica alla
necessità di Ti. 47e 5, 56c 5, all'apeiron di Phlb. 24a 6 sqq., al principio che
determina lo stravolgimento dell'ordine del cosmo, cioè "il desiderio connaturato"
15 C. S, 2007, p. 5 sqq. Una posizione diversa è manifestata da F. F, 1999, p. 70 sqq.,
che, in parziale dissenso con la tesi proposta da C. S, 1994, p. 146, non ritiene sucienti
e probanti le prove lologiche che attesterebbero la presenza in Platone di una "concezione delle
idee come 'pensieri di dio'" (p. 71). Un ulteriore argomento contro l'ipotesi della presenza in
Platone di un'idea ontologica di Bene come pensiero di dio è costituita, secondo Ferrari, dal
riuto all'interno del corpus della "teoria di origine aristotelica dell'autoriessività del pensiero
divino" (ibidem).
16 M. P, 1967, p. 275.
295
È il dio degli Stoici lantropo?
(σύμφυτος ἐπιθυμία ) di Plt. 272e 5 (cf. an proc. 1014E-1015A)"17. Il cosmo –
egli dice in de Is. 370F – non è mosso da un'unica anima, ma probabilmente
da più, certamente da non meno di due; di queste una è produttrice di bene,
l'altra, opposta a questa, è creatrice di eetti opposti". Agli stoici contestava di
aver fatto di una divinità benevola l'unico principio del male e di aver fatto di
Zeus un dio 'a portata di mano'. Plutarco, al contrario, riteneva che il divino,
pur intervenendo nella storia umana e nella vita della natura, appartenesse "ad
una realtà di ordine superiore, di cui nel mondo sensibile si possono cogliere
solo riessi e lampeggiamenti"18 , facendo sua la denizione di Pindaro (fr. 57
Snell-Maehler) di un dio "artista supremo", di un "dio sovrano e signore di
tutto, artece della giustizia, cui compete di misurare il tempo, il modo e la
misura della punizione di ogni singolo malvagio" (ser. num. vind. 550A).
ri f e r i m e n T i b i b l i o g r a f i c i
B , D., Plutarco e lo stoicismo (ed. it. a cura di A. B), Milano,
2003.
C, M. (ed.), Plutarco, Il tramonto degli oracoli, in Dialoghi delci, Milano,
1995.
F, F., Dio, idee e materia. La struttura del cosmo in Plutarco di Cheronea ,
Napoli, 1995.
_____"Πρόνοια platónica e νόησις aristotelica: Plutarco e l'impossibilità di una
sintesi", in A. P J . (ed.), Plutarco, Platón y Aristóteles ,
Actas del V Congreso Internacional de la I.P.S., (Madrid-Cuenca, 4-7
de Mayo, 1999), Madrid, 1999, pp. 63-77.
L, N., (ed.), L. Annaei Senecae, Dialogorum liber I De providentia ,
Firenze, 2008.
P, M., La Stoa . Storia di un movimento spirituale, I-II (tr. it. di O. De
Gregorio, introd. di V. E. A, note di B. P), Firenze, 1967
[testo originale: Die Stoa. Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung, I-II, con
aggiornamento di H. Dörrie, Göttingen, 19643 (1948-1949)].
S, C., Plutarchs Interpretation der Ideenlehre Platons, Münster-
Hamburg, 1994.
S, C., "Il dio dei loso", Il pensiero. Rivista di losoa, XLVI n. 1 (2007) 5-11.
T , L., "Linguaggio del reale e linguaggio dell'immaginario nel De sera
numinis vindicta", in G. D'I I. G (ed.), Strutture formali
dei Moralia di Plutarco. Atti del III Convegno plutarcheo (Palermo, 3-5
Maggio, 1989), Napoli, 1991, pp. 91-120.
17 F. F, 1995, p.75 sqq.
18 L. T, 1991, p. 103.
297
Harvesting the fruits of virtue: philia , eros and arete in Plutarch
ha r v e s T i n g T h e f r u i T s o f v i r T u e : p H i l i a , e r o S a n d a r e T e i n
pl u T a r c h
T B
University of Nottingham
Abstract
is essay examines Plutarch's manipulation of epithalamial imagery in the Amatorius in
conjunction with the motif of the discourse on love from Plato's Symposium. In particular, it
explores how the topos of "fruit", traditionally representing fertility in wedding poetry, is separated
from human reproduction by pederastic discourse and instead held to represent "virtue", the
fruit of philosophical friendship between men. Women are associated with an inferior "ower",
incapable of friendship or virtue. Yet Plutarch combines and develops these images to produce a
philosophy on love that is at once relevant to marriage and to philosophic discourse.
If Sappho was proud enough of her songs to write to a
rich lady,
"When you are dead, there you shall lie, and there will be
no memory of you, who have no share, in roses that the
Muses bear,"
will you not be able to have proud and splendid thoughts
of yourself, if you have a share not in the roses, but actually
in the fruit the Muses bear, and which they have lavished
upon those who admire education and philosophy?1
us writes Plutarch to Eurydice in the conclusion to the Coniugalia
Praecepta. At rst glance, this image seems only natural in the context of
a marriage – the occasion for this text. e topos of fruit and owers is a
commonplace in nuptial literature, dating back at least to Sappho's epithalamia.
It betokens sexuality and fecundity, and can be used as a metaphor for the loss
of the bride's virginity, as in frr. 105(a) and (b) V2 .
In Plutarch, it serves to bring full-circle his ring-composition in the
Coniugalia Praecepta3 : the epithalamial motif connects with the participle
συνυμεναιοῦντα, "join the wedding song", in 138B. e Muses, popular gures
in the wedding songs of Sappho4 , in Plutarch's introduction lay the foundations
for the παιδεία καὶ φιλοσοφία mentioned here, "ensuring the tunefulness of
marriage through discourse (λόγου) and harmony and philosophy" (138C).
Finally, the "plucking" of virginity implied in the rst two precepts (the bride
should eat a quince, μήλου κυδωνίου, on the wedding night, so that the rst
χάρις of her mouth and voice should be sweet; in Boeotia the bride is crowned
1 Con. Praec. 145F-146A.
2 See R. H, 1983; R. D. G, 1989; E. C-T, 1990, esp. pp. 95-7;
T. B, 2008, pp. 15-27.
3 For ring-composition in the Con. Praec. and the Amat., see further L. G, 1962, p.
46. 4 E.g. fr . 103.8 V.
with asparagus because the sweetest fruit, ἥδιστον καρπὸν, comes from the
sharpest thorns; husbands who cannot put up with the bride's early quarrels
are like those who leave a bunch of grapes, σταφυλὴν, to others because the
rst one they plucked was tart, 138D-E) is transmuted to a positive image of
marital "harvest" or "bounty" in the last, suggesting a successful integration of
the bride into marriage, which is the long-term aim of this treatise.
ough Plutarch makes extensive use of the imagery of the Sapphic
epithalamium, however, he seems to reject Sappho's programme in his nal
remarks to Eurydice. e fruits of the Muses are represented as superior to
their owers; his project must in some way trump that of Sappho: how can
we reconcile this simultaneous integration and rejection of the poetess? In the
rest of this paper, I will argue that Plutarch's use of this epithalamial image is
complex and distinctive. His Muses are not just those of music and marriage,
but also of philosophy. In the Coniugalia Praecepta, he lays the foundations for
the development of that philosophy in the Amatorius. is is a very dierent
text, a debate about love more generally rather than precepts for a marriage,
but the use of certain themes and imagery from the Coniugalia Praecepta
suggests that our understanding of the latter text may be enhanced by the
former. Here Plutarch adapts Platonic motifs, especially the dialogue on love
from the Symposium, to another encomium of married love. In doing so, he
expounds a theory of ἔρως that is at once located in the marriage relationship
and at the same time, an appropriate subject for philosophic discourse.
To make sense of this motif, we must examine more closely his quotation
of Sappho. e rich woman with no share in the "roses of Pieria" is one with no
talent for poetry. But more than this, because of her lack, she will be forgotten,
οὐδέ τις μναμοσύνα, after her death. is implies that, unlike Sappho, she
will have no share in the immortal κλέος which results from poetry. e
owers of the Muses, then, represent poetic immortality (as may be evidenced
in the collections of anthologia, or the description of Sappho's poems as her
"immortal daughters")5 . What then, of their fruits? Perhaps they, too, represent
immortality – but of a superior kind. As well as love and marriage, Plutarch
develops the connection between καρπός and ἀθανασία in the Amatorius.
As in the Coniugalia Praecepta, marriage forms the occasion for this work
– in the immediate context, that of Bacchon and Ismenodora, which prompts
the dispute about love, but in the wider narrative frame, that of Plutarch and
his own wife, which occasions his presence in espiae for that dispute. e
festival-goers divide into two camps: those who abjure the love of women,
including Bacchon's ἐραστής Pisias and his friend Protogenes; and those who
embrace such love, including Plutarch, who referees the debate, Anthemion, the
youth's older cousin, who is in favour of the match, and Daphnaeus, Protogenes'
dialectical opponent. While the setting is overshadowed by nuptial elements,
aspects of the homerotic dialogue on love from Plato's Symposium intrude: the
περὶ Ἔρωτος λόγους (748F) which Flavianus commands Autoboulus to relate
5 AP 7.407, also 7.14, 17.
299
Harvesting the fruits of virtue: philia , eros and arete in Plutarch
recall the περὶ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν λόγων demanded of Apollodorus after Agathon's
συνδείπνον (172b). Additional parallels to the Ilissus of Plato's Phaedrus have
been noted on many occasions6 , and this text, particularly through Plutarch's
allusion to the ascent of the soul, may even be a more important paradigm for
the Amatorius 7 . ese allusions are in turn played o against the role of λόγος
in the opening of the Coniugalia Praecepta 8 . A tension is created between the
marital and the philosophical9 .
As Frazier has noted, the dialogue is divided into three parts, each
representing a progression of thought towards Plutarch's eschatological, marital
ἔρως10 . In the rst part of the discourse, Protogenes, a lover of boys, exploits
the abovementioned tension and attempts to dissociate καρπός from a nuptial
context. Denying that love or φιλία has any connection with women, he takes a
position familiar from the Symposium: "Love, in fact, it is that attaches himself
to a young and talented soul and through friendship brings it to a state of
virtue" (εἰς ἀρετὴν διὰ φιλίας τελευτᾷ, 750D)11 . Ἐπιθυμία, desire for women,
is connected with the owers identied as inferior in the Coniugalia Praecepta:
ὥρας καὶ σώματος12 . True love wants only to harvest the fruit: "Love, if he loses
the hope of inspiring friendship, has no wish to remain cultivating a decient
plant which has come to its prime (ὥρᾳ), if the plant cannot yield the proper
fruit of character (καρπὸν ἤθους) to produce friendship and virtue" (750E). On
this model, the epithalamial image is divided, though in a dierent way to the
Coniugalia Praecepta: owers are associated with corporeal bloom, the female,
and inferior desire; fruit with the soul and character, the male, and superior
love. Only the latter is part of a relationship of φιλία, which leads to ἀρετή .
6 Plu. Amat. 749A, cf. Pl. Phdr. 229a-b. H. M. M J., 1984, p. 86; A. B, 1999,
p. 205; J. M. R, 2001, p. 559.
7 J. M. R, 2001, p. 558; F. F, 2005/6, p. 64.
8 See also V. W , 1997, p. 170, on the union of Hermes and Aphrodite – or λόγος and
ἔρως – in 138C-D.
9 I am grateful to F. Brenk for drawing my attention to this tension following the delivery
of this paper at the 8th IPS Congress. It arises not so much from the pederasts' subversion of
an epithalamial motif – indeed, καρπός had also been associated with the mental as well as the
physical at least since Pindar (O. 7.8, P. 2.74, N. 10.2) – but from the competing claims on this
image of both homosexual and heterosexual philosophy and education.
10 F. F, 2008, pp. IX-XII: the rst discussion starts from the question of whether
Bacchon should marry Ismenodora, and progresses through Plutarch's 'central intervention' on
the divinity and benets of Eros, to his apology and encomium of conjugal love in answer to
Zeuxippus.
11 While all Plato's dinner-guests accept pederasty as a higher form of love, Pausanias
separates ἔρως into "Common" (love for women, the body, and the unintelligent) and "Heavenly"
(love for intelligent boys), 180c-185c. To him, the granting of sexual favours (χαρίζεσθαι, 185b)
should only be done for the sake of virtue. By the time of Plutarch's writing, the distinction
between the two loves is a rhetorical commonplace (cf. Luc., Amores 37, F. F, 2005/6, p.
80) and the impulse of pederasty towards virtue is typical of Stoic thought: SVF III 716-717.
12 Ὥρα is often used metaphorically for the "spring-time" or "bloom" of youth, associated
with physical beauty: Mimn. 3.1, LSJ s.v. ὥρα. It is specically associated by Plutarch with
ἄνθος at Alc . 4.1. Cf. also S. G, 1995, p. 174.
Protogenes claims a "philosophical" function for pederasty (751A), based on
women's incapacity for virtue13 . is attitude is common for the period – the
Stoic philosophers in particular held love to be θήρα...ἀτελοῦς μεν εὐφοῦς δὲ
μειρακίου πρὸς ἀρετήν14 . But by insisting on such pedagogical pederasty and
aligning himself with the Stoics, he somewhat forsakes his claim to "Platonic"
capital – for this philosopher presented female capacity for virtue as equal to
that of men15 .
On the other side of the debate, Daphnaeus argues that Protogenes'
"harvest" is merely the forbidden fruit of pederasty: either it must be gathered
furtively, γλυκεῖ' ὀπώρα φύλακος ἐκλελοιπότος, which means it has nothing
to do with philosophical ἔρως, or, if there is to be no sexual intercourse in it,
it is Eros without Aphrodite – an oxymoron (752A). Moreover, it denies the
legitimate use of any naturalistic imagery: it is a union contrary to nature, παρὰ
φύσιν (751C). If the harvest is taken by force, it involves βία and λεηλασία;
if it happens by consent, it is weak and eeminate – there is no manly virtue
involved at all (751E)16 , and being without virtue, it is thus without fruit
(ἄκαρπον , 752B). Χάρις, the yielding of woman to man (another epithalamial
motif: χάριεν, Sappho fr. 112.3 V), is instead held to be the beginning of
φιλία (751E-F).
e tension is exacerbated, but not irreconcilably – for though Daphnaeus
rejects the pederastic καρπός and reclaims φιλία for the female sex, he himself
does not specify the "fruit" of such a "natural" union. As Martin notes, "he
never goes so far as to actually claim that women are capable of ἀρετή " 17 , but
as Plutarch continues to develop his thought throughout the dialogue, he will
attempt to resolve the tension between the epithalamial and the philosophical18
(indeed, this part of the dialogue has been identied as "pre-philosophical" –
it is more rhetorical, and the true philosophical debate has not yet begun)19 .
Plutarch's encomium of Eros begins on the side of married love. e traditional
"fruit" of a marital union – children – are eulogised, and Ismenodora's capacity
for procreation is stressed (754C). In the next part of the dialogue, Aphrodite
is called εὔκαρπον, as she is in the Coniugalia Praecepta (756E), suggesting
13 H. M. M J., 1984, p. 83; M. B. C, 1999, p. 291; J. M. R, 2001, p. 559.
14 De Comm. Not. 1073B. Marriage and family life were regarded by Stoics as the duty of the
sage to the state, and thus a dierent sphere: SVF I 270, cf. D. B, 1963, pp. 57, 60-61.
15 Pl. Men. 72a-73c, R. 451d-e, 455d-e, Lg. 804e-806c, 829c, but cf. Ti . 90e-91a, R. 605d-e,
Lg. 781a-b. "Socrates" also maintained the equality of male and female virtue in other texts: X.,
Smp. 2.9, D. L. 6.12, contra Arist. Pol. 1260a21. See also A. G. N, 1997, pp. 29-30.
16 M. F, 1986, p. 201; M. B. C, 1999, p. 293. S. S in S. B. P
(ed.), 1999, p. 89, locates this change from classical ideology in the need for perpetuation
of Hellenic identity (through reproduction) of Greek elites at the beginning of the Second
Sophistic, but contra C. P, 1999, p. 129.
17 H. M. M J., 1984, p. 83.
18 Plutarch briey resumes the question of women's virtue in 754A (Πλοῦτον δὲ γυναικὸς
αἱρεῖσθαι μὲν πρὸ ἀρετῆς ἢ γένους ἀφιλότιμον καὶ ἀνελεύθερον...) and, in suggesting in the
last part of the dialogue that Eros is the source of all virtue (757F , esp. 761E), foregrounds its
applicability to women.
19 J. M. R, 2001, 561.
301
Harvesting the fruits of virtue: philia , eros and arete in Plutarch
the traditional function of sexuality in such a relationship. Eros must also
be present for this relationship to produce φιλία, but this is not necessarily
problematic – the god is traditionally her follower, though Plutarch here
reverses their relationship20 . Indeed, he seems to be the deity who presides
when men ποθοῦσι δὲ γάμου καὶ φιλότητος (757D).
Yet the metaphor of erotic cultivation is more often used as a model
for the education of the young through pederasty, and, even when Plutarch
supposedly applies it to marital ἔρως, even he cannot overcome his Platonic
paradigm to develop the image beyond the education of boys: though divine
love is the guide and helper of marriage, he operates, as Russell states, via
the traditional analogies of boy-love: hunting the "fairest prey" (κάλλιστον
θήραμα), and shaping boys and youths "in the ripening and owering season"
(ὥρᾳ καὶ ἄνθει , 758E). Indeed, Eros is the god "whose care it is that a man
grows straight in the direction of virtue with no deviation or crushing of the
main stem of excellence" (757F-758A)21 . e tension remains, but Plutarch
does align the image of youth's ower, ὥρα, with both the body and the soul
(ὥραν καὶ κάλλος ἅμα σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς, 757E), thus mitigating Protogenes'
strict dichotomy of ower/body/female vs. fruit/soul/male.
e result of this alignment is itself expressed in terms of natural fertility, but
this goes beyond the wedding song. Eros is αὐγὴ δὲ καὶ θερμότης γλυκεῖα καὶ
γόνιμος (764B), a physician, saviour, and guide (indeed, the most philanthropic
of gods, 758A) who directs the soul to the Plain of Truth (764F-65A)22 . e
aid to memory which allows the lover to apprehend the true Beauty which
resides on this plain is to be found in pederasty: ἔν τε σχήμασι καὶ χρώμασι
καὶ εἴδεσι νέων ὥρᾳ στίλβοντα (765B)23 . e warmth generated in the true
lover by such a memory produces "sap", just as in a growing plant (φυτῷ
βλαστάνοντι) which allows the development of εὐπειθείας καὶ φιλοφροσύνης
(765C). Eros, in this model, is again the cultivator of the human "plant", which
leads to φιλία.
While Plutarch's exposition is linguistically pederastic, he is keen to
reclaim this image for marriage in the third part of the dialogue, claiming
that the εἴδωλα of both boys and women can enter the body of the lover and
produce "seed", as long as ἦθος combines with ὥρα (766E-F). He goes further
20 Cf. Hes. . 201-2; compare Amat. 759E-F; F. F, 2005/6, p. 97, 2008, p. XXVII.
21 D. A. R, 1997, pp. 102-3: "ese two analogies are traditional. e lover and the
sophist are "hunters" of the young in Plato and Xenophon [e.g. Pl., Sph. 221-2, 231D, Lg. 831B,
X., Cyn. 13.9]; the analogy between education and growing plants is also conventional and
obvious; and the association between paederasty and education is Platonic".
22 Here Plutarch departs most obviously from the conversation of Plato's Symposium to
that of the Phaedrus : τὸ ἀληθείας πεδίον (248b). e motif of ascent of the soul is, however,
also present in Socrates' dialogue with Diotima (Symp. 211b-c), demonstrating Plutarch's
manipulation of a number of Platonic theories. See H. M. M J., 1984, p. 85; J. M. R,
2001, p. 558. J. O, 2004, p. 137, however, argues against scholarly opinion, especially that
of Cherniss, that Plutarch is "a Platonic interpreter manipulating the texts so as to make them
suit his own interests". Instead, he suggests that Plutarch was searching for doctrinal consistency
across dialogues (p. 155), which explains his mixing of theories.
23 See J. M. R, 2001, p. 572.
than Daphnaeus in reclaiming the physical "ower" for a positive usage: to
him, women are capable of virtue, and this is inseparable from beauty. "To be
sure they say that beauty is 'the ower of virtue' (ὥραν "ἄνθος ἀρετῆς" εἶναι );
yet it would be absurd to deny that the female produces that ower or gives a
"presentation" of a 'natural bent for virtue'" (767B)24 . A woman's ower is not
just in her body, but, in the case of a "good" woman, also in her ἤθος – the
character whose fruit, Protogenes insisted, produces φιλία and ἀρετή in boys
and men25 .
Such encomium of female beauty, in the case of nuptial literature, may
inspire the ἔρως which allows the groom to consummate the marriage26 , and
Plutarch applies a novel twist to this traditional topos: consummation is itself
the beginning of φιλία (769A), which is absent from "philosophical", pederastic
sex (768B)27 . We see a progression from the beauty of a good woman, the
"ower of virtue", to ἔρως, leading to physical union, which inspires φιλία and
the cultivation of the "fruit of virtue", ἀρετή, which in turn leads to beauty
(769B-D). Such a progression forms a never-ending cycle, in which fruit
follows ower, which in turn fertilises the human plant so that the ower
may bloom again. Neither seems to represent a "superior" metaphor, as they
continually supersede one another. e harvest of virginity and the harvest of
virtue are equated, though what is intended here is not the singular "reaping"
of the bride on the wedding night, but a long-term "cultivation", a lifetime's
progression or renewal (ἀνανεοῦνται) of φιλία ( φιλοφροσύνῃ, 769A)28 .
e idea of "progression" leads us back to the beginning of this paper: the
concept of the ower of immortality. For it is the bloom of youth, ὥρα, by which
"Love gently excites our memory"; reminding us of the true and intelligible
Beauty that lies behind bodily forms (765B). e lover tests the beloved to
discover if they, too, can perceive this ideal Beauty, and if so, a communion of
ἔρως and φιλία results, which refracts the memory of the lover to the Beauty
of the other world29 . e physical ὥρα "iname[s] his spirit" in this life (766B),
24 is is itself a Stoic expression, εἶναι δὲ καὶ τὴν ὥραν ἄνθος ἀρετῆς, SVF III 718A, and
shows Plutarch developing the contemporary theories put forward by Protogenes as well as
those of Daphnaeus earlier in the dialogue. See also G. N, 1997, p. 84, on also Mul.
Virt. 242F.
25 M. F, 1986, p. 161 argues that female possession of equal virtue is a Stoic
innovation; cf. S. G, 1995, p. 157: "[Plutarch], like Musonius, appears to allow a woman
in the name of shared virtue to demonstrate the qualities of a man: to andreion".
26 E.g. Men. Rh. 407.12-14.
27 Not only does Plato reject the physical consummation of love (e.g. Symp. 211b), but
consummation with the female leading to philosophic φιλία is a Plutarchian innovation. See
M. B. C, 1999, p. 295; R. H, 1999, p. 117. In this way, Plutarch reconceptualises,
rather than remaining utterly faithful to, Plato; J. M. R, 2001, p. 559: he "oers a 'Platonic'
evaluation of the human experiences available to most of us, nit just to the self-conscious
followers of Diotima of the Symposium or to the philosophical lovers and kings of the Republic";
F. F, 2005/6, p. 64, 2008, p. XV.
28 A. G. N, 1997, p. 45 on the "general application" of the Solonian legislation on
frequency of sex (Sol. 20.4) in this context.
29 Amat. 765D: ὅπου δ' ἂν ἔχωσιν ἴχνος τι τοῦ θείου καὶ ἀπορρoὴν καὶ ὁμοιότητα
303
Harvesting the fruits of virtue: philia , eros and arete in Plutarch
but it is in the next that he progresses upwards and reaps the true benet:
"e true lover, when he has reached the other world and consorted with true
beauty in the holy way, grows wings and joins in the continual celebration of
his god's mysteries" (766C). e τέλος generally assumed for marriage has
taken on an eschatological form, appropriate to the ἔργον ἱερώτερον (758B)
of the marriage-deity30 .
is is an intriguing development of both the Platonic and the epithalamial,
and may oer some resolution to the tension between them. Daphnaeus had
argued that marriage makes mankind immortal through reproduction in this
life (752A; we see the same formulation in Symp. 208); in the ascent of the
soul, we may think that Plutarch intends a Platonic progression and contrast
between the immortality granted by corporeal ospring and those which
result from "spiritual" pregnancy: τεκόντι δὲ ἀρετὴν ἀληθῆ ( Symp. 212a), or
assume, as does Wohl, that "philosophy becomes the child of this union"31 . But
Plutarch goes further than both these ideas and that of poetic immortality, to
suggest that true love, whose locus is marriage, oers immortality in the afterlife
(μετὰ τὴν τελευτήν, 766B). e begetting of life is mentioned, certainly (769E,
770A), but it is after death that his philosophical lovers are expected to "reap"
the "harvest" of their philosophy. As in the Coniugalia Praecepta, the "ower"
and "fruit" of the epithalamium function as a metaphor for immortality, but
with a distinct dierence. In the earlier text, owers had represented poetic
immortality and fruit a superior, spiritual one, gained by the young wife
through philosophical intimacy with her husband32 . In the Amatorius, Plutarch
uses and develops this imagery in a dierent way.
In the Coniugalia Praecepta, Plutarch implied that the "fruits of the Muses"
were superior to their owers. e theory of pederasty represents this fruit as
virtue, the ethical product of a human plant cultivated by Eros. Taking its cue
from the contrast between "Heavenly" and "Common" love in the Symposium 33 ,
"virtuous" ἔρως for boys is contrasted with desire for women, based solely on the
physical ower of the body. But to those who support married love, this ower,
ὥρα, is connected with both body and soul – thus, in the Amatorius, Plutarch
presents a far less dichotomised schema either than that of Protogenes, and
one that is also dierent from his own conclusion in the Coniugalia Praecepta .
As in the epithalamium, beauty combines with χάρις to situate ἔρως within
an idealised marriage relationship. is is held to produce φιλία, which leads
to virtue, of which beauty is the ower. Plutarch struggles to combine the
σαίνουσαν, ὑφ' ἡδονῆς καὶ θαύματος ἐνθουσιῶντες καὶ περιέποντες, εὐπαθοῦσι τῇ μνήμῃ καὶ
ἀναλάμπουσι πρὸς ἐκεῖνο τὸ ἐράσμιον ἀληθῶς καὶ μακάριον καὶ φίλιον ἅπασι καὶ ἀγαπητόν.
30 See also 750C: ἱερωτέρα κατάζευξις.
31 V. W, 1997, p. 184. is assumption is based on the λόγων χρηστῶν σπέρματα which
will prevent a wife who shares her husband's education from κύουσι evil thoughts and feelings
(Con. Praec . 145D). Cf. Pl., Smp. 210a, in which the budding philosopher may γεννᾶν λόγους
καλούς in the body of a beautiful beloved.
32 I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer of this article for their comments on this point.
33 Cf. n. 11; M. F , 1986, p. 195.
philosophic with the epithalamial; nally he mixes and progresses beyond both
these and other Platonic elements to a philosophy of immortal love grounded
in mortal marriage. is philosophy is more developed in the Amatorius, setting
up the idea that fruit may supersede ower, only to show that both are part of
a continual cultivation of virtue within marriage. Within this philosophy, both
images form part of a progression towards immortality that is superior to that
oered by the "roses of Pieria" – not the preservation of song, but that of soul.
W o r k s c i T e d
B, D., 'Les Stoïciens et l'Amour', REG, 76 (1963) 55-63.
B, T., e Wedding Song in Greek Literature and Culture, PhD Diss.,
Nottingham, 2008.
B, A., "Le Dialogue sur l'amour de Plutarque et les Dialogues de Platon
sur l'amour", in A. P J . (eds.), Plutarco, Platón y
Aristotéles. Actas del V Congresso Internacional de la I.P.S. (Madrid-
Cuenca, 4-7 de Mayo, 1999), Madrid, 1999.
C-T, E., Hymenaios und Epithalamion: das Hochzeitslied in
der frühgriechischen Lyrik, Stuttgart, 1990.
C, M. B., "Amatorius: Plutarch's Platonic Departure from the Peri
Gamou Literature", in A. P J . (eds.) Plutarco, Platón
y Aristotéles. Actas del V Congresso Internacional de la I. P. S. (Madrid-
Cuenca, 4-7 de Mayo, 1999), Madrid, 1999, pp. 287-97.
F, M., e Care of Self: e History of Sexuality. vol. 3 (trans. R.
H), London, 1986.
F, F., "L'Érotikos: un éloge du Dieu Éros? Une relecture du dialogue de
Plutarque", Ploutarchos, 3 (2005/6), pp. 63-101.
_______ Plutarque, Érotikos: Dialogue sur l'amour, Paris, 2008.
G, S., Foucault's Virginity: Ancient Erotic Fiction and the History of
Sexuality, Cambridge, 1995.
G, L., Plutarchs Gedanken über die Ehe, Zurich, 1962.
G, R. D., "In Praise of the Bride: Sappho fr. 105(A) L-P, Voigt",
TAPhA, 119 (1989) 55-61.
H, R., "Ancient Greek Wedding Songs: e Tradition of Praise", Journal
of Folklore Research, 20 (1983) 131-43.
H, R., "Practicing What You Preach: Plutarch's Sources and Treatment",
in S. B. P (ed.), 1999, pp. 116-27.
M J., H. M., "Plutarch, Plato and Eros", CB, 60 (1984) 82-8.
305
Harvesting the fruits of virtue: philia , eros and arete in Plutarch
N, A. G., "Plutarch on Women and Marriage", WS, 110 (1997) 27-
88.
O, J., "Plutarch's De anime procreatione in Timaeo: Manipulation or
Search for Consistency?", in P. A, H. B & M. W. F.
S (eds.), Philosophy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, Latin and Arabic
Commentaries, BICS Supplement 83.1 (2004) pp.137-62.
P, C., "Plutarch's Advice to the Bride and Groom: Traditional Wisdom
through a Philosophic Lens", in S. B. P (ed.), 1999, pp. 128-
37.
P, S. B. (ed.), Plutarch's Advice to the Bride and Groom and A
Consolation to His Wife: English Translations, Commentary,
Interpretive Essays, and Bibliography, Oxford, 1999.
R, J. M., "Plutarch's Amatorius: A Commentary on Plato's eories of
Love?", CQ, 51 (2001) 557-75.
R, D. A., "Plutarch, Amatorius 13-18", in J. M. M (ed.), Plutarch
and his Intellectual World: Essays on Plutarch, London, 1997, pp. 99-112.
W, V, "Scenes from a Marriage: Love and Logos in Plutarch's Coniugalia
Praecepta", Helios, 24 (1997) 170-92.
307
Eros em Plutarco e a apologia do amor conjugal
E P
M L S B
Universidade Nova de Lisboa
Abstract
Eros is a god who had several representations. Also his power on men and gods has been
referred to by several Greek authors. Plutarch was no exception and describes him as a god with
more power than any other. Gods like Hades, Aphrodite or Ares are nothing when compared
with the god of love.
In Amatorius, Plutarch presents us another aspect concerning love, which is not usual in
Classical Antiquity: the apology of conjugal love. e feeling inspired by Eros is not exclusive
of the man and heterosexual love is also inspired by this god. Plutarch praises women's virtues,
particularly their capacities of delity, tenderness and devotion. He also refers himself to the
relationship between husband and wife, as the "integral union", that relationship where, initially
love corresponds to some eervescence, which, in time, calms down, giving place to a great
stability.
ese aspects – the way how Plutarch sees Eros and his conception of conjugal love – are those
we intend to approach in this paper.
1. Antiguidade de Eros
Eros é uma divindade bastante antiga, como é comprovado pelo seu culto,
que teve como centros mais importantes Téspias, Leuctros, Paros, Atenas,
Esparta, Élide, Creta e Samos. Comprovado por autores como Plutarco e
Pausânias, entre outros, o seu culto recua a épocas antiquíssimas, nalguns casos
desconhecidas1 . Do mesmo modo, as referências que lhe são feitas na literatura
conrmam a sua antiguidade. Se Homero o omite, atribuindo a Afrodite as
funções que posteriormente veremos dadas a este deus, já o mesmo não se pode
dizer de Hesíodo, que a ele alude na Teogonia: "Antes de tudo existiu o Caos;
em seguida a Terra de largo peito, assento sempre seguro de todos os imortais,
que possuem o cimo do nevado Olimpo e o Tártaro sombrio, no fundo da
terra de muitos caminhos; e Eros, o mais belo dos deuses imortais, aquele que
enfraquece os membros, aquele que, no peito de todos os deuses e de todos
os homens, domina o espírito e a vontade sábia"2 . Diversos poetas lhe fazem
referência ao longo do tempo, quer para estabelecer a sua genealogia, quer para
se referirem às suas funções, ou ao sofrimento que é capaz de provocar nos
outros. Nos líricos, por exemplo, aparece como divindade primordial, tal como
1 Nos casos de Téspias, Leuctros ou Paros parece evidente pelos testemunhos que este culto
recua a épocas remotas. Pausânias chega a referir que o seu culto em Paros – que não é inferior ao
de Téspias – parece ser um culto pré-jónico, hipótese que não está completamente demonstrada,
visto que se baseia nalgumas moedas da cidade da época de Adriano. Estas pretendiam reproduzir
o famoso Eros de Praxíteles, apresentando um herma no qual o deus apoiava a perna direita, mas
que não se encontra na estátua. No entanto, é possível que este herma seja um vestígio de um
culto local arcaico, proveniente de uma época em que o deus fosse representado desta forma, ou
como divindade ctónica.
2 Hesíodo, Teogonia, vv. 116-122.
308
Maria Leonor Santa Bárbara
nos poetas trágicos3. No entanto, Eros começa a surgir também associado ao
amor e a Afrodite.
Embora tradicionalmente seja considerado lho de Afrodite, nem sempre
assim foi referido pelos poetas: para Alceu (fr. 327 Loeb) ele é lho de Íris
e de Zéro4 ; Safo (cf. Schol. Teócrito 13.1-2) refere-o como lho da Terra e
de Úrano; Simónides (Poetæ Melici Græci, fr. 70) faz dele lho de Ares e de
Afrodite; Acusilau (cf. Schol. Teócrito 13.2) diz que é lho da Noite e de Éter;
Eurípides (Hipólito, vv. 530-534) apresenta-o como lho de Zeus; Sócrates,
baseando-se na narrativa de Diotima de Mantineia (Platão, Banquete, 203
cd), arma tratar-se de uma divindade intermédia, lho de Pénia e Poros; em
Apolónio de Rodes (Argonautas, III. 26) o deus é lho de Afrodite, embora
não lhe seja dado um pai. Aliás, saliente-se que esta liação, relativamente a
Afrodite, se verica principalmente a partir do século III a.C., embora já antes
o deus surja ao serviço da deusa5 .
2. Representações de Eros
Eros teve, ao longo do tempo, múltiplas representações, que já
apresentámos noutro local6 . Divindade do amor, é qualicado como ladrão e
comparado com animais como a abelha, que embora pequena provoca feridas
lancinantes. A Antologia Palatina, sobretudo nos livros V e XII, dedicados
aos epigramas amorosos, está cheia destas referências: Mosco refere-se-
lhe como escravo fugitivo de Afrodite7 , enquanto Diófanes de Mirina8 o
acusa de ser um triplo ladrão, insolente, um indivíduo que não dorme e está
sempre pronto a despojar os outros. Associada a estas representações temos a
descrição que Mosco faz dele, comparando-o com uma abelha9 . No entanto,
3 Cf. Ésquilo, Danaides, fr. 44 Nauck. Aqui o deus origina a união do Céu e da Terra. Esta,
fecundada pela chuva, produz para os homens cereais e, para os rebanhos, erva. Ver também
Sófocles, Antígona, vv. 781-800, onde Eros é um poder abstracto que governa todos os seres
vivos sobre a terra, embora aqui seja também confundido com o instinto sexual, encarnado
por Afrodite. De modo idêntico, na cosmogonia órca, Eros terá nascido do ovo primordial,
engendrado pela Noite. As duas metades deste ovo formam a Terra e o Céu.
4 Referido por Plutarco, Erótico 765 e.
5 Como é visível na taça do pintor Leandro, c. 460 a.C.
6 Primeiro, na dissertação de mestrado, intitulada Eros na Antologia Grega, apresentada
à Faculdade de Letras de Universidade de Lisboa em 1987; posteriormente na comunicação
intitulada "Grandeza e pequenez nas representações de Eros na literatura e na arte", apresentada
no IV Congresso da APEC, realizado na Universidade do Algarve, em 2004.
7 Cf. AP. IX. 440. Do mesmo modo, Sátiro (APl. 195), Mécio (APl. 198) e Crinágoras (APl.
199) aludem ao deus como ladrão de corações e prisioneiro. Anthologie Grecque (texte établi et
traduit par P. Waltz), Paris, 1931-1974 (13 vols.).
8 C f. AP. V. 309. Cf. AP. IX. 616, onde o deus é descrito como um ladrão, que rouba as roupas
das Cárites enquanto estas se banham.
9 Cf. Mosco, XIX: "Certa vez, estando Eros, armado em ladrão, a roubar cera dos cortiços,
uma abelha furiosa picou-lhe a ponta do dedo, arranhando-o. Porque estava aito, soprou a mão,
feriu a terra com golpes, saltou e, mostrando a Afrodite a sua dor, queixou-se-lhe que a abelha
era um animal pequeno, mas que fazia feridas pungentes. Então a mãe riu-se: «O quê? Não és
tu igual às abelhas? Pequeno como és, provocas feridas lancinantes.»."
309
Eros em Plutarco e a apologia do amor conjugal
também o podemos encontrar a auxiliar os outros, como pastor, lavrador e
jardineiro10 , ou associado à natureza11 .
Foi, ainda, representado sob formas diversas: apesar de o identicarmos
com uma criança travessa e alada, esta guração só surge no séc. III a.C. Antes
disso, ele é um jovem que acompanha o cortejo de Afrodite e é como jovem
que está no friso do Pártenon.
3. Poder de Eros
Tal como sucede com a sua genealogia e as representações, também o
poder que esta divindade exerce sobre homens e deuses é referido em inúmeros
autores. A passagem de Hesíodo acima referida testemunha esta ideia: anal, o
poeta já alude ao deus como uma entidade que domina os outros, embora aqui
o seu poder seja gerador. Muitos poetas o farão também, designadamente os
autores dos epigramas apresentados na secção anterior.
Plutarco não foi excepção, descrevendo-o como uma divindade com um
poder superior ao de qualquer outra. Hades, Afrodite ou Ares nada são ao pé
do deus do amor. Sem o auxílio de Eros, Afrodite é incapaz de inspirar um
sentimento profundo, mas somente uma relação carnal. É Eros que faz surgir
a afeição. Diz Plutarco12 que, sem Eros, o trabalho de Afrodite é algo que se
vende por uma dracma. Daí que ninguém corra qualquer risco por ele, se não
estiver apaixonado (μὴ ἐρῶν). Afrodite é o prazer físico, enquanto Eros é o
amor e o desejo, ideia reforçada pela seguinte armação: "Por isso, o prazer de
Afrodite é frágil e inconstante, se não for inspirado por Eros."13
Além disso, embora haja homens capazes de partilhar com outros as suas
amantes e, até, as suas mulheres14 , nenhum amante (ἐραστής) faria o mesmo
com o seu amado (ἐρόμενος), nem que fosse em troca das honras de Zeus.
Hades, por seu turno, cedeu ao impulso de Eros, como se vê pelo exemplo
de Orfeu15 . Quanto a Ares, o que pode o seu valor guerreiro perante a força do
10 Cf., respectivamente, AP. VII. 703, de Mirino, APl. 200, de Mosco, e APl. 202.
11 A este respeito rera-se a relação de Eros com os jardins, dormindo junto das rosas (APl.
338, de Juliano), ou à sombra dos plátanos (AP. IX. 627, de Mariano o Escoliasta); ou a sua
relação com os animais (em AP. IX. 221, Marco Argentário descreve-o conduzindo um leão pela
mão, enquanto Páladas – APl. 207 – no-lo apresenta com um golnho numa das mãos.
12 Cf. Plutarco, Erótico 759 e.
13 Plutarco, Erótico 759 f: Οὕτως ἀσθενἡς καὶ ἁψίκορός ἐστιν ἡ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης χάρις Ἔρως
μὴ ἐπιπνεύσαντος. Plutarque, Œuvres Morales. X : Dialogue sur l'Amour (texte établi et traduit
par R. Flacelière), Paris, 1980.
14 Cf. Plutarco, Erótico 759 f-760 b, onde encontramos as histórias de Gaba e de Faúlo. O
primeiro ngia dormir para que Mecenas pudesse desfrutar da sua mulher, enquanto o segundo
vestiu a mulher de homem para que ela se pudesse encontrar com Filipe V, sem que o seu inimigo
Nicóstrato se apercebesse do facto. Ambos pretendiam com isso obter algum benefício.
15 Cf. Plutarco, Erótico 761 e-f, que nos apresenta, para além desta conhecido história,
alguns exemplos bem conhecidos na literatura grega: Alceste, mulher cujo amor pelo marido
foi suciente para que Hades permitisse que Héracles a levasse de volta a Admeto; Protesilau,
recém-casado com Laodamia quando partiu para Tróia, morto por Heitor ao desembarcar.
Hades autorizou-o a regressar do seu reino para se despedir da mulher, a quem ele dá o conselho
de se suicidar para se juntar a ele (a este respeito, veja-se Luciano, Diálogo dos Mortos, 23).
310
Maria Leonor Santa Bárbara
Amor? Isto mesmo é comprovado pelo exemplo de Cleómaco, que auxiliou os
habitantes de Cálcis na sua luta contra os de Erétria16 . O seu valor guerreiro em
combate foi tanto maior, quanto sabia que o seu jovem amado estava a assistir
ao combate, lutando com ardor e assim desbaratando o inimigo. A sua história
apresenta Eros como incentivo do espírito guerreiro entre indivíduos que se
amam. 761 b é uma alusão explícita a Tebas e ao seu contingente especial,
constituído por erastas e erómenos, que assim se incentivavam mutuamente
ao combate.
4. Eros e o amor conjugal
Plutarco apresenta-nos, no Erótico, um outro aspecto relativo ao amor,
pouco comum na Antiguidade: a apologia do amor conjugal. Convém, contudo,
não esquecer que esta apologia é feita num contexto em que se discute qual o
verdadeiro amor, no sentido de superior, melhor, mais puro: o dos jovens ou
o conjugal? Frequentemente é o amor pelos jovens – associado a Eros – que
é considerado superior, enquanto a relação com uma mulher é considerada
simplesmente física, desprovida de um verdadeiro sentimento de afecto e
amizade e, como tal, associada a Afrodite. O objectivo de Plutarco é demonstrar
que o sentimento inspirado por Eros não se limita ao sexo masculino, sendo o
amor heterossexual inspirado também por este deus. Para isso, ele demonstra
a antiguidade e a importância do deus, chamando a atenção para todos os seus
benefícios, entre os quais o afecto sincero é um dos mais importantes.
Simultaneamente, como que "reabilita" a mulher e as relações heterossexuais:
em 753 f-754 a, defende que, se algumas mulheres se aproveitaram de certos
homens, isso deveu-se mais à fraqueza deles do que a defeito delas. As relações
de homens pobres e apagados com mulheres ricas provam precisamente o
contrário – eles conservaram a sua dignidade e foram respeitados por elas,
exercendo sobre elas uma autoridade misturada com afecto, armação que se
aproxima da célebre Epístola de S. Paulo aos Coríntios.
Recordando Platão17 , Plutarco arma que Eros preside ao ἐνθουσιασμός
(impulso vindo do exterior por acção de um poder superior, que altera a
compreensão e a razão humanas e que é produzido pelo facto de entrarmos
em comunicação, ou em participação, com um deus). Há vários tipos de
ἐνθουσιασμός (profético, báquico, poético e musical), mas nenhum tão forte,
tão duradouro, como o do Amor18 .
Eros é uma divindade que proporciona grandes benefícios aos homens,
tanto aos amados, como aos que amam. A estes, concede o Amor coragem,
alegria, generosidade, liberalidade19 . Concede também a capacidade de ver para
lá da aparência: aquele que ama vê no objecto do seu amor qualidades de que
os outros não se apercebem.
16 Cf. Plutarco, Erótico 760 e-761 a.
17 Cf. Plutarco, Erótico 758 d-e.
18 Cf. Plutarco, Erótico 758 e-759 b.
19 Cf. Plutarco, Erótico 762 b ss..
311
Eros em Plutarco e a apologia do amor conjugal
Além disso, o seu poder é tal que se sobrepõe a todos, gerando uma união
que tende para o divino e para o que há no mundo de mais belo20 .
Recuperando lendas egípcias que, a par do Amor vulgar e do celeste,
ainda admitem a existência de um terceiro Amor – o sol21 –, Plutarco realça
a importância do deus por comparação com Afrodite: o sol é um calor doce e
fecundante que alimenta os corpos, dando-lhes luz e crescimento. Tal como o
sol, ao surgir por detrás das nuvens, é mais ardente, também a reconciliação dos
apaixonados, após uma discussão, é mais viva e agradável.
Mas isto não é suciente. Plutarco retoma a doutrina dos átomos, de
Demócrito e de Epicuro: se pequenos corpos, formados à imagem do objecto
amado, saem dele, penetram no corpo do amante e estimulam a massa dos seus
átomos, pondo-os em movimento e produzindo esperma, não será possível que
estes mesmos pequenos corpos possam emanar da mulher22 ? Além disso, não
possuirão as mulheres virtude (ἀρετή ) 23 ?
Plutarco exalta a virtude das mulheres, especialmente as suas capacidades
de delidade, ternura e dedicação. São estes sentimentos mútuos que são
necessários no casamento24 e que preservam a relação e a delidade dos esposos,
a lealdade. Cama e Empona são excelentes exemplos desta delidade25 : a
primeira envenenou o assassino do marido e suicidou-se no mesmo momento,
na esperança de se reencontrar com o marido; a segunda foi capaz de preservar
uma imagem de viúva, enquanto mantinha secretamente a relação com o
marido, que todos julgavam morto. Chegou mesmo a levá-lo, disfarçado, para
Roma, na esperança de obter para ele o perdão do imperador, acabando por ser
mandada matar por este.
A relação física com uma mulher é fonte de amizade, de partilha em
comum26 . Se a duração do prazer é curta, já o sentimento que se desenvolve a
partir daí é duradouro – afecto, amizade, conança. São estes sentimentos que
fazem com que a relação entre cônjuges seja "a união integral", aquela relação
em que o amor gera incialmente efervescência, que com o tempo se acalma,
dando lugar a grande estabilidade. Com efeito, é a solidez desta relação que
permite a armação de Plutarco: "Pois no casamento, amar é um bem maior
do que ser amado."27 .
bi b l i o g r a f i a c i T a d a
B, F., Eros Adolescent. La pédérastie dans la Grèce antique, Paris, 1980.
20 Cf. Plutarco, Erótico 763 f.
21 Cf. Plutarco, Erótico 764 b ss..
22 Cf. Plutarco, Erótico 766 e.
23 Cf. Plutarco, Erótico 767 b.
24 Cf. Plutarco, Erótico 767 e.
25 Cf. Plutarco, Erótico, 768 b-d e 770 d-771c, respectivamente.
26 Cf. Plutarco, Erótico 769.
27 Plutarco, Erótico 769 d: Τὸ γὰρ ἐρᾶν ἐν γάμῳ τοῦ ἐρᾶσθαι μεῖζον ἀγαθόν ἐστιν.
312
Maria Leonor Santa Bárbara
F, R., "Les Épicuriens et l'amour", REG, 67 (1954) 69-81.
_____ L'Amour en Grèce, Paris, 1971.
S B, M.ª L., Eros na Antologia Grega. Dissertação de mestrado
em Literatura Grega apresentada à Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa,
1987.
T, B. S., Eros. e myth of ancient Greek sexuality, Boulder/Oxford,
1997.
313
Krasis oinou diken. Amore coniugale e linguaggio del simposio nell'Amatorius di Plutarco.
kr a S i S o i n o u D i k e n . am o r e c o n i u g a l e e l i n g u a g g i o d e l
s i m p o s i o n e l l 'am a T o r i u S d i p l u T a r c o
R S
Università di Salerno
Abstract
e κρᾶσις metaphor of water and wine in a mixture of balanced proportion aimed at ensuring
a correct assumption of the drink, respectful of the rules of the convivium, is taken by Plutarch
from the world of the symposium and repeatedly applied in his Amatorius to the love between
husband and wife as a deep connection between their souls. us, the author expresses a concept
of eros coherent with the most genuine Hellenic cultural tradition: this way, eros is the projection
on a familiar basis of the φιλία that society should rely on, even in politics, according to Plato's
point of view. Moreover, the vision of eros, as it emerges from the analyses conducted, seems to
respect the Aristotelian ethical principle of τὸ μέτριον.
Un'analisi del lessico e della complessa trama metaforica che
caratterizza l'Introduzione al IV libro delle Quaestiones convivales (659E-
660A) permette di sviluppare qualche riessione di ordine più generale
sul valore assunto nell'immaginario plutarcheo dal simposio e dalle sue
regole come modello di riferimento per altri ambiti della realtà umana,
anche privati, quale potrebbe essere il rapporto coniugale; a questo scopo
di notevole interesse può risultare la lettura comparata di alcuni passi tratti
dall'Amatorius , dai Coniugalia praecepta e dal Septem sapientium convivium.
Plutarco1 sostiene nell'Introduzione che scopo del simposio, come della
1 Ὦ Σόσσιε Σενεκίων, τοῦ Πολυβίου Σκηπίωνι παραινοῦντος Ἀφρικανῷ μὴ πρότερον ἐξ
ἀγορᾶς ἀπελθεῖν ἢ φίλον τινὰ ποιήσασθαι τῶν πολιτῶν, φίλον δεῖ μὴ πικρῶς μηδὲ σοφιστικῶς
ἀκούειν ἐκεῖνον τὸν ἀμετάπτωτον καὶ βέβαιον, ἀλλὰ κοινῶς τὸν εὔνουν· [...] Φιλία γὰρ ἐν
χρόνῳ πολλῷ καὶ δι' ἀρετῆς ἁλώσιμον· εὔνοια δὲ καὶ χρείᾳ καὶ ὁμιλίᾳ καὶ παιδιᾷ πολιτικῶν
ἀνδρῶν ἐπάγεται, καιρὸν λαβοῦσα πειθοῦς φιλανθρώπου καὶ χάριτος συνεργόν. Ἀλλ' ὅρα τὸ
τῆς παραινέσεως, εἰ μὴ μόνον ἔχει δεξιῶς πρὸς ἀγορὰν ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς συμπόσιον· ὥστε δεῖν
μὴ πρότερον ἀναλύειν ἢ κτήσασθαί τινα τῶν συγκατακειμένων καὶ παρόντων εὔνουν ἑαυτῷ
καὶ φίλον. Eἰς ἀγορὰν μὲν γὰρ ἐμβάλλουσι πραγμάτων εἵνεκεν καὶ χρειῶν ἑτέρων, εἰς δὲ
συμπόσιον οἵ γε νοῦν ἔχοντες ἀφικνοῦνται κτησόμενοι φίλους […] Καὶ τοὐναντίον ὁ τούτου
παραμελῶν ἄχαριν αὑτῷ καὶ ἀτελῆ τὴν συνουσίαν ποιεῖ καὶ ἄπεισι τῇ γαστρὶ σύνδειπνος οὐ τῇ
ψυχῇ γεγονώς· ὁ γὰρ σύνδειπνος οὐκ ὄψου καὶ οἴνου καὶ τραγημάτων μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ λόγων
κοινωνὸς ἥκει καὶ παιδιᾶς καὶ φιλοφροσύνης εἰς εὔνοιαν τελευτώσης […] ταῖς δὲ φιλικαῖς
λαβαῖς ὁ οἶνος ἁφὴν ἐνδίδωσι μιγνύμενος λόγῳ· λόγος γὰρ αὐτῷ τὸ φιλάνθρωπον καὶ ἠθοποιὸν
ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος ἐποχετεύει καὶ ἐνδίδωσιν· εἰ δὲ μή, πλανώμενος ἐν τῷ σώματι
πλησμονῆς οὐδὲν σπουδαιότερον παρέσχεν. Ὅθεν ὥσπερ ὁ μάρμαρος, τοῦ διαπύρου σιδήρου
τῷ καταψύχειν τὴν ἄγαν ὑγρότητα καὶ ῥύσιν ἀφαιρῶν, εὔτονον ποιεῖ τὸ μαλασσόμενον αὐτοῦ
καὶ τυπούμενον, οὕτως ὁ συμποτικὸς λόγος οὐκ ἐᾷ διαφορεῖσθαι παντάπασιν ὑπὸ τοῦ οἴνου
τοὺς πίνοντας, ἀλλ' ἐφίστησι καὶ ποιεῖ τῇ ἀνέσει τὸ ἱλαρὸν καὶ φιλάνθρωπον ἐγκέραστον καὶ
κεχαρισμένον, ἄν τις ἐμμελῶς ἅπτηται, καθάπερ σφραγῖδι φιλίας εὐτυπωτάτων καὶ ἁπαλῶν
διὰ τὸν οἶνον ὄντων. Il testo di riferimento è quello costituito da A. M. S (ed.), 2001, da
cui ci si allontana solo in alcuni punti: è stata infatti accolta la correzione ἐνδίδωσιν proposta dal
Wilamowitz per συνδίδωσιν dei codici contro συνδιαδίδωσιν dello Hubert; si è preferito inoltre
respingere l'aggiunta di τὸ dello Hubert dinanzi a κεχαρισμένον e la correzione εὐτυπώτων
Reiske per εὐτυπωτάτων dei codici; per le prime due divergenze cfr. S.-T. T, 1990,
frequentazione dell'agorà, è quello di procurarsi degli amici: chi partecipa al
simposio per scopi diversi rende dunque l'incontro privo di piacere (ἄχαρις)
e inutile (ἀτελής ) 2 . Il simposio è così subito accomunato ad una esperienza
collettiva ‒ come potrebbe essere quella politica ‒ che va vissuta e trova
giusticazione nell'ambito dei rapporti della polis: al simposio, infatti, ci si
reca per saziare non solo il corpo, ma anche l'anima attraverso la condivisione
di discorsi (λόγοι), momenti di divertimento più leggero (παιδιαί) e cordiale
allegria (φιλοφροσύνη), il che produce benevolenza (εὔνοια ) 3 . Plutarco
distingue a questo punto tra i termini φιλία ed εὔνοια: la prima si conquista
nel tempo e attraverso la virtù (ἐν χρόνῳ πολλῷ καὶ δι' ἀρετῆς ) 4 , mentre la
seconda nasce tra individui della stessa città dalla consuetudine (χρεία), dalla
frequentazione (ὁμιλία) e anche attraverso il divertimento (παιδιά), in virtù
di quella capacità, che ha la sua radice nella natura lantropica dell'uomo, di
attirare la simpatia e il rispetto degli altri con il fascino del proprio carattere
(πειθὼ φιλάνθρωπος καὶ χάρις). Perché il simposio non si riduca ad una
volgare bevuta occorre però che al vino sia mescolato il λόγος, il quale dionde
nell'anima un'amorevole inclinazione verso il prossimo, mentre il vino da
solo vagherebbe nel corpo producendo solo un senso di sazietà (πλησμονή ) 5 .
Plutarco propone dunque un modello di simposio sobrio in cui si crei tra i
partecipanti un feeling soprattutto spirituale attraverso la condivisione di uno
stile di vita decoroso e del gusto per un divertimento sano ed equilibrato.
A questo punto Plutarco per chiarire il concetto introduce una similitudine
tratta dall'ambito dell'arte metallurgica: come il marmo raredda il ferro
incandescente e ne contrasta mollezza e uidità eccessive, rendendo plastica
quella parte che è soggetta ad ammorbidimento e si presta ad essere plasmata,
così il λόγος συμποτικός impedisce che chi beve sia in balia degli eetti del
vino, ma con l'ammorbidimento che esso produce tiene sotto controllo e guida
la tendenza alla cordialità e all'amicizia6 rendendola temperata (ἐγκέραστον) e
gradevole, come se proprio a causa del vino i partecipanti al simposio diventassero
più malleabili e morbidi al sigillo dell'amicizia (καθάπερ σφραγῖδι φιλίας
εὐτυπωτάτων καὶ ἁπαλῶν διὰ τὸν οἶνον ὄντων)7 . Il linguaggio plutarcheo
pp. 16, 17 e per la terza cfr. infra, n. 7. Per tutte le citazioni dall'Amatorius il testo di riferimento
è quello di R. F, 1980 ora riedito in F. F, 2008. Le eventuali divergenze dal
testo del Flacelière saranno indicate in nota.
2 Una celebrazione del ruolo dell'amico nell'ambito del simposio compare anche in Quaest.
conv. 697D.
3 Il concetto è ribadito più volte da Plutarco: cfr. Quaest. conv. 618E, 620C, 643A,
ma soprattutto 621C διαγωγὴ γάρ ἐστιν ἐν οἴνῳ τὸ συμπόσιον εἰς φιλίαν ὑπὸ χάριτος
τελευτῶσα.
4 Cfr. Am. mult. 94A. Anche per Arist., EN VIII 1155 a 2-3 l'amicizia è legata alla virtù; cfr.
pure EN VIII 1157 a 30-31.
5 Cfr. Ad. et. am. 66B; Quaest. conv. 613B, D; 614E.
6 Per il valore assunto dal termine φιλανθρωπία nel corpus plutarcheo cfr. S.-T. T,
2007, pp. 187-91.
7 La lezione dei codici εὐτυπώτατον potrebbe essere corretta in εὐτυπωτάτων ammettendo
un comune scambio ω>ο: cfr. F. T. G, 1976, pp. 275-7. La presenza di un superlativo al
posto del comparativo è giusticabile come un fenomeno di iperurbanismo, di cui si hanno altre
315
Krasis oinou diken. Amore coniugale e linguaggio del simposio nell'Amatorius di Plutarco.
slitta così impercettibilmente da un piano semantico all'altro; anche se l'uso
del termine εὔτυπος prolunga la metafora del metallo, l'autore attinge anche al
lessico del simposio: infatti con l'aggettivo ἐγκέραστον8 egli indica l'equilibrio
raggiunto attraverso l'intervento del λόγος; esso temperando nell'anima gli
eetti del vino che, se lasciato agire senza controllo, potrebbe indurre ad
atteggiamenti eccessivamente sfrenati, svolge la stessa funzione dell'acqua
che si mescola al vino per stemperarne la forza, secondo le convenzioni del
simposio ellenico9 .
Se nel contesto della performance (reale o ttizia)10 delle quaestiones era
giusticabile l'uso abbondante di metafore simposiali, la loro presenza in
opere di natura e struttura diverse è ancora più indicativa di come la categoria
del "simposio" potesse fornire un paradigma di comportamento applicabile
anche ad altri ambiti della vita quotidiana. Esse ricorrono ad esempio proprio
nell'Amatorius, il dialogo dedicato, com'è noto, alla denizione della φιλία
nell'ambito matrimoniale11 . Se confrontiamo le aermazioni contenute
nell'Introduzione al IV libro delle Quaestiones convivales con le idee espresse
in più luoghi dell'Amatorius noteremo un forte parallelismo occultato per
via della dislocazione di tali concetti nel corso del dialogo, laddove nell'altro
testo essi vengono espressi in forma più didascalica e concentrati, si direbbe
in forma programmatica, all'inizio dell'opera. La nalità dell'amore, come del
simposio, è per Plutarco quella di procurarsi un'amicizia virtuosa12 , mentre chi
ama solo per soddisfare il bisogno di piacere sico prova la stessa sensazione
di sazietà di chi si ubriaca bevendo vino puro13 ; la συνουσία soprattutto se
coinvolge persone dello stesso sesso ed è quindi orientata verso la conquista
di un piacere momentaneo e puramente sico, senza avere come esito la
procreazione e la creazione di una famiglia, risulta nauseante e inutile14 . S e
dunque l'unione tra uomo e donna costituisce una σύγκρασις 15 , quella di due
tracce nel corpus plutarcheo: cfr. G. G, 1988, pp. 73-5. Per la frequenza di metafore e
similitudini tratte dall'ambito dell'ars ferraria cfr. A. I. D, 1892, pp. 60-1.
8 S.-T. T, 1990, p. 17 accetta la correzione εὐκέραστον del Bernardakis contro
ἐγκέραστον dei codici; l'aggettivo in eetti è un hapax, ma il verbo ἐγκεράννυμι è ampiamente
utilizzato, oltre che nel senso di "versare", anche in quello di "mescolare", solitamente in senso
gurato: cfr. ad esempio Lucianus, Am. 19 κοινὸν οὖν ἀμφοτέρῳ γένει πόθον ἐγκερασαμένη.
9 Cfr. anche Quaest. conv. 657E.
10 Su questo tema cfr. F. P P, 1999.
11 Cfr. R. M.ª A, 1990-1991; M. H. T. C. U P, 1995; A. G. N,
1997; R. J. G C, 1999; M. V S, 2003; J. B, 2008.
12 Amat. 750E: Ἔρως δὲ [...] οὐκ ἐθέλει παραμένειν [...] εἰ καρπὸν ἤθους οἰκεῖον εἰς φιλίαν
καὶ ἀρετὴν οὐκ ἀποδίδωσιν.
13 Amat. 752B: [...] Ἔρως χωρὶς Ἀφροδίτης, ὥσπερ μέθη χωρὶς οἴνου πρὸς σύκινον πόμα
καὶ κρίθινον, ἄκαρπον αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀτελὲς τὸ ταρακτικόν ἐστι καὶ πλήσμιον καὶ ἁψίκορον.
14 Amat. 756E: ἀνέραστος γὰρ ὁμιλία καθάπερ πεῖνα καὶ δίψα πλησμονὴν ἔχουσα πέρας εἰς
οὐθὲν ἐξικνεῖται καλόν· ἀλλ' ἡ θεὸς Ἔρωτι τὸν κόρον ἀφαιροῦσα τῆς ἡδονῆς φιλότητα ποιεῖ
καὶ σύγκρασιν. Cfr. R. S, 2006, p. 89.
15 Sul valore di σύγκρασις cfr. H. G, 2006, nn. 70 e 423; J. O, 2006, p.
228, n. 93; J. B, 2006/2007.
uomini viene al contrario denita ἀκρασία, "un miscuglio mal riuscito", dove
i due elementi risultano malamente uniti tra di loro in maniera violenta e
non veramente fusi insieme16 . Pertanto, come nel banchetto accanto al vino
bisogna dare spazio al λόγος, così nell'amore ad Afrodite, che costituisce la
componente sica, deve unirsi Eros, la componente spirituale ed aettiva che
proietta gli individui interessati da questo sentimento nell'orizzonte di un
progetto che non è solo di coppia, ma si realizza completamente nello spazio
civico. Al contrario il soddisfacimento di un capriccio prodotto dalla pulsione
erotica tra due individui dello stesso sesso nisce per appiattirli entrambi sul
momento dell'incontro sico che, privo di πειθώ e χάρις, risulta al contrario
frutto di violenza, sfrenato e sfrontato17 . La componente più furiosa può essere
invece eliminata con il saggio ragionamento e il pudore (σώφρων λογισμός
μετ' αἰδοῦς) che del fuoco della passione lasciano sussistere soltanto la luce
e il calore; in questo modo l'eros non è più un terremoto sconvolgente, ma
un meraviglioso ammorbidimento dell'anima che produce docilità e amabilità
(εὐπέθεια καὶ φιλοφροσύνη)18 . Come avviene anche nel simposio, sono dunque
seduzione (πειθώ) e grazia (χάρις) le qualità femminili che ingenerano una
dolce soerenza nell'uomo, ma conquistano il suo aetto conducendolo alla
virtù e all'amore19 ; infatti senza queste due componenti il rapporto è tenuto
insieme solo dalle briglie della vergogna e della paura20 .
16 Amat. 768E: τὴν μὲν πρὸς ἄρρεν' ἄρρενος ὁμιλίαν, μᾶλλον δ' ἀκρασίαν καὶ ἐπιπήδησιν,
εἴποι τις ἂν. Nell'uso del termine ἀκρασία si potrebbe ammettere un voluto gioco di parole dal
momento che il greco conosce gli omogra ἀκρᾰσία e ἀκρᾱσία, che rispettivamente signicano
"cattiva mescolanza" e "incontinenza"; se con il primo si prolunga il riferimento al linguaggio
del simposio, con il secondo risulta evidente come agli occhi di Plutarco il rapporto non
fondato sull'amore sia segno di ἀκρασία, di intemperanza, propria di chi non è in possesso della
σωφροσύνη; è il λόγος allora che deve intervenire controllando l'ἐπιθυμία e convogliandola
nell'orizzonte di comportamento ritenuto giusto dalla collettività.
17 Amat. 751D-E: Ἡ (sc . χάρις) δ' ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρρένων ἀκόντων μετὰ βίας φερομένη καὶ
λεηλασίας, ἂν δ' ἑκουσίως, σὺν μαλακίᾳ καὶ θηλύτητι, "βαίνεσθαι" κατὰ Πλάτωνα "νόμῳ
τετράποδος καὶ παιδοσπορεῖσθαι" παρὰ φύσιν ἐνδιδόντων, ἄχαρις παντάπασι καὶ ἀσχήμων καὶ
ἀναφρόδιτος. Per questo testo in parte divergente da quello del Flacelière cfr. R. S ,
2006, pp. 100-1, in part. n. 76. Per il valore assunto dal termine χάρις nell'opuscolo plutarcheo
cfr. M. F , 1984 (20079 ), pp. 205-9; A. V C & M. A. S Á,
2007.
18 Amat. 765C: ὅσοι δὲ σώφρονι λογισμῷ μετ' αἰδοῦς οἷον ἀτεχνῶς πυρὸς ἀφεῖλον τὸ
μανικόν, αὐγὴν δὲ καὶ φῶς ἀπέλιπον τῇ ψυχῇ μετὰ θερμότητος, οὐ σεισμόν, ὥς τις εἶπε, κινούσης
ἐπὶ σπέρμα κατ' ὄλισθον ἀτόμων ὑπὸ λειότητος καὶ γαργαλισμοῦ θλιβομένων, διάχυσιν δὲ
θαυμαστὴν καὶ γόνιμον [...] καὶ πόρους ἀνοίγουσαν εὐπειθείας καὶ φιλοφροσύνης.
19 Amat. 758B: οὐδὲν γάρ ἐστιν αἰσχρὸν οὐδ' ἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλὰ πειθὼ καὶ χάρις ἐνδιδοῦσα
"πόνον ἡδὺν" ὡς ἀληθῶς "κάματόν <τ' εὐκάματον>" ὑφηγεῖται πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ φιλίαν; cfr.
anche 769C: καὶ γὰρ φιλότεκνοι καὶ φίλανδροι, καὶ τὸ στερκτικὸν ὅλως ἐν αὐταῖς, ὥσπερ
εὐφυὴς χώρα καὶ δεκτικὴ φιλίας, οὔτε πειθοῦς οὔτε Χαρίτων ἄμοιρον ὑπόκειται. [...] ἡ
φύσις γυναικὶ περιθεῖσα χάριν ὄψεως καὶ φωνῆς πιθανότητα καὶ μορφῆς ἐπαγωγὸν εἶδος,
τῇ μὲν ἀκολάστῳ πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ ἀπάτην, τῇ δὲ σώφρονι πρὸς εὔνοιαν ἀνδρὸς καὶ φιλίαν
μεγάλα συνήργησεν; 767D: στέργεσθαι δὲ καὶ στέργειν ἑνί μοι δοκεῖ γράμματι τοῦ στέγειν
παραλλάττον εὐθὺς ἐμφαίνειν τὴν ὑπὸ χρόνου καὶ συνηθείας ἀνάγκῃ μεμιγμένην εὔνοιαν.
Χάρις e χρεία accompagnano la φιλία in Ad. et am. 51B.
20 Amat. 752C: [...] ἄμοιρον ἐνθέου φιλίας κοινωνίαν, ἣν τῆς ἐρωτικῆς πειθοῦς καὶ χάριτος
317
Krasis oinou diken. Amore coniugale e linguaggio del simposio nell'Amatorius di Plutarco.
Se nell'Introduzione al IV libro delle Quaestiones convivales Plutarco
non sembra tanto interessato a stabilire una netta dierenza tra φιλία ed
εὔνοια21 , rigettando la distinzione, che egli denisce sostica, di φίλος
come ἑκείνος ὁ ἀμετάπτωτος καὶ βέβαιος ed equiparandolo all'εὔνους ,
nell'Amatorius invece egli distingue tra i due sentimenti per sottolineare
con più forza la superiorità del rapporto matrimoniale rispetto alle
relazioni omosessuali22 : se, infatti, l'amore contro natura tra i maschi
non rovina l'εὔνοια è, però, l'eros tra maschio e femmina a condurre alla
φιλία attraverso la χάρις23 ; le nozze sono inoltre una κοινωνία amorosa
che partecipa di una divina amicizia (ἔνθεος φιλία, 752C). La φιλία
appare dunque nell'opera una condizione più stabile, certa e consapevole
nei rapporti tra gli individui24 , in particolare tra quelli di sesso diverso,
laddove l'εὔνοια rappresenta lo stadio iniziale di quel rapporto, stadio a
cui è condannata a fermarsi la relazione tra persone dello stesso sesso25 .
Insomma se nell'ambito politico e sociale l'εὔνοια può essere identicata
grosso modo con la φιλία, è in quello matrimoniale che la distinzione si
fa netta, perché funzionale al messaggio di fondo dell'opuscolo, che poco
spazio vuole lasciare all'esperienza omoerotica, relegata all'età giovanile
e destinata ad essere superata. Così si moltiplicano nel testo plutarcheo
i riferimenti alla condizione di stabilità che caratterizza questa forma di
φιλία26 , mentre l'eros omosessuale è instabile e insicuro27 . Come vedremo
tra breve, per esprimere il senso di precarietà che accompagna una visione
distorta dell'eros Plutarco si serve dell'immagine ora della tempesta
invernale ora della mescolanza turbolenta di liquidi, mentre per l'amore
coniugale ricorre alla metafora marina della bonaccia e a quella della κρᾶσις
dei liquidi.
ἀπολιπούσης μονονοὺ ζυγοῖς καὶ χαλινοῖς ὑπ' αἰσχύνης καὶ φόβου μάλα μόλις συνεχομένην
ὁρῶμεν.
21 Per la denizione di εὔνοια cfr. Arist., EN IX 1166b 30; per la discussione su questi
due termini e sul loro valore cfr. S.-T. T, 2007, pp. 191-4; per il valore di εὔνοια
nell'ambito politico cfr. E. A, 2008. Sugli aspetti assunti dalla φιλία nelle opere di
Plutarco cfr. J. C. F, 1974, pp. 434-41; J. G L, 1990; R. M.ª A, 2002;
R. A M, 2005.
22 Su questo tema è possibile consultare un'ampia bibliograa: cfr. almeno M. F ,
1984 ( 2007 9 ); J. C. C, 1999; M. B, 2000; S.-T. T, 2004/2005; B.
F, 2006, part. 252-68; G. D'I, 2007.
23 Amat. 751C-D: εἰ γὰρ ἡ παρὰ φύσιν ὁμιλία πρὸς ἄρρενας οὐκ ἀναιρεῖ τὴν ἐρωτικὴν
εὔνοιαν οὐδὲ βλάπτει, πολὺ μᾶλλον εἰκός ἐστι τὸν γυναικῶν καὶ ἀνδρῶν ἔρωτα τῇ φύσει
χρώμενον εἰς φιλίαν διὰ χάριτος ἐξικνεῖσθαι.
24 Cfr. anche Am. mult. 97B. Plutarco doveva seguire in questo il pensiero di Arist., EN VIII
1157b 17-24.
25 Cfr. Arist., EN VIII 1155b 33-34; IX 1167a 6-8, 13-14.
26 Cfr. infra, n. 42.
27 Cfr. le osservazioni di Arist., EN VIII 1156 a 6-35; 1156 b 1-12, 17-18. Nell'Amatorius ,
del resto, proprio sul modello fornito da Aristotele, trova posto anche una vera e propria
classicazione delle forme di φιλία (cap. 16, 758C-D).
Ad esempio, nei Coniug. praec. 142F-143A28 Plutarco sostiene che in natura
alcuni corpi sono costituiti di elementi distinti (ἐκ διεστώτων), altri di elementi
uniti insieme (ἐκ συναπτομένων), mentre gli esseri viventi costituiscono una
unità naturale (ἡνωμένα καὶ συμφυῆ); allo stesso modo il matrimonio fondato
sull'amore è un'unità naturale (σχεδὸν οὖν καὶ γάμος ὁ μὲν τῶν ἐρώντων
ἡνωμένος καὶ συμφυής ἐστιν), quello basato sull'interesse economico o sui
gli è un accostamento di elementi giustapposti (ἐκ συναπτομένων), quello
di chi dorme nello stesso letto risulta di elementi distinti (ἐκ διεστώτων), e
l'esistenza di costoro può denirsi una coabitazione, non una vita in comune
(οὐ συμβιοῦν ). Plutarco ritiene, infatti, che nel vero matrimonio, che è una
συμβίωσις29 , le due componenti costituiscano un'unità completa. Inne,
spostandosi dal piano sico a quello dei rapporti umani egli ritorna ad un
esempio tratto dalla realtà naturale che serve a chiarire meglio il concetto di
matrimonio: "Come la mescolanza dei liquidi investe, secondo la teoria dei
naturalisti, ogni loro parte, allo stesso modo corpi, beni, amicizie e relazioni dei
coniugi devono realizzare tra di loro un perfetto amalgama"30 .
L'espressione δι'ὅλων ... κρᾶσις, che richiama letteralmente il concetto
stoico testimoniato da un lungo frammento del Περὶ γάμου di Antipatro di
Tarso31 , ricorre anche nel cap. 24 dell'Amatorius (769F), dove di nuovo l'autore
stabilisce un confronto tra il comportamento dei liquidi in natura e quello
della coppia matrimoniale: "Ma come se dei liquidi si mescolassero tra di loro,
28 Τῶν σωμάτων οἱ φιλόσοφοι τὰ μὲν ἐκ διεστώτων λέγουσιν εἶναι καθάπερ στόλον καὶ
στρατόπεδον, τὰ δὲ ἐκ συναπτομένων ὡς οἰκίαν καὶ ναῦν, τὰ δὲ ἡνωμένα καὶ συμφυῆ καθάπερ
ἐστὶ τῶν ζῴων ἕκαστον. σχεδὸν οὖν καὶ γάμος ὁ μὲν τῶν ἐρώντων ἡνωμένος καὶ συμφυής
ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ τῶν διὰ προῖκας ἢ τέκνα γαμούντων ἐκ συναπτομένων, ὁ δὲ τῶν συγκαθευδόντων
ἐκ διεστώτων, οὓς συνοικεῖν ἄν τις ἀλλήλοις, οὐ συμβιοῦν νομίσειε. δεῖ δέ, ὥσπερ οἱ φυσικοὶ
τῶν ὑγρῶν λέγουσι δι' ὅλων γενέσθαι τὴν κρᾶσιν, οὕτω τῶν γαμούντων καὶ σώματα καὶ
χρήματα καὶ φίλους καὶ οἰκείους ἀναμιχθῆναι δι' ἀλλήλων. Il testo di riferimento è quello di
G. M – A. T (edd.), 1990.
29 Cfr. Coniug. praec. 138D, 141B, 141D; Aet. Rom. 263E; fr. 157, ll. 5-6 S. Nell'
Amatorius l'autore usa il verbo συγκαταβιόω (754A) accompagnato dall'espressione μετ' εὐνοίας
ad indicare una convivenza basata sul sincero aetto reciproco, e συγκαταζάω ( Amat. 749D) per
esprimere l'intenzione di Ismenodora di sposare Baccone e di convivere con lui. Per Arist., EN
VIII 1157b 7-19 il rapporto di φιλία si rinsalda vivendo insieme (συζῶντες), mentre tra chi non
fa vita in comune (μὴ συζῶντες) si stabilisce solo un rapporto basato sull'εὔνοια.
30 Per la traduzione qui utilizzata cfr. G. M – A. T (eds.), 1990, pp. 85-7.
31 Cfr. SVF III 63 = pp. 254-257 A; la denizione che qui interessa è in particolare
a p. 255, ll.12-16 αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλαι φιλίαι ἢ φιλοστοργίαι ἐοίκασι ταῖς τῶν ὀσπρίων ἤ τινων
ἄλλων παραπλησίων κατὰ τὰς παραθέσεις μίξεσιν, αἱ δ' ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυν̣αικὸς ταῖς δι' ὅλων
κράσεσιν, ὡς οἶνος ὕδατι καὶ τοῦτο ἐπιμέν<ων> μίσγεται δι' ὅλων: "Infatti, le altre forme di
amicizia o di tenerezza assomigliano a quei miscugli, come di fagioli o di altri legumi, i quali si
formano per aggiunta di elementi, invece l'amore fra l'uomo e la donna è una fusione totale come
quella del vino con l'acqua, dove questo permane, ma fondendosi completamente <con l'altra>"
(trad. in R. R (ed.), 2002, p. 1475). Gli stoici distinguevano in maniera molto sottile tra
mistione, commistione, connessione, mescolanza e fusione di corpi: cfr. SVF II 463-481. Per
la discussione sulla dipendenza da fonti stoiche delle tesi espresse da Plutarco nell'Amatorius ,
cfr. D. B, 2003 (1969), pp. 127-32; J. B, 2006/2007, pp. 5-6; per le idee stoiche
sul matrimonio cfr. D. B, 1963; I. R, 2000. Sulla letteratura περὶ γάμου cfr. A.
C, 1999.
319
Krasis oinou diken. Amore coniugale e linguaggio del simposio nell'Amatorius di Plutarco.
l'amore produce in principio un ribollire torbido e confuso, poi con il tempo
assestandosi e trovando un suo pacato equilibrio, raggiunge la condizione di
massima stabilità. Siamo davvero di fronte alla cosiddetta 'unione completa',
quella degli amanti; mentre quell'unione che interessa quanti vivono in modi
diversi assomiglia agli scontri e agli intrecci degli atomi epicurei, perché subisce
collisioni e rimbalzi, ma non produce quella stessa unità di cui invece è artece
Amore quando costituisce una unione matrimoniale"32 .
L'immagine della mistione dei liquidi che all'inizio ribolle e poi trova il
suo equilibrio è coerente con quella più volte ricorrente della tempesta prodotta
da Eros: nel cap. 5 (751E) Plutarco aerma ad esempio che Solone era uscito
dalle tempeste degli amori maschili ed aveva assestato la propria vita nel porto
tranquillo del matrimonio e della losoa33 ; nel cap. 9 (754C) ricorda invece
che in un rapporto all'inizio ci sono tempeste, perché Eros si precipita sulle
anime come il vento su una nave senza pilota, ma quando i due imparano a
comandare e a obbedire reciprocamente, allora il matrimonio va in porto34 .
Ovviamente doveva agire sulla memoria di Plutarco l'immagine tradizionale
di Eros come forza violenta, il vento del famoso frammento di Sao 47 V.35 , di
cui egli si ricorderà anche altrove nel testo36 e nel fr. 134 Sandbach37, mentre la
nave senza pilota potrebbe richiamare l'immagine platonica dell'anima che ha
come nocchiero il νοῦς contenuta in Phdr. 247c38 .
32 Ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ὑγρῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα συμπεσόντων ποιεῖν τινα δοκεῖ ζέσιν ἐν ἀρχῇ καὶ
τάραξιν ὁ ἔρως, εἶτα χρόνῳ καταστὰς καὶ καθαρθεὶς τὴν βεβαιοτάτην διάθεσιν παρέσχεν.
Aὕτη γάρ ἐστιν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἡ δι' ὅλων λεγομένη κρᾶσις, ἡ τῶν ἐρώντων· <ἡ δὲ τῶν> ἄλλως
συμβιούντων ταῖς κατ' Ἐπίκουρον ἁφαῖς καὶ περιπλοκαῖς ἔοικε, συγκρούσεις λαμβάνουσα
καὶ ἀποπηδήσεις, ἑνότητα δ' οὐ ποιοῦσα τοιαύτην, οἵαν Ἔρως ποιεῖ γαμικῆς κοινωνίας
ἐπιλαβόμενος. La traduzione sopra riportata è mia.
33 […] ὥσπερ ἐκ ζάλης καὶ χειμῶνος τῶν παιδικῶν ἐρώτων ἔν τινι γαλήνῃ τῇ περὶ γάμον
καὶ φιλοσοφίαν θέμενος τὸν βίον.
34 […] ἐν ἀρχῇ δὲ κυμαίνει καὶ ζυγομαχεῖ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἂν Ἔρως ἐγγένηται, καὶ καθάπερ
πνεῦμα κυβερνήτου μὴ παρόντος ἐτάραξε καὶ συνέχεε τὸν γάμον. Per l'uso metaforico
dell'immagine del vento e del mare in tempesta ad indicare una condizione di pericolo sico o
morale in Plutarco cfr. A. I. D, 1892, pp. 81-4, 132-5.
35 Ἔρος δ' ἐτίναξέ / μοι φρένας, ὡς ἄνεμος κὰτ ὄρος δρύσιν ἐμπέτων che richiama Hom.,
Od. 5.368 e Hes., Op. 505-511; appare interessante che in entrambi i contesti la forza del vento
sia vista in azione sul mare; il modello esiodeo inoltre chiama in causa Borea, che secondo il
mito rapì Oritia. Tale mito è rievocato da Platone in Phdr. 229b, nel contesto introduttivo che
contiene la famosa descrizione dell'Ilisso a cui Plutarco allude all'inizio dell'Amatorius (cfr. F.
E. B, 1995, 1110 = F. E. B, 1998, 51); questo riferimento mitico potrebbe anche
giusticare l'uso ricorrente nell'opera della metafora del vento per indicare l'azione di Eros. Su
questo topos cfr. anche Sapph., fr. 130 V.; Ibyc., fr. 286 D, vv. 9-13; Verg., A. IV 441 – 449.
36 Cfr. anche Amat. 759F: "Ἐλθὼν δ' ἐξαπίνης ἄνεμος" σὺν ἔρωτι πολλῷ καὶ πόθῳ ταὐτὸ
τοῦτο τῶν Ταντάλου λεγομένων ταλάντων καὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀρχῆς ἀντάξιον ἐποίησεν. οὕτως
ἀσθενὴς καὶ ἁψίκορός ἐστιν ἡ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης χάρις Ἔρωτος μὴ ἐπιπνεύσαντος.
37 Τῶν Μενάνδρου δραμάτων ὁμαλῶς ἁπάντων ἓν συνεκτικόν ἐστιν, ὁ ἔρως, οἷον πνεῦμα
κοινὸν διαπεφυκώς. Il testo di riferimento per i frammenti qui come nei prossimi casi è quello
di F. H. S , 1987, da cui ci si allontana nella conservazione del participio διαπεφυκώς
rispetto alla correzione διαπεφοιτηκώς del Bernardakis.
38 Ἡ γὰρ ἀχρώματός τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος καὶ ἀναφὴς οὐσία ὄντως οὖσα, ψυχῆς κυβερνήτῃ
μόνῳ θεατὴ νῷ [...] τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τόπον.
L'idea della stabilità prodotta dall'amore coniugale rispetto al turbamento
e all'instabilità legati all'esperienza omosessuale fa tutt'uno nell'Amatorius con
l'esigenza di consolidare e stabilizzare la πάτριος καὶ παλαιὰ πίστις39 , minacciata
da una visione materialistica ed atea del mondo e dei rapporti tra gli uomini,
che Plutarco sembra identicare con il pensiero epicureo40 , il che giustica il
passaggio dall'immagine dei liquidi mescolati confusamente all'urto caotico
degli atomi, che aveva fatto la sua comparsa nel ragionamento plutarcheo già
al cap. 19 (765C)41 . La tradizione, infatti, è per Plutarco la solida base che
sta a fondamento dell'εὐσέβεια, ma se essa viene turbata e scossa in qualche
suo punto, allora diventa instabile (ἐπισφαλῆς) e sospetta42 . In questo caso
è possibile ipotizzare che nell'uso dei verbi ταράττω e σαλεύω all'immagine
della tempesta marina si sovrapponga quella del sisma prodotto dal pensiero
atomistico degli epicurei43 .
La denizione dell'unione coniugale come κρᾶσις compare anche nel fr. 167
Sandbach (= Stob., IV 28.8, V, p. 678 H.), appartenente all'epistola περὶ φιλίας
di Plutarco e che recita: "γάμος γὰρ ἀπὸ μὲν φιλίας διττῆς κράσεως βελτίων,
ἑτέρως δὲ σφαλερός" ("È migliore il matrimonio che nasca dalla mescolanza
di una doppia amicizia, in caso diverso è fragile"44 ). La testimonianza permette
di ipotizzare che nella lettera sull'amicizia trovasse posto in qualche modo
anche la riessione sulla migliore forma di matrimonio, che, come si è visto,
nell'Amatorius era considerato l'espressione più nobile di una φιλία conseguita
attraverso l'ἀρετή. Se l'aggettivo σφαλερός richiama l' ἐπισφαλής di Amat.
756B, sottolineando di nuovo l'instabilità a livello individuale e sociale di un
γάμος che non si fondi sulla φιλία, sulla base di un altro luogo dell'Amatorius
si potrebbe ipotizzare che con κρᾶσις Plutarco volesse alludere qui come in
Amat. cap. 24 (769F) e in Coniug. praec. 143A, al modello oerto dalle giuste
porzioni di acqua e vino stabilite dalla tradizione del simposio45 .
Infatti nel cap. 7 (752E) Pisia, difensore dell'amore omosessuale,
criticando la scelta da parte di Ismenodora, più grande e più ricca, di sposare
l'ancora adolescente Baccone, sostiene che è invece accettabile il matrimonio
tra un giovane e una donna povera e di umili origini, perché questa unione
decreta la superiorità del giovane come quando il vino si mescola all'acqua
(μέγα γάρ, ἂν ἐλαφρᾷ καὶ λιτῇ γυναικὶ μειρακίου συνελθόντος εἰς ταὐτὸν ἡ
κρᾶσις οἴνου δίκην ἐπικρατήσῃ). Il matrimonio appare come un amalgama di
39 Cfr. F. F, 1999; F. F, 2005; A. I. O V, 1991.
40 Cfr. su questo tema A. B, 1988; R. S, 2006; G. S, 2007.
41 Cfr. n. 18.
42 Amat. 756B: Ἀρκεῖ γὰρ ἡ πάτριος καὶ παλαιὰ πίστις [...] Ἀλλ' ἕδρα τις αὕτη καὶ βάσις
ὑφεστῶσα κοινὴ πρὸς εὐσέβειαν, ἐὰν ἐφ' ἑνὸς ταράττηται καὶ σαλεύηται τὸ βέβαιον αὐτῆς καὶ
νενομισμένον, ἐπισφαλὴς γίνεται πᾶσα καὶ ὕποπτος.
43 Cfr. R. S, 2006, p. 96, n. 57.
44 La traduzione del frammento è di R. G A, in AA.VV., Plutarco, I
frammenti, in corso di stampa.
45 Cfr. Quaest. conv. 657E. In Quaest. conv. 621 C-D Plutarco utilizza il paragone con il vino
mescolato all'acqua che ne stempera gli eccessi per ricordare che nel convivio occorre mescolare
insieme momenti seri ad altri più leggeri.
321
Krasis oinou diken. Amore coniugale e linguaggio del simposio nell'Amatorius di Plutarco.
acqua e vino in cui è naturalmente il vino, cioè l'elemento maschile, ad imporre
e a indirizzare la vita coniugale, pur nell'armonia dell'unione46 . Se l'opinione
di Pisia è contestata ampiamente dallo stesso Plutarco47 , che non vede nulla
di male in una coppia in cui la donna è molto più grande dell'uomo a patto
ovviamente che ci sia l'amore, la similitudine dell'unione matrimoniale con il
vino mescolato all'acqua doveva essere invece da lui accolta48 , anche perché
essa aveva un autorevole antecedente in un passo del IV libro delle Leggi di
Platone, 773c-d, che potrebbe essere individuato come testo di riferimento
per queste sue aermazioni: il losofo, infatti, osserva che bisogna evitare per
il bene della città matrimoni tra persone dello stesso rango sociale anche se
"non è facile comprendere che una città deve essere mescolata come se fosse
un cratere, dove il vino puro, appena versato, ribolle, ma una volta temperato
da un altro dio sobrio, realizza una bella unione e produce una bevanda buona
e moderata" (οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον ἐννοεῖν ὅτι πόλιν εἶναι δεῖ δίκην κρατῆρος
κεκραμένην, οὗ μαινόμενος μὲν οἶνος ἐγκεχυμένος ζεῖ, κολαζόμενος δὲ ὑπὸ
νήφοντος ἑτέρου θεοῦ καλὴν κοινωνίαν λαβὼν ἀγαθὸν πῶμα καὶ μέτριον
ἀπεργάζεται)49 . L'uso dell'espressione δίκην κρατῆρος sembra riecheggiata da
Plutarco in οἴνου δίκην50 mentre l'immagine del bollore iniziale e del successivo
equilibrio raggiunto nell'unione matrimoniale doveva essere presente alla sua
mente al cap. 24 (769F) dove egli denisce ζέσις il primo stadio dell'incontro
tra liquidi e dove la sequenza γαμικῆς κοινωνίας ἐπιλαβόμενος sembra un
riecheggiamento del platonico κοινωνίαν λαβών .
Al di là delle consonanze sul piano linguistico, proviamo ora a rileggere
le aermazioni contenute nel cap. 2451 alla luce di questo luogo delle Leggi :
l'ipotesto di riferimento più evidente è senza dubbio il Platone di Phdr. 251c52 ,
46 Malgrado si possa cogliere nell'Amatorius una visione per certi versi più moderna del
rapporto coniugale (cfr. P. W, 1999; C. P, 1999; S. P, 2002), è probabile
che Plutarco non si spingesse tanto lontano da ammettere addirittura l'uguaglianza dei due
individui nella coppia; sono numerose al contrario le tracce della volontà da parte dell'autore
di sottolineare la superiorità dell'elemento maschile, secondo un'ottica molto tradizionale; in
questo senso assume un certo rilievo il ridimensionamento a cui sembra sottoporre proprio
nell'Amatorius i culti di Iside, che al contrario attribuivano alla donna un ruolo addirittura
centrale nella coppia: cfr. R. S, 2007, p. 433, n. 43. Per l'idea che la donna deve
essere specchio dell'uomo cfr. M. R C, 2007. Cfr. anche infra, n. 48.
47 Cfr. Amat. 753C-754E.
48 Cfr. anche Coniug. praec. 142E. La κοινωνία del matrimonio si preserva attraverso l'aetto
che deve essere ricambiato reciprocamente (Coniug . praec. 140E). In Coniug. praec. 140F inne
si auspica anche la messa in comune del patrimonio; Plutarco in questa occasione fa di nuovo
riferimento alla mescolanza di acqua e vino: come nel banchetto acqua e vino producono un
miscuglio (κρᾶμα) che si continua a chiamare vino, così il patrimonio ottenuto dall'unione dei
patrimoni di uomo e donna appartiene comunque al marito, anche se quello della donna dovesse
essere più sostanzioso.
49 La traduzione riportata è mia. A questo passo platonico si fa riferimento anche altrove nel
corpus plutarcheo: cfr. [Lib. ed.] 15A; An seni resp. 790F-791B; fr. 210 S.
50 Per l'uso avverbiale di δίκην seguito dal genitivo cfr. B. W, 1994 (1895), p.
25. 51 Per il testo cfr. supra, n. 32.
52 Ζεῖ τε καὶ ἀγανακτεῖ καὶ γαργαλίζεται φύουσα τὰ πτερά. H. G, 2006, p. 139,
in cui si aerma che l'anima di recente iniziata alla verità quando sulla terra
incontra la bellezza in un primo momento ribolle (ζεῖ) per il prurito e l'irritazione
che essa produce mentre le fa spuntare quelle ali che la spingono verso l'alto. Il
linguaggio utilizzato da Plutarco risulta ancora una volta polisemico: i sostantivi
ζέσις e τάραξις potrebbero alludere di nuovo all'ondeggiamento e all'instabilità
riattivando la metafora marina53 che abbiamo visto operante in Amat. 751E
e 754C o quella del terremoto di 765C; in medicina tuttavia essi indicano il
primo un'alterazione della temperatura corporea a causa di una malattia o lo
stato di agitazione dovuto all'ira54 e il secondo un'inammazione degli occhi55 ;
con τάραξις poi l'autore voleva forse indicare anche lo stato di turbamento
psicologico in cui cade chi è vittima di Eros (il τό μανικόν), che è considerato
un'inammazione, φλεγμονή 56 , e una malattia, νόσος 57; il topos dell'amore-
amma e dell'amore-malattia percorre del resto l'intero opuscolo ed è declinato
in tutte le sue varianti58 , non ultima quella relativa alla liquefazione dei metalli59 ,
che come si è visto è utilizzata da Plutarco in relazione al tema della φιλία in
Quaest. conv. 659E-660C. Tuttavia nel contesto del cap. 24 la presenza di ζέσις ,
alla luce del passo delle Leggi sopra citato, avvalora l'ipotesi che i due liquidi
che si incontrano e si fondono siano proprio il vino e l'acqua, anche in virtù
della presenza dell'espressione κρᾶσις τῶν ὅλων che, come si è già ricordato, in
ambiente stoico indicava una forma completa di fusione, un esempio della quale
era proprio la combinazione di acqua e vino. Plutarco del resto stabilisce una
n. 57, indica questo luogo platonico in riferimento ad Amat. 752A. Per i modelli platonici tenuti
presenti da Plutarco nella sua riessione sull'eros cfr. H. M, 1984; F. E. B, 1988 =
F. E. B, 1998, pp. 13-27; A. C, 1999; A. B, 1999; J. B, 1999; J.
M. R, 2001; P. G B, 2007, pp. 123-32; F. F, 2005/2006; F. F,
2008, pp. VII-XLVI.
53 Cfr. ad esempio Hdt., 7.188; Pl., Phd. 113a.
54 Cfr. Gal., Di. febr. II, in MedG, vol. VII, p. 283, l. 7 K; Hsch., Lex., vol. I, p. 255
S, glossa il sostantivo con θερμότης. Il verbo ζέω è utilizzato anche per indicare il
ribollire delle passioni: cfr. almeno S., O.C. 434; Pl., Cra. 419e, R. 440c; Arist., de An. 403A
31; AP 7. 385,7. Un'interessante testimonianza dell'uso del termine ζέσις in ambito amoroso
è inoltre fornita dall'epigramma d'apertura del V libro dell'Antologia Palatina, che raccoglie
appunto epigrammi erotici: l'anonimo autore sostiene di voler suscitare nei giovani un "saggio
ribollire del cuore" e per questo come inizio della sua opera prenderà Eros, che appicca il fuoco
alle parole: Νέοις ἀνάπτων καρδίας σοφὴν ζέσιν, / ἀρχὴν Ἔρωτα τῶν λόγων ποιήσομαι ·/
πυρσὸν γὰρ οὗτος ἐξανάπτει τοῖς λόγοις.
55 Cfr. [Gal.], Intr., in MedG, vol. XIV, p. 768 K.
56 Cfr. fr. 137 S συστέλλεται δὲ καὶ φλεγμονὴ ἐπιθυμίας παρεχούσης τραχὺ
κίνημα.
57 Cfr. fr. 135 S οἱ μὲν γὰρ νόσον τὸν ἔρωτα οἱ δ' ἐπιθυμίαν οἱ δὲ φιλίαν οἱ δὲ
μανίαν οἱ δὲ θεῖόν τι κίνημα τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ δαιμόνιον, οἱ δ' ἄντικρυς θεὸν ἀναγορεύουσιν; cfr.
anche Amat. 755E. Per il rapporto amore - malattia cfr. M. C, 1976; per il carattere
ambivalente di eros nel pensiero plutarcheo cfr. J. O, 2006, pp. 208-20, in part. 219-20.
58 Per il fuoco d'amore cfr. Amat. 752D, 753A, 758D-759B, 759F, 762C, 764B-D, 765B-C,
766A-B, 767B, 767F; frr. 135, 137, 138 S; per l'amore νόσος cfr. invece Amat. 755E.
Sul topos della amma d'amore cfr. almeno G. S, 2006. Per l'uso traslato di termini
aerenti ai campi semantici della malattia - sanità e del fuoco cfr. A. I. D, 1892,
rispettivamente pp. 10-4 e 138-41.
59 Cfr. Amat. 758C, 761C, 762C, 766A, 767E.
323
Krasis oinou diken. Amore coniugale e linguaggio del simposio nell'Amatorius di Plutarco.
stretta relazione tra ubriacatura e innamoramento sia in Quaest. conv. 622D60 ,
sia nello stesso Amatorius: infatti nel cap. 16, dopo aver elencato nelle orme
platoniche le varie forme di mania dovute a malattia, all'ispirazione poetica,
a Bacco e ad Ares, Plutarco cita quella erotica attribuendole degli attributi
dionisiaci61 . Occorre inne sottolineare come l'opposizione presente nel testo
platonico tra i participi μαινόμενος e κολαζόμενος in riferimento al vino62 sia
riproposta da Plutarco nell'Amatorius nell'opposizione tra una sessualità solo
istintuale e rivolta alla soddisfazione del piacere personale, che è considerata
παράνομος63 e che l'autore identica con l'amore omosessuale da lui relegato
all'età giovanile, e quella temperata dal λόγος, la forma più alta di φιλία, in
quanto convoglia l'istinto e l'impulso sessuale maschile verso la procreazione
e la costruzione di una famiglia, segnando il passaggio dell'individuo alla
maturità, che lo vede ora perfettamente e legittimamente inserito nell'intera
comunità, di cui condivide da buon cittadino valori religiosi e culturali64 . Anche
in questo Plutarco doveva seguire il Platone del III libro delle Leggi (783a)
il quale sostiene che le tre ἑπιθυμίαι del mangiare, del bere e del sesso vanno
indirizzate al meglio e contenute attraverso φόβος, νόμος e ἀληθὴς λόγος.
Una stretta relazione tra le funzioni di Afrodite e di Dioniso e quindi di
ἔρως e di οἶνος è poi sottolineata da Plutarco nel Septem sapientium convivium,
156C-D65 : qui egli specica che Afrodite non è solo, come solitamente si
60 Ἐλέχθη δὲ καὶ ὅτι τῷ μεθύειν τὸ ἐρᾶν ὅμοιόν ἐστιν.
61 Cfr. Amat. 759A: λείπεται δὲ τῆς ἐξαλλαγῆς ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ παρατροπῆς οὐκ ἀμαυρὸν
οὐδ' ἡσυχαῖον, [...] μόριον [...] "Τί<ς καλλί>καρπον θύρσον ἀνασείει θεῶν" τὸν φιλητικὸν
τοῦτον περὶ παῖδας ἀγαθοὺς καὶ σώφρονας γυναῖκας ἐνθουσιασμὸν πολὺ δριμύτατον ὄντα
καὶ θερμότατον;. Di una ἐρωτικὴ θερμότης Plutarco parla anche al cap. 18 (762D): cfr. su
questo tema L. V S, 1992, pp. 110-7; R. C S, 1998; L. V
S, 1999.
62 Cfr. anche Ath. XIV 613a-c. Per l'uso di μαινόμενος in riferimento al vino puro cfr.
anche E., Cyc. 617 e le osservazioni di A. M, 1996. L'anonimo autore del trattato Sul
sublime (32,7) considera il passo platonico di Lg. 773c-d un esempio tra gli altri degli eccessi
in cui poteva cadere il losofo che, nell'uso delle metafore, si dimostra così "un poeta davvero
non sobrio".
63 Per il carattere "abnorme" dei rapporti vissuti solo sul piano sico e pericolosi per il corpo
sociale tutto, perché diondono il culto del piacere e del materialismo cfr. ad esempio Amat .
765B e le osservazioni di R. S, 2006, pp. 95-6.
64 Cfr. G. S, 2003, pp. 126-9; G. T, 2008, pp. 703-4; P. B D, 2007.
65 Οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης ἔργον ἐστὶ συνουσία καὶ μῖξις, οὐδὲ τοῦ Διονύσου μέθη
καὶ οἶνος, ἀλλ' ἣν ἐμποιοῦσι διὰ τούτων φιλοφροσύνην καὶ πόθον καὶ ὁμιλίαν ἡμῖν καὶ
συνήθειαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους· [...] ἔστι δὲ τῆς μὲν πρὸς γυναῖκας ἀνδρῶν ὁμοφροσύνης καὶ
φιλίας δημιουργὸς ἡ Ἀφροδίτη, τοῖς σώμασιν ὑφ' ἡδονῆς ἅμα συμμιγνύουσα καὶ συντήκουσα
τὰς ψυχάς· τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς καὶ μὴ πάνυ συνήθεσι μηδ' ἄγαν γνωρίμοις ὁ Διόνυσος ὥσπερ ἐν
πυρὶ τῷ οἴνῳ μαλάσσων τὰ ἤθη καὶ ἀνυγραίνων ἀρχήν τινα συγκράσεως πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ
φιλίας ἐνδίδωσιν. [...] οὐδὲν ἔργον ἐστὶν οἶμαι κύλικος οὐδ' οἰνοχόης, ἀλλ' αἱ Μοῦσαι καθάπερ
κρατῆρα νηφάλιον ἐν μέσῳ προθέμεναι τὸν λόγον, ᾧ πλεῖστον ἡδονῆς ἅμα καὶ παιδιᾶς καὶ
σπουδῆς ἔνεστιν, ἐγείρουσι τούτῳ καὶ κατάρδουσι καὶ διαχέουσι τὴν φιλοφροσύνην, ἐῶσαι
τὰ πολλὰ τὴν οἰνοχόην ἀτρέμα κεῖσθαι "κρατῆρος ὕπερθεν", ὅπερ ἀπηγόρευσεν Ἡσίοδος ἐν
τοῖς πίνειν μᾶλλον ἢ διαλέγεσθαι δυναμένοις. Il testo di riferimento è quello di F. L C
(ed.), 1997.
intende, l'unione sessuale (συνουσία καὶ μῖξις) e Dioniso non è solo l'atto
di bere del vino (μέθη καὶ οἶνος); essi sono al contrario qualcosa di più:
aetto (φιλοφροσύνη), desiderio (πόθος), incontro (ὁμιλία) e frequentazione
(συνήθεια πρὸς ἀλλήλους) che si realizzano rispettivamente attraverso l'unione
amorosa e il vino66 . Afrodite, infatti, è δημιουργός di concordia (ὁμοφροσύνη)
e amore (φιλία) tra uomini e donne, in quanto unisce e fonde (συμμιγνύουσα
καὶ συντήκουσα)67 le anime attraverso il piacere; Dioniso invece ammorbidisce
e inumidisce con il vino (μαλάσσων καὶ ἀνυγραίνων) il carattere dei πολλοί ,
producendo comunione (σύγκρασις ) e amicizia (φιλία) tra individui non legati
da particolari vincoli, ma da una certa conoscenza. Questa azione è inne
paragonata come al solito a quella della amma sui metalli, come suggerisce
anche l'uso dei verbi συντήκω e μαλάσσω 68 .
Se i πολλοί hanno bisogno del vino per stabilire un rapporto di amabile
aetto (φιλοφροσύνη) mentre la coppia dell'amore, ai saggi basta solo il λόγος
che le Muse orono loro come un cratere sobrio (νηφάλιος), facendo sì che
il mestolo rimanga inutilizzato sopra il cratere. Plutarco cita per suragare
la sua aermazione l'autorità di Hes., Op. 744, il quale sostiene appunto che
se non si è in grado di conversare, ma si pensa solo a bere, non si riesce a
tenere mai fermo il mestolo con cui si attingeva il vino dal cratere69 . Nel fr.
93 Sandbach egli fornisce però una interpretazione diversa della prescrizione
esiodea ora intesa nel senso che i saggi non antepongono l'interesse personale
a quello comune; il cratere, infatti, è disposto al centro della tavola, mentre i
commensali si servono attingendo ognuno singolarmente dal mestolo70 .
Questa seconda interpretazione del testo esiodeo se da un lato testimonia
la libertà con cui il materiale antico veniva piegato da Plutarco alle esigenze del
suo ragionamento, è dall'altro coerente con la concezione della φιλία e dell'ἔρως
66 Si nota nel ragionamento plutarcheo la volontà di interpretare il testo in chiave
moraleggiante.
67 Con συμμιγνύω si indica proprio l'unione sessuale; Ar., Av. 700 attribuisce questa
operazione ad Eros.
68 Il verbo συντήκω compare due volte nel discorso di Aristofane contenuto nel Simposio
platonico (192d – e) per indicare la condizione di completa compenetrazione delle anime che
gli amanti si augurano di raggiungere; che anche Platone stesse pensando alla fusione dei metalli
è testimoniato dal riferimento ad Efesto, il cui intervento gli innamorati auspicano per essere
saldati insieme completamente. Questa immagine ritorna in Amat. cap. 21 (767D-E) dove
συντήκω compare insieme a συνάγω (cfr. il testo infra, n. 73) proprio sul modello platonico
sopra indicato; in Platone lo stesso verbo è accompagnato da συμφυσάω e συνέρχομαι . I l
ricorso a termini composti con la preposizione σύν, anche sul piano retorico, serve a Plutarco
per sottolineare la comunione spirituale che caratterizza la φιλία e, in particolare, il rapporto
coniugale; per questi aspetti della tecnica retorica plutarchea cfr. R. G A,
2000. Per μαλάσσω cfr. in Plutarco, Quaest. conv. 619A, 660C, 802B; anche questo verbo è
utilizzato in greco in riferimento all'ambito della metallurgia (cfr. Pl., R. 411b; Arist., Mete .
383a 31).
69 Il verso completo di Esiodo è μηδέ ποτ' οἰνοχόην τιθέμεν κρητῆρος ὕπερθεν.
70 Τοιοῦτον οὖν καὶ τὸ ἐπιτιθέναι τῷ κρατῆρι τὴν οἰνοχόην συμβολικὸν παίδευμα· τουτέστι
μὴ ἐπίπροσθεν ἄγειν τοῦ κοινοῦ τὸ ἴδιον. Per il κρατῆρ ἐν μέσῳ come πηγὴ φιλοφροσύνης ,
che è lo scopo del simposio, cfr. anche Plu., Alex. Magn. fort. 329C; Def. or. 421A; Quaest. conv.
615A-B, 643B.
325
Krasis oinou diken. Amore coniugale e linguaggio del simposio nell'Amatorius di Plutarco.
che emergono rispettivamente dall'Introduzione al IV libro delle Quaestiones
convivales e dall'Amatorius. In entrambi i testi, infatti, si sottolinea l'aspetto
comunitario e collettivo, e quindi di rilievo a livello sociale, del simposio da
un lato e dell'amore coniugale dall'altro71 ; le due esperienze vanno vissute non
in maniera egoistica e individualistica, ma nell'ottica della condivisione e della
μετριότης72 : nel caso dell'amore coniugale Plutarco osserva, infatti, che nelle
prime fasi della vita in comune i due componenti della coppia distingueranno
tra "ciò che è mio" e "ciò che mio non è", ma poi condivideranno tutto e
diventeranno una sola anima, secondo il proverbio "tutto è comune tra gli
amici"73 .
Se nel Septem sapientium convivium è prerogativa solo del saggio quella
di realizzare la φιλοφροσύνη senza bisogno del vino, ma solo con le Muse,
cioè con il λόγος 74 , nell'Amatorius Plutarco sembra superare questa posizione
eccessivamente intellettualistica e austera che parrebbe relegare il sapiente
in un mondo privo di piacere e riservare il vino ai πολλοί che non sono in
grado di trarre benecio dal retto uso della ragione, per proporre una forma
più "umana" e più concreta di saggezza, in cui l'istinto non viene del tutto
cancellato o morticato, ma continua a sussistere e ad esprimersi, seppure
temperato dal λόγος 75 ; la κοινωνία ἐρωτική risulta pertanto ora l'espressione
più alta di una formazione intellettuale e spirituale che non nega le passioni del
corpo, ma ne placa gli ardori con l'aiuto della ragione76 e della cultura, ovvero
del rispetto della tradizione e trova espressione in uno stile di vita equilibrato
e decoroso77 .
71 Cfr. anche G. T, 2008, pp. 713-6. Plutarco sembra condividere il pensiero di
Arist., EN VIII 1155 a 22-23, secondo cui la φιλία tiene unite le città.
72 Cfr. Quaest. conv. 615A. Secondo Pl., R. 462c la concordia dello stato nasce proprio
quando i cittadini sono d'accordo nel dire "questo è mio, questo non è mio"; quando tale identità
di interessi viene meno si apre la strada pericolosa verso la discordia civile.
73 Amat. 767D: Ὧι δ' ἂν Ἔρως ἐπισκήψῃ <τ' ἄφνω> καὶ ἐπιπνεύσῃ, πρῶτον μὲν ἐκ τῆς
Πλατωνικῆς πόλεως "τὸ ἐμὸν" ἕξει καὶ "τὸ οὐκ ἐμόν"·οὐ γὰρ ἁπλῶς "κοινὰ τὰ φίλων" <οὐδ'
ἐρώντων>, ἀλλ' οἳ τοῖς σώμασιν ὁριζόμενοι τὰς ψυχὰς βίᾳ συνάγουσι καὶ συντήκουσι, μήτε
βουλόμενοι δύ'εἶναι μήτε νομίζοντες. Cfr. anche Ad. et am. 65A; Frat. am. 490E. Il modello di
riferimento è Arist., EN VIII 1162a 23.
74 Per la svalutazione plutarchea del ruolo del vino nel percorso verso la losoa cfr. le
riessioni di M. D, 2007, pp. 49-50.
75 Il Septem sapientium convivium viene datato al decennio 80-90 d.C. da K. Z, 1965,
p. 294, mentre l'Amatorius per la complessità della sua struttura narrativa e per la profondità della
riessione è considerata un'opera della maturità, se non addirittura una delle ultime composte
dall'autore (cfr. R. F, 1980, pp. 7-11; C. P. J, 1966, in part. p. 72, dove l'opuscolo
è datato agli anni successivi al 96 d.C.).
76 Cfr. anche Coniug. praec. 138F: [...] τὸν ἀπὸ σώματος καὶ ὥρας ὀξὺν ἔρωτα τῶν νεογάμων
ἀναφλεγόμενον δεῖ μὴ διαρκῆ μηδὲ βέβαιον νομίζειν, ἂν μὴ περὶ τὸ ἦθος ἱδρυθεὶς καὶ τοῦ
φρονοῦντος ἁψάμενος ἔμψυχον λάβη διάθεσιν.
77 Plutarco polemizza con l'etica stoica, che predicava la svalutazione totale delle passioni,
mentre tendeva a rivalutare la μετριοπάθεια peripatetica: su questi temi cfr. D. B, 2003 (1969),
pp. 359-72; F. B, 2005; F. F, 2008; sul concetto di "medietà" nel campo della morale
cfr. A. B, 2003; A. B, 2007, pp. 223-64. In particolare, per il ragionamento che
si è n qui svolto, risulta di un certo rilievo che in Virt. mor. 451C-D nel sostenere che quanti
temono le passioni non le eliminano del tutto, ma le moderano (κεραννύουσι), proprio come
Il costante ricorso nei testi analizzati ad immagini tratte dall'ambito
simposiale e al lessico ad esso relativo non rientra soltanto nella più generale
tendenza di Plutarco a creare un linguaggio polisemico in cui lo slittamento
del signicato di un termine da un piano metaforico all'altro contribuisce ad
accrescere la densità concettuale della sua prosa. Al contrario, il riferimento
all'istituzione del simposio si fonda su solide basi ideologiche facilmente
condivisibili e per questo motivo di più facile impatto sui destinatari delle opere.
Pertanto nell'Amatorius l'immagine della κρᾶσις di acqua e vino utilizzata per
rappresentare la riuscita unione matrimoniale tra uomo e donna, anche in virtù
degli autorevoli modelli losoci di riferimento che si possono individuare in
controluce (platonici innanzitutto), poteva essere funzionale al messaggio che
Plutarco voleva veicolare nel segno di una complessiva difesa delle tradizioni
culturali e dei più genuini costumi ellenici. Infatti il simposio, che agli occhi dei
greci era da sempre il luogo in cui i desideri e le pulsioni naturali (il mangiare,
il bere, il sesso), attraverso le fasi di un rituale ormai codicato e riconosciuto
dall'intera società78 , subivano una decantazione in nome dell'ideale estetico
ed etico del τὸ μέτριον, veniva ad essere il termine di paragone più ecace a
rappresentare, anche sul piano formale, il giusto equilibrio tra corpo e spirito,
tra istinto e ragione, tra φύσις e παιδεία, che è in ultima analisi il modello di
vita proposto da Plutarco nel suo opuscolo e probabilmente nell'intero corpus
delle sue opere.
ri f e r i m e n T i b i b l i o g r a f i c i
A, R. M.ª, "La Mujer, el Amor y el Matrimonio en la Obra de Plutarco",
Faventia, 12-13 (1990-1991) 307-25.
_____"La amistad según Plutarco: los Moralia", in L. T (ed.), Scritti in
onore di Italo Gallo, Napoli, 2002, pp. 7-25.
A, E., "Eunoia bei Plutarch: von den Praecepta Gerendae Reipublicae zu
den Viten", in A. G. N (ed.), 2008, pp. 365-86.
A M, R., "La inuencia de la tradición clásica en la reexión
de Plutarco sobre la amistad", in M. J . (eds.), Plutarc a la
seva època: paideia i Societat. Actas del VIII Simposio Internacional de
la Sociedad Española de Plutarquistas (Barcelona, 6-8 de Noviembre,
2003), Barcelona, 2005, pp. 185-90.
chi teme di ubriacarsi non rovescia il vino, Plutarco ricorra proprio alla similitudine con l'ambito
del simposio e al lessico relativo; in 452B inoltre osserva che se si estirpassero tutte le passioni
la ragione diventerebbe inerte come un nocchiero quando gli viene a mancare il vento; Plutarco
ricorre di nuovo alla similitudine tra le passioni e il vento, che, come si è visto, è utilizzata anche
nell'Amatorius.
78 Cfr. J. M, 1931; H. L, 19692 ; H. L, 2006, pp. 103-16; M. V, 1983;
L. E. R, 1983; F. L, 1989; P. S-P, 1987; O. M, 1989; O .
M, 20077 ; D. M, 2001; L. D B & S. B, 2002, p. 40.
327
Krasis oinou diken. Amore coniugale e linguaggio del simposio nell'Amatorius di Plutarco.
B, D., "Les Stoïciens et l'amour", REG, 76 (1963) 55-63.
_____ Plutarque et le Stoïcisme, Paris, 1969 (si cita dall'edizione italiana, D.
B., Plutarco e lo stoicismo, a cura di A. B, presentazione di R .
R, Milano, 2003).
B D, P., "Entre o casamento e a comunidade: imagens, modelos e
funções do afecto conjugal", in J.-M. N I & R. L L
(eds.), 2007, pp. 545-56.
B, A., "L'amore: Plutarco contro Epicuro", in I. G (ed.),
Aspetti dello stoicismo e dell'epicureismo in Plutarco. Atti del II convegno
di studi su Plutarco, (Ferrara, 2-3 Aprile, 1987), Ferrara, 1988, pp.
89-108.
B, F. , " Apatheia e metriopatheia in Plutarco", in A. C (ed.),
Plutarco e l'età ellenistica. Atti del Convegno Internazionale di Studi
(Firenze, 23-24 settembre 2004), Firenze, 2005, pp. 385-400.
B, A., "Aristotele pitagorico? La concezione della medietà nel De
virtute morali di Plutarco", Rivista di losoa neoscolastica, 95 (2003)
3-36.
_____ "La teoria plutarchea della virtù tra platonismo, pitagorismo e
aristotelismo", in P. V C & F. F (eds.), Plutarco
e la cultura della sua età. Atti del X Convegno plutarcheo (Fisciano -
Paestum, 27-29 Ottobre, 2005), Napoli, 2007, pp. 223-64.
B, J.,"Plutarch on the Role of Eros in a Marriage", in A. G. N
(ed.), 2008, pp. 689-99.
B, A., "Le Dialogue sur l'Amour de Plutarque et les Dialogues de Platon
sur l'amour", in A. P J . (eds.), 1999, pp. 201-13.
B, J., "Trois Eros? Comment Plutarque réecrit Platon", in A. P
J . (eds.), 1999, pp. 215-26.
_____"Le paradigme de la crase dans la pensée de Plutarque", Ploutarchos, n.s.
4, (2006/2007) 3-17.
B, F. E., "Plutarch's Erotikos: e Drag Down Pulled Up", in M .
M . (eds.), Plutarch. Robert Flacelière. In Memoriam, ICS
13,2, Urbana, 1988, pp. 457-71 = F. E. B, 1998, pp. 13-27.
_____"e Boiotia of Plutarch's Erotikos beyond the shadow of Athens", in
A. C (ed.), Proceedings of the 2nd Meeting of the Society of
Boeotian Studies, Athens, 1995, pp. 1109-17 = F. E. B, 1998, pp.
50-8.
_____ Relighting the Souls. Studies in Plutarch, in Greek Literature, Religion, and
Philosophy, and in the New Testament Background, Stuttgart, 1998.
B, M., "El debate entre los dos amores en la literatura imperial", in M.
A R . (eds.), Epieikeia. Studia Graeca in memoriam
Jesús Lens Tuero, Granada, 2000, pp. 53-73.
C S, R. , "El Amatorius de Plutarco y la locura amorosa", in
F. R. A – A. M (eds.), Actas del IX Congreso Español de
Estudios Clásicos, vol. IV, Madrid, 1998, pp. 95-100.
C, J. C., "L'amore è un dardo. Le ragioni dell'omosessualità in
Aristotele e Plutarco", in A. P J . (eds.), 1999, pp.
567-82.
C, M. , La «malattia d'amore» dall'Antichità al Medioevo, Roma,
1976.
C, A., "Amatorius: Plutarch's platonic Departure from the Peri Gamou
Literature", in A. P J . (eds.), 1999, pp. 288-97.
D'I, G., "Omosessualità e pederastia in Plutarco", in J.-M. N
I & R. L L (eds.), 2007, pp. 467-76.
D, M., Filosoa del vino, con una prefazione di G. G, Milano,
2007.
D B, L. B, S., Oinos. Il vino nella letteratura greca, Roma,
2002.
D, A. I., De comparationibus et metaphoris apud Plutarchum, Traiecti ad
Rhenum, 1892.
F, B., "Soziologisches und Sozialgeschichtliches zu Erotik, Liebe
und Geschlechterverhältnis", in H. G . (eds.), 2006,
pp. 236-73.
F, F., "Moderatismo etico e controllo delle passioni in Plutarco", in G.
G (ed.), Le emozioni dei loso antichi, Catania, 2008, pp. 135-62.
F, R., (ed.), Plutarque. Œuvres morales, tome X, Dialogue sur
l'amour, Paris, 1980, pp. 1-107 (il volume contiene anche le Amatoriae
Narrationes, a cura di M. C).
F, M., Le souci de soi. Histoire de la sexualité 3, Paris, 1984 (si cita
dall'edizione italiana, M. F., La cura di sé. Storia della sessualità 3, trad. di
L. G, Milano, 1985, 20079 ).
F, J. C., Philia. La notion d'amitié dans la philosophie antique, Paris, 1974.
F, F., "Platonisme et Patrios Pistis dans le Discours Central (chs. 13-20)
de l'Érotikos", in A. P J . (eds.), 1999, pp. 343-55.
_____"Göttlichkeit und Glaube. Personliche Gottesbeziehung im Spätwerk
Plutarchs", in R. H–L (ed.), Gott und die Götter bei Plutarch.
Götterbilder – Gottesbilder – Weltbilder, Berlin/New York, 2005, pp. 111-37.
329
Krasis oinou diken. Amore coniugale e linguaggio del simposio nell'Amatorius di Plutarco.
_____"L'Érotikos : un éloge du Dieu Éros", Ploutarchos, n.s. 3 (2005/2006) 63-
101.
_____ (ed.), Plutarque, Érotikos. Dialogue sur l'amour, Paris, 2008.
G C, R. J., "Belleza y grandeza del amor conyugal", in J. G. M
C . (eds.), 1999, pp. 233-42.
G L, J. , "Relaciones personales en Moralia de Plutarco: familia,
amistad y amor", en A. P J – G. C (eds.), Estudios
sobre Plutarco: obra y tradición, Málaga, pp. 105-122.
G A, R., "Le parole dell'amicizia. Prassi retorica nel De
amicorum multitudine", in L. V S (ed.), Rhetorical eory
and Praxis in Plutarch, Acta of the IVth International Congress of the
International Plutarch Society (Leuven, July 3-6, 1996), Louvain-
Namur, 2000, pp. 225-35.
G, G., "Problemi testuali nei Moralia I", in I. G (ed.), Sulla
tradizione manoscritta dei Moralia di Plutarco. Atti del Convegno
(Salerno, 4-5 Dicembre, 1986), Salerno, 1988.
G, F. T., A Grammar of the Greek Papyri of the Roman and Byzantine
Periods, vol. I: Phonology, Milano, 1976.
G B, P., "El amor en Plutarco: la necesaria corrección platónica
de Platón", in J.-M.ª N I & R. L L (eds.), 2007,
pp. 123-32.
G, H., "Einführung, Text, Übersetzung und Anmerkungen", in H.
G . (eds.), 2006, pp. 3-188.
G, H. . (eds.), Plutarch. Dialog über die Liebe, Amatorius,
Tübingen, 2006.
J, C. P., "Towards a cronology of Plutarch's works", JRS, 56 (1966) 61-
74.
L , H., Sexual Life in Ancient Greece, London, 19692 .
_____L'amore al banchetto , in C. C (ed.), L'amore in Grecia, Roma/Bari,
2006.
L, F., L'immaginario del simposio greco, Roma/Bari, 1989 (ed. or. F.
L., Un ot d'images. Une esthètique du banquet grec, Paris, 1987).
L C, F. ( ed.), Plutarco, Il convito dei sette sapienti (introduzione, testo
critico, traduzione e commento), "Corpus Plutarchi Moralium, 26",
Napoli, 1997.
M, G. - T, A. (edd.), Plutarco, Precetti coniugali (introduzione,
testo critico, traduzione e commento), "Corpus Plutarchi Moralium, 6",
Napoli, 1990.
M J., H. M., "Plutarch, Plato and Eros", e Classical Bulletin, 60.4
(1984) 82-8.
M, J. , Symposium. Die Geschichte einer literarischen Form, Paderborn,
1931.
M, A., "Euripide, Cycl. 608 ss.", QUCC n. s. 53. 2 (1996) 67-72.
M C, J. G. . (eds.), Plutarco, Dioniso y el vino. Actas del VI
Simposio español sobre Plutarco (Cádiz, 14-16 de Mayo, 1998), Madrid,
1999.
M , O., Sympotika. e papers of a Symposium on the symposion, Oxford,
1989.
_____"L'uomo e le forme di socialità", in J. P. V (ed.), L'uomo greco ,
Roma/Bari, 1991, 20077 , pp. 219-56.
M, D., Il simposio nel suo sviluppo storico, Roma/Bari, 2001.
N I, J. M.a & L L, R. (eds.), El amor en Plutarco. Actas del
IX Simposio español sobre Plutarco (28-30 Septiembre, 2006), León,
2007.
N, A. G. (ed.), e Unity of Plutarch's Work. Moralia emes in the
Lives, Features of the Lives in the Moralia, Berlin/New York, 2008.
_____ "Plutarch on Women and Marriage", WS, 11 (1997) 27-88.
O, J., "Eros in Plutarchs moralischer Psychologie", in H. G
. (eds.), 2006, pp. 208-35.
O V, A. I., "El mundo divino, objeto de una disputa: Plutarco
y el epicureismo", in J. G L & E. C D (eds.),
Estudios sobre Plutarco: paisaje y naturaleza. Actas del III Simposio
Español sobre Plutarco (Murcia, 1990), Madrid, 1991, pp. 79-87.
P, C., "Plutarch's Advice to the Bride and Groom: Traditional Wisdom
through a Philosophic Lens", in S. P (ed.), Plutarch's Advice to
the Bride and A Consolation to His Wife, New York, 1999, pp. 128-37.
P J, A. . (eds.), Plutarco, Platón y Aristóteles. Actas del V
Congreso Internacional de la I. P. S. (Madrid – Cuenca, 4-7 de Mayo,
1999), Madrid, 1999.
P , S., "Plutarch's Conversations on Love: Something Old, Something
New, Something Borrowed", in B. A . (eds.), Noctes Atticae.
34 Articles on Graeco-Roman Antiquity and its Nachleben. Studies Presented
to Jorgen Mejer on his Sixtieth Birthday (March 18, 2002), Copenhagen,
2002, pp. 226-33
P P, F., "El Banquete de Plutarco: ccion literaria o realidad
historica?", in J. G. M C . (eds.), 1999, pp. 379-92.
331
Krasis oinou diken. Amore coniugale e linguaggio del simposio nell'Amatorius di Plutarco.
R, R. (ed.), Stoici antichi. Tutti i frammenti, secondo la raccolta di H
A, Milano, 2002.
R, I., "La tematica dei matrimoni nello stoicismo romano: alcune
osservazioni", Ilu. Revista de ciencias de los religiones, 5 (2000) 145-62.
R C, M., "La imagen de la esposa como espejo del marido en los
Deberes del matrimonio de Plutarco", in J.-M.ª N I & R.
L L (eds.), 2007, pp. 575-81.
R , J. M., "Plutarch's Amatorius: a commentary on Plato's eories of Love?",
CQ, 51 (2001) 557-75.
R, L. E., "Il simposio greco arcaico e classico come spettacolo a se stesso",
Atti del VII Convegno di studio Spettacoli conviviali dall'antichità classica
alle corti italiane del '400, Viterbo, 1983, pp. 41-50.
S, F. H. (ed.), Plutarch's Moralia, vol. XV, Fragments, Cambridge,
Mass., London, 1987.
S, G., "Plutarco, l'epicureismo e l'amore. 'Citazioni' epicuree nelle
Quaestiones convivales e nell' Erotikòs di Plutarco", in J.- M.ª N
I & R. L L (eds.), 2007, pp. 179-86.
S, R., "Polemiche antiepicuree nell'Amatorius di Plutarco e
nell'Euboico di Dione di Prusa", in AA.VV., Aspetti del mondo classico:
lettura ed interpretazione dei testi, Seminari in collaborazione con
l'A.I.C.C. – sede di Salerno, Napoli, 2006, pp. 81-126.
_____ "Afrodite e la luna in Plut. Amat. 764B-D", in J.-M.ª N I &
R. L L (eds.), 2007, pp. 421-42.
S, A. M. (ed.), Plutarco, Conversazioni a tavola (libro quarto),
"Corpus Plutarchi Moralium, 34", Napoli, 2001.
S, G., Eros tiranno. Sessualità e sensualità nel mondo antico, Roma/Bari,
2003.
S-P, P., La cité au banquet, Lyon, 1987.
S, G., "Il fuoco d'amore. Storia di un topos dalla poesia greca arcaica
al romanzo bizantino. Il successo del topos in Callimaco, Teocrito e
Apollonio Rodio", in Maia, n.s., III (2006), pp. 449-63.
T, S.-T., A commentary on Plutarch's Table Talks, vol. II (books 4-6),
Götheborg, 1990.
_____"Plutarch's Views on Love", Ploutarchos, n.s. 2 (2004/2005) 107-122.
_____"Four terms of friendly emotion in Plutarch: φιλανθρωπία , φιλία , ἔρως ,
φιλοστοργία", in J. M. N I & R. L L (eds.), 2007,
pp. 187-97.
332
Rosario Scannapieco
T, G., "Integrating Marriage and Homonoia", in A. G. N
(ed.), 2008, pp. 701-18.
U P, M. H. T. C., "A philia conjugal na obra de Plutarco", in A.
A. N . (eds.), Eros e Philia na cultura grega. Actas de
Colóquio Internacional, Lisboa, 1995, pp. 225-37.
V S, M., "Amor y matrimonio en el Erótico de Plutarco", in
J.-M.a N I (ed.), Lógos hellenikós. Homenaje al Prof. Gaspar
Morocho Gayo, León, 2003, pp. 441-54.
V S , L., Twinkling and Twilight. Plutarch's reections on Literature,
Brussel, 1992.
_____"Plutarch on mania and its therapy", in J. G. M C .
(eds.), 1999, pp. 517-26.
V, M. (ed.), Poesia e simposio nella Grecia antica: guida storica e critica ,
Roma/Bari, 1983.
V C, A. & S Á, M. A., "El concepto de χάρις
en el Erótico de Plutarco", in J.-M.ª N I R. L L
(eds.), 2007, pp. 83-91.
W, P., "Plutarch on Women", Symbol. Osl., 74 (1999) 163-83.
W, B., Die Sprache Plutarchs von Chaeronea und die
pseudoplutarchischen Schriften, Straubing, 1895, (si cita dall'edizione
italiana, B. W., La lingua di Plutarco di Cheronea e gli scritti pseudoplutarchei,
a cura di G. I, con una premessa di I. G, Napoli, 1994).
Z, K., Plutarco, ed. it. a cura di B. Z, trad. di M. R. Z
R, Brescia, 1965.
333
Tragedy and Philanthropia in the Lives of Demosthenes and Cicero
T r a g e d y a n d p H i l a n T H r o p i a
i n T h e li v e S o f De m o S T H e n e S a n D ci c e r o
M V
University of Oporto
Abstract
e concept of philanthropia is often associated with that of compassion and characterizes,
ideally, the relations between the powerful and those who are found to be in a situation of
fragility and impotence. e intention of this study is to show how, in the Lives of Demosthenes
and Cicero, this notion of philanthropia takes on a tragic tone, one which is reinforced by the
allusions to Sophocles's Antigone, a play which seems to serve as an ethical frame of reference
for the evaluation of the protagonists' ethos in crucial moments of their lives.
In using the term φιλάνθρωπος to characterize the act that cost
Prometheus terrible divine punishment, Aeschylus, or whoever composed
the drama Prometheus Bound, dened the essence of the concept of
φιλανθρωπία as a disinterested feeling of friendship, or love of men, born
of the compassion for man's situation of abandonment and weakness1 .
Prometheus's act, since it is also a gesture of rebellion against the gods,
valorizes the human race, not only because it impedes its destruction by
Zeus and makes the light of civilization possible, but principally because
his altruism and compassion confer a certain dignity upon mortals. Coming
from a divinity whose stature is dierent from that of the gods of Olympus,
philanthropia is not, in its mythical origin, a divine sentiment that humans
are obliged to imitate, or it would not invite punishment. But still it seems,
on the human plane, to be a fundamental condition for the transformation of
chaos into order, barbarity into civilization. is conception of philanthropia
as a mark of civilization is one of the meanings of the word and its cognates
in Plutarch, as we know. It is not, however, the only one, though it would
seem to me that this is one of the fundamental semantic vectors for the
comprehension of this concept2 . One other sense which the word takes on in
Plutarch and which is truly central in his moral and political thinking could
be translated as "kindness", "generosity" or even "clemency". In this sense it
has to do with the relationship between governors and the governed, with
the attitudes towards defeated enemies and towards those who are found
to be in a situation of fragility and powerlessness. In this particular sense,
the concept of philanthropia already had a long history in the Greek poetic
tradition, even though the use of the word before the Hellenistic period was
rare. is is a history that perhaps begins with the Homeric Poems, but whose
1 Cf. Pr. 240 sqq.
2 On the various meanings the word recovers in Plutarch, see H. M. M J., 1961;
S.-T. T, 2007; J. R. F, 2008. Another word which is central in Plutarch's
thought and sometimes has a similar meaning is praotes. Cf. H. M. M J., 1960 and J.
R, 1979.
truly fertile period of exploration and development occurs in the tragedy of
the 5th century B.C.
Indeed, if it is in Prometheus Bound that the word, in its adjectival form
appears, as far as we know, for the rst time, there is no doubt that Sophoclean
tragedy presents us with a variety of characters whose attitudes and actions
can be translated as philanthropia, a feeling of understanding and kindness
to others. is feeling is ultimately based on the recognition of that which in
them carries the mark of the human condition and allows for a vision of the
other as close and similar. is philanthropia, this humanity, always associated
with the capacity for compassion, denes characters such as eseus in Oedipus
at Colonus, Neoptolemus in Philoctetes , Deianira in e Trachiniae, Ulysses in
Ajax, or, on the negative side, Creon of Oedipus at Colonus and Antigone.
e evocation of Greek tragedy in relation to this subject in Plutarch does
not derive from a simple association of ideas. Of course, we know that the
biographer knew the history of the tragedy well. is assumption rests upon
the various allusions and citations of passages, characters and playwrights
from Greek tragedy that we nd in his oeuvre, as well as from the tragic tone
in the narration of some of the Lives 3 . is fact that, in the rst instance,
attests to the importance of literary education in the Hellenistic paideia, is also
symptomatic of the prominence that the theatre still possessed in the cultural
life of the 1st century AD. And if the moralist Plutarch, inuenced by Plato,
does not acknowledge the educative role of tragedy and poetry in general
without reservations, the truth is that, parting company with the philosopher,
he does not reject the potential pedagogic quality of the emotions provoked
by dramatic works4 . From this we can arm that not only philosophy, but also
tragic poetry feed his ethical and moral convictions5 .
In the case of the Lives of Demosthenes and of Cicero, in addition to
presenting episodes that reect the closeness between the art of oratory and
3 Cf. P. de L, 1952. In spite of maintaining, in my view with some exaggeration, that
Plutarch reveals in his writings a reproving attitude toward tragedy, this author arms that "in
the Demetrius the allusions to drama are so persistent that the whole structure of the biography
appears to be conceived in terms of tragedy." Also J. M. M, 1988, speaks of a "tragic
atmosphere" in Life of Alexander and supports the notion that Plutarch "uses tragic coloring to
delineate the darker side of Alexander's character." See as well P. S, 2002.
4 e frequency with which the author employs the terms "tragic", "dramatic" and "theatrical"
in a negative way, in order to censor acts and attitudes of men, does not imply, contrary to what
Philip de Lacy thinks, a "condemnation of tragedy". It seems rather that these expressions would
have already taken on common forms for the translation of the hypocrisy of certain human acts,
and do not reveal any kind of aesthetic or moral value judgment in relation to tragedy as a form
of poetic expression. Indeed, we are dealing with classications that we still use in the same
semantic context without this indicating any kind of condemnation of the theatre.
5 Cf. P. C (2008). Not even in relation to the education of the young does Plutarch
reject the pedagogic value of poetry, as we know. In the treatise known as De audiendis poetis
(1a) the author declares that it is neither possible (δυνατόν) nor advantageous (ὠφέλιμον) to
keep the young from reading the poets. Rather he seeks to orient them with this type of reading,
defending (37b) the role of poetry as an introduction (προπαιδευθείς) to philosophy. On this
treatise see J. L. B, 2001.
335
Tragedy and Philanthropia in the Lives of Demosthenes and Cicero
that of theatre6, the author also compares the world of theatre with life itself7 .
And the way in which he narrates the sequence of some important events
emphasizes a tragic sense, which cannot be disassociated from the tragedy of
the 5th century BC. ere is one play in particular which stands out, functioning
as a kind of frame of ethical reference for evaluating the behavior of the orators
in central moments of their lives and, more generally, as a consideration of the
moral order that the author engages in with respect to the attitudes of the
powerful vis-à-vis the weaker. I am referring to Antigone by Sophocles, cited in
the narration of the circumstances surrounding the death of Demosthenes, and
in the Synkrisis, with respect to Cicero's performance as a statesman8 . Keeping
in mind the respective political and governmental responsibilities that both
orators had, in dierent degrees, during their lifetimes, the connection to a play
whose central conict turns upon questions related to the exercise of power,
the application of the law and the possible conicts between human and divine
laws seems natural. Indeed, it is not by chance that nearly all of the occurrences
of the word philanthropia and its cognates in these Lives refer precisely to
the eld of power and to how whoever exercises it treats his subjects9 . e
fact is that philanthropia represents an act of will and of freedom, on the part
of a person of superior social and political status who, for this reason, nds
himself in an advantageous position in relation to others. Likewise, it is for
this reason that philanthropia seems to be the human act par excellence, since
only the reason and the compassion of man are capable of dominating that
which by nature is still of an animal order: oppression, rage and the desire for
vengeance.
I will begin with an example that clearly illustrates the point, taken from
the Life of Demosthenes; without referring directly to the play, it nevertheless
allows us to establish a correlation between philanthropia, power and how
best to deal with a dead enemy. It is the passage when Plutarch criticizes the
unworthy reaction of the Athenians and of the orator himself to the death of
Philip of Macedon. He says the following (22. 2-4):
εὐθὺς οὖν ἔθυον εὐαγγέλια καὶ στεφανοῦν ἐψηφίσαντο Παυσανίαν, καὶ
προῆλθεν ὁ Δημοσθένης ἔχων λαμπρὸν ἱμάτιον ἐστεφανωμένος, ἑβδόμην
ἡμέραν τῆς θυγατρὸς αὐτοῦ τεθνηκυίας, ὡς Αἰσχίνης φησί, λοιδορῶν ἐπὶ
τούτῳ καὶ κατηγορῶν αὐτοῦ μισοτεκνίαν (…) ἐγὼ δ' ὡς μὲν ἐπὶ θανάτῳ
βασιλέως, ἡμέρως οὕτω καὶ φιλανθρώπως ἐν οἷς ευτύχησε χρησαμένου
πταίσασιν αὐτοῖς, στεφανηφορεῖν καλῶς εἶχε καὶ θύειν, οὐκ ἂν εἴποιμι·
πρὸς γὰρ τῷ νεμεσητῷ καὶ ἀγεννές, ζῶντα μὲν τιμᾶν καὶ ποιεῖσθαι πολίτην,
πεσόντος δ' ὑφ' ἑτέρου μὴ φέρειν τὴν χαρὰν μετρίως, ἀλλ' ἐπισκιρτᾶν τῷ
νεκρῷ καὶ παιωνίζειν, ὥσπερ αὐτοὺς ἀνδραγαθήσαντας.
6 Cf. Demosthenes 7; Cicero 5.
7 Cf. Demosthenes 22. 5.
8 is same play is cited in the Life of Phocion (1.5), though it is in order to reject the idea
contained in the verses cited.
9 e same thing happens for the same reason in the Lives of Alexander and Caesar.
At once, then, the Athenians proceeded to make thank-oerings for glad
tidings and voted a crown for Pausanias. And Demosthenes came forth in
public dressed in a splendid robe and wearing a garland on his head, although
his daughter had died only six days before, as Aeschines says, who rails at him
for this and denounces him as an unnatural father. (…) For my own part, I
cannot say that it was honourable in the Athenians to crown themselves with
garlands and oer sacrices to the gods on the death of a king who, in the midst
of his successes, had treated them so mildly and humanely in their reverses; for
besides provoking the indignation of the gods, it was also an ignoble thing to
honour him while he was alive and make him a citizen of Athens, but when he
had fallen by another's hand to set no bounds to their joy, nay, to leap, as it were,
upon the dead, and sing paeans of victory, as if they themselves had wrought a
deed of valour.10
In Plutarch's view, Philip had the renement and the nobility to deal
with the defeated with humanity (φιλανθρώπως), while, on the contrary, the
Athenians did not react in the same way once they had learned of his death.
Yet, since death is the inexorable destiny of all men, it is the moment which
most calls for a sentiment of moderation and of respect, exposing to divine
νέμεσις those who neglect it. is lesson was already to be found in Homer11 ,
but the problem is, as we know, central in Sophocles's Antigone.
Let us move on to the references to the tragedy. e rst one is found in
the Life of Demosthenes, inserted into the description of the circumstances of
his death. e whole episode is narrated in a way that accentuates the dramatic
and even theatrical side of the last moments of his life. Indeed, the orator
is presented to us as the protagonist of a miniature play whose secondary
characters are completely erased before the force of the principal. Only he
has the right to speak in direct discourse, while the author controls, through
narration, the cues of the other participants. is little drama even contains
irony – typical of Sophoclean tragedy – which is apparent whether in the
words of the protagonist, or, mainly, in the reaction of the Macedonian soldiers
who, in their ignorance and impiety, laugh at what they consider to be the fear
and the cowardliness of their enemy. Let us look at the episode.
In order to avoid the cruelty of the Macedonian Antipater and a humiliating
death at the hands of his opponents, Demosthenes had taken refuge as a
suppliant in the Temple of Poseidon on Calauria. A leader of the Macedonian
soldiers, by the name of Archias, known as φυγαδοθήρας (28. 3) and of whom
it was said that he had been an actor of tragedies and teacher of the famous
actor Polus, was sent by Antipater to capture him. He tried to persuade the
orator to leave the temple, addressing him with aability (φιλάνθρωπα) and
promising reconciliation with Antipater. Plutarch tells us that Demosthenes,
10 English translations are adapted from the Loeb edition of Plutarch's Lives.
11 In the Odyssey (22. 412) Odysseus censures Eurycleia when she wants to let loose a
shout of exaltation at the death of the suitors, saying: οὐχ ὁσίη κταμένοισιν ἐπ' ἀνδράσιν
εὐχετάασθαι.
337
Tragedy and Philanthropia in the Lives of Demosthenes and Cicero
on the night before, had had a dream in which he had competed for a prize
against Archias in a theatrical performance12 . e result had not favored the
orator because, in spite of captivating the audience, he was beaten due to the
poverty of the props and the quality of the set. And because of this he rejects
the promises of reconciliation with the Macedonian general with these words
(29. 3):
ὦ Ἀρχία, οὔθ' ὑποκρινόμενός με πώποτ' ἔπεισας, οὔτε νῦν πείσεις
ἐπαγγελλόμενος.
"O Archias, you did never convince me by your acting, nor will you now
convince me by your promises."
Demosthenes unmasks the philanthropia exhibited by his pursuer because
it bets neither the situation nor the character of the personage: the truth
is that, on the one hand, the moment demanded real feeling, as apposed to
contrived feeling, and, on the other, the mask of philanthropia did not match
the cruel ethos of Archias13 . When Archias, however, reverts to his true
character and begins to threaten him, Demosthenes then decides to take up
the theatrical game. Now it is he himself who takes on the role of the actor:
making it seem that he is writing a letter to his friends, he instead actually
swallows the poison that he had hidden in the calamus and remains sitting,
his head covered, exactly like a character out of an Aeschylian tragedy. e
scene stands out through the detail given by the narration of the movements
of Demosthenes, and the way they are described is strengthened by the use
of the aorist tense, which emphasizes the sequence of actions (29.4). Seeing
him like this, the soldiers call him weak and cowardly, and Archias tries to
persuade him once again, to which Demosthenes, already feeling the eects of
the poison responds, looking at him (ἀποβλέψας )14 :
οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις ἤδη τὸν ἐκ τῆς τραγῳδίας ὑποκρινόμενος Κρέοντα καὶ τὸ
σῶμα τουτὶ ῥίπτων ἄταφον.
"You cannot be too soon now," he said, "in playing the part of Creon in the
tragedy and casting this body out without burial."
If previously it was hypocrisy that he had denounced, now it is the
sacrilegious character of Archias's attitude that the orator prefers to underline,
evoking the gure of Creon who, in Antigone, prohibits the burial of Polynices
12 e dream is also a recurrent motif in some tragedies which, as in this scene, inuences the
actions of the dramatis personae. About the dreams in Plutarch, see F. E. B, 1975.
13 e situation recalls the episode in Oedipus at Colonus in which Creon hides his intention
to take Oedipus against his will to ebes by using words of apparent friendship and compassion.
Like Oedipus, the blind man whose logoi possess the capacity to see everything, Demosthenes,
trained in the art of words, easily picks apart such falsity.
14 e scene is full of dramatic clues like this one.
and condemns the young daughter of Oedipus for disobeying his decree. With
this example Demosthenes censures Archias and, by extension, Antipater and
the whole Macedonian cause, for having chosen, in the theatre of life, to play
the role of Creon, the powerful character, insensible to another's suering and
incapable of dealing in a dignied manner with a fellow human being, even
when he is dead, all of which adds up to an act of oence to the gods themselves.
In a certain way, is also the gure of Antigone that arises here, adding to the
tragedy of the moment. In fact, Demosthenes demonstrates the same capacity
for self-determination and a sense of courage equal to the tragic heroine, by
escaping, through his own devices, the humiliation of a dishonorable and cruel
death. is attitude will be praised by the biographer in the synkrisis with
which the telling of these Parallel Lives concludes.
e tragic framing of this episode seems, then, to have been inspired by
what Plutarch knew about the reaction of Demosthenes himself. Knowing
Archias's theatrical heritage, from that he takes the ironical opportunity to
accuse him of hypocrisy and inhumanity – the exact antithesis of philanthropia .
But there is no doubt that Plutarch, taking advantage of the parallelism with
the Sophoclean play suggested by the orator, develops and exploits it, creating
a scenic context of great dramatic force.
e other episode that I refer to above occurs in the synkrisis as a way for
Plutarch to recall the action of Cicero as a statesman and the way in which he
exercised power. is is what he says (52. 2-3):
ὃ δὲ δοκεῖ μάλιστα καὶ λέγεται τρόπον ἀνδρὸς ἐπιδεικνύναι καὶ βασανίζειν,
ἐξουσία καὶ ἀρχὴ πᾶν πάθος κινοῦσα καὶ πᾶσαν ἀποκαλύπτουσα κακίαν,
Δημοσθένει μὲν οὐχ ὑπῆρξεν … Κικέρων δὲ ταμίας εἰς Σικελίαν καὶ ἀνθύπατος
εἰς Κιλικίαν καὶ Καππαδοκίαν ἀποσταλείς, … πολλὴν μὲν ἐπίδειξιν ὑπεροψίας
χρημάτων ἐποιήσατο, πολλὴν δὲ φιλανθρωπίας καὶ χρηστότητος.
But what is thought and said most of all to reveal and test the character of a
man, namely power and authority, which rouses every passion and uncovers
every baseness, this Demosthenes did not have … whereas Cicero was sent
out as quaestor to Sicily, and as pro-consul to Cilicia and Cappadocia … and
gave many proofs of his contempt for wealth, and many of his humanity and
goodness.
is is not, of course, a direct reference to the Sophoclean play. Rather we
should note that it was a traditional thought attributed variously to some of the
Seven Sages15 . We may argue that it was perhaps this proverbial wisdom that
Plutarch had in mind, as the verbal forms δοκεῖ and λέγεται seem to indicate.
But the idea that only the exercise of power completely reveals the character of
a man is not echoed simply as a short maxim but developed into an extension
15 Diogenes Laertius (1. 77), for example, attributes the maxim power shows a man ( ἀρχὴ
ἄνδρα δείξει) to Pittacus.
339
Tragedy and Philanthropia in the Lives of Demosthenes and Cicero
that recalls Antigone 175-177. From the reader's point of view and given the
previous reference to the tragedy, this is a logical association. In that play the
thought is expressed by Creon, a situation that constitutes one of the ironies
of the tragedy, since that is the opinion voiced through the character himself
to whom that idea justly applies16 . But, taken up at the end of the narration,
these words show us the kind of morality that can be extracted from the Lives
of Demosthenes and of Cicero as they touch upon the practice of politics: the
action of governing requires an exemplariness of character which is reected
in the absence of greed, in honesty and in philanthropia. Indeed, it is in his
capacity to treat the other, the weaker one, with compassion and benevolence
that the ethos of a powerful man truly manifest itself, or rather, that his humanity
emerges freeing itself in this way from the bestiality that would animalize him.
Bestiality is precisely the attitude that the biographer denounces in another
passage, when he refers to the agreement between Octavius Augustus, Mark
Antony and Lepidus that resulted in the death of Cicero. Plutarch's words
(46.6) are well aimed and remind us of certain of ucydides's words with
respect to the excesses committed during the Peloponnesian War:
Οὕτως ἐξέπεσον ὑπὸ θυμοῦ καὶ λύσσης τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λογισμῶν, μᾶλλον
δ' ἀπέδειξαν ὡς οὐδὲν ἀνθρώπου θηρίον ἐστὶν ἀγριώτερον ἐξουσίαν πάθει
προσλαβόντος.
So far did anger and fury lead them to renounce their human sentiments,
or rather, they showed that no wild beast is more savage than man when his
passion is supplemented by power.
Philanthropia is, then, the complete antithesis of this: it is a rational
attitude that dominates unbridled and selsh passion, the ideal attitude of one
who governs, whose power does not manifest itself in the humiliation of the
weak, but in benevolence and clemency which are the signs of the nobility of
the soul.
But philanthropia is also a sense of compassion and of sympatheia based
on the recognition of a common destiny that aects all men. at is perhaps
why, at the end of the synkrisis, Plutarch appeals to the reader's humanity by
taking up the description of the death of Cicero in summary form. In fact,
this is hardly a dignied moment for evaluating the ethos of the orator. If
in certain traces of his personality, namely those which have to do with the
love of wealth, Cicero showed himself to be nobler than Demosthenes, his
end contrasts decisively with the dignity that Demosthenes showed before
inevitable death. Plutarch summarizes in brief but signicant and no less
dramatic brush strokes the sequence of events that led to the assassination of
Cicero in a context whose tragic tone derives less from the grandeur of the
personage than from the weakness of his character, as he ends of suering
16 Plutarch knows well this characteristic of Sophocles tragic style, to which he refers in De
audiendis poetis 27f.
340
Marta Várzeas
a dishonorable death after various attempts at escape. is image of an old
man who desperately tries to escape death, without the courage to accept and
confront it is the image of the sum of human misery for which, as in tragedy,
Plutarch proposes the best possible response – that of compassion (οἰκτίσαι ),
which is, in the end, the basis of philanthropia .
W o r k s c i T e d :
B, J. L., "A formação do leitor em Plutarco: poesia, losoa e educação
em De audiendis poetis", in J. R. F (ed.), Actas do Congresso
Plutarco Educador da Europa, Porto, 2002, pp. 197-211.
B, F. E ., "e Dreams in Plutarch's Lives", Latomus, 34.2 (1975) 336-
49.
C, P., "I poeti tragici maestri di virtù nelle opere di Plutarco", in J.
R. F . (eds.), Philosophy in society: Virtues and Values in
Plutarch, Leuven-Coimbra, 2008, pp. 65-74.
F, J. R., "La douce caresse de la philanthropia", in J. R. F
. (eds.), Philosophy in society: Virtues and Values in Plutarch, Leuven-
Coimbra, 2008, pp.99-105.
L, P. de, "Biography and Tragedy in Plutarch", AJPH, 73 (1952) 159-72.
M J., H. M., "e concept of Praotes in Plutarch's Lives", GRBS, 3
(1960) 65-73.
_____ "e Concept of Philanthropia in Plutarch's Lives", AJPh, 82 (1961)
164-75.
M, J. M., "Tragedy and Epic in Plutarch's Alexander", JHS, 108 (1988)
81-93.
R, J. de, La douceur dans la pensée grecque, Paris, 1979.
S, P. , "Alexandre educador ou o império da nitude", in J. R. Ferreira
(ed.), Actas do Congresso Plutarco Educador da Europa, Porto, 2002, pp.
93-102.
T, S T. , "Four Terms of Friendly Emotion in Plutarch:
Φιλανθρωπία, φιλία , ἔρως , φιλοστοργία", in J. M. N I R.
L L (eds.), El Amor en Plutarco. Actas del IX Simposio español
sobre Plutarco (28-30 Septiembre, 2006) León, 2007, pp. 187-97.
341
Amistad, Filantropía y Eros en la Paideia Plutarquea: la Vida de Catón el Viejo
am i s T a d , f i l a n T r o p í a y e r o S e n l a p a i D e i a p l u T a r q u e a :
l a vi D a D e ca T ó n e l vi e j o 1
V M. R P
Universidad de Zaragoza
Abstract
e present contribution reviews some ethical and emotional criteria that underlie the Life
of Cato the Elder in order to determine the real meaning of the Plutarchan paideia . In that
sense, Plutarch shows that friendship, philanthropy and eros constitute (in praesentia aut in
absentia) a proper manner to describe Cato's personality and education, which must improve as
he becomes increasingly familiar with the above-mentioned Greek concepts. Finally, Plutarch
seems to maintain that the right use of these concepts has an eect on both the moral and the
political education of the statesman.
En el estado actual de la investigación plutarquea, podemos desprender
ciertas observaciones sobre el programa educativo del biógrafo. Efectivamente,
Plutarco presenta el inventario de categorías éticas al servicio de una
planicación didáctica, de una paideia político-moral que revierta en benecio
del lector cuya instrucción integral se pretende. Al respecto, Plutarco traza un
diseño de morfología retórica que, por expresarlo con términos acuñados en
corrientes de hermenéutica literaria, se articula en torno a un triple eje: emisor,
mensaje y receptor. De este modo, el emisor (es decir, el biógrafo como autor)
exhibe una retórica moral o retórica de la virtud – expresado en palabras del
profesor Stadter – fomentada en el bagaje retórico-escolar del propio Plutarco2 ;
el mensaje (o sea, el personaje concretamente implicado) es sometido a una
moralización literaria merced a la caracterización que el héroe biograado
experimenta con la educación recibida, con sus acciones y con el ejercicio de
la palabra; por último, el receptor (el lector destinatario de la obra) aprehende
el legado de una paideia ecaz, la cual contribuirá a sellar la personalidad
de un ciudadano – futuro mandatario acaso – capaz, discretamente crítico y
cómodamente integrado en el sistema político.
A decir verdad, como ha explicado inteligentemente P. Stadter, el biógrafo
expone sus posiciones ético-políticas ante un público de relaciones con el
poder frecuentemente estrechas3 : este factor y la comprometida situación
vivida en época de Domiciano reclamaban, con Trajano, unos modos públicos
de mesura, la prudencia del posibilismo histórico, un equilibrio en el fondo
y en la forma de hacer política. El caso es que los nuevos tiempos exigían
nuevas soluciones; y Plutarco, vocacionalmente adepto al platonismo medio,
propuso con sagacidad categorías doctrinales que conciliaran su adscripción
losóca y el pragmatismo recabado de la nueva política. Ello explica, a la
1 El presente artículo se ha beneciado del Proyecto HUM 2007-64772, nanciado por la
DGI española.
2 P. A. S, 2000.
3 P. A. S, 2000, pp. 493-4.
342
Vicente M. Ramón Palerm
postre, que el biógrafo sugiera para el gobernante cabal las virtudes cardinales
de la ἀνδρεία, la φρόνησις, la σωφροσύνη y la δικαιοσύνη, es decir el valor,
la sensatez, la prudencia y la justicia, criterios morales que ha estudiado
modélicamente la profesora F. Frazier4 ; y explica también que estas virtudes
presenten su correlato en maneras suaves y atemperadas como la πρᾳότης, la
φιλανθρωπία y la ἐπιείκεια, o sea la delicadeza, la lantropía humanitaria y la
generosidad práctica. En suma, he aquí la adecuación de la forma y el fondo en
las virtudes de los héroes biograados, un principio axiomático que conforma
la educación del buen estadista en la arquitectura de la paideia plutarquea y, de
paso, prescribe el ennoblecimiento ético-político para el lector amigo5 .
Por mi parte, no insistiré aquí en el papel, capital sin duda, que Plutarco
conere al sistema educativo en la promoción correcta del individuo6 . Quiero
decir que no procede demorarme en esas virtudes de fondo, por lo demás bien
reseñadas, que singularizan (in praesentia o in absentia) la instrucción y condición
moral del mandatario correspondiente. Sin embargo, es momento de atenerme
a algunas de las virtudes formales que, bien imbricadas, deben complementar
y acompasar a las cardinales en la trayectoria de una personalidad denida
y paradigmática, como emulación moral para las nuevas generaciones de
políticos. Permítaseme que lo exprese de este modo: si la educación académica
y convencional se mueve en tres niveles operativos que, como queda dicho,
afectan al emisor-autor, al mensaje-personaje y al receptor-lector, nos las vemos
ahora con una educación sentimental y concerniente asimismo a los tres niveles
citados. Dicho en términos modernos, la inteligencia emocional que también
deende Plutarco constituye una declaración programática y persuasiva que
dene al autor, caracteriza al personaje y alecciona al lector sobre las bondades
de la misma en un doble sentido: como valor intrínsecamente ético y como
instrumento de seducción para el arte de la política. Por lo demás, está escrito
que, a juicio de Plutarco, el estadista de envergadura debe serlo, sí, y debe
parecerlo en el entramado de sus relaciones sociales o afectivas7 .
Pues bien, con el propósito de ilustrar el tema que nos ocupa, me ha
parecido conveniente traer a colación la gura de M. Catón, cuya vida traza
Plutarco en una combinación translúcida y sutil de aspectos positivos y
negativos sobre la prosopografía del héroe romano. Y es que, dada la técnica
compositiva que observamos, esta biografía merece una ponderación exquisita
en el quehacer literario de Plutarco8 . En efecto, una panorámica sobre la
estructura de la biografía revela incidencias de interés, ya que la consideración
de las categorías ético-emocionales en que nos hemos detenido (la amistad,
la lantropía, el eros) perlan con maestría la semblanza de Catón y destilan
4 F. F, 1996, pp. 177 sqq.
5 T. D, 2007/2008, deende una lectura de las Vidas en clave losóco-moral.
6 Cf. algunos trabajos recientes y signicativos sobre la cuestión: A. P J, 2002;
T. D , 2005; S.-T. T, 2005.
7 Cf. A. P J, 2002.
8 M. B, 2000, p. 20 (y n. 28), indica sin ambages: "e life of the elder Cato certainly
ranks as one of Plutarch's best".
343
Amistad, Filantropía y Eros en la Paideia Plutarquea: la Vida de Catón el Viejo
las admoniciones pertinentes para las enseñanzas político-morales del lector.
Se da la circunstancia añadida de que las observaciones sobre la educación
sentimental y la ductilidad de las maneras personales en Catón se adecuan
perfectamente a los pormenores de su educación convencional. Veámoslo con
un ejemplo singular: una tónica del relato plutarqueo consiste en deslizar la
interpretación de que Catón (cuya fama era proverbial en la conciencia colectiva
del hombre romano) limó las asperezas de su educación gracias a los contactos
que experimentó con el mundo y las letras de Grecia. Sobre el particular, resulta
atractivo el pasaje en que Plutarco reere el cambio de orientación intelectual
– en un proceso de mímesis – que observa nuestro personaje tras su encuentro
con el pitagórico Nearco (2, 3-6): "En la época en que Fabio Máximo tomó la
ciudad de Tarento, Catón, aún muy joven, se hallaba en la campaña bajo sus
órdenes. Allí trabó amistad con un tal Nearco, extranjero de la escuela de los
pitagóricos, y se apresuró a participar de sus enseñanzas. Una vez que escuchó
a este hombre pronunciarse sobre los temas que ha tratado también Platón,
quien calica el placer como el mayor señuelo del mal y el cuerpo como la
primera desgracia del alma, cuya liberación y puricación se logran mediante
la reexión, que es lo que más la aleja y la disocia de las sensaciones del cuerpo,
sintió aún más la inclinación por la austeridad y la continencia. Por lo demás,
se dice que comenzó demasiado tarde a instruirse en la cultura griega, que su
edad era ya muy avanzada cuando cogió entre sus manos libros en griego y
que para el ejercicio de la retórica sacó algo de provecho de Tucídides, y más
de Demóstenes. No obstante, su prosa está bastante salpicada de proverbios e
historias de los griegos, y en sus máximas y sentencias hay muchas traducciones
literales del griego"9 . Como puede vericarse, este fragmento es de escogida
importancia: Catón, que halló en las enseñanzas de Nearco ese espejo modélico
para su código ético, pulió las imperfecciones de su instrucción cultural – ya en
edad provecta – merced también a las letras griegas10 . A tenor de lo antedicho,
Plutarco contrapone virtudes y defectos en la instrucción cultural de Catón; y
9 Φαβίου δὲ Μαξίμου τὴν Ταραντίνων πόλιν ἑλόντος ἔτυχε μὲν ὁ Κάτων στρατευόμενος
ὑπ᾽ αὐτῷ κομιδῇ μειράκιον ὤν, Νεάρχῳ δέ τινι τῶν Πυθαγορικῶν ξένῳ χρησάμενος
ἐσπούδασε τῶν λόγων μεταλαβεῖν. Ἀκούσας δὲ ταῦτα διαλεγομένου τοῦ ἀνδρός, οἷς κέχρηται
καὶ Πλάτων, τὴν μὲν ἡδονὴν ἀποκαλῶν μέγιστον κακοῦ δέλεαρ, συμφορὰν δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ
σῶμα πρώτην, λύσιν δὲ καὶ καθαρμὸν οἷς μάλιστα χωρίζει καὶ ἀφίστησιν αὑτὴν τῶν περὶ τὸ
σῶμα παθημάτων λογισμοῖς ἔτι μᾶλλον ἠγάπησε τὸ λιτὸν καὶ τὴν ἐγκράτειαν. Ἄλλως δὲ
παιδείας Ἑλληνικῆς ὀψιμαθὴς γενέσθαι λέγεται καὶ πόρρω παντάπασιν ἡλικίας ἐληλακὼς
Ἑλληνικὰ βιβλία λαβὼν εἰς χεῖρας βραχέα μὲν ἀπὸ Θουκυδίδου, πλείονα δ᾽ ἀπὸ Δημοσθένους
εἰς τὸ ῥητορικὸν ὠφεληθῆναι. Τὰ μέντοι συγγράμματα καὶ δόγμασιν Ἑλληνικοῖς καὶ ἱστορίαις
ἐπιεικῶς διαπεποίκιλται· καὶ μεθηρμηνευμένα πολλὰ κατὰ λέξιν ἐν ταῖς γνωμολογίαις
τέτακται. La traducción española de los pasajes oportunos procede de L. C, 2003. El texto
griego proviene de R. F E. C, Plutarque. Vies, V, Paris, 1969.
10 Cf. M. B, 2000, p. 24. Por lo demás, la aversión por la cultura griega (que Plutarco
glosa en el capítulo 23) acompañó a Catón durante buena parte de su vida; por ello, si bien se
mira, el pasaje citado redime parcialmente al personaje de su actitud. Para esta anotación y otras
implicaciones adicionales del fragmento referido, cf. V. R P, "Plutarco y la biografía
política en Grecia: aspectos de innovación en el género", in AA.VV., La biografía como género
literario: de la Antigüedad al Renacimiento, Veleia (Anejos). (en prensa).
344
Vicente M. Ramón Palerm
la presencia del legado griego permite corregir ciertos deslices de la educación
convencional en el personaje. Pues bien, del mismo modo, Plutarco alterna
aspectos positivos y negativos en la educación sentimental de Catón; y dejará
entrever – con nitidez oscilante – que la adecuación del gobernante a esas
categorías formales, de señalada impronta griega, contribuye a su perfección
ética y al provecho de su actividad política. Así ocurre, verbigracia, con los
pasajes en que Plutarco muestra (de manera explícita o implícita) las relaciones
que establece Catón con la amistad, la lantropía, el eros 11 . Y debo anticipar
que, en líneas generales, el resultado es como sigue: la amistad es divisa
fundamental y altamente positiva en el talante de Catón; en segundo lugar,
Catón parece escasamente proclive a una conducta lantrópica y, cuando
Plutarco menciona detalles al respecto, lo hace de una manera críticamente
reservada, negativa en puridad; en última instancia, las actitudes eróticas
presentan un curso cambiante en Catón y merecen el elogio cierto o la censura
severa, respectivamente, de Plutarco. A continuación, expongo los pasajes
representativos sobre las categorías correspondientes.
1. De la amistad
– 2, 3 (cf. supra): como ha sido observado, la amistad de Nearco proporciona
al joven Catón un contacto ennoblecedor en su trayectoria (Νεάρχῳ δέ τινι
τῶν Πυθαγορικῶν ξένῳ χρησάμενος ἐσπούδασε τῶν λόγων μεταλαβεῖν).
Por añadidura, no debemos soslayar la circunstancia de que el testimonio,
el cual transmite Cicerón (Sobre la vejez [4, 10; 12, 39]), puede responder a
un articio documental, ideado por Cicerón con intención propagandística
y adaptado por Plutarco con un tono moralizante12 . Obviamente el término
implicado, φιλία, no consta fehacientemente, pero el contenido amistoso
del pasaje resulta incontrovertible. Además, si admitimos que en Plutarco
menudea el denominado moralismo implícito – común en el relato general
de las semblanzas – por oposición al moralismo explícito que sobresale en las
συγκρίσεις13 , deberá igualmente aceptarse la expresión de virtudes formales
respectivamente implícitas o explícitas.
– 3, 1-4: "Había un patricio, uno de los romanos más inuyentes y
poderosos, de sorprendente capacidad para apreciar la virtud en el momento
11En general, sobre la tradición griega de las categorías que manejamos y la acepción
genuina de las mismas en Plutarco, cf. S.-T. T, 2007. En todo caso, la utilización de
los mencionados conceptos para nuestro trabajo debe entenderse lato sensu, razón por la que
hemos renunciado a la expresión de los términos en su versión estrictamente griega.
12 Cf. J. M. G H, 2007, p. 68 n. 10. Por otra parte, debe subrayarse que el
testimonio sobre enemistad más relevante en esta biografía es relativo a la gura de Escipión
el Grande y diere de otras informaciones histórico-biográcas. Escribe Plutarco (11, 1):
"Mientras Catón permanecía todavía en Hispania, Escipión el Grande, que era su enemigo
(ἐχθρός ) y pretendía contrarrestar sus éxitos y asumir los asuntos de Hispania, consiguió obtener
aquella provincia como sucesor suyo". Sin embargo, como documenta L. C, 2003, p. 108, n.
279), los datos que consignan Tito Livio (34, 43) y Nepote (Ca. 2, 2) discrepan del testimonio
plutarqueo; de hecho, niegan que Escipión recibiera entonces la Hispania Citerior.
13 T. D, 2002, especialmente pp. 53 sqq.
345
Amistad, Filantropía y Eros en la Paideia Plutarquea: la Vida de Catón el Viejo
que brota y con buena disposición a alimentarla y encaminarla hacia la fama:
Valerio Flaco [...]; ...lo convenció con sus consejos (i.e. a Catón) para que
se dedicara a la carrera política en Roma. Así, pues, Catón se dirigió allí y
enseguida se granjeó admiradores y amigos con sus discursos de defensa; y
mucha fue, además, la honra e inuencia que Valerio añadió a su persona. El
de tribuno militar fue el primer cargo que obtuvo, y más tarde desempeñó el
de cuestor. A partir de entonces, gozando ya de luz propia y de popularidad,
hizo junto al propio Valerio la carrera hacia las más altas magistraturas y llegó
a compartir con él el consulado y, en otra ocasión, la censura"14 .
– 10, 1: "Designado cónsul junto con Valerio Flaco, íntimo amigo suyo,
recibió la provincia que los romanos llaman Hispania Citerior. Allí, mientras
sometía a unos pueblos y se granjeaba la amistad de los otros con su diplomacia,
cayó sobre él un gran ejército de los bárbaros y corrió el riesgo de ser expulsado
deshonrosamente; por ello buscó atraerse la alianza con los vecinos celtíberos"15 .
Como puede comprobarse, frente a lo que sucede frecuentemente en los
Moralia, los ejemplos en que la amistad comparece no adquieren ribetes de
moralización explícita: son aquí aducidos para caracterizar implícitamente el
ethos del personaje y manifestar el rendimiento político que el ejercicio de la
amistad procura en quienes la cultivan.
2. De la lantropía
– 3, 7: "El caso es que Escipión hizo ver en Roma los preparativos de la
guerra como anticipo de la victoria y se mostró como alguien alegre durante el
tiempo libre que compartía con sus amigos, pero en modo alguno negligente
con los asuntos serios e importantes por llevar una vida muelle, con lo cual
pudo hacerse a la mar rumbo a la guerra"16 .
– 5, 5: "Y es que no se debe tratar a los seres animados como sandalias o
utensilios, que se tiran cuando están rotos y desgastados por el uso, sino que
hay que proponerse ser afable y dulce con ellos, aunque sólo sea por el afán de
humanidad"17 .
14 Ἦν δέ τις ἀνὴρ εὐπατρίδης μὲν ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα ῾Ρωμαίων καὶ δυνατός, ἀρετὴν δὲ φυομένην
μὲν αἰσθάνεσθαι δεινός, εὐμενὴς δὲ καὶ θρέψαι καὶ προαγαγεῖν εἰς δόξαν, Οὐαλέριος Φλάκκος
[…] …προετρέψατο καὶ συνέπεισεν ἅψασθαι τῆς ἐν ῾Ρώμῃ πολιτείας. Κατελθὼν οὖν εὐθὺς
τοὺς μὲν αὐτὸς ἐκτᾶτο θαυμαστὰς καὶ φίλους διὰ τῶν συνηγοριῶν, πολλὴν δὲ τοῦ Οὐαλερίου
τιμὴν καὶ δύναμιν αὐτῷ προστιθέντος χιλιαρχίας ἔτυχε πρῶτον, εἶτα ἐταμίευσεν. Ἐκ τούτου
δὲ λαμπρὸς ὢν ἤδη καὶ περιφανὴς αὐτῷ τῷ Οὐαλερίῳ πρὸς τὰς μεγίστας συνεξέδραμεν ἀρχάς,
ὕπατός τε μετ᾽ ἐκείνου καὶ πάλιν τιμητὴς γενόμενος.
15 Ὕπατος δὲ μετὰ Φλάκκου Οὐαλερίου τοῦ φίλου καὶ συνήθους ἀποδειχθεὶς ἔλαχε τῶν
ἐπαρχιῶν ἣν Ἐντὸς Ἱσπανίαν ῾Ρωμαῖοι καλοῦσιν. Ἐνταῦθα δ᾽ αὐτῷ τὰ μὲν καταστρεφομένῳ
τῶν ἐθνῶν, τὰ δ᾽ οἰκειουμένῳ διὰ λόγων πολλὴ στρατιὰ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐπέπεσε καὶ κίνδυνος
ἦν αἰσχρῶς ἐκβιασθῆναι· διὸ τῶν ἐγγὺς Κελτιβήρων ἐπεκαλεῖτο συμμαχίαν.
16 Ὁ μὲν οὖν Σκιπίων ἐν τῇ παρασκευῇ τοῦ πολέμου τὴν νίκην ἐπιδειξάμενος καὶ φανεὶς
ἡδὺς μὲν ἐπὶ σχολῆς συνεῖναι φίλοις, οὐδαμῇ δὲ τῷ φιλανθρώπῳ τῆς διαίτης εἰς τὰ σπουδαῖα
καὶ μεγάλα ῥᾴθυμος, ἐξέπλευσεν ἐπὶ τὸν πόλεμον.
17 Οὐ γὰρ ὡς ὑποδήμασιν ἢ σκεύεσι τοῖς ψυχὴν ἔχουσι χρηστέον κοπέντα καὶ κατατριβέντα
346
Vicente M. Ramón Palerm
– 22, 2: "Al punto, los jóvenes más amantes de las letras acudieron al
encuentro de estos hombres (i.e. lósofos), a quienes escuchaban con admiración.
Fue sobre todo el carisma de Carnéades, cuya autoridad era enorme y cuya
reputación no era menor que su autoridad, el que atrajo grandes auditorios
interesados por los asuntos humanos y el que, como un viento, barrió la ciudad
con sus ecos"18 .
Los tres pasajes aducidos presentan una importancia nada desdeñable,
pese a su aparente y tangencial relación con la gura de Catón19. En el primero
de ellos, se contraponen a la personalidad austera de Catón los modos de
Escipión el Grande (rival y enemigo político del héroe biograado), cuyo
talante desprendido y lantrópico con sus íntimos no empece a la seriedad de
la actividad política que despliega. En el segundo fragmento, la sobriedad en
exceso cicatera de Catón (quien proponía desechar a los esclavos viejos por
inservibles [cf. 4,5; 5,1]) da paso a cierto comentario del queronense sobre la
necesidad de ser indulgente con los seres vivos, en términos absolutos, siquiera
por razones humanitarias20 . En el tercer pasaje, los jóvenes romanos, atraídos
por cuestiones de importancia para el ser humano, comparecen con interés a
las conferencias de lósofos griegos en Roma; y ello contrasta con el carácter
desdeñoso de Catón en relación con la cultura griega y con los efectos de esta
sobre las generaciones más jóvenes. En síntesis, da la impresión de que Plutarco
confronta las actitudes humanitarias y lantrópicas que personalmente defendía
para la comunidad grecorromana21 con la indiferencia llamativa de Catón
sobre el particular, lo cual parece encerrar una na crítica implícita al proceder
de nuestro personaje mediante una intención que rebasa, seguramente, el puro
desliz moral para alcanzar repercusiones de índole política.
3. Del eros
– 20, 1-4: "Fue también un buen padre, un marido honrado con su mujer
y un administrador no desdeñable [...]. Desposó a una mujer más noble que
rica, pues creía que, aunque ambos tipos de mujeres eran serias y sensatas, las
de buen linaje se avergonzaban ante lo deshonroso y eran más sumisas a sus
maridos en lo que atañe a la virtud. Decía que un hombre que golpeaba a su
esposa o a su hijo ponía sus manos sobre los seres más sagrados. Le parecía más
ταῖς ὑπερεσίαις ἀπορριπτοῦντας, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ διὰ μηδὲν ἄλλο, μελέτης οὕνεκα τοῦ φιλανθρώπου
προεθιστέον ἑαυτὸν ἐν τούτοις πρᾶον εἶναι καὶ μείλιχον.
18 Εὐθὺς οὖν οἱ φιλολογώτατοι τῶν νεανίσκων ἐπὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἵεντο καὶ συνῆσαν
ἀκροώμενοι καὶ θαυμάζοντες αὐτούς. Μάλιστα δ᾽ ἡ Καρνεάδου χάρις, ἧς <ἦν> δύναμίς τε
πλείστη καὶ δόξα τῆς δυνάμεως οὐκ ἀποδέουσα, μεγάλων ἐπιλαβομένη καὶ φιλανθρώπων
ἀκροατηρίων ὡς πνεῦμα τὴν πόλιν ἠχῆς ἐνέπλησε.
19 Para un comentario exhaustivo y provechoso de las implicaciones convenientes sobre los
pasajes citados (implicaciones de orientación ético-política), remito al estudio de J. M.ª C
que consta en el presente volumen ("Filantropía en la Vida de Catón el Viejo").
20 Esta circunstancia es asimismo detectable en los escritos zoopsicológicos de Plutarco. Cf., en
general, la introducción que proporciona G. S en L. I & G. S, 1999.
21 Cf. G. D'I, 2005, pp. 180-2.
347
Amistad, Filantropía y Eros en la Paideia Plutarquea: la Vida de Catón el Viejo
digno de alabanza ser un buen esposo que un gran senador. En efecto, Catón
no admiraba nada del antiguo Sócrates salvo el hecho de que, a pesar de tener
una mujer difícil y unos hijos necios, los tratara toda su vida con benevolencia
y dulzura. Nacido su hijo, no hubo para él ninguna obligación, salvo las de
carácter público, que fuera tan perentoria que le impidiera ayudar a su mujer
mientras bañaba y envolvía en pañales a su hijo"22 .
– 24, 1: "Es evidente que...Catón no quedó libre de la venganza divina,
pues perdió tanto a su esposa como a su hijo. Pero él, que era de constitución
robusta y se mantenía fuerte y vigoroso, resistió durante muchísimo tiempo,
de modo que, aun siendo ya anciano, tenía con frecuencia contacto sexual con
alguna mujer y, en contra de lo que conviene a su edad, contrajo de nuevo
matrimonio..."23 .
– 6, 1-3 (σύγκρισις): "El matrimonio del propio Catón, sin embargo,
impropio tanto de su honor como de su edad, infundió a este respecto
sospechas importantes y serias. En efecto, el que un anciano de tanta edad y
con un hijo ya adulto...despose a la hija de un sirviente suyo...no está nada
bien. Tanto si lo hizo buscando placer como si fue por vengarse del asunto
con la hetera, la acción y su motivo son por igual vergonzosos. El argumento
al que acudió con tono irónico ante su hijo no era cierto, pues si hubiera
querido traer al mundo hijos tan nobles como éste, debería haber reparado
en ello desde un principio y haber contraído matrimonio legal en lugar de
contentarse con cohabitar con una mujer ilegítima y compartida mientras
pasó inadvertido y, una vez que fue descubierto, hacer suegro suyo a quien era
más fácil de convencer, y no a aquel con quien hubiera resultado más honroso
crear lazos familiares"24 .
Es perceptible que la indicación de los lances erótico-amorosos en la Vida de
Catón ofrece una perspectiva doble y palmariamente opuesta sobre la actitud del
22 Γέγονε δὲ καὶ πατὴρ ἀγαθὸς καὶ περὶ γυναῖκα χρηστὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ χρηματισμὴς οὐκ
εὐκαταφρόνητος […]. Γυναῖκα μὲν γὰρ εὐγενεστέραν ἢ πλουσιωτέραν ἔγημεν, ἡγούμενος
ὁμοίως μὲν ἀμφοτέρας ἔχειν βάρος καὶ φρόνημα, τὰς δὲ γενναίας αἰδουμένας τὰ αἰσχρὰ
μᾶλλον ὑπηκόους εἶναι πρὸς τὰ καλὰ τοῖς γεγαμηκόσι. Τὸν δὲ τύπτοντα γαμετὴν ἢ παῖδα τοῖς
ἁγιωτάτοις ἔλεγεν ἱεροῖς προσφέρειν τὰς χεῖρας. Ἐν ἐπαίνῳ δὲ μείζονι τίθεσθαι τὸ γαμέτην
ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ μέγαν εἶναι συγκλητικόν· ἐπεὶ καὶ Σωκράτους οὐδὲν ἄλλο θαυμάζειν τοῦ παλαιοῦ
πλὴν ὅτι γυναικὶ χαλεπῇ καὶ παισὶν ἀποπλήκτοις χρώμενος ἐπιεικῶς καὶ πρᾴως διετέλεσε.
Γενομένου δὲ τοῦ παιδὸς οὐδὲν ἦν ἔργον οὕτως ἀναγκαῖον, εἰ μή τι δημόσιον, ὡς μὴ παρεῖναι
τῇ γυναικὶ λουούσῃ τὸ βρέφος καὶ σπαργανούσῃ.
23 Καὶ…φαίνεται γεγονὼς οὐκ ἀνεμέσητος· καὶ γὰρ τὴν γυναῖκα καὶ τὸν υἱὸν ἀπέβαλεν.
Αὐτὸς δὲ τῷ σώματι πρὸς εὐεξίαν καὶ ῥώμην ἀσφαλῶς πεπηγὼς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἀντεῖχεν, ὥστε
καὶ γυναικὶ πρεσβύτης ὢν σφόδρα πλησιάζειν καὶ γῆμαι γάμον οὐ καθ᾽ ἡλικίαν…
24 …αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ Κάτωνος ὁ παρ᾽ ἀξίαν ἅμα καὶ παρ᾽ ὥραν γάμος οὐ μικρὰν οὐδὲ φαύλην
εἰς τοῦτο διαβολὴν κατεσκέδασε. Πρεσβύτην γὰρ ἤδη τοσοῦτον ἐνηλίκῳ παιδὶ…ἐπιγῆμαι
κόρην ὑπηρέτου…οὐδαμῇ καλόν, ἀλλ᾽ εἴτε πρὸς ἡδονὴν ταῦτ᾽ ἔπραξεν εἴτ᾽ ὀργῇ διὰ τὴν
ἑταίραν ἀμυνόμενος τὸν υἱόν, αἰσχύνην ἔχει καὶ τὸ ἔργον καὶ ἡ πρόφασις.ᾯ δ᾽ αὐτὸς ἐχρήσατο
λόγῳ κατειρωνευόμενος τὸ μειράκιον, οὐκ ἦν ἀληθής. Εἰ γὰρ ἐβούλετο παῖδας ἀγαθοὺς
ὁμοίως τεκνῶσαι, γάμον ἔδει λαβεῖν γενναῖον ἐξ ἀρχῆς σκεψάμενον, οὐχ ἕως μὲν ἐλάνθανεν
ἀνεγγύῳ γυναικὶ καὶ κοινῇ συγκοιμώμενος ἀγαπᾶν, ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐφωράθη ποιήσασθαι πενθερὸν ὃν
ῥᾶστᾳ πείσειν, οὐχ ᾧ κάλλιστα κηδεύσειν ἔμελλεν.
348
Vicente M. Ramón Palerm
estadista. Advertimos una caracterización implícita en los dos primeros pasajes
que, en la σύγκρισις conclusiva, se resuelve del modo acostumbradamente
explícito por cuanto atañe al segundo matrimonio del personaje. En efecto, el
primer pasaje muestra a un Catón amante de su esposa y corresponsable en la
unidad conyugal, un Catón que comparte las tareas paterno-liales y observa
una reciprocidad cotidiana en el curso de su relación marital. Plutarco se prodiga
en elogios sobre la gura de Catón, ya que el matrimonio se conduce a la manera
que el de Queronea deende en su Erótico, donde priman la concordia y la
responsabilidad doméstica de los esposos prácticamente en pie de igualdad25 .
No obstante, la opinión de Plutarco se modica radicalmente en lo concerniente
al segundo matrimonio de Catón. Y es que Plutarco censura ahora tanto la
raticación del matrimonio per se (considerando la edad avanzada del mandatario)
cuanto las razones presuntas del mismo, acaso motivadas por el hecho de que
Catón mantenía relaciones sexuales, en su propia casa y de modo indisimulado,
con una concubina joven y de moralidad laxa; el caso es que la muchacha paseaba
por la casa impúdicamente a la vista del propio hijo de Catón, lo cual tensa la
convivencia entre el padre, el hijo y la novia de este. Pues bien, Catón resuelve
de forma urgente concertar matrimonio con la hija de uno de sus esclavos para
zanjar el asunto y tal vez dar un golpe de autoridad paterna26 .
Para concluir: la moralización implícita que menudea en la Vida de
Catón se ve motivada, en buena medida, por la destreza cultural y las virtudes
cardinales del personaje merced a su pericia y contactos tardíos con la paideia
griega. De modo simétrico, Plutarco desliza la concepción de que las virtudes
formales, la educación sentimental, la inteligencia emocional de Catón se
hallan caracterizadas por la ausencia o presencia respectiva de categorías
inherentes, asimismo, al orbe heleno. He aquí una reexión tamizada con
que Plutarco perla el talante de Catón, claro está; pero se trata también de
una reexión con que el biógrafo trasciende la pura defensa de ciertos valores
afectivos-morales, anejos al personaje, para el ennoblecimiento del lector
y, en última instancia, para el sustento de una paideia henchida de aristas
ético-políticas al servicio del estadista incipiente en un mundo civilizador,
grecorromano, globalizado.
bi b l i o g r a f í a c i T a d a
B, M., "Anecdote and the Representation of Plutarch's Ethos", in L. V
D S (ed.), Rhetorical eory and Praxis in Plutarch. Acta of the
IV International Congress of the I.P.S. (Leuven, July 3-6), Louvain-
Namur, 2000, pp. 15-32.
25 Cf. las oportunas reexiones de M. V, 2003. Cf. asimismo J. B, 2008,
particularmente p. 698.
26 Cf. 24, 2-7, donde Plutarco reere los pormenores correspondientes sobre el asunto.
349
Amistad, Filantropía y Eros en la Paideia Plutarquea: la Vida de Catón el Viejo
B, J., "Plutarch on the Role of Eros in a Marriage", in A. G. N
(ed.), e Unity of Plutarch's Work. Moralia emes in the Lives, Features of
the Lives in the Moralia, Berlin-New York, 2008, pp. 689-99.
C, L., Plutarco. Vidas de Aristides y de Catón, Madrid, 2003.
D'I, G., "Filantropia, ellenocentrismo e polietnismo in Plutarco", in
A. P J F.T (eds.), Historical and Biographical
Values of Plutarch's Works. Studies devoted to Professor Philip A. Stadter
by the International Plutarch Society, Málaga-Logan, 2005, pp. 179-
96.
D, ., Plutarch's Lives. Exploring Virtue and Vice, Oxford, 2002.
_____"Education in Plutarch's emistokles", in M. J . (eds.),
Plutarc a la seva època. Paideia i societat. Actas del VIII Simposio español
sobre Plutarco, (Barcelona, 6-8 de Noviembre, 2003), Barcelona, 2005,
pp. 553-60.
_____"Plutarch's readers and the moralism of the Lives", Ploutarchos, n.s. 5
(2007/2008) 3-18.
F, R. C, E., Plutarque. Vies, V, Paris, 1969.
F, F., Histoire et morale dans les Vies parallèles de Plutarque, Paris,
1996.
G H, J. M., Plutarco. Vidas Paralelas. IV, Madrid, 2007.
I, L. S, G., Plutarco. Il cibarsi di carne, Napoli, 1999.
P J, A., "Exemplum: the paradigmatic education of the ruler in
the Lives of Plutarch", in P. A. S L. V S (eds.),
Sage and Emperor. Plutarch, Greek Intellectuals, and Roman Power in the
Time of Trajan (98-117 A.D.), Louvain, 2002, pp. 105-14.
_____"La elocuencia como instrumento político en las Vidas paralelas", CFC,
12 (2002) 253-70.
R P, V., "Plutarco y la biografía política en Grecia: aspectos de
innovación en el género", in AA.VV., La biografía como género literario:
de la Antigüedad al Renacimiento, Veleia (Anejos). (en prensa).
S, P. A., "e rhetoric of virtue in Plutarch's Lives", in L. V
S (ed.), Rhetorical eory and Praxis in Plutarch. Acta of the IV
International Congress of the I.P.S. (Leuven, July 3-6), Louvain-Namur,
2000, pp. 493-510.
T, S.-T., "El programa de Plutarco para la conducta social", in M.
J . (eds.), Plutarc a la seva època. Paideia i societat. Actas del
VIII Simposio español sobre Plutarco (Barcelona, 6-8 de Noviembre,
2003), Barcelona, 2005, pp. 659-64.
350
Vicente M. Ramón Palerm
_____ "Four terms of friendly emotion in Plutarch: Φιλανθρωπία, φιλία, ἔρως,
φιλοστοργία", in J. Mª N R. L (eds.), El amor en Plutarco.
Actas del IX Simposio español sobre Plutarco (28-30 Septiembre,
2006), León, 2007, pp. 187-97.
V, M., "Amor y matrimonio en el Erótico de Plutarco", in J. M.ª N
(ed.), Logos Hellenikós. Homenaje al Profesor Gaspar Morocho Gayo, Leó n,
2003, pp. 441-54.
351
Filantropía en la Vida de Catón el Viejo
fi l a n T r o p í a e n l a vi D a D e ca T ó n e l vi e j o
J M. C M
Universidad de Sevilla
Abstract
In the Life of Cato Maior Plutarch looks at his main character with an attitude consisting of
admiration on one hand, of criticism and blame on the other. e concept of philanthropia
represents the key that opens the door to the criticism. Catos's lack of philanthropia is responsible
for his philotimia, his decient autarkeia and his want of sophrosyne. Even his political activity
undergoes the eects of this fundamental failure. is paper tries to explore how the structure
of the biography reects the importance that Plutarch assigns to the central aw of its
protagonist.
Resultaría problemático incluir la Vida de Catón el Viejo entre las biografías
negativas. El modelo más acabado de biografía negativa es probablemente la
Vida de Demetrio. Un presupuesto importante de esta obra lo constituye el
marco temático que brindan las grandes naturalezas, las naturalezas dotadas
tanto para el bien como para el mal que por un error o una serie de elecciones
erróneas concluyen en un nal desastroso1 . La teatralidad, entendida como
despliegue ostentoso y vacío, es otro de los ingredientes de la Vida de Demetrio2 .
Y por último la esterilidad, la ausencia de realizaciones o mensajes importantes
políticos o humanos, es otro componente que Plutarco subraya y parece
considerar denitorio de una existencia como la de Demetrio3 . Nada de esto
aparece en la Vida de Catón. Sin embargo, Plutarco alberga fuertes reservas
morales contra su protagonista, hasta tal punto que Catón el Viejo parece
situarse en un punto intermedio entre los personajes que en las Vidas Paralelas
aparecen como modelos a imitar y aquellos otros que destacan ante todo por
sus cualidades negativas.
Son dos los pasajes de la biografía que exponen con claridad y con cierto
detalle los defectos de la personalidad de Catón. Uno de ellos se sitúa al inicio,
en los capítulos 4 y 5. Plutarco comienza aquí hablando de la tendencia a la
economía que despliega su protagonista en distintas facetas de su vida: en el
vestido, en la comida y la bebida, en las construcciones de su hacienda, en la
compra de esclavos. Catón creía, arma el biógrafo, que cuando los esclavos
envejecen hay que venderlos para no gastar alimento en seres inútiles. Aquí
Plutarco hace un alto: tratar así a los esclavos, como si fueran animales, es
propio de un carácter rígido para el que la utilidad es el único fundamento
1 Plutarco toca el tema de las grandes naturalezas (sobre el que teoriza en Ser. num. vind.
551D-552D) no sólo el proemio a las Vidas de Demetrio y Antonio ( Demetr. 1.7-8) sino también
en em. 2.7, Nic. 9.1, y Cor. 1.3. Se trata de un tema sobre el que disertan tanto Platón (el
pasaje canónico es R. 491d-492a; véase también Hp. Mi. 376a) como Jenofonte (Mem. 4.1.4).
Tratamientos modernos de la cuestión ofrecen O. A, 1989 y T. D, 1999.
2 Sobre la prominencia de los elementos teatrales en la Vida de Demetrio véase O. A,
1989, pp. 78-82; J. M. C, 1999, pp. 142-3.
3 Véase Demetr. 42.3. Comentario en J. M. C, 1999, pp. 143-4.
de las relaciones entre los hombres4. Nuestros buenos sentimientos, sin
embargo se extienden hasta el punto de tratar suave y benévolamente incluso
a los animales. Con este comentario Plutarco abre una digresión en la que
diserta sobre un tema reiterado en su obra y representativo de su personalidad
literaria, el afecto hacia los animales5 . Ya al nal, después de comentar varios
ejemplos ilustrativos observa que no debe usarse a "quienes tienen alma" (τοῖς
ψυχὴν ἔχουσι) como si fueran objetos; antes bien se ha de adoptar hacia
estos un comportamiento dulce y benigno, si no por otra razón para poner en
práctica los preceptos de la lantropía (μελέτης οὕνεκα τοῦ φιλανθρώπου, 5.
5). El concepto de φιλανθρωπία hace aquí una aparición opaca y, digamos,
disimulada. En primer lugar se halla envuelto en el interior de una discusión
que comienza hablando de la economía y dedica gran espacio al tema del
afecto hacia los animales. En segundo lugar solo lo leemos al nal, cuando la
digresión está tocando a su n. Se le invoca, además, como último recurso con
el que justicar una determinada práctica (εἰ διὰ μηδὲν ἄλλο μελέτης οὕνεκα
τοῦ φιλανθρώπου ...).
Plutarco asocia en otras ocasiones la liberalidad económica, la falta de
avaricia y de preocupación ante el dinero con la φιλανθρωπία. Solón, de familia
noble, gastó la fortuna de su padre en actos de lantropía y en mercedes6 .
Pelópidas, nacido en el seno de una casa opulenta, socorría con sus riquezas
a cuantos lo necesitaban, y todos se acogían a su lantropía y liberalidad7 .
Catón es un homo novus cuya falta de la liberalidad en lo referente al dinero
y la riquezas acentúan diversos pasajes de la biografía, incluido un lugar tan
prominente como la síncrisis8 . Ahora bien, al caracterizar esa faceta de su
personaje Plutarco, aparentemente, evita el término φιλανθρωπία, término
que utiliza de manera diríase que marginal, casi como si lo escondiese.
El segundo de los pasajes que disertan con amplitud sobre los aspectos
negativos de Catón aparece en el tramo nal de la biografía. El capítulo 22
menciona la famosa embajada a Roma en la que participó el lósofo Carnéades.
Ante la expectación que el lósofo despierta entre la población romana, Catón
se muestra partidario de hacer que todos los lósofos sean conducidos fuera
de la ciudad9 . Tal reacción se debió ante todo a su hostilidad hacia la losofía y
la cultura griegas. Después de brindar algunos ejemplos de este antihelenismo,
Plutarco consigna una predicción de Catón, conforme a la cual el estado
romano sería destruido cuando las letras griegas penetrasen en sus ciudadanos.
Predicción que el tiempo ha demostrado falsa, pues, comenta el biógrafo, la
supremacía de Roma ha coincidido con la implantación en el imperio de los
4 Cat. Ma. 5.1: μηδὲν ἀνθρώπῳ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον οἰομένου κοινώνημα τῆς χρείας πλέον
ὑπάρχειν.
5 Sobre el tema ouede hallarse información y bibliografía actualizada en J. M. C
M, 2005 y M. T. C S, 2005.
6 Sol. 2.1: εἰς φιλανθρωπίας τινάς, ὥς φησιν Ἕρμιππος, καὶ χάριτας.
7 Pel. 3.3: ἐχρῶντο τῇ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐλευθεριότητι καὶ φιλανθρωπίᾳ.
8 Además del pasaje citado véase Cat. Ma. 21; 31 (4).
9 Cat. Ma. 22.6: ἔγνω μετ' εὐπρεπείας ἀποδιοπομπήσασθαι τοὺς φιλοσόφους πάντας ἐκ
τῆς πόλεως.
353
Filantropía en la Vida de Catón el Viejo
conocimientos y la cultura de Grecia. Un posicionamiento ante la cultura griega
como el que aquí se describe, constituye para Plutarco una falta mayor. Así los
subraya el capítulo 24, cuya frase inicial presenta la muerte de la esposa y el
hijo de Catón como un castigo divino (νέμεσις) sobrevenido a consecuencia
de la actitud antihelénica del personaje. Los aspectos más desfavorables de
su personalidad quedan al descubierto, además, en dos episodios que siguen.
Catón, una vez viudo, frecuenta a una prostituta (παιδίσκῃ) a la que lleva
a su casa. Cuando se encuentra con ella la joven esposa de su hijo tiene
lugar una situación embarazosa. A continuación Catón contrae su segundo
matrimonio con una joven de extracción humilde, hija de uno de sus clientes.
Boda bochornosa que, según se dice en la síncrisis, constituye materia para un
justicado reproche.
También en este segundo pasaje negativo para el protagonista aparece el
término φιλανθρωπία, pero, como sucedía en el pasaje anterior, su presencia es
subrepticia, de manera que casi pasa inadvertido. Al principio, cuando Plutarco
consigna el éxito que obtuvo Carnéades en Roma, añade que sus conferencias
atraían audiencias amplias y llenas de simpatía (μεγάλων [...] καὶ φιλανθρώπων
ἀκροατηρίων). El término da la impresión de recoger aquí ese valor general
de afecto o empatía emocional con lo humano que estudios recientes le han
atribuido, un valor que, por lo demás, resulta característico de la losofía vital
de Plutarco10 . Ahora bien, en el momento histórico en que escribe Plutarco,
φιλανθρωπία puede haber sido un concepto cargado de connotaciones
políticas. En el panegírico que Plinio dedica a Trajano, el término humanitas ,
la φιλανθρωπία griega, se usa reiteradamente: cualidad propia del hombre, no
del dios, la humanitas es una de las virtudes que distinguen al bonus princeps del
dominus e incluso es, se ha armado, la cualidad que fundamentalmente alaba
Plinio en Trajano11 . Si se admite que el panegírico de Plinio es exponente de un
cambio ideológico que se produce cuando Trajano llega al trono; si se admite
asimismo que Plutarco, como Tácito o Dión Crisóstomo, participa plenamente
de dicho cambio; si igualmente se acepta, como estudios recientes aseguran,
que las Vidas Paralelas sólo se pudieron gestar en el ambiente intelectual
propiciado por el ascenso de Trajano12 : si todo ello se admite no puede pensarse
que φιλανθρωπία sea para Plutarco una palabra más. Al contrario, debe ser, en
principio, un término destacado, portador de un fuerte colorido ideológico.
En la síncrisis Plutarco atribuye el vergonzoso segundo matrimonio de
Catón a falta de σωφροσύνη 13 . La parte narrativa que presenta dicho episodio
se abre con el tema del antihelenismo del protagonista, un antihelenismo que,
al unirse a la hostilidad hacia la losofía, hacia la medicina griega o hacia
10 Cf. A. G, 1997, p. 69; G. D'I, 2005, pp. 180-1; S.-T. T,
2007, pp.189-90.
11 Cf. P. A. S, 2002b, pp. 228-9. La búsqueda del término humanitas en el texto
electrónico del Panegírico proporciona siete entradas (2.7.2; 3.4.4; 4.7.1; 24.2.3; 47.3.2; 49.6.1;
71.5.3).
12 Véase P. A. S, 2002a, p. 6; M. T. S, 2002, pp. 201-5; G. Z, 2002,
p. 194.
13 Cat. Ma. 33 (6).1.
guras emblemáticas como Sócrates, produce una impresión de rudeza y
ausencia de παιδεία muy en sintonía con las circunstancias y motivaciones
actuantes en ese segundo matrimonio. Ahora bien, para Plutarco, la cultura,
y concretamente la losofía, son un ingrediente esencial del buen gobernante;
baste remitir a determinados pasajes del ad principem indoctum 14 . La postura
antilosóca e inculta de Catón hace de él, por tanto, un mal gobernante.
Plutarco no explicita esta conclusión. Tampoco utiliza la φιλανθρωπία para
descalicar de manera directa a su protagonista. Pero la actuación de éste se
contrapone a la de aquellas audiencias que escuchaban, llenas de φιλανθρωπία ,
al lósofo Carnéades. Quizás no carezcan de intención las menciones de dos
tiranos, Pisístrato y Dionisio de Siracusa, insertas en el pasaje que relata el
segundo matrimonio de Catón15 .
El apego de Catón a las riquezas también aparece en la síncrisis, donde
se interpreta como el resultado de una deciente αὐτάρκεια 16 . La inclusión
en un lugar tan destacada como este delata la importancia que reviste el tema
a los ojos del biógrafo. La avaricia, la φιλοπλουτία, constituye para Plutarco
un grave defecto, según muestran las observaciones contenidas en el tratado
de cupiditate divitiarum. Dejando aparte dichas observaciones, que atañen
sobre todo a la vida privada, la carga negativa que supone al φιλοπλoυτία
para el dirigente se indica reeja en dos pasajes de los precepta gerendae rei
publicae. Uno de ellos presenta la φιλοπλουτία como un rasgo de Cleón, un
político muy censurado por Plutarco17 . El otro conecta la φιλοπλουτία y la
φιλοχρηματία con los mayores desastres en la vida pública18 . La avaricia, es,
igual que la falta de σωφοσύνη, una lacra que colorea muy negativamente la
personalidad de Catón como político. Ambos defectos se mencionan en la
síncrisis, y los pasajes narrativos que los presentan y detallan hacen en ambos
casos una mención explicíta del concepto de φιλανθρωπία.
Hay una tercera mención explícita del concepto de φιλανθρωπία en la
Vida de Catón. Durante la segundo guerra púnica Catón fue nombrado cuestor
bajo las órdenes de Escipión Africano, cónsul a la sazón. Escipión efectuaba
en Sicilia los preparativos necesarios para desembarcar en África y Catón, al
observar la prodigalidad con que el cónsul gastaba los fondos públicos y su
lujoso tren de vida, presenta una denuncia en Roma. Dos tribunos llegan de
Roma para vericar la exactitud de la denuncia. Escipión entonces justica los
gastos con la perspectiva de la victoria y hace ver que si durante los momentos
de ocio comparte con sus amigos dulces experiencias, su dedicación a los
asuntos serios e importantes no queda mermada por ese régimen de vida
"lantrópico"19 . Aparentemente, tampoco aquí se percibe un uso político del
14 Véase, por ejemplo, 779D; 780A; 781A
15 Pisístrato: 24.8; Dionisio: 24.11.
16 Cat. Ma. 31 (4).2-4.
17 Praec. ger. rei. 806F. Sobre la valoración que hace Plutarco de Cleón véase G. J. D. A,
1982, p. 30.
18 Praec. ger. rei. 819E.
19 Cat. Ma.3.7 (φανεὶς ἡδὺς μὲν ἐπὶ σχολῆς συνεῖναι φίλοις, οὐδαμῇ δὲ τῷ φιλανθρώπῳ
τῆς διαίτης εἰς τὰ σπουδαῖα καὶ μεγάλα ῥᾴθυμος). Debe subrayarse que la noticia que aquí
355
Filantropía en la Vida de Catón el Viejo
concepto de φιλανθρωπία, concepto que además, como ocurría en la narración
de las conferencias de Carnéades, se atribuye al adversario de Catón, pero no
se niega a Catón mismo. Plutarco tampoco hace, de momento, comentario
alguno sobre este enfrentamiento con Escipión. Pero en la síncrisis el episodio
es recordado y utilizado como argumento para una acusación de peso: con su
ataque a Escipión Catón perjudica la guerra contra Aníbal20 . Una vez más
un pasaje marcado por la presencia aparentemente inocua del concepto de
φιλανθρωπία da lugar a una condena severa del protagonista.
La Vida de Catón no es una biografía negativa. A Plutarco le habría sido
muy difícil ennegrecer por completo la gura de este personaje, cuya memoria,
adornada con los perles de exemplum tradicional, había pasado a ser todo
un paradigma de las virtudes romanas21 . Pero determinadas actuaciones del
protagonista de la biografía, y especialmente su antihelenismo, constituían una
mácula difícil de pasar por alto. De aquí que en su retrato convivan las notas
aprobatorias con fuertes reservas. Quizás la expresión más elocuente de esta
actitud matizada y ambivalente se da en el capítulo sexto, que comentando
el rigor desplegado por Catón como pretor en Cerdeña arma que la
administración romana no fue nunca ni más temida ni más deseada 22. Plutarco,
en suma, se siente con la libertad suciente para emitir un juicio distanciado
que, sin ser negativo, tampoco ahorra las críticas. En este sentido la Vida de
Catón parece conrmar aquel punto de vista según el cual la historia de la
república se convierte, con el advenimiento de Trajano, en historia antigua, es
decir, en un ámbito lo sucientemente lejano como para permitir opiniones
ajenas a la disensión política y, por tanto, libres y distanciadas23 : si no había
contradicción en presentar como héroes tanto a César como a sus ejecutores,
tampoco lo había en admirar a Catón y, al mismo tiempo, desautorizar sus
actuaciones.
Esa desautorización actúa, si la tesis aquí propuesta se admite, mediante
la incrustación en pasajes clave del término φιλανθρωπία, que marca en el
ambiente ideológico donde se encuadran las Vidas Paralelas una virtud política
imprescindible. Plutarco, por otra parte, emplea el término φιλανθρωπία de
manera aparentemente casual, como si se pretendiera restarle importancia.
Ello puede atribuirse a la preferencia del biógrafo por una escritura de tono
bajo, que evita subrayar los puntos candentes de la actualidad y que busca
conferir a sus palabras un manto de intemporalidad24 . Cabe también formular
tal preferencia con otras palabras. La escritura de Plutarco conforma un texto
complejo y polisémico en el que proliferan las alusiones, los guiños al lector,
transmite Plutarco es posiblemente falsa, siendo su fuente de inspiración el conicto que
mantuvieron Escipión y Catón a partir del 180: véase A. A. A, 1978, pp.14-6.
20 Cat. Ma. 32 (5).4.
21 Sobre Catón como ejemplo de virtudes romanas véase S. A, 1980. La misma autora
(pp. 95-8) habla de una "leyenda negra" (aunque de matices moderados) sobre Catón en cuyo
contexto sitúa la crítica de Plutarco.
22 Cat. Ma. 6.4
23 J. G, 2002, p. 97
24 Véase P. A. S, 2002b, pp. 236, 238; C. B. R. P, 2002, pp. 215, 222.
los sobreentendidos y las indicaciones oblicuas. Lo que parece casual puede
ser, en realidad, determinante, y una observación carente a primera vista de
importancia puede ser la clave sobre la que descansa una interpretación cargada
de consecuencias. Tal vez deban entenderse bajo esta óptica las apariciones del
concepto de φιλανθρωπία en la Vida de Catón el Viejo .
bi b l i o g r a f í a c i T a d a
A, G. J. D., Plutarch's Political ought, Amsterdam, 1982.
A, S., "Caton le Censeur, les fortunes d'une légende", Caesarodonum, 15
(1980) 71-107.
A, O., "Demetrio Poliorcete secondo Plutarco: Da una 'grande natura'
a 'grandi' vizi", in Vite parallele. Plutarco. Demetrio (introduzione,
traduzione e note di O. A.); Antonio (introduzione, traduzione e note di
R. S), Milano, 1989, pp. 35-93.
A, A. A., Cato the Censor, Oxford, 1978.
C, J. M., "La Vida de Demetrio como biografía negativa", in J. G.
M C . (eds.), Plutarco, Dionisio y el vino. Actas del
VI Simposio Español sobre Plutarco (Cádiz, 14-16 de Mayo, 1998),
Madrid, 1999, pp. 139-44.
C M, J.M., "La virtud de los animales en el Gryllus de Plutarco",
in J, M. . (eds.), 2005, 265-272.
C S, M. T., "El Grilo y la sátira del humanismo en Maquiavelo
y Gelli", in J, M. . (eds.), 2005, 693-702.
D'I, G., "Filantropia, ellenocentrismo e polietnismo in Plutarco", in
A. P J F. T (eds.), Historical and Biographical
Values of Plutarch's Work. Studies Devoted to Professor Philip A. Stadter by
e International Plutarch Society, Málaga – Logan, 2005, pp. 179-96.
D, T., "Plutarch, Plato and 'Great Natures'", in A. P J .
(eds.), Plutarco, Platón y Aristóteles. Actas del V Congreso Internacional
de la I. P. S. (Madrid-Cuenca, 4-7 de Mayo de 1999), Madrid, 1999, pp.
313-32.
G, J., "Felicitas Temporum and Plutarch's Choice of heroes", in P . A.
S L. V S (eds.), 2002, pp. 91-102.
G, A., Plutarchs' Pelopidas. A Historical and Philological Commentary,
Stuttgart und Leipzig, 1997.
J, M. . (eds.), Plutarch a la seva època: paideia e societat. Actas del VII
Simposio Español sobre Plutarco (Barcelona, 6-8 de Noviembre de 2003),
Barcelona, 2005.
357
Filantropía en la Vida de Catón el Viejo
P, C. B. R. , "Plutarch's Caesar: A Caesar for the Caesars?", in P. A.
S L. V S (eds.), 2002, pp. 213-26.
S, M.T., "Trajan's Rescript de bonis relegatorum and Plutarch's Ideal
Ruler", in P. A. S L. V S (eds.), 2002, pp. 201-
12.
S, P. A., "Introduction: Setting Plutarch in his Context", in P . A.
S L. V S (eds.), 2002a, pp. 2-26.
_____ "Plutarch and Trajanic Ideology", in P. A. S L. V
S, (eds.), 2002b, pp. 227-41.
_____ V S, L. (eds.), Sage and Emperor. Plutarch, Greek
Intellectuals, and Roman Power in the Time of Trajan (98-117 A.D.),
Leuven, 2002.
T, S.-T., "Four Terms of Friendly Emotion in Plutarch:
Φιλανθρωπία, φιλία , ἔρως , φιλοστργία ", in J. M. N I R.
L L (eds.), El Amor en Plutarco. Actas del IX Simposio español
sobre Plutarco (28-30 de Septiembre, 2006), León, 2007, pp. 187-97.
Z, G., "Plutarch as Political eorist and Trajan: some reections", in
P. A. S L. V S (eds.), 2002, pp. 191-200.
359
O sentido de philanthropia nas biograas de Coriolano, Cícero e Catão de Útica
o s e n T i d o d e p H i l a n T H r o p i a n a s b i o g r a f i a s d e co r i o l a n o ,
cí c e r o e ca T ã o d e ÚT i c a
J J. S. P
Universidade da Madeira
Abstract
In this paper, we propose to identify the sense and context of philanthropia, one of the transversal
concepts of Greek culture, in the Roman biographies of Coriolanus, Cicero, and Cato Minor.
Our aim is to analyse the actions that Plutarch associates with philanthropia and the various
values attached to it. In restricting our research to Roman biographies we intend to evaluate the
sense of philanthropia in Plutarchan synkriseis and its cultural implications.
A interpretação do sentido de philanthropia nas biograas de Coriolano,
Cícero e Catão de Útica tem o objectivo de avaliar o contexto em que Plutarco
usa o vocábulo e de vericar se é possível notar alguma diferença semântica por
serem heróis romanos. Tanto as Vidas Paralelas como os Tratados Morais parecem
indicar que, em geral, se procede a uma helenização da identidade romana, como
acontece, por exemplo, nas Quaestiones Romanae 1 , ao nível da religião.
A philanthropia, juntamente com outros valores, como a dikaiosyne ,
a praotes, a andreia, a phronesis, a sophrosyne, é uma manifestação da paideia ,
que remete para a dimensão moral, losóca ou ética do ser humano. Nessa
medida, a sionomia pode não revelar o ethos philanthropon, como Plutarco
refere na biograa de Fócion (5.1):
Τῷ δ' ἤθει προσηνέστατος ὢν καὶ φιλανθρωπότατος, ἀπὸ τοῦ προςώπου
δυσξύμβολος ἐφαίνετο καὶ σκυθρωπός, ὥστε μὴ ῥᾳδίως ἄν τινα μόνον
ἐντυχεῖν αὐτῷ τῶν ἀσυνήθων.
Embora [Fócio] possuísse um carácter muito afável e humano, pelo semblante
parecia ser tão pouco sociável e austero que dicilmente alguém ia ao encontro
dele sozinho, a não ser que fosse seu familiar.
Apesar de a philanthropia dos heróis se manifestar em várias acções,
como adiante veremos, é no íntimo de cada indivíduo e pelo controlo da parte
irracional da alma que, numa primeira fase, se consolida este valor. Nesse sentido,
a philanthropia, a praotes, a epieikeia ou a sophrosyne, por oposição à kakoetheia ,
surgem associadas a uma ideia de equilíbrio, sociabilidade, indulgência,
afabilidade e autodomínio2 . Filopémen, "o último dos Gregos", tentou imitar a
inteligência e a integridade de Epaminondas, mas não conseguiu, nas disputas
políticas, ser el à philanthropia, por causa da cólera (orge) e do seu carácter
belicoso (philonikia )3 . Desse modo, tomou duas medidas sintomáticas de uma
1 E.g. 269A e 274E-F.
2 Cf. Cor. 21.1.
3 Cf. Phil. 3.1-2, 2.2-4, 13.8 e 17.5.
360
Joaquim J. S. Pinheiro
paideia deciente: a abolição da constituição de Licurgo e a substituição da
educação espartana pela aqueia4 . Também a Coriolano faltava, por um lado, a
paideia grega e, por outro, a πραότης e a φιλανθρωπία, duas virtudes essenciais
para a intervenção na vida pública, pois o seu ethos fundava-se, em especial, na
ὀργή e na φιλοτιμία, uma vez que desejava superar as suas próprias provas de
heroísmo e aumentar a sua fama5 . Para Plutarco, de facto, a philanthropia, tal
como outras virtudes, está directamente relacionada com a paideia, como se
depreende da apresentação sumária de Marcelo (Marc. 1.2-3):
ἦν γὰρ τῇ μὲν ἐμπειρίᾳ πολεμικός, τῷ δὲ σώματι ῥωμαλέος, τῇ δὲ
χειρὶ πλήκτης, τῇ δὲ φύσει φιλοπόλεμος, καὶ τοῦτο δὴ πολὺ τὸ γαῦρον
καὶ ἀγέρωχον ἐπιφαίνων ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι· τῷ δ' ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ σώφρων,
φιλάνθρωπος, Ἑλληνικῆς παιδείας καὶ λόγων ἄχρι τοῦ τιμᾶν καὶ θαυμάζειν
τοὺς κατορθοῦντας ἐραστής, αὐτὸς δ' ὑπ' ἀσχολιῶν ἐφ' ὅσον ἦν πρόθυμος
ἀσκῆσαι καὶ μαθεῖν οὐκ ἐξικόμενος.
Ele tinha, na verdade, experiência na arte guerreira, um corpo vigoroso, mãos
lutadoras, uma natureza amante da guerra e, nos combates, demonstrava ser
muito autoritário e dominador. Porém, quanto ao resto, era moderado, humano,
amante da cultura e das letras gregas, a ponto de honrar e admirar os que se
dedicam a elas com êxito, mas ele, por causa das suas ocupações, não as consegue
exercitar e estudar tanto quanto desejaria.
Desta forma, a philanthropia faz parte da paideia e confunde-se com
ela. Se a paideia se sobrepõe às fronteiras espaciais como traço distintivo do
homem, também a philanthropia surge como uma qualidade que exerce grande
inuência nas atitudes sociais e no desempenho da actividade política. Plutarco,
aliás, no tratado Praecepta gerendae reipublicae (823A-C), inclui a philanthropia
na lista das qualidades do político ideal:
ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν εὐπροσήγορος καὶ κοινὸς ὢν πελάσαι καὶ προσελθεῖν
ἅπασιν, οἰκίαν τε παρέχων ἄκλειστον ὡς λιμένα φύξιμον ἀεὶ τοῖς χρῄζουσι,
καὶ τὸ κηδεμονικὸν καὶ φιλάνθρωπον οὐ χρείαις οὐδὲ πράξεσι μόνον ἀλλὰ
καὶ τῷ συναλγεῖν πταίουσι καὶ κατορθοῦσι συγχαίρειν ἐπιδεικνύμενος·
Em primeiro lugar, [o homem de Estado] é afável e sociável com todos os que
dele se aproximam e o consultam. Tem a casa aberta como um porto sempre
pronto a acolher os necessitados e demonstra a sua solicitude e humanidade
não apenas nos afazeres e acções mas também ao partilhar a dor com os que
fracassam e ao congratular-se com os que alcançam êxito.
4 Cf. Phil. 16.7-9. Para Políbio (21.32.3), esse foi um estratagema de Filopémen para reduzir
o papel da Esparta. Por sua vez, Pausânias (8.51.3) refere que Filopémen destruiu as muralhas de
Esparta e que proibiu os jovens espartanos de se exercitarem segundo as leis de Licurgo, mas que
o deviam fazer como os jovens aqueus. Seriam os Romanos a ter um papel importante, segundo
Plutarco e Pausânias, na readopção da antiga constituição.
5 Cf. Cor. 4.3 e 15.4.
361
O sentido de philanthropia nas biograas de Coriolano, Cícero e Catão de Útica
Temos, assim, um sentido fundamental de philanthropia: o relacionamento
interpessoal, ou seja, a sociabilidade com outros membros da comunidade ou com as
instituições da cidade6 . É nesse contexto, sobretudo, que encontramos a maioria das
ocorrências do vocábulo, como concluiu F. Frazier (1996) ao comparar philanthropos
com praos e epieikes , dois adjectivos de sentido similar. Ao longo dos tratados
políticos, por exemplo, o Queronense lembra recorrentemente a necessidade de
o político tratar os concidadãos com amabilidade e benevolência, mesmo quando
não são amigos (816C). Nas Vitae , por sua vez, podemos enumerar como exemplo
de philanthropia : a forma bondosa como Teseu tratou os mais humildes, passando
estes a aproveitar o túmulo do herói fundador para local de refúgio (es. 36.4); a
excessiva severidade usada por Catão Censor com os escravos, levando o biógrafo
a aconselhar a prática da philanthropia ( Cat. Ma. 5); o próprio Alcibíades, um dos
heróis de carácter mais ambíguo, protagoniza uma série de acções que atenuam os
seus defeitos, como a humanidade (philanthropia) que evidencia ao criar o lho que
teve da relação com uma concubina de Melos7 . Discernir as virtudes dos heróis nem
sempre é uma tarefa fácil, não só por causa do uso no mesmo sintagma de duas ou
três palavras quase sinónimas, um recurso estilístico muito frequente em Plutarco8 ,
mas também porque as virtudes se manifestam, na prática, de forma complexa, como
se refere na introdução da biograa de Fócion, o par grego de Catão de Útica9 :
τούτων δὲ τῶν ἀνδρῶν αἱ ἀρεταὶ μέχρι τῶν τελευταίων καὶ ἀτόμων διαφορῶν
ἕνα χαρακτῆρα καὶ μορφὴν καὶ χρῶμα κοινὸν ἤθους ἐγκεκραμένον ἐκφέρουσιν,
ὥσπερ ἴσῳ μέτρῳ μεμειγμένου πρὸς τὸ αὐστηρὸν τοῦ φιλανθρώπου, καὶ πρὸς
τὸ ἀσφαλὲς τοῦ ἀνδρείου, καὶ τῆς ὑπὲρ ἄλλων μὲν κηδεμονίας, ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν
δ' ἀφοβίας, καὶ πρὸς μὲν τὸ αἰσχρὸν εὐλαβείας, πρὸς δὲ τὸ δίκαιον εὐτονίας
συνηρμοσμένης ὁμοίως· ὥστε λεπτοῦ πάνυ λόγου δεῖσθαι καθάπερ ὀργάνου
πρὸς διάκρισιν καὶ ἀνεύρεσιν τῶν διαφερόντων.
As virtudes destes homens [Fócion e Catão de Útica] mostram, até às últimas
e inseparáveis diferenças, um só carácter, aspecto e moral, formadas de uma
matiz comum, como se tivessem misturado em igual medida a austeridade e a
humanidade, a coragem e a prudência, a solicitude pelos outros e a intrepidez
por eles próprios, a precaução contra actos vis e o ardor, igualmente harmonioso,
pela justiça. Por conseguinte, é necessário usar, como instrumento, um discurso
extremamente subtil para separar e descobrir as diferenças.
Quanto à ocorrência dos vocábulos φιλανθρωπία , φιλάνθρωπος (adj.) e
φιλανθρώπως (adv.) nas três biograas que servem de base ao nosso estudo,
começamos por fazer referência a um elemento quantitativo: nos pares Fócion-
Catão de Útica e Demóstenes-Cícero , é na biograa romana que esses vocábulos
6 P. C , Dictionnaire Étymologique de la Langue Grecque, Paris, 1984, s.u. φίλος :
considera que mais do que uma relação sentimental exprime a pertença a um grupo social.
7 Cf. Alc.16.5; esta acção é analisada em conjunto com o apoio que deu à terrível carnicina
contra os Mélios (16.6).
8 S.-T. T, 2000.
9 Phoc. 3.8; cf. Mul. Virt. 243C e Quaest. Conu. 732B.
362
Joaquim J. S. Pinheiro
se encontram com mais frequência, enquanto no par Coriolano-Alcibíades
as ocorrências se repartem de forma equitativa (5). Logo, estes elementos
parecem conrmar a ideia de que as biograas romanas das Vidas Paralelas são
essenciais para a análise de conceitos éticos, em especial os que pertencem à
tradição cultural helénica, como é o caso da philanthropia
A biograa de Coriolano comprova que existe uma relação entre paideia e
philanthropia. O Romano é, segundo Plutarco, "testemunha para os que pensam
que a natureza, ainda que seja nobre e boa, se tiver uma educação insuciente,
produz muitos defeitos juntamente com qualidades, tal como acontece na
agricultura a um campo fértil que ca sem cultivo" (1.3) e, por este motivo a acção
política de Coriolano caria marcada por diversos excessos, de tal modo que ao
longo da narrativa biográca nenhuma das suas acções merece ser relacionada
com a philanthropia. Em 16.2, o adjectivo philanthropos surge associado ao preço
do trigo: ἐλπίζων ἀγορᾷ τε χρήσεσθαι φιλανθρώπῳ καὶ προῖκα τὰς δωρεὰς
νεμηθήσεσθαι ( [o povo] esperava comprar no mercado o grão a um preço moderado
e receber de forma gratuita o trigo que tinha sido enviado como presente). Como se
vive uma enorme tensão social na Vrbs , entre patrícios e plebeus, em dois casos o
mesmo adjectivo surge associado à politeia (17.7 e 19.3):
(…) ἀλλὰ καιρὸν ἐπισφαλῆ καὶ ὀξὺν εὐγνώμονος πολιτείας καὶ φιλανθρώπου
δεόμενον.
(…) mas o momento instável e crítico requeria uma política prudente e
generosa.
οἱ δὲ πρεσβύτατοι καὶ δημοτικώτατοι τοὐναντίον ἠξίουν οὐ χαλεπὸν οὐδὲ
βαρύν, ἀλλὰ πρᾷον καὶ φιλάνθρωπον ὑπὸ τῆς ἐξουσίας ἔσεσθαι τὸν δῆμον·
Os senadores mais velhos e com mais sentimento democrático julgavam que
o povo, com esta faculdade, não se tornaria violento e severo, mas afável e
humano.
Em 30.7, os adjectivos epieikes e philanthropos (respectivamente, moderação
e cortesia) servem para qualicar o logos 10 dos embaixadores, enviados para
demover Coriolano do ataque a Roma. Pelo contrário, Coriolano, novamente
movido pela orge, revela-se inexível, impondo um limite de trinta dias aos
Romanos para cederem às pretensões dos Volscos. Passado o momento da
trégua, conta Plutarco que é o próprio Coriolano, curiosamente, que aconselha
os Romanos a serem mais moderados e benévolos com os Volscos (31.6),
notando-se a repetição dos dois adjectivos usados antes para qualicar o
discurso dos embaixadores romanos.
Quanto a Cícero, além da curiosidade intelectual e do percurso político, isto é,
a harmonização da paideia com a politeia, Plutarco enfatiza a forma como o orador
10 Cf. Aem. 6.5 e Pyrrh. 18.6; em Phoc. 27.6, surge associada às condições do acordo.
363
O sentido de philanthropia nas biograas de Coriolano, Cícero e Catão de Útica
romano conseguiu ser íntegro e justo11. Refere-se, aliás, que Cícero, relativamente
ao processo judicial de Manílio, exigiu que o réu fosse tratado segundo o que
a lei permitia, pois ele próprio sempre havia tratado os réus com benevolência
(ἐπιεικῶς) e humanidade ( φιλανθρώπως )12 . É, contudo, na synkrisis (3.4) que se
encontra talvez o texto mais elucidativo da philanthropia de Cícero:
πολλὴν μὲν ἐπίδειξιν ὑπεροψίας χρημάτων ἐποιήσατο, πολλὴν δὲ
φιλανθρωπίας καὶ χρηστότητος.
[Cícero] deu, por um lado, muitas provas do seu desprezo pelo dinheiro, e, por
outro, muitas da sua humanidade e bondade.
Ao longo da biograa, notamos o facto de a philanthropia surgir três vezes
associada a César (21.5, 40.5 e 45.3), o que não causa qualquer estranheza, tendo
em conta que o mesmo sucede na própria biograa de César (8.1) ou na de Catão
de Útica (22.5 e 23.1), quando Plutarco narra os acontecimentos que envolvem
Catilina13 . Associada ao tom de um discurso ou à própria acção de César, a
philanthropia assume-se como um valioso instrumento de persuasão política
(Caes. 13.4). Usando o mesmo recurso, conta Plutarco que Clódio persuade o
povo com νόμοις φιλανθρώποις (30.1), de forma a colocar em perigo a situação
política de Cícero. Resta-nos mencionar o sintagma καταφυγὴν φιλάνθρωπον
(47.7), realçando-se o facto de o adjectivo philanthropos, com o sentido de
"agradável" ou "tranquilo", qualicar o local de refúgio de Cícero, em Gaeta.
O terceiro herói romano aqui tratado, o Uticense, é descrito, por Plutarco,
como um homem ἀρετῆς ἐνθουσιασμός, ὑπὲρ τῶν καλῶν καὶ δικαίων
ἀγωνιζομένης ( entusiasmado com a virtude e que luta pelo bem e pela justiça,
26.5). Apesar dessas qualidades, o Romano não se deixa vencer, como alguns
senadores, pela praotes e philanthropia, após o discurso de César, atrás referido,
mas reage com orge e pathos (23.1), revelando, nesta ocasião, uma atitude
contrária à metriopatheia. Em três ocasiões a philanthropia surge associada à
justiça (21.5, 21.10, 29.4), merecendo Catão de Útica, segundo Plutarco, a
admiração da maioria dos cidadãos pela sua conduta humana (philanthropia)
e moderada (metriotes) no caso de Metelo, com quem Catão teve diversos
confrontos políticos, em particular quando, em 62 a. C., os dois exerceram o
cargo de tribunos da plebe. Mais evidente ainda é o elogio feito por Plutarco
após o discurso proferido por Catão (60.1):
(…) ἦσαν μὲν οἱ καὶ τοῖς λόγοις ἀγόμενοι πρὸς τὸ θαρρεῖν, οἱ δὲ πλεῖστοι πρὸς
τὸ ἀδεὲς καὶ γενναῖον αὐτοῦ καὶ φιλάνθρωπον ὀλίγου δεῖν ἐκλαθόμενοι τῶν
παρόντων, ὡς μόνον ὄντα τοῦτον ἀήττητον ἡγεμόνα καὶ πάσης κρείττονα
τύχης, ἐδέοντο χρῆσθαι καὶ σώμασιν αὐτῶν καὶ χρήμασι καὶ ὅπλοις (…)
11 Cf. ibidem. 8.2; em 36. 3-5, elogia-se a administração que Cícero fez dos bens.
12 Cf. ibidem. 9.6.
13 Sobre Plutarco e Catilina, vide C. B. R. P, 2002.
364
Joaquim J. S. Pinheiro
(…) com as palavras de Catão, alguns recuperaram a conança, mas a maior
parte, perante a audácia, a nobreza e a humanidade dele, depressa esqueceu o
momento presente e, considerando-o o único chefe invencível e mais forte do
que todo o tipo de vicissitude, pedia-lhe que usasse os seus corpos, os seus bens
e as suas armas (…).
É deste modo que se associa de forma directa a philanthropia a uma gura
importante da história romana do século I a. C., digno do nome de philosophos14
e que havia sido, como Plutarco, sacerdote de Apolo15 .
Este conjunto de ocorrências prova que a philanthropia: primeiro, surge, na
maioria das vezes associada à paideia e à politeia; segundo, não só caracteriza o ethos
dos heróis, como também, por exemplo, leis ou locais; e terceiro, é um valor acessível
ao Romanos16 . Plutarco não esconde, no entanto, que a philanthropia é uma marca
do virtuosismo da Hélade e, em particular, de Atenas, como se pode ler no nal da
biograa de Aristides17 : ἧς φιλανθρωπίας καὶ χρηστότητος ἔτι πολλὰ καὶ καθ' ἡμᾶς
ἡ πόλις ἐκφέρουσα δείγματα θαυμάζεται καὶ ζηλοῦται δικαίως ( Ainda nos nossos
dias a cidade de Atenas oferece numerosos exemplos desta humanidade e benevolência,
e, por causa disso, é, com razão, admirada e emulada); ou quando, na biograa de
Pelópidas18 , contrapõe à habilidade guerreira e à conduta tirânica dos Espartano
a philanthropia ancestral dos Atenienses que trataram com respeito os Tebanos19 .
Rera-se que, na linha da partilha dos valores, já Dionísio de Halicarnasso (Ant.
Rom. 1.89.1) armara que Roma, a cidade grega, era a mais sociável e humanitária
das cidades por ser refúgio para bárbaros, fugitivos e vagabundos.
14 Cf. Cat. Ma. 27.7.
15 Cf. Cat. Mi. 4.1.
16 C f. Marc. 20.1: Τῶν δὲ Ῥωμαίων τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀνθρώποις δεινῶν μὲν εἶναι πόλεμον
μεταχειρίσασθαι καὶ φοβερῶν εἰς χεῖρας ἐλθεῖν νομιζομένων, εὐγνωμοσύνης δὲ καὶ
φιλανθρωπίας καὶ ὅλως πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς ὑποδείγματα μὴ δεδωκότων, πρῶτος δοκεῖ τότε
Μάρκελλος ὑποδεῖξαι τοῖς Ἕλλησι δικαιοτάτους Ῥωμαίους. Para os estrangeiros, os Romanos
eram considerados hábeis na condução da guerra e terríveis na luta, não tendo dado provas de
benevolência, de humanidade e, em geral, de virtude política. Marcelo parece ter sido o primeiro a
mostrar aos Gregos que os Romanos eram particularmente justos.
17 Arist. 27.7.
18 Em Pel. 4.5 (Λακεδαιμονίοις ἔτι φίλοις καὶ συμμάχοις οὖσι πεμφθείσης ἐκ Θηβῶν
βοηθείας), depois de contar o conito de Mantineia, Plutarco introduz a mudança de atitude
entre Lacedemónios e Tebanos; cf. Marc. 23.5.
19 Ibidem. 6.2; Vide Quaest. Conu. 720C e De E Delph. 384D-E, onde Atenas surge como a
cidade de maior nível cultural, mas, por aquilo que escreve em Praec. Ger. Reip. 799C-D, a polis não
está isenta de defeitos, embora o texto não deixe de realçar a philanthropia dos Atenienses: οἷον
ὁ Ἀθηναίων εὐκίνητός ἐστι πρὸς ὀργήν, εὐμετάθετος πρὸς ἔλεον, μᾶλλον ὀξέως ὑπονοεῖν ἢ
διδάσκεσθαι καθ' ἡσυχίαν βουλόμενος· ὥσπερ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοῖς ἀδόξοις καὶ ταπεινοῖς βοηθεῖν
προθυμότερος, οὕτω τῶν λόγων τοὺς παιγνιώδεις καὶ γελοίους ἀσπάζεται καὶ προτιμᾷ· τοῖς
μὲν ἐπαινοῦσιν αὐτὸν μάλιστα χαίρει, τοῖς δὲ σκώπτουσιν ἥκιστα δυσχεραίνει· φοβερός ἐστιν
ἄχρι τῶν ἀρχόντων, εἶτα φιλάνθρωπος ἄχρι τῶν πολεμίων. Por exemplo, o povo Ateniense tem
uma inclinação para a cólera, que facilmente transforma em piedade, pois quer mais conjecturar de
imediato do que aprender com tranquilidade. Tal como considera muito benévolo auxiliar os homens
desprezados e humildes, também acolhe e prefere as palavras com humor e engraçadas; regozija-se
principalmente com aqueles que o louvam, mas pouco se irrita com os que zombam dele; é terrível com
os seus governantes, mas revela-se humano até com os inimigos.
365
O sentido de philanthropia nas biograas de Coriolano, Cícero e Catão de Útica
Na verdade, o sentido de philanthropia nas biograas espelha a visão
poliétnica e a própria sociedade multicultural e cosmopolita da época de
Plutarco. Esboçando na estrutura paralela das Vitae uma crase cultural, sem
apagar as diferenças entre Gregos e Romanos20 , Plutarco, em vez de congurar
a philanthropia como um valor pan-helénico, conforme surge em Isócrates ou
Xenofonte, procura tornar o seu sentido universal, abrangendo todos os que
são cidadãos do imperium, embora seja fundamental os Romanos cultivarem
a paideia helénica. De fora cam os Bárbaros pela sua inclinação natural para
o vício, a bestialidade ou para a superstição21 . Deste modo, o pepaideumenos ,
o homem novo da Segunda Sofística, teria de ter capacidade de liderança,
ser patriótico, íntegro e justo, lutar pelo bem comum, sem perseguir riquezas
pessoais, e ter um carácter enformado por virtudes como a praotes, a epieikeia e
a philanthropia 22 , valores de raiz helénica.
Para Plutarco, a aproximação entre as duas culturas, a grega e a romana,
poderia atingir-se mediante uma partilha de competências "naturais", cabendo,
desse modo, à Grécia contribuir com o esplendor e a humanidade da sua
paideia e à Vrbs com a sua capacidade governativa e engenho militar. Esta
proposta de compromisso civilizacional23 pode vericar-se, como vimos,
pela forma como a philanthropia surge associada aos heróis plutarquianos,
tanto Gregos como Romanos, uma vez que ela adquire, ao mesmo tempo,
uma dimensão individual e uma dimensão colectiva ou social. Se, por um
lado, o homem se deve comprometer com a sua formação com o objectivo de
aperfeiçoar a alma, os conhecimentos e o carácter, por outro, terá de ser capaz
de transpor para a sociedade ou para a vida pública a philanthropia. Assim, a
philanthropia plutarquiana é muito mais do que um conceito abstracto, uma
vez que transmite, com algum pragmatismo, uma ideia de civilidade bastante
útil aos destinatários das Vidas Paralelas e também aos actuais leitores.
20 Desta opinião partilha S. G, 2002, p. 270: "It's rather that the boundaries
of Greekness and Romanness — as with all myths of cultural origin at the site of cultural
conict — prove all too permeable, all too intertwined. Establishing and preserving the value of
Greekness becomes not just the assertion of an identity but a set of questions about cultural self-
positioning". Para P. D, 1992, p. 4471: "l'unità della cultura antica nelle sue essenziali
e parallele componenti greca e romana è un punto di arriva, e non di partenza, della riessione
plutarchea"; por sua vez, para S.-T. T, 2005a, p. 438: "the coalescence of Greek and
Roman culture in the late Imperial period produced a sentiment of cultural unity in the Empire";
vide ainda S.-T. T, 2005b, pp. 659-64.
21 Cf. A. G. N, 1986, J. P C, 1997 e T. S, 1999.
22 F. F, 1996, 231 sqq., na esteira de J. de R, 1979, classica esta tríade de
virtudes como "les trois vertus 'douces' traditionelles"; vide ainda H. M. M J., 1960, pp.
55-70.
23 H. M. M J., 1961 defendeu, apoiando-se na atitude lantrópica de Prometeu,
que, desde a sua origem, a philanthropia está conotada com a difusão civilizacional entre os
Helenos. Por philanthropia, Plutarco traduz não só uma atitude que tem implícito um sentido
de humanidade, mas também actividades que são reexo de uma atitude civilizacional, como
o banho ou o tratamento do corpo (Lyc. 16.12), ou uma qualidade muito importante para o
político ganhar a conança dos seus súbditos ou para enfrentar tempos de crise, como aqueles
que a Grécia vivia.
366
Joaquim J. S. Pinheiro
bi b l i o g r a f i a c i T a d a
D, P., "La Formazione delle Coppie nelle 'Vite' plutarchee", ANRW ,
II.33.6 (1992) 4470-86.
F, F., Histoire et Morale dans les Vies parallèles de Plutarque, Paris,
1996.
M J., H. M., "e concept of «praotes» in Plutarch's Lives", GRBS, 3
(1960) 65-73.
_____"e concept of Philanthropia in Plutarch's Lives", AJPh, 82.2 (1961)
164-75.
N, A. G., "ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΟΣ – ΒΑΡΒΑΡΙΚΟΣ. Plutarch on Greek and
Barbarian Characteristics", WS, 99 (1986) 229-44.
P C, J., "La noción de barbárie en las Vidas Paralelas de Plutarco
de Queronea", in C. S . (eds.), Plutarco y la Historia.
Actas del V Simposio Español sobre Plutarco (Zaragoza, 20-22 de
Junio, 1996), Zaragoza, 1997, pp. 367-78.
P, C. B. R., "Plutarch and Catiline", in , Plutarch and History,
London, 2002, pp. 45-63.
R, J. de, La douceur dans la pensée grecque, Paris, 1979.
S, T., Plutarque et les barbares. La rhétorique d'une image, Leuven/
Namur, 1999.
T, S.-T., "Plutarch's use of synonyms: a typical feature of his style",
in L. V D S (ed.), Rhetorical eory and Praxis in Plutarch.
Acta of IVth International Congress of the International Plutarch
Society (Leuven, July 3-6, 1996) Leuven, 2000, pp. 511-8.
_____ "Plutarch, amalgamator of Greece and Rome", in A. P J &
F. T (eds.), Valori Letterari delle Opere di Plutarco. Studi Oerti
al Professore Italo Gallo dall' International Plutarch Society, Málaga/
Logan, 2005a, pp. 433-40.
_____ "El programa de Plutarco para la conducta social", in M. J .
(eds.), Plutarc a la seva època: Paideia i societat. Actas del VIII Simposio
Internacional de la Sociedad Española de Plutarquistas (Barcelona, 6-8
Noviembre, 2003), Barcelona, 2005b, pp. 659-64.
367
S 5
Quaestiones Convivales
369
Educating the Young ... over Wine?
E ... P, C
T, F
G R
Catholic University of Leuven
Abstract
Already in the Archaic period, the symposion was often connected with educational
purposes. Plato elaborated his own alternative (esp. in the first two books of the Laws ) ,
which in turn influenced later authors. This contribution deals with three such thinkers:
Plutarch, Calvenus Taurus, and Favorinus of Arles. All three realised that the context of
the symposion yielded interesting opportunities for the education of younger students. I
propose to examine their evaluation of their students, their attitude (and, in Plutarch's case,
self-characterisation) as a teacher, and their didactic approach.The evidence shows that
Plutarch and Taurus basically pursue the same philosophical purposes in their education
during dinner, by promoting independent and critical thinking, whereas Favorinus'
teaching activities are more in line with the brilliant self-display of the so-called 'Second
Sophistic'.
οἶνος, ὦ φίλε παῖ, καὶ ἀλάθεα
Alcaeus, fr. 366
1. Wine and education: a strange alliance?
For most people, the Greek symposion probably does not call forth
associations with respectable education on a high level. One rather thinks
of bacchic dancing and mimes, skolia, relaxed conversation, laughter and
friendship, expensive ute-girls1 who may also have been hetairai, clowns,
acrobats, and jugglers, and in the rst place much wine and drunkenness2 .
Several of these elements were part and parcel of the symposion from the
very beginning, and once introduced, most of them remained popular until
late antiquity. is is not only conrmed in Old Comedy3 but also in many
passages from later symposium literature.
This, however, is only one side of the picture. Very early in the Greek
tradition, the banquet was also connected with educational purposes and
could be used as a tool for affirming and rehearsing elite values. In both
Crete and Sparta, young boys were in the Archaic period allowed to attend
the common meals of their fathers and to listen to their discussions of
political and military affairs4 . The Corpus Theognideum illustrates the same
tendency of teaching young boys like Cyrnus in the (pederastic?) context
of a symposion5 , and from Plato on, the educative aspect of the symposion
1 Cf. C. G. S, 1978.
2 See in general E. P, 1990, and (on the typical character of the ἄκλητος ) B . F,
1990.
3 See E. L. B, 1995.
4 J. N. B, 1990, pp. 136-7.
5 Cf. also W. R, 1995, pp. 109-11.
is discussed and justified from a philosophical point of view. It is well
known that Plato is usually rather critical of the contemporary practices at
drinking-parties6 , but in the first two books of his last work, the Laws , he
finally elaborates his own alternative, interpreting symposia as a training
in, and a secure test of, temperance (646c-650b) and emphasising the
close connection between παιδεία and a well-ordered symposion which
is supervised by sober commanders7 . In a famous passage from a much
earlier dialogue, Plato already opposed the symposia of ordinary people
to those of cultivated and noble participants (καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ συμπόται
καὶ πεπαιδευμένοι), arguing that flute-girls usually attend the former
banquets but remain absent from the latter, where the company is able
to entertain themselves with their own conversation (Prt. 347c-348a).
Well in line with this view, Eryximachus proposes, near the beginning of
Plato's Symposium, to bid farewell to the flute-girls and spend the time
together in conversation (176e). In Plutarch's Quaestiones convivales , the
Stoic Philip of Prusias8 perceptively points to the exceptional nature of
Agathon's banquet. The company consisted of a small number of learned
guests (cf. also 613D), so that "the surprising thing was not that the
flute-girl should be expelled from such a company, but that the party
was not so entertained and charmed as to forget both food and drink"
(710BC; transl. E. L. Minar, slightly modified). The conclusion seems
to be that even at more learned banquets some place could be given to
popular forms of entertainment, and indeed, Xenophon's Symposium also
contains both philosophical conversations and interludes during which a
Syracusan company diverts the guests with different performances. On
the other hand, when Xenophon depicts the banquets in the Cyropaedia as
remarkably sober and devoid of all customary entertainments, he appears
to speak normatively rather than descriptively9 .
In any case, the Greek tradition of the symposion soon showed a
double face. On the one hand, the banquet was a world of heavy drinking
and revelry, with all the risks of socially disruptive behaviour. On the
other hand, it helped to strengthen social ties and build community (by
creating and maintaining friendship and by educating the young towards
honourable moral behaviour). My focus on the latter aspect does not
necessarily betray my own preferences (which are irrelevant here) but
instead illustrates that of the authors who will be discussed. Let us begin,
then, with Plutarch.
6 See esp. the thorough discussion of M. T, 1990. Cf. on Plato's general attitude to
wine also P. B, 1951.
7 See Lg. 641b-d; 642a; 643a; 645c; 652a; 671a-674c.
8 On Philip of Prusias, see B. P, 1992, pp. 4869-70; S.-T. T, 1996, pp. 102-3;
cf. also D. B, 1969, pp. 254-60 on the contrast between Philip of Prusias and an anonymous
Stoic sophist in Quaest. conv. 710B-711D.
9 See D. L. G, 1993, pp. 150-4.
371
Educating the Young ... over Wine?
2. Plutarch of Chaeronea
Plutarch was no heavy drinker indeed10 , and even if he may occasionally
have been indulgent with the drinking of several of his heroes11 , he usually
advocates temperance and moderation12 . is implies that he was by no
means a rigid abstainer, and basically the same attitude he adopted towards
the customary forms of sympotic entertainment. He deems them pleasant
whenever present but refuses to attach great importance to them (cf., e.g.,
Quaest. conv. 629C) and just like Plato prefers to lay full emphasis on another
kind of entertainment, viz. that of erudite discussions. It is from such a pastime
that Plutarch's cultivated friends derive their highest pleasures. At Plutarch's
dinners, the burlesque clown has to give way to rened humour, the ute-girl
to lively conversations about music, and in general, sympotic entertainment
tends to coincide to an important extent with relaxed philosophical discussions.
e topics for conversation should be adapted to the specic context of the
symposion13 , to be sure, and the argumentative style should likewise reect
the sympotic atmosphere14 , but the high intellectual level of the company
suciently guarantees that the discussion never results in trivial platitudes or
vulgar bragging.
It is clear that such a context yields interesting opportunities for the
education of younger students. And young men do indeed participate in several
banquets which Plutarch describes (646A; 653B; 655EF; 676E; 692B; 704E).
On these occasions, the conversations also have an educative character, and
in that sense, they contain important information about Plutarch's educative
ideals and about his practical approach. We may catch a glimpse of the kind
of students Plutarch welcomes at his table and of the way in which he judges
them, and we may see dierent teachers at work, not in their school but in a
less formal context.
2.1. e students
In Plutarch's Quaestiones convivales, the young men are usually characterised
in a fairly negative way. First of all, they are easily impressionable. At a banquet
which the musician Erato organises in Athens, for instance, the participants
use garlands of roses instead of laurel, and when Ammonius begins to criticise
this, the young men are much embarrassed and quietly begin to take o their
10 ere is only one passage in the Quaestiones convivales where Plutarch mentions that the
party risked to degenerate into drunken behaviour (620A), but even in this case, the company
soon turned to intellectual discussions; see on the passage P. A. S, 1999, pp. 483-5.
11 Such as Cimon (cf. Cim. 4,3 and 15,3) and Cato the Younger (cf. Cat. Mi. 6,1-2); see H.
G. I, 1999.
12 See, e.g., S.-T. T, 1999, and A. G. N, 1999.
13 Accordingly, Plutarch prefers to deal with familiar and non technical issues (see esp.
Quaest. conv. 614D-615B), imitating the example of Xenophon (630A).
14 Here, Plato's Symposium is the model, combining as it does an easy argumentation with
concrete examples and myths (Quaest. conv. 614CD).
garlands (645D-646A). Plutarch immediately makes it clear that such a
reaction is unnecessary: Ammonius is just making fun of the company (645D:
ἐπέσκωψε) and merely introduces the issue for the sake of exercise and inquiry
(646A: γυμνασίας ἕνεκα καὶ ζητήσεως). At a symposion of Plutarch's father,
likewise in Athens, the host raises the question of why sweet new wine is
least intoxicating (655EF). Again, most students are embarrassed, coming no
further than being baed by what they regard as paradoxical and incredible
(655F), although in this case two of them (Hagias and Aristaenetus) do
their best to provide a plausible explanation (655F-656A). When Lucanius
entertains Plutarch's friends in Corinth, nally, the discussion is about the
use of the pine as the victor's garland at the Isthmia. An unnamed professor
of rhetoric, well-known for his familiarity with literature, points out that the
ancients used celery rather than the pine and argues his point by means of a
whole series of quotations (676C-E). In this case, too, the young are impressed
by the rhetorician's great learning and wide reading (676E) and once again,
one of the older, learned participants (here the host himself ) has to intervene
in order to put things into perspective (676EF).
Secondly, young people are – unsurprisingly – still represented as
insuciently acquainted with ancient literature. We already saw how they were
impressed by the wealth of quotations adduced by the rhetorician (676E).
On another occasion, young men attacked Epicurus for having introduced
in his Symposium a discussion about the proper time for coition. In their view,
Epicurus gave evidence of extreme licentiousness by dealing with such a topic
in the presence of young men and at a banquet (653BC). Such a criticism,
however, is not merely cheap but even entirely unjustied, being based on utter
ignorance of the great literature of the past – both Xenophon's Symposium
(653C) and Zeno's Republic (653E) deal with similar topics – and on a careless
interpretation of Epicurus' position. Zopyrus thus undertakes the defence of
Epicurus and explains what the great philosopher of the Garden really wanted
to say (653C-E). As a result, the young men are reduced to silence and the
company goes on to discuss precisely this topic.
irdly, the young give evidence of radicalness, which may be connected
with their fresh enthusiasm for philosophy. When Philinus took some of
his students to a banquet of Philo the physician, one of them refused to eat
anything but bread (660D). is example is somewhat ambivalent, though,
for the student's behaviour is indirectly (and not without humour) attacked
by the host and no less indirectly defended by Plutarch and Philinus. e
young man's conduct shows a praiseworthy principled consistency, to be sure,
but also a rigid inexibility which hardly suits the sympotic conviviality and
may thus be regarded as παρὰ καιρόν. Elsewhere, such radicalness appears
in an even more negative light. At a dinner given by Aristion, the discussion
is initiated by Niger. Before reporting the latter's arguments, Plutarch gives
a short characterisation of the young man: he happens to have returned from
a brief course of instruction under a famous philosopher. e phrase χρόνον
οὐ πολύν (692B) already suggests that Niger's philosophical progress is at
373
Educating the Young ... over Wine?
best fairly limited and supercial and thus announces Plutarch's explicit
evaluation that the young man has not really comprehended his teacher's
doctrines. He has begun, however, to imitate his annoying behaviour by
continuously criticising and cross-examining the company. When he
launches his attack against the sumptuous preparations which Aristion
has made, combining a strongly moralising tone with would-be erudition15
(692C-E), we already know that his high-principled radicalness lacks any
fundamentum in re. No wonder, then, that the host easily succeeds in refuting
his young guest by correcting his mistakes, showing a much higher level of
erudition, and demonstrating that the attack is exaggerated and irrelevant
(692E-693E).
Finally, hardly anything is said about positive qualities, with one exception,
though: the learned company fully appreciates the young men's skill in nding
arguments (εὑρησιλογίαν) (656A). Now εὑρησιλογία is an ambiguous term
and it has more than once a negative connotation in Plutarch's works. Especially
the Stoics are often blamed for their sophistic ingenuities16 . In this context,
however, the word is obviously positive17 , for Plutarch goes on to praise the
fact that the young men looked for proper solutions instead of falling back on
more ready answers (656AB). Even this praise, however, remains somewhat
ambivalent, for the reader may easily conclude that the students' εὑρησιλογία
was a dire necessity, rooted in their ignorance of well-known traditional
solutions.
e following general conclusions can be derived from the evidence
discussed so far. In Plutarch's Quaestiones convivales, the young men [1] usually
remain passive. ey often undergo the situation and occasionally become
themselves the topic of conversation rather than actively contributing to it. [2]
ey give ample evidence of their immaturity, both by their conduct and by their
words, and [3] they do not seem to be full members of the company. eir sincere
interest in philosophy and the intellectual and moral level which they have
already reached enables them to attend the conversations of Plutarch's learned
friends, to be sure, but they are never on a par with the older participants.
Plutarch's attitude towards the young students in the Quaestiones convivales ,
then, shows a curious mix of a condescending depreciation and a prudent
appreciation. Plutarch realised very well that his intellectual level, and that
of his erudite friends, far surpassed that of the immature and inexperienced
νέοι, and in spite of his friendly openness and stimulating remarks, this great
distance was never overcome.
It is interesting to compare this characterisation of the young students
with that of the προκόπτων ("the man who is making (moral) progress") in
15 According to D. B, 1969, pp. 252-4, several aspects of Niger's speech show that
he went to a Stoic teacher. M. C, 1969, p. 565 suggests the interesting possibility that
Niger's teacher was none other than Epictetus.
16 See De aud. poet. 31E; De comm. not. 1070E and 1072F; cf. also De Stoic. rep. 1033B. In all
these passages, the term εὑρησιλογία undoubtedly has a negative connotation.
17 Cf. also Quaest. conv. 625C and 632B.
De profectibus in virtute. In this treatise, Plutarch lists a series of indications
of moral progress: the continuity of one's course, mildness (πραότης )18 and
lack of jealousy, authenticity, consistency, untroubled dreams, alleviation of
the passions, etc.19 . It is striking that not one of these positive indications
returns in the characterisation of the students in the Quaestiones convivales .
As far as I can see, there are only two interesting parallels. Near the end of
De profectibus in virtute, Plutarch argues that the presence of a certain self-
condence and self-knowledge can be regarded as a clear token of moral
progress. Accordingly, a man who has made such progress will no longer be
disturbed when a famous and prudent man suddenly appears, nor conceal
or change some personal detail (85BC), but will even in the presence of
good men be satised with his own condition. Diametrically opposed to
such a behaviour is that of the students who at the dinner of Erato were
embarrassed by Ammonius' attack against the use of ower-garlands and
began to take them o (646A). eir conduct obviously shows that they
have made only little progress and is opposed to that of Plutarch himself,
who is not confused at all but quietly and appropriately deals with the
situation.
Earlier in the treatise, Plutarch suggests that authenticity (τὸ πρὸς
ἀλήθειαν) rather than outward display ( τὸ πρὸς ἐπίδειξιν ) should be
considered as an indication of moral progress (80E). Whereas beginners are
over-bold, give themselves airs, and have a countenance full of disdain which
spares nobody, the προκόπτοντες are less conceited and less concerned with
external details, and – what is especially interesting in our context – replace
their contempt for other people with biting self-criticism and mildness
towards others (81BC). If that is true, Niger can obviously be classied under
the group of mere beginners (692B-E), just like the young men who attacked
Epicurus (653B). In all of these cases, the students who are introduced in
the Quaestiones convivales are negative examples of moral progress. It is clear,
then, that a comparison with De profectibus in virtute fully conrms the above
conclusions and that the gure of the student in the Quaestiones convivales is
usually characterised in a fairly negative way.
2.2. e teachers
While the young students all have their own teachers at school, in the
context of the symposion, the older participants de facto function together
as one group of mutually supporting teachers. Each member of the learned
company can take the initiative in contributing directly to the instruction
of the young. e host frequently plays an important part in this process
by raising interesting questions and directing the discussions, but the
guests do not refrain from intervening either, adding new perspectives or
18 On the crucial importance of this virtue in Plutarch's work, see, e.g., H. M. M J.,
1960, and J. D R, 1979, pp. 275-307. On its limitations, see G. R, 2004a.
19 See G. R, 2005, pp. 220-363 for a systematic discussion of the whole treatise.
375
Educating the Young ... over Wine?
introducing other problems. In that sense, the whole conversation often has
an instructive aspect.
In the sympotic context, then, education turns out to be teamwork, and the
stimulating exchange of ideas is a win-win situation for teachers and students
alike. But this particular context even yields an additional advantage, in that
it enables the students to observe the conduct of their distinguished teachers
outside the school, in their private life20 . One should recall in this context the
paramount importance which Plutarch attaches to the dynamics of μίμησις
in the educational process21 . It is well-known that this is one of the crucial
motivations behind the ambitious project of the Lives, which oer concrete
examples of illustrious men and their honourable accomplishments and thus
incite to careful reection and imitation (see esp. Per. 1,3-2,4 and Aem. 1,1).
In De profectibus in virtute, Plutarch likewise argues that active imitation
of good examples, even in small details, can be regarded as an indication of
moral progress. In this light, the young students who participate in the learned
banquets get a unique opportunity. ey can watch how their teachers behave
in their private life and fashion their own conduct after it. e teachers, on
the other hand, appear to function as paradigmatic models, and this aspect of
their role in the Quaestiones convivales is a telling example of Plutarch's self-
assurance as a teacher.
ere are two questions which need further examination in this section:
the kind of subjects which the teachers bring forward for discussion and
their didactic approach. As far as the former question is concerned, the great
variety of subjects immediately attracts notice. All kinds of problems are
discussed, with a slight preference for unusual questions (cf. 673A: ζητεῖν
τι τῶν περιττῶν). Not without reason, the Quaestiones convivales have been
linked with the genre of προβλήματα22 (a genre which often occurs in the
Corpus Plutarcheum23 ), and – equally important in this context – there can also
be established a connection with the genre of ζητήματα 24 (as exemplied in
the Quaestiones Platonicae , which are obviously rooted in Plutarch's teaching
activities). ese genres interrelate to an important extent, and distinctions are
even further blurred by the convivial context, in which education is merely one
of the aims (and perhaps not the most important), next to pleasant pastime
and creating and maintaining friendship.
e great variety of subjects reects the broad interests of the company
and their accurate observations of details, but also illustrates typical features
of the mature philosophical thinking of Plutarch's day, such as the continuous
concern to explore and elaborate traditional answers and the sincere attempt
20 at is, in a context in which they show their real selves; cf. Per. 7,5 and F. B. T,
1999, pp. 496-9.
21 See, e.g., L. V S, 2005.
22 See, e.g., S.-T. T, 1989, p. 12; cf. also J. M, 1931, pp. 173-9.
23 e Quaestiones Romanae, the Quaestiones Graecae and the Quaestiones naturales are still
extant. e Lamprias catalogue also mentions a work Περὶ προβλημάτων (n. 193); cf. further n.
119, 139, 149, 160, 161, and 167. See also G. W. M. H, 2000.
24 See esp. J. O, 1996, pp. 75-6.
to get a grip on even the most trivial details of reality through a rational
explanation of their causes. e company does not merely consist of Platonists
such as Plutarch and Ammonius, but also of adherents of the Peripatos
(e.g. Lamprias), Pythagoreans (e.g. Lucius), Stoics (e.g. Sarapion and Philip
of Prusias), and Epicureans (e.g. Boethus and Zopyrus). is philosophical
circle is further completed by physicians, poets, rhetoricians, grammarians,
mathematicians, and statesmen. Everyone brings along his own expertise
and deals with the questions from his own point of view25 . No doubt every
member of the company, however erudite he may be, can benet from
such a conversation26 . For the students, however, it provides a particularly
rich introduction to dierent domains of the contemporary scientic and
philosophical thinking27 .
e teachers' didactic approach, on the other hand, is fully adapted
to the sympotic context, rather than vice versa. Usually the learned
company does not seem to bear in mind that the conversation also serves
a pedagogical aim. ey just go on to entertain themselves through their
discussions. e young men can listen silently and attentively, and thus
learn a lot. Occasionally, however, the students are invited to make their
own contribution. In such cases – which remain fairly rare after all – their
self-motivation and independence is stimulated28 (646A; 656CD; 744C;
746B; cf. also 694D) and they get the opportunity to secure for themselves
a more important place in the company. For a while, the education process
appears to become a dialogue. Even at such moments, however, the distance
between students and teachers remains and the seeds of the dialogue never
reach maturity. e reason for this is not so much the teachers' disdain but
rather their friendly tact: the learned company fully takes into account the
less advanced level of the students. erefore Ammonius does not refute
Trypho's argument (648B) and later on generously promises to refrain
from replying to the solutions proposed by the young men (649A). It is
clear that such an attitude, while combining kindness with diplomacy, is
hardly conducive to real dialogue. Only twice are the students' contributions
explicitly praised as clever and plausible products of personal thinking
(656A and 719E). Se non è vero, è ben trovato. And twice indeed, one may
well remain sceptical about the value of their position, for in both cases, the
praise is immediately followed by instruction: the students are introduced
to traditional solutions which are well-known in the school but which they
25 Only the statesmen cannot take advantage of their political experience, since the subject
of politics is usually avoided in the sympotic discussions; cf. S.-T. T, 1995.
26 Passages such like Quaest. conv. 628D and 664D make it perfectly clear that the debates
are not merely an exercise for the young men alone.
27 It may be added in passing that this approach is also in line with Plutarch's sceptical
outlook (on which see J. O, 1998). Dierent views are often praised as plausible and
are more than once juxtaposed without clear hierarchy. e members all look for the truth,
without claiming to have reached denitive conclusions. Cf. L. V S, 2000, pp. 94
and 97-8.
28 See in general G. R, 2004b, esp. pp. 101-14.
377
Educating the Young ... over Wine?
apparently overlooked or ignored. In that sense, the young men even here
fail to become full members of the group.
Similar conclusions, nally, hold for moral topics, which are also
discussed. As has been said above, the moral conduct of the company at the
banquet serves as a concrete model that is worthy of imitation. Furthermore,
the older participants sometimes bear in mind the specic situation and
needs of the young. When Olympichus, for instance, advocates complete
sexual continence, Soclarus intervenes, pointing to the presence of young
married men for whom such an advice is worthless (654C). Finally, if
need be, the students are rebuked for their moral shortcomings. When the
company occasionally forgets the decorum and joins in disgraceful dancing,
Lamprias wishes to rebuke the young men but hesitates because he does
not wish to appear as a severe schoolmaster (704C-E). When Callistratus
adds fuel to the re, however, he decides to intervene and elaborates on
the moral dangers which rhythmical music entails (705B-706C). is is a
beautiful piece of parrhesiastic admonition which still remains friendly and
tactful: through his indirect and theoretical approach, Lamprias perfectly
succeeds in avoiding direct attacks and disturbing the context of convivial
friendship, while at the same time managing to get his message across in an
unambiguous and clear way29 . In this case, too, the same tension between
tactful respect and patronising returns.
3. Calvenus Taurus
Basically the same approach returns in our sources about Calvenus
Taurus, an inuential Platonist in Athens whose oruit is placed by Eusebius
in 145 A.D. (Chron. 2161; p. 202 Helm)30 and whose lessons were attended
by Aulus Gellius. Gellius' work contains much interesting information about
Taurus' pedagogical convictions and ideals. Several passages from his Noctes
Atticae show a fairly negative portrait of the students, who in Taurus' view
are far inferior to their predecessors (1,9,1-11 and 7,10,1-5). Taurus himself,
on the other hand, appears as an erudite teacher who is well acquainted
with medicine (12,5,3 and 18,10,1-7), is respected by powerful politicians
(2,2,1)31 , and always welcomes opportunities for intellectual discussions
(12,5,5).
In the context of this contribution, however, it is especially important that
Taurus used to invite his students to dinner. Gellius tells how the students were
expected to bring topics for discussion as their own contribution to the dinner.
ese contributions were called τραγημάτια or "little sweetmeats" (7,13,12),
which may be understood both as a humorous allusion to the second book of
29 A beautiful parallel is to be found in De ad. et am. 70E (Ammonius' indirect rebuke of
one of his students).
30 Good studies of Taurus' life and philosophy include H. D, 1973; J. D, 1977,
pp. 237-47; M.-L. L, 1995. An edition of the fragments with commentary can be
found in A. G, 2002, pp. 221-376.
31 Cf. J. D, 2002, pp. 29-30.
Plato's Republic (372c and e, on the desserts of the 'healthy' and the 'fevered'
state) and as a tacit correction of this passage (replacing as it does even the most
simple desserts such as gs or beans with pleasant intellectual discussions32 ).
However that may be, it is clear that Taurus' symposia (at least those mentioned
by Gellius) are much more adapted to the specic intellectual condition of
students than Plutarch's. Whereas the young students usually remain silent
participants in Plutarch, they apparently play a much more important part at
Taurus' table.
We might expect, then, that the characterisation of the students which
we nd in Gellius is more positive too. is, however, is only partly true. Here
as well, the young men occasionally appear as immature, and their easy and
unjustied rejection of some subtle problems as empty sophisms (7,13,7)
recalls the cheap criticism of the young men against Epicurus in Plutarch's
Quaestiones convivales (653B)33 . But in general, Taurus seems to have taken
their arguments seriously, although an important caveat should be added
here, viz. the dierences of perspective in both sources: Plutarch wrote as a
teacher, Gellius as a student, and this, of course, in all likelihood inuenced
their presentation. We shall never know what Taurus really thought about the
contributions of his students nor how he behaved in a context comparable to
that of Plutarch's learned symposia.
Taurus' didactic approach is very similar to that of Plutarch. For just
like Plutarch, Taurus takes care to stimulate the independence and the self-
motivation of his students, and more than Plutarch, he succeeds in turning the
educational process into a real dialogue. His invitation to look for intriguing
(cf. 7,13,4: ἐνθυμημάτια [...] orentem vino animum lacessentia) problems is a
particularly interesting and accurate way of arousing wonder, which constitutes
the ἀρχή of philosophy, and like Plutarch, he does not hesitate to derive
himself topics for discussion from concrete events (17,8,3-9). Under Taurus'
supervision, the students as it were learn to philosophise. ey are allowed to
speak rst, whereupon Taurus intervenes in order to conrm their answer34
(17,8,11), to add supplementary information (17,8,11-15) and raise related
questions (17,8,16), or to emend their erroneous views by giving the relevant
philosophical background (7,13,7-11).
e general conclusion, then, is that Plutarch and Taurus were both
conscious of the rich opportunities which a symposion could provide for
educative purposes. e students have a more signicant role in Taurus'
approach, although this is no doubt connected with the specic context
(Taurus' symposia, unlike Plutarch's, were specically organised for students)
and perhaps with the judgement of Gellius. But both Plutarch and Taurus
32 us following Plato's own ideals of sympotic entertainment; cf. Prt. 347cd and Smp.
176e.
33 Cf. also the gure of the garrulous and boastful Stoic student in 1,2,3-6, who may serve
as the counterpart of Niger in Plutarch, Quaest. conv. 692B-E.
34 Even if he probably disagreed with several aspects of the proposed solution; cf. M.-L.
L, 1995, p. 158.
379
Educating the Young ... over Wine?
try to stimulate basically the same philosophical attitude by encouraging
independent thinking35 .
4. Favorinus of Arles
A completely dierent case is that of Favorinus, who knew Plutarch
personally36 and participated in at least one symposion where Plutarch was
present as well (Quaest. conv. 734E-735C). But Favorinus also organised
symposia himself, and two of these were attended by Gellius37 . During these
dinners, so Gellius tells us, a slave usually read a book. On one such occasion,
Favorinus makes a critical remark which immediately closes the debate, even
before it has begun (3,19,1-5). e other case is even more illustrative. When in
a Latin poem the term Iapyx occurred, the company asks Favorinus to explain
this name and add supplementary information about the names of the other
winds (2,22,2). Favorinus replies with a torrent of words, going on and on ad
nauseam. His speech is a beautiful sample of his encyclopedic erudition38 , to
be sure, but also shows ex cathedra teaching which leaves no place at all for any
dialogue. e process is entirely monological, and the students can only remain
passive and admire the brilliant speaker in silence. ey are never encouraged
to think for themselves or adopt an independent and critical position.
It is interesting to note that Favorinus himself seems to realise that his
contribution was not entirely comme il faut. At the end of his lengthy speech,
he admits that "for one to do all the talking at a large dinner-party is neither
decent nor becoming" (2,22,26: in convivio autem frequenti loqui solum unum
neque honestum est [...] neque commodum; transl. J. C. Rolfe). ese words most
strikingly reveal Favorinus' principal concern. His avowal is by no means rooted
in an educative reex but in his insight that a dinner is not the appropriate
place to give a speech such like that. His intervention is much more in line
with the epideictic speeches characteristic of the so-called 'Second Sophistic',
which require another audience and another context. He does not attempt to
stimulate independent thinking but wants to impress the audience through
his erudition and through the literary embellishment of his words. In that
sense, Gellius' reference to Favorinus' elegantia verborum and to his beautiful
style (2,22,27) is far from pointless. For Taurus, this would have been of minor
importance (17,20,5-6), but for Favorinus, it was essential. It is clear, then, that
35 One may well wonder whether Taurus read Plutarch's Quaestiones convivales and drew
inspiration from the work for his didactic approach, or whether the similarities should rather be
traced back to the Platonic philosophical tradition which they both share. For Taurus' general
appreciation of Plutarch (cf. 1,26,4: Plutarchus noster, vir doctissimus ac prudentissimus), see, e.g.,
J. D, 1977, p. 237; M.-L. L, 1995, pp. 227-8.
36 On the philosophical connections between both, see, e.g., J. O, 1997.
37 On Gellius' importance as a source for Favorinus, see M.-L. L, 1997; S. M.
B, 2001; cf. also B. B, 1973 and M. P, 1973.
38 Favorinus was the author of a Παντοδαπὴ στορία, a miscellaneous work in 24 books which
gives evidence of his encyclopedic interests; see further A. B, 1993, pp. 568-70 and L.
H-S, 1988, pp. 81-3.
Favorinus' education is aimed at a dierent ideal. Unlike Plutarch and Taurus,
he does not wish to educate mature Platonic philosophers, but self-conscious,
erudite, and virtuoso speakers such like himself.
5. Conclusion
e above evidence clearly shows that the symposion did not necessarily
coincide with drunken revelry in the intellectual circles of the rst and second
century A.D. It was especially regarded and appreciated as a pleasant pastime
which tightened the bonds of friendship, but at the same time, it yielded rich
opportunities for the education of younger men. In the convivial context, these
educative purposes sometimes came to the fore (viz. in the banquets which
Taurus organised for his students), and sometimes merely played a secondary part
in a broader context (as in Plutarch's Quaestiones convivales). In all of the above
discussed cases, however, the sympotic conduct of both teachers and students
gives evidence of the triumphant victory of rened culture over rened wine.
W o r k s c i T e d
B, D., Plutarque et le stoïcisme, Paris, 1969.
B, B., "Aulus Gellius and his Circle", AClas, 16 (1973) 103-7.
B, A., "Favorino di Arelate", ANRW II, 34, 1, Berlin – New York,
1993, pp. 556-81.
B, S. M., "Homo fandi dulcissimus: e Role of Favorinus in the Attic Nights
of Aulus Gellius", AJPh, 122 (2001) 87-106.
B, E. L., "Wine in Old Comedy", in O. M & M. T (eds.),
In vino veritas, London, 1995, pp. 113-25.
B, P., "Platon et le vin", BAGB, 4 (1951) 3-19.
B, J. N., "Adolescents, Symposion, and Pederasty", in O. M (ed.),
Sympotica. A Symposium on the Symposion, Oxford, 1990, pp. 135-48.
C, M., "Plutarque et Épictète", in Actes du VIIIe Congrès de l'Association
Guillaume Budé (Paris, 5-10 Avril, 1968), Paris, 1969, pp. 560-6.
D R, J., La douceur dans la pensée grecque, Paris, 1979.
D, J., e Middle Platonists. A Study of Platonism 80 B.C. to A.D. 220,
London, 1977.
_____"e Social Role of the Philosopher in the Second Century C.E.: Some
Remarks", in P. A. S & L. V S (eds.), Sage and
Emperor. Plutarch, Greek Intellectuals, and Roman Power in the Time of
Trajan (98-117A.D.), Leuven, 2002, pp. 29-40.
381
Educating the Young ... over Wine?
D, H., "L. Kalbenos Tauros. Das Persönlichkeitsbild eines platonischen
Philosophen um die Mitte des 2. Jahrh. n. Chr.", Kairos, 15 (1973) 24-
35 [repr. in I, Platonica minora, München, 1976, pp. 310-23].
F, B., "Entertainers at the Symposion: e Akletoi in the Archaic Period",
in O. M (ed.), Sympotica. A Symposium on the Symposion, Oxford,
1990, pp. 185-95.
G, D. L., Xenophon's Cyropaedia. Style, Genre, and Literary Technique,
Oxford, 1993.
G, A., Filoso medioplatonici del II secolo D.C. Testimonianze e frammenti.
Gaio, Albino, Lucio, Nicostrato, Tauro, Severo, Arpocrazione. Edizione,
traduzione e commento, Napoli, 2002.
H, G. W. M., "Problems with the Genre of Problems: Plutarch's
Literary Innovations", CPh, 95 (2000) 193-99.
H-S, L., Aulus Gellius, London, 1988.
I, H. G., "Οὐ ψέγεται τὸ πίνειν. Wie Plutarch den übermäßigen
Weingenuß beurteile", in J. G. M C . (eds.), Plutarco,
Dioniso y el vino. Actas del VI Simposio español sobre Plutarco (Cádiz,
14-16 de Mayo, 1998), Madrid, 1999, pp. 277-90.
L, M.-L., Der Platoniker Tauros in der Darstellung des Aulus Gellius,
Leiden/New York/Köln, 1995.
_____"Favorinus von Arelate. Aulus Gellius über seinen Lehrer", in B. C
. (eds.), Vir bonus dicendi peritus. Festschrift für Alfons Weische zum
65. Geburtstag, Wiesbaden, 1997, pp. 233-43.
M J., H. M., "e Concept of Praotes in Plutarch's Lives", GRBS, 3
(1960) 65-73.
M, J., Symposion. Die Geschichte einer literarischen Form, Paderborn,
1931.
N, A. G., "Plutarch's Attitude to Wine", in J. G. M C
. (eds.), Plutarco, Dioniso y el vino. Actas del VI Simposio español
sobre Plutarco (Cádiz, 14-16 de Mayo, 1998), Madrid, 1999, pp. 337-
48.
O, J., "Ζητήματα: Structure et argumentation dans les Quaestiones
Platonicae", in J. A. F D F. P P
(eds.), Estudios sobre Plutarco: Aspectos formales. Actas del IV Simposio
Español sobre Plutarco (Salamanca, 26 a 28, Mayo, 1994), Salamanca,
1996, pp. 71-83.
_____ "Favorinus versus Epictetus on the Philosophical Heritage of Plutarch.
A Debate on Epistemology", in J. M. M (ed.), Plutarch and his
Intellectual World. Essays on Plutarch, London, 1997, pp. 17-39.
_____ In Search of the Truth. Academic Tendencies in Middle Platonism, Brussel,
1998.
P, E., "Outlines of a Morphology of Sympotic Entertainment", in O.
M (ed.), Sympotica. A Symposium on the Symposion, Oxford, 1990,
pp. 177-84.
P, M., "Gellio e la scuola di Favorino", ASNP, 3 (1973) 837-60.
P, B., "Prosopographie des amis de Plutarque", ANRW II, 33, 6, Berlin/
New York, 1992, pp. 4831-93.
R, G., "Plutarch on Self and Others", AncSoc, 34 (2004) 245-73 [=
2004a].
_____"From Stick to Reasoning. Plutarch on the Communication between
Teacher and Pupil", WS, 117 (2004) 93-114 [=2004b].
_____On the Path to Virtue. e Stoic Doctrine of Moral Progress and its Reception
in (Middle-)Platonism, Leuven, 2005.
R, W., "Wine and Truth in the Greek Symposion", in O. M M.
T (eds.), In vino veritas, London, 1995, pp. 106-12.
S, P. A. , "Drinking, Table Talk, and Plutarch's Contemporaries", in J.
G. M C . (eds.), Plutarco, Dioniso y el vino. Actas del
VI Simposio Español sobre Plutarco (Cádiz, 14-16 de Mayo, 1998),
Madrid, 1999, pp. 481-90.
S, C. G., "An Evening with the Flute-Girls", PP, 33 (1978) 401-10.
T, M., " Logos Sympotikos: Patterns of the Irrational in Philosophical
Drinking: Plato Outside the Symposium", in O. M (ed.),
Sympotica. A Symposium on the Symposion , Oxford, 1990, pp. 238-
60.
T, S.-T., A Commentary on Plutarch's Table Talks, vol. I, Göteborg,
1989.
_____"La politica nelle Questioni conviviali", in I. G B.S
(eds.), Teoria e prassi politica nelle opere di Plutarco. Atti del V Convegno
plutarcheo (Certosa di Pontignano, 7-9 Giugno, 1993), Napoli, 1995,
pp. 433-7.
_____ A Commentary on Plutarch's Table Talks. Vol. III (Books 7-9), Göteborg,
1996.
_____ "Dionysus Moderated and Calmed: Plutarch on the Convivial Wine",
in J. G. M C . (eds.), Plutarco, Dioniso y el vino. Actas
del VI Simposio español sobre Plutarco (Cádiz, 14-16 de Mayo, 1998),
Madrid, 1999, pp. 57-69.
383
Educating the Young ... over Wine?
T, F. B., "Everything to do with Dionysus: Banquets in Plutarch's
Lives", in J. G. M C . (eds.), Plutarco, Dioniso y el vino.
Actas del VI Simposio español sobre Plutarco (Cádiz, 14-16 de Mayo,
1998), Madrid, 1999, pp. 491-9.
V S, L., "Aspects of the Ethics and Poetics of the Dialogue
in the Corpus Plutarcheum", in I. G C. M (eds.), I
generi letterari in Plutarco. Atti del VIII Convegno plutarcheo (Pisa, 2-4
Giugno, 1999), Napoli, 2000, pp. 93-116.
_____"e Sting of Ambition: Plutarchan Reections on Mimetical
Behaviour", in M. J . (eds.), Plutarc a la seva època: Paideia
i societat. Actas del VIII Simposio Español sobre Plutarco (Barcelona,
6-8 de Noviembre, 2003), Barcelona, 2005, pp. 139-44.
385
e symposium in Plutarch's Table Talk VII, 9 - VIII, Proem and Maximus of Tyre's Oration XXII
"v i n o u s b a b b l i n g "
Th e s y m p o s i u m i n pl u T a r c h 's T a b l e Ta l k vii, 9 – viii,
pr o e m (714a – 717a) a n d ma x i m u s o f T y r e 's or a T i o n xxii
J L
Research Foundation – Flanders
Catholic University of Leuven
Abstract
In his Table-Talk (VII, 714A – VIII, 717A), Plutarch introduces a theme which also occurs
in Maximus of Tyre's Oration XXII 'On proper entertainment', viz. the Persian habit to discuss
important subjects over wine. Both authors consider this matter in the context of a wider moral-
philosophical reection on the appropriate way of dealing with deliberation, drinking and
drunkenness, but each of them comes to a dierent appreciation, which seems quite indicative
for their position throughout their wider oeuvre: whereas Plutarch seems to attribute high value
to the custom of the symposium and even uses it as an inspiring setting for his Table Talk ,
Maximus often associates it with attery and immoderate drunkenness, which entails a real
threat for the virtuous man. By comparing these two authors' opinion on the symposium, this
paper enlarges the understanding of the Plutarchan symposium within its Greek and Roman
context, and highlights the philosophically and socially distinctive position of both authors vis-
à-vis their contemporary audience.
0. e status of the symposium in Plutarch's Table Talk and elsewhere
in his oeuvre still provokes fruitful scholarly discussion. Was the Plutarchan
symposium the description of an actual social ritual in the élite society of his
day or merely a literary ction?1 To what extent should his banquets be read
as a normative example? How is the philosophical tradition interwoven with
Plutarch's view on symposia? How much independence did he allow himself
(or did his public allow him) in his dialogue with this authorized tradition?
Of course, Plutarch's Table Talk and his other works are but one source for
a reconstruction of the actual ritual of the symposium in the Roman Empire,
and they might contain some rather misleading information, for it cannot be
taken for granted that Plutarch aimed at presenting an objective image of a
drinking party in his day. A confrontation with other authors might help to
gain a better understanding of the symposium in and outside Plutarch's milieu .
is paper will compare the connotations of the word 'symposium' in Plutarch's
oeuvre and in that of Maximus of Tyre2 , a philosophical orator of the second
1 See e.g. J. M, 1931, pp. 177 sqq. (Plutarch's συμποσιακά as a ctional literary
framework); J. C. R, 1992, p. 232: "Plutarch blurs the line between articially constructed
symposia and actual drinking parties not only by referring to the symposia of Xenophon
and Plato as if they actually happened, but by literary rendering actual entertainments"; M.
V, 2000, passim, esp. p. 225 (Plutarch's symposium as a mainly antiquarian summary of
philosophical and symposiastic themes) and F. P P, 1999 (the historicity of
some symposiastic aspects in Plutarch's Table Talk).
2 Since a more stylistic comparison between Plutarch and Maximus has already been
made by P. V C, 2000, I will focus on a thematic comparison and only analyse
Plutarch's and Maximus' rhetorical strategies if they underline a thematic point of view.
century AD, who probably delivered his speeches in Rome as an introduction
to philosophy for young students3 . Maximus did not write as extensively on
symposia as Plutarch did, but that does not mean that his description of the
symposium does not present an authentic testimony on drinking parties in
the Imperial era. On the contrary, since Maximus seemed to have less interest
in the philosophical, elevated value of the drinking parties (cf. infra), the
symposia described in his texts might be closer to the actual drinking parties
of his contemporaries.
1. In the fourth paragraph of his twenty-second Oration 'On Proper
Entertainment', Maximus expresses his disgust at the symposiastic behaviour
of the Aenianes, whose banquets are characterized by a burlesque form of
role-playing, including even simulated ghting scenes. Maximus, commenting
that this is a highly unconvivial spectacle, far prefers the Persian symposium,
where important subjects are usually discussed over a moderate amount of
wine, as described in Herodotus' Histories4 . e main reason for Maximus'
approval is the fact that the Persians had a "rule restraining drunkenness", which
"simultaneously roused their virtues", because it withheld the participants from
"inaming [their contentiousness] beyond what was needed" (22, 4, e; translation:
M. B. Trapp). at Maximus is opposed to heavy drinking and drunkenness
during the discussion of important matters also appears from the comparison
between drunkards and sober demagogues in the Athenian assembly, who
have an unrestrained (and, to Maximus, pernicious) license of speech. Here
is another major element to be encountered in Maximus' appreciation of
the symposium, his rejection of free speech which is provoked by a certain
amount of wine. ese two aspects, the abhorrence of unrestrained drinking
and the rejection of parrhesia, are of major importance for the understanding
of Maximus' position in contrast to Plutarch's.
Plutarch, for his part, introduces the topic of the Persian symposium in
a dierent context. In his Table Talk, Glaucias, one of the dinner guests, tries
to prove that discussing important matters over wine was no less a Persian
than a Greek custom (VII, 9; 714A-C). is conclusion provokes the question
3 See G. L. K, 1982, pp. 113-114 and M. B. T, 1997, pp. xx-xxii.
4 Hdt. I, 133.3. It is very likely that Maximus also had some passages (esp. 2.2.1-2.3.1
and 8.8.10) of Xenophon's Cyropaedia in mind while referring to this custom (just as Plutarch
probably did). It is in fact noteworthy in this context that the most outstanding feature of the
Cyropaedia's parties is their unusual sobriety (see D. L. G, 1993, pp. 132-91, esp. p. 150).
is, however, does not mean that Maximus is not advancing his own opinion about symposia
in this passage as well as in other parts of his work, since the same can be said about Maximus
as D. L. G, 1993, p. 154 suggests about Xenophon: "... the omissions and restrictions of
the Cyropaedia's symposia, as well as their uniformity in tone, must have been deliberately
planned by Xenophon, for he was acquainted with very dierent types of symposia, both actual
and literary." Just like Xenophon, Maximus knew a large corpus of practices and canonical
texts from which he could pick the most appropriate ones to bring his own point of view
home. Besides, he explicitly arms his own approval of the Persian practice, without any literal
reference to a traditional authority. erefore, I think, it can hardly be doubted that Maximus is
communicating his own opinion on symposia to his audience here.
387
e symposium in Plutarch's Table Talk VII, 9 - VIII, Proem and Maximus of Tyre's Oration XXII
whether it was a good custom to discuss such matters at a drinking-party
(VII, 10; 714D-716C). In answer to that, a brother of Plutarch's, although
warning against possible excesses at table, utters a positive appreciation of
typical symposiastic activities. He leans particularly on the argument that
the drinking of wine at a party elicits free speech, and, combined with that,
truthful discussions among the participants (715F)5 . In the Proem to Book
VIII of his Table Talk (716D-717A), Plutarch continues to reect on this
subject, arguing that especially philosophical6 topics should be dealt with
over wine, for otherwise a party ends in an unstructured stream of 'vinous
babbling'. Using the Persian example as a starting point then, and placing
philosophical discussion at the centre of the symposium, Plutarch creates a
normative example of a proper drinking-party, which he situates in the context
of the Greco-Roman symposium.
is rst comparison has already brought to light an important dierence
between the two philosophers. Maximus, on the one hand, makes no particular
eort to promote the symposium, and minimizes its privileged position in moral
and philosophical instruction. To his mind, the symposium can be a justied
institution only if the core elements which are characteristic for a symposiastic
party – the abundant food tables, the heavy drinking, cheap entertainment,
etcetera – are banned or restrained. Since there is no rule limiting the use of
alcohol in the Greco-Roman world, Maximus chooses his example in Persia
without, however, wanting to extend this example to real prescriptions for
Greek and Roman symposiacs. One may well wonder whether Maximus does
not consider the symposia of his time rather redundant happenings which
provide no additive educational contribution for his students in philosophy.
Plutarch, on the other hand, does not only point at the possible excesses
which occur at symposia, but also actualizes the Persian custom described by
Herodotus to his own contemporary drinking groups which he introduces as
exemplary for other convivial companies.
2. When I now relate these opinions on Greek symposia to the more
general views of the two authors, a remarkable consistency in both opinions
and agendas comes to the surface. Maximus tends to associate symposia with
attery7 , wrong decision-making8, silly enjoyment of pleasure9, misplaced
5 On parrhesia in the context of the (Greek) symposia, see W. R, 1995, esp. pp.
108-9.
6 As S.-T. T, 1995 and 1999, p. 68 convincingly suggests, the political aspect
in Plutarch's Table Talk as well as in other symposiastic works seems quite absent in favour of
the philosophical discussion. Also the passages under consideration here "sono piuttosto temi
conviviali, 'simpotici'" (1995, p. 343).
7 Max., Or., 14, 7, f on the atterers of a certain Callias, who was ridiculed by Eupolis at
the theatre.
8 Ibid., 3, 7, d oers a comparison between the accusers of Socrates and drunken
symposiacs.
9 Ibid., 25, 6, a.
luxury10 , and unacceptable behaviour11. e only place where he considers the
symposium as a possibly virtuous institution is the aforementioned passage
where he talks about the Persian custom. In any other case, he implicitly advises
his students against attending convivial activities, which entail a real threat for
the virtuous man. is latter aspect appears clearly in this simile between the
symposium and the stimuli of the senses:
Ὥσπερ οὖν ἐν συμποσίῳ μεστῷ κνίσης πολλῆς, καὶ οἴνου χεομένου, καὶ
αὐλῶν ἤξου, καὶ συρίγγων, καὶ ψαλμάτων, καὶ θυμιαμάτων, †ανδρὸς ἂν εἴη
καρτεροῦ συναγείραντος καὶ συστείλαντος καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἀποστρέφοντος,
νηφάλιον καὶ κόσμιον† 12· οὕτως ἀμέλει καὶ ἐν τῇ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πολυφωνίᾳ
χαλεπὸν εὑρεῖν νήφοντα νοῦν, καὶ δυνάμενον προσβλέπειν τοῖς αὑτοῦ
θεάμασιν. (Max., O r. 11. 7g)
erefore, just as at a symposium, as rich savours ll the air, and the wine is
poured, and utes and pipes and lyres play, and incense burns, it would take a
strong-willed man to stay sober and disciplined – a man capable of taking a
grip on himself and chastening himself and diverting his own proper objects.
(Transl. M.B. Trapp)
In this passage, the virtuous man receives no moral instruction to deal with
a symposium. He must simply be armed against its vices by his own mental
strength, and it is his own responsibility to stay sober in the face of all these
malicious seductions. As the potential optative clause suggests, the appearance
of a virtuous man at a drinking-party is just a ctitious illustrative supposition.
is utterance implicitly advises the students who truly want to become wise
and virtuous to stay away from, rather than to indulge in, such gatherings
as the symposia. Maximus' own position on the symposiastic environment is
further illustrated by the following passage:
Καί τις ἤδη ἰατρὸς εὐμήχανος ἀνεκέρασεν βραχεῖαν ἡδονὴν τῷ ἀλγεινῷ τῆς
ἰάσεως· ποριστὴς δὲ ἡδονῆς, καὶ παντοίας ἡδονῆς, οὔτε ὁ Ἀσκληπιός, οὔτε οἱ
Ἀσκληπιάδαι, ἀλλ' ὀψοποιῶν τὸ ἔργον. (...) Ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν ὀψοποιοὺς τούτους
τοῖς συμποσίοις ἐῶμεν, καὶ γαστρὸς καὶ ἀκοῆς ὑπηρέτας πονηρούς· ἡμῖν δὲ δεῖ
λόγου ὀρθοῦ καὶ διανεστηκότος. (Max., Or., 25. 5h-6a)
Many a resourceful doctor has before now tempered the bitterness of his cure
with a small admixture of something sweeter; but neither Asclepius nor the
Asclepiadae are indiscriminate purveyors of pleasure – that is the work of
caterers. (...) Let us leave these contenders to their symposia, like the miserable
servants of belly and ear that they are. What we need is a style of utterance that
stands straight and tall. (Transl. M.B. Trapp)
10 Max., Or. 30, 3, e on king †Aeetes†.
11 Ibid., 39, 4, a on Alcibiades.
12 is passage is indeed a locus desperatus, but the general content seems clear.
389
e symposium in Plutarch's Table Talk VII, 9 - VIII, Proem and Maximus of Tyre's Oration XXII
rough his use of the μέν-δέ-construction, Maximus opposes himself
and his pupils to cooks who provide 'idle' food at the symposia (this combined
with the negative 'idle' connotation of ὀψοποιία in Plato's Gorgias 13 ). By this
statement, Maximus leaves no doubt that his educational program must be
organized away from the burlesque symposia, where mere care for the stomach
prevails over philosophical discussion and knowledge.
e same admonitory statements occur in Plutarch's oeuvre as well, but with
a dierent undertone. Like Maximus, Plutarch also warns about moral vices at
symposia like (pseudo-philosophical) talkativeness14 , but he does not aim as much
at keeping people away from these parties as he tries to show the right conduct
that must be displayed when one enters a convivial gathering. Plutarch's attitude
is characterized by a tension between a realistic, sometimes excessive image of
convivial parties and a highly normative portrayal which ts his own agenda. Even
if most of the people at a party behave badly, the virtuous man does not need to
stay away from it. He must rather face this gathering in a morally elevated way:
Οἷον ἐν συμποσίῳ φίλου κιθαρῳδὸς αἴδει κακῶς ἢ πολλοῦ κωμῳδὸς
ἐωνημένος ἐπιτρίβει Μένανδρον, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ κροτοῦσι καὶ θαυμάζουσιν·
οὐδὲν οἶμαι χαλεπὸν οὐδὲ δύσκολον ἀκούειν σιωπῇ καὶ μὴ παρὰ τὸ φαινόμενον
ἀνελευθέρως ἐπαινεῖν. (Plu., De vit. pud. 531B-C)
us at a friend's banquet a citharode sings badly or a comic actor got for a great
price murders Menander, and the crowd applauds and admires. Here I think it
no hard or grievous matter to listen in silence and refrain from insincere and
unmanly applause. (Transl. e Loeb Classical Library)
e very fact that Plutarch prescribes what one should or should not do at a
drinking-party illustrates that he does not consider the symposium as a morally
indierent and hedonistic gathering where anything goes, but as an institution
where one can train one's moral and mental strength. In Plutarch's view, the
occurrence of vicious persons at a drinking-party does not exclude guidelines
for the right symposiastic conduct, as is the case in Maximus' oeuvre. Besides
the portrayal of some excesses, which indicates that Plutarch is not blind to the
dangers which the attendance of a symposium might imply, the positive value
of the symposiastic institution is often highlighted as well, not only evidently
in Plutarch's so-called symposiastic works (the Table Talk and the Dinner of the
Seven Sages), but also in the rest of his oeuvre. Ample illustrations can be found
of Plutarch's benevolent appreciation of the symposium, which is distinguished
alternately by its appropriateness15 , its philosophical and poetical value16, and
its capability to illustrate a man's modesty17 . Plutarch thus conrms a virtuous
13 Pl., Grg., 462 sqq.; 521d-522a for ὀψοποιία as a form of κολακεία. Cf. M . B. T , 1997,
p. 211 n. 17.
14 Plu., De prof. in virt., 80A; De gar., 502F; 514C.
15 I, Lyc. , 25, 2; Aem., 28, 5; Reg. et imp. apophth., 198B.
16 I, De ad. et am., 68B; De Pyth. or., 405F; Non posse, 1095C-E.
17 I, Dion, 13, 2; De cup. div., 527B; De coh. ira, 461D.
man's ability to surmount the vicious kind of behaviour at drinking-parties,
and makes the symposium a fruitful place where one can give evidence of one's
exemplary character and enjoy moral and philosophical instruction.
3. After this brief survey of the connotations of the symposium in
Maximus' and Plutarch's works, I return to the passage in the Table Talk in
which Plutarch discusses the appropriate way of dealing with deliberation,
drinking, and drunkenness at a symposium. In his introduction to the eighth
Book, he makes the following statement:
Τὴν γοῦν μέθην οἱ λοιδοροῦντες φιλόσοφοι λήρησιν πάροινον ἀποκαλοῦσιν·
τὸ δὲ ληρεῖν οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀλλ' ἢ λόγῳ κενῷ χρῆσθαι καὶ φλυαρώδει· λαλιᾶς
δ' ἀτάκτου καὶ φλυαρίας εἰς ἄκρατον ἐμπεσούσης ὕβρις καὶ παροινία τέλος
ἀμουσότατον καὶ ἀχαριστότατον. (Plu., Quaest. conv., 716F)
At any rate, those philosophers who wish to give indulgence in wine a bad
name dene it as "vinous babbling," and babbling means, precisely, engaging
in empty and frivolous conversation. e outcome of undisciplined chatter and
frivolity, when it reaches the extreme of intemperance, is violence and drunken
behaviour – an outcome wholly inconsistent with culture and renement.
(Transl. e Loeb Classical Library)
One of this type of mentioned philosophers who adopt a radically
hostile position towards the symposium seems to be Maximus of Tyre.
Since, according to Maximus, the outcome of such a gathering is nothing
but immoral behaviour, a true philosopher should ban the attendance of
symposia from his life, following only the so-called non-excessive and
philosophical way to real knowledge and understanding. Plutarch, however,
chooses another approach:
... λόγῳ τε δεῖ χρῆσθαι παρὰ πότον θεωρίαν τινὰ καὶ μοῦσαν ἔχοντι καὶ λόγου
τοιούτου τῇ μέθῃ παρόντος ἀποκρύπτεται τὸ ἄγριον καὶ μανικόν, ὑπὸ τῶν
Μουσῶν εὐμενῶς κατεχόμενον. (Plu., Quaest. conv., 717A)
... when drinking we ought to engage in conversation that has something
speculative, some instruction in it, and that when conversation like this
accompanies indulgence in wine the wild and manic element is hidden away,
benevolently restrained by the Muses. (Transl. e Loeb Classical Library)
As is indicated in the passage, Plutarch, using a generally imperative
tone (cf. δεῖ χρῆσθαι), focuses not on symposiastic vices here, but on the
normative and exemplary function which a symposium should full.
4. Besides the philosophical aspirations of these two authors, there is
also the question of the social embedding of their discourses. How should
Maximus' and Plutarch's appreciation of the symposium be understood against
391
e symposium in Plutarch's Table Talk VII, 9 - VIII, Proem and Maximus of Tyre's Oration XXII
the social background of the Imperial era? Drinking, after all, is in many
societies primarily a social practice18 .
Celebrating parties and consuming alcohol can be a means for
consolidating social power, as was the case in the aristocratic origin of the
Greek symposium19 , but they can also constitute a value scale on their own,
which does not necessarily correspond to the 'natural' hierarchy in society20 .
It was, in other words, of major importance for the upper class not to let
their drinking habits undermine their distinctive position vis-à-vis the lower
classes21 . erefore, apart from their philosophical concerns, both Plutarch's
and Maximus' texts can be read as a societal response to this potential threat to
the élite dominance over other social groups.
Ingenkamp has proposed the interesting hypothesis that Plutarch's attitude
towards drinking and getting drunk was heavily inuenced by the social practice
of his élite society22 . To my mind, Plutarch must indeed have felt the pressure of
his contemporary audience, who might have enjoyed rather abundant symposia,
but he reacted against this tendency by morally elevating the institution of the
symposium through an explicitly normative discourse. A socio-anthropological
reading of Plutarch's texts would reveal that, by introducing philosophy as the
main aspect of his symposia, the Chaeronian made sure that his élite public would
still distinguish itself from the mob, even while celebrating drinking parties.
e Tyrian, for his part, considered it safer for the élites to avoid the abundant
symposia – unless, of course, the abundance was restrained, as was the case among
the Persians –, for these symposia might not only corrupt the moral virtues of his
listeners, but also blur their social distinction as élites towards 'inferior' people.
5. Does Plutarch's Table Talk then oer a realistic portrait of the symposium,
or is it merely a literary utopia? Some passages in Plutarch and the comparison
with Maximus' Orations in any case show that, for Greek and Roman people,
there was no evident link between symposiastic activities and morally high-
standard behaviour23 . If Plutarch's image of the symposium in his Table Talk as
18 M. D, 1987, p. 4.
19 For the 'ritual' function of the symposium and its role in the creation of a social order, see
O. M, 1990, pp. 3 sqq.; cf. A. M. S, 1999, pp. 7-13.
20 See O. M, 1995, pp. 4 sqq. Cf. M. D, 1987, p. 8: "Drinks also act as markers
of personal identity and of boundaries of inclusion and exclusion." Here she is referring to a
study of G. M, 1987, which deles the social power of drinking for working men on the
docks in Newfoundland, Canada, where a man's transition from outsider to insider depends
more heavily on his drinking habits and 'skills' than on his commitment to and talent for his
job.21 On the importance for a member of the élite to distinguish himself from the ordinary
people on various (cultural) levels, see P. B, 1979. On the idea of equality among the
participants in a convivium in the Early Empire, see J. D'A, 1990, esp. p. 313 for Plutarch's
Table Talk. One should however bear in mind that the drinking companions at the Plutarchan
symposium are already members of the social élite, which obviously inuences our interpretation
of the argument in favour of ίσότης among the participants.
22 H. G. I, 1999.
23 is conclusion corresponds well with A. G. N, 1999, pp. 342-3: "Perhaps, all
well as in other works does in fact correspond to real customs among the Greeks,
it was, I think, at the very most a rare and idealizing interpretation by small
groups of cultivated men, who were inspired by the great tradition of symposia
as described by canonical philosophers, in the rst place Plato and Xenophon24 .
To conclude then, it seems fair to state that Maximus and Plutarch both
serve their own philosophical and social agendas. Both testify to the possible
dangers interwoven with the symposia, but each of them comes to a dierent
appreciation. Whereas Maximus turns his back on these so-called pernicious
kinds of gatherings, Plutarch, on the other hand, by situating philosophical
discussion at the very heart of the symposium, wants to revalue this institution
and make it an outstanding place where the virtuous man can give evidence of
his qualities and enjoy an elevated status.
W o r k s c i T e d
B, P., La distinction: critique social du jugement, Paris, 1979.
D'A, J., "e Roman Convivium and the Idea of Equality", in O. M
(ed.), 1990, pp. 308-20.
D, M. (ed.), Constructive Drinking. Perspective on Drink from Anthro-
pology, Cambridge, 1987.
_____"A Distinctive Anthropological Perspective", in M. D (ed.),
1987, pp. 3-15.
G, D. L., Xenophon's Cyropaedia: Style, Genre, and Literary Technique,
Oxford, 1993.
I, H. G., "Οὐ ψέγεται τὸ πίνειν. Wie Plutarch den übermäβigen
Weingenuβ beurteilte", in J. G. M C . (eds.), 1999, pp.
277-90.
K, G. L., "On Maximus of Tyre: Zetemata (I)", ClAnt, 1 (1982) 87-
121.
M, G., "Longshore Drinking, Economic Security and Union Politics in
Newfoundland", in M. D (ed.), 1987, pp. 91-102.
would agree with Plutarch that every self-respecting and orderly man should avoid getting
drunk. Yet, judging once more from the extant literary symposia, from Plato and Xenophon
to Athenaeus and Lucian, to say nothing about sympotic representations in art, few people in
antiquity, I think, would attend a banquet in order to seek instructions or moral edication".
24 See M. V, 2000, p. 223: "La scuola losoca ha un proprio modello di simposio,
dierente da quello del resto degli uomini, non edonistico ma creativo." One should, however,
not underestimate the time-gap between Plutarch's time and that of Plato. On the relation
between Plutarch's symposium and the tradition, A. M. S, 1999, p. 127 argues that
"il simposio plutarcheo ha le sue regole, ma sono diverse da quelle che valevano nell'età classica:
esse rispecchiano il cambiamento delle convinzioni e delle coscienze, ora piú aperte e tolleranti,
ora piú intransigenti ed austere."
393
e symposium in Plutarch's Table Talk VII, 9 - VIII, Proem and Maximus of Tyre's Oration XXII
M, J., Symposion. Die Geschichte einer literarischen Form, Paderborn,
1931.
M C, J. G. . (eds.), Plutarco, Dioniso e el vino. Actas del VI Simposio
español sobre Plutarco (Cádiz, 14-16 de Mayo, 1998), Madrid, 1999.
M, O. (ed.), Sympotica. A Symposium on the Symposion, Oxford, 1990.
_____"Sympotic History", in O. M (ed.), 1990, pp. 3-13.
_____ " Histories of Pleasure", in O. M M. T (eds.), 1995, pp.
3-16.
_____ T, M. (eds.), In vino veritas, Oxford, 1995.
N, A. G., "Plutarch's Attitude to Wine", in J. G. M C
. (eds.), 1999, pp. 337-48.
P P, F., "El banquete de Plutarco: ¿Ficción literaria o realidad
histórica?", in J. G. M C . (eds.), 1999, pp. 379-92.
R, J. C., "Rethinking the History of the Literary Symposium", ICS, 17
(1992) 213-44.
R, W., "Wine and Truth in the Greek Symposion", in O. M M.
T (eds.), 1995, pp. 106-12.
S, A. M., Plutarco, Conversazioni a tavola. Libro primo (introduzione,
testo critico, traduzione e commento), Napoli, 1999.
T, S.-T., "La politica nelle questioni conviviali", in I. G B.
S (eds.), Teoria e prassi politica nelle opere di Plutarco. Atti del
V Convegno plutarcheo (Certosa di Pontignano, 7-9 Giugno, 1993),
Napoli, 1995, pp. 433-7.
_____ A Commentary on Plutarch's Table Talks, vol. III (Books 7-9), Göteborg,
1996.
_____"Dionysus Moderated and Calmed: Plutarch on the Convivial Wine",
in J. G. M C . (eds.), 1999, pp. 57-69.
T, M. B., Maximus of Tyre: e Philosophical Orations (translated, with an
introduction and notes), Oxford, 1997.
V, M., "Plutarco e il 'genere simposio'", in I. G C. M
(eds.), I generi letterari in Plutarco. Atti del VIII Convegno plutarcheo
(Pisa, 2-4 Giugno, 1999), Napoli, 2000, pp. 217-29.
V C, P., "Plutarco e Massimo Tirio: procedimenti retorici
e technica formale", in L. V S (ed.), Rhetorical eory
and Praxis in Plutarch. Acta of the IVth International Congress of
the International Plutarch Society (Leuven, July 3-6, 1996), Leuven,
Namur, 2000, pp. 527-32.
395
e Role of Reality in Plutarch's Quaestiones Convivales
Th e r o l e o f r e a l i T y i n p l u T a r c h ' s Qu a e S T i o n e S co n v i v a l e S
F B. T
Utah State University, Logan
Abstract
In his Quaestiones Convivales, Plutarch is, if not the rst, one of the rst to fuse the genres of
problem-collection with more traditional symposiastic literature. Later works like Athenaeus'
Deipnosophistae and parts of Aulus Gellius' Noctes Atticae show that the hybrid remained a popular
one. is is surely at least partially a function of the lively nature of the Quaestiones themselves.
Is another part of the attraction the opportunity to look through a window at Plutarch, his
private life, and family? If so, does it matter whether or not these dinner parties actually took
place? Yes and no, depending on the reader's viewpoint. e literal reality of the dinner parties
is a tactic, part of the arsenal of techniques with which Plutarch will lead us to a greater reality
that is much more meaningful.
e QC open with an address to Sossius Senecio, in which Plutarch tells
us what he means to do in these essays, and why he has written them, or
written them down:
"…to consign to utter oblivion all that occurs at a drinking-party is not
only opposed to what we call the friend-making character of the dining-
table, but also has the most famous of the philosophers to bear witness
against it, – Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle, Speusippus, Epicurus, Prytanis,
Hieronymus, and Dio of the Academy, who all considered the recording of
conversations held at table a task worth some eort,– and since, moreover,
you thought that I ought to collect such talk as suits our purpose from
among the learned discussions in which I have often participated in various
places both at home in your company and among us in Greece, with table
and goblet before us, I have applied myself to the task and now send you
three of the books, each containing ten questions which we have discussed"
(Mor . 612E ).
Of the authors Plutarch lists above, we have only the symposia by Plato
and Xenophon to which we can compare the QC. ere are obviously many
similarities, including the use of historical gures for the participants, and
the philosophic nature of the debate, but the QC are much more varied in
content and setting. Symposiastic authors after Plutarch, notably Athenaeus
and Aulus Gellius, continue Plutarch's general format of miscellaneous and
learned discussion over the dinner-table, but conne the conversation to one
night's dinner. Since he wrote only a century after Plutarch, and since he cites
over 1,000 dierent authors, it seems odd that Athenaeus cites Plutarch of
Chaeronea only once, in a passage about a doctor who avoided intoxication by
consuming bitter almonds before a symposium (II 52). e fact that there is
no other specic mention of Chaeronean Plutarch has led to the suggestion
that this passage was not by Athenaeus, but interpolated (Olson, vol. 1, x-xi).
It may be that the Plutarch of Alexandria who is one of the dinner guests
is, in fact, a reference, or even compliment, to Plutarch of Chaeronea. is
kind of correlation may be true of other Deipnosophists also, like Ulpian (for
the jurist Ulpian of Tyre), Philadelphus of Ptolemais (for the Egyptian king
Ptolemy Philadelphus), or the philosopher Democritus of Nicomedia (for the
philosopher Democritus of Abdera). Since either, neither, or both of those
things could be true, it is sucient here to establish the generic link between
some writings of Plutarch and Athenaeus.
Aulus Gellius, writing in the latter third of the second c. CE, was quite
familiar with Plutarch's works. He cites Plutarch numerous times, referring
to at least four dierent works, including the QC. In fact, his very rst essay
discusses a lost Plutarchan treatise "on the mental and physical endowment
and achievements of Hercules while he was among men" (NA 1.1.) In
his introduction, Gellius makes it clear that he is using a similar system
to Plutarch's own notebooks, or hypomnemata1 , and in fact this is how he
explains the character of the Attic Nights and where they got their name:
"For whenever I had taken in hand any Greek or Latin book, or had heard
anything worth remembering I used to jot down whatever took my fancy,
of any and every kind, without any denite plan or order; and such notes I
would lay away as an aid to my memory, like a kind of literary storehouse,
so that when the need arose of a word or a subject which I chanced for
the moment to have forgotten, and the books from which I had taken it
were not at hand, I could readily nd and procure it... And since, as I have
said, I began to amuse myself by assembling these notes during the long
winter nights which I spent on a country-place in the land of Attica, I have
therefore given them the title of Attic Nights" (Praef. 4). So in fact, Gellius
has a lot more in common with Plutarch in terms of methodology than their
mutual authorship of symposiastic literature.
eir very nature makes the QC challenging to describe, or categorize
any further than this. Once past the basic "nine books, ten questions" format
Plutarch himself describes, there is no obvious pattern. All nine books contain
some dialogues that are linked dramatically2 . Some books begin with very long
questions, the longest in the book (I, II, IV), but others' longest question is #7
(V) or #6 (VII). e books themselves are of dierent lengths (IV and IX are
missing questions #4 and 5, respectively). Yet it is clear there must be some kind
of structure. Plutarch goes to so much trouble to describe the well-made dinner
party as something that has little obvious, but much concealed structure3 that
it is counterintuitive to assume that there is NOT a similar structure to this
work. We do not have to agree with Gellius' statement that symposiastic or
convivial literature authors valued quantity above quality (solam copiam , praef.
1 On Plutarch's notebooks, see De Tranq. An (Mor. 464F with V S, 575-79.
2 I 2-3; II 4-5, 8-9; III 1-2, 3-5, 7-9; IV 4-6; V 5-6, 8-9; VII 7-8, 9-10; VIII 1-2, 7-8; all
of Book IX).
3 Mor. 614A: "the height of sagacity is to talk philosophy without seeming to do so…"
397
e Role of Reality in Plutarch's Quaestiones Convivales
11), accumulating material indiscriminately (sine cura discriminis) to observe
that whatever this structure might be, it is not easily detected.
Harrison has suggested that in the QC, Plutarch is not only experimenting
with superimposition of the symposiastic form, but in some places is
constructing an actual parody, and that an underlying armature, or structure,
is in place: "Beyond expanding its scope so that it could encompass all the
dierent genres of quaestiones, Plutarch brought an episodic structure to the
symposium, which allowed the reader to take up and put down his convivial
reminiscences at will and browse through them rather like a collection of poems
or fables instead of a work whose argument had to be followed sequentially"
(197). Gellius, at any rate, would not agree, rather observing that reading such
works brings on fatigue before the reader actually encounters anything worth
reading (NA Praef. 11). True or not, it would be very dicult to prove such a
theory, but it is easy to agree with the suspicion that the QC are unlikely to
be organized completely randomly, even though the subject matter is wide-
ranging and unpredictable.
For it certainly is both. Many essays deal with every-day, human behavior,
and have an almost medical cast. "Why Old Men Read Best at a Distance"
(QC 1.84 ), for instance, is evidently a problem of very long standing. "Why
Women Do Not Eat the Middle Part of Lettuce" (QC 4.10) is less of a concern
these days. "Why Noises Are Better Heard in the Night than the Day" (QC
8.3), "Why in Autumn Men Have Better Stomachs than in Other Seasons of
the Year" (QC 2.2), and "Which Is the Fittest Time for a Man to Know His
Wife?" (QC 3.6) are other examples. Some essays are at-out invitations to
debate, such as "What Is Plato's Meaning, When He Says at God Always
Plays the Geometer?" (QC 8.2), "Whether the Sea or Land Aords Better
Food?" (QC 4.4), "Which of Venus's Hands Diomedes Wounded?" (QC 9.4),
or "Whether the Jews Abstained from Swine's Flesh Because ey Worshiped
at Creature, or Because ey Had an Antipathy Against It?" (QC 4.5). Other
essays, predictably, cover party management. "at one should guard especially
against the pleasures derived from degenerate music, and how to do so", which
describes with horror a situation where "music can inebriate, more eectively
than any wine, those who drink it in as it comes, with no restraint. For the
guests were no longer content to shout and clap from their places, but nally
most of them leapt up and joined in the dancing with movements disgraceful
for a gentleman, though quite in keeping with that kind of rhythm and melody"
(QC 7.4). ere is quite a lot about dancing in the QC, as one would expect, as
well as much valuable information about parties in general–seating, discussion
topics, wine and its eects. Some problems appear to be common to all times:
"Concerning ose Guests at Are Called Shadows, and Whether Being
Invited by Some to Go to Another's House, ey Ought to Go; and When,
and to Whom" (QC 7.6); others less so, i.e. "Whether it Is Fitting to Wear
Chaplets of Flowers at Table" (QC 3.1) or "Whether Flute-girls Are to Be
4 References to the QC henceforth will take the form of book and question number.
Allowed at a Feast" (QC 7.7). And there are many scientic questions, such
as "Why Fresh Water Washes Clothes Better than Salt?" (QC 1.9), "Which
Was First the Bird or the Egg?" (QC 2.3) , "Whether Ivy Is of a Hot or Cold
Nature?" (QC 3.2), and "What Is the Reason at Hunger Is Allayed by
Drinking, but irst Increased by Eating?" (QC 6.3).
e diculty in discerning an over-arching structure and the disparity
among the various essays may be one reason why an important aspect of
scholarly discussion about Plutarch's QC has centered on "authenticity," that is
whether or not something is or is not literally true5 . is debate assumes that
whether or not these dinners took place where, when, and with whom Plutarch
describes is crucial to understanding the QC: as Teodorsson puts it, "Whether
his model works were symposiac dialogues or not, Plutarch's contribution
to the symposiac genre is obvious. is is due specically to the element of
authenticity…is element is essential to the work6 ". To be fair, Teodorsson
does not suggest that Plutarch staged these dinner parties in order to mine
the party chatter, nor that he had these dinner-talks recorded, but rather that
as he wrote later in life, he remembered them, sometimes even the particular
themes. In fact, this is what Plutarch tells us himself:
that he wrote these conversations down sporadically, as each came to mind,
evidently expecting readers to view these conversations as invented saying
"Nor must my readers be surprised, if though addressing myself to you, I have
introduced some of your own past conversation also; for indeed if the getting
of knowledge does not insure that one remembers it, frequently the same end
is attained by recollection as by learning" (QC 2. Intro).
But focusing on the literal reality of the banquets, possibly, is to miss a
much larger point. Early in the QC, the grammatikos Marcus invites debate
on Neanthes' Sagas of the State. Fellow banqueter Milo wants to establish the
truth of a particular anecdote in the work before commencing discussion.
Philopappus says the veracity of the anecdote is not an issue "because the
discussion will provide occasion for practice, even if it provides nothing else
useful" (QC 1.10). e reality described by Plutarch at the dinner parties is just
as real for his purposes as a video recording. To insist on "authenticity" or truth
as an important lens through which to view the QC is to fail to distinguish the
subtle dierences between and among history, biography, and autobiography.
What the QC present us with is something a little in between: what at least
conveys the texture of what MIGHT have happened, COULD have happened,
and periodically HAD in fact happened. For Plutarch's purposes, this is really
all the same thing. He seems to refer to this in Solon (27.1):
"at Solon should discourse with Croesus, some think not agreeable with
chronology; but I cannot reject so famous and well-attested a narrative, and,
5 S.-T. T, vol. 1, 12-13 a good background to this discussion.
6 S.-T. T, vol. I, 13.
399
e Role of Reality in Plutarch's Quaestiones Convivales
what is more, so agreeable to Solon's temper, and so worthy his wisdom and
greatness of mind, because, forsooth, it does not agree with some chronological
canons, which thousands have endeavoured to regulate, and yet, to this day,
could never bring their diering opinions to any agreement".
But Pelling is surely right not to put too much weight on this 7: "It is simply
that the boundary between truth and falsehood was less important than that
between acceptable and unacceptable fabrication, between things which were
'true enough' and things which were not. Acceptable rewriting will not mislead
the reader seriously, indeed readers will grasp more of the important reality if
they accept what Plutarch writes than if they do not. Truth matters; but it can
sometimes be bent a little" (156).
As far as we know, we do not see at-out fantasy in the QC, and clearly
Plutarch cannot stray too far from reality, particularly in terms of the other
symposiasts. Philopappus, for instance, was a Roman consul during Trajan's
reign. L. Mestrius Florus, the man who obtained Plutarch's Roman citizenship
for him, and Sossius Senecio, another Roman consular to whom some of the
Parallel Lives and Moralia are dedicated8 , also make appearances in the QC.
We hear about and from many of Plutarch's relatives, like his father, sons, and
father-in-law9 . Some of the banquets take place in Rome, but many are hosted
in Chaeronea, providing opportunity for local details on politics, landmarks,
and religious festivals. However, in this process, it is dangerous to draw too
many or too rm conclusions about Plutarch himself, or his life and family,
despite their frequent participation in this essay. Too much inter, or meta, or
subtextuality can lead to overreading.
One example of the sort of problem that can arise from mining Plutarch's
work for autobiographical elements centers on the answer to the question of
why Plutarch resided in Chaeronea, instead of Rome, or at least Athens. At
rst glance this is straightforward: Plutarch says he chose to stay there because
it was such a small town that even one absent citizen would be noticed (Dem .
2). Although this is a charming sentiment, it is a little disingenuous to be
accepted at face value. Perhaps rst and second century CE Athens was a
little too Roman for Plutarch, whether that meant expensive, bureaucratic,
crowded, impersonal, dangerous, or a combination of the above. Plutarch may
not have liked big cities, Rome in particular; he believed that living in a big
city was not necessary for living a virtuous and happy life; he did not wish to
compete in the international arena any more than was unavoidable through his
local political work and his friendship with Roman ocials, perhaps because
of a kind of apprehensive caution that should not be called by as strong a
term as fear. In light of his lack of condence in his Latin, he could not make
use of the library and intellectual resources that would make the expense and
stress of life in Rome "worthwhile". Perhaps his natural diplomacy preferred
7 C. B. P, 1990, pp. 143-44, pp. 156-162.
8 eseus, Demosthenes, Dion; Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus.
9 See J and P on the various historical personages in Plutarch's writings.
to accentuate the positive aspect of life in Chaeronea rather than deplore
the negative aspects of hyperurban life. It is therefore inadequate to accept
Plutarch's own descriptions of people and events without further scrutiny, and
dangerous to construct evidentiary houses on sand10 .
Yet the characterizations of Plutarch's relatives are vivid, and imply
a certain familiarity on the part of his readers, a familiarity conrmed by
details. Lamprias, Plutarch's brother or uncle, is said to have spoken up in his
"customarily loud voice" (QC 1.2); his grandfather Lamprias "was his most
ingenious and eloquent self when drinking, and it was his habit to say that,
much as incense is volatilized by heat, so was he by wine" (QC 1.5). Later one
Xenocles of Delphi "as usual" began to tease Plutarch's brother (QC 2.2). He
refers to the festival Pithoigia, where the new wine is dedicated, saying that
"My father had celebrated the ritual, as was his custom" (QC 3.7). Plutarch
denitely emphasizes the repetitive and familiar, lulling us into participating
as invited eavesdroppers. Are these relatives real? Yes. Is their speech and
behavior in the QC typical? Yes. Did the dinner party conversation happen as
reported? Maybe.
And in the end, does authenticity matter? If the characters of Plutarch's
QC were anonymous, and the banquets declared to be fabrications, we would
be dealing with Plutarch's candidly stated own thoughts and ideas, not a free-
owing, evolving, democratically-shaped discussion. But that is not the case.
e QC are populated by known personages, and Plutarch's statement to
Sossius Senecio that he is responding to Sossius' own suggestion in collecting
the conversations cannot be complete invention. Plutarch certainly wants us
to respond to real people and their real thoughts. To that extent, it matters
that banquets certainly took place, and the symposiasts surely at times were
together. But as intermediator, Plutarch himself is as much a part of the QC as
the banquets and conversations spare from which they originated. His choice,
organization, and presentation of anecdotes, individuals, and language, as well
as some kind of very subtle structure, give us a greater, or enhanced reality
than that of the actual banquets. He is in a way the editor of our experience of
these banquets, and indispensable to that experience. e QC do not need to
be authentic to be real and true.
W o r k s c i T e d
D, T. E., "How Lives Begin", in A.G. N (ed.), e Unity of
Plutarch's Work. 'Moralia' emes in the 'Lives', Features of the 'Lives' in
the 'Moralia'. Acta of the VII International Congress of the International
Plutarch Society, Rethymno, 2005. Millennium Studies vol 19, Berlin,
2008, pp. 187-207.
10 F. B . T, 2002, pp. 140-41; see now Z, A: "It will emerge from the
argument that what we tend to look upon as staple facts about Plutarch's writing career are
guarded moves in the game of identity-negotiation" (103).
401
e Role of Reality in Plutarch's Quaestiones Convivales
H, G.W.M., "Problems with the genre of problems: Plutarch's literary
innovations", CPh, 95 (2000) 193-99.
J, C.P., "Prosopographical Notes on the Second Sophistic", GRBS, 21
(1980) 373-80.
M, J., "Plutarch's Dinner of the Seven Wise Men and Its Place in
Symposion Literature", in J. M (ed.), Plutarch and His Intellectual
World, London, 1997, pp. 119-40.
O, D., Athenaeus . e Learned Banqueters. Vols. I and II, Cambridge,
2006.
P, C., "Truth and Fiction in Plutarch's Lives", in Antonine Literature ,
D.A. R (ed.), Oxford, 1990, pp. 19-52; repr. in Plutarch and
History, London, New York, 2000, pp. 143-170.
P, B., "Prosopographie des amis de Plutarque", in ANRW II,33,6, W.
H & H. T (eds.), Berlin, New York, 1992, pp. 4831-93.
T, S.-T., A Commentary on Plutarch's Table Talk, vols. I-III,
Gothenburg.
T, F.B., "Plutarch and Roman(ized) Athens", in E.N. O
(ed)., Greek Romans or Roman Greeks?, Aarhus, 2002, pp. 136-41.
V S, L., "A Plutarchan Hypomnema on Self-Love", AJPh, 120
(1999), 575-599.
Z, A., "King of his Castle: Plutarch, Demosthenes 1-2", PCPhS, 52
(2006) 102-27.
403
Dancing with Plutarch: dance and dance theory in Plutarch's Table Talk
D P
da n c e a n d d a n c e T h e o r y i n p l u T a r c h ' s Ta b l e T a l k
C A. M J
University of Coimbra
Abstract
e aim of this paper is to analyze Plutarch's discussion of the dierent kinds of ancient dance
and their meaning in the Table Talk. Besides a large section from Book 9 (question 15), all of
it concerning the parts of dance and their relation to poetry, we focus on those other moments
where dierent rhythms of dance are discussed. Looking beyond the Plutarchan material, we
search for the implications of this subject in terms of philanthropia and moderation, concepts
extremely important in all nine books of the Table Talk.
e ancient symposium was a strictly staged social event at which members
of the male elite drank, talked and enjoyed themselves, in a variety of ways. As
for this last element, the convivial one, the various semiotic sources that have
been preserved – mostly literature and painting1 – are clear on the importance
given to many other elements besides eating and drinking. Music and poetry,
inseparable arts, were a constant presence in ancient banquets, and the same
should apply to dance.
As far as literature is concerned, there are many fragments from poems
composed to be performed at banquets, at least from the middle of the seventh
century BC onwards2 . It is in the Odyssey (8. 72-95) that we nd what is probably
the oldest western description of an aristocratic symposium, given by Alcinoos
to Odysseus upon the latter's arrival3 . In this passage we are presented with an
aoidos singing the very beginnings of the Trojan War, which moves Odysseus
to tears. But it is perhaps Herodotus (6. 129.6-19) who gives us the rst proof
that banqueters not only enjoyed the dancer's art but also danced themselves,
inspired by the wine and the artists' constant encouragement.
προϊούσης δὲ τῆς πόσιος κατέχων πολλὸν τοὺς ἄλλους ὁ Ἱπποκλείδης
ἐκέλευσέν οἱ τὸν αὐλητὴν αὐλῆσαι ἐμμελείαν· πειθομένου δὲ τοῦ αὐλητέω
ὀρχήσατο. καί κως ἑωυτῷ μὲν ἀρεστῶς ὀρχέετο, ὁ Κλεισθένης δὲ ὁρέων
ὅλον τὸ πρῆγμα ὑπόπτευε. μετὰ δὲ ἐπισχὼν ὁ Ἱπποκλείδης χρόνον ἐκέλευσέ
τινα τράπεζαν ἐσενεῖκαι, ἐσελθούσης δὲ τῆς τραπέζης πρῶτα μὲν ἐπ' αὐτῆς
ὀρχήσατο Λακωνικὰ σχημάτια, μετὰ δὲ ἄλλα Ἀττικά, τὸ τρίτον δὲ τὴν
κεφαλὴν ἐρείσας ἐπὶ τὴν τράπεζαν τοῖσι σκέλεσιν ἐχειρονόμησε. Κλεισθένης
δὲ τὰ μὲν πρῶτα καὶ τὰ δεύτερα ὀρχεομένου ἀποστυγέων γαμβρὸν ἄν οἱ ἔτι
1 W. J. H, 2000, p. 6 denes and analyzes three dierent groups of testimony
about the Greek symposium: sympotic poetry, vase-painting and archaeological remains from
the banquet rooms themselves.
2 On sympotic lyric, see W. J. H, 1997. E. L. B, 1986, p. 34 views the
symposium as a privileged space for elegiac recitation, taking it as the beginning of the festive
event itself.
3 Nevertheless, the word used for banquet in this text is δαίς, not συμπόσιον.
404
Carlos A. Martins de Jesus
γενέσθαι Ἱπποκλείδεα διὰ τήν τε ὄρχησιν καὶ τὴν ἀναιδείην κατεῖχεν ἑωυτόν,
οὐ βουλόμενος ἐκραγῆναι ἐς αὐτόν·4
As they sat late drinking, Hippoclides, now far outdoing the rest, bade the ute-
player play him music, and when the ute-player so did, he began to dance; and
he pleased himself marvellous well with this dancing; but Cleisthenes saw the
whole business with much disfavour. After a while, Hippoclides bade a table be
brought; when it came he danced on it Laconian rst and then Attic gures;
last of all he rested his head on the table and made gestures with his legs in
the air. Now Cleisthenes at the rst and the second bout of dancing could no
more bear to think of Hippoclides as his son-in-law, for his dancing and his
shamelessness; yet he had held himself in check, not willing to vent his wrath
on Hippoclides5.
In this passage, we read about the wedding-banquet oered by Cleisthenes
to those who want to marry his daughter. One of them, Hippoclides, asks a
ute-player girl to join him in a tragic dance (ἐμμέλεια) and, as a table is
brought into the room, he dances on it some warrior-style Laconic steps and
poses followed by (more comic) Attic ones. What is more, the sort of dance
preferred at banquets is already the pantomimic one, as it will be in Plutarch's
Table Talk. Also, in Herodotus' view, moderation is a priceless value to be taken
into consideration at banquets. At the very last, Cleisthenes therefore refuses
Hippoclides as a candidate for his daughter's hand, for he had been excessive
in his performance. Relating to an earlier form of social arrangement – an
aristocratic one – both examples may be no more than ancestors of the kind
of symposium we nd in Plutarch's Table Talk, still being an example of spaces
of convivium in witch poetry, music and dance also played an important role.
In other words, they are not supposed to be wise-men reunions, since the
beginning thought to be a space of scientic and philosophical discussion,
even if they actually enrich the elite banqueters with the gift of wisdom.
Before looking at sympotic poetry in more detail, let us point to yet another
literary banquet, namely the one described in Xenophon's Symposium (2. 15-
23). At some point, a boy begins to dance (ἐκ τούτου ὁ παῖς ὠρχήσατο) and
the banqueters, including Socrates, try to imitate him in a humorous scene. In
this text – which Plutarch should have known very well – dance is only taken
as an exercise (καλῶς γυμνάζει καὶ τὰ ἐμὰ ὀρχήματα) rather than as the object
of deeper philosophical discussion, if only because Socrates admits that he is
not a skilful dancer himself.
Beyond this, several poems from the Anacreontea, an anthology put
together from the second century BC to the seventh AD, express perfectly the
space given to dance in the post-meal program of the banquet. For instance,
poem 43 is a ne illustration of the joyful environment that should be usual
at banquets:
4 H. B. R, Herodoti Historiae , vol. II. Leipzig, 1997.
5 All translations are those of the Loeb Classical Library.
405
Dancing with Plutarch: dance and dance theory in Plutarch's Table Talk
Στεφάνους μὲν κροτάφοισι
ῥοδίνους συναρμόσαντες
μεθύωμεν ἁβρὰ γελῶντες.
ὑπὸ βαρβίτωι δὲ κούρα
κατακίσσοισι βρέμοντας
πλοκάμοις φέρουσα θύρσους
χλιδανόσφυρος χορεύει·
ἁβροχαίτας δ' ἅμα κοῦρος
στομάτων ἁδὺ πνεόντων
κατὰ πηκτίδων ἀθύρει
προχέων λίγειαν ὀμφάν.
ὁ δ' Ἔρως ὁ χρυσοχαίτας
μετὰ τοῦ καλοῦ Λυαίου
καὶ τῆς καλῆς Κυθήρης
τὸν ἐπήρατον γεραιοῖς
κῶμον μέτεισι χαίρων6.
Let us fasten garlands of roses on our brows and get drunk, laughing gently.
Let a gorgeous-ankled girl dance to the lyre carrying the thyrsus with its rich
ivy tresses. With her let a boy, soft-haired and with sweet-smelling mouth, play
the lyre, pouring forth a clear song. And golden-haired Love with beautiful
Lyaeus and beautiful Cythere will join happily in the revel that old men nd
delightful.
No concern is shown here for moderation or good behavior. In fact, this
idea is absent from the entire Anacreontic collection. Nevertheless, thanks to
his own art and that of his imitators, Anacreon has become a real symbol of
sympotic poetry; for the banquet is the special context of most of these poems,
a space where Eros, wine, music and dance among drinking men with garlands
around their heads are very important elements.
Equally rich testimony is given by Greek vase-painting. Besides
their frequent use at the banquet, they usually show sympotic scenes, both
mythological ones and episodes from daily life7 . Moreover, the physical rooms
where the event took place were often decorated with sympotic motifs. e
most widely known one is probably the so-called Swimmer Tomb Room in
Paestum, which was indeed a dining room. On its four walls we see the guests,
servants and even a komos with a ute-player girl and other artists that could
in fact perform some dance steps8 .
e relevance of this evidence on the Greek symposium to Plutarch is
that all the sympotic descriptions that he created (or recreated, we cannot be
6 To quote the Anacreontea, we use the text of M. L. W , Carmina Anacreontea, Leipzig,
1984. Numbers 2, 15, 38, 40, 42, 47 and 59 of the collection also mention dance in a sympotic
environment.
7 For three examples, clearly related to banquets, see L. B. L, 1964, pp. 119-20.
8 In the Roman period, too, the walls of banquet rooms were painted with sympotic motifs,
as in the case of the Triclinium House in Pompeii. See K. M. D. D, 2003, pp. 52-60
and plates I-III.
406
Carlos A. Martins de Jesus
sure) in the nine books of his Table Talk are consciously Greek. Inspired by the
banquets of wise men portrayed by Plato, Xenophon and others that have not
come down to us – yet very dierent from those archaic symposia we nd in the
Homeric poems –, the Plutarchan convivium is designed to imitate Greek ways
of drinking, eating and enjoying entertainment. In a joyful party environment,
where philosophy is mixed with more trivial issues, singing and dancing would
have been part of the post-meal program. Nevertheless, nowhere in the book
do we nd any detailed description of a dance performance, except maybe
the allusion to a dance contest in Book 9 (question 15), to which we shall
soon return. Just like the rest of the speakers, Plutarch is more interested in
discussing which dance styles are more appropriate to the wise men's banquets,
recurring all the time to the opinion of those Greek authors who dealt with
the subject, most notably Plato and Xenophon.
e subject of dance appears rst in Book 1 of the Table Talk (614D-E), at
a moment when the discussion focuses on the philosophic argumentation most
suitable to a banquet. e dance is then used in the following metaphor:
ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰ σώματα πινόντων δι' ὀρχήσεως καὶ χορείας νενόμισται
σαλεύειν, ἂν δ' ὁπλομαχεῖν ἀναστάντας ἢ δισκεύειν ἀναγκάζωμεν αὐτούς, οὐ
μόνον ἀτερπὲς ἀλλὰ καὶ βλαβερὸν ἔσται τὸ συμπόσιον, οὕτω τὰς ψυχὰς αἱ μὲν
ἐλαφραὶ ζητήσεις ἐμμελῶς καὶ ὠφελίμως κινοῦσιν [...]9.
For just as the bodies of men who are drinking are accustomed to sway in
time with pantomimic and choral dancing, but if we compel them to get up
and exercise in heavy armour or throw the discus, they will nd the party not
only unpleasant but even harmful, just so their spirits are harmoniously and
protably stirred by subjects of inquiry that are easy to handle...
e metaphor serves to prove how frequently dance was a part of banquets,
because it is only this frequency that allows it to be used as an example of
something common. Going one step further, we may see how moderation,
in relation to dance, is Plutarch's major concern. It must not be allowed to
confuse or even distract the company from the path of reason, thus preventing
the event from becoming "not only unpleasant but even harmful" (οὐ μόνον
ἀτερπὲς ἀλλὰ καὶ βλαβερὸν), just like philosophy, which is not supposed to
compromise the good mood, by being too serious or too deep.
Further on in Book 7 (705A), in a discussion of good and bad music,
dance is again a subject of conversation. It is cited as a parallel when Calistratus
distinguishes between pleasures of the body and those of the soul:
οὐδὲν οὖν ὁρῶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς ἴδιον ἐχούσας, <ἢ> ὅτι μόναι τῆς ψυχῆς
εἰσιν, αἱ δ' ἄλλαι τοῦ σώματος καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα καταλήγουσιν· μέλος δὲ καὶ
ῥυθμὸς καὶ ὄρχησις καὶ ᾠδὴ παραμειψάμεναι τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐν τῷ χαίροντι
τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπερείδονται τὸ ἐπιτερπὲς καὶ γαργαλίζον. ὅθεν οὐδεμία τῶν
9 For the Greek text of the Table Talk, we use C. H, Plutarchus. Moralia, IV, Leipzig,
1971.
407
Dancing with Plutarch: dance and dance theory in Plutarch's Table Talk
τοιούτων ἡδονῶν ἀπόκρυφός ἐστιν οὐδὲ σκότους δεομένη καὶ τῶν τοίχων
'περιθεόντων', ὡς οἱ Κυρηναϊκοὶ λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ στάδια ταύταις καὶ
θέατρα ποιεῖται, καὶ τὸ μετὰ πολλῶν θεάσασθαί τι καὶ ἀκοῦσαι ἐπιτερπέστερόν
ἐστι καὶ σεμνότερον, οὐκ ἀκρασίας δήπου καὶ ἡδυπαθείας ἀλλ' ἐλευθερίου
διατριβῆς καὶ ἀστείας μάρτυρας ἡμῶν ὅτι πλείστους λαμβανόντων.
I do not see that pleasures of this sort have anything special about them, except
that they alone have to do with the mind, whereas the rest are pleasures of the
body and reach and end in the body. Melody, however, and rhythm and dance and
song go on past sense-perception and nd a basis for their pleasing and enticing
quality in the mind's faculty of enjoyment. us none of the pleasures of this kind
is secret or requires darkness or walls 'running round' (as the Cyrenaics say), but
stadia are even built for them, and theatres; and to witness a spectacle of sight
or sound in a large company is considered more enjoyable and more impressive
because we are associating as many persons as possible with ourselves, surely not
in incontinence and sensuality, but in a liberal and civilized pastime.
While the so-called bodily pleasures are given by the sensory organs of
perception, the pleasures of the soul are given by sight and hearing, being
far beyond the sensual stage of knowledge, as well as free from excess. is
is why dance and music are included in this last group. Lamprias does not
agree, thinking that the pleasures of the soul have a truly charming power
that undermines both reason and good judgment, leading a man to excess
(ἀκρασία ) and loss of reason (ἄγνοια).
Having proved the need for a moderate enjoyment of pleasures, in banquets
as in all human life, in the eight question of Book 7 (711E-F), Plutarch goes
on to discuss precisely what kind of amusement is welcome at a banquet. With
this issue, we enter the straight eld of συμποτικά (discussion about the banquet
itself), which is dierent from συμποσιακά (discussion about several subjects, only
in the context of a banquet), an expression that gives the title to the entire work.
πρώτην <τὴν> τραγῳδίαν, ὡς οὐ πάνυ τι συμποτικὸν ἀλλὰ σεμνότερον
βοῶσαν καὶ σκευωρουμένην πραγμάτων ὑποκρίσεις πάθος ἐχόντων καὶ
οἶκτον. ἀποπέμπω δὲ τῆς ὀρχήσεως τὴν Πυλάδειον, ὀγκώδη καὶ παθητικὴν
καὶ πολυπρόσωπον οὖσαν· αἰδοῖ δὲ τῶν ἐγκωμίων ἐκείνων, ἃ Σωκράτης περὶ
ὀρχήσεως διῆλθε, δέχομαι τὴν Βαθύλλειον αὐτόθεν πέζαν τοῦ κόρδακος
ἁπτομένην, Ἠχοῦς ἤ τινος Πανὸς ἢ Σατύρου σὺν Ἔρωτι κωμάζοντος
ὑπόρχημά τι διατιθεμένην.
First of all, tragedy: it is not at all appropriate to a party, with its majestic elocution
and its elaborated representation of events that are moving and sorrowful. As
for dances, I should disqualify the Pylladic, as pretentious and emotional and
requiring a large cast; but out of respect for Socrates' well-known praise of the
dance, I will accept the Bathyllic. It is a straightforward unaccompanied dance,
verging on the kordax, and presents a danced interpretation of Echo or some
Pan or Satyr reveling with Eros.
408
Carlos A. Martins de Jesus
Diogenianus intends to exclude tragic performances from the banquet for
not being suitable to it (οὐ πάνυ τι συμποτικὸν), which is to say, for not being
convenient to the good mood of the event – the same point that had been
made about philosophy before. is is a strongly Platonic way of thinking10 ,
which is also present elsewhere in Plutarch's works11 . Talking about dance,
he then excludes the so-called Pylladic dance, yet accepts the Bathyllic one,
a local rhythm which he describes as being very similar to the Greek kordax .
As for Pylades (1st century BC), we know that he was from Cilicia and that he
introduced important changes to tragic pantomime, making it more exuberant
and emotional by means of a sophisticated choreography and a larger number
of characters12 . Suetonius (Aug. 45. 4) actually says that Pylades, along with
Bathyllus, gave a new shape to Roman pantomime, with both men becoming
the founders of the so-called "Italic dance"13 . Athenaeus (20d-e), the richest
and most comprehensive source we have about both artists' style, talks about
Pylladic dance in a strikingly similar way. us, we may conclude that he and
Plutarch followed the same sources, perhaps Seleucus and Aristonicus, who
are the ones identied by Athenaeus himself. As for Bathyllic dance, it is
described as being very similar to the Greek kordax, as it is in Plutarch, but
mixed with satirical elements:
τῆς δὲ κατὰ τοῦτον ὀρχήσεως τῆς τραγικῆς καλουμένης πρῶτος εἰσηγητὴς
γέγονε Βάθυλλος ὁ Ἀλεξανδρεύς, ὅν φησι παντομίμους ὀρχήσασθαι Σέλευκος.
τοῦτον τὸν Βάθυλλόν φησιν Ἀριστόνικος καὶ Πυλάδην, οὗ ἐστι καὶ σύγγραμμα
περὶ ὀρχήσεως, τὴν Ἰταλικὴν ὄρχησιν συστήσασθαι ἐκ τῆς κωμικῆς, ἣ ἐκαλεῖτο
κόρδαξ, καὶ τῆς τραγικῆς, ἣ ἐκαλεῖτο ἐμμέλεια, καὶ τῆς σατυρικῆς, ἣ ἐλέγετο
σίκιννις (διὸ καὶ οἱ σάτυροι σικιννισταί), ἧς εὑρετὴς Σίκιννός τις βάρβαρος. οἳ
δέ φασιν ὅτι Κρὴς ἦν ὁ Σίκιννος. ἦν δὲ ἡ Πυλάδου ὄρχησις ὀγκώδης παθητική
τε καὶ πολυπρόσωπος, ἡ δὲ Βαθύλλειος ἱλαρωτέρα· καὶ γὰρ ὑπόρχημά τι
τοῦτον διατίθεσθαι.14
Now the rst to introduce this "tragic dancing", as it was called, was Bathyllus
of Alexandria, who, as Seleucus says, danced in pantomime. Aristonicus says
that this Bathyllus, together with Pylades, who wrote a treatise on dancing,
developed the Italian style of dance out of the comic ing called the cordax ,
the tragic measures called emmeleia, and the satyr rout called sicinis (whence
the satyrs are also called sicinnistae), the inventor of which was a barbarian
named Sicinnus. But others say Sicinnus was a Cretan. Now Pylades' dancing
was solemn, expressing passion and variety of character, whereas Bathyllus' was
more jolly; in fact he composed a kind of hyporcheme.
10 See Pl., Cra. 408c; Grg. 502b; Smp. 194b; Lg. 659 a-c, 700d – 701b, 876f.
11 Quaest. conv. 724D; De facie 926C; De aud. 41f.
12 Two epigrams from the Greek Anthology are very encomiastic about Pylades' art: 9. 248
and 16. 290.
13 On this issue, see E. J. J, 1981.
14 e Athenaeus' text is quoted from C. B. G, Athenaeus. e Deipnosophists , 7 vols.,
Cambridge, Mass., 1927-1941.
409
Dancing with Plutarch: dance and dance theory in Plutarch's Table Talk
Athenaeus makes a clear distinction between both artists' style, especially
in relation to their tone –the rst more pathetic, the second more joyful –, and
that is also the reason why Plutarch seems to distinguish them, rejecting one
and accepting the other. e explanation for this is perhaps to be found in
Athenaeus' text when he says that Bathyllus' dance is ἱλαρωτέρα ("more jolly")
– a quality that must be taken into consideration, according to Plutarch's
morality, along with at least two others, decency and moderation. In fact, we
know that Pylades became famous for the mimic adaptation of mythical-tragic
histories15 , and it should not be forgotten that Diogenianus himself, earlier
in the text, had already excluded tragedy from banquets (771E). Moreover,
the very same Diogenianus is clear about the fact that he only accepts the
Bathyllic dance "out of respect for Socrates' well-known praise of the dance".
is seems to be an obvious reference to Xenophon's text (Smp. 2. 16-19),
where, nevertheless, only the good eects of the dance on the body, as a
physical exercise, are at issue, whereas no reference at all is made to the moral
implications that are Plutarch's almost exclusive concern.
It seems certain at any rate that, when we talk about dance in the Table
Talk, we are actually talking about pantomime, that dramatic way of expression
without words, where only body movements, poses and the characters' outlook,
along with music and maybe some non-verbal sounds, are the means to
perform mythological or daily-life episodes16 . Signicantly, it is the same art
that is deeply analyzed in Book 9, in the very last question of the work, which
is all dedicated to the parts of the dance and its relation to poetry. e context
that provokes the discussion is simple: a dance performance of the Pyrrhic
oered to the guests after dinner, in which Lamprias, Plutarch's brother, was
appointed, along with the trainer, to be the judge, on the strength of his past
record of excellence as a dancer17 . It is important to observe that this style
also ts into the pantomimic group of dances, which has been discussed at
length. In fact, it was originally the mimic dance representation of a ght,
performed by armed dancers, which was in itself a good form of entertainment
and exercise for the soldiers18 . A fragment from Aristoxenus of Tarentum (4th
century BC), a Peripatetic philosopher who wrote about music and rhythm,
denes how the Pyrrhic must have been in its origins (fr. 103 Wehrli = cit.
Athen. 630c):
15 Take, for example, his performance of Hercules Furens, as reported by Macrobius (Sat. 2. 7.
12-19). On the subjects of pantomimic representation see E. J. Jory 2008, pp. 157-168.
16 From the wealth of recent scholarly work on pantomime, see I. L-R, 2007,
R. W, 2008 and E. H & R. W, 2008.
17 e text is clear about the fact that it was a competition for boys (τοῖς παισὶ νικητήριον
ὀρχήσεως). According to some scholars, this forces us to conclude that Lamprias, too, at the
aforementioned banquet, must have been a boy (perhaps even a young boy). For this reason,
S.-T. T, 1989, 3, p. 375, thinks that this sympotic reunion must have taken place in
AD 66/67. Nevertheless, we still think it is a forced conclusion to assume that, being appointed
as judge, Lamprias should be a παῖς or a μειράκιον at the time of the banquet.
18 X., An. 6.1.5-13 alludes to this function of the Pyrrhic dance.
410
Carlos A. Martins de Jesus
(...) τρεῖς δ' εἰσὶ τῆς σκηνικῆς ποιήσεως ὀρχήσεις, τραγικὴ κωμικὴ
σατυρική. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῆς λυρικῆς ποιήσεως τρεῖς, πυρρίχη γυμνοπαιδικὴ
ὑπορχηματική. καί ἐστιν ὁμοία ἡ μὲν πυρρίχη τῇ σατυρικῇ, ἀμφότεραι γὰρ
διὰ τάχους. πολεμικὴ δὲ δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ πυρρίχη. ἔνοπλοι γὰρ αὐτὴν παῖδες
ὀρχοῦνται. τάχους δὲ δεῖ τῷ πολέμῳ εἰς τὸ διώκειν καὶ εἰς τὸ ἡττωμένους
"φεύγειν μηδὲ μένειν μηδ' αἰδεῖσθαι κακοὺς εἶναι...
... three are the dances of scenic poetry: tragic, comic and satirical. Also three
are the lyric ones: pyrrhic, gymnastic and that of hyporchemae. Just like the
Pyrrhic is the satirical, they are both based on basic steps. In fact, boys dance
it armed. In war it is necessary to be fast in pursuit but also, for those who are
defeated, to run and never stop or feel ashamed for being cowards.
Apparently, the dance gradually lost its warrior meaning. is seems to
be implicit in the paragraph from the Table Talk we are discussing, where the
winners are even given a cake as a prize. Nevertheless, it would still be an
important part of the athletes' training in ght schools, especially at Sparta.
As for the rest of the Greek world, however, it should have become mostly
a Dionysiac dance. is is suggested by Athenaeus 631a-b, perhaps the best
testimony we have about what dance must have been like in Plutarch's times:
ἡ δὲ πυρρίχη παρὰ μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησιν οὐκ ἔτι παραμένει· ἐκλιπούσης
δὲ αὐτῆς συμβέβηκε καὶ τοὺς πολέμους καταλυθῆναι. παρὰ μόνοις δὲ
Λακεδαιμονίοις διαμένει προγύμνασμα οὖσα τοῦ πολέμου· ἐκμανθάνουσί τε
πάντες ἐν τῇ Σπάρτῃ ἀπὸ πέντε ἐτῶν πυρριχίζειν. ἡ δὲ καθ' ἡμᾶς πυρρίχη
Διονυσιακή τις εἶναι δοκεῖ, ἐπιεικεστέρα οὖσα τῆς ἀρχαίας. ἔχουσι γὰρ οἱ
ὀρχούμενοι θύρσους ἀντὶ δοράτων, προίενται δὲ ἐπ' ἀλλήλους καὶ νάρθηκας
καὶ λαμπάδας φέρουσιν ὀρχοῦνταί τε τὰ περὶ τὸν Διόνυσον καὶ [τὰ περὶ] τοὺς
Ἰνδοὺς ἔτι τε τὰ περὶ τὸν Πενθέα.
e pyrrichê, however, no longer survives among other Greeks, and coincidently
with its decline the wars stopped. But among the Spartans alone it still persists
as a preparatory drill for war; further, all males in Sparta, from ve years of
age on, learn thoroughly how to dance the pyrrichê. e pyrrichê of our times
is rather Dionysiac in character and is more respectable than the ancient kind.
For the dancers carry Bacchic wands in place of spears, they hurl also at one
another stalks of fennel, they carry torches, and dance the story of Dionysus
and India, or again the story of Pentheus.
Athenaeus' text proves that the Pyrrhic was still a mimic dance,
representing at that time not the battles of men, but rather the histories of
the gods, especially those related to the Dionysiac cult. And it was in this new
disguise – which is only thematic – that the Romans received it.
Ammonius, whose intersemiotic theory of dance occupies the remainder
of the book, advocates its analysis in three dierent but still complementary
stages, which prove once more that the issue under discussion is pantomime.
411
Dancing with Plutarch: dance and dance theory in Plutarch's Table Talk
ey are φορά , σχῆμα and δεῖξις, tentatively to be translated as "phrase"
("movement", or even "coordination"), "gure" (or "pose") and "indication"
(747B-C)19 :
Ἔφη δὲ τρί' εἶναι, τὴν φορὰν καὶ τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὴν δεῖξιν. 'ἡ γὰρ ὄρχησις
ἔκ τε κινήσεων καὶ σχέσεων συνέστηκεν, ὡς τὸ μέλος τῶν φθόγγων καὶ
τῶν διαστημάτων· ἐνταῦθα δ' αἱ μοναὶ πέρατα τῶν κινήσεών εἰσιν. φορὰς
μὲν οὖν τὰς κινήσεις ὀνομάζουσι, σχήματα δὲ <τὰς> σχέσεις καὶ διαθέσεις,
εἰς ἃς φερόμεναι τελευτῶσιν αἱ κινήσεις, ὅταν Ἀπόλλωνος ἢ Πανὸς ἤ τινος
Βάκχης σχῆμα διαθέντες ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος γραφικῶς τοῖς εἴδεσιν ἐπιμένωσι.
τὸ δὲ τρίτον, ἡ δεῖξις, οὐ μιμητικόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ δηλωτικὸν ἀληθῶς τῶν
ὑποκειμένων·
[which] he said were three in number: the phrase, the pose, and pointing.
"Dancing", he explained, "consists of movements and positions, as melody of
its notes and intervals. In the case of dancing the rests are the terminating
points of the movements. Now they call the movements 'phrases', while 'poses'
is the same of the representational positions to which the movements lead
and in which they end, as when dancers compose their bodies in the attitude
of Apollo or Pan or a Bacchant, and then retain that aspect like gures in
a picture. e third element, pointing, is something that does not copy the
subject-matter, but actually shows it to us.
Just like the poet uses onomatopoeia and metaphors to represent
reality, the dancer may use movement and pose to mime any situation or even
narrative. As for δεῖξις, which is said to be a non-mimetic concept of dance
(οὐ μιμητικόν ἐστιν ), some additional considerations are called for. Indeed,
Plato did not distinguish between movement and pose, always taking dance
as the art of representing speech visually (Lg. 816), as did Aristotle (Poet.
1447a 24). As L. B. Lawer (1954, pp. 155-157) pointed out, when studying
the uses of δεῖξις and other words of the same root, they always have some
mimetic sense. is leads us to agree with S.-T. Teodorsson (1983, 3, p. 379),
when he says that "Plutarch's source may have been a treatise written by a
musician or a rhetorician of Peripatetic outlook, who tried to describe dancing
as an expressive for parallel to speech and analysable into basically the same
elements as speech, as well as those of music".
Still, one may ask how we are to read δεῖξις in this very special context.
It seems that Ammonius views dancing as a way either to imitate things, by
means of a static pose or movements, or simply to point at them, by indicating
them to the spectator, the latter corresponding to the aforementioned non-
mimetic concept of dance. Let us give an example: a dancer can imitate the
pose or the movements of an animal – let us say, a swan – or simply point at a
statue of the very same creature close to him.
Bearing this in mind, one can now understand that the discussion is
focused entirely on Pyrrhic dance, only in its non-warrior version, rather
19 A thorough study of these concepts is made by L. B. L, 1954.
412
Carlos A. Martins de Jesus
the later Dionysiac one. Moreover, the initial reference to the Pyrrhic dance
performed by Lamprias no longer appears to be a simple digression, as some
scholars have argued20 .
Indeed, that triple comparison between dance, poetry and painting
is what moves Ammonius to quote one of the most famous of Simonides'
ancient apophthegmata (6th century BC), according to which that poet would
have been the rst to establish the parallel between poetry and music. In the
following words Plutarch quotes that detail of the poet's tradition (De glor.
Athen. 346F)21 :
πλὴν ὁ Σιμωνίδης τὴν μὲν ζωγραφίαν ποίησιν σιωπῶσαν προσαγορεύει, τὴν
δὲ ποίησιν ζωγραφίαν λαλοῦσαν. ἃς γὰρ οἱ ζωγράφοι πράξεις ὡς γινομένας
δεικνύουσι, ταύτας οἱ λόγοι γεγενημένας διηγοῦνται καὶ συγγράφουσιν.
Simonides, however, calls painting inarticulate poetry and poetry articulate
painting: for the action which painters portray as taking place at the moment
literature narrates and records after they have taken place.
And here is how Ammonius intends to deny it in the Table Talk
(748A-B):
καὶ ὅλως' ἔφη 'μεταθετέον τὸ Σιμωνίδειον ἀπὸ τῆς ζωγραφίας ἐπὶ τὴν ὄρχησιν·
<ταύτην γὰρ ὀρθῶς ἔστι λέγειν ποίησιν> σιωπῶσαν, καὶ φθεγγομένην ὄρχησιν
[δὲ] πάλιν τὴν ποίησιν· † ὅθεν εἶπεν οὔτε γραφικὴν εἶναι ποιητικῆς οὔτε
ποιητικὴν γραφ<ικ>ῆς, οὐδὲ χρῶνται τὸ παράπαν ἀλλήλαις· ὀρχηστικῇ δὲ καὶ
ποιητικῇ κοινωνία πᾶσα καὶ μέθεξις ἀλλήλων ἐστί, καὶ μάλιστα [μιμούμεναι]
περὶ <τὸ> τῶν ὑπορχημάτων γένος ἓν ἔργον ἀμφότεραι τὴν διὰ τῶν σχημάτων
καὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων μίμησιν ἀποτελοῦσι.
In short, one can transfer Simonides' saying from painting to dancing, <rightly
calling dance> silent poetry and poetry articulate dance. ere seems to be
nothing of painting in poetry or of poetry in painting, nor does either art make
any use whatsoever of the other, whereas dancing and poetry are fully associated
and the one involves the other. Particularly it is so when they combine in that
type of composition called hyporchema, in which the two arts taken together
eect a single work, a representation by means of poses and words.
Poetry and dance are indeed a kind of imitation of reality. e very best
poetical genre to accomplish this is the hyporchema, a performance based on
the songs and dances of a chorus that, according to its ancient characterization,
should have gathered around some god's altar, at the time when the victims
were sacriced22 . e dance gures (σχήματα) stand for the words (or names,
20 According to S.-T. T, 1989, 3, p. 374, for example, "at the beginning of the talk
the pyrrhic dance is mentioned as an introduction, while the subsequent speech delivered by
Ammonius (...) concerns above all the contemporary pantomime."
21 e same apophthegma is mentioned in De aud. 17F and De ad. et am. 58B.
22 On the hyporchema see A. M. D, 1950.
413
Dancing with Plutarch: dance and dance theory in Plutarch's Table Talk
ὀνόματα) in poetry, similar elements from two dierent semiotic codes serving
the same purpose – μίμησις βίου .
Some conclusions may nally be drawn from this analysis of dance in the
Table Talk. First of all, it was a regular part in both private and social banquets,
which Plutarch represents – at least in a literary sense – in the Greek way.
en, as it is impossible to trace exactly which were Plutarch's sources on this
issue – in which he seems to be far from Plato and Aristotle –, the discussion
focused mostly on pantomime, the most famous style in those days. It is in
fact this style that allows us to conduct an intersemiotic study in the Table
Talk, taking in parallel dance, poetry and painting and looking at what they
have in common – the fact that they all are μίμησις βίου or, to use Aristotle's
words, μίμησις πράξεως. e dance conceived by Plutarch must be understood
in a dramatic sense, being close to the performance of a play; and that is why
Aristotle's theories on tragedy are so important to understand his point of
view. Above all this, as a guiding idea, stands the supreme ideal of moderation,
which does not allow excesses or deviations, a pregnant concept in all the
banquets (re)created by Plutarch.
One question is still worth asking: why does Plutarch choose to end an
entire philosophical work like the Table Talk on such a frivolous issue as is
dance theory23 ? Maybe because it is not a frivolous issue at all, as it may seem
at rst sight. It appears that dance is an intermediate discipline, a kind of
study and practice not for actual philosophers or philosophy students, but still
capable of providing a discussion mostly based on Plato's theories on body and
soul, besides being an issue perfectly suitable to the sympotic environment.
On this, one should remember Plutarch's own words in Coniugalia Praecepta
(145C):
αἰσχυνθήσεται γὰρ ὀρχεῖσθαι γυνὴ γεωμετρεῖν μανθάνουσα, καὶ φαρμάκων
ἐπῳδὰς οὐ προςδέξεται τοῖς Πλάτωνος ἐπᾳδομένη λόγοις καὶ τοῖς
Ξενοφῶντος.
For a woman studying geometry will be ashamed to be a dancer, and she will
not swallow any beliefs in magic charms while she is under the charm of Plato's
or Xenophon's words.
If dancing is not a deep philosophical issue, dance theory can certainly be
one, based as it is mostly on ethics and morality24 . Although Plutarch seems to
refuse to give his Table Talk a very complex end, he chooses to give it one that
is still capable of launching the discussion of deep philosophical questions that
are traceable through the entire work.
23 We would like to thank Professor Philip Stadter, who posed us this very same question
after the presentation of this paper.
24 I. L-R, 2008, pp. 285-313 focuses on the ethical and moral role of pantomime,
asking – in the very title of her paper – "Was pantomime 'good to think with' in the ancient
world?".
414
Carlos A. Martins de Jesus
W o r k s c i T e d
B, E. L., "Early Greek elegy, symposium and public festival", JHS, 106
(1986) 13-35.
D, A. M., "Stasimon and hyporcheme", Eranos, 48 (1950) 14-20.
D, K. M. D., e Roman banquet. Aspects of conviviality. Cambridge,
2003.
H, W. J., "Elegie en sumposion", Akroterion, 41.2 (1997) 4-22.
_______"Aspects of the ancient Greek symposion", Akroterion, 45 (2000)
6-26.
J, E. J., "e literary evidence for the beginnings of Imperial pantomime",
BICS, 28 (1981) 147-61.
_______"e pantomime dancer and his libretto", in H, E. W, R.
(eds.), New directions in ancient pantomime. Oxford, 2008, pp. 157-68.
L-R, I., Silent Eloquence. Lucian and pantomime dancing. London,
2007.
_______"Was pantomime 'good to think with' in the ancient world", in H,
E. W, R. (eds.), New directions in ancient pantomime. Oxford,
2008, pp. 285-313.
L, L. B., "Phora, schema, deixis in the Greek dance", TAPhA, 85 (1954)
148-58.
T, S.-T., A commentary on Plutarch's Table Talk (3 vols.), Göteborg,
1989.
W, R., Demons and Dancers. Performance in Late Antiquity. Cambridge/
Mass., 2008.
415
e omnipresence of philosophy in Plutarch's Quaestiones Convivales
Th e o m n i p r e s e n c e o f p h i l o s o p h y i n p l u T a r c h ' s
Qu a e S T i o n e S co n v i v a l e S 1
R L
University of Coimbra
Abstract
In the following paper I attempt to clarify in which way philosophy is present in the Quaestiones
Convivales. I leave aside the role that this work plays as an anthology of Ancient Philosophy
and focus on two other aspects that seem to be decisive for an understanding of its architecture:
philosophy as a discussion subject, and, more important, as a structural force in this collection
of talks. Taking into account the traditional division of Ancient Philosophy in three branches –
logic, ethics and physics –, I try to show that there are very clear connections between them and
those two vectors of analysis: philosophy as a subject of discussing is strictly related with physics,
and philosophy as a structural force depends on ethics and logic.
1. Philosophy in the Symposium
As a code of rituals and symbols of interaction, commensality is a practice
that follows Man from time immemorial. Initially found in military, religious and
political contexts, and later simply practised as a form of social conduct, human
interaction around a table was governed by certain rules and procedures that
determined the gathering's development2 . Even in Homer one can nd examples
of this kind of reunion, which did not have the specic structure that we know
from the archaic and classical periods (namely the division between deipnon and
symposion), like the Achaean embassy to Achilles in Iliad Book 9 or Odysseus'
arrival at the palace of Alcinous in Odyssey Book 7. In both of them, as in other
examples of the same type, the conversation focuses on the intentions of the man
who arrives from outside the gathering3 , and for that reason can be seen to be
strictly related to hospitality rituals. After this phase, the sympotic descriptions
left by the archaic poets show us an atmosphere of feasting and amusement, in
which a primary role was given to the cultivation and dissemination of sung
poetry and other forms of music, to ethnographic narratives, and to praise or
blame. Briey, the symposium was a space of amusement, cultural dissemination
and remembrance of an heroic past4 . Still in a context of fun, but already in the
classical period, one of the most complete descriptions of a symposium is oered
by Aristophanes in his Wasps, in which there are many conversations, but all of
them in a jesting context (vv. 1175-1206), culminating in mutual insults and
several acts of violence by the drunken symposiasts (vv. 1300-1325).
In all of the above-mentioned examples, the importance of λόγος in
the symposium is obvious. However, this λόγος has a sense of "conversation"
1 I wish to thank Manuel Tröster for his precious help with the English version of this paper
and also for his suggestions that helped me to improve it.
2 Apud O. M, 1990, p. 6.
3 Cf. E. L. B, 1993, p. 357.
4 Apud W. R, 1990, pp. 231-2 (Cf. E. L. B, 1993, pp. 358-66).
and not yet of "dialogue"; it refers to "speaking" and not "discussing", far less,
following Plato, "discussing dialectically"; for the main goal of those gatherings
was amusement, and not investigation.
It is not very clear how the transition between the λόγος of "speaking" and
the λόγος of "discussing" occurred, or, in other words, how the philosophical
symposium came into being, because the works that seem to have been the rst
of this kind did not survive5 . According to a fragment from Aristotle (fr. 72 Rose),
the rst author of a philosophical Symposium was Alexamenos of Styra or Teos,
and Diogenes Laertius (3.48) says that the rst were Zeno and Protagoras. So it
is safer to say that was Plato who initiated the philosophical symposium tradition.
It is true that we can not determine whether Plato's Symposium was written before
Xenophon's, but, even if it was not, Xenophon says in the beginning of his work
that it is a collection of amusing conversations (1.1) and not of philosophical
discussions. Besides that, Plato's role in the establishment of the philosophical
symposium is not conned to his Symposium: he talks about the rules and
requirements of this kind of work in other dialogues too. In the Protagoras ,
Socrates clearly distinguishes two kinds of symposia: those of common and vulgar
men (φαύλοι καὶ ἀγοραῖοι ), where the sounds of the ute-girl rules, and those of
the καλοὶ κἀγαθοί, during which everyone talks and listens in an organized way,
even if they drink too much wine (347c-e). Likewise, in Plato's Symposium , the
decision to dismiss the ute-girl in order that the gathering may be given over to
discussion indicates that the symposium should be taken up with λόγοι instead
of jokes and amusements, and become a philosophical symposium – a feast of
speeches, as Plato says many times (e.g. Grg. 447a; R. 352b, 354a-b; Ti . 20c). As
for the purpose of those discussions, Socrates makes himself quite clear: it is to
make trial of the truth and of the speakers themselves (Prt. 348a).
2. e Quaestiones Convivales6 as a philosophical symposium
us, we must raise the following question concerning the set of symposia
that Plutarch presents in the QC: is it like that of Aristophanes' Wasps or is
it closer to Plato's conception? As we shall see, the answer is quite obvious,
because, besides the fact that the QC are almost universally recognised to be a
philosophical symposium7 – or a set of symposia –, the text itself gives us much
evidence that validates this conclusion.
In the very beginning of this work, Plutarch frames the set of symposia
that he is about to present to Sosius in a tradition of other authors that did
the same before him, like, among others, Plato and Xenophon (612E)8 . us,
he assumes from the start that the QC belong to a group of works with a
philosophical orientation; besides that, the very rst question is precisely about
5 On the origins of the philosophical symposium, see M. V , 2000, pp. 219-22.
6 From now on, the Quaestiones Convivales will be referred as QC.
7 See F. K, 2007, pp. 650, 653; L. R, 2002, p. 109.
8 Although vast, the list remains incomplete. On this problem, see M. V , 2000, p. 222;
S.-T. T, 1989, p. 12.
417
e omnipresence of philosophy in Plutarch's Quaestiones Convivales
the presence of philosophy in the symposia. us, by noting so clearly this
aliation with such a tradition, the reader will obviously expect to nd in
the following pages a set of conversations about serious – even philosophical
– matters and not a collection of jokes or other amusing activities, as in the
archaic symposia or the one described in the Wasps. Later, in the Prooemium
to Book VI, Plutarch conrms this aliation by insisting on the necessity of
writing down all that was said during the banquet, leaving aside everything
related to its material side, like the dishes or drinks that were consumed, just
like Xenophon and Plato had done (686 D).
On the other hand, these conversations, in order to follow their
philosophical legacy, will have to be governed by the rules of proper conversation
held by educated people; otherwise it would become the record of a symposium
of the φαύλοι καὶ ἀγοραῖοι. But we must ask ourselves what kind of λόγος
this is: the "saying" one, or the "discussing" one? When, in the Proemium to
Book I, Plutarch makes use of the examples of other authors of symposia and
says that the task of writing down the conversations held while one drinks
is worthy and that, on the other hand, it is wise to forget the improprieties
(612D4: τῶν πλημμεληθέντων) committed during the gathering, he is not
very explicit about the content of those talks. But, to say that what is improper
must be forgotten and, at the same time, assuming that something must be
written down implies that the things that deserve to be remembered should
be something proper.
According to L. Van der Stockt, the QC follow a model of conversation
among polite and moderate men based on the ethical criteria of φιλία ,
φιλανθρωπία, εὔνοια, and κοινωνία9 . For this reason, it is very rare to nd
someone exceeding the limits imposed by these values10 . Hence, we must infer
that these parts of the symposia that Plutarch wanted to transmit to posterity
through writing have some kind of normative codication as far as concerns
the conversation rules. Besides, the main goal of the symposium itself was to
cultivate those criteria which govern conversation and, even though there is
some room left for certain useful amusements (711A), it is quite clear that
there is a supremacy of λόγος to the disadvantage of the spirit of fun that we
nd in archaic symposia; for the pleasures generated during the symposium
will be taken from conversation (713C1: τὰς ἡδονάς ἐκ λόγου λαμβάνειν ).
In truth, throughout the QC there are few references to other ludic activities;
for this work is, in a general way, a set of conversations that occurred during
symposia, and the meaning of a symposium is to share not only meat and
drink but also conversations, which leads to friendship (660B).
Returning to the distinction established by Plato in the Protagoras between
the symposium of the φαύλοι καὶ ἀγοραῖοι and that of the καλοὶ κἀγαθοί, it
is very curious to note that, in the Septem Sapientium Convivium, Mnesiphilus
says that the character of the men Periander had gathered exempted wine
9 L. V S, 2000, p. 94.
10 See L. V S, 2000, pp. 93-4; F. M G, 1987, pp. 11-2.
from the symposium on the grounds that conversation, the highest pleasure
of a symposium as it combines earnestness and amusement, was already
there like in a κρατήρ which all of them could share (156D10-12: καθάπερ
κρατῆρα νηφάλιον ἐν μέσῳ προθέμεναι τὸν λόγον, ᾧ πλεῖστον ἡδονῆς
ἅμα καὶ παιδιᾶς καὶ σπουδῆς ἔνεστιν). But in the QC, the character of the
symposiasts is much more diversied, since they gather philosophers, doctors
or even farmers at the same table11 , and, consequently, conversation must
be introduced by some means. Maintaining the κρατήρ metaphor, Plutarch
establishes a connection between wine and conversation, conceiving them as
ingredients of a sort of blend that will raise or increase the main ethical criteria
that govern the symposium: as Dionysus is the Loosener, for he unleashes
the tongue (613C1-2: ὁ Διόνυσος Λύσιός ἐστι καὶ Λυαῖος, μάλιστα δὲ τῆς
γλώττης ἀφαιρεῖται), wine must circulate in the body through conversation
and, blended with it, will take it from the body to the soul (660B11-12: ἐπὶ
τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος ἐποχετεύει), rousing man's rational part, giving
birth to φιλανθρωπία, and tying the bonds of friendship. But, on the other
hand, if wine circulates throughout the body without any mediation, it will
not produce anything but repletion (660C1-2: εἰ δὲ μή, πλανώμενος ἐν τῷ
σώματι πλησμονῆς οὐδὲν σπουδαιότερον παρέσχεν). e same is to say that
wine must be ruled by λόγος and, conversely, wine will generate λόγος. Because
of this strict correlation and interdependence between wine and conversation,
whose equilibrium will determine the symposium's course, both of them must
stand at the same level; in order to maintain the convivial spirit in harmony,
conversation, like wine, must be within one's reach, as if it were in a κρατήρ.
But, more than vain and pointless talk, the concept of conversation in
the QC is very close to philosophical discussion: Plutarch says that, instead
of bringing into the symposium activities that would turn themselves into
obstacles to entertainment more than into entertainment itself, they should
amuse themselves with philosophy and conversation (713D5: διὰ λόγου καὶ
φιλοσοφίας). By putting both at the same level (even syntactically they are
strictly connected), it is obvious that the conversations will necessarily be
philosophical. Consequently, one may expect that the symposiasts will dene
themselves as philosophers and their activity as performative philosophy12 . In
certain sections this is quite evident, particularly when Plutarch refers to some
young men as symposiasts that were "philosophizing" with them (655F1: τοῖς
φιλοσοφοῦσι μειρακίοις μεθ' ἡμῶν), or, even more clearly, when he says that
the conversations held in the days before were philosophical questions and
discourses (686C4-5: προβλημάτων δὲ καὶ λόγων φιλοσόφων).
e very rst question of the QC introduces the discussion on the use
of philosophy during the symposium (Εἰ δεῖ φιλοσοφεῖν παρὰ πότον). We
may surely say that its position is not accidental; for it represents a sort of
general guideline according to which the conversations will be held and, at a
narrative level, they will be displayed in writing. At the same time, it establishes
11 On the diversity of the participants of the QC, see F. K, 2007, p. 653.
12 See F. K, 2007, pp. 659-.
419
e omnipresence of philosophy in Plutarch's Quaestiones Convivales
the set of principles which philosophy must obey whenever it is a subject of
conversation. Unlike the Persians, who, according to Plutarch, used to keep
philosophy far away from the symposium and preferred instead activities more
compatible with drinking like dances or mimes (613A), they will accept it in
their symposium, but with some restrictions.
As regards the kind of problems to be dealt with, in order to keep intact
the main ethical criteria that govern the symposium, the investigations must
be relaxed and the questions must be familiar (614D5-6: εἶναι δὲ δεῖ καὶ αὐτὰς
τὰς ζητήσεις ὑγροτέρας καὶ γνώριμα τὰ προβλήματα), and as for the method
of pursuing those questions, the discussion must be driven by persuasive
discourse rather than by the violence of demonstrations (614C8-9: διὰ τοῦ
πιθανοῦ μᾶλλον ἢ βιαστικοῦ τῶν ἀποδείξεων ἄγουσι τὸν λόγον).
2.1 Philosophy as a conversation subject (physics)
Many of the questions in the QC are designed to solve philosophical
issues. Nevertheless, the range of the investigations is generally restricted to
natural philosophy; for the diversity of the participants does not allow the
discussion of complicated problems, and, for that reason, the emphasis is
mainly on physics. Human nature is one of the most recurrent topics, to which
Plutarch dedicates several questions, particularly as far as concerns psychology
(Problêmata 3.6; 8.10), physiology (Problêmata 2.2; 4.10; 7.1; 8.8; 9.10), the
origins or causes of illnesses (Problêmata 6.8; 8.9) and the way human beings
deal with sensations and aections (Problêmata 1.8; 3.4; 5.1; 6.1-3; 7.3,5; 8.3).
On the other hand, since wine is a very important element in the organization
of a symposium and since the QC also deal with questions related to this
matter, there are also many questions that focus on the relation between man
and wine, most notably its eects (Problêmata 1.6-7; 3.3, 7-9; 3.5). Apart from
human nature, there also discussions about other dimensions of the natural
world, particularly questions related to animals (Problêmata 2.3, 7-9; 3.10; 4.4;
6.10; 8.8), plants (Problêmata 2.6; 3.2; 4.2; 5.9; 6.10), the elements (Problêmata
1.9; 6.4-6), and also to astronomy (Problêmata 4.7; 9.9). As for the sources that
the participants use to develop their argumentation, although there are dozens
of quotations of the principal Aristotelian scientic doctrines, mainly from
the Problêmata, which at that time were attributed to him, and, generally, from
the Peripatetic tradition, one must be cautious in saying that Plutarch follows
them in the QC for two major reasons. First, there are very few situations
in which the conclusion of the discussion matches the Aristotelian axiom
(659D; 696D; 702B), for the most part these 'quotations' are used either to
get a discussion started (650A; 652A; 656B-D; 690C,F; 704F; 720D; 734E;
735C), or, less frequently, they are simply refuted (627A-D; 694D; 724D).
Second, in some respects Plutarch clearly follows the Platonic tradition, as in
the aforementioned characterization of the human aections and sensations,
which is strictly connected with the theories established by Plato in the
Timaeus (43c-.; 78e-).
In a general way, the preponderance of physical aspects as a conversation
subject establishes the QC as a piece of philosophical investigation by means
of encyclopaedic knowledge – a sort of πολυμάθεια 13 . On the other hand, the
observations on natural philosophy are designed to deny some common-sense
beliefs, and put forward theories based on scientic knowledge: the cause of
problems in navigation is not the sh called remora, but the deterioration of
the ship's keel (Problêma 2.7); trues are not generated by thunderbolts that
penetrate the soil, but by the nature of the water that falls with them (Problêma
4.2)14 ; Mithridates was called Dionysus not for drinking too much wine, but
because he too had been hit by lightning when he was a child (Problêma 1.6).
2.2 Philosophy as a structural force (ethics and logic)
As I pointed out before, Plutarch refers to some participants as young
symposiasts that are philosophizing with them. us, besides discussing
philosophy, the organizers of the symposium also seek to initiate the younger
participants into these arts of investigating the truth of things. is clearly
shows, on the one hand, the pedagogical purpose of the symposium, a matrix
also present in the Platonic conception of the symposium15 , and, on the other
hand, a particular concern about the integration of those younger members in
the dynamics of the symposium and, hence, in the philosophical method.
However, conceiving that the conversations held in the QC have a
philosophical foundation and accepting as a structural principle that those
conversations must be within the range of every participant raises an inevitable
ἀπορία. Among so many speakers with so many distinct characters, there will
always be some that do not share the same passion for philosophical questions
or that simply do not have the capacity to follow the investigations. Blending
these two aspects may put at stake some of the primary ethical criteria that
regulate the symposium. How does Plutarch solve this problem? e answer
is quite simple. He takes advantage of the heterogeneity of the convivial set to
create a sort of unity through dierence, just like in a symphony, where many
instruments coexist in perfect harmony, each one with a dierent sound and a
dierent nature. In Plutarch's own words, coexistence in the symposium will
be like human language, which, although it is composed of dissonant sounds –
mute consonants and sonant vowels –, is natural and spontaneously harmonious
(613E2-4: ὥσπερ ἄφωνα γράμματα φωνηέντων (…) οὐ παντελῶς ἀνάρθρου
καὶ συνέσεως κοινωνήσουσιν). And, so that he can full that dicult task of
tuning in the dierences among the speakers, Plutarch proposes to eliminate
conversations of "wranglers" and "thimble-riggers" (614E2-4: 'ἐριδαντέων' δὲ
κατὰ Δημόκριτον καὶ 'ἱμαντελικτέων' λόγους ἀφετέον), and to prevent the
gathering from being carried away to a contest proper to sophists or similar
to those that occur in the streets (713F2-4: ἀγῶνα σοφιστικὸν ἐκφερομένης
13 Apud G. S, 1949, p. 321.
14 On this particular issue, see in this volume the contribution by A. S.
15 See Pl., Lg. 671a.
421
e omnipresence of philosophy in Plutarch's Quaestiones Convivales
ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ † πρὸς ἀγῶνας ἐκκλησιαστικοὺς καὶ ἀγοραίους). is is
to say that they must investigate accessible and worthy problems and that they
must not waste their time with useless riddles, that may embarrass some of
those present. Likewise, the rhetorical level must be simple, so that everyone
can understand what people are talking about. is is absolutely synchronized
with Plutarch's rhetorical conception, which favours a simple form of speech;
for the main concern is that the message can be understood16 . For this reason,
they should follow Plato's example, embracing men with exempla and mythical
narratives (614D4: παραδείγμασι καὶ μυθολογίαις προσάγεται τοὺς ἄνδρας)
instead of driving them through pure demonstrations.
By proposing a lighter version of philosophy to occupy the symposium,
Plutarch seems to pull it down to a lower rank, so that it may be accessible even to
those that are not καλοὶ κἀγαθοί. However, conceiving it in purely Stoic terms as
an art of life (613B5: τέχνην περὶ βίον), he shows that his primary purpose is to
use it in a very pragmatic way, which is a far cry from the metaphysical exercises
of his master Plato. Closer to Socrates, whose philosophical system depended
upon the set of actions he performed, yet connected to the Stoic ideal, Plutarch
detaches philosophy from its metaphysical pedestal and brings it to the real world,
so that it may reproduce at a praxiological level what it establishes theoretically,
revealing its ability to conrm in actions what it teaches in words (613C7-8:
φιλοσοφίαν ὡς ἔργῳ βεβαιοῦν ἃ διδάσκει λόγῳ μὴ δυναμένην). Bearing in
mind that this denition is put forward precisely in the same sentence in which
it is said that wine unleashes the tongue, and with both notions being clearly
connected, we may easily conclude that, on the one hand, it is wine that allows
that λόγος turn into ἔργον, and, on the other hand, it is that same philosophical
λόγος that rules the consumption of wine, thus keeping the ethical criteria of
φιλία, φιλανθρωπία, εὔνοια, and κοινωνία. Here and elsewhere in the Moralia,
philosophy is a medicine for the soul and its cultivation erases stupidity (ἄνοια ),
derangement (παραφροσύνη) and lack of education (ἀπαιδευσία )17 , which
contaminate the ideal state of the symposium.
us, drawn nearer to the καλοὶ κἀγαθοί through wine, the symposiasts
will then be able to handle the kind of questions that those καλοὶ κἀγαθοί
handled in their symposia: philosophical questions. is does not mean that
the QC are a work of pure philosophy (like a treatise), but, as we shall see, the
goal to which they aspire is purely philosophical. e very denomination of each
book section – πρόβλημα – shows that the main challenge that the symposiasts
are willing to take up is to surpass each one of those obstacles by means of
logical reasoning, each one of them demanding an investigation method that
will solve the puzzle and, consequently, nd its cause. As Plutarch says, it is at
the point where the explanation of a cause fails that one begins to be puzzled,
or, in other words, to philosophize (680C9-D2: ὅπου γὰρ ὁ τῆς αἰτίας ἐπιλείπει
λόγος, ἐκεῖθεν ἄρχεται τὸ ἀπορεῖν, τουτέστι τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν). Consequently, the
purpose of the conversations held in the QC, whether or not their subject matter
16 Apud G. M, 1991, pp. 295-6, 313.
17 Apud F. B, 1999, p. 27.
is philosophy (physics, as we have seen), is to determine the causes (αἰτίαι) of
a certain problem by means of an investigation (ζήτησις )18 – in truth, there are,
throughout the QC, dozens of occurrences of the words ζήτησις 19 and αἰτία 20 ;
many times, the latter is part of a πρόβλημα title (Problêmata 5.3, 6, 9; 6.1, 4, 5,
6, 8, 10; 9.2, 7, 9); besides that, most of these titles begin with similar expressions
like διὰ τί or εἰ, presenting a condition that needs conrmation). is clearly
shows the omnipresence of this spirit of philosophical search.
Of course, this does not mean that a unanimous conclusion must result from
every discussion; on the contrary, the purpose is to have conversations, about
philosophical questions or otherwise, that allow the symposiasts to exercise the
faculty of thinking in a group setting, of discussing dialectically. When, at a certain
point, the participants take into consideration the veracity of certain questions,
more precisely, whether they ought to discuss what may not be true (628B),
Marcus, the grammarian, relates the story of Democritus, who, even when he
realized that, after all, the cucumber that he was eating was sweet because his
maid had left it inside a honey pot, even so he decided to investigate the cause
of that sweetness as if it was related to the place where it had grown, as he had
thought in the rst place (628C-D). Like Democritus, they should assume that
the conclusion itself must not determine their investigation, for the discussion,
if nothing more useful, will allow them to practise (628D4-5: ἐγγυμνάσασθαι
γάρ, εἰ μηδὲν ἄλλο χρήσιμον, ὁ λόγος παρέξει). In its general insight, the QC
display a scientic spirit very similar to the one that pervaded Plato's Academy21 ;
on this particular issue, that relation is quite obvious. According to a fragment
of Epicrates (fr. 11 Edmonds), Plato gathered his new students in the gymnasia
of the Academy to observe and dene every element of the natural world; but,
when they tried to dene a pumpkin, many problems arose, since this object
belonged to more than one category. In spite of that, Plato told them to try
again, because the purpose was to practice the method of dening an object,
more than to establish a denition itself.
3. Conclusions
Concluding this brief investigation, we now may ask: in what way is
philosophy omnipresent in the QC? I think the answer depends on three
dierent factors.
First, the structure of this work is framed according to the three branches of
18 Apud L. V S, 2000, p. 96.
19 612E13; 614D6, E1; 619B2; 628B10, D1; 636A7; 646A8; 651A2; 664D6; 667E1; 673C9;
675E10; 683C2; 700C3, E4, F5; 701A4; 713F2; 714D5; 725A3; 726C9; 747B6.
20 617E9; 618D4; 619B9; 624A8; 625A7, F5; 626F3; 627A4; 628B9, C6, D1; 635B4,
D4, F3; 639D8; 640C3; 641C7, 10, D10; 642A5; 649D4, E5; 650A5, 10; 656C5, D4; 657F4;
658C12; 664C7, D7, 12; 665D3, E1, 8; 666A5, D9, E4; 670A6, B5; 673C9; 676A11; 677C3;
678F1; 679C7; 680C5, 9, F2-3; 682F3; 689C8, E10; 690F5; 691C8; 693B9; 694B11; 696E8, F4;
699E4; 700C9, D4, 11; 701A3, E6; 702B10; 704E12; 722D2; 725A3, B5; 728E7; 729A10, E5;
730B7; 731A2, D2, 6; 732A2; 733D3; 734E4; 737E4; 740B2, D8; 741B10; 744C4; 745D3.
21 Apud L. V S, 2000, pp. 97-8.
423
e omnipresence of philosophy in Plutarch's Quaestiones Convivales
ancient philosophy22. Physics constitutes a major percentage of the conversation
subjects treated in the Problêmata . Analyzing it from a global perspective, the
aprioristic system that Plutarch proposes tries to display the main aspects of the
human being and its relation with the sensible world while, at the same time,
denying common-sense opinions about these questions. After all, this is the
major concern of a work about natural philosophy. Ethics allows the participants
to talk about many questions (philosophical or otherwise) according to a model
of a regulated relationship, which, on the one hand, enables every symposiast to
participate in the discussion and, on the other hand , generates and augments the
main ethical criteria of the symposium. As for logic, it provides the instruments
to discuss the various matters proposed throughout the Problêmata , allowing
the investigations to be ruled by a dialectical metastructure that puts the
argumentative level of the conversation very near to that one of the Academy.
Consequently, those who are learning may interact with those who know
philosophy and thereby learn the means of achieving the truth more than the
truth itself – for instance, Plutarch's brother Lamprias deduced Hieronymus'
theory of vision, even though he did not know his book (626A).
Second, this omnipresence gains even more consistency through the
unitary correlation that the three branches achieve together; for they are
strictly connected and depend upon one another. It would not be possible
to discuss questions of natural philosophy without the means provided by
argumentative logic; nor would it be possible to talk about any philosophical
question whatsoever if the ethical code had not been established. Instead of
separating three branches of philosophy, the structure of the QC is thus framed
according to their interconnection and interdependence.
ird, if we ought to consider the symposia that Plutarch describes as a
sample of human interaction, as I think we should, the denition of philosophy
as a τέχνη περὶ βίον acquires a deeper sense. In other words, if life, considered
as human performance, is, or must be, regulated, guided and understood
through philosophy, the symposium, being a sample of life, will consequently
display the same relation with philosophy.
W o r k s c i T e d
B, F., "Plutarco fra Platonismo e Aristotelismo: la Filosoa como
παιδεία dell'Anima", in A. P J . (eds.), Plutarco, Platón
y Aristóteles. Actas del V Congreso Internacional de la I.P.S. (Madrid-
Cuenca, 4-7 de Mayo, 1999), Madrid, 1999, pp. 25-43.
B, E. L., "Greek Table-Talk before Plato", Rhetorica, XI.4 (Autumn 1993)
355-71.
K, F., "Portraits of the Philosopher: Plutarch's Self-Presentation in the
22 is tripartion is also adopted in the QC (744D9-10: ἐν δὲ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ τὸ λογικὸν καὶ
τὸ ἠθικὸν καὶ τὸ φυσικόν).
424
Rodolfo Lopes
Quaestiones Convivales", CQ , 57.2 (2007) 650-67.
M G, F., Plutarco. Obras Morales y de Costumbres (Moralia) IV
(Charlas de Sobremesa ), Madrid, 1987.
M, G., "Strutture Retoriche e Colloquiali nelle Quaestiones Convivales",
in G. D'I I. G (eds.), Strutture Formali dei Moralia di
Plutarco. Atti del III Convegno Plutarcheo (Palermo, 3-5 Maggio,
1989), Napoli, 1991, pp. 295-313.
M, O., "Sympotic History", in O. M (ed.), Sympotica: a Symposium
on Symposion, Oxford, 1990, pp. 3-13.
R, L., Philosophes entre Mots et Mets. Plutarque, Lucien et Athénée autour
de la Table de Platon, Grenoble, 2002.
R, W., "Mnemosyne in the Symposion", in O. M (ed.), Sympotica: a
Symposium on Symposion, Oxford, 1990, pp. 230-7.
S, G., "Les Questions de Table et la Philosophie Religieuse de Plutarque",
REG, 62 (1949) 320-27.
T, S.-T., A Commentary on Plutarch's Table-Talks, I, Göteborg,
1989.
V S, L., "Aspects of the Ethics and Poetics of the Dialogue in
the Corpus Plutarcheum", in I. G C. M (eds.), I Generi
Letterari in Plutarco. Atti del VIII Convegno Plutarcheo (Pisa, 2-4
Giugno, 1999), Napoli, 2000, pp. 93-116.
V, M., "Plutarco e il 'Genere Simposio'", in I. G C. M
(eds.), I Generi Letterari in Plutarco. Atti del VIII Convegno Plutarcheo
(Pisa, 2-4 Giugno, 1999), Napoli, 2000, pp. 217-29.
425
Evocative contexts of women in Plutarch's Quaestiones Convivales
"A " E
P' Qu a e S T i o n e S co n v i v a l e S 1
Á R C. R
University of Coimbra
Abstract
Goddesses, women poets, matronae, lascivious autists or concubines, those are Plutarch's
women. e references to women in Plutarch's Quaestiones Conuiuales are spread all over the
work and occur in a variety of contexts: mythical justication, intimate hygiene, support of
men, the role of mother or simply that of woman. us, in this vast gallery presented by the
scholar from Chaeronea, the trivial humane gures will be highlighted with the aim to unveil
the importance of women and their place in the social sphere. erefore, the image of the female
projected in the Quaestiones will be crossed with the dominant view in Graeco-Roman society.
e space that Plutarch devotes to women and to all things related to them
– education, social behaviour, the functioning of their body – in the whole of his
work is unusual2 . Moreover, it is remarkable how the scholar from Chaeronea
stands up in their defence, not only as human beings, but also as women, not
reducing them to weak and useless beings, but exalting them as a natural and
cultural force, like noble people that should be dignied from a social and
individual point of view, as long as they remain in an inferior sphere.
In fact, the sheer number of works in the Moralia dedicated to the situation
of women shows Plutarch's interest in this subject, a real testimony to the
history of the female condition: in the Consolatio ad uxorem, the author tries
to attenuate his wife's pain for the loss of her daughter; the works Mulierum
Virtutes and De Iside et Osiride are dedicated to Clea, a Delphic priestess and
cultured women with whom Plutarch discusses religious and philosophical
issues3 ; we also have a lot to learn from the Lacaenarum apophthegmata, as from
Amatorius and Coniugalia Praecepta, where Plutarch accords to marriage an
erotic and sacred dimension4 .
1 I am grateful to Professor J. Ribeiro Ferreira for commenting on an earlier version of this
paper, and to Professor Manuel Tröster, who helped to improve the English text.
2 For an exhaustive study on Plutarch's attitude to women and marriage see A. G. N,
1997. See also F. L C, 1981 for an analysis of the descriptions of women in the Vitae.
3 Cf . F. F, 2006/2007, p. 51. is is how Plutarch opens the work Bravery of Women
(242E-F): "Regarding the virtues of women, Clea, I do not hold the same opinion as ucydides.
For he declares that the best woman is she about whom there is the least talk among persons
outside regarding either censure or commendation, (…). But to my mind Gorgias appears to
display better taste in advising that not the form but the fame of a woman should be known to
many." In the treatise Coniugalia Praecepta, Plutarch mentions the female education issue and
its potential impact on the future of young girls, a precept that is most relevant to the present
(see Moralia 145C sqq). As F. F, 2006/2007, p. 56 concluded: "Si à l'époque classique, il
nous donne peu d'anecdotes montrant des lles (…), cela n'est plus le cas lors de la période
de la domination romaine sur le monde méditerranéen où l'auteur décrit des scènes de la vie
quotidienne représentant des llettes, soit que cela lui tienne particulièrement à cœur, soit qu'un
changement ait eectivement eu lieu dans la société."
4 Cf. Moralia 139C-D, 142D-E, 754D, 767D-E, 769F-770A.
426
Ália Rosa C. Rodrigues
However, even if the recreated banquets in Quaestiones Conuiuales did not
accept the presence of women, it is a recurrent subject in several contexts, as
we will see. is is what we will try to do in this paper: analyse specically
the treatment of women in Quaestiones Conuiuales in their various evocative
contexts.
A. Nikolaidis (1997, p. 97), following in the footsteps of Vernière5 , views
Plutarch as the precursor of "feminism", as a believer in women's innate
abilities, both defending and praising the benets of female education, the
most precious of her jewels. Plutarch himself was an example of this conviction,
since he admitted women to his own school in Chaeronea6 :
For a woman studying geometry will be ashamed to be a dancer, and she will
not swallow any beliefs in magic charms while she is under the charm of Plato's
or Xenophon's words. And if anybody professes power to pull down the moon
from the sky, she will laugh at the ignorance and stupidity of women who
believe these things (…) (145c-sqq)7
In the Banquet of Seven Sages, Plutarch allows the presence of Cleobulina,
a twelve-year-old girl, and Melissa, Periandro's wife. ey were indeed present
during the meal (148CD, 150D, 154B) but left when the men started drinking
more (155 E), and therefore they did not take part in the discussion8 . However,
this would not happen again in the dialogue, at least under the same conditions,
5 See Y. V, "Plutarque et les femmes", Anc. W. 25 (1994), p. 165 apud A. G.
N, 1997, p. 88, a feminist point of view also shared by R. F, a theoretician
of feminism in antiquity. See idem, L'Amour en Grèce, Paris, 1971, passim; Le Féminisme dans
l'ancienne Athènes, Paris, 1971, passim. e exhaustive study of F. L C, 1981, as well as the
studies by P. S P and G. S, 1991 (apud K. B, 1997, p. 73) and K .
B, 1997 contested this feminist interpretation, thinking that Plutarch conserves the
ideal of female inferiority: "Accepting her supposedly natural inferiority, a woman was herself
accepted as morally equal and allowed to give proof of virtue and magnanimity" (idem, p. 90).
6 Cf. Moralia 138C. Nevertheless, Plutarch's attention to the woman's philosophic education
is not new. is subject had been already proposed by Plato in his Republic (451-457) and refused
by Aristotle in Politics (1264b). In the Hellenistic period, some philosophical schools granted
access to women, like Epicureanism, Cynism and Neo-Pythagorism. e Roman Musonius
Rufus, following in the footsteps of Stoic tradition, accepts the natural equality between man
and woman and holds that anyone should have dierent privileges (frgs. 3 e 4 Hense). However,
in spite of defending equal access to education, he never admits the same in politics (frg. 4). See
F. de O, 1992, p. 97, 100. As I. R M, 2005 says: "En denitiva, todas
estas mujeres, con Hipatia a la cabeza, supieron ganarse un lugar destacado en el pensamiento
griego, donde aportaron su grano de arena, aunque, en ocasiones, sólo conozcamos sus nombres
y apenas nada de sus doctrinas, salvo por algunas breves referencias de sus discípulos." (p. 122).
e Cynic movement (about IV BC-V AD) had a famous member, Hipparchia (. 336-333
BC), a woman scholar from race that was a pupil of Crates of ebes, besides being her
husband and having followed him everywhere.
7 All translations are those of the Loeb Classical Library.
8 With regard to this complex gure, D. F. L, 2002 concluded: "Por último, Cleobulina
contribui, também, para transformar o espaço do banquete numa cosmópolis dos vários tipos de
sapiência: ela representaria, assim, uma sabedoria mais simples, permeada de intuição política e
de humanidade, conforme se depreende as palavras que Tales profere a respeito dela." (p. 91).
427
Evocative contexts of women in Plutarch's Quaestiones Convivales
since the women that took part in the banquet were only ute-players or hetairai,
branded women in a moral sense9 . Nevertheless, this episode shows, as F. Facq
(2006/2007, p. 44) notes, that young Greek girls were not resigned to gynoecium
but had contact with the male sphere: "chez Plutarque, les lles sont importantes
aux yeux de leur père mais elles revêtent aussi un caractère particulier pour les
étrangers qui connaissent cet attachement: elles ont même un rôle" (p. 46)10 .
e access of women to this kind of male private events was dierent
in Greek and Roman culture11 , as well as the meaning of the banquet itself,
named comissatio in Rome12 . e cultural dierence becomes more manifest in
the Imperial period, when it became common to see Roman women reclined
with men13 . E. Fantham and M. Roller14 mention this kind of behaviour,
characteristic of the new conscience of gender roles, motivated by equally
new social and moral dynamics15 . On the other hand, the Greek banquet did
not accept the access of women to this space, a cultural aspect witnessed by
Cornelius Nepos16 :
Many actions are seemly according to our code which the Greeks look upon as
shameful. For instance, what Roman would blush to take his wife to a dinner-
9 Cf. F. L C, 1981, pp. 149-65.
10 Cf. Moralia (198A) and F. L C, 1981, pp. 85-95.
11 On the legal, social and family condition of Athenian women see: F. L C, 1981,
pp. 11-5; A. C & A. K, 1993; D. C, 1989; R. O R, 1986?; S.
P, 1975; J. P. G, 1980. With regard to the situation of Roman women, see F. L
C, 1981, pp. 21-5; K. M. D. D, 2003, pp. 22-3.
12 See R. C T, 2005; A. D C, 1986?; M. R, 2003; O. M ,
1990. As a matter of fact – as noted by K. M. D. D, 2003, p. 20 – the comissatio did not
have the same relevance for the Romans that the Greek symposion had for Plutarch's people.
13 As M. R, 2003, p. 400 noted: "Representations of women's conviviality become more
plentiful in Augustan and imperial texts. ese representations conrm that a woman's dining
posture – at least in elite male company- expresses her sexuality, but they show considerable
ambivalence about the consequences of such expression". See also in the same study, 2003, p. 402
(n. 58) and p. 403, who mentions some situations that reveal the licentiousness that characterize
the conuiuia. Cf. Plu., Mor. 759F-60, Suet., Aug. 69.1 and Cal. 25.1, 36.2, Sen., Const. 18.2.
14 See E. F ., 1995, pp. 280-93 and M. R, 2003, p. 400.
15 Note that the parties organized exclusively for women would be characterized by the very
same kind of activities that men had in banquets, like the festival of Demeter, for example. See
J. B , 1998 whose study oers a new look at female sociability, which was not restricted
to the gynoecium but rather created a large number of contexts in which women could interact
with men: "e evidence makes it clear that women were active in commensal activities, both
inside classical Athens and certainly outside. is survey of the variety of Greek women's
drinking and dining activities emphasizes the need to include women more centrally in histories
of commensality and sociality in the ancient Greek world." (p. 161).
16 See Vitae, Praef. 6-7: Contra ea pleraque nostris moribus sunt decora, quae apud illos
turpia putantur. Quem enim Romanorum pudet uxorem ducere in conuiuium? Aut cuius
non mater familias primum locum tenet aedium atque in celebritate uersatur? Quod multo
t aliter in Graecia. Nam neque in conuiuium adhibetur nisi propinquorum, neque sedet nisi
in interiore parte aedium, quae gynaeconitis appellatur; quo nemo accedit nisi propinqua
cognatione coniunctus. On the literary and iconographic representation of Roman woman in
the rst century see the chapter of E. F's study, 1995, pp. 280-93: "e "New Woman":
representation and reality."
428
Ália Rosa C. Rodrigues
party? ... But it is very dierent in Greece; for there a woman is not admitted
to a dinner-party, unless relatives only are present and she keeps to the more
retired part of the house called "the women's apartment" to which no man has
access (…)
Cicero too (In Verrem 2.1.26.66) quotes an episode which took place in
an ut Graeco more biberetur ("drunk in the Greek way") banquet, when Rubrius
asked Philodamus, a Greek himself, to invite his daughter to the banquet17 :
"Tell me, Philodamus, why not send for your daughter to come in and see
us?" e respectable and elderly father received the rascal's suggestion with
astonished silence. As Rubrius persisted, he replied, in order to say something,
that it was not the Greek custom for women to be present at a men's dinner-
party.
As a matter of fact, it is Plutarch who ascribes to Cato the Elder (8. 4)
the saying that "all other men rule their wives; we rule all other men, and our
wives rule us" (em. 18.7). Roman women enjoyed a superior social condition
when compared to the Greek world18 , where the life of women was associated
with the gynoecium and the preservation of their own oikos, being therefore far
from male activity. As a Greek, Plutarch does not allow women to join these
banquets, a position well expressed in Book I (Quaest. Conv. 613A), when the
guests discuss whether it is convenient to have philosophical discussions at the
table once the wine makes serious argumentation impossible:
<ἐγὼ> δ' εἶπον 'ἀλλὰ γὰρ εἰσίν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, καὶ πάνυ γε σεμνῶς κατειρωνευόμενοι
λέγουσι μὴ δεῖν ὥσπερ οἰκοδέσποιναν ἐν οἴνῳ φθέγγεσθαι φιλοσοφίαν,
καὶ τοὺς Πέρσας ὀρθῶς φασι μὴ ταῖς γαμεταῖς ἀλλὰ ταῖς παλλακίσι
συμμεθύσκεσθαι καὶ συνορχεῖσθαι· ταὐτὸ δὴ καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀξιοῦσι ποιεῖν εἰς τὰ
συμπόσια τὴν μουσικὴν καὶ τὴν ὑποκριτικὴν ἐπεισάγοντας φιλοσοφίαν δὲ μὴ
κινοῦντας (…)19
And I replied, "Certainly there are, my friend, and the pretext they very
solemnly employ is that philosophy should no more have a part in conversation
over wine than should the matron of the house. ey commend the Persians for
17 Note that iconography does not always conrm this vision. ere are, in fact, Greek
monuments with representations of respectable women participating in mixed banquets.
However, as K. M. D. D, 2003, p. 22 noted, this kind of representation corresponds to
an older iconography where the gures are identied as heroes or gods. ere are also funerary
representations where the woman appears sitting in the chair or at the end of the bed where the
man, the husband, is reclined. is kind of iconography has a more conservative character due
to its funerary specicity. See also M. R, 2003.
18 In regard to women's place in Rome, see A. Del C, 1986?. As R. C T,
2005, observes: "Podríamos decir grácamente que, en términos generales, los espacios de poder
que las mujeres ocupan en Roma son una prolongación del ámbito familiar y privado (…)" (p.
125). Cf. n. 10. See also K. B, 1997.
19 For the Greek text of the Table-Talks, we use C. H, Plutarchus. Moralia, IV, Leipzig,
1971.
429
Evocative contexts of women in Plutarch's Quaestiones Convivales
doing their drinking and dancing with their mistresses rather than with their
wives; this they think we ought to imitate by introducing music and theatricals
into our drinking-parties, and not disturb philosophy.
e οἰκοδέσποιναν mentioned in the text should be some kind of
housekeeper, maybe a slave for taking care of the house and the children; that
is why the host's wife was not supposed to take a seat in the symposium, always
eating with the youngest ones20 . It is still interesting that Plutarch ascribes to
the barbarians what we all know to be also a Greek custom: the participation
of concubines and hetairai – both slaves and even young foreign girls –, along
with music and pantomime21 .
e very same issue is discussed in Book VII of Quaestiones Conuiuales
(710B) by a sophist, who dismissed the ute-player girls that animated the
banquet, judging that their presence compromised the κοινωνία τῶν λόγων
by absorbing all men's attention:
Περὶ ἀκροαμάτων ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ λόγοι παρὰ πότον ἐγένοντο Διογενιανοῦ
τοῦ Περγαμηνοῦ παρόντος, καὶ πράγματ' εἴχομεν ἀμυνόμενοι βαθυπώγωνα
<σοφιστὴν> ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς, ὃς ἐπήγαγεν τὸν Πλάτωνα22 κατηγοροῦντα τῶν
αὐλητρίσι χρωμένων παρ' οἶνον, ἀλλήλοις δὲ συγγίνεσθαι διὰ λόγου μὴ
δυναμένων.
When I gave a dinner party, in Chaeronea, for Diogenianus of Pergamum,
there was some discussion of types of entertainment, and we had considerable
diculty in beating o the attack of a long-bearded sophist of the Stoic
persuasion, who brought up Plato's indictment of people who listen to ute-
girls over their wine because they are unable to entertain themselves by
conversation.
e "woman dressing up for the banquet" had some moral characteristics
and a sui generis style: "gold brooches", "nely wrought earrings" and "Aphrodite's
magic band", a symbol of seduction. All these separated her from the married
woman, who was forced to follow a distinct model (Quaest. Conv. 693C):
μέχρι τούτων ἐπιμέλεια [καὶ] καθαριότητός ἐστιν· ὅταν δὲ τὰς χρυσᾶς
περόνας ἀναλαμβάνῃ καὶ τὰ διηκριβωμένα τέχνῃ ἐλλόβια καὶ τελευτῶσα
τῆς περὶ τὸν κεστὸν ἅπτηται γοητείας, περιεργία τὸ χρῆμα καὶ λαμυρία μὴ
πρέπουσα γαμετῇ γέγονεν. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸν οἶνον οἱ μὲν ἀλόαις χρωτίζοντες ἢ
κινναμώμοις καὶ κρόκοις ἐφηδύνοντες ὥσπερ γυναῖκα καλλωπίζουσιν εἰς τὰ
συμπόσια καὶ προαγωγεύουσιν·
So far she is showing concern for cleanliness, but when she picks up those
gold brooches and nely wrought earrings, and, lastly turns to the witchery of
20 See F. M G, 1987, p.49 n.11.
21 Plutarch refers to the same custom with regard to the Persian kings in Coniugalia Praecepta
140 b. See more about "music and theatricals" in Quaestiones Convivales 711E-F, 747C.
22 See Prot. 347 c and Mor. 176e.
430
Ália Rosa C. Rodrigues
Aphrodite's magic band23, it is plainly a case of overdoing things and a wanton
conduct unbecoming to a wife. Even so, those who color wine with aloes or
sweeten it with cinnamon or saron are adorning it like a woman's face in
preparation for a gay party, and are acting as a kind of pander;
Excessive luxury and female style of dress were, as we all know, a very
polemical issue, being actually legally prohibited in Syracuse24 . It may be
interesting to note that Lucian of Samosata (125-180 AD), in his work De
domo (7-15) also presents an ideal female decency very similar to the one
outlined by Ariston, Plutarch's guest:
but only in such degree as would suce a modest and beautiful woman to
set o her beauty – a delicate chain round her neck, a light ring on her nger,
pendants in her ears, a buckle, a band that connes the luxuriance of her hair
and adds as much to her good looks as purple border adds to a gown.
Being a social educator and caring for the preservation of traditional
values, Plutarch stands for a noble image of the woman and for family values.
In Book I of Quaestiones Conuiuales (619D), when discussing "Why the place at
banquets called the consul's acquired honor", he draws the model of a consul's
political presentation; he is not valuable only by himself, but also on account
of those who are related to him, both paying him social respect and giving him
the guarantee of his own status, at least during the banquet.
τῶν <δὲ> συνέγγιστα τόπων ὁ μὲν [γὰρ] ὑπ' αὐτὸν ἢ γυναικὸς ἢ παίδων ἐστίν,
ὁ δ' ὑπὲρ αὐτὸν εἰκότως τῷ μάλιστα τιμωμένῳ τῶν κεκλημένων ἀπεδόθη, ἵν'
ἐγγὺς ᾖ τοῦ ἑστιῶντος.
And of the places nearest him the one which is below him belongs either to his
wife or his children, while the one above him was given properly enough to the
guest of honor in order that he might be near his host.
On the other hand, if a governor's political dignity requires the presence of
his family, as a symbol of individual and social stability, the same is demanded
of women, who are not supposed to take a seat in public meals without their
husbands, where both men and women are present:
ἔτι πολλὰ τῶν γαμικῶν ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα δρᾶ ται διὰ γυναικῶν· ὅπου δὲ γυναῖκες
πάρεισι, καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιπαραλαμβάνεσθαι.
Besides, many or most of the activities relating to a wedding are in the hands of
women, and where women are present it is necessary that their husbands also
should be included. (667B)25
23 It corresponds to the magic band that Aphrodite oered to Hera (Il. 14. 214).
24 Phylarchus apud Athen. 512 B. Plutarch also emphasizes this censure in Moralia 142B.
25 e scholar from Chaeronea gives the same advice to Eurydice in Coniugalia Praecepta
139D: τὴν δὲ σώφρονα γυναῖκα δεῖ τοὐναντίον ὁρᾶσθαι μάλιστα μετὰ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς οὖσαν,
431
Evocative contexts of women in Plutarch's Quaestiones Convivales
Nevertheless, Plutarch goes even further. Indeed, besides establishing
a family stereotype for appearances in public26 , he also interferes with the
private sphere. Here is an example: if a man comes more sexually inspired
from a banquet, "bringing a garland and his own body perfumed" (654E),
he is supposed to lie down with his own wife and not with any concubine27 .
However, he must do it during the night, because it would be very
uncomfortable to take his wife out of the gynoecium just to full his wants
ἀλεκτρυόνος ("like a cock"). at is to say that the male spaces are dierent
from the female ones, but respect must be reciprocal28 . e scholar from
Chaeronea treats this theme at greater length in the Coniugalia Praecepta ,
a wedding present to his married friends Eurydice and Pollianus, a treatise
that M. Foucault (1984, p.192) considered a key text of a new morality of
marriage29 . is attitude may have emerged around the rst century AD and
manifests a change of the view of marriage due to the new status of women,
as we will see further on:
Τῶν σωμάτων οἱ φιλόσοφοι τὰ μὲν ἐκ διεστώτων λέγουσιν εἶναι καθάπερ
στόλον καὶ στρατόπεδον, τὰ δ' ἐκ συναπτομένων ὡς οἰκίαν καὶ ναῦν, τὰ
δ'ἡνωμένα καὶ συμφυῆ καθάπερ ἐστὶ τῶν ζῴων ἕκαστον. σχεδὸν οὖν καὶ
γάμος ὁ μὲν τῶν ἐρώντων ἡνωμένος καὶ συμφυής ἐστιν (...) (Mor. 142F)
οἰκουρεῖν δὲ καὶ κρύπτεσθαι μὴ παρόντος, "a virtuous woman ought to be most visible in her
husband's company, and to stay in the house and hide herself when he is away".
26 Note the well-known image used by the Stoic Antipater of Tarsus (frg. 3.63.11.16 von
Arnim), as expressed in Amatorius 769F: "e same is true for lovers; (…) for this truly is what is
called 'integral amalgamation' [ὅλων κρᾶσις] that of a married couple who love each other". K.
B, 1997, pp. 73-4 commented this passage, noting that the complete union suggested
by this metaphor is illusory, since the mixture between wine and water is always called "wine",
showing that a hierarchy within the marriage still persists. Cf. Mor. 142F. See "Plutarch on
marriage: the element of communality" and "Plutarch on marriage: reciprocity, the secret for a
happy wedlock" in A. G. N, 1997, pp. 51-7, 63-76, as well as F. L C, 1981, pp.
25-38.
27 We can nd the very same advice in Plato's Leges (VIII, 839a-b): "at was precisely the
reason why I stated that in reference to his law I know of a device for making a natural use of
reproductive intercourse and, on the other hand, by abstaining from every female eld in which
you would not desire the seed to spring up. (…) For, in the rst place, it follows the dictates of
nature, and it serves to keep men from sexual rage and frenzy and all kinds of fornication, and
from all excess in meats and drinks, and it ensures in husbands fondness for their own wives".
28 Note that Plutarch (Coniugalia Praecepta 144C-D) advises, however, the woman to accept
that the man can choose to have sexual relations with a slave woman, because that would be
a mark of respect for his wedded wife: "If therefore a man in private life, who is incontinent
and dissolute in regard to his pleasures, commits some peccadillo with a paramour or a maid-
servant, his wedded wife ought not to be indignant or angry, but she should reason that it is
respect for her which leads him to share his debauchery, licentiousness, and wantonness with
another woman." Plutarch also refers to the example of the Persians kings mentioned in note
21 above.
29 For an analysis of Foucault's view of Plutarch's Coniugalia Praecepta, see C. P,
1992.
432
Ália Rosa C. Rodrigues
Philosophers30 say of bodies that some are composed of separate elements, as
a eet or an army, others of elements joined together, as a house or a ship, and
still others form together an intimate union as is the case with every living
creature. In about the same way, the marriage of a couple in love with each
other is an intimate union.
Actually, we also nd this new marital morality in other contemporary
Stoic texts, for example, Antipater's Peri Gamou (Stobaeus, IV), some
passages of Musonius Rufus (Stobaeus III, 6.23, IV. 22.20) and Hierocles
(Stobaeus IV. 22. 21)31 about this subject. However, as Cynthia Patterson
(1992, p. 4714) noted, although this attitude may sound new, it may also
reect the popular discourse about marriage: "(…) it seems to me that
Plutarch's advice is grounded in and reects traditional, popular and
pragmatic marital concern, and would strike a common chord in readers
both Roman and Greek".
Elaborating on the subject of female ethics in the social and private spheres,
the philosopher discusses the constitution of the woman's body, which is, from
our point of view, actually a reection of the idealistic social construction of
the female and female psychology. In order to conrm this, we may look at the
adjectives used by Plutarch in order to describe the woman's body functions
when comparing both the elders' and the women's bodies: while the former is
"dry", "rough" and "hard", the latter is "moist", "smooth" and "soft", qualities
that go far beyond the physiological assumption and somehow reect a gender
construction, a female stereotype32 (Quaest. Conv. 650 A-B):
ἔφη τοίνυν ὁ <Σύλλας> θατέρῳ θάτερον ἐμφαίνεσθαι· κἂν εἰ περὶ τῶν
γυναικῶν ὀρθῶς τὴν αἰτίαν λάβοιμεν, οὐκ ἔτι πολλοῦ λόγου δεήσεσθαι
περὶ τῶν γερόντων· ἐναντίας γὰρ εἶναι μάλιστα τὰς φύσεις τῇ θ' ὑγρότητι
καὶ ξηρότητι <καὶ λειότητι> καὶ τραχύτητι καὶ μαλακότητι καὶ σκληρότητι.
'καὶ τοῦτ'' ἔφη 'λαμβάνω κατὰ τῶν γυναικῶν πρῶτον, ὅτι τὴν κρᾶσιν ὑγρὰν
ἔχουσιν, ἣ καὶ τὴν ἁπαλότητα τῆς σαρκὸς ἐμμεμιγμένη παρέχει καὶ τὸ στίλβον
ἐπὶ λειότητι καὶ τὰς καθάρσεις·
Sulla replied that one part of the problem threw light upon the other. If we
should rightly determine the cause where women are concerned, there would
be no further need of much speculation where old men are concerned, for their
natures are very emphatically opposites: moist and dry, smooth and rough, soft
30 Plutarch is referring to Stoic philosophers, see De Defectu Oraculorum 426a.
31 See M. F , 1982, p.174 and his analysis of Stoic texts about marriage in the same
study, pp. 177-216. e same author also refers to Seneca, Epictectus and some Pythagoric
texts.
32 Actually, this comparison is also found in Aristotle (fr. 107 Rose), according to Athen. 429
C and Geop. VII 34.2. Moreover, we nd the same characterisation at Ps-Arist. Probl. 880a 13.
ere are two main sources in Greek Literature that make explicit reference to female anatomy
or physiology: the Hippocratic Corpus and Aristotle's History of Animals , Parts of Animals and
Generation of Animals. See L. D-J, 1991, pp. 111-37. On this subject see also S.-T.
T, 1989, p. 327.
433
Evocative contexts of women in Plutarch's Quaestiones Convivales
and hard. "e rst thing about women", he continued, "I take to be this, that
they possess a moist temperament which, being a component of the female, is
responsible for her delicate, sleek, smooth esh, and for her menses.
Plutarch discusses another subject related to female physiology again in
Book III (650 F): "Whether women are colder in temperament than men or
hotter". Only earth is "moist" (ὑγρότητι) as women, both being promises of
live and the support of mankind, as is said by Plato about all rational or animal
female beings (Quaest. Conv. 638 A):
οὐ γὰρ γῆ' φησὶν ὁ Πλάτων 'γυναῖκα, γῆν δὲ γυνὴ μιμεῖται' καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
θηλέων ἕκαστον.
'For earth does not imitate woman,' says Plato (Mx. 238 A), 'but woman earth,'
as indeed does each of the other females.
Indeed, as Plato insists, "earth does not imitate woman, but woman earth",
meaning that both are able to reproduce. A linguistic sign of this theory is the
adjective θῆλυς; for it may be translated as either "female" or "fertile", being
anyway usually more related to the female gender (Il. 8.7; 19.97; Hdt. 3.109,
X. Mem. 2.1.4). Let us attend to the following quotation from Book II (640
E-F):
μὴ κρατεῖσθαι μηδὲ μεταβάλλειν. ἔτι δ' εἶπεν 'οὐκ ἄδηλον ὅτι δεῖ πρὸς τὸ
ἐμφυτευόμενον χώρας λόγον ἔχειν τὸ δεξόμενον· τὴν δὲ χώραν δεῖ θήλειαν
ἔχειν καὶ γόνιμον· ὅθεν τὰ πολυκαρπότατα τῶν φυτῶν ... ἐκλεγόμενοι
παραπηγνύουσιν, ὥσπερ γυναιξὶν <πολυ>γαλακτούσαις ἕτερα <βρέφη>
προσβάλλοντες.
"Further", he continued, "it is quite clear that the stock to be grafted fulls the
function of soil for the scion; soil and stock must be fertile and productive33 ,
and so they select the most fruitful of plants and insert the scions in them,
much like putting infants out to nurse with women who have abundant
milk.
eir similar qualities are proved in the text, for πολυκαρπότατα ("the
most fruitful of plants") are compared to γυναιξὶν < πολυ>γαλακτούσαις
("women who have abundant milk"). Again we may conrm the Platonic
theory of women as an imitation of earth.
As A. G. Nikolaidis (1997, p. 28) suggests, this Plutarchan "feminism"
must have been strongly inspired by the Roman matrona's status, far
superior to that of the Greek woman34 ; and the same should have
33 Lac. 4-7 T: ἐμβολάσιν Hubert, "for grafts", or the like προσεκλεγόμενα Bernardakis.
34 K. B, 1997, p. 90 draws the same conclusion: "In this area, as so often, Plutarch
adopts a Roman ideal; his heroines are essentially Roman matrons, strong and virtuous, even
434
Ália Rosa C. Rodrigues
happened in the social and family spheres, where women "enjoyed a
dignity and independence at least equal if not superior to those claimed by
contemporary feminists"35 .
e truth is that the analysis of the woman's evocations in Quaestiones
Conuiuales comes to justify Plutarch's avantgarde thoughts in relation to the
female place in the family, an institution to be preserved in society. As a matter
of fact, as noted by J. Burton (1998, p. 149), a new horizon of opportunities
for women had begun to develop as early as the Hellenistic period, given the
questioning of the ideal of the citizen-soldier after the gradual disintegration of
the polis, which had mostly determined the erased image of the Greek woman.
e marriage contracts change – protecting also the woman –, the chance of
having property and being elected to political oce, along with increasing
economic power, all together came to build a new gender conscience, as S.
Blundell points out36 :
But in general it can be said that there was an erosion of the asymmetry
between the sexes during the Hellenistic Age, and a consequent improvement
in the status of women. In the political arena, the most spectacular advance was
made by the women of the Hellenistic royal families. (1999, p. 199)
In relation to literary tradition, Plutarch is therefore actually an
innovator, not accepting an old misogynic tradition supported by Hesiod
(Th. 590-612), Homer (Od. 11. 426-34), Semonides or Euripides, excluding
only Socrates, Plato, the Cynic philosophers37 and the Stoics – including the
Roman Musonius Rufus – who admitted the equality of both genders38 . As
for Plutarch, he builds the image of a woman full of ethical and intellectual
when dressed in the traditional Greek peplos ."
35 Vide J. C, 1956, p. 98.
36 e same scholar also refers to a papyrus from Egypt that reveals that, during this period,
women could buy and sell, such as happened in Greek cities, where inscriptions refer to women
as having property and owning slaves. In Sparta, moreover, there are many cases of women that
accumulate great riches. See , 1999, p. 199. On the female condition in the Hellenistic period
see the chapter "e Hellenistic Period: women in a cosmopolitan world" in E. F
. (eds.), 1995, pp. 136-81. See also L. F, 1989, p. 31 on women's property in Classical
Athens and, for a most extensive treatment of the subject, D. S, 1979.
37 Cf. n. 5 and L. P, 1975, p. 24. See Diogenes Laërtius (6, 12) on Antisthenes, an early
Cynic, and on his pupil Diogenes (6, 72), as well as the passages on Crates (Plut., Mor. 141 E)
and his wife Hipparchia (D. L., 6, 96). Apud L. P, 1975, pp. 40, 91, 113, 116.
38 See A. G. N, 1997, p. 29; C. P, 1989, p. 4720 has come to a similar
conclusion about the Coniugalia Praecepta: "But what is unusual (within at least the Greek
literary tradition) is his enunciation of the ideals of marriage in an essentially positive form".
Note the famous passage of Politics (1260a 6), where Aristotle compares the woman to a slave on
account of her weak nature, condemned to obey to a male, who is distinguished by intellectual
skills: "for the soul by nature contains a part that rules and a part that is ruled, to which we
assign dierent virtues, that is, the virtue of the rational and that of the irrational. It is clear then
the case is the same also with the other instances of ruler and ruled. Hence there are by nature
various classes of rulers and ruled. For the free rules the slave, the male the female (…)". See
also 54b 13, 59a 39, 60a 9.
435
Evocative contexts of women in Plutarch's Quaestiones Convivales
arete, still not allowed to access the masculine circles of power – as K.
Blomquist, 1997 showed39 – or conviviality, as we can conclude from his
attitude of keeping women away from the symposion and philosophical
discussions.
In fact, he does not completely avoid the former popular tradition of
the image of women in the private and social circle saying, for example,
that "where [women] are present it is necessary that their husbands also
should be included" (Quaest. Conv. 667B). Thus, if in the texts on marital
ethics40 , conjugal intimacy and feminine education Plutarch actually
follows the Stoic and Cynic traditions, admitting the equality of women,
he does not abandon the norm of traditionalist behavior in the public
sphere.
As for the banquets, the presence of women is still not allowed – for these
reunions are made (or described) in the Greek way, because Greek is also his
point of view.
W o r k s c i T e d
B, K., "From Olympias to Aretaphila" in J. M (ed.), Plutarch
and His Intellectual World, London, 1997, pp. 73-97.
B, S., Women in Ancient Greece, London, 1999.
B, J., "Women's commensality in the ancient Greek world", G&R, 45
(1998) 143-65.
C, A. & K, A. (eds.), Images of Women in Antiquity. London,
1993.
C, J., Daily Life in Ancient Rome. London.
C, D., "Seclusion, Separation, and the Status of Women in Classical
Athens", G&R, 36 (1989) 3-15.
C T, R., "Espacios de poder de las mujeres en Roma", in J. M.ª
N I (ed.), Estudios sobre la mujer en la cultura griega y latina ,
León, 2005, pp.193-215.
D-J, L., "e Cultural Construct of the Female Body", in S. P
(ed.), Women's History & Ancient History, Chapel Hill/London, 1991, pp.
111-37.
39 Blomquist analyses some cases of Plutarch's women that were very close to politics, either
by supporting men – Octavia, Aretaphila, Pompeia Plotina – or by manipulating them – Aspasia,
Cleopatra, and Olympias – and concluded: "Women are not wicked or morally depraved unless
they transgress the rules of their sex and strive to achieve privileges reserved for men. Women
are capable of courageous deance of tyrants and external enemies – but after their exploits, they
are to renounce all power."(p. 89)
40 Cf. n. 25.
436
Ália Rosa C. Rodrigues
D C, A., "El sistema legislativo como elemento fundamental para el
desarrollo femenino en el mundo romano", in E. M. G G
(ed.), Actas de las V Jornadas de investigación interdisciplinaria La mujer
en el mundo antiguo, Madrid, 1986?, pp. 183-94
D, K. M. D., e Roman Banquet. Images of Conviviality, Cambridge,
2003.
F, F., "Les lles chez Plutarque", Ploutarchos, n.s. 4 (2006/2007) 41-56.
F, E. ., Women in the Classical World: Image and Text, Oxford,
1995.
F, M., Histoire de la Sexualité. II. L'usage des plaisirs; III. Le souci de soi,
Paris, 1984.
F, L., "Household, Gender and Property in Classical Athens", CQ, 39
(1989) 22-44.
G, J. P., "Law, Custom and Myth: Aspects of the Social Position of
Women in Classical Athens", JHS, 100 (1980) 38-59.
J, S. R. & M, S. (eds.), Women and Slaves in Greco-Roman
Culture. Dierential Equations, London, 2001.
L, A. & M, L., Making Silence Speak. Women's Voices in Greek
Literature and Society. Princeton, 2001.
L C, F., Plutarque et les femmes dans les Vies Parallèles, Paris, 1981.
L, D. F., "Legislação relativa às mulheres na Vita Solonis de Plutarco", in
J. R F (ed.), Actas do Congresso Plutarco Educador da
Europa, Porto, 2002, pp. 81-91.
M G, F. , Obras Morales y de Costumbres. IV Charlas de Sobremesa .
Madrid, 1987.
M, O., Sympotica. A Symposion on the Symposion. Oxford, 1990.
N, A., "Plutarch on Women and Marriage", WS, 110 (1997) 27-88.
O R, R., "Anotaciones sobre la representación de la mujer en
Grecia", in E. M. G G (ed.), Actas de las Jornadas de
Investigación Interdisciplinaria La mujer en el mundo antiguo, Madrid,
1986, pp. 123-205.
O, F. de, "O pensamento de Musónio Rufo", Máthesis 1 (1992) 89-
107.
P, L., Les cyniques grecs. Fragments et témoignages, Ottawa, 1975.
P, C., "Plutarch's Advice on Marriage: Traditional Wisdom through
a Philosophic Lens", ANRW 2.33.6, Berlin/New York, 1992, pp. 4709-
23.
437
Evocative contexts of women in Plutarch's Quaestiones Convivales
P, S., Goddesses, Whores, Wives and Slaves, New York, 1975.
R, M., "Horizontal women: posture and sex in the Roman convivium",
AJPh, 124 (2003) 377-422.
S, D., Economic Rights of Women in Ancient Greece, Edinburgh, 1979.
439
Trues and underbolts (Plu., Quaest. conv. 4.2, 1-2)
T r u f f l e s a n d T h u n d e r b o l T s (p l u ., Qu a e S T . c o n v . 4.2 , 1-2)
A S
University of Perugia
Abstract
In the rst part of a chapter of his Quaestiones convivales (4.2,1-2) Plutarch seeks to explain
the popular belief according to which trues are produced through the agency of thunder by
linking their appearance with the physical phenomena accompanying thunder and lightning.
is can be regarded as an example of the attempt – common in Hellenistic and Roman times
– to save popular beliefs through scientic, philosophical, or allegorical interpretations, as the
Stoics had done in the case of divination.
In the second problem of the fourth book of the Συμποσιακά, or Quaestiones
convivales, Plutarch treats two dierent matters concerning lightning and
thunderbolts, the rst of which is paralleled in several ancient writers1 and will be
the object of the present inquiry – namely, the belief connecting the appearance
and growth of trues with thundering. e title of the problem, as formulated
by Plutarch, shows that he is more concerned with explaining the reason for
the rise of this popular belief than with establishing the real connection, if any,
between trues and thunderbolts: "Why trues seem to be born through the
agency of thunder": διὰ τί τὰ ὕδνα τῇ βροντῇ δοκεῖ γίνεσθαι2.
e location of the banquet during which the question was raised is
particularly apt: the city of Elis, where Agemachos, the host, served his guests
trues of extraordinary size3 . at Elis, in the Peloponnese, was renowned for
its trues is indeed conrmed by eophrastus and Pliny4 .
e appearance of the trues at the banquet is greeted by one of the
diners with an ironical allusion, duly underlined by Plutarch, to the popular
belief connecting trues and thunder: "someone said with a smile: 'these
trues are indeed worthy of the thundering we recently had', thus scorning
those who connect the birth of trues with thundering"5 .
is already poses a problem, because according to both eophrastus and
Pliny6 trues were believed to owe their origin to the autumn thunderstorms,
1 phr., Fr. 400A Fortenbaugh (= Athen. 62A-C); Plin., Nat.19.37 (clearly drawing
on eophrastus); cf. Apollon. Mir. 47, p. 140, 258-259 Giannini. For eophrastus cf. O.
R, 1940, col. 1444. At phr., HP 1.6.5 the correction κεραύνιον was proposed for
the transmitted κράνιον (which, however, must probably be corrected to γεράνιον).
2 e second question is similarly introduced in the title: καὶ διὰ τί τοὺς καθεύδοντας
οἴονται μὴ κεραυνοῦσθαι.
3 Plu., Quaest. conv. 4.2,1, 664B ὕδνα παμμεγέθη δειπνοῦσιν ἡμῖν Ἀγέμαχος παρέθηκεν ἐν
Ἤλιδι.
4 Cf. Plin., Nat. 19.37 Asiae nobilissima circa Lampsacum et Alopeconnesum, Graeciae vero circa
Elim, derived from phr. Fr. 400A (= Athen. 62C).
5 Plu., Quaest. conv. 4.2,1, 664B ἔφη τις ὑπομειδιάσας 'ἄξιά γε τῶν βροντῶν τῶν ἔναγχος
γενομένων', ὡς δὴ καταγελῶν τῶν λεγόντων τὰ ὕδνα τὴν γένεσιν ἐκ βροντῆς λαμβάνειν. A.
S, 1950, col. 1383, wrongly attributes this remark to Agemachos himself.
6 phr., Fr. 400A (= Athen. 62B) ὅταν ὕδατα μετοπωρινὰ καὶ βρονταὶ γίνωνται σκληραὶ
but both writers, as well as Discorides, concur in stating that the best time
for the gathering and consumption of trues is spring7 . e words Plutarch
attributes to this guest, however, clearly show that the way he refers to this
belief makes no provision for an interval between the birth of the true and its
readiness for consumption, since he mentions recent thunderstorms (ἔναγχος
γενομένων). is may remind us of a detail connected with the paradoxical
nature of trues, as reported by Pliny, who declares himself to be in doubt
whether they grow or attain their size immediately at birth8 ; and eophrastus,
as quoted by Athenaeus, even seems to take it for granted that trues, like
other things created in the earth, are produced instantaneously at their full size9
– a statement that appears to be at odds with their alleged birth in autumn and
readiness for consumption in spring. Unfortunately the season during which
Agemachos' banquet took place is not specied, but a parallel to the way the
popular belief is alluded to by this character of Plutarch's is found in Juvenal, who
places in spring both the thundering originating trues and the consumption
of the latter as a delicacy10 . is, however, might be a simplication due to
the desire to give particular emphasis to the striking connection popular belief
posited between thunder and the appearance of trues.
A second opinion is then reported by Plutarch in oratio obliqua, but it is
presumably to be understood as put forward at the time by some other guests
of Agemachos', as shown by the tense employed: "there were some who said"
etc.11 . According to them thunder produces clefts in the earth, thus guiding
true seekers – which gave rise to the belief that thunder creates trues,
rather than simply revealing them. is opinion is itself in line with the title
of the problem, which, as we saw, is mainly concerned with the origin of the
popular belief, but it unambiguously stresses that the latter is mistaken, and
its supporters appear to be overly careful to distinguish themselves from the
uneducated mass: οἱ πολλοί 12 .
It is then Agemachos' turn to express his opinion; he defends the popular
belief by referring to the numerous inexplicable phenomena connected with
lightning and thunderbolts – aptly described by him as διοσημίαι – and urging
his hearers not to dismiss as impossible what merely appears paradoxical. In
this attitude of the host we recognize the spirit of the principle later stated by
Mestrius Florus in the Συμποσιακά: one should not lightly reject traditional
τότε γίνεσθαι, καὶ μᾶλλον ὅταν αἱ βρονταί ~ Plin., Nat.19.37 cum fuerint imbres autumnales et
tonitrua crebra tunc nasci et maxime tonitribus.
7 phr., Fr. 400A (=Athen.62B) τὴν δὲ χρείαν καὶ τὴν ἀκμὴν ἔχειν τοῦ ἦρος; Plin., Nat.
19. 37tenerrima autem verno esse; Dsc. 2.145 ἔαρος ὀρυττομένη.
8 Plin., Nat.19.34 crescant anne vitium id terrae… ea protinus globetur magnitudine, qua
futurum est… non facile arbitror intellegi posse.
9 phr., Fr. 400A (= Athen. 62A) ἡ τῶν ἐγγεοτόκων τούτων γένεσις ἅμα καὶ φύσις .
10 Juv., 5.116-118 tradentur tubera, si ver / tunc erit et facient optata tonitrua cenas / maiores.
11 Plu., Quaest. conv. 4.2,1, 664B ἦσαν οὖν οἱ φάσκοντες κτλ. If this referred generically to a
current idea, we would probably have the present tense: τινές φασι, or something similar.
12 Plu., Quaest. conv. 4.2,1, 664BC ἐκ δὲ τούτων δόξαν ἐγγενέσθαι τοῖς πολλοῖς ὅτι τὸ
ὕδνον αἱ βρονταὶ γεννῶσι, οὐ δεικνύουσι.
441
Trues and underbolts (Plu., Quaest. conv. 4.2, 1-2)
views when we are not able to ascertain the causes of inexplicable phenomena,
though these are to be sought by resorting to logic13 . On the other hand,
Agemachos is playing his role as a host, in that, as he says at the end of his
speech, his goal is to spur the discussion, as a polite way to have his guests
contribute their share to the delicacy they are being served14 , and thus ensure
the success of the banquet.
Finally, Plutarch himself enters the discussion. His position favors an
explanation reconciling the popular belief with more scientic views, but
nevertheless, as he remarks himself, it is closely connected with Agemachos'
speech15 . e latter had in fact hinted at the fertilizing power attributed
by farmers to rain accompanied by thunderstorms16 . It should not escape
us, however, that Agemachos had simply referred to the farmers' empirical
recognition of the fact, whereas Plutarch endeavors to give it a scientic
foundation.
e way he does so is of the highest interest. He starts by stating that
the fertilizing power of thunderstorm rain is due to the presence of heat in
the rain-water17 . He goes immediately on to say, however, that the purest and
most violent portion of the re present in the rain clouds is released in the
form of lightning, whereas the heavier and steamier portion warms up the
cloud18 . What we should emphasize here is the fact that Plutarch presents
thunder and lightning as mere signs of the appearance of trues, not as agents
in any way. It is in fact the fertilizing heat produced in thunderstorm rain by
the heavier particles of re remaining in the clouds that is responsible for the
growth of trues, whereas lightning is merely the re which is immediately
released, and has no role in the process. e latter, however, can only take
place when particles of re are present in the clouds, and is therefore regularly
accompanied by thunder and lightning.
Plutarch continues his speech by stressing the paradoxical nature of the
true, with remarks paralleled in other writers. Trues are a sort of disease
of the earth in the form of sickly outgrowths19 ; they have no roots20; they
cannot be born without water21 . e latter is of course a common observation
13 Cf. Plu., Quaest. conv. 5.7,1, 680CD; also Conv. sept. sap. 20, 163D.
14 Plu., Quaest. conv. 4.2,1, 664D ταῦτα…ἀδολεσχῶ παρακαλῶν ὑμᾶς ἐπὶ τὴν ζήτησιν τῆς
αἰτίας, ἵνα μὴ πικρὸς γένωμαι συμβολὰς τῶν ὕδνων πρασσόμενος.
15 Plu., Quaest. conv. 4.2,2, 664D αὐτὸν οὖν ἔφην τρόπον τινὰ τῷ λόγῳ δεξιὰν ὀρέγειν τὸν
Ἀγέμαχον.
16 Plu.,Quaes.conv. 4.2,1, 664D τὰ δ' ἀστραπαῖα τῶν ὑδάτων εὐαλδῆ καλοῦσιν οἱ γεωργοὶ
καὶ νομίζουσιν.
17 Plu.,Quaest. conv. 4.2,2, 664D αἰτία δ' ἡ τῆς θερμότητος ἀνάμιξις.
18 Plu., Quaest. conv. 4.2,2, 664DE τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὀξὺ καὶ καθαρὸν τοῦ πυρὸς ἄπεισιν ἀστραπὴ
γενόμενος, τὸ δ' ἐμβριθὲς καὶ πνευματῶδες ἐνειλούμενον τῷ νέφει καὶ συμμεταβάλλον
ἐξαιρεῖ τὴν ψυχρότητα.
19 Plu., Quaest. conv. 4.2,2, 664F; 665A τῆς γῆς ... παθούσης τι καὶ μεταβαλλούσης . Cf .
Plin., Nat. 19.34 vitium… terrae; 19.33 terrae callum.
20 Plu., Quaest. conv. 4.2.2, 665A ἄρριζον; cf. Plin., Nat.19.33. According to Dsc. 2.145, by
contrast, the true itself is a root.
21 Plu., Quaest. conv. 4.2,2, 664F οὐδ' ἄνευ ὕδατος ἔχει τὴν γένεσιν; cf. phr., Fr.400A (=
referring to all mushrooms22, and eophrastus and Pliny emphasize this detail
in connection with trues by coupling rain and thunder as their producing
factors23 . For this reason several scholars have maintained that the horti tuber
created by water (quod creavit unda) in a poem in Petronius' Satyrica 24 should
be taken to refer to a true. e word tuber does refer very often to the true
in Latin, in particular when it is accompanied by the genitive terrae. e
Italian word for true, "tartufo", descends from a Latin rustic form, *territufer,
equivalent to the classic terrae tuber. But tuber can refer to other underground
bulbs and also to visible outgrowths as well. I have argued elsewhere25 that in
Petronius' poem, in which the tuber is actually created by water, it does not refer
to a true, but to a gourd, which, according to Gargilius Martialis, is nothing
but curdled water: aqua coagulata 26 .
Plutarch ends his speech with a further reference to Agemachos' words,
by emphasizing the godly and often inexplicable nature of the phenomena
connected with thunder and lightning, which his host, as we have seen, had
described as διοσημίαι 27 .
If we now keep in mind that Plutarch's explanation makes provision both
for thunder and lightning as a sign of the phenomenon under discussion and
for the physical agency of the heat remaining in thunderstorm rain after the
purest particles of re have been released in the form of lightning, we may
conclude that his speech is a ne specimen of the general attempt – common
in Hellenistic and Roman times – to save popular beliefs through scientic,
philosophical, or allegorical interpretations.
Stoicism, for example, considered many forms of folkloric tradition to
reect the original, authentic imprint of the universal logos, which became
adulterated in later times and/or in social strata more exposed to the debasing
inuence of a civilization that increasingly moved away from nature and reason,
as the Stoics understood them. As far as language is concerned, for example,
even such a bitter opponent of archaism, at the literary level, as Seneca must
recognize that the most authentic form of expression is found either in ancient
authors or in turns of the spoken language handed down even among the
uneducated, independently of the mainstream cultural and literary tradition.
I have treated these matters in detail elsewhere, and there is no need to dwell
on them here28 .
Athen. 62B); Plin., Nat. 19.37.
22 Cf. e.g. Pl., St.773; Plin., Nat. 22.100.
23 Cf. above, note 6.
24 Petr. 109.10.3- 4 rotundo / horti tubere quod creavit unda.
25 A. S , 2006.
26 Garg. Mart. med. ex oler. et pom. 6, p. 140, 6-9 Rose = 6.1-3, p. 9 Maire veteres medici de
cucurbita ita senserunt, ut eam aquam dicerent coagulatam. Galenus umidae putat virtutis et frigidae,
idque ex eo probat quod in cibo sumpta... bibendi desideria non excitat.
27 Plu., Quaest. conv. 4.2, 2, 665A διὸ καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς πάθεσι τούτοις δόξα θειότητος
πρόσεστι.
28 For the original closeness of language to reality and its gradual adulteration cf. A. S,
1988, pp. 25-32, 37-43; for Seneca's recognition of the closeness of ancient authors and popular
443
Trues and underbolts (Plu., Quaest. conv. 4.2, 1-2)
Another area of folkloric tradition in which the Stoics – or most of them
– recognized the original imprint of their all-pervading logos were the myths
concerning the gods, handed down from the remotest antiquity and transmitted,
though often adulterated, by poetry. is idea is easily recognizable in the
handbook bearing the title Summary of Greek eology written in the I century
A.D. by Annaeus Cornutus, who was probably a freedman of Seneca's brother
Annaeus Mela, though Seneca himself did not share his attitude. is matter too
has been analyzed in detail elsewhere, and needs only a brief reference here29 .
But the area in which the Stoics tried hardest to reconcile popular traditions
with their own philosophy was of course divination. is form of prediction of
the future was theoretically founded on the doctrine of συμπάθεια, the mutual
connection and reciprocal inuence of all natural phenomena, stemming from
the basic ideas of πρόνοια ("providence") and εἱμαρμένη ("fate", conceived as
an uninterrupted chain of causes), but the need to save the pre-philosophical
folkloric traditions connected with divination forced the Stoics to assume a link
between the facts traditionally considered as signs and the ensuing phenomena
considered to be announced by them – which restricted them to an empirical
observation admitting of no experimental test or rational ascertainment of causal
sequences. Already Zeno, and later Chrysippus and Posidonius, had to found
divination (μαντική) on empirical events or results (διά τινας ἐκβάσεις )30 .
In the orthodox Stoic conception there were of course no fortuitous
events: as Quintus, Cicero's brother, makes it clear in the latter's De divinatione,
man is reduced to the observation of signs only because he cannot grasp the
complete chain of the εἱμαρμένη 31 . Reconciling this dogmatic position with
the empirical procedure just outlined was no easy task. Posidonius, however,
tried at least to shift the problem by allocating to divination the task to inquire,
if not the causes of an event, at least the signs of the causes32 . is brings us back
to Plutarch's explanation of the relationship linking trues and thunderbolts,
with the latter – as we have seen – playing the role of signs of the real cause;
but it also places us on a level dierent from divination, and rather belonging
to the realm of conjectural science. Posidonius, however, made a gallant, if ill-
fated, attempt to reconcile the latter with divination.
In Cicero's De divinatione 33 Quintus, at the beginning of his speech and
of the rst book, quotes no less than ve times his brother's Prognostica 34 , the
spoken language to reality and reason cf. A. S, 2000, pp. 228-31.
29 Cf., among the most recent scholarship, G. W. M, 1989; F. B, 2003; P. C,
2003; C. T, 2003; and the commentary of I. R, 2003. ese works, as well as several
others, have been discussed, and new approaches attempted, in A. S , 2003-2004, pp.
341-67.
30 D. L. 7.149 (cf. SVF I 174; II 1191; Posid. F 7 + 27 E.-K.; 258; 371a .).
31 Cic., Div. 1.127; cf. 1.9 earum rerum quae fortuitae putantur.
32 Cic., Div. 1.127 etsi causas ipsas non cernunt, signa tamen causarum et notas cernunt.
33 I have treated the matter touched on here in A. S , 2005, also discussing, among
others, the interpretations given by A. S. P, 1973, S. T, 20016 , and J. K - T ,
2004.
34 Cic., Div. 1.13; 1.14; 1.15 (thrice).
translation in Latin hexameters of the nal part of Aratos' poem, dealing with
weather forecasts, that is with a conjectural science basing its predictions on
rational and reasonable deductions founded on signs physically homogeneous
with the results expected: meteorology; and medicine is also mentioned in
the same context35 . e sixth quotation, closely following upon the previous
ve, however, comes from a dierent poem by Cicero, the De consulatu,
and amounts to a shift from meteorological to divinatory signs: the omens
portending Catilina's conspiracy, as listed by the Muse Urania in a long
speech36 . Quintus can do so because he posits an anity between divination
and conjectural sciences, even though he recognizes them as dierent: age ea,
quae quamquam ex alio genere sunt, tamen divinationi sunt similiora, videamus37 .
At the end of the book and of Quintus' speech, though more conjectural arts
and sciences – namely politics, medicine again, navigation, and agriculture –
have been mentioned as distinct from divination38 , the dierence between the
two appears to be as good as obliterated; and it is exactly at this point that
Posidonius' name occurs39 .
In the following book, in which Cicero takes up the discussion in order
to explode the very idea of divination, he roundly denies the anity between
the latter and conjectural sciences posited by his brother: dissimile totum are
his peremptory words40 . Conjectural arts and sciences dier from divination in
that they are based on regular sequences between homogeneous phenomena,
rather than on relationships arbitrarily established or taken for granted
between disparate events linked by no rationally recognizable causal bonds, as
is the case with divination.
But though the evidence provided by Cicero's De divinatione clearly shows
that Posidonius did posit an anity between conjectural arts and sciences and
divination, an interesting testimony overlooked by both Edelstein-Kidd and
eiler41 enables us to sketch a more nuanced picture of his position. I am
referring to a chapter in Iamblichus' De mysteriis42 whose contacts with Cicero's
De divinatione are absolutely evident, down to close verbal parallels, while the
Posidonian imprint, and even such Stoic terms as συμπαθής and πρόνοια ,
are still clearly recognizable beneath the radically dierent conception of
divination promoted by Iamblichus43 . We learn from this text that Posidonius
considered the conjectural arts and sciences (navigation and medicine are
mentioned) to provide conditional predictions based on signs that are
35 Cic., Div. 1.13.
36 Cic., Div. 1.17-22 (= de consul. fr. II Soubiran).
37 Cic., Div. 1.13.
38 Cic., Div. 1.111-112.
39 Cic., Div. 1.130. Cf. Posidon. F 110 E.-K.; 378 .
40 Cic., Div. 2.47. Here Posidonius is also mentioned, but in reference to his natural
researches, not to his theories on divination.
41 eiler does refer to this text (Iamb. Myst. 3.26) in his commentary (W. T, 1982,
pp. 297-9; cf. W. T, 1930, pp. 136-9), but does not include it in Posidonius' fragments.
42 Iamb. Myst. 3.26, pp. 135-6 Des Places.
43 Cf. note 33, A. S , 2005, pp. 256-8.
445
Trues and underbolts (Plu., Quaest. conv. 4.2, 1-2)
reasonable and probable, but not absolutely certain, whereas those oered by
divination possess unconditional validity; but we also nd the conrmation of
the anity posited between the former and the latter by Quintus in Cicero's
De divinatione44 .
It should not escape us that in this connection Posidonius includes in
the conjectural arts and sciences any insight drawn from natural phenomena
concerning any aspect of reality (εἴ τινα ἐκ φύσεως ἐπιβολὴν εἰς τὰ ὄντα
παρειλήφαμεν) – which perfectly ts the connection established by Plutarch
between lightning as perceptible sign and a phenomenon otherwise concealed:
the growth of trues, though these are actually produced by a dierent, if
related, cause. Shortly before45 Posidonius had proposed two dierent
explanations of the relationship established between the behavior of some
animals and impending meteorological changes: the rst posited a direct
consentaneity between these animals and parts or aspects of the cosmos as
a whole – συμπάθεια in the most general sense; the second assumed that
they were endowed with a special sharpness of perception – in other words,
it appealed to a causal link that could be rationally grasped and to a physical
anity between the sign and the event, which could provide a reasonable
foundation for this type of meteorological lore. Plutarch's explanation of the
relationship between trues and thunderbolts, while refusing to discredit the
folkloric tradition, shows a similar eort to account for it in a rational and
reasonable way. He diers from Posidonius in that he does not aim to endorse
the popular belief as such, but rather to explain its origin. e meaning of the
title we have hinted at in the beginning is now absolutely clear: "Why trues
seem to be born through the agency of thunder". And of course Plutarch would
not, as the Stoics did, extend this attitude to all the traditional superstitions
connected with divination.
W o r k s c i T e d
B, F., "Anneo Cornuto nelle Saturae e nella Vita Persi", in I. G
& G. M (eds.), Gli Annei. Una famiglia nella storia e nella cultura
di Roma imperiale. Atti del Convegno Internazionale di Milano-Pavia
(2-6 Maggio, 2000), Como, 2003, pp. 185-210.
C, P., "Lucio Anneo Cornuto esegeta di Virgilio", in I. G &
G. M (eds.), Gli Annei. Una famiglia nella storia e nella cultura
di Roma imperiale. Atti del Convegno Internazionale di Milano-Pavia
(2-6 Maggio, 2000), Como, 2003, pp. 211-44.
K-T, J., Cicéron, De la divination, Paris, 2004.
44 Iamb. Myst. 3.26, p. 136 Des Places οὐ δεῖ, εἴ τινα ἐκ φύσεως ἐπιβολὴν εἰς τὰ ὄντα
παρειλήφαμεν ἢ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐπαφήν, ἐγκρίνειν ταύτην ὡς μαντικὴν πρόγνωσιν· ἀλλ'
ὁμοία μέν ἐστι μαντικῇ. (cf. Cic., Div. 1.13, quoted above, in the text).
45 Iamb. Myst. 3.26, p. 136 Des Places.
446
Aldo Setaioli
M, G. W., "Cornutus and Stoic Allegoresis: A Preliminary Report",
ANRW, II 36, 6 (1989) 2014-65.
P, A. S., M. Tulli Ciceronis De divinatione libri duo, Darmstadt, 1973 (rst
published, 1920-1923).
R, I., Anneo Cornuto. Compendio di teologia greca (Testo greco a fronte,
saggio introduttivo e integrativo, traduz. e apparati), Milano, 2003.
R, O., "eophrastus", RE, Suppl. VII (1940) 1354-562.
S , A., Seneca e i Greci. Citazioni e traduzioni nelle opere losoche ,
Bologna, 1988.
____ Facundus Seneca. Aspetti della lingua e dell'ideologia senecana, Bologna,
2000.
____"Interpretazioni stoiche ed epicuree in Servio e la tradizione dell'esegesi
losoca del mito e dei poeti a Roma (Cornuto, Seneca, Filodemo)",
IJCT, 10 (2003-2004) 335-76; 11 (2004-2005) 3-46.
____"Le fragment II Soubiran du De consulatu de Cicéron, le De diuinatione
et leur lecture par Virgile", in J. K-T (ed.), Signe et prédiction
dans l'antiquité. Actes du Colloque International de Créteil et de Paris
(22-24 Mai, 2003), Saint-Étienne, 2005, pp. 241-63.
____ "Vegetables and Bald Heads (Petr. Sat. 109.10.3-4)", Prometheus, 32
(2006) 233-44.
S, A., "Pilze", RE, 40 (1950) cols. 1372-86.
T, W., Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus, Berlin, 1930.
____ Posidonius, Die Fragmente. II. Erläuterungen, Berlin/New York, 1982.
T, S., Marco Tullio Cicerone, Della divinazione, Milano, 20016 .
T, C., "Cornuto, Seneca, i poeti e gli dèi", in I. G & G. M
(eds.), Gli Annei. Una famiglia nella storia e nella cultura di Roma imperiale.
Atti del Convegno Internazionale di Milano-Pavia (2-6 Maggio, 2000),
Como, 2003, pp. 167-84.
447
Astrometeorología e inuencia lunar en las Quaestiones Convivales de Plutarco
as T r o m e T e o r o l o g í a e i n f l u e n c i a l u n a r
e n l a s Qu a e S T i o n e S co n v i v a l e S d e p l u T a r c o
A P J
Universidad de Málaga
Abstract
Among the scarce references to ancient astrology in Plutarch's works, we must pay attention
to questions of astrometeorology. Such references, limited to the Sun and the Moon, concern
popular beliefs on the inuence of both stars on plants and animals. In this paper I analyse
some passages from the Quaestiones convivales where Plutarch echoes those beliefs concerning
the eects of the Moon and the Sun on the nature and physiology of the beings of this world.
Similar astrometeorological prescriptions are also found in astrological texts, such as lunaria
from late antiquity and the Middle Ages.
1
Aunque no hay datos seguros sobre la actitud particular de Plutarco frente
a la astrología y la proporcionalmente escasa atención que presta en sus obras
conservadas apunta a que tenía especial interés por ella, contamos con algunas
evidencias de que no era del todo ajeno a estas prácticas adivinatorias. Sin duda
los aciertos de algunos astrólogos famosos, sobre todo de aquellos vinculados
con las altas esferas de la sociedad romana, favoreció en él cierta curiosidad
respetuosa por sus métodos, que a veces incluso da pie a una sorpresiva
admiración ante sus resultados. Ésa es la razón y el tenor de la digresión
de Plutarco en la Vida de Rómulo sobre Tarrucio, el amigo de Varrón, y su
determinación astrológica de la fecha de la fundación de Roma; o, si es cierta
nuestra reciente propuesta de un fragmento de la Vida de Tiberio en Malalas1 ,
debió atraerle la personalidad de Trasilo, el famoso astrólogo de Tiberio. Por otra
parte, en la noticia del encuentro de Sila con los caldeos y las predicciones de
éstos sobre su futuro hay curiosidad, pero no el escepticismo que esperaríamos
de un platónico a propósito de esas predicciones2 . En otros casos, la actitud
negativa hacia la astrología u otras creencias astrales ha de entenderse más
como indignación del moralista político por el comportamiento irracional de
los grandes responsables de la historia (como el general de Sila Octavio o el
propio Nicias) ante estas supersticiones, que como un rechazo radical contra
los métodos de la que pudiéramos llamar "astrología cientíca"; o, como en
Crass. 29.4, para marcar algún rasgo del personaje; aquí se trata de Casio que
responde a los guías, cuando le aconsejan esperar antes de partir a Siria que la
luna abandone Escorpio, que más teme a Sagitario. En algunos pasajes Plutarco
alude a dogmas o doctrinas propias de la astrología, como la clasicación moral
de los planetas (De Iside 370D), la referencia a las exaltaciones y depresiones de
éstos y sus consecuencias astrológicas (en Sept. sap. conv. 149A) o la referencia
1 A. P J, 2007/2008, pp. 91-8.
2 Sull. 5.5 y 37.6.
a la interpretación alegórica de la conjunción Marte-Venus (en De poetis
audiendis 4.19E-F) sin que haya ningún posicionamiento especial por parte
del Queronense ante estas doctrinas (en el último caso su ironía va más contra
el método, que contra el tipo de alegoría en cuestión)3 .
Por otra parte, en cambio, en las obras de Plutarco se encuentran alusiones
a otras cuestiones no tan estrictamente astrológicas, pero que conciernen a la
inuencia de los astros y evidencian la curiosidad entre cientíca y complaciente
de Plutarco por los efectos astrometeorológicos del sol y sobre todo de la luna
y su incidencia en los procesos físicos, biológicos e incluso psicológicos de los
seres que habitan el mundo sublunar. Se trata de ese tipo de inuencias, entre
explicables y materia de superstición, que Tolomeo esgrimirá en su Tetrabiblos
para defender la posibilidad cientíca de la astrología4 . Plutarco se interesa
por estas cuestiones, como hemos dicho siempre en relación con el Sol y la
Luna, en diversas obras; algunas son muy especializadas, de carácter cientíco
o de historia de las ideas religiosas, como De facie in orbe Lunae y De Iside et
Osiride; pero en otras la explicación astrometeorológica está al servicio de los
personajes de sus diálogos. Así, en las Quaestiones Convivales, entre seriedad,
ironía y desenfado, Plutarco deja ver sus posiciones no del todo críticas sobre
supersticiones que él mismo trata de integrar en el pensamiento cientíco de
su época; algunas de ellas cuentan ya con una tradición previa en los autores
de cuestiones naturales y otras sirven como material para distintas obras
plutarqueas, como el Comentario a los Trabajos y Días, las Quaestiones Romanae
y las Quaestiones Naturales 5 .
2
En cuanto a las Quaestiones Convivales que ahora centran nuestra atención,
lamentablemente no se han conservado algunos diálogos donde, a juzgar por
los títulos, se afrontaban problemas astronómicos (por ejemplo, la IX 10,
sobre la duración de los eclipses) o relacionados con el calendario y con sus
implicaciones astrológicas (como la IV 7, sobre la semana planetaria).
Tan sólo en dos pasajes se mencionan con cierto detalle o se discuten
estos temas en clave de astrometeorología; una es la cuestión IV 5, donde, para
explicar por qué los judíos no comen cerdo, Calístrato recuerda las asociaciones
egipcias del topo con la luna y del león con el sol; la otra es la cuestión III 10,
en que el propio Plutarco se posiciona ante la evidente inuencia de la Luna
en nuestro mundo.
El tema de este diálogo es el de la putrefación de la carne a la luz de la
luna, planteado por Eutidemo de Sunion, antrión del banquete; conesa con
3 Para la compatibilidad de algunos conceptos astrológicos con la curiosidad intelectual de
Plutarco, remito a mi artículo, 1992 y P. V C, 2005.
4 Ptol., Tetr. 1.2.
5 Por ejemplo, Quaest. nat. 24, 917F-918A, sobre la humedad que deja caer sobre la tierra la
luna como causa de que los cazadores encuentren con mayor dicultad las huellas cuando hay
plenilunio.
449
Astrometeorología e inuencia lunar en las Quaestiones Convivales de Plutarco
jactancia a sus invitados que disponía de un jabalí mayor que el que ahora sirve
como mesa, pero que se echó a perder a causa de la luz de la luna. Este hecho
sirve para que los comensales, en particular el médico Mosquión y Plutarco,
reexionen sobre los motivos de ese efecto producido por la luna. Mosquión
lo atribuye al calor suave de nuestro satélite, ya que "si es suave y tranquilo,
remueve las partes húmedas e impide (la conservación), mientras que si es
ardiente, ocurre lo contrario, que reseca las carnes"6 . Plutarco no comparte esta
explicación en su totalidad, pues en verano se pudren las carnes más que en
invierno y el calor del sol es más suave en éste que en aquél. Por ello, la razón
no está en el grado del calor, sino en su cualidad, que sea seco o húmedo. La
constatación de que la luz o el calor procedente de la luna son distintos de los
que vienen del sol (658E) y que esa diferencia está en su humedad, permitirá a
Plutarco someter a los aparentes principios de la ciencia una serie de creencias
populares sobre la acción lunar en la tierra cuyo fundamento pertenece al
ámbito de la experiencia, la religión y las supersticiones.
En primer lugar y según leemos en los tratados médicos, poco sospechosos
de irracionalidad, la naturaleza húmeda de la luna explica efectos negativos y
positivos sobre la naturaleza humana.
Positiva es la relación que se establece entre el astro y la siología femenina.
En el diálogo que comentamos, en concreto, Plutarco asume el efecto favorable
para los partos de la luna llena: "se dice que también ayuda a un buen parto,
cuando es llena, pues por la relajación de los líquidos hace más suaves los
dolores"7 . La literatura losóca y médica se hace eco también de esta inuencia,
que atribuye al principio de simpatía (relación de los procesos de crecimiento
y decrecimiento con las fases de la luna), o, como Plutarco en este pasaje, a la
naturaleza física del astro, que propicia la fecundidad8 ; nuestro exégeta señala
el reejo literario de esa creencia llevado de su curiosidad mítico-religiosa y
de su ación a las etimologías. De modo que, para ilustrar con la literatura
los argumentos de la ciencia y de la razón, recurre a asociaciones simbólicas
complementarias y teológicas, como la identicación de la Luna con Hera/
Juno, Lucina, que le hace ejercer las mismas funciones de estas diosas9 ( Quaest.
Rom. 282C: καὶ νομίζουσιν ἐν ταῖς λοχείαις καὶ ὠδῖσι βοηθεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ
σελήνην, ῾διὰ κυάνεον πόλον ἄστρων διά τ᾿ ὠκυτόκοιο σελάνας·᾿ εὐτοκεῖν
γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πανσελήνοις μάλιστα δοκοῦσι); o con Ártemis-Locheia e Ilitía:
ὅθεν οἶμαι καὶ τὴν ῎Αρτεμιν Λοχείαν καὶ Εἰλείθυιαν, οὐκ οὖσαν ἑτέραν ἢ
τὴν σελήνην, ὠνομάσθαι. Τιμόθεος δ᾿ἄντικρύς φησιν ῾διὰ κυάνεον πόλον
ἄστρων,/ διά τ᾿ ὠκυτόκοιο σελάνας (658F-659A)10 . En este sentido merece
6 Quaest. conv. 658B: θερμασίαν δὲ πᾶσαν, ἂν μὲν ᾖ μαλακὴ καὶ πραεῖα, κινεῖν τὰ ὑγρὰ καὶ
† κωλύειν, ἂν δ' ᾖ πυρώδης, τοὐναντίον ἀπισχναίνειν τὰς σάρκας.
7 Quaest. conv. 658F: λέγεται δὲ καὶ πρὸς εὐτοκίαν συνεργεῖν, ὅταν ᾖ διχόμηνος, ἀνέσει
τῶν ὑγρῶν μαλακωτέρας παρέχουσα τὰς ὠδῖνας.
8 La relación entre la luna y el embarazo y el parto cuenta con el aval en la literatura greco-
romana de autores como Aristóteles, Crisipo, Ciceron, Varrón y Séneca (para los textos, cf. C.
P, 1973, pp. 89-91).
9 Sobre el tema en la literatura romana, véase S. L, 1979, pp. 167-74.
10 También en Quaest. Rom. 282C, con la misma cita de Timoteo. Sobre la identicación
señalarse el gusto de Plutarco por repetir (aquí, en De facie y en Quaest. nat.
24. 918A) el verso de Alcmán en que hace al rocío (῎Ερσα) hijo de Zeus y de
la divina Selene, una asociación que πανταχόθεν μαρτυρεῖται τὸ τῆς σελήνης
φῶς ἀνυγραντικὴν <ἔχον> καὶ μαλακτικὴν δύναμιν.
Constatamos con la curiosidad que suscita el gusto socrático de Plutarco
por bajar al terreno de la vida cotidiana y aprovechar sus tópicos para acercar
sus argumentos a los contertulios, que, en los demás ejemplos de este diálogo,
Plutarco somete a razón actitudes supersticiosas ante la luna de diferentes
profesiones. En 658E se trata de las nodrizas. El texto, tal como lo han
transmitido los manuscritos (διὸ τὰ μὲν νήπια παντάπασιν αἱ τίτθαι δεικνύναι
τὴν σελήνην φυλάττονται· πλήρη γὰρ ὑγρότητος ὄντα, καθάπερ τὰ χλωρὰ
τῶν ξύλων, σπᾶται καὶ διαστρέφεται), no se ha entendido por los editores que,
desde la edición de Basilea, corrigen el complemento τὴν σελήνην del verbo
δεικνύναι. Esa edición, en efecto, lo hace añadiendo delante del acusativo la
preposición πρός (adición aceptada por Hubert, en la edición teubneriana),
mientras que Teodorsson en su comentario11 y Chirico en su edición del Corpus
Plutarchi Moralium12 preeren la corrección de Turnebus τῇ σελήνῃ, menos
problemática desde el punto de vista paleográco. En cuanto al sentido, las dos
modicaciones coinciden en que las nodrizas evitan exponer los niños a la luz
de la luna. En esa dirección va también en parte – sólo en parte – la adaptación
del texto plutarqueo por Macrobio en Saturnalia 7.16, 24, donde dice así:
hinc et nutrices pueros fellantes operimentis obtegunt, cum sub luna praeterunt, ne
plenos per aetatem naturalis umoris amplius lunare lumen umectet et sicut ligna
adhuc virore umida accepto calore curvantur, ita et illorum membra contorqueat
umoris adiecto.
Pero lo cierto es que el texto de Macrobio, en su primera parte, que es
la problemática, tampoco sigue el que proponen los editores de Plutarco
con la literalidad acostumbrada en el resto de su adaptación. No vemos en él
ningún verbo "indicare" (que traduzca δεικνύναι) y añade otros detalles que no
encontramos en Plutarco, como, por ejemplo, el adjetivo fellantes, o la actitud de
cubrir a los niños para evitar que les llegue la luz de la luna, operimentis obtegunt,
o la precisión del momento en que tiene lugar el riesgo de esa exposición, cum
sub luna praeterunt. Con estas alteraciones el texto de Macrobio no es nada
ambiguo y su sentido es el mismo que en el texto modicado de Plutarco,
si es que traducimos δεικνύναι por "exponer"; pero este sentido del verbo
como régimen de la luna es más extraño que si lo fuera de personas, como, por
ejemplo, en otro pasaje de Plutarco (682B: ὥστε μὴ δεικνύναι τὰς γυναῖκας
αὐτοῖς τὰ παιδία μηδὲ πολὺν ἐᾶν χρόνον ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων καταβλέπεσθαι);
es fácil pensar que, aunque el texto de Plutarco presentara un acusativo, un
autor latino como Macrobio pudo por error o lapsus entenderlo como dativo;
Ártemis-Ilitía, véase Fr. 157.5 (Περὶ τῶν ἐν πλαταίαις δαιδάλων).
11 S.-T. T, 1989, pp. 386-7.
12 I. C, 2001, p. 192.
451
Astrometeorología e inuencia lunar en las Quaestiones Convivales de Plutarco
y también que, para eliminar el carácter general de ese comportamiento de
las nodrizas, lo contextualizara, reriéndose a situaciones en que éstas debían
andar de noche con los niños.
Pero, si mantenemos la lectura de T, cabe la posibilidad, y ésa es ahora
nuestra propuesta, de entender que Plutarco lo que hace es buscar una
explicación cientíca para un gesto habitual y supersticioso de las nodrizas
del que, por desgracia, no hemos encontrado ejemplos paralelos en el mundo
antiguo, aunque sí en otros contextos culturales. Interpretando τὰ νήπια como
sujeto de δεικνύναι el sentido podría ser que "las nodrizas no dejan de ningún
modo que los niños señalen la luna". En efecto, en algunos lugares se impide a
los niños (o evitan los adultos) mirar o señalar (con el dedo) la luna creciente y
la luna llena13 , bien porque ello trae mala suerte14, produce enfermedades de la
vista15 , o (en el caso de las mujeres embarazadas y los bebés16) para evitar (por
el principio de simpatía imitativa) que los niños tengan "cara de luna"; en otros,
el acto de señalar con el dedo la luna es parte de rituales mágicos.
En cualquier caso, la explicación que da Plutarco es el efecto de la humedad
de la luz lunar que produce espasmos en los niños por la disolución de sus
humores17 . El ejemplo se presenta como un hecho de experiencia popular
(avalado por el compor tamiento de las nodrizas), en los mismos términos
en que ya se había referido a ello antes Aristóteles, que lo reere a la luna
llena18 . Fruto de la experiencia popular es de igual modo el conocimiento de
los efectos que produce la luz de la luna en quienes se quedan dormidos a la
intemperie por la noche: τοὺς δὲ κατακοιμηθέντας ἐν αὐγῇ σελήνης μόλις
ἐξανισταμένους οἷον ἐμπλήκτους ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι καὶ ναρκώδεις ὁρῶμεν·
ἡ γὰρ ὑγρότης ὑπὸ τῆς σελήνης διαχεομένη βαρύνει τὰ σώματα (Quaest.
conv. 658F). Ese embotamiento de los sentidos, semejante al del vino, y los
espasmos que produce en las personas así expuestas, se ha puesto en relación
y acertadamente con los procesos epilépticos, frecuentes durante el sueño19 .
13 Cf. H. B-S, "Finger", Handwörterbuch der deutschen Aberglauben (= HAD),
Berlin, 1927 (repr. 2000), II, col. 1483.
14 Cf. H. H, "Beißen, Biß", HDA, Berlin, 1927 (repr. 2000), I, col. 1020.
15 Cf. S. S, "Augenkrankheiten", HDA, Berlin, 1927 (repr. 2000), I, col. 715, y F.
E, "Branntwein", Idem, col. 1501.
16 De hecho, en Plin., Nat. 7,42, leemos que la luna es peligrosa para embarazadas y niños.
Cf. B. K,"Kind", HDA, Berlin, 1927 (repr. 2000), IV, cols. 1318, 1320.
17 La tendencia a la disolución de los humores corporales por causa de la humedad de la luna
en los dos primeros cuartos, un principio que utilizará Plutarco en sus explicaciones relativas
a la carne y las plantas, se contempla también en los consejos de los astrólogos a propósito
de la inuencia de este astro. Así lo vemos, por ejemplo, en el Fructus atribuido a Tolomeo,
cuya máxima 56 dice así: Ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῆς σελήνης τετραγώνῳ ἐκρέουσιν οἱ ὑγρότητες τῶν
σωμάτων μέχρι τοῦ δευτέρου, ἐν δὲ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἐλαττοῦνται.
18 HA 7.12, 588a: Εἴωθε δὲ τὰ παιδία τὰ πλεῖστα σπασμοὺς ἐπιλαμβάνειν, καὶ μᾶλλον τὰ
εὐτραφέστερα καὶ γάλακτι χρώμενα πλείοιν ἢ παχυτέρῳ καὶ τίτθαις εὐσάρκοις. … Καὶ ἐν ταῖς
πανσελήνοις δὲ μᾶλλον πονοῦσιν. ᾿Επικίνδυνον δὲ καὶ ὅσοις τῶν παιδίων οἱ σπασμοὶ ἐκ τοῦ
νώτου ἄρχονται. Cf. C. P, 1970, pp. 132-3.
19 Idem, pp. 387-8. Que la humedad embota los sentidos (vista y oído) se dice en De def. orac.
432F. Sobre el efecto de pesadez producido en el alma por la humedad, cf. De ser. num. vind.
566A.
Pues bien, que la Luna causa la epilepsia era una idea generalizada en el
mundo antiguo y en concreto en los estratos populares, que defendían de esas
inuencias a los niños con amuletos lunares. La superstición ha entrado en los
textos astrológicos y médicos, que consideran efectivamente la epilepsia y los
procesos espasmódicos una mala inuencia de la luna20 .
La relación de la luna con los partos es otra creencia popular, arraigada por
la experiencia, que tiene que ver con la asociación entre la siología femenina
(los ciclos menstruales) y el mes lunar y que se mantuvo en la literatura médica
hasta Sorano. La humedad como explicación para la procreación de varones
y hembras en el plenilunio que leemos en otros lugares21 y para el curso de
los embarazos y la facilidad en el parto22 , le viene a Plutarco sin duda de esos
ámbitos cientícos y de la losofía. En el texto que comentamos, con una
terminología muy próxima a la de los estoicos, está convencido de que la
humedad relaja los ujos de la mujer y hace los partos más suaves. Como
aquí (λέγεται δὲ καὶ πρὸς εὐτοκίαν συνεργεῖν) también en De facie 25 (939F)
atribuye a la luna todas aquellas inuencias que se deben a la humedad y no a
la sequedad, incluyendo entre ellas las εὐτοκίαι γυναικῶν. La identicación
de la luna con Ártemis Locheia y con Ilitía viene, pues, al caso; pero no debe
ser casual que también en este caso tengamos un eco del mismo tópico en De
facie, donde la identicación concreta sus funciones como integradora (Ilitía
= ἣ συντίθησι ) y disgregadora ( Ártemis = ἣ διαιρεῖ ). A la simpatía imitativa
pertenece en cambio la relación que Calístrato establece en Quaest. conv. 4.5
(670B) entre el nacimiento del topo y la luna nueva y entre el decrecimiento
de su hígado y el menguante, un tema éste de la inuencia de la luna sobre los
animales que estaba presente en la paradoxografía y que no es ajeno a nuestro
autor, pues vuelve a él en De Iside, siempre con referencia a los egipcios.
Por último, veamos los efectos sobre los seres inanimados. Aquí la
inuencia astrometeorológica es doctrina más asentada por la tradición
grecorromana. De hecho, es la relación entre la madera y la fase lunar en
que se corta la que sirve de fundamento para explicar el problema planteado
20 Cf. S.-T. T, 1989, p. 387, con citas de Retorio, Manetón, Galeno, Plauto.
Añadimos Heph. Astrol., II 16.3 y el anónimo De planetarum patrociniis (CCAG , VII, p. 99:
σημαίνει δὲ τὰς ἐπιληψίας καὶ τὰ ὅμοια πάθη). Véase sobre los testimonios griegos C. P,
o.c., pp. 91-4, que apuesta por una vinculación entre la luna y la enfermedad a partir de la época
helenística, como consecuencia precisamente de la entrada de la astrología. (p. 91). De ahí los
términos σεληνιάζοντες , lunatici para designar a los epilépticos. Más referencias en el artículo
del Pauly Wissowa, "Selene", col. 1139.
21 Fr. 105. El escoliasta hace verdaderos equilibrios para explicar por qué el dieciséis es
bueno para engendrar varones y no hembras (Hesíodo no habla de "engendrar", sino de "parir"),
cuando se dice que el viento del norte (seco) es bueno para engendrar varones, mientras que el
del sur (húmedo) lo es para las mujeres. Vide sobre la realidad de estas creencias en el mundo
griego, C. P, o. c., pp. 88-9 y en el romano, S. L, o. c., pp.76 sqq.
22 La humedad de la naturaleza de las mujeres, los niños y los jóvenes, frente a los hombres
y los viejos es algo asumido cientícamente por Plutarco. En Quaest. conv. 650C se explica por
ello la mayor facilidad de emborracharse los viejos (frio y seco) que las mujeres, cuya humedad
resta efecto al vino.
453
Astrometeorología e inuencia lunar en las Quaestiones Convivales de Plutarco
por Eutidemo23. En efecto, como de nuevo en De facie donde se atribuyen a
la luna las μαλακότητες ξύλων , también aquí la humedad de su luz explica
que la madera se pudra si es cortada en creciente o plenilunio; un hecho
constatado ya por autores anteriores, como Teofrasto (H.P. 5.1, 3: κελεύουσι
δὲ καὶ δεδυκυίας τῆς σελήνης τέμνειν ὡς σκληροτέρων καὶ ἀσαπεστέρων
γινομένων. ἐπεὶ δὲ αἱ πέψεις τῶν καρπῶν παραλλάττουσι, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ
αἱ ἀκμαὶ πρὸς τὴν τομὴν παραλλάττουσιν), Catón (37.3) y Cicerón, que
extiende la prohibición a la luna menguante (De div. II 33-34)24 . Plutarco
se hace eco de estas opiniones tanto en el Comentario a los Días 25 como en
Quaest. conv. donde ahora lo hace recurriendo a otro campo profesional, el
de los carpinteros, cuando habla de que éstos rechazan la madera cortada
bajo esas condiciones: γίνεται δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄψυχα τῶν σωμάτων ἐπίδηλος
ἡ τῆς σελήνης δύναμις· τῶν τε γὰρ ξύλων τὰ τεμνόμενα ταῖς πανσελήνοις
ἀποβάλλουσιν οἱ τέκτονες ὡς ἁπαλὰ καὶ μυδῶντα ταχέως δι᾿ ὑγρότητα,…
(659A). La creencia no es inusual en Plutarco, pues estaba muy arraigada
(y aún lo sigue estando) entre los campesinos. Columela coincide en esta
apreciación cuando dice que el menguante es el mejor momento para cortar la
madera destinada a la construcción, así como para otros usos y concreta como
época más recomendable los días del veinte al treinta26 . Esta prescripción se
ha incorporado a las listas de los lunarios de la antigüedad tardía y de la Edad
Media. Así en uno medieval, que debe mucho a Melampo, se prescribe que
el día 15 (luna llena) no es bueno para cortar madera27 . También la alusión
al efecto de la luna en la harina (que al fermentar se hincha) es objeto de
una explicación cientíca para otra creencia profesional (en este caso el de
los panaderos o pasteleros) posiblemente fundamentada en el principio de
simpatía imitativa (la masa del pan crece con la luna llena); de nuevo aquí se
atribuye el fenómeno a la humedad, que favorece la fermentación, entendida
23 Véase, a propósito de este pasaje, A. C, 2005, pp. 67-74.
24 Vide S.-T. T, 1989, pp. 388-9. La inuencia negativa del plenilunio (o del
creciente según Macrobio) en la madera tiene otros testimonios posteriores como Athen., 7,
276DE y Macr., Sat. 7.16.15-34, utilizados para claricar la comprensión del texto plutarqueo
por A. C, a.c., pp. 70 sqq.
25 Fr. 61.
26 Ag r. XI, 2, 11 : Sed utraque melius unt luna decrescente ab vicesima usque in tricesimam,
quoniam omnis materia sic caesa iudicatur carie non infestari. Para otros testimonios (Plinio, Catón,
Varrón) en los que se recomienda cortar los árboles en fase menguante o nueva, vid. C. P,
o.c., pp. 131-2 y S. L, o.c., pp. 55-8. Cf. Plu., Fr. 109: ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ τῆς ὥρας εὔκαιρος
καὶ μηνὸς ἡ ἑπτακαιδεκάτη χρήσιμος, ὅτε τὸ μὲν φῶς τῆς σελήνης πρόσθεσιν οὐκέτ᾿ ἔχει
πανσελήνου γεγονυίας, ἔνικμα δὲ πῶς ἐστι τὰ ξύλα καὶ διὰ ἐλαττώσεως τοῦ φωτὸς ἐλαττοῦται
τὸ ὑγρὸν ἀφ᾿οὗ συμβαίνειν εἴωθεν ἡ σῆψις. Que la humedad pudre la madera es evidente y se
expresa en muchos lugares: Quaest. conv. 636D (aparición de gusanos por la pudredumbre de
la humedad).
27 CCAG, XI1 (1932), p. 141: Αὕτη ἡ ἡμέρα εἰς πάντα παρατηρήσιμος· μὴ... ξύλα κόπτειν,
ξύλα δὲ ἐπιτήδεια πρὸς οἰκίαν μὴ θέσῃς. El mismo día en CCAG IV (1903), p. 143: ὁ κόπτων
ξύλα κινδυνεύσει. Como Columela, Plinio, NH 18.321, aconseja las labores de corte, entre
otras, en luna menguante: Omnia, quae caeduntur, carpuntur, tondentur, innocentius decrescente
luna quam crescente unt.
como putrefación de la harina28; por último, de la vida profesional de los
campesinos recoge la prescripción de retirar el trigo de la era antes de que
vuelva a aparecer la creciente (659A); pues el grano que se retira durante
el plenilunio (ἀκμῇ τῆς σελήνης) no se seca bien y se rompe durante la
molienda, como aclara Angelo Casanova29 .
Como vemos, Plutarco reduce al mismo principio explicativo, la humedad
que viene de la luna, supersticiones de distintos estratos sociales. Y, dado que
la luna nueva no tiene efectos humectantes, así queda también justicada la
recomendación hesiódica de que se abra el vino cuando hay luna nueva30 ;
aunque, en este caso (y permítasenos la licencia de apartarnos del marco de
las Quaestiones Convivales) otra vez Plutarco hace extensivo su código físico
de explicaciones a una creencia popular que obedece a razones de otro tipo.
Sabemos, en efecto, que entre los campesinos se aconsejaba tener cuidado de
que, al abrir los cántaros de vino, no le llegara la luz, ni del sol ni de la luna, ya
que se podía agriar. Es por ese motivo y no por la humedad del plenilunio por
lo que se recomendaba abrirlos con luna nueva31 .
bi b l i o g r a f í a c i T a d a
B, J. & C, F., Les Mages hellénisés, II, Paris, 1973 (1ª ed. 1938).
C, A., "Plutarco, Quaest. conv. III, 659A: gli inussi della luna", in
A. P J & F. T (eds.), Valori letterari delle Opere di
Plutarco. Studi oerti al Professore Italo Gallo, Málaga - Logan, 2005, pp.
67-74.
C, I., Plutarco. Conversazioni a tavola. Libro terzo, Napoli, 2001.
L, S., Recherches sur la Lune, Leiden, 1979.
P J, A., "Trasilo y Tiberio. ¿Un fragmento de la Vita Tiberii de
Plutarco?", Ploutarchos, n.s., 5 (2007/2008) 91-8.
_____ "Alle frontiere della scienza. Plutarco e l'astrologia", in I. G (ed.),
Plutarco e le scienze, Genova, 1992, pp. 297-309.
28 Quaest. conv. 659D: λέγουσι δὲ καὶ τἄλευρον ἐν ταῖς πανσελήνοις ζυμοῦσθαι βέλτιον·
ἡ γὰρ ζύμωσις ὀλίγον ἀποδεῖ σῆψις εἶναι· κἂν ἀποβάλῃ τὸ μέτρον, ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν φθορὰν
ἀραιοῦσα καὶ λεπτύνουσα τὸ φύραμα προήγαγεν.
29 A. c., pp. 72-3.
30 Fr. 111: καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἄνοιξιν δὲ τοῦ πίθου φυσικῶς εἴρηκε. Μάλιστα γάρ φασι περὶ τὰς
πανσελήνους ἐξίστασθαι τὸν οἶνον διὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς σελήνης ὑγρὰν θέρμην, ὥστ᾿ εἰκότως ὅταν
ἥκιστα τοῦτο προβάλῃ κελεύει τὸν πίθον ἀνοίγειν καὶ τοῦ οἴνου πεῖραν λαμβάνειν.
31 Geop.7.5, recomendación atribuida a Zoroastro (cf. J. B F. C, 1973 (1ª ed.
1938), p. 189 y C. P, o.c. l, p. 102): Χρὴ ἀνοίγειν τοὺς πίθους, παραφυ λαττο μέ νους τὴν
τῶν ἄστρων ἐπιτολήν· τότε γὰρ κίνησις γίνεται τοῦ οἴνου, καὶ οὐ χρὴ τὸν οἶνον ψηλαρᾶν. …3
εἰ δὲ ἐν νυκτί, τῆς χρείας πολλάκις καλούσης, ἀνοίγειν μέλλεις τὸν πίθον, ἐπισκοπεῖν χρὴ τῷ
φωτὶ τῆς σελήνης.
455
Astrometeorología e inuencia lunar en las Quaestiones Convivales de Plutarco
P, C., La Lune dans la pensée grecque, Bruxelles, 1973.
T, S.-T., A Commentary on Plutarch's Table Talks , I, Göteborg,
1989.
V C, P., "Gli animali dello Zodiaco nell'opera di Plutarco", in J.
B (ed.), Les Grecs de l'Antiquité et les animaux. Le cas remarquable
de Plutarque, Lille, 2005, pp. 189-96.
S 6
Convivium Septem Sapientium
459
El Banquete de los Siete Sabios de Plutarco y los temas de sabiduría práctica
el ba n Q u e T e D e l o S Si e T e Sa b i o S d e pl u T a r c o
y l o s T e m a s d e s a b i d u r í a p r á c T i c a 1
J V T
Universidad de Zaragoza
Abstract
e aim of this article is to study why Plutarch makes use of the literary tradition of symposia to
place the legend of the Seven Sages. Instead of that we should expect, given the hold of Plato
over his work, Plutarch relegates philosophical argument to a type of dialogue focusing on
aspects of practical wisdom. In our opinion, the explanation of this apparent contrast must be
analyzed from a double and complementary perspective: rst, by considering the protagonists of
that ctitious meeting, the Seven Wise Men, the paradigm of archaic wisdom, which combined
both practical and intellectual learning; second, as a result, the suitability of form and content to
a symposiac framework deeply rooted in the literary tradition, just as it is attested by the early
patterns of the fourth century BC: Xenophon and Plato.
1. Plutarco sitúa la leyenda de los Siete Sabios dentro de la tradición de
Banquetes2 . Sin embargo, en contra lo que cabría esperar, dado el ascendiente
del maestro Platón sobre el de Queronea3 , en dicho encuentro legendario
nuestro autor subordina la argumentación losóca a un tipo de diálogo en el
que predomina la atención a aspectos de sabiduría práctica4 . En efecto, aunque
se enmarca dentro del género literario del symposion 5 , el contenido de la obra
parece acercarse más a la colección de saberes y conocimientos de la versión
de Jenofonte o de los Deipnosostas de Ateneo, que a la discusión losóca
de Platón6 . Ello, unido a otras particularidades de la obra, como que la lista
de los Sabios no se corresponda con la del diálogo Sobre la E de Delfos, llevó a
la crítica dieciochesca y decimonónica a dudar de su adscripción a Plutarco,
liación generalmente admitida desde la auctoritas de Wilamowitz7 . Y es que,
1 La realización de este trabajo ha tenido lugar en el marco del Proyecto de Investigación
HUM 2007-64772, auspiciado por la Dirección General de Investigación (Ministerio de
Educación).
2 Al respecto, fueron canónicos los trabajos de U. von W, 1890, G. H, 1893,
en particular, pp. 4-24, y el más reciente B. S, 1966, pp. 115-8.
3 Sin embargo, para J. M, 1997, p. 121, "Given such Platonic authority, it is hardly
surprising that Plutarch decided to attempt a variation on the theme, and the result is the
Dinner of the Seven Wise Men".
4 Como se desprende, en particular, de su comparación con las Quaestiones Convivales (para
J. M, 1997, p. 120, junto a Ateneo, ejemplos de "prescriptive symposion literature"). Mas,
con F. R A, 1996, p. 137, las vemos más próximas a los Problémata syssytiká de
Aristóteles y no en relación directa con los Banquetes, pues carecen de una "intención dramática".
Como indica Gallardo, 1972, p. 188, en nuestra pieza asistimos a un tipo literario muy afín al
clásico. Para más información vid. S.-T. T, 1996, en particular, pp. 39-47, y la revisión
plutarquea de E. S T, 2005.
5 Al respecto, cf. C. M O & J. G L, 1986, p. 209 sqq., con referencias
a las propuestas de J. D, 1985, pp. 7-35, y D. E. A, 1972, pp. 51-60.
6 Sobre esta cuestión vid. nuestra revisión en J. V T, 2007, pp. 29-47.
7 U. von W, 1890, 196-7. Sobre la autoría véase la revisión de C. M O
como ya pudimos apreciar en el anterior Simposio plutarqueo8 en la synkrisis
del tratamiento de la gura de Solón en el Bios y en el Banquete, el tipo de
forma y contenidos literarios escogido por el de Queronea determinan el uso
de la tradición9 .
En nuestra opinión, la explicación a este aparente contraste ha de
buscarse desde una perspectiva complementaria: los propios protagonistas del
cticio encuentro, los Siete Sabios, paradigma del ideal arcaico de sabiduría,
que combina sabiduría práctica e intelectual10 ; en segundo lugar, y como
consecuencia, la adecuación de contenido y forma a un marco simposiaco de
honda raigambre en la tradición literaria11 .
2. En la misma línea apuntada sobre las dudas de la autenticidad, se ha
insistido en las dicultades estructurales de interpretación de la pieza12 , las
& J. G L, 1986, pp. 210-2.
8 Cf. J. V T, 2008, pp. 501-14.
9 Para M.-L. P, 1956, p. 409, Plutarco "sembri considerare il lato pratico ed operante
della sapienza dei Savi. Ciò è indizio dell'uso di una fonte peripatetica", que podría ser Dicearco,
quien en su Βίοι φιλοσόφων habría jado el perl de los Sabios como expertos en la práctica
política (según la información de D. L. I 40, Dicearco denió a los sabios no como sofoí ni
lósofoi sino synetoí y nomothetikoí). Más adelante (pp. 410-1), añade la impronta de Hermipo y
su Περὶ τῶν σοφῶν en la elaboración de material didáctico con nes retóricos. En la misma línea
se pronuncia G. J. D. A, 1977, p. 28: "Plutarch will have known (a substantial part of)
this literature; he will also have been inuenced by it, and have made use of it, when he decide
to describe a simposium of the Seven Wise Men".
10 Así, R. P. M, 1993, p. 119, dene a los Sabios como "practical men, political advisers
or tyrants", y A. B, 2002, p. 94, cataloga el opúsculo como "une sorte d'apologie de la
sagesse grecque".
11 En efecto, aunque ya en el siglo V a.C. tenemos referencias a través de los sostas (Critias F 4
D elogia el simposio espartano), el género simposiaco como tal conoce los primeros antecedentes
en el siglo IV. No cabe duda de la inuencia de Platón (cf. J. M, 1997, p. 120: "a very well-
established genre, dominated by Plato's Symposium"). Sin embargo, el testimonio de Jenofonte
resulta aquí imprescindible para comprender la adaptación de una amplia tradición de dichos
en nuevas formas conversacionales en el ámbito de la prosa de instrucción: en Memorables (cf.
V. J . G, 1998, pp. 159-77, cap. IX, "e tradition of instructional literature"), en la tradición
de anécdotas de hombres sabios del Hierón ( V. J. G, 1986, p. 115 sqq.), con Simónides como
el primero de ellos, y en el Banquete de corte socrático, obra que tiene su origen, en palabras de
V. J. G, 1992, p. 74, "as a literary genre in the adaptation, development and transformation
of a wider collection of stories about what the wise men of old said and did at their symposia".
En este sentido, D. L. G, 1993, pp. 132-91, estudiando "e Symposia of the Cyropaedia",
demuestra el perfecto conocimiento del autor del marco literario simposiaco, adaptado al mundo
persa (vid., asimismo, M.-P. N, 2006, p. 144). No sorprende, por tanto, como apreciara G. J.
D. A, 1977, p. 32 y 1982, p. 62, la familiaridad de Plutarco con el Banquete de Jenofonte
(cf. Praec. 823).
12 Así, por ejemplo, J. M, 1997, p. 122, atribuye su diversidad al carácter conversacional:
"the structure is very delicately hinged together and takes some time to perceive". Sin embargo,
ya J. D, 1985, p. 178, observaba que "tout le plan du Banquet répond au schéma suivi
par Platon: le préambule dramatique, la première partie morcelée en un dialogue fait de courtes
répliques, la seconde partie, constituée d'exposés plus substantiels, cette conclusion abrupte
enn, qui donne l'impression que bien des questions restent en suspens et que l'auteur fuit
devant une conclusion". Sugerente, también, resulta la idea de F. R A, 1996,
p. 129, quien observa una estructura en anillo delimitada por la tradición antitiránica expuesta
por Tales del comienzo y la intervención nal de Anacarsis desplazando a Periandro por haber
461
El Banquete de los Siete Sabios de Plutarco y los temas de sabiduría práctica
cuales, en nuestra opinión, no resuelve la propuesta de Aune13, con frecuencia
citada. Así, el diálogo, siguiendo en ello el modelo platónico, comienza
súbitamente, en medio de una conversación entre Diocles y Nicarco14 . Un
diálogo epistolar que nos avisa de un carácter pedagógico-moralizante15
imprescindible para la comprensión de la obra, en el que Plutarco, a través
de Diocles, adopta, desde el principio, como el viejo y sabio maestro, el papel
de intermediario entre los sabios y su propio discípulo Nicarco16 : "ἐπεὶ σχολή
τε πάρεστι πολλὴ καὶ τὸ γῆρας οὐκ ἀξιόπιστον ἐγγυήσασθαι τὴν ἀναβολὴν
τοῦ λόγου, προθυμουμένοις ὑμῖν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἅπαντα διηγήσομαι" (146C).
A continuación, el relato del paseo del narrador Diocles con Tales, que nos
retrotrae al de los participantes del Banquete de Jenofonte o al de Sócrates y
Fedro en el diálogo homónimo de Platón, da comienzo a la acción argumental
ya encaminada.
2.1. Los siguientes pasajes, que coinciden con los momentos iniciales
del banquete17 , dan ya la pauta temática de la obra, jalonada por anécdotas
que ponen de relieve la competencia de los Sabios en toda suerte de saberes
prácticos (p. ej. la medición de la pirámide por Tales, citada en 147A). Dichas
habilidades se hacen patentes mediante el relato de anécdotas con un tono
de buen humor18 , propio de todo banquete, como cuando Diocles (147C)
ejercido la tiranía.
13 D. E. A, 1972, pp. 56-8, divide la pieza en: I. "Prooímion" histórico (cap. 1); II.
Composición narrativa introductoria (caps. 2-5); III. El "sympósion": conversación principal
(caps. 6-21). Tal esquema nos parece insuciente para una comprensión global en el marco del
género al que pertenece.
14 Al margen de posibles resonancias (cf. J. D, 1985, p. 179), son nombres cticios,
muy habituales en la época: M. D. G, 1972, p. 182. Más provechoso nos parece detectar
el posible alterego del autor en la gura de Diocles.
15 En este sentido, A. B, 2002, p. 101, habla de una obra "relativement scolaire", si bien,
con E. S T, 2005, p. 474, no compartimos el juicio que añade de que el autor
"ne s'est pas particulièrement illustré dans la reprise et l'adaptation des éléments traditionnels
de la syllogè".
16 El diálogo-simposio y su función al servicio de la paideia, previsto por el fundador de la
Academia, seguían vigentes: cf. E. S T, 2005, pp. 480-1.
17 A través de Tales (147D-148B), Plutarco ilustra su concepto simposial – cf. Quaest. Conv.
686D –, basado en 3 principios: 1. adecuada preparación – de los nobles a los que se dirige la
"carta" de Nicarco – para el banquete, porque "es más difícil encontrar el adorno conveniente al
carácter, que el adorno superuo e inútil para el cuerpo". Introduce comparaciones alusivas al mal
comensal que "es capaz de destruir y estropear" el mejor vino, comida o canto, considerando las
consecuencias negativas de "cuando la insolencia o el enfado han surgido por causa del vino". 2.
"el aceptar compartir el banquete con unos comensales elegidos al azar es propio de un hombre
poco inteligente", y, por ello, Quilón no aceptó la invitación hasta conocer los nombres de cada
uno de los invitados. 3. la costumbre egipcia de colocar una momia junto a los comensales
(citada por Hdt. II 78), que "aporta alguna ventaja, si impulsa a los comensales no a la bebida y al
placer, sino a la amistad y al afecto mutuo y los exhorta a no hacer una vida, que es muy corta por
el tiempo, larga por sus malas acciones", es el cierre paradigmático de su concepto de simposio.
De hecho, Plutarco sigue el modelo jenofonteo en el que las etapas del banquete real marcan la
pauta de la conversación (cf. J. M, 1931, p. 259, n. 2; J. M, 1997, p. 129).
18 Ciertamente, la combinación de un tono serio con otro cómico es la atmósfera característica
desde Jenofonte (cf. J. M, 1931, pp. 1-32; J. M, 1997, p. 122). Así, D. L. G,
recuerda la anécdota del muchacho que tiraba piedras a un perro y, habiéndole
dado a la suegra, exclamó "Tampoco así está mal" (cf. De tranq. anim. 467C),
en el fondo, una alegoría del buen gobernante que sabe cambiar el paso: διὸ
καὶ Σόλωνα σοφώτατον ἡγησάμην οὐ δεξάμενον τυραννεῖν (149C-D). Muy
divertida también es la que narra el prodigio de una cría de yegua, mitad
humana y mitad équido, presagio de la ruina de la familia de Periandro, y
que Tales interpreta menospreciando los ritos puricadores de Diocles: "mi
consejo es que no emplees a hombres tan jóvenes para guardar a los caballos, o
proporciónales mujeres" (149E).
En 148D aparece en escena – pues mucho hay de teatro en los banquetes
literarios – Eumetis o Cleobulina19 , por ser hija de Cleóbulo de Lindos, pero
también por su proverbial "sagacidad para los enigmas y su sabiduría". Junto
a ella20 , otro invitado especial a tan selecto grupo es Esopo, paradigma de la
sabiduría popular21 , cuyas fábulas serán el contrapunto a las intervenciones de
los Sabios.
El banquete ya está en marcha con los personajes precisos, mientras los
Sabios σοφῶν κἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν (150C) hacen gala de una moderación muy
del gusto de nuestro sacerdote de Apolo, y que está en consonancia con el
buen gobierno sobre el que se va a conversar tras terminar la comida (1ª fase
del banquete).
2.2. Entre los capítulos 6-12 se aborda el tema del gobierno del Estado,
recordando al legendario faraón Amasis, no a través de acciones concretas
sino de su capacidad para resolver enigmas, como cuando pide ayuda a Bías
para resolver la prueba del rey etíope (151B-E), que le prometió que, si se
bebía todo el mar, se quedaría con la isla Elefantina, a lo que Bías le aconseja
responder que primero "contuviera los ríos que van a parar al océano". La
conclusión es que las enseñanzas de los Sabios forman al buen gobernante.
Tras la intervención de Solón (cap. 7, 151F-D), conoceremos la prueba a la
que, a modo de réplica (152E), somete Amasis al rey etíope, y cuyo "mensaje
1993, p. 136, identica el σπουδαιογέλοιον como un principio propio del género, "in fact,
particularly associated with Socratic symposia in ancient times".
19 Con D. F. L, 2005, p. 349, podemos entrever también una propuesta didáctica en la
inclusión de este personaje femenino, un tanto sorprendente en el ambiente masculino de la
tradición simposíaca: "Cleobulina contribui, também, para transformar o espaço do banquete
numa cosmópolis dos vários tipos de sapiência: ela representaria, assim, uma sabedoria mais
simples, permeada de intuição política e humanidade". J. M, 1997, p. 134, apunta que
la escena "it provides a healthy diet of philosophical and political thought leavened with lively
characterization and picturesque setting which the conversation, sometimes with undertones of
irony and sadness, brings vividly to life".
20 La presencia simultánea de Cleobulina y Esopo no es casual. Así, cuando Cleodoro siente
ofendida su virilidad por la presencia de ésta (153E-154C), Esopo deende su asistencia. Vid. la
interpretación de D. F. L, 2005, p. 349: "ao colocar-se ao lado de Cleobulina, está também a
defender a mesma sabedoria popular que ele próprio representa".
21 J. M, 1931, p. 58, compara el papel de Esopo con el de Aristófanes en el Banquete
de Platón, en su condición de representantes de una cultura más popular que otros participantes.
Por su parte, S. J, 1997, pp. 49-52, observa que el autor se sirve del personaje de
Esopo para introducir a través de sus fábulas las respuestas que le interesaban de los Sabios.
463
El Banquete de los Siete Sabios de Plutarco y los temas de sabiduría práctica
lamentable" (sic, ἀχνυμένη σκυτάλη; cf. Archil. 185 W) corrige Tales22 ,
siguiendo su juego de preguntas y respuestas que culmina en: "Τί ῥᾷστον; " " τὸ
κατὰ φύσιν, ἐπεὶ πρὸς ἡδονάς γε πολλάκις ἀπαγορεύουσιν" (153C-D). Frente
al aparente alejamiento del Banquete del maestro Platón visto por algunos, el
eco de su pensamiento comienza a atisbarse en esta declaración de principios
plutarqueos.
Sin embargo, esta suerte de recopilación de saberes no estaría completa sin
contar con Hesíodo23 , a quien Plutarco introduce (cap. 10) en certamen con
Lesques, autor de la Pequeña Ilíada, y no con Homero, obteniendo el de Ascra
el trípode de la victoria en los funerales de Andamante. La autoridad de sus
poemas se equipara a la de los enigmas que se plantean en la conversación.
2.3. Agotado el tema del gobierno del Estado, Diocles introduce el del
gobierno de la casa (cap. 12): "βασιλείας μὲν γὰρ καὶ πόλεις ὀλίγοι κυβερνῶσιν,
ἑστίας δὲ πᾶσιν ἡμῖν καὶ οἴκου μέτεστι" (154F). De la secuencia de respuestas
de los presentes24 , destacamos la de Quilón, a través del cual el autor conecta el
gobierno de la casa con el político. Éste ilustra su faceta política con la respuesta
que dio Licurgo a alguien que le aconsejaba establecer una democracia en su
ciudad y al que contestó "primero establece en tu casa una democracia".
El nal del turno de respuestas sirve a Plutarco para retardar la narración
e introducir el tema de la bebida25 en el banquete (cap. 13), que deja clara su
22 La coincidencia con la Vida de Tales de D. L. I 35 demuestra, para A. B, 2002, p.
96, la gran dependencia de este relato de las fuentes antiguas, especialmente en lo referente a
sentencias y apotegmas. Sin embargo, con C. M O & J. G L, 1986, p.
241 n. 96, quizás no sean palabras reales de Tales sino un reejo del pensamiento platónico y
neoplatónico.
23 Ciertamente, como apunta V. J. G, 1998, p. 160 – siguiendo a M. L. W, 1978
–, Trabajos y días debe ser considerada el primer testimonio de una tradición de "wisdom
literature", de honda raigambre oriental, en la que se instalará la tradición sapiencial de los Sabios.
Posteriormente, la propia poesía de sus representantes constituye el vehículo de propagación de
su ideario ( J. V T, 2008, p. 506), hasta llegar al siglo IV en el que la escuela socrática
– A. B, 2002, p. 99, habla de "reprise du genre littéraire du logos oikonomikos"– habría
jugado un papel destacado en el paso al ámbito de la prosa del pensamiento práctico (como las
χρεῖαι de Aristipo, contemporáneo de Sócrates, citado por D. L. 2.48 y 86). Esta larga tradición
gnomológica queda congurada denitivamente en época helenística, a partir de sentencias
y apotegmas atribuidos a los Sabios, de los que es deudor el polígrafo de Queronea (cf. A.
B, 2002, p. 102: "le matériel gnomologique et apophtegmatique utilisé par Plutarque
constituerait même, pour ainsi dire, l'armature du dialogue"). En denitiva, como propone R.
P. M, 1993, p. 123, "e "sympotic" strain in the stories of the Seven Sages (as in the tale
of their banqueting together) would not, then, be a recent invention, but a relic of a much older
context", por lo que el Banquete plutarqueo sería "an expression of a continuing tradition, not
just Plutarch's innovation", sin menoscabo de su aportación personal.
24 Cada uno de los contertulios responde de acuerdo con su perl: Esopo con la fábula de
la zorra y la pantera que ilustra la belleza interior "de los que habitan una casa honrada y feliz";
Solón propugna que la adquisición de riquezas sea sin mediar injusticia y que sean gastadas con
mesura; Bías habla del respeto a las leyes dentro y fuera de casa; Tales preere la casa que permite
disfrutar del mayor descanso; Cleóbulo alaba al dueño que tiene más gente que lo quiera que lo
tema; y para Pítaco la ideal es la que no necesita nada superuo ni carece de lo necesario.
25 Las consecuencias de la ingesta excesiva de vino es un tema recurrente en la tradición: en
el Banquete de Jenofonte, con el personaje del bufón Filipo (1.11-16), y en el de Platón, al que
voluntad de adscripción al género al marcar el tiempo interno del banquete (cf.
cap. 5). Los consejos al respecto de Hesíodo y Homero vuelven a convertir a la
épica en fuente de sabiduría.
Tras este paréntesis, entre los caps. 14 y 16, se retoma en detalle la
discusión sobre el gobierno de la casa26 . Los temas se suceden perfectamente
engarzados: abre Quersias (157A) planteando la cuestión de la medida de
la propiedad adecuada para cada individuo, ideal imposible para Cleóbulo,
quien, en conversación con el médico Cleodoro, lo compara con la dosis de
los medicamentos: "También tú […] a tus enfermos no les recetas lo mismo a
todos, sino a cada uno lo que le conviene". Ello sirve para introducir el tema de
la dieta, para el cual Solón alude como autoridad a la "dieta de Epiménides",
si bien nalmente preere a Hesíodo, presente a lo largo de todo el tratado,
pero con un protagonismo especial en estos párrafos en los que es reconocida
su competencia ὡς δῆλός ἐστιν οὐκ ἀμελῶς οὐδ' ἀπείρως περὶ διαίτης 27 . Es
éste un pasaje decisivo para entender este tratado, tan extraño para algunos
críticos, porque nos está ofreciendo las claves del pensamiento de Plutarco,
aquí más délco que nunca. Establecida la primacía de Hesíodo, Cleodoro
inviste a Esopo, el octavo Sabio, como discípulo de aquél "con más derecho que
Epiménides"28 , y se atribuye al fabulista "el origen de esa hermosa y variada
sabiduría" (158B), lo que demuestra la conciencia de una tradición sapiencial
por parte del autor.
No obstante, a lo largo de los capítulos 15 y 16, el tema del régimen de
vida va a adquirir una nueva dimensión que pone de relieve la clara conexión
concurre Alcibíades en lamentable estado (212b sqq.). Cf. J. V T, 2007, p. 33.
26 Como indica A. B, 2002, p. 99, "Le thème de l'οἰκονομία permet ainsi à Plutarque
d'évoquer le rapport entre gouvernement de la cité et gestion domestique". No obstante, la
presencia de estos contenidos adquiere una especial relevancia desde el punto de vista literario,
pues se atribuye a la tradición socrática la atención a estos temas: cf. F. R, 1990. Ello
reforzaría la idea de quienes, como D. M, 2001, p. 89, intuyen el inujo socrático sobre
el simposio: "Il ruolo del socratismo nel ripensamento globale della vita è decisivo. E poiché
il socratismo segna la nascita della losoa in senso stretto, in quanto riessione sistematica
sui principi dell'essere, del conoscere e del dover essere (perciò, della realtà, della conoscenza
e della morale), è chiaro che proprio la riessione dell'ambiente socratico decide il destino di
una pratica sociale che al socratismo certo preesisteva, ma che quella cultura losoca ha scelto
come luogo privilegiato di comunicazione". Los últimos años del siglo V y primeras décadas
del IV serían los de la maduración de la consideración losóca de esta práctica social. A este
respecto J. M, 1931, p. 124, relativiza la inuencia de Sócrates, quien "provides a sort
of endpoint". Pese a admitir el modelo socrático en la vinculación del diálogo a Delfos, en su
temática política y en la presencia de fábulas esópicas, concluye que éstas fueron marginales
dentro de su actividad.
27 Y es que, en efecto, en Hesíodo, se encuentra ya una detallada guía, aquí reproducida
(158A-B), sobre el régimen de comidas (Trabajos 559 sqq.), la mezcla del vino (Trabajos 592-5),
el valor del agua (Trabajos 735-741), del baño (Trabajos 753), sobre las mujeres (Trabajos 373-5
y 699-705), el tiempo propicio para la relación sexual (Trabajos 735-6 y 812) y el modo como se
han de sentar los recién nacidos (Trabajos 750-2). Cf. C. M O & J. G L,
1986, p. 257.
28 La común utilización por parte de Esopo (4 y 4a P) de la fábula del halcón y el
ruiseñor, que relatara Hesíodo (Trabajos 203 sqq.), es para Cleodoro el argumento de peso a
favor del fabulista.
465
El Banquete de los Siete Sabios de Plutarco y los temas de sabiduría práctica
para Plutarco entre sociedad e individuo, destinatario de su παιδεία. Inquirido
Solón por Cleodoro sobre su modelo, y respondiendo aquél que "de los bienes
mayores y más importantes, el segundo es necesitar muy poco alimento" y,
el primero, "τὸ μηδ' ὅλως τροφῆς δεῖσθαι", la réplica casi airada del médico
introduce principios propios del estoicismo29 sobre la condición humana, cuya
vida "se consume en una serie de trabajos", la mayoría de los cuales los provoca
"ἡ τῆς τροφῆς χρεία καὶ παρασκευὴ τὰς πλείστας παρακαλεῖ" (158D-E). Mas
la necesidad constituye el principio de nuestra civilización: el hambre nos llevó
a la invención de la agricultura, ésta a las artes y ocios, de éstos se pasó a las
honras a los dioses y el respeto a los dioses nos llevó a practicar los placeres de
Afrodita en la intimidad de la noche y no al aire libre como bestias. En suma,
"el que no necesita alimento tampoco necesita el cuerpo y eso sería no tener
necesidad de sí mismo" (159A). La respuesta de Solón30 , que ocupa todo el cap.
16, frente a la defensa de las τέχναι que ha llevado a cabo el iatros Cleodoro,
sirve a Plutarco para realizar una declaración de principios religioso-losóca,
que se apoya en el prestigio de Solón31 , quien ocupa el primer asiento por saber
y edad32 . En efecto, comenzando con planteamientos órcos, que postulan la
impureza de la carne y, por ende, la prohibición de su ingesta, Solón considera
la alimentación como un signo de esclavitud del ser humano: la única salida es
llegar a ser αὐτάρκη καὶ ἀπροσδεᾶ (159C). En consecuencia, enlazando con un
pensamiento neoplatónico, el alma esta encerrada siempre en el cuerpo, ὥσπερ
ἐν μυλῶνι τῷ σώματι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐγκεκαλυμμένην ἀεὶ περὶ τὴν τῆς τροφῆς
χρείαν κυκλοῦσαν (159D).
A partir de aquí, Plutarco hace patente su casi devota delidad al
pensamiento de Platón, como cuando Solón prosigue diciendo "por falta de
conocimiento de las cosas bellas, nos contentamos con una vida basada en
las obligaciones" (160C), lo cual, sin duda, desdice a quienes quisieron ver un
alejamiento del Banquete de Platón33 . En denitiva, concluye el primero de
29 Cf. C. M O & J. G L, 1986, p. 259 n. 164.
30 M. D. G, 1972, p. 186, considera que el discurso de Solón está inspirado en el de
Sócrates en el Fedón 64a-67b de Platón.
31 En dicha consideración sigue la opinión de su venerado maestro Platón, quien a través de
Critias (Ti. 20d), había calicado a Solón como "el más sabio de los Siete": cf. J. V T,
2008, p. 505. G. J. D. A, 1977, p. 29, empero, se sorprende de que Plutarco "father his
platonizing ideas on the Seven Sages, especially on Solon, who as a rule were considered to be
the prominent representatives of a more practical and pedestrian wisdom".
32 Así lo relata en 151E, cuando Quilón dice "que era justo que Solón comenzara la
disertación, no sólo porque aventajaba a todos por la edad y estaba casualmente sentado el
primero, sino porque ejercía el poder más elevado y perfecto por haberles dado a los atenienses
sus leyes": vid. J. V T, 2008, p. 512.
33 No cabe duda de que las palabras de Solón nos traen resonancias de la intervención
de la enigmática Diótima (209e-212a) en el Banquete platónico, en uno de los episodios más
renombrados en el que se describen los pasos necesarios para alcanzar el ideal de perfección
de belleza, τὸ καλόν – τὰ καλά γνῷ αὐτὸ τελευτῶν ὃ ἔστι καλόν (211c) – y, a través de él, la
excelencia verdadera – τεκόντι δὲ ἀρετὴν ἀληθῆ (212a). Es cierto que ya no cabe, como en aquél,
el elogio del amor homosexual como modelo de perfección, pero es que el de Queronea no hace
sino seguir algo que ya se había anticipado en la obra homónima de Jenofonte (una comparación
entre ambos testimonios puede encontrarse en J. V T, 2007, pp. 35 sqq.), en la que los
los Sabios, el alma alimenta el cuerpo con esfuerzo y dedicación pero, si fuera
liberada de esta servidumbre, viviría "εἰς αὑτὴν ὁρῶσα καὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν,
οὐδενὸς περισπῶντος οὐδ' ἀπάγοντος." (160C), concepto que es la base del
pensamiento de Platón34 . No obstante, por si nos cabe alguna duda de su sentido
último, Diocles-Plutarco vuelve al eje argumental: "Τὰ μὲν οὖν ῥηθέντα περὶ
τροφῆς, ὦ Νίκαρχε, ταῦτ' ἦν".
2.4. Como el Alcibíades del Banquete de Platón o el empresario siracusano
que llega con su compañía de actores en el de Jenofonte, la irrupción súbita de
Gorgo35 , el hermano de Periandro que entra "cuando todavía estaba hablando
Solón", rompe el hilo argumental y, a través de una larga intervención (caps.
17-20), a caballo entre el relato verídico y el mito36 (como el del antropoide en
Platón o el mimo sobre los amores de Dioniso y Ariadna representado en el
de Jenofonte), introduce la leyenda etiológica del músico Arión37 , que ilustra
los principios de la Providencia divina que rigen el gobierno del Universo38 ,
principios que nuestro autor resume en la máxima délca por excelencia39 ,
"nada en demasía", puesta en boca de Quilón. Esta máxima da pie, en el capítulo
nal, a una animada discusión en la que se entremezcla la devoción a Delfos40 ,
misterios del amor que conducen a la perfección, se realizan a través del amor heterosexual y
conyugal (1.10). Esta es, de hecho, la tesis principal del trabajo de J. M, 1997, pp. 126-
34: "its deliberate omission of homosexual themes and its substitution of heterosexuality into
the traditional symposion context" (p. 134).
34 Cf. A. B, 2002, pp. 98-9.
35 J. M, 1997, p. 131, subraya que "the arrival of Gorgos structurally resembles de
arrival of Alcibiades in Plato in that it changes the direction of discussion". La del empresario
siracusano que va a representar el mimo de Dioniso y Ariadna en el de Jenofonte tiene la misma
función estructural, lo cual implica un rasgo de género y no una mera imitación: cf. J. V
T, 2007, p. 35.
36 M. D. G, 1972, p. 186, habla de "las páginas más elevadas de toda la obra" y
subraya que Plutarco sigue "la técnica platónica del diálogo, según la cual se introduce un mito
lleno de belleza y poesía y de él se sacan conclusiones fundamentales". Y no sólo en el de Platón.
Debe destacarse que hay una adecuación argumental al contexto simposiaco: a Arión se atribuye
la invención del ditirambo, asociado al culto dionisíaco, y el mimo representado en el jenofonteo
versa sobre los amores de Dioniso y Ariadna.
37 Sobre el mito de Arión, J. M, 1997, p. 131, opina que "not arbitrary chosen, but
sum up some of the most important themes of the dialogue, including the theme of love".
En nuestra opinión, la tendencia de su estudio a reducir al tema amoroso el signicado de la
obra, con ser importante, hace que se le escape el profundo sentido délco de un mito que,
con A. B, 2002, p. 101, "devait faire parties du patrimoine delphique à la disposition de
Plutarque".
38 Como apunta M. D. G, 1972, p. 187, la armación de Anacarsis, ψυχῆς γὰρ
ὄργανον τὸ σῶμα, θεοῦ δ᾽ ἡ ψυχή (163E), es la culminación de toda la losofía platónica. Cf. F.
R A, 1996, p. 129: "en denitiva, lo que se hace es pasar del gobierno de los
hombres al gobierno de Dios: todo está calculado".
39 En este sentido, seguimos a A. B, 2002, p. 97, cuando arma que "Il n'y a pas de
grande surprise à ce que la prête d'Apollon eut recours aux maximes delphiques", que una larga
tradición había asociado a los Siete Sabios (cf. Demetrio, FGrHist 228 F 114; Diodoro IX
10.1-4).
40 Suscribimos las palabras de E. S T, 2005, p. 474, para quien la tradición
de los Siete Sabios tiene una indiscutible impronta délca – que también explicaría la presencia
de Esopo –, "aunque luego se ha convertido en un bien "mostrenco" de las sucesivas etapas de
467
El Banquete de los Siete Sabios de Plutarco y los temas de sabiduría práctica
el signicado de sus máximas, la autoridad sapiencial de los Sabios ligados a
ellas y el vínculo de las fábulas de Esopo con esta tradición(164B), culminando
la narración en el destino al que el autor nos quería llevar: la renacida autoridad
del santuario de Apolo. En este contexto, los juegos literarios sobre otras
máximas y anécdotas délcas llevan a los comensales a la noche, referencia
temporal que conrma la atención al canon simposiaco, aquí (164D) a través
de la cita erudita del verso homérico41 :
νὺξ δ' ἤδη τελέθει· ἀγαθὸν καὶ νυκτὶ πιθέσθαι.
(Il . 7.282 y 293)
3. Llegados al nal de la obra, es, pues, el momento de establecer las
conclusiones a las que el propio autor nos ha llevado:
– La obra no es una recopilación inconexa de anécdotas sino que muestra
un esquema claro en el que los temas de sabiduría práctica, propios de los
protagonistas, actúan como elemento aglutinador. Así, se pasa del buen
gobierno42 del Estado al buen gobierno de la casa, de éste al buen gobierno/
cuidado del cuerpo, del cuerpo al alma y de esta a Dios, con su sede en Delfos
y sus principios apolíneos resumidos en la máxima: nada en demasía43 . En
consecuencia, dado el carácter práctico de las máximas délcas, el Banquete de
los Siete Sabios no podía seguir al pie de la letra el modelo de Platón y sí otros
referentes más cercanos a la tradición sapiencial.
– Del mismo modo, con mayor claridad que en cualquier otra de sus obras
dialógicas o de temática socrático-platónica, el Banquete plutarqueo se enmarca
claramente en el esquema de dicho género literario44 . El diálogo simposiaco,
la cultura griega". Por ello, no comparte la idea de A. B, 2002, p. 102), de que la leyenda
esté desprovista de su sentido inicial, "sino que más bien lo veo recuperado, en cuanto a la
reivindicación apolínea y religiosa que preside esta obra, sobre todo a partir de la entrada en
escena de Gorgo, el hijo de Periandro, y el relato del rescate de Arión".
41 La idea de prevenir una deriva "indeseada" une los Banquetes jenofonteo y plutarqueo: vid.
J. V T, 2007, p. 35. Así, J. M, 1997, p. 134, señala que "Solon's bringing the
dialogue to an abrupt end, we feel, prevents the conversation straying further on to dangerous
ground, as the irony of Periander's disastrous marriage break-up threatens to re-emerge".
42 Vid. A. B, 2002, p. 94: "l'objectif caché de Plutarque fut de décrire un banquet
exemplaire pour ses contemporains dont le thème central, récurrent dans la littérature de cette
époque, était l'οἰκονομία des États, des maisons et du Cosmos".
43 Un simposio délco de principio – cuando Plutarco se nos disfraza de Diocles, sacerdote
puricador – a n, por ser Delfos sede de la sabiduría máxima que todo joven bien instruido
debe seguir para alcanzar las máximas metas. Así, J. S, 2000, p. 205, pone de relieve que
el Banquete fue escrito poco después de que Plutarco fuera nombrado sacerdote en Delfos. En
una línea similar, A. B, 2002, p. 94 subraya "la volonté de Plutarque de sauver de l'oubli et
de réactualiser le capital culturel de Delphes".
44 No compartimos la armación de J. S, 2000, p. 160, de que "est une imitation
directe de Platon", aunque sí coincidimos en que Plutarco percibiera "les possibilités que lui
orait le dialogue pour exposer les idées qui par ailleurs faisaient l'objet de son enseignement".
Tampoco nos parece, como añade, que se viera obligado a abandonar una tradición para la que
no estaba dotado como Luciano: "semble avoir quelque peu hésité dans la conception même du
banquet et avoir cédé à des sollicitations divergentes; l'une plutôt pédagogique, visant à donner
desde la tradición socrática, reemplaza a la poesía como marco sapiencial y
cada autor adopta libremente los temas de discusión, lo que explica las lógicas
"desviaciones" del referente de Platón. Por otra parte, la introducción de temas
de carácter práctico y la preeminencia del eros heterosexual y conyugal –
frente al homoerotismo platónico – está perfectamente atestiguado desde los
comienzos del género en prosa en la obra de Jenofonte.
– En denitiva, nos hallamos ante un ejemplar de carácter didáctico, con
pinceladas del género epistolar en su forma, dirigido a los jóvenes aristócratas,
futuros gobernantes del Imperio romano, cuyo paradigma de conducta se
encuentra en las máximas de los Sabios – la mayoría de los cuales habían
ejercido el poder –, como cuando Tales arma que "Un tirano que preera
gobernar a esclavos más que a hombres libres en nada se diferencia de un
agricultor que preera recolectar cizaña y malas hierbas en lugar de trigo y
cebada." (147C). Los ideales que emanan de este banquete délco son el buen
gobierno y la lantropía, como en las ya citadas cualidades encarnadas por
Cleobulina (148D): νοῦς […] πολιτικὸς καὶ φιλάνθρωπον ἦθος.
bi b l i o g r a f í a c i T a d a
A, G. J. D., "Political thought in Plutarch's Convivium Septem
Sapientium", Mnemosyne, 30.1 (1977) 28-39.
_____ Plutarch's Political ought, Amsterdam/Oxford/Nueva York, 1982.
A, D. E., "Septem sapientium convivium", en H. D. B (ed.), Plutarch's
eological Writings and Early Christian Literature, Leiden, 1972, pp. 51-
105.
B, A., Les Sept Sages de la Grèce Antique. Transmission et utilisation d'un
patrimoine légendaire d'Hérodote à Plutarque, París, 2002.
dans un panorama de la philosophie quelques lumières sur les diverses origines de la sagesse
hellénique, l'autre, plutôt esthétique, visant à composer un nouveau type de banquet; les deux
objectifs ne se marient pas avec bonheur, l'un embarrassant l'autre" (p. 162). No parece que esta
obra entusiasme a la escuela francesa, porque también dice A. B, 2002, p. 93: "Malgré
le déploiement de grands eorts pour esquisser une scène pittoresque, le prête de Delphes ne
s'est malheureusement pas illustré pour son habilité dans l'écriture du dialogue légendaire". En
una línea más productiva, F. R A, 1996, p. 136, admite la cercanía al género
del banquete socrático-platónico, pero partiendo de una tradición helenística escrita. No
compartimos, empero, la inuencia de los modelos cínicos más allá de la inclusión, como sabio,
del cínico Anacarsis, que reemplaza a Periandro en el grupo por su condición de tirano: "Estos
Banquetes cínicos de los Siete Sabios han sido la base, sin duda, del Banquete de Plutarco, que
los ha reelaborado, sin renunciar, sin duda, a introducir más material de los mismos orígenes" (p.
139). Estos hipotéticos Banquetes estaban relacionados con el de Menipo, del que poco sabemos
(cf. J. M, 1931, p. 211 sqq.), que inuyó en el de Plutarco y en los de Meleagro, Lucilio,
Varrón, Horacio, Petronio, Luciano y los julianos. No lo tiene tan claro D. F. L, 2005, p. 345:
"Menos evidente se agura, no entanto, a hipótese de existir uma ou várias obras de premeio".
En suma, aunque, en su forma, derivaba lógicamente de "viejas tradiciones", es plenamente
original en su contenido.
469
El Banquete de los Siete Sabios de Plutarco y los temas de sabiduría práctica
G, M. D., "Estado actual de los estudios sobre los simposios de
Platón, Jenofonte y Plutarco", CFC, 3 (1972) 127-91.
G, D. L., Xenophon's Cyropaedia. Style, Genre, and Literary Technique,
Oxford, 1993.
G, V. J., "Xenophon's Hiero and the Meeting of the Wise Man and Tyrant
in Greek Literature", CQ, 36 (1986) 115-23.
_____ "Xenophon's Symposion: e Display of Wisdom", Hermes, 120 (1992)
58-75.
_____ e Framing of Socrates: e Literary Interpretation of Xenophon's
Memorabilia, Stuttgart, 1998.
H, G., Plutarch von Chaeronea, der Verfasser des Gastmahl der 7 Weissen,
Diss. Würzburgo-Burghausen, 1893.
J, S., Il convitato sullo sgabello: Plutarco, Esopo ed i Sette Savi, Roma,
1997.
L, D. F., "Plutarco e a tradição dos Sete Sábios", en M. J .
(eds.), Plutarc a la seva època: Paideia i societat. Actas del VIII Simposio
Internacional de la Sociedad Española de Plutarquistas (Barcelona, 6-8
Noviembre, 2003), Barcelona, 2005, pp. 343-51.
M, J., Symposion, Paderborn, 1931.
M, R. P., "e Seven Sages as Performers of Wisdom", en C. D
& L. K (eds.), Cultural Poetics in Ancient Greece: Cult, Performance,
Politics, Cambridge, 1993, pp. 108-28.
M, J., "Plutarch's Dinner of the Seven Wise Men and its place in
symposion literature", in J. M (ed.), Plutarch and his Intellectual
World, Londres, 1997, pp. 119-40.
M, D., Il simposio, Roma-Bari, 2001.
N, M.-P., "Symposion, philanthrôpia et empire dans la Cyropédie de
Xénophon", en P. B-D & E. P (eds.), Φιλολογία.
Mélanges oerts a M. Casevitz, Lyon, 2006, pp. 133-46.
P, M.-L., "Inuenza della tradizione dei Sette Savi nella Vita di Solone
di Plutarco", REG, 69 (1956) 377-411.
R A, F., "Géneros helenísticos en el Banquete de los Siete
Sabios", en J. A. F D F. P P (eds.),
Estudios sobre Plutarco: aspectos formales. Actas del IV Simposio Español
sobre Plutarco (Salamanca, 26-28 de Mayo, 1994), Madrid, 1996, pp.
125-42.
R, F., "Inussi Antistenici nell'Economico di Senofonte", Prometheus ,
16 (1990) 207-16.
470
José Vela Tejada
S, J., Plutarque de Chéronée: un philosophe dans le siècle, París, 2000.
S, B., "Zur Geschichte von Gastmahl der Sieben Weissen", en B. S,
Gesammelte Schriften, Göttingen, 1966.
S T, E., "Diálogo, losofía y simposio", en M. J .
(eds.), Plutarc a la seva època: Paideia i societat. Actas del VIII Simposio
Internacional de la Sociedad Española de Plutarquistas (Barcelona, 6-8
Noviembre, 2003), Barcelona, 2005, pp. 463-83.
T, S.-T., "Principles of Composition in the Quaestiones Convivales",
en J. A. F D F. P P (eds.), Estudios
sobre Plutarco: aspectos formales. Actas del IV Simposio Español sobre
Plutarco (Salamanca, 26 a 28 de Mayo, 1994), Madrid, 1996, pp. 39-
48.
V T, J., "Έρως και Παιδεία στο Συμπόσιο του Ξενοφώντα: είναι
δυνατή μια σύγκριση με το Συμπόσιο του Πλάτωνα", Αριάδνη, 13
(2007) 29-47.
_____ "El Banquete de los Siete Sabios y la Vida de Solón de Plutarco: mito
político y contexto literario", en A. G. N (ed.), e Unity of
Plutarch's Work: Moralia emes in the Lives, Features of the Lives in the
Moralia, Berlín/Nueva York, 2008, pp. 501-14.
W, M. L., Hesiod. Works and Days, Oxford, 1978.
W, U. von, "Zum Gastmahl der Sieben Weisen", Hermes, 25 (1890)
196-227.
Ediciones y traducción en español del Septem sapientium convivium
B, F. C. (ed.), Plutarch's moralia, vol. II, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1928, (repr. 1962).
D, J. ., Plutarque. Œuvres morales, tome II, París, 1985.
M O, C. & G L, J., Obras morales y de costumbres, vol. II,
Madrid, 1986.
471
El Banquete de los Siete Sabios como tour de force escolar
el ba n Q u e T e D e l o S Si e T e Sa b i o S c o m o T o u r D e f o r c e e s c o l a r
R G E
Universidad de Salamanca
Abstract
e main issue of this contribution is to point out the genre of anecdote (χρεία) that Plutarch
relates to the symposiac sphere according to the classication specied in progymnasmatic
manuals, and to show how this rhetorical device works in the dialogization process of the
symposium as a literary genre.
: exercice qui exige de la force.
– . Action dicile accomplie avec une
habilité remarquable. 2. Action ou moyen d'action
qui suppose de l'adresse, de l'habileté, de la malice,
de la ruse. Le Nouveau Petit Robert (2004)
1. En 1928 Frank C. Babbitt calicó esta obra como un tour de force
literario1 . El empeño de Plutarco, desde plena época imperial, por recrear a un
grupo legendario de legisladores y gobernantes de época arcaica en un género
de época clásica ya sancionado por Platón y Jenofonte, exigía de su autor una
gran energía (ἐνέργεια) y habilidad (δεινότης). Debía resolver ante todo dos
operaciones difíciles: la construcción escénica y revestir las conversaciones de
sus personajes de naturalidad y encanto.
J. J. Reiske en el siglo XVIII y R. Volkmann2 en el XIX, con vistas al
resultado y no a la intención, lamentan el abuso de anacronismos y la ausencia
de un plan de conjunto, incluso el primero se permite armar que Tales de
Mileto y los Sabios, por razones cronológicas, no habrían podido coincidir
espacialmente3 . Según esta objeción, a Plutarco el versátil escritor de las
diversas formas literarias que conforman los Moralia, lo desacredita Plutarco
el grave historiador de las programáticas Vidas paralelas. Quienes ejercieron la
crítica interna del tratado4 concluyeron que nos encontrábamos ante un trabajo
1 F. C. B, 1956, p. 346. La edición utilizada para este trabajo es la de J. D,
Plutarque. Le Banquet des Septs Sages in J. D . (eds.), 1985. La traducción citada
es la de C. M O & J. G L, Plutarco. Obras Morales y de Costumbres , II,
Madrid, 1986.
2 R. V, 1967.
3 En D. A. W, 1821, p. 201 encontramos citado el curioso reparo de Reiske:
"Non valde congruit historiae, quod hunc cto nomine Niloxenum dictum Naucratitam facit. Nam
aletis aetate, qui Cyro et Croeso aequalis uixit, Naucratis nondum erat, condita sub Inaro in Aegypto
regnante et Artaxerxe in Perside circa Olymp. 90. teste Strabone p. 1153. Etiam aetates sapientium
haud satis apte congruunt. Periander Solone est antiquior: mitto alium". De ahí que W
exclamara a continuación: "Hoc mihi est judicium docti hominis! si judicium dici potest temerarium
dictum properanter scribentis."
4 C. M en su Geschichte des Ursprungs, Fortgangs und Verfalls der Wissenschaften in
472
Rodolfo González Equihua
escolar5 escrito por un sosta contemporáneo. Aquí escolar y sofístico, desde
luego, son dos atributos negativos: censuran y limitan el alcance del Banquete
plutarqueo. Señalan la falta de inventiva, el estigma de lo inacabado y el exceso
de licencias literarias, de articio.
Mi objetivo, no obstante, es analizar este tratado precisamente a través de
su maniesto carácter escolar y la luz que arroja en el periodo de formación
de su autor, acaso el más arduo y laborioso, aquel en que se escogen y ensayan
varios caminos y también aquel en que se descubren los territorios y vados
que tan sólo conviene mirar desde las orillas. Sobre todo, si aceptamos que
la fecha asignada a esta obra en la carrera de Plutarco apunta aún a su etapa
de formación6 . Clasicando esta obra como un ejercicio escolar apreciaríamos
mejor y seríamos más condescendientes con su temeraria invención y con el
deliberado anacronismo que la permea, al tiempo que nos entregaría los trazos
inestables de todo empeño por adquirir un estilo propio.
2. Cuando se habla de ejercicio escolar hemos de referirnos obligadamente
a uno de los métodos más productivos en la época imperial para el aprendizaje
gradual de la retórica y de sus formas discursivas fundamentales: los
progymnásmata o ejercicios de preparación, cuya formulación, esquematización
e incluso ejemplicación nos legaron Teón de Alejandría, Hermógenes de
Tarso, Aftonio de Antioquía y Nicolás de Mira7 , por mencionar tan sólo los
manuales griegos que nos han sobrevivido y que datan del siglo I al V d.C8 .
Que Plutarco se aplicara a su estudio y laboriosa asimilación nos explica en
parte que dos ejercicios constituyan las líneas directrices de su trabajo literario:
por una parte, la synkrisis vertebra el plan biográco de las Vidas paralelas, así
como por la otra la profusa producción "chreica"9 recorre sus Ensayos misceláneos
y cartas, como quería Babbitt que tituláramos sus tratados morales10 .
Apoyándonos tan sólo en el vínculo temporal, que haría factible el textual
Griechenland, Lemgo, 1781, I, p. 135 sqq., seguido por R. V, 1967, posturas nalmente
adoptadas por las historias de la literatura griega de W. C, 1889 y M. C, 1928.
5 Según la síntesis de las posturas críticas ante el tratado que, en su edición, hace J. D,
1985, p. 171: "Ce recueil de platitudes ne pourrait être l'œuvre de l'auteur des Moralia: ce ne
serait qu'un travail scolaire écrit par un sophiste contemporain".
6 J. S, 2000, p. 160: "On peut discuter à l'inni sur la date du Banquet. Aucun
argument n'est déterminant, les allusions à la démocratie pas plus que les autres. On doit songer
plutôt à un exercice un peu articiel des années d'enseignement, entre 80 et 90 ou même 95".
7 Cf. M. P & G. B, 1997; G. A. K, 2003. La traducción de los
progymnasmata citada en este trabajo es la de M. D. R M, 1991.
8 Sobre la versión latina de los progymnásmata cf. S. F. B, 1977, pp. 250-76. Para la
época bizantina cf. H. H, 1978, pp. 92-120. Análisis de la obra de Plutarco a la luz de la
teoría progimnasmática han sido llevados también a cabo por J. A. F D, 2000;
y por A. V, 2005; y, eadem, en este mismo volumen, pp. 75-85.
9 P. H, 1963, p. 142 arma que la intención de Plutarco era hacer una colección de
chreiai en forma de banquete: "Man hat den Eindruck, dass es ihm hauptsächlich darauf ankam
eine Chriensammlung in die Form eines Symposions zu bringen (vgl. o.S. 115,1) und dann mit
allen Farben der Rhetorik auszumalen".
10 F. C. B, 1949, p. xiii: "Certainly a better descriptive title would be "Miscellaneous
Essays and Letters", for the Moralia cover many elds, and show an astounding learning and a
wide range of interests".
473
El Banquete de los Siete Sabios como tour de force escolar
e incluso el espacial –la historia literaria hace converger a ambos autores en
el siglo I d.C. –, y ante el desconocimiento del rétor que marcó la actividad
libresca del Queronense11 , conjeturemos una posible relación magisterial entre
Teón de Alejandría y Plutarco, y veamos cómo llegó a reejarse en la obra que
nos ocupa.
3. No hay nada equiparable, nos dice Jean Sirinelli12 , a excepción del Gryllos ,
en el corpus plutarqueo, en lo que respecta a la introducción de personajes
abierta y totalmente cticios, al Septem sapientium convivium. ¿Por qué Plutarco
optó por hacer un simposio y por qué escogió entre los comensales al oscilante
grupo de los Siete Sabios?
Tal vez en principio asumió la exigencia subrayada por Teón de no
acercarse a ninguna modalidad oratoria sin antes adentrarse en el estudio
de la losofía so pena de perder amplitud de pensamiento13 . A aquella se
suma el deber de ejercitarse en las sentencias de los sabios (τοῖς τῶν σοφῶν
ἀποφθέγμασιν) y recopilarlas de las obras antiguas para adquirir, a fuerza de
interiorizarlas, un carácter virtuoso14 . De ahí que el Queronense se esmerara
en la compilación y confección de apotegmas, hypomnemata , chreiai, proverbios
y sentencias a las que posteriormente recurrirá para aderezar sus escritos. Baste
leer la justicación de sus Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata (172d-e):
En las Vidas, las manifestaciones de los hombres se sitúan junto a sus hechos
y aguardan el placer de una lectura sosegada. Aquí, pienso que sus palabras,
coleccionadas por separado como ejemplo y semilla de sus vidas (δείγματα τῶν
βίων καὶ σπέρματα), no te harán malgastar el tiempo y podrás pasar revista con
brevedad a muchos hombres dignos de recuerdo15.
O baste recordar las líneas donde arma: "Hice una colección de aquellos
apuntes (ἐκ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων) sobre la paz del alma que tenía a mano
preparados para mí mismo"16 . Huelgue citar las palabras donde declara este
conveniente hábito: "Por esto intento siempre reunir y releer no ya solamente
estos dichos de los lósofos […] sino más bien los de los reyes y tiranos"17 ,
donde vemos declarada la predilección plutarquea por la sabiduría práctica
más que por el conocimiento teórico. No nos extrañe entonces la atención que
le merecieron los Sietes Sabios, a quienes los griegos pusieron en el origen de
11 J. M. D L, 1999, p. 58. En todo caso, de la teoría progimnasmática hay indicios
anteriores a Teón, su primer codicador conocido.
12 J. S, 2000, p. 161. "…il n'y a guère dans toute l'oeuvre de Plutarque de textes
du même ordre; il y a des traités, des dialogues ctifs ou réels entre des personnages réels de
l'entourage de Plutarque, des biographies, mais nous n'avons que deux dialogues entre des
personnages ouvertement et totalment ctifs, ce sont le Gryllos et le Banquet des sept sages ."
13 eon 1,1-4.
14 eon 2,16-19.
15 Trad. M. L S & M. A. M, Plutarco. Obras Morales y de Costumbres, I II,
Madrid, 1987.
16 Cf. De tranquillitate animi ( Mor. 464F) Trad. R. M.ª A, Plutarco. Obras Morales y
de Costumbres (Moralia) , VII, Madrid, 1995.
17 Cf. De cohibenda ira (Mor. 457D-E). Trad. R. M.ª A, 1995.
474
Rodolfo González Equihua
su historia de la losofía y de los cuales Heródoto nos ofrece algunos ejemplos
de su agudeza política18 : "hombres prácticos, de acción –nos dice B. Snell–, que
en su mayoría, participaban en la vida del Estado como legisladores, soberanos
o consejeros"19 .
Por lo tanto, Plutarco debió en principio de someterse a la tarea de recoger
un corpus de sentencias y consejos útiles comenzando por las inscripciones
délcas: "conócete a ti mismo" y "nada en demasía". En el curso de la encuesta se
enfrentaría a la falta de acuerdo tanto en la atribución de las sentencias como en
el número de los Sabios20 , hecho que reejará y solucionará en la introducción de
su Simposio al multiplicar el número de comensales. Importaba más, en cambio, la
pervivencia del conocimiento acumulado, que todas las sentencias se acomodasen
muy bien a la denición de la chreia del rétor alejandrino; en suma, que fueran
declaraciones o acciones breves atribuidas a un personaje determinado y que fueran
útiles (chreiai) para la vida21 . Habría también seguido con atención el ejemplo de
chreia verbal de respuesta interrogativa y su alusión a Pítaco de Mitilene22 .
4. El siguiente paso era encontrar qué tipo de discurso hacer con su acopio
de sentencias: ¿cuál era la mejor forma de realizar el exhaustivo programa que
Teón presenta para ejercitarse en la chreia, el cual comprende tres géneros23 ,
cinco tipos24 , seis subespecies25 y doce categorías formales26? Plutarco debió
de pensar en el recurso de pregunta y respuesta que la primera sofística
encontrara27 al transitar por el terreno de las antinomias y perfeccionar el
arte de hacer prevalecer la opinión personal, cuyo desarrollo culminaría en el
diálogo platónico. Esta fase intermedia podemos encontrarla en las respuestas
que el rey etíope, referidas por Nilóxeno de Náucratis, da a las preguntas ¿Qué
es lo más viejo, lo más hermoso, lo más grande, lo más sabio, lo más común,
lo más útil, lo más perjudicial, lo más poderoso y lo más fácil? (Mor. 152E-
18 Cf. Hdt. I 27, 29, 59, 74 y 170.
19 El descubrimiento del espíritu (Die Entdeckung des Geistes, trad. J. F), Barcelona,
2007 (1ª ed. Hamburgo, 1963), p. 504.
20 D. L. 40-41.
21 eon 18, 9-14.
22 C f. eon 20, 3-6: "Habiéndole sido preguntado a Pítaco de Mitilene si la mala conducta
pasa desapercibida a los dioses, respondió: 'No, ni aún pretendiéndolo'."
23 Chreiai verbales (λογικαί), de hechos (πρακτικαί) y mixtas (μικταί).
24 Chreiai enunciativas (ἀποφαντικόν), de respuesta (ἀποκριτικόν), dobles (διπλῆ), activas
(ἐνεργητικαί ) y pasivas ( παθητικαί).
25 De enunciación voluntaria (καθ' ἑκούσιον ἀπόφασιν), de enunciación circunstancial (κατὰ
περίστασιν), interrogativas (καθ' ἐρώτησιν), indagativas ( κατὰ πύσμα), causales interrogativas
(καθ' ἐρώτησιν αἰτιῶδες ), de respuesta propiamente dicha (ἀποκριτικόν).
26 De sentencia (αἱ γνωμολογικῶς), demostrativa (αἱ ἀποδεικτικῶς), graciosa (αἱ κατὰ
χαριεντισμόν), de silogismo (αἱ κατὰ συλλογισμόν), de argumentación conclusiva o entimema
(αἱ κατὰ ἐνθύνημα ), de ejemplo (αἱ κατὰ παράδειγμα), de súplica (αἱ κατ' εὐχήν), simbólica (αἱ
συμβολικῶς), gurada (αἱ τροπικῶς), con ambigüedad (αἱ κατὰ ἀμφιβολίαν), con metalepsis
(αἱ κατὰ μετάληψιν), compuesta mediante combinación de varios modos (ὁ δὲ συνεζευγμένος
τρόπος). Cf. M. A. B, 2005.
27 D. L. 9 53-55 nos dice que Protágoras fue el primero en suscitar el modo de dialogar que
llamamos socrático (οὗτος καὶ τὸ Σωκρατικὸν εἶδος τῶν λόγων πρῶτος ἐκίνησε) y registra
entre sus libros una Técnica de controversias (τέχνη ἐριστικῶν).
475
El Banquete de los Siete Sabios como tour de force escolar
153A), preguntas ipso facto refutadas por Tales de Mileto (Mor. 153B-C),
en una escena que reeja muy bien el juego sofístico de hacer preguntas que
expresasen el grado máximo de una cualidad o de una circunstancia.
La elección de esta forma literaria parecía ineluctable. Unos supuestos
Septem sapientium logoi debían aspirar a ocupar un lugar junto a los logoi
socráticos del autor que llevara este género a la perfección y a quien Teón
recurría constantemente como modelo ya no sólo del progimnasma de la
chreia sino de otros más: de la fábula, el relato mítico 28, la descripción29, la
caracterización30 y el encomio31. A Plutarco quizá lo animó el hecho de que
sólo Jenofonte, otro escritor ecléctico, hubiera tratado de emular los diálogos
platónicos sin transigir en la caricatura. Después de todo, a pesar de que los
Memorabilia fueron redactados transcurridos casi sesenta años después de la
muerte de Sócrates, existe la tesis, sustentada por O. Gigon32 , de que Jenofonte
se había remontado a una extensa literatura socrática, no dependiente de la de
Platón y más antigua, de mentalidad más simple.
Plutarco había remontado no años sino épocas enteras para espigar una
literatura igual de extensa y hacerse con un catálogo de las sentencias de
los sabios. Tenía la forma en que debía integrarlas, el diálogo simposiaco, y
con ésta resolvía la construcción escénica y la inserción de cuadros ricos en
polémicas. El Queronense, no apartándose del patrón platónico, hace contar
a uno, Diocles, a manera de refutación de una apócrifa versión en boga, lo
narrado por un tercero ausente y traslada la escena a un pasado remoto. Tenía
a los personajes. Quedaba por revestir las conversaciones de sus personajes de
naturalidad y encanto, dotarlas de animación.
Para tal empresa recurrió al progimnasma de la caracterización o
prosopopeya. Teón la había denido como "la introducción de un personaje
que pronuncia discursos indiscutiblemente apropiados a su propia persona
y a las circunstancias en que se encuentra"33 . En este caso Plutarco ya sabía
qué diría cada personaje, sólo restaba concebir las circunstancias. Más allá
de la general, el banquete organizado por Periandro en la esta sacricial en
honor de Afrodita (Mor. 146C-D), hacía falta la pauta para que las sentencias
aparecieran con cierta espontaneidad en el texto.
Jean Defradas ha señalado que el desorden de la composición es el defecto
28 eon 10, 2-7: "De narración serían ejemplos hermosísimos, de las míticas, la de Platón
en el libro segundo de la República sobre el anillo de Giges y en el Banquete sobre el nacimiento
del amor, así como las relativas a los temas del Hades presentes en el Fedón y en el libro décimo
de la República ."
29 eon 12, 8-13: "Muchas descripciones han sido realizadas por los antiguos, como en
Tucídides, en el libro segundo, la peste y, en el tercero, el cerco de Platea y, en otra parte, un
combate naval y un combate a caballo; y en Platón, en el Timeo, lo relacionado con Sais…".
30 eon 12, 23-26: "De prosopopeya ¿qué ejemplo habría más hermoso que la poesía de
Homero, los diálogos de Platón y de los demás socráticos, y los dramas de Menandro?".
31 eon 12, 26-13,1 "Tenemos también los encomios de Isócrates, los epitaos de
Platón…"
32 O. Gigon, Sokrates: sein Bild in Dichtung und Geschichte, 1947, p. 525.
33 eon 70,1-3. Los otros manuales designan de ordinario a este ejercicio con el término
etopeya.
476
Rodolfo González Equihua
principal de este banquete y que todo intento por encontrarle una unidad
resulta vano34 . Sin caer en la excesiva generalización con que E. David jó el
tema central: "la vida social en su aspecto más general y más particular"35 , bien
podemos desdoblarlo un poco y establecerlo de la siguiente manera: un examen
del vicio y la virtud a partir de los cuatro ámbitos característicos de acción
humana: el simposiaco, el doméstico, el político y el religioso36 . Semejantes
ámbitos servirían a Plutarco para articular sus catálogos chreicos con las virtudes
y vicios típicos de cada uno de ellos.
Plutarco y Teón comparten el mismo interés en la formación moral sin por
ello descartar en su exposición y pedagogía los casos escabrosos: "Es necesario
–nos dice Teón– cuidar no menos el decoro, de manera que no pongamos al
descubierto lo vergonzoso directamente, sino que lo expongamos mediante
circunloquios"37 . Con esta pauta vemos cómo el rétor alejandrino38 transcribe
un ejemplo de chreia lleno de picardía sacado de la República 329b-c:
–Sófocles, ¿qué tal estás para los placeres del amor?
–¡Calla la boca –responde [Sófocles] –, pues yo con la mayor alegría huí de ellos
como si escapase de un amo furioso y cruel.
Con esta misma pauta vemos cómo el polígrafo queronense hace que
Tales aligere el funesto presagio del nacimiento de un centauro, calicado por
Periandro como una infamia y una impureza, y que el de Mileto zanja con una
chreia verbal graciosa (κατὰ χαριεντισμόν), presente dentro de las categorías
formales del ejercicio: "No emplees a hombres tan jóvenes para cuidar tus
caballos, o proporciónales mujeres" (Mor. 149E). La pulla va dirigida contra
Diocles, nuestro cronista del Banquete, adivino de la corte de Periandro, y según
David E. Aune39 , pseudónimo bajo el que se agazapa Plutarco. Asentimos si
pensamos que la alusión a unos aparentemente absurdos ritos de puricación va
dirigida al pepaideumenos, al lector familiarizado con Heródoto o con la noticia
que él registra, de que el presagio de querella y discordia tuvo repercusiones
más graves que la simple negativa de Alexídemo a comer con los Sabios40 .
Pero si esta chreia presenta algo gracioso41 sin que aporte ninguna utilidad
vital, vayamos ahora como quiere Teón a las sentencias que se reeren a las
cosas útiles para la vida42 y demostremos con más ejemplos concretos cuán
34 J. D, 1985, p. 173.
35 E. D, 1936.
36 En la actualidad, el lósofo holandés R. R dirá, de la mano de omas Mann, que el
arte, la moral y la política conforman la totalidad de la vida humana. Cf. R. R, 2008.
37 eon 16, 25-26; 17,1
38 eon 9, 13-20.
39 In H. B (ed.), 1978, p. 51.
40 Hdt. III 50-53.
41En todo caso, el humor es un componente importante del material progimnasmático. Cf.
J. A. F D, 1996.
42 eon 19, 5-8: Se le llama chría por excelencia porque en muchos aspectos es más útil para
la vida que las otras formas [sentencia, apomnemoneuma].
477
El Banquete de los Siete Sabios como tour de force escolar
meticulosamente las categorías formales del rétor se reejan en el Banquete de
acuerdo con los grupos temáticos antes mencionados.
5. Limitemos nuestra investigación, ajustándonos al título de este congreso,
al núcleo de acción simposiaca. ¿Qué es lo apropiado a personas que se dirigen
al banquete? Tales reere la anécdota, a manera de ejemplo (κατὰ παράδειγμα)
que posteriormente refutará a partir del argumento ético de la inconveniencia
(ἐκ τοῦ ἀσυμφόρου ), de los sibaritas y su muelle y exquisita costumbre de
invitar a sus mujeres "con un año de antelación, a n de que tuvieran tiempo
de preparar sus vestidos y adornos para ir al banquete" (Mor. 147E). A Tales,
por el contrario, le parece poco tiempo si se trata de adornar el carácter (ἤθει
τὸν πρέποντα κόσμον). El que es inteligente (ὁ νοῦν ἔχων), véase la siguiente
chreia simbólica (συμβολικῶς), continúa Tales, no se encamina al banquete
como si fuera un vaso vacío dispuesto a ser llenado, imagen que enriquecerá
más tarde en sus Quaestiones convivales (Mor. 660A-C). Incluye después una
chreia demostrativa (ἀποδεικτικῶς) para ilustrar el sentimiento de antipatía
(δυσάρεστον ) que produce el comensal, a quien compara con un vino de mala
calidad, insolente y grosero en el banquete (Mor. 147F-148A). Más adelante,
ahondando en la misma idea, Tales concuerda con el parecer del lacedemonio
Quilón, quien rehusaba asistir a un banquete si desconocía la lista de convidados,
y le atribuye la siguiente chreia de silogismo (κατὰ συλλογισμόν): "los que
están obligados a navegar o hacer la guerra tienen que soportar al compañero
de navegación o de campaña insensato; pero es propio de un hombre poco
inteligente aceptar compartir el banquete con unos comensales elegidos al azar"
(Mor. 148A). Para nalizar el primer cerco de chreia s circunscritas al ámbito
simposiaco, Tales nos presenta una de argumentación, naturalmente, conclusiva
(κατὰ ἐνθύνημα ) que nos exhorta a la virtud mayor de todo banquete ( Mor.
148B): la lantropía, implícita en el προτρέπεται πρὸς φιλίαν καὶ ἀγάπησιν
ἀλλήλων, curiosamente a través de la tremebunda costumbre egipcia, a caballo
entre el respice nem y el carpe diem, de sentar a la muerte en la mesa. Nos dice
Plutarco por boca de Tales:
La momia, que los egipcios solían, con buen juicio, colocar y mostrar a los
comensales en los banquetes para recordarles que pronto ellos serían como ella,
a pesar de que llega como un invitado desagradable e intempestivo, sin embargo
aporta alguna ventaja si impulsa a los comensales no a la bebida y al placer, sino
a la amistad y al afecto mutuo y los exhorta a no hacer una vida, que es muy
corta por el tiempo, larga por sus malas acciones.
(Mor. 148A-B)
El siguiente cuadro continúa no sólo con la lograda caracterización del
personaje de Tales sino con la exploración mediante chreias, de otros aspectos
morales relativos al simposio. Vemos la animada escena donde el milesio
Alexímeno sale furioso del banquete a causa del lugar deshonroso que le asignó
Periandro. Nos encontramos ante la versión grecolatina del asunto protocolario
de los primeros puestos. Pensemos que la versión judeocristiana, el Evangelio
478
Rodolfo González Equihua
de Lucas (14, 7-11), se adentra en el mismo asunto también a través de una
chreia para amonestar a los invitados que escogen los lugares principales43 .
En nuestra obra, Tales rememora la regia y elegante postura que asumiera
Agesilao, otra chreia de argumentación conclusiva (κατὰ ἐνθύνημα), cuando
lo relegaron al último lugar del coro y respondiera: "Muy bien, has encontrado
cómo convertir este lugar en un sitio honroso" (Mor. 149A). Aderezada con la
mención de un ejemplo astrológico y cerrándola con la exigencia de mantener,
sea cual sea el lugar que ocupemos, una actitud lantrópica; es decir, buscando
un comienzo y una coyuntura para la amistad (ἀρχὴν καὶ λαβὴν φιλίας). En la
siguiente escena, Tales de Mileto cumplirá con hechos sus palabras, ocupando
de buen grado el lugar que despreciara Alexídemo junto al autista Árdalo de
Trecén (Mor. 149F).
Con estos breves ejemplos espero haber demostrado en parte el rigor con
que Plutarco ensayó los distintos tipos de chreia pacientemente esquematizados
por Teón, y cómo encontró en la forma del diálogo la manera más ecaz de
inyectarles vida y llevar a buen término este auténtico tour de force escolar.
bi b l i o g r a f í a c i T a d a
A F, R. M., Plutarco. Obras Morales y de Costumbres, VII,
Madrid, 1995.
A, D. E., "Septem sapientium convivium", in H. D. B (ed.), Plutarch's
Ethical Writings and Early Christian Literature, Leiden, 1978, pp. 51-
105.
B, F. C. (ed.), Plutarch's Moralia, I, London/Cambridge, Mass., 1949.
______ Plutarch's Moralia, II, London-Cambridge, Mass., 1956.
B, M. A., La chreia en los Moralia de Plutarco, Tesis Doctoral, Universidad
de Salamanca, 2005.
B, S. F., Education in Ancient Rome: From the Elder Cato to the Younger
Pliny, Berkeley, 1977.
C, W., Geschichte der griechischen Literatur, München, 1898. (1ª ed.
Nördlingen, 1889).
C, A. C, M., Histoire de la Littérature Grecque, V, Paris, 1928.
D, E., Πλουτάρχου τῶν ἑπτὰ σοφῶν συμπόσιον, Atenas, 1936.
D, J. ., Plutarque. Oeuvres Morales, II, Paris, 1985.
D L, J. M., Las citas de Homero en Plutarco, Tesis Doctoral, Universidad
de Extremadura, 1999.
43 "Porque todo el que se eleva será rebajado y el que se rebaja será ensalzado" (ὅτι πᾶς ὁ
ὑψῶν ἑαυτὸν ταπεινωθήσεται καὶ ὁ ταπεινῶν ἑαυτὸν ὑψωθήσεται).
479
El Banquete de los Siete Sabios como tour de force escolar
F D, J. A., "El sentido del humor de Plutarco", in J. A.
F D & F. P P (eds.), Estudios sobre
Plutarco: Aspectos formales, Madrid, 1996, pp. 381-403.
_____"Le Gryllus, une éthopée parodique", in L. V S (ed.),
Rhetorical eory and Praxis in Plutarch, Louvain-Namur, 2000, pp. 171-
81.
G, O., Sokrates: sein Bild in Dichtung und Geschichte, Bern, 1947.
H, P., Der Dialog, II, Hildesheim, 1963 (=Leipzig, 1895).
H, H., Die hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzantiner, I, München,
1978.
K, G. A., Progymnasmata. Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and
Rhetoric (trans., introd. and notes), Leiden, 2003.
L S M. & M, M.A., Plutarco. Obras Morales y de Costumbres, III ,
Madrid, 1987.
M O, C. G L, J., Plutarco. Obras Morales y de
Costumbres, II, Madrid, 1986.
P, M. & B, G. (eds.), Aelius éon: Progymnasmata, Paris,
1997.
R M, M. D., Teón, Hermógenes, Aftonio. Ejercicios de retórica,
Madrid, 1991.
R, R., Nobility of Spirit: A Forgotten Ideal, Yale, 2008.
S, J., Plutarque de Chéronée. Un philosophe dans le siècle, Paris, 2000.
S, B., El descubrimiento del espíritu, Barcelona, 2007. (1ª ed. Hamburg,
1963).
V, A., "Plutarco, Sobre si es más útil el agua o el fuego: Una tesis
progymnasmática", in M. J . (eds.), Plutarc a la seva época:
paideia i societat. Actas del VIII Simposio español sobre Plutarco,
Barcelona, 2005, pp. 507-15.
V, R., Leben und Schriften des Plutarch, Berlin, 1967 (=Leipzig,
1870).
W, D. A., Animadversiones in Plutarchi Moralia, II, Leipzig, 1821.
481
Historical Fiction, Brachylogy, and Plutarch's Banquet of the Seven Sages
hi s T o r i c a l f i c T i o n , b r a c h y l o g y , a n d pl u T a r c h ' s
ba n Q u e T o f T H e Se v e n Sa g e S
L K
University of Texas, Austin
Abstract
In this paper I examine the ways in which the weaknesses and strengths of Plutarch's
Banquet of the Seven Sages are tied to Plutarch's attempt to recreate the world of the sixth
century BCE in ctional form. e awkwardness of the rst half of the dialogue stems from
the incommensurability between the symposiastic genre of the Banquet and the Sages' role
as 'performers of wisdom' and their noted brevity of speech, or brachulogia. It is only when
Plutarch stops trying to historicize in the second half of the dialogue (and shifts his focus away
from the Sages altogether) that it becomes more readable, literary, and Plutarchan. is disparity
reects a broader tension between archaic brachulogia, and the less denitive, ambivalent, and
voluble style of discourse Plutarch favored, and I suggest that the Banquet stages its own internal
dialogue between alternative modes of representing the past.
Introduction
e Banquet of the Seven Sages is something of an anomaly in Plutarch's
works. As its title suggests, the work belongs to the genre of literary symposia,
linked to the seminal texts of Plato and Xenophon as well as Plutarch's own
Table Talk and other Imperial examples such as Lucian's parodic Symposium,
or the Lapiths and Athenaeus' Deipnosophists1 . But the Banquet can also be
classed more broadly as a dialogue, a form particularly favored by Plutarch,
and within this category it stands out as one of only two "historical" dialogues
in the Plutarchan corpus; the other is On Socrates' Daimonion2 . Both combine
a narrative of a well-known event from the distant past—in one, the legendary
dinner of the Sages at the home of Periander, tyrant of Corinth, and in the
other, the liberation of ebes in 379—with the sort of philosophical discussion
familiar from Plutarch's other dialogues.
While several of Plutarch's biographies, most notably Solon and Pelopidas,
cover analogous time periods, the composition of a ctional dialogue set at a
particular place and moment in historical time presents somewhat dierent
challenges relating to literary and dramatic composition. It seems that the early
sixth-century BCE milieu of the Banquet, less well-documented and perhaps
more alien in worldview to Plutarch than the Plato-inected fourth-century
setting of On Socrates' Daimonion, was the more dicult period to recreate
1 On the symposiastic genre in Plutarch, see M. V , 2000, and L. R, 2002, for
Imperial literary symposia in general.
2 One could arguably include Gryllus, a dialogue between Odysseus and one of Circe's
man-animals, but its heroic setting places it somewhat apart from the historical dialogues. On
Plutarchan dialogue, see R. H, 1895, pp. 124-237, I. G, 1998, L. S,
2000, and R. L, 2001, pp. 146-87. Some of the dialogues of Heraclides Ponticus were
similarly set in the distant past; cf. R. H, 1895, p. 138.
successfully. Certainly On Socrates' Daimonion is widely considered to be one
of Plutarch's best and most original literary works3 , while the Banquet has not
been judged as kindly by posterity4 . My purpose here is to take a closer look
at the Banquet as an experiment in writing historical ction about the archaic
period, focusing on the particular problems involved in incorporating the
Seven Sages tradition and their celebrated brevity of discourse, or, brachulogia ,
into a symposiastic setting.
It might help to start with a brief sketch of the text. Like many of Plutarch's
dialogues, the Banquet is framed as a retrospective narrative (1; 146B-C), here
told by a certain Diocles, an expert in divination who was actually present at
the dinner, to an equally unknown Nicarchus and a group of his friends. It
opens with Diocles and one of the Sages, ales of Miletus, making their way
to Periander's home; they are joined by Niloxenus, a messenger conveying a
letter from the Egyptian king Amasis to Bias of Priene (2; 146D-148B). Upon
their arrival, they meet Periander, their host, and the other six sages — Bias,
Chilon, Cleobulus, Solon, Pittacus and Anacharsis (a fairly traditional list) —
but also several other guests — Cleobulus' daughter Cleobulina, known for
her riddles, Aesop, Periander's wife Melissa, Solon's companion and disciple
Mnesiphilus, the doctor Cleodorus, the poet Chersias and an otherwise
unknown Ardalus (3-4; 146B-150D). Once the eating is done and the ute-
girls have performed, the symposium proper begins. e rst half features the
Sages answering questions and oering advice, generally of a political nature, in
a manner marked by brevity and rapidity (5-12; 150D-155D); the second half,
signaled by the withdrawal of the women, Cleobulina and Melissa, features
more extended speeches on loftier topics (13-21; 155E-164D). is part of
the symposium is interrupted by the arrival of Periander's brother who tells
the wondrous story of an event he has just witnessed: the arrival at Taenarum
of Arion, conveyed by dolphins. After an ensuing discussion of dolphin-lore,
the dinner comes to an abrupt conclusion, returning perfunctorily (the last
sentence) to the framing narrative of Diocles5 .
One of the most striking characteristics of the Banquet is the considerable
disparity, in style and content, between the two halves of the text (1-12; 13-
21). e Sages dominate the rst half of the dialogue; the conversation is rapid,
consisting of short, sententious opinions, and the topics broached relate to
human activity, such as politics and the household. In the second half, however,
the non-Sages come to the fore, expounding long speeches on subjects of a
more divine and cosmic signicance familiar from Plutarch's other dialogues.6
3 On this text, see, e.g., D. B, 1984, A. B, 1988, and R. L, 2001,
pp. 179-87.
4 U. von W-M, 1890, p. 196 is the most incisive condemnation.
For a long time many scholars were convinced that the Banquet was not by Plutarch at all, or, at
least, could be dismissed as a youthful indiscretion. Few now doubt the work's authenticity—J.
D, 1954, conclusively demonstrated the unmistakably Plutarchan nature of the
Platonically-inuenced ideas expressed in the second part of the Banquet.
5 D. E. A, 1978, pp. 56-8 provides a convenient outline summary of the text.
6 L. S, 2000, p. 113.
483
Historical Fiction, Brachylogy, and Plutarch's Banquet of the Seven Sages
Each portion has occasioned negative appraisals: if the rst half 's sprinkling
of the Sages' sayings has been criticized as "une sorte de recueil assez froid de
maximes sur divers sujets"7 , the second raises charges of gross anachronism
— Solon and Cleobulus become virtually indistinguishable from Plutarch's
relatives Lamprias or Soclaros in other dialogues8 . Coming to grips with this
stark split in subject matter and style is thus essential for fully evaluating and
understanding the Banquet ,9 and the failure to do so hampers recent attempts
to recuperate the text by locating a unifying theme underlying the apparent
convivial chaos — e.g., oikonomia, politics, love, a Platonic insistence on the
power of the divine over the material. Even the best reading of the text, by
Judith Mossman, who elegantly and persuasively argues that "the Dinner is a
richly and allusively written piece whose dramatic context and narrative are
inextricably entwined with its content…",10 concentrates on the introduction
and the second half of the dialogue, which have been recognized as possessing
considerable literary merit11 , and elides the 'dicult' rst half of the dinner.
In what follows, I examine the two halves of the dialogue as embodying
dierent approaches on the part of Plutarch toward the problem of writing
historical ction set in a period embodying ideas and an aesthetic radically
dierent from his own. In the rst part of the Banquet, Plutarch's attempts to
incorporate the traditional lore about the Sages into a symposiastic framework
— that is, to be 'historically' faithful to the Sages' tradition — runs into serious
diculties; it is only when he abandons this historicizing goal in the second
part, that the dialogue can take ight. But the two halves are also characterized
by their contrasting discursive styles, and Plutarch, wittingly or no, reveals
the tensions that exist between the brachulogia characteristic of the 'historical'
Sages, and by extension the archaic period, and the less denitive, ambivalent,
and voluble style of discourse he himself favored. In this sense, the Banquet
stages its own internal dialogue between alternative modes of representing the
past.
Historicizing the Seven Sages
roughout the dialogue, but especially in its rst half, Plutarch attempts to
incorporate as much of the legendary tradition about the Sages as possible into
his text in order to lend it the proper historicizing avor and some semblance
7 J. D, 1954, p. 13, referring to chs. 5-12. Cf. R. H, 1895, pp. 139-40.
8 U. von W-M, 1890, p. 196. Other anachronisms (Croesus,
Periander, and Amasis as contemporaries; the presence of women (Eumetis and Melissa) at an
archaic symposium (on this see J. M. M, 1997, pp. 124-5; p. 137 n. 28)) were probably
not of great concern to Plutarch, since the very idea of a dinner of the Seven Sages is dicult
to square with chronology. J. D, 1954, pp. 7-12 succinctly summarizes the debate; cf.
30 on questions of date.
9 Oikonomia: D. E. A, 1978, pp. 52-3; politics: G. J. D. A, 1977; love: J. M.
M, 1997; Platonic: J. D, 1954, p. 15.
10 J. M. M, 1997, p. 122.
11 E.g., by J. D, 1954, pp. 14-5.
of authenticity12. e premise of the Banquet draws on a longstanding tradition
that all of the Sages had gathered together at a symposium; the location varied,
but Corinth is attested as one possibility13 . Periander was often included in lists
of the Seven Sages, but his credentials were also questioned, given his rather
un-Sage-like portrayal in Herodotus. Plutarch's decision to have him host
the banquet allows him to participate in the conversation without concerns
about eligibility. e extensive guest list is an indication that Plutarch has
tried to include as many familiar faces from the archaic period as possible; and
in fact, reference is made during the conversation to many other well known
gures of the time, such as Hesiod, Epimenides, rasybulus of Miletus, and
Croesus. As the choice of characters suggests, the Banquet's evocation of the
archaic world has, perhaps inevitably, a considerable Herodotean avor. In
fact, the text cannot help but exploit the temporal xity of his symposium
by activating readers' knowledge of the Histories; Mossman shows how the
Banquet is suused with "a good deal of underlying sadness and irony" when
one considers the often tragic future in store for the guests: Periander's murder
of Melissa, Solon's sad last days in Athens, Anacharsis' brutal death in Scythia,
and Aesop's ignoble execution at Samos14 .
e two pivotal episodes in each half of the dialogue—the reading
and response of the letter from the Egyptian king Amasis, and the story of
Arion and the dolphin — are inspired by Herodotus as well. e Arion tale
is a marvelous rewriting of one of the most famous Herodotean narratives,
which I discuss at the end of this article. e letter from Amasis to Bias is
not from the Histories, but ts snugly into a Herodotean milieu. e use of
letters by non-Greek monarchs is a well-known feature of Herodotus' world,
and Amasis' epistolary correspondence with the tyrant Polycrates of Samos
(3.40-43) would be familiar to any reader of the Histories. Moreover, Amasis'
request to Bias for help is an example of another Herodotean topos, in which a
monarch or tyrant receives advice from a 'wise man' or sage. Further thematic
connections are brought out by a brief anecdote ales tells Diocles en route
to Periander's, about a previous 'epistolary' exchange between Bias and Amasis
(146F). Amasis had sent Bias an animal for sacrice asking him to send back
the best and worst portion of the meat. Bias responded to both requests by
sending back only one body part — the tongue — an act of wisdom that gained
him Amasis' respect and esteem15 . e story is linked both to the Herodotean
fondness for depicting symbolic, non-verbal communication (e.g., rasybulus
12 e specic sources are less important here than the fact that Plutarch makes a
conscientious attempt to include sayings that were well-known in the Sages tradition.
13 Plutarch refers to a banquet of the Sages at Periander's at Solon 4.1. D. L. I 40-44 mentions
the Panionion, Corinth, and Delphi as attested locations, and remarks that Archetimus of
Syracus also set it in Corinth, at the court of Cypselus (Periander's father) while Ephorus moved
it to Croesus' court. For the tradition, see B. S, 1954.
14 J. M . M, 1997, p. 126, and L. I, 2002, pp. 66-7. Occasionally there is
a pointed allusion: ales' remark that Periander is making a good recovery from despotism
(147C) concludes with an ominous "at least up till now", pointing to the disasters to come.
15 On this story and its antecedents, see I. M. K, 2004, pp. 97-119.
485
Historical Fiction, Brachylogy, and Plutarch's Banquet of the Seven Sages
and Periander: Hdt. 1.22) and the folktale motif, also found in his work, in
which a ruler rst tests an advisor before asking more important questions
(Croesus' testing of the Greek oracles before selecting Delphi: Hdt. 1.46-48).
In addition, Amasis' request falls into the category of the so-called 'riddle of
the superlative', which consists of asking "what thing or person possesses a
certain quality to the highest degree" and seems to have been a favorite device
employed by monarchs in legend — the most famous example being Croesus'
request to Solon to name the "most fortunate" man (Hdt. 1.29)16 .
Problems with Performance
If the letter ts well with Plutarch's historicizing project by contributing
to the archaic Herodotean atmosphere with which he imbues the Banquet, it
comes across as somewhat unusual when considered against the symposiastic
setting of the piece17 . e symposium is traditionally a space for oral,
improvisatory performance and public conversation, while a letter is written,
planned, premeditated, and mute — a private communication between two
individuals. Moreover, it would seem a priori dicult to incorporate a letter,
which presupposes separation in time and space between writer and addressee,
into the literary symposium's relatively restricted temporal and geographical
frame18 . is tension, however, is symptomatic of a wider problem that Plutarch
had to grapple with when incorporating the historically attested stories about
the Sages into a symposiastic milieu. On the face of it, the Sages would
seem to t extremely well into the spontaneous and face-to-face world of the
symposium, especially since the well-known anecdotes and legends about the
Sages depict them primarily as skilled performers of oral improvisatory wisdom.
As Richard Martin has suggested, the Sages are often depicted as 'performing'
wisdom, that is, giving advice or criticism, usually about political matters, in
the form of 'public enactments' before an audience, generally a tyrant or other
important man19 . We can recall the well-known episodes involving the Sages
in the rst book of Herodotus: Solon's encounter with Croesus (1.29-33),
Bias' quip to the same ruler about shipbuilding and horses (1.27), Chilon's
advising Peisistratus' father not to have a son (1.59)20 . Such stories spotlight
the Sages' fame for their ability to "shoot a brief, concise, and unforgettable
remark, just like a skilled javelin thrower, that makes the person he's speaking
16 On the 'riddles of the superlative', see I. M. K, 2005, pp. 20-2 with extensive
bibliography; quote from idem, 2004, p. 126.
17 Cf. Lucian's Symposium 21-27, in which a letter from an absent angry philosopher disrupts
the proceedings.
18 L. D, 2005, p. 90 comments on this aspect of the letter from Amasis, and her
article compares the Banquet with the Letter of Aristaeus.
19 R. M , 1993, pp. 115-16: "e sages are poets, they are politicians and they are
performers…by perfomance, I mean a public enactment, about important matters, in word
or gesture, employing conventions and open to scrutiny and criticism, especially criticism of
style."
20 On the individual Sages in Herodotus, see A. B, 2002, pp. 17-27.
to seem no better than a child."21 e quotation is from Plato's Protagoras ,
in which Socrates claims more generally that the Sages' preference for terse,
pithy opinions — their "laconic brevity" (brachulogia tis Lakônikê) — was "the
characteristic style (tropos) of ancient philosophy (tôn palaiôn tês philosophias)"
(343a-b). Plutarch knows this passage and the sentiment it expresses well and
is committed to dramatizing this archaic brachulogia in his text.
But a closer consideration reveals some diculties, and it is worth
exploring them before turning to the letter itself. In Herodotus the eect of
the Sages' bons mots arises from their appropriateness to a particular situation
and addressee, and once the Sage utters his clever, incisive comment the
anecdote abruptly comes to an end. In a biography, such as the Life of Solon, or
those of individual Sages in Diogenes Laertius, these anecdotes can be linked
as a series of encounters that occur at various points in a Sage's life, relatively
unconnected in space and time. In a symposiastic dialogue, however, it is
dicult to 'stage' these momentous scenes between Sage and ruler, not only
because of the restrictions of the temporal and spatial setting, but also because
the somewhat antagonistic nature of the anecdotes is not well-suited to the
conviviality of a symposium.
e problem facing Plutarch then was how to include more than just a
few of these 'performances', for which the Sages were famous, in a setting that
was so unsuited to them. One solution is to insert famous quotes or anecdotes
about a given Sage into the mouth of another character in the text: e.g., the
story discussed above concerning Amasis, Bias, and the tongue is told by
ales. Another instance from the opening of the dialogue is when Niloxenus
informs Diocles and ales of Amasis' admiration for ales' wisdom by
relating two anecdotes illustrating this wisdom: ales' method of measuring
the pyramids and his quip that "a tyrant that lived to be old" was the most
paradoxical thing he had ever seen22 . So at the dinner proper, we nd, to
take only a few examples, Aesop quoting Solon and Eumetis (152D; 150E-F,
154B), Cleodorus quoting Pittacus (153E), and at one very odd moment Bias
almost 'becomes' ales, answering on his behalf with ales' own sayings
(160E). On one level, this is a tidy way out of the diculty identied above;
Plutarch can regale (or remind) his audience of the witty aphorisms of the
Sages and include many more 'performance' stories than otherwise. One could
also argue that the retrospective narration of the Sages' activities by their peers
gives the impression both of the fame enjoyed by all of the Sages and their
general familiarity with each other.
In a way though, this is also the problem. By having the Sages 'remind'
the gathered company of their fellows' past activities, Plutarch characterizes
these stories as already traditional at the time of the Banquet. e sense one
gets within the narrative, however, is that they are not well-known at all, since
21 Pl. Protag. 342e; quoted by Plutarch at De garrul. 17; 510E.
22 147A-B. Cf. the slightly dierent versions of the pyramid-measuring story in D. L. 1.27
and Plin., Nat. 36.82. Plutarch himself attributes the tyrant remark to Bias at De adul. et am.
61c; cf. the much longer version at De gen. Socr. 578d.
487
Historical Fiction, Brachylogy, and Plutarch's Banquet of the Seven Sages
they are told in their entirety rather than just referred to in passing. Niloxenus,
for example, insists on retelling the wisdom-stories about ales in full, even
though one of his addressees is the very person, ales, that originally performed
them23 . Indeed, the presence of the Sages as audience to the telling of their
own deeds and the quoting of their own words contributes considerably to the
forced and articial conversation that dominates the rst half of the dialogue24 .
A more serious diculty is that such a method fails to take advantage of the
Banquet's setting and the presence of the Sages; we do not witness the Sages
performing the improvised wisdom for which they are known, but only hear
about things they have already done.
e Letter of Amasis
Plutarch's major task then is to engineer situations in which we can
see the Sages in action, despite the incongruity of their performance style
to the symposiastic milieu. One example occurs before the dinner begins:
upon their arrival at Periander's Diocles and ales are shown a baby centaur
born in Periander's stables and after some speculation on the meaning of such
a portent, ales remarks to Periander that he should either avoid having
young men take care of his horses, or else provide wives for them. Periander
bursts out laughing, embraces ales, and then the three enter the dining
room; ales' 'performance' concludes the episode. But during the dinner
itself, once the guests have all settled in their places, such encounters become
more dicult to choreograph. In what follows, I want to examine Plutarch's
interesting, but ultimately fruitless, attempt to represent the oral improvisatory
performance of the Sages by means of the introduction of a written letter into
the symposium.
After the meal itself has been completed, the post-dinner discussion
begins with Niloxenus' reading of Amasis' letter to Bias. In it, Amasis explains
that the Ethiopian king and he are involved in a "contest of wisdom" (sophias
hamilla) with each other, and that the Ethiopian has demanded that Amasis
"drink the ocean" (ekpiein tên thalattan). If Amasis fails to solve this riddle, he
will have to withdraw from the villages around Elephantine; if he solves it, he
can lay claim to more Ethiopian territory. After a moment's thought, and some
consultation with Cleobulus (who had a reputation as a riddle-master), Bias
answers triumphantly: Amasis should oer to drink the ocean only after the
Ethiopian king has stopped up the rivers owing into it, since the agreement
was to drink the ocean that exists now, and not in the future25 . "As soon as Bias
23 e eect is mitigated slightly by ales' response, which is to correct Niloxenus'
attribution to ales — the tyrant quip was actually said by Pittacus of Mitylene — and add his
own improvisatory variation.
24 Compare the dierent eect in the second part of the dialogue when stories are told about
famous gures who are not at the banquet, such as Epimenides or Hesiod.
25On this category of riddle, known as the adynaton — an impossible situation or request
that is often answered, as here, by proposing "an equally impossible counter-task…that logically
precedes that of the propounder's adynaton", see I. M. K, 2004, pp. 121-6 (quote
had said these words, Niloxenus, hastened to embrace and kiss him out of joy
and the rest of the company also commended the answer and expressed their
satisfaction with it" (151D).
As we mentioned above, the monarchical letter to a wise advisor evokes
Herodotus and the archaic period; the further epistolary relation referred to
within the letter — the suggestion that in the old days Eastern monarchs
conducted epistolary contests of wits with each other — was also ingrained
in the popular tradition, and most likely derived from Egyptian and Near
Eastern tales. e best example comes from the Aesop Romance, where Aesop
becomes the special riddle advisor to the Babylonian king Lycurgus. e
narrator explains: "In those days it was customary for kings to collect tribute
from one another by means of contests in wit. ey did not face one another
in wars and battles, but sent philosophical conundrums by letter, and the one
who couldn't nd the answer paid tribute to the sender" (101). In the Banquet ,
however, Plutarch employs the letter to transform the standard face-to-face
performance of advice between Sage and ruler into a display of wisdom before
an audience of his peers. Unlike the above-mentioned references to past
displays, Bias' performs his wisdom in the present, at the symposium itself; the
reader too can witness the Sage in action. Normally in stories of this type, the
sage's wisdom impresses either the king to whom he gives the advice, or the
king whose riddle is defeated, but here neither Amasis nor the Ethiopian king
is present. Rather it is Amasis' proxy Niloxenus and the dinner guests who
provide the marveling response required by such stories. e letter has thus
enabled an act of performative wisdom.
Once Bias has oered his successful riposte, however, another problem
emerges. e conclusiveness of Bias' sententious solution to the Ethiopian
king's riddle leaves the narrative at an impasse. In other depictions of Sages,
such as in Herodotus, or the Life of Solon, the author can simply move on to
another anecdote, another situation for the Sage to show o his aphoristic
wisdom. In the Banquet, however, that is not possible; the cast of characters
remain in place, and there is thus no natural way to continue the dinner
conversation. e letter's strength, which was its ability to introduce by way of
proxy a distant monarch into the symposium, is also its weakness — the absent
Amasis cannot respond to the Sage's intervention.
Plutarch's solution to this dilemma is to have the Sages nevertheless
act as if Amasis were present. e silence following Bias' answer is broken
by Periander, who suggests that each Sage in turn advise Amasis as to "how
he could render his kingship drinkable and sweet to his subjects." Starting
with Solon, each sage oers a pithy response: e.g., "If only he is thoughtful"
(Anacharsis); If he trust none of his associates" (Cleobulus); "If he should make
his subjects fear, not him, but for him." (Pittacus). is 'rotation of wisdom'
is repeated two more times during the rst half of the dinner—regarding
the best kind of democracy (154D) and the best managed household (154F-
from 123). Cf. D. E. A, 1978, p. 94.
489
Historical Fiction, Brachylogy, and Plutarch's Banquet of the Seven Sages
155D) — with equally banal results26. e practice, of course, has good
sympotic precedent in both Plato and Xenophon27 , and is a way to have every
Sage, and not just Bias, contribute some wisdom, but the traditional brevity
of the Sages' responses turns the exercise into a listing of platitudes addressed
to a gure, Amasis, who is not even present at the dinner. Each aphorism
thus loses the power that it might have possessed in a particular performative
context. Furthermore, while juxtaposing the Sages' responses in this fashion
allows greater participation, it also emphasizes their interchangeability28 . No
quote is particularly tailored to any one Sage; any quote could be re-attributed
to another sage with little trouble, and in fact many of the Sages' maxims were
interchangeable in the tradition29 . Plutarch himself often ascribes them to
dierent sages: the story about Bias and the tongue, for instance, is told of
Pittacus in On Listening to Lectures (38C) and On Talkativeness (506C). is
virtual identity of thought on the part of the Sages contrasts strongly with the
diversity of opinions, philosophical allegiances, and professions that regularly
feature at such gatherings, from Plato's Symposium to Plutarch's Table-Talk.
In fact, the monotony of the Sages' responses can be contrasted with that
of Periander, who, though not ocially a Sage in this text, usually oers an
eighth opinion in these roundabouts, reective of his status as a tyrant, and
hence individualized and somewhat opposed to those of the generally anti-
tyrannical Sages.
e "rotation of wisdom" has hardly succeeded as a means of giving life to
Plutarch's ctional Sages, and in fact leaves matters right where it took them
up: the brevity and conclusiveness of the Sages' aphorisms have ended rather
than initiated further discussion. Plutarch falls back on his previous ploy;
Niloxenus reveals that the letter from Amasis has a second part. In addition
to the riddle posed to him by the Ethiopian king, Amasis had also received his
opponent's replies to a set of questions that he had posed (What is the oldest
thing? Time. e greatest? e kosmos. e wisest? Truth, etc.), and now was
26 On Plutarch's use of these "tours de parole", see L. D, 2005, pp. 82-6, who views
them in a more sympathetic light.
27 Pl. Smp.; Xen. Smp. 3-4.
28 e lack of dierentiation among the Sages is also suggested by Amasis' instructions to
Niloxenus: "if Bias should give up trying to solve it, he should show the letter to the wisest men
among the Greeks" (146E). e epithet "wisest of the Greeks" recalls the best-known story
about the Sages, told in multiple versions, about the tripod or cup of Bathycles that is meant
for 'the wisest' (Plutarch has Aesop jokingly allude to the legend in passing at 155E and tells
his own version at Solon 4.2-7). e story goes that the object was sent rst to one of the Sages,
usually ales or Bias, who then sent it to another, until the object had passed through the
hands of all of them, and is either kept by ales again, or dedicated to Delphi. e constant
circulation of the tripod can be taken to highlight the humility of the sages and their respect
for each other, but on another level it underlines their sameness and interchangeability. In this
context the letter of Amasis is very much a stand-in for the tripod (which Plutarch almost
ostentatiously fails to mention). For an overview of the entire tradition of the cup/tripod, see A.
B, 2002, pp. 56-64.
29 E.g., ales' saying about animals, tyrants, and atterers is attributed to Bias by Plutarch
in Adul. et am. 61C; see above the other ales and Bias stories told by Niloxenus.
requesting an assessment of the responses30. is time the spokesman is ales,
who criticizes the Ethiopian's answers as incorrect and oers his own solutions
instead: e.g., "God is oldest, for God is something that has no beginning."
ales' answers match ideas attributed to him by Diogenes Laertius (I 35),
and a comparison with that text demonstrates how Plutarch has managed
to take the bare skeleton of ales' maxims and worked them into a context
where he can be seen performing them. But the problem that arose with Bias'
response is even more apparent here; ales' Sage-like propensity for brevity
results in a catalog of maxims or gnomai that brings an end to, rather than
starts, discussion of the issue at hand. Even when the Sages do enact their
wisdom onstage, as it were, their celebrated concision, or brachulogia, and the
suddenness with which their responses get at the "truth", are ill suited to the
extended conversation required by their presence together at a dinner. Plutarch
tries to import some of the Sages' often antagonistic advice to rulers into the
more harmonious rhythms of the symposium by directing ales' criticisms to
a king who is absent from the symposium. But the physical absence of that
king signicantly diminishes the eect of ales' performance.
To conclude this section, it seems that the Sages, despite the fact that
their associations with orality, performance, improvisation, and wisdom appear
to qualify them as ideal candidates for depicting in a symposium, are actually
quite unsuited to a symposiastic context; their tendency toward brevity, their
status as contextualized performers, and their interchangeability all militate
against the kind of dialogue that Plutarch was accustomed to writing.
Arion, Anachronism, and Brachulogia
e Banquet, however, changes dramatically in the second part of the
dinner, beginning with the speech of Mnesiphilus, Solon's protégé, at 156B;
from then on, not only does the conversation turn away from the political
to matters of proper diet, the care of the body and nally religion, but the
guests speak at length, represent a diversity of opinions, and espouse beliefs
that are hard to imagine as conceivable in the sixth century BCE. We should
note, however, that this criticism is valid only for this second half of the
dinner; in fact, it is precisely when Plutarch stops trying to historicize, that
is, when he stops trying to include the Sages' sayings and witticisms from
the gnomological tradition, that the dialogue becomes more readable, more
literary, more Plutarchan. Indeed he shifts his focus away from the Sages
altogether; the non-Sages, who are individualized by their professions — the
doctor Cleodorus, the diviner Diocles, and the poet Chersias — become more
prominent as speakers, and when a famous contemporary gure is discussed,
it tends to be one who is not present at the dinner, such as Epimenides, rather
than one of the Sages themselves. And when a Sage does speak (e.g., Solon),
he no longer does so in brief sound bites, but in the long elaborate speeches
more characteristic of other Plutarchan dialogues.
30 On the second part of the letter, see I. M. K, 2005, pp. 36-44.
491
Historical Fiction, Brachylogy, and Plutarch's Banquet of the Seven Sages
It is instructive to compare the sections surrounding the letter from
Amasis with the parallel 'Herodotean' episode in the second half of the dinner
— the beautifully crafted retelling of the story of Arion and the dolphin31 . e
tale is told to the banqueters by Periander's brother Gorgus, who functions
as the 'unexpected guest' familiar from other literary symposia and interrupts
the banquet with news of the fabulous event he has just witnessed: a device
that is also reminiscent of the way that exciting news arrives in the midst
of Plutarch's 'dramatic dialogues' like Amatorius and On Socrates' Daimonion 32 .
Technically, the story is another retrospective narrative, but the immediacy of
the event, combined with its description by an eyewitness who has interrupted
the dinner in order to bring the news, enables the fantasy of "being there" as
"history" is made — much as the letter of Amasis allowed Plutarch, somewhat
less successfully, to show the Sages in action.
In his presentation, Plutarch lays great emphasis on the wonder and
religious mystery that the episode evokes. Arion's arrival is described from
Gorgus' innocent perspective; during a moonlight sacrice on the beach at
Taenarum, a ripple is seen suddenly in the otherwise calm sea, surrounded
by foam and noise, and begins moving rapidly toward the shore. All of those
nearby raced down to the water, struck with wonder (thaumasantas); they
saw a band of dolphins carrying a man's body, which, when deposited on the
shore, was recognized as the citharode Arion. Arion himself tells Gorgus
the familiar story of his near-death experience at the hands of pirates, but
the whole episode, which Herodotus centers on the 'brave gesture' of Arion's
leap and the punishment of his would-be murderers (the latter omitted by
Plutarch), is reconceived as a religious epiphany:
Observing that the sky was dotted with stars, and that the moon was rising
bright and clear, while the sea everywhere was without a wave as if a path
were being opened for their course, [Arion] thought to himself that the eye of
Justice is not a single eye only, but through all these eyes of hers God watches
in every direction the deeds that are done on land and on the sea. (161E-F)
is elegant reworking of the marvelous as an instance of the divine
revealing itself to the human world recalls the Delphic Dialogues, where
similarly haunting tales, such as the Death of Pan, are told (De def. orac.
419A-E). And the speech Anacharsis gives in the Banquet to explain the
behavior of the dolphins employs the same argument about the divine, the
body, and the soul oered in On the Pythian Oracles (404B)33 . Needless to say,
the philosophical underpinning of Plutarch's recasting of the Arion story is
completely alien to archaic thought, but it is at this moment, when he is the
most unabashedly anachronistic, that he manages to best draw his audience
31 On this episode, see J. M. M, 1997, pp. 131-3; and the detailed comparison of L.
I, 2002.
32 On the 'dialogo drammatico', see A. B, 1988.
33 J. D, 1954, p. 15; 111-2 n. 187 sees this idea as central to the Banquet.
directly into the world of Archaic Greece and convey the sense of immediacy
and wonder might have had for the people of that long ago time. Rather
than stay faithful to his archaic 'sources', Plutarch chooses to portray the event
from his own perspective and interests, and those of the members of his circle.
e rewriting of the Arion episode is an excellent example of how Plutarch
views an archaic narrative through his own Imperial and Platonizing lens,
skillfully re-arranging its structure and re-focusing its thematic signicance.
Ironically in a work seemingly dedicated to bringing the world of the Sages to
life, Plutarch has achieved his most vivid success with a story that has nothing
to do with them—Arion's only connection to the guests is through Periander.
e Sages, instead of serving as the main attraction, have become, along with
the reader, the audience for a far more compelling narrative.
e length and leisurely pace of Gorgus' narrative, thick with description
of the scene and Arion's thoughts, contrast strongly with the repartee and bons
mots that make up the episode concerning the letter from Amasis. Moreover,
whereas the Sages' pithy replies to the letter from Amasis ground the
conversation to a halt, Gorgus' story of Arion engenders further discussion—
aside from Anacharsis' philosophical musings, the banqueters recall a series
of dolphin stories that continue to dwell on the themes suggested by Gorgus'
tale and carry the reader to the conclusion of the dialogue. e disparity is
symptomatic of that between the two parts of the dialogue in general; the
length and detail of the speeches in this last section are as characteristic of
the second part of the dinner as the concise utterances are of the rst. And
as Laetitia Demarais has proposed, this inconsistency between the brachulogia
of the opening of the symposium and the makrologia of its conclusion is so
conspicuous that it must be the result of a deliberate move on Plutarch's part34 .
For Demarais, the dierence is primarily due to content; while Plutarch's motive
in the rst part is to "show that brachylogy does not exclude profundity", he
acknowledges in the second part that for certain, more metaphysical topics,
"only macrology is relevant"35 .
Although I think that some of the awkwardness in the rst half of the
Banquet is the unintentional result of Plutarch's failed struggle to smoothly
incorporate traditional Sage-lore into a symposiastic context36 , I agree that
the shift between the rst and the second half is so radical to suggest a more
subtle design. But I see the juxtaposition of two halves, so dierent in form
and content, as a sign of an underlying tension in Plutarch's thought between
the kind of conversation, style, and philosophizing characteristic of the Sages
(and by extension the Archaic period), and those on display in his other,
contemporary, dialogues. After all, a certain ambivalence in Plutarch's view
of the Sages can occasionally be glimpsed elsewhere in his corpus: the Sages'
(predominantly democratic) political attitudes do not always accord well with
34 L. D, 2005, pp. 96-7.
35 L. D, 2005: quotes from p. 96.
36 M. V , 2000, p. 226 suggests that Plutarch might have intended to return to the text
to revise and rene it.
493
Historical Fiction, Brachylogy, and Plutarch's Banquet of the Seven Sages
Plutarch's own, and in the Life of Solon, for example, he expresses some disdain
for the Sages' primitive scientic knowledge (3.5) as well as moral disapproval
of their opinions (7 on ales' views on marriage and 20, 23 on Solon's laws).
Most importantly perhaps, while Plutarch shows great respect for
concision and brevity of speech in On Talkativeness (17.511A-B), Lycurgus
(19-20), and specically for the Sages' apophthegmata in On the Pythian
Oracles37 , these qualities are entirely antithetical to Plutarch's own stylistic
choices. e passage from On the Pythian Oracles, however, also testies to
Plutarch's vacillations on the relative virtues of brief and extended speech:
the speaker, eon, comparing the Delphic maxims attributed to the Sages
to the straightforward prose of the present-day Pythia, points out that brevity
can lead to obscurity rather than enlightenment. e Sages' maxims may be
concise, but "if you were to examine what has been written and spoken about
them by those wishing to learn what each one means, you would hardly nd
any discourses longer ( logous makroterous) than these" (29.408E). And indeed
while eon praises concision and directness of speech, his own argument
hardly displays these qualities, extending for pages and pages38 . In the sort of
ideal symposiastic or dialogic setting that Plutarch prefers to depict, concise
sayings and maxims are meant to be unpacked and explored, their meanings
and appropriateness discussed at length, and not simply stated and left alone.
e Banquet can be seen as a Plutarchan experiment in historical ction,
one that asks: is it better to historicize and portray the Sages as accurately as
possible, to incorporate the evidence of the tradition into the dialogue, in an
attempt to capture a sense of 'authenticity'? Or should one instead describe that
past, the events and gures of that time, in a way more amenable to Plutarch
and his Imperial audience, discussing ideas and topics of current interest in an
anachronistic, but less alienating manner? It also poses the broader question of
whether the style of discourse characteristic of the Sages and the archaic period
is as appropriate for a properly philosophical and symposiastic conversation as
the more expansive style adopted by Plutarch. By depicting each half of the
Banquet in such discordant ways, Plutarch lets us make that choice for ourselves,
but I suspect that many readers would agree that the aesthetic qualities and
philosophical expressions of the dialogue's second half suggest that, to Plutarch
at least, the archaic mode leaves something to be desired39 .
37 De Pyth. orac. 29.408E-F. E.g., "…he can accept and marvel at the maxims of the Sages…,
because of their concision, as encompassing in a small size a compact and rmly-forged
idea…"
38 e dialogue as a whole is structured as a debate on the clarity and ordinariness of
simple unadorned prose and the elevated, yet obscurity and pretentiousness of poetic verse; the
former is explicitly privileged, but one senses an uneasiness within the dialogue concerning that
conclusion.
39 As Mark Beck has pointed out to me, there surely must be a strong allusion to the
discussion involving the Sages and brachylogy in Plato's Protagoras, as well as the more central
debate in that dialogue between the relative ecacy of Protagoras' long speeches (makrologia)
and Socrates' elenchus.
W o r k s c i T e d
A, G. J. D., "Political ought in Plutarch's Convivium Septum [sic]
Sapientium", Mnemosyne, 30 (1977) 28-39.
A, D. E., "Septem Sapientium Convivium ( Moralia 146B – 164D)", in H.
D. B (ed.), Plutarch's Ethical Writings and Early Christian Literatures,
Leiden, 1978, pp. 51-105.
B, D., "Le dialogue de Plutarque Sur le démon de Socrate. Essai
d'interprétation", BAGB, 1 (1984) 51-76.
B, A., "Plutarco e il dialogo 'drammatico'", Prometheus, 14 (1988)
141-63.
B, A., Les sept sages de la Grèce antique. Transmission et utilisation d'un
patrimoine légendaire d'Hérodote à Plutarque. Avec une postface de B.
D, Paris, 2002.
D, J., Plutarque: le Banquet des Sept Sages (ed., tr., comm.), Paris,
1954.
D, L., "Sages et souverain à l'époque du banquet: le Banquet des
Sept Sages et la Lettre d' Aristée à Philocrate", in A. C (ed.),
Plutarco e l' età ellenistica. Atti del Convegno Internazionale di Studi
(Firenze, 23 - 24 Settembre 2004), Firenze, 2005, pp. 79-103.
G, I., "Forma letteraria nei 'Moralia' di Plutarco: Aspetti e problemi",
ANRW, II.34.4 (1998) 3511-40.
H, R., Der Dialog. Zweiter Teil, Leipzig, 1895, pp. 132-48.
I, L., "La leggenda di Arione tra Erodoto e Plutarco", Seminari Romani,
5 (2002) 55-82.
K, I. M., "Trial by Riddle: e Testing of the Counsellor and the
Contest of Kings in the Legend of Amasis and Bias", C&M, 55 (2004)
85-138.
_____ "Amasis, Bias and the Seven Sages as Riddlers", WJA, n. F. 29 (2005)
11-46.
L, R., Plutarch, New Haven, 2001.
M, R., "e Seven Sages as Performers of Wisdom", in C. D
& L. K (eds.), Cultural Poetics in Archaic Greece, Oxford, 1993,
pp.108-28.
M, J. M., "Plutarch's Dinner of the Seven Wise Men and Its Place
in Symposion Literature", in J. M. M (ed.) Plutarch and his
Intellectual World, London, 1997, pp. 119-40.
495
Historical Fiction, Brachylogy, and Plutarch's Banquet of the Seven Sages
R, L., Philosophes entre mots et mets. Plutarque, Lucien et Athénée autour de
la table de Platon, Grenoble, 2002.
S, B., "Zur Geschichte vom Gastmahl der Sieben Weisen", in O.
H, H. K F. T (eds.) esaurismata.
Festschrift für Ida Kapp zum 70. Geburtstag, München, 1954, pp. 105-
11.
S, L., "Aspects of the Ethics and Poetics of the Dialogue in
the Corpus Plutarcheum", in I. G & C. M (eds.) Plutarco
e i generi letterari. Atti dell'VIII convegno plutarcheo (Pisa, 2-4 Giugno
1999), Naples, 2000, pp. 93-116.
V, M., "Plutarco e il 'genere simposio", in I. G & C. M
(eds.) Plutarco e i generi letterari. Atti dell'VIII convegno plutarcheo
(Pisa, 2-4 Giugno 1999), Naples, 2000, pp. 217-29.
W-M, U. von, "Zu Plutarchs Gastmahl der sieben
Weisen", Hermes, 25 (1890) 196-227.
497
Animal Philanthropia in the Convivium Septem Sapientium
an i m a l p H i l a n T H r o p i a i n T h e co n v i v i u m Se p T e m Sa p i e n T i u m
S T. N
Duquesne University, Pittsburgh
Abstract
e Convivium Septem Sapientium contains a series of references to human-animal relationships
which, when read in the order of their appearance, move from a position in which animals are
seen as subservient to humans to one in which animals are presumed to be capable of morally-
signicant behavior, illustrated in the rescue of the singer Arion by dolphins. Plutarch's references
to animals in the dialogue closely mirror his pronouncements on animal intellect and behavior
in his animal-related treatises. Viewed in the light of the civilized and elevated debates that
constitute the subject manner of the Convivium, the references to animals potentially capable of
rational and ethical behavior add a thought-provoking parallel narrative to the dialogue.
While nineteenth-century scholarship on the Convivium Septem
Sapientium concentrated heavily on questions relating to its authorship and
its faithfulness to history1 , scholars in recent decades have begun to examine
the intellectual content of the work, giving particular attention to its political
and religious themes2 . Although some have called attention to the extended
retelling of the famous anecdote of Arion's rescue by dolphins (160E-162B)
and to the other dolphin stories that follow, the discussions of dolphins form
in fact the culmination of a surprising number of references in the treatise
to various aspects of the human-animal relationship. ese references, which
constitute a sort of "parallel narrative" in the treatise, exhibit a progression
of thought, leading from situations in which humans exert dominance over
animals, in sacrice, through fables in which potential intellectual endowments
in animals are referenced, and concluding with human-animal interactions
of a sort that suggests rationality and moral agency in animals, manifested
in particular in striking examples of φιλανθρωπία in animals that Plutarch
details in the rescue of Arion and in his subsequent dolphin stories.
While it would be an exaggeration to claim that the sometimes eeting
allusions to animals in the Convivium constitute more than a secondary theme,
their arrangement in the treatise clearly portrays human-animal interactions
in an increasingly complex light, as Plutarch gradually draws animals closer to
human beings in their intellectual capacities and nally hints at the possibility
of an ethical relationship between species, when he depicts animals displaying
concern for and kindness toward humans. e present study traces the
development of this animal theme in the Convivium, giving particular attention
1 U. W-M, 1890, p. 196, for example, criticizes Plutarch
for an inability to write in a historically convincing manner, while G. H, 1893, pp. 1-26,
defends Plutarch's authorship on stylistic grounds and on the similarity of ideas presented in the
treatise to those seen elsewhere in Plutarch, including his conviction that animals have a share
of rationality, a view developed in his animal-related treatises.
2 Studies that emphasize the political and religious themes prominent in the Convivium
include G. J. D. A, 1977; J. M. M, 1977; and L. V S, 2005.
to the order in which references to human-animal relations are presented, and
will suggest that earlier manifestations of the theme both prepare the way for
the portrait of animal φιλανθρωπία in the latter portions of the dialogue and
mirror Plutarch's pronouncements in his animal-related treatises.
e participation in the Convivium of the legendary fabulist Aesop, who
was not reckoned among the Seven Sages in any ancient enumeration, greatly
facilitates the introduction of animal themes into the dialogue, as he poses
riddles, replies to questions, and is teased by the other interlocutors3 . His
function in the dialogue has been the subject of some speculation. In his
annotated edition of the work, Jean Defradas notes that the portrait of Aesop
oered in the Convivium is in line with those of Herodotus and Aristotle
in emphasizing his "sagesse pratique"4 , while Judith Mossman, in her study,
"Plutarch's Dinner of the Seven Wise Men and Its Place in Symposion Literature,"
concludes that his participation allows the dialogue to "... tend toward a
lighter tone"5 , and George Harrison, in his study, "Problems with the Genre
of Problems: Plutarch's Literary Innovations," admits that Aesop's presence at
an evening full of riddles should "seem appropriate, not superuous," although
he does not elaborate on his observation6 . It can be argued, however, that
Aesop's presence in the dialogue is rather more functional and integral than
incidental or merely comical, since many of the more casual and passing
references to animals in the earlier chapters of the work involve him, while the
more substantial discussions of animal themes toward the end of the work are
introduced by or commented on by members of the Seven.
Aesop does not gure in the dialogue's rst anecdote involving animals
(146F), in which ales recounts that on one occasion a sacricial animal
(ἱερεῖον ) was sent to Bias by a king with the command that he send back the
best and worst parts of the animal. Bias sent the tongue and thereby earned
a reputation for cleverness. It is signicant that animals make their rst
appearance in the work in that role, as sacricial victims, that was reckoned
most proper to them and essential to the functioning of the ancient state.
Moreover, the anecdote reminds the reader of a fundamental assumption that
underlay much of classical speculation on human-animal relations, namely,
that humans are dierent from and superior to other species7 . In her recent
study "Beastly Spectacle in the Ancient Mediterranean World," Jo-Ann
Shelton observes, "Sacrice was a practice that emphasized the possibility
of communication between humans and gods, while, at the same time, it
3 Plu., Quaest. conviv. 614A-B, comments on the pedagogical, ethical and philosophical
usefulness of riddles, stories and anecdotal material, the sorts of contributions that Aesop
naturally makes, to convivial discourse.
4 J. D, 1954, p. 23.
5 J. M. M, 1997, p. 124.
6 G. W. M. H, 2000, p. 196.
7 On ancient attitudes toward the superiority of human beings to other animal species,
see R. S, 1993, pp. 1-16 and 122-57; G. S, 2005, pp. 1-92 and 223-51; and S. T.
N, 2006, pp. 1-65.
499
Animal Philanthropia in the Convivium Septem Sapientium
underscored the distinction between humans and animals"8. In Plutarch's rst
anecdote, animal sacrice appears as part of a game, but the assumption of
human domination and animal subjugation is evident.
In the second appearance of an animal in the treatise (149C-E), the
distinction between human and animal is blurred. A young herdsman brings
in a piece of leather containing a creature whose neck and arms are human
but the rest of whose body is that of a horse. Although the term is not used
in the text, the creature is obviously a centaur. e character Niloxenus turns
away in pious horror, but ales makes light of the portent. is peculiar
incident has intrigued scholars. Defradas speculates that it may be intended
as a presentiment of the spirit that infuses the later dolphin anecdotes9 ,
while Mossman calls it "an excellent example of the σπουδαιογέλοιον" that
is characteristic of symposium literature10 . When one recalls, however, that
at least some centaurs, including Pholus and in particular Chiron, teacher of
heroes and scholar of medicine, were exceptions to the rule that their kind
were violent and uncivilized, one glimpses the ambivalent nature of the ancient
attitude toward this creature that straddles two worlds, joining the wildness of
the animal with the intellect of the human.
Plutarch eects a transition from the bizarre tale of the centaur to the
series of fables involving Aesop, rst mentioned as present at the banquet at
150A, by continuing his exploration of creatures that are, as Judith Mossman
puts it, "half-and-half things"11 . He portrays Aesop as alluding in a fable to
the bastard status of rasybulus' son Alexidemus, who refuses to dine with
the others since he feels that his dignity as the son of rasybulus has been
slighted. Aesop recounts a tale in which a mule acts like a horse when he
sees his image in a river and is impressed with his own size and handsome
appearance, until he "becomes aware, takes note" (συμφρονήσας, 150A) that he
is the ospring of an ass and abandons his conceit. While it would be unwise
to press the vocabulary of fables too closely, it is interesting to note that in
each of Aesop's contributions, we nd technical terms or illustrative examples
frequently employed in ancient philosophical discussions of animal mentality.
Aristotle devoted considerable attention to the question of the content of
animal intellect in relation to its human counterpart. At Nicomachean Ethics
1140b20-21, for example, he calls φρόνησις, the intellectual capacity to which
Aesop alludes in the above anecdote, a sort of "practical wisdom" that entails "a
truth-attaining rational quality that concerns things good for human beings"12 .
is denition suggests that here at least he denies practical wisdom to non-
humans. At Metaphysics 980b22, however, he declares that animals possessing
memory are φρονιμώτερα, "wiser, more intelligent," than other animals. In
8 J.-A. S, 2007, p. 111.
9 J. D, 1954, p. 13.
10 J. M. M, 1997, p. 128.
11 J. M. M, 1997, p. 129.
12Arist., EN 1140b20-21: ἀνάγκη τὴν φρόνησιν ἕξιν εἶναι μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ περὶ τὰ
ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ πρακτικήν.
his own defense of animal rationality, De sollertia animalium, Plutarch allows
his interlocutor Autobulus to suggest that we should consider animal intellect
to be less acute than that of humans rather than claiming that animals are
devoid of intellect and practical wisdom altogether13 .
Shortly after the anecdote of the vain mule, Solon jokingly establishes
Aesop's credentials as an expert on animals by calling him "clever at
understanding ravens and jackdaws" (σὺ δὲ δεινὸς εἶ κοράκων ἐπαΐειν καὶ
κολοιῶν, 152D), a passing allusion to ancient speculation on the linguistic
capacities of birds. In Stoic theory, meaningful language was denied to
animals because the "governing principle," or ἡγεμονικόν, in the animal soul
remained irrational so that animal utterances are meaningless14 . In contrast,
Plutarch tells of a "remarkable jay" (θαυμαστόν τι χρῆμα ... κίττης, De sollertia
animalium 973C) that meditated upon the sounds of a trumpet that it had
heard and repeated only certain of its notes in its own song, suggesting that
the self-taught bird possessed more reason than would have been evident in
one that had learned from others15 .
In the next anecdote involving animals, Anacharsis, one of the Seven
Wise Men, chastises Aesop for supposing that a home is mere mortar and
wood, when even an anthill or a bird's nest can be a happy home if the beasts
who inhabit it "possess mind and discretion" (νοῦν ἔχουσι καὶ σωφρονοῦσι,
155C). Ants and some bird species gure prominently in ancient literature as
animals endowed with impressive intellectual capacities. In his article "Some
Stock Illustrations of Animal Intelligence in Greek Psychology," Sherwood
Dickerman observed that in classical sources, "four animals appear with a
regularity so great as to challenge attention—the ant, the bee, the spider, the
swallow (now and then the birds in general)"16 . Plutarch (De sollertia animalium
967E) maintains that the behavior of ants suggests that they have the classical
virtues of courage, prudence, practical wisdom (φρονήσεως) and justice. Here
Anacharsis reiterates that claim.
e nal allusion to human-animal relations preceding the dolphin
anecdotes has been variously interpreted. At 159B-C, Solon laments the fact
that the diet of humans by necessity entails injustice because it involves the
ingestion of other living things, be they plant or animal, and, perhaps with a
nod to Phaedo 66b, he asserts that the need for food weighs down the human
soul and renders it gross and impure. G. J. D. Aalders remarks of this lament,
"Solon's ideas about the soul and the desirability of restricting one's diet to
a minimum (158b.) can hardly stem from the historical Solon and are not
even found in Plutarch's Life of Solon"17 . Yet if Solon's comments are viewed
13 Plu., De soll. anim. 973B: μηδὲ τὰ θηρία λέγωμεν ... μὴ διανοεῖσθαι μηδὲ φρονεῖν ὅλως.
14 On the Stoic doctrine of the ἡγεμονικόν, see S. T. N, 1999 and S. T. N,
2006, p. 46.
15Plu., De soll. anim. 973E: ὥστε, ὅπερ ἔφην, τῆς εὐμαθείας λογικωτέραν εἶναι τὴν
αὐτομάθειαν ἐν αὐτοῖς.
16 S. O. D, 1911, p. 123.
17 G. J. D. A, 1977, p. 29.
501
Animal Philanthropia in the Convivium Septem Sapientium
in the context of Plutarch's theme of human-animal relations developed in the
Convivium, his reservations concerning human injustice toward animals seem
less problematic, especially if one recalls strikingly similar pronouncements
in De esu carnium, Plutarch's argument for vegetarianism, wherein he claims
(994E) that animals at the point of slaughter, whose remarkable intelligence
(περιττὸν ἐν συνέσει ) humans ignore, demand justice from their slayers 18 .
Already in 1893, Georg Hauck had noted the similarity in Plutarch's
argumentation here in the Convivium to those passages from his Gryllus and
De sollertia animalium where he argues for rationality in animals, a connection
which Aalders does not note19 .
Whether Solon's scruples here are his own or reect Plutarch's views as
stated in the animal treatises, it is noteworthy that the anecdotes of Arion's
rescue by dolphins and of the recovery of Hesiod's body by dolphins follow
closely upon Solon's expression of concern that human behavior toward
other species might have ethical ramications. Most scholars have judged
the dolphin anecdotes to be fundamental to some overarching theme in the
Convivium, although the animals have regularly been viewed as instruments
rather than as actors in the drama. Defradas, for example, sees the dolphins
as agents of justice carrying out the will of the gods on earth20 , a view which
indeed nds textual support both in Arion's conclusion (161F) that his rescue
illustrates how god watches over all deeds on land and sea and in Anacharsis'
observation concerning the recovery of Hesiod's body (163E-F) that god uses
every creature as his instrument (ὄργανον, 163E).
Even Luc van der Stockt, who displays greater aection for Plutarch's
dolphins as animals than do other scholars, concluded that the animals are "part
of a world in which god, man and animals take care of each other"21 . In van der
Stockt's understanding of Plutarch's dolphin anecdotes, god governs the cosmos
in such a way that animals serve to unite god and man, and are symbolic of god's
sympathy for the universe. Here too, the animals are viewed instrumentally . It
can be argued, however, that Plutarch's dolphins are more than passive tools
of divine will, and that the dolphin anecdotes form the culmination to the
human-animal theme in the Convivium: having raised the possibility, in Solon's
comments, that humans might have obligations to act justly toward animals,
Plutarch now raises the possibility that some animals may be moved to act
justly toward humans, who thereby benet from actions which, if performed by
humans, might be considered instances of φιλανθρωπία .
In his study of Plutarchan φιλανθρωπία, Rudolf Hirzel argued that
Plutarch understood that term in several senses, ranging from the conviviality
of a dinner party, to guest-friendship, to ordinary politeness, to a belief in a
18 On the concept of justice toward animals, see S. T. N, 1992 and S. T. N,
2006, pp. 48-65.
19 G. H, 1893, p. 48.
20 J. D, 1954, p. 14.
21 L. V S, 2005, p. 19.
connection between man and man in which one is benefactor to the other22 . H e
points out Plutarch's conviction, inuenced by Pythagoras and given voice at
De sollertia animalium 959F23 , that kindness to animals inspires φιλανθρωπία
toward fellow-humans. He does not suggest that Plutarch believed that a
human might practice τὸ φιλάνθρωπον toward animals, much less that
animals might be so inclined toward humans. Yet it is the possibility of this
ethical relationship that especially distinguishes Plutarch's accounts of dolphin
behaviors from the others.
Classicists are familiar with Herodotus' charming account of the rescue
of the poet Arion (I. 23-24), and may know the versions of Pliny (NH IX. 28)
and the post-Plutarchan Aelian (NA XII. 45). In Plutarch's retelling of the
tale, two narrative details are added which are absent from earlier versions:
the rescue is eected in Plutarch by more than one animal working as a team,
and this teamwork inspires human witnesses to suspect ethical motivations in
the animals' actions. Pliny (NH IX. 24) calls the dolphin "an animal friendly
to man" (homini ... amicum animal), but he does not ascribe any motivation to
the animal's behavior. Similarly, in Herodotus, Arion is rescued by one animal
whose motivations are not specied.
In Plutarch's account of the rescue, Gorgus, brother of Periander, tyrant
of Corinth who hosts the convivium and at whose court the tale of Arion was
set in Herodotus as well, reports witnessing a group of dolphins bearing ashore
a man whom the onlookers recognized as the famous Arion (161A). e
singer recounted that at the moment when he was about to drown, dolphins
gathered around him "in a manner kindly-disposed" (εὐμενῶς, 161D), and
passed him on to one another, "relieving each other as if this were a duty
necessary and incumbent upon them all" (διαδεχομένους ὡς ἀναγκαῖον ἐν
μέρει λειτούργημα καὶ προσῆκον πᾶσιν, 161D). Shortly after this, Solon
relates that the body of the drowned poet Hesiod was recovered by dolphins
who acted, in his view, in a "kindred and human-loving manner" (οἰκείως
καὶ φιλανθρώπως, 162F). e juxtaposition here of the adverbs οἰκείως and
φιλανθρώπως oers critical insight into Plutarch's view of animal intellect
and behavior toward human beings, including instances of what might be
termed "animal φιλανθρωπία".
In Stoic ethical theory, οἰκείωσις was the recognition of kinship, attachment
or belonging that one group naturally feels to another that it senses to be akin
to itself24 . Humans experience this toward other humans, and animals toward
other animals, but no οἰκείωσις exists between humans and animals because
animals are fundamentally unlike humans, being, in Stoic teaching, forever
irrational25 . At De nibus III. 67, Cicero states that the natural consequence of
22 R. H, 1912, p. 24.
23 Plu., De soll. anim. 959F: ὥσπερ αὖ πάλιν οἱ Πυθαγορικοὶ τὴν εἰς τὰ θηρία πραότητα
μελέτην ἐποιήσαντο πρὸς τὸ φιλάνθρωπον καὶ φιλοίκτιρμον.
24 e Stoic concept of οἰκείωσις has inspired an extensive body of scholarship. Particularly
illuminating are C. O. B, 1955-1956; G. S, 1983; and G. R-S, 2003.
25 Cicero, O. I. 50, oers the classic formulation of the Stoic position on the lack of
503
Animal Philanthropia in the Convivium Septem Sapientium
this lack of natural kinship, in the view of the Stoics, was that humans could
have no bonds of justice with animals: sed quomodo hominum inter homines esse
vincula putant, sic homini nihil iuris cum bestiis.
In De sollertia animalium, Plutarch argued, against the Stoics, that all
animals in fact partake of reason to some degree26 . In Plutarch's view, rationality
in animal species diers quantitatively rather than qualitatively from rationality
in human beings27 . Consequently animals must be judged akin (οἰκεῖοι) to
human beings after all. Not only are they therefore owed justice, but Plutarch's
use of the ethically-charged terms ἀναγκαῖον , λειτούργημα and προσῆκον in
his account of the rescue of Arion in the Convivium (161D) suggests that he
considered them to be capable of disinterested and intentional aiding actions
that had moral overtones28 . At De sollertia animalium 984D, one speaker asserts
that the dolphin, alone of animals, practices the ideal of the philosophers:
friendship without advantage (τῷ δὲ δελφῖνι ... μόνῳ ... τὸ φιλεῖν ἄνευ χρείας
ὑπάρχει). Perhaps a greater degree of rationality allowed the dolphins to exercise
that friendship in a "kindred and human-loving manner" in rescuing Arion
and recovering the body of Hesiod, and perhaps too it was a recognition that
dolphins were "kindred" (οἰκεῖοι) that led to the unwritten law to which Solon
alludes (163A), that no human might harm or hunt them.
While the animal theme traceable in the Convivium is overshadowed
by the debate on the form of government proper to human societies and on
the role of god in human life, the ideas advanced concerning animals in this
dialogue are, as the present study has endeavored to show, entirely in keeping
with Plutarch's views as these are set forth at length in his animal treatises.
e theme of just and "human-loving" behavior in animals who are hinted to
possess, at least to a degree, some of the better intellectual and ethical qualities
of human beings adds an intriguing counterpoint to a dialogue devoted to
rational discourse on high-minded themes carried on by the Sages of Greece.
W o r k s c i T e d
A, G. J. D., "Political ought in Plutarch's Convivium Septum [sic]
Sapientium", Mnemosyne, 30 (1977) 28-39.
kinship between humans and irrational animals: Sed quae naturae principia sint communitatis
et societatis humanae repetendum videtur altius; est enim primum, quod cernitur in universi generis
humani societate. Eius autem vinculum est ratio et oratio, quae docendo, discendo, communicando,
disceptando, iudicando conciliat inter se homines coniungitque naturali quadam societate; neque ulla re
longius absumus a natura ferarum, in quibus inesse fortitudinem saepe dicimus, ut in equis, in leonibus,
iustitiam aequitatem, bonitatem non dicimus; sunt enim rationis et orationis expertes.
26 Plu., De soll. anim. 960A: ἀποφηνάμενοι γὰρ ἐχθές, ὡς οἶσθα, μετέχειν ἁμωσγέπως
πάντα τὰ ζῷα διανοίας καὶ λογισμοῦ ...
27 On Plutarch's doctrine of quantitative dierences in rationality between species, see S.
N, 2006, p. 40, which provides citations from Plutarch's animal treatises.
28 For a detailed discussion of Plutarch's ideas on altruistic, cooperative and philanthropic
behaviors in non-human animals, see S. N, 2006, pp. 76-84.
504
Stephen T. Newmyer
B, C. O., "Οἰκείωσις and οἰκειότης: eophrastus and Zeno on Nature in
Moral eory", Phronesis, 1 (1955-1956) 123-45.
D, J., Plutarque: Le banquet des sept sages (Texte et traduction avec une
introduction et des notes), Paris, 1954.
D, S. O., "Some Stock Illustrations of Animal Intelligence in Greek
Psychology", TAPhA, 42 (1911) 123-30.
H, G. W. M., "Problems with the Genre of Problems: Plutarch's
Literary Innovations", CPh, 95 (2000) 193-99.
H, G., Plutarch von Chaeronea, der Verfasser des Gastmahls der 7 Weisen,
Burghausen, 1893.
H, R., Plutarch, Leipzig, 1912.
M, J. M., "Plutarch's Dinner of the Seven Wise Men and Its Place in
Symposion Literature", in J. M. M, Plutarch and His Intellectual
World: Essays on Plutarch, London, 1997, pp. 119-40.
N, S. T., "Plutarch on Justice toward Animals: Ancient Insights on a
Modern Debate", in Scholia: Natal Studies in Classical Antiquity, n. s. 1
(1992) 38-54.
_____"Speaking of Beasts: e Stoics and Plutarch on Animal Reason and the
Modern Case against Animals", QUCC, n. s. 63 (1999) 99-110.
_____ Animals, Rights and Reason in Plutarch and Modern Ethics , Oxford,
2006.
R-S, G., "Human Bonding and Oikeiōsis in Roman Stoicism",
OSAPh, 22 (2003) 221-51.
S, J.-A., "Beastly Spectacles in the Ancient Mediterranean World", in
L. K (ed.), A Cultural History of Animals in Antiquity, Oxford and
New York, 2007, pp. 97-126.
S, R., Animal Minds and Human Morals: e Origins of the Western
Debate, Ithaca, NY, 1993.
S, G., Anthropocentrism and Its Discontents: e Moral Status of Animals
in Antiquity, Pittsburgh, 2005.
S, G., "e Role of Oikeiôsis in Stoic Ethics", OSAPh, 1 (1983) 145-
67.
V S, L.,"Plutarch and Dolphins: Love Is All You Need", in J.
B (ed.), Les grecs de l'antiquité et les animaux: le cas remarquable
de Plutarque, Lille, 2005, pp. 13-21.
W-M, U. Von, "Zu Plutarchs Gastmahl der Sieben
Weisen", Hermes, 25 (1890) 196-227.
505
Music and symposium in Plutarch's Convivium Septem Sapientium: a brief note
mu s i c a n d s y m p o s i u m i n pl u T a r c h 's
co n v i v i u m Se p T e m Sa p i e n T i u m : a b r i e f n o T e
R A R J
Federal University of Paraná
Abstract
In a symposion , music played an important role. It was through music that the traditions were
perpetuated and the young men were educated. We see this in several ancient Greek texts, from
Homer to Athenaeus. Music also has a signicant role in Plutarch's Convivium Septem Sapientium .
In this brief paper, my aim is to examine the use that Plutarch makes of musical themes in that
dialogue. In the end, I intend to show that music marks Plutarch's way of thinking and style.
In ancient Greek culture, the banquet and the symposion were the most
important occasions in the social life of an adult male. In a symposion friendship
relations were created or reinforced, political decisions were discussed and
inuenced and a great part of poetical and musical culture was perpetuated
and transmitted. So, there could never be a banquet without food, and after
the banquet, a symposion without wine and especially music, and when we say
'music' in ancient Greece, we are talking about a complex of arts that involved
what we nowadays call music, poetry and dance.
We can see this determinant role played by music in the banquet and in the
symposion already in the Homeric poems. In the Iliad (1, 603-604), Apollo plays his
lyre and sings with the Muses in the banquet of the gods on Olympus. In the Odyssey
Homer says many times1 that 'music is a banquet's ornament'. is not to mention
the noteworthy presence of Demodocus in book VIII and the interventions of
Phemius in book I of the Odyssey . But maybe the strongest demonstration that there
could never be a banquet without music is in 9. 3-11, when, praising the orderly and
peaceful atmosphere that reigns in Alcinoos' palace, Odysseus remembers that the
aoidos is an essential element for the maintenance of the peace-loving and happy
model of existence that prevails in the Phaeacians' Island.
We nd other references to music's role in banquets and symposia in,
for example, Xenophanes (fr. 1W) and in many fragments of Alcaeus and
Anacreon. In this kind of poetry, that was composed to be performed in a
banquet or in a symposion, there are many references to music in its practical
aspect, that is, references to instruments, to the presence of a musician or to
the kind of music he or she was playing. Later, after the second half of the
fth century, when another form of literature develops and a specic literary
genre, the Symposion, ourishes, the performance of music will be reduced
to give place to a new kind of 'musical' exercise: the discussion of dierent
subjects in a dialogue among wise men. is is what we read in Plato's and
Xenophon's Symposia, in Plutarch's Quaestiones Conviviales and in Athenaeus'
Deipnosophistai, to mention just some texts2 .
1 1, 152-155; 1, 370 and 421; 21, 430.
2 On the symposion, see W. J . H, 2000; and F. F, 2000.
506
Roosevelt Araújo da Rocha Júnior
So music, as one of the most inuential elements in Greek culture, could
not be absent from a Plutarchean work set in a symposion, namely the Convivium
Septem Sapientium. I intend to show, on the one hand, that discussions of
musical themes were usual in ancient Greek banquets and, on the other, that
Plutarch was familiar with and very fond of this kind of subject. Plutarch is
famous because of his large knowledge of all ancient disciplines, and music
was an art in which he was no beginner when he wrote this work: far from it.
It is important to understand the reason why Plutarch often chooses examples
taken from music to explain or illustrate some theme. And I think this is an
aspect of his work and style still underestimated.
In the Convivium, we nd important allusions to musical subjects. In
147F, dealing with the guest's behaviour, Plutarch says, through ales' voice,
that, if someone who was invited to a dinner does not behave properly, this
person can make unpleasant the best wines, the most delicious foods and the
performances of the most talented musicians. In making this remark, ales
indirectly is telling us about the basic components indispensable to any
symposion.
Further on, in 149A, trying to calm a guest down, rasybulus' son
Alexidemus of Miletus, who was not satised with the place of little honour
that Periander gave him next to Aeolians and men from other islands, ales
gives an example of how a guest must behave in a dinner by telling a little
story about a Spartan who was put by the director in the last place of a chorus,
but was not discontented, and exclaimed that by doing that the director had
discovered a way of making that position a place of honor. en ales himself,
in 149F-150A, gives an example of proper behavior by sitting next to Ardalus
of Troezen3 , an aulōidos and "a priest of the Ardalian Muses whose worship
his forefather, Ardalus of Troezen, had established"4 . In this passage, we can
see irony in ales' words when he says that he would pay to share the table
with Ardalus. To understand the irony we must remember that, many times
in ancient Greek literature, the musicians and most of all the ones that had
some relation to the aulos, the aulētai and the aulōidoi, were not considered
people worthy of respect5 . So, ales, by doing so, is showing that it doesn't
matter where and next to whom the guest is placed in the table, but the most
important thing is try to learn as much as possible from whoever is sitting next
to us and trying to start a new friendship whenever we can.
After the dinner, the guests make a libation accompanied by an aulētris , a
girl that plays the aulos, and, inspired by her presence, Ardalus asks Anacharsis if
the Scythians had aulētrides (150D-E). Anacharsis answers that the Scythians
don't have aulētrides or grape-vines, but they have gods, though they don't
"believe that the gods have more pleasure by listening to the sounds produced
by bits of bone and wood", as the Greeks do. And this leads us to a remark by
the character Aesop (150F) about the good melody produced by auloi made of
3 is character will appear again in 150D-E, 155E, 157D and 157F.
4 All the translations are taken from B' edition for the Loeb Classical Library.
5 About the situation of auletai, see A. B, 2002.
507
Music and symposium in Plutarch's Convivium Septem Sapientium: a brief note
asses' bones: the ass is an unmelodious animal, but the most beautiful melodies
are played with his bones. In the sequence Neiloxenus makes a commentary
about a complaint that the citizens of Busiris have against the people of
Naucratis because they use asses' bones to make auloi. For the Busirians to
hear even a salpinx, a trumpet, was a sin, because it sounded like an ass bray
and the ass was associated with Set, a malignant god sometimes represented
by the features of this animal. So one can notice that a simple remark or little
story leads to another one and on and on and on, like a sequence of echoes that
virtually has no end, as we would expect in an idealised talk among the wisest
men of Greece.
Some paragraphs later (156C), Plutarch, through the words of his character
Mnesiphilus, commenting on Solon's opinion "that the task of every art and
faculty, both human and divine, is the thing that is produced rather than the
means employed in its production, and the end itself rather than the means
that contribute to that end", tells us what he believes must be music's role
because "the Muses would most assuredly feel aggrieved, if we should regard
as their task a lyre or auloi, and not the development of the characters and the
soothing of the emotions of those who make use of songs and melodies". As a
follower of Platonic ideas, Plutarch would endorse Damonian ethical theory
of music, according to which music has the power to transform the soul and
to mould the character6 .
At the end of the Convivium (160C-D), Gorgus, Periander's brother,
arrives and takes part in the talk. Returning from a voyage to Taenarum,
Gorgus has an amazing story to tell his brother rst and then to everybody
there. Before Gorgus starts telling what he saw, Periander warns his friends
about the extraordinary fact that Gorgus is about to report. But Bias recalls
that ales said that we must believe in our friends' words, even if they sound
absurd. And besides, Bias says that Gorgus should tell his story at least "to
compete with those newly invented dithyrambs" (160E). is seems to be
a covert reference to Arion as the inventor of the dithyramb, according to
Babbitt, in note to this passage. But I think there is more to be said about
this comment of Bias. ere is a latent irony in these words. It sounds as if
Plutarch was making a remark about the strangeness that characterizes the
dithyramb in his own time or as if he was reproducing some other author's
words, maybe those of Plato or Aristoxenus, because these thinkers made
this kind of comment about the degeneration of the dithyramb earlier
and also inuenced Plutarch's ideas in a decisive way. We know that this
dialogue has a strong ctional character, but it is worth mentioning that
it is an anachronism7 told by a historical character that lived in the sixth
century, when the dithyramb was still getting its 'classical' shape8 . I think
it is interesting to note that, in another work ascribed in the tradition to
6 On ethical theories about music's power, see M. L. W, 1992, pp. 246-53.
7 On anachronism in Plutarch's Convivium, see G. J. D. A, 1997 and A. B ,
2008, pp. 584-5.
8 About this question, see G. A. P, 1979 and A. D' A , 1997.
508
Roosevelt Araújo da Rocha Júnior
Plutarch, the De Musica, we nd many references to the alleged decadence
of the dithyramb, especially at the end of the fth and rst half of the fourth
century B. C9 .Be that as it may, this comment by Bias prepares the reader to
what will follow: the story of Arion (160E-162B).
Gorgus tells that after he had sacriced to Poseidon, when the moon
was shining over the sea, he saw dolphins leaving a man on the shore. is
man was Arion, the kitharōidos. He gave his name and was easily recognizable
because he was wearing his ceremonial robes, i.e. his special clothes for the
occasions when he sang and played his kithara. Arion told that he was coming
from Italy to Corinth, after receiving a letter from Periander. Because of this
he took a Corinthian merchant vessel. After three days, Arion sensed that the
sailors were planning to do something against him. en, inspired perhaps by
a divine impulse, he put on his ceremonial garments and started to sing his
swan song, the nomos Pythicos to Apollo. When he was in the middle of his
song, the sailors advanced to murder him. But Arion threw himself into the
sea and was saved by dolphins. He strongly believed that he was a man beloved
by the gods10 .
After Gorgus told the story of Arion, the other participants start a
discussion and some report other stories about dolphins rescuing humans.
Solon, in particular, tells how Hesiod's body, after he was dead, was taken by
dolphins and nishes his words saying that these animals like music so much
and delight themselves with the sound of auloi and songs (162F). is fact
could explain why they help humans, specially poets and musicians like Arion
and Hesiod.
To end this brief comment about the 'musical' passages of the Convivium
Septem Sapientium, it is worth reporting some words put in the mouth of
Anacharsis by Plutarch (163E-F): just as living beings depend on God's
power, serve Him and are responsive to His movements, so the Scythians are
responsive to bows and the Greeks are very fond of lyres and auloi. is remark
serves to distinguish the barbarian Scythians from the civilized Greeks, but it
also makes evident the love that the Hellenic people dedicated to music, love
that is shown many times in this dialogue.
W o r k s c i T e d
A, G. J. D., "Political thought in Plutarch's Convivium Septem
Sapientium", Mnemosyne, 30.1 (1997) 29-31.
B, A., "Dicoltà e rischi della professione musicale" in A. B,
Euterpe. Ricerche sulla musica greca e romana, Pisa, 2002, pp. 105-15.
9 See chapters 3, 4, 6, 12, 29 and specically 30, where Plutarch quotes the famous fragment
from the comedy entitled Chiron, by Pherecrates (fr. 155 Kassel-Austin). On the authorship of
the De Musica cf. R. R, 2007, pp. 15-31.
10 In Herodotus, 1, 24, we nd another version of this story.
509
Music and symposium in Plutarch's Convivium Septem Sapientium: a brief note
B, A.,"Plutarque et la scène du banquet", in A. G. N ed.),
e Unity of Plutarch's Work. Moralia emes in the Lives, Features of the
Lives in the Moralia, Berlin, 2008, pp. 584-5.
D'A, A., "How the dithyramb got its shape", CQ, 47.2 (1997) 331-51.
F, F., "Aimer boire et chanter chez les Grecs: la literature au banquet
d'Homère à Athénée", Cahiers du GITA, 13 (2000) 65-105.
H, W. J., "Aspects of the ancient Greek symposion", Akroterion, 45
(2000) 6-26.
P, G. A.,"Il Ditirambo no al IV secolo", in R . B. B (ed.),
Storia e civiltà dei Greci, vol. 5, Milan, 1979.
R, R., O Peri Mousikēs, de Plutarco: Tradução, Comentários e Notas. Tese
de Doutoramento, IEL – UNICAMP, 2007, ( http://libdigi.unicamp.
br/document/?code=vtls000431822).
W, M. L., Ancient Greek Music, Oxford, 1992.
511
e tyrannos as a sophos in the Septem Sapientium Convivium
Th e T y r a n n o S a s a S o p H o S i n T h e
Se p T e m Sa p i e n T i u m co n v i v i u m
D L
University of Coimbra
Abstract
e group of the Seven Sages in the Septem Sapientium Convivium includes a number of gures
whose presence is problematic due to their association with autocratic power. Although the
invitation to the meeting was sent out by the tyrant Periander, he is nevertheless eliminated
from the central core of the Sages. is decision may be justied, in the rst place, by the fact
that he is a tyrant and that there is a deep animosity towards this form of government in the
Convivium. Nevertheless, Periander was expected to full a more important function in his
capacity as host, but, contrary to this scenario, his presence begins to recede, especially once
the eulogy of the democratic system starts, to the point that the honour of closing the banquet
falls to Solon. Even so, Pittacus has ruled over the destinies of Mytilene as an aesymnetes and
continues to gure among the sophoi, and the same can be said of Cleoboulus, the autocrat of
Lindos. Taking these factors into account, I propose to discuss in this paper the reason why
Pittacus and Cleoboulus were able to remain as sophoi, while Periander ended up being relegated
to a secondary place.
In my earlier work, I argued that the Septem Sapientium Convivium
represents, in a certain way, a kind of cosmopolis of dierent sorts of wisdom1 .
Among the sophoi, the dominant prole corresponds, as should be expected,
to the masculine, aristocratic and Greek sensibility, as shown in the characters
of Solon, ales, Bias, Cleoboulus, Pittacus and Chilon. e seventh gure
of the gallery is occupied by the Scythian Anacharsis, a personality that a
long-lasting tradition2 used to consider under the double perspective either
of a sort of martyr of Greek culture or of a "bon sauvage" still uncorrupted by
the vices of civilization and, because of that, apt to deprecate those same vices
without being subject to the compromises of social convenience. Besides that,
Anacharsis also adds a note of eccentricity to the group of sapientes, as he too
ends up representing the nomadic oddness of the northern barbarians.3
e group of the sophoi as a whole is not, nevertheless, the object of
the approach I intend to present, which rather deals with the image of the
tyrannos as a sophos in the banquet of the Seven Wise Men. Solon, ales,
Bias and Chilon are usually present in the stable nucleus of the Seven but do
not correspond to the tyrannos/sophos prole. Accordingly, their example is
1 e results of these several studies were gathered in a single global analysis, published in
D. F. L, 2006. See also D. F. L, 2008. I would like to express my gratitude to Manuel
Tröster, who read an earlier version of this paper and improved a lot on the English.
2 Present already in Herodotus, 4.76-77.
3 To this relatively exotic ambience contributes as well Neiloxenos, Amasis' envoy to the court
of Periander, who can be considered, to a certain point, an example of Egyptian sophistication,
although he does not belong to the restricted circle of the Seven Wise Men. I shall later return
to him and to other secondary gures like the young Cleobouline (or Eumetis), who, along with
Aesop, represents a more intuitive knowledge.
adduced only to strengthen the contrast with other personalities present in the
Convivium: Pittacus and Cleoboulus, in their role of sapientes, and Periander
in the quality of the meeting's host. What these three gures have in common
is the fact that they all represent autocratic regimes. ere are, nevertheless,
important dierences of detail that might help to understand the dissimilar
way in which Plutarch characterized them. Besides, this happens not only in
the Convivium but is also detectable elsewhere in his oeuvre, for instance in the
De E apud Delphos (385d-e), where the author reduces the number of sapientes
to only ve (Chilon, ales, Solon, Bias and Pittacus), expressly excluding the
tyrants Cleoboulus and Periander. is clearly shows that Plutarch is somehow
reluctant to include tyrannoi among the group of sophoi. Such a perspective is
hardly surprising, because even in earlier representations of tyranny (dating
especially back to the fth and fourth centuries) the concept of autocratic
rule in general was closely connected with the idea of illegitimacy, the use
of mercenary troops, personal abuse and contempt for the laws of the city4 .
Nevertheless, it should also be taken into account, as I shall argue, that a
positive tradition related with the tyrants is also found in the sources, probably
owing its formation to an oral tradition that goes back to the time when some
of these more ancient gures lived (the sixth century). It is very important to
be aware of this in order to understand and solve the apparent contradiction of
Plutarch's portrayal of these characters in the Septem Sapientium Convivium ,
where a certain tension can be detected in their treatment, as well as a positive
appraisal. In discussing the question, I shall start by evoking some fundamental
traits of each personality in the literary tradition. However, this should not be
seen as a mere exercise of Quellenforschung, but as a preliminary step towards
understanding Plutarch's options when he decided to describe a symposion
with the Seven Sages.
Pittacus of Mytilene
Pittacus was an aristocrat of Lesbos who involved himself directly, as did
the poet Alcaeus, in the political struggles that aected the island during the
VII and VI centuries. In an initial phase of his active life, he joined Alcaeus and
Antimenides (the poet's brother) in order to depose the tyrant Melanchrus,
whose government would be substituted by that of Myrsilus, with whom
Pittacus then aligned himself, to the bitter resentment of his former allies,
who had to go into exile. Myrsilus' death was celebrated in Alcaeus' verses
with enormous elation5 , and it was in a context of great political and social
instability that Pittacus rose to power, at the turn of the VI century (around
590/89), ruling over the destinies of Mytilene over ten years. Although they had
worked together in the past, Pittacus' government is repeatedly criticized by
Alcaeus, who considers his rise to power an act of madness by the Mytileneans
4 See C. M, 2006, 189, in discussing Plato and Plutarch on the Sicilian tyrants.
5 Cf. frg. 332 Voigt.
513
e tyrannos as a sophos in the Septem Sapientium Convivium
and a consecration of tyranny6. is opposition from exile represents a clear
sign that Pittacus was progressively moving away from the aristocrats who
started by giving him their support, and that this evolution in behaviour had,
as counterpart, the eect of drawing him closer to the popular classes. In this
respect, Pittacus' political career is not dierent from that of other autocratic
leaders. However, there are two aspects that turn his experience of government
into something strikingly singular: rst, Pittacus rose to power not by force,
but in the quality of a sovereign elected by the people (aisymnetes); second,
the sources sustain that, once he managed to calm the atmosphere of civil
dissension, he abandoned the government of his own free will and died around
ten years later (possibly c. 570).
ese are precisely the aspects that deserve a deeper analysis now, because
they will provide, with great probability, the explanation for the fact that,
although being a tyrannos, Pittacus managed to be considered one of the
Seven Wise Men and retained that same position in Plutarch's Convivium. It
is therefore worthwhile to ponder more carefully the passage where Aristotle
mentions the way Pittacus rose to power (Pol. 3.1285a29-1285b3):
δύο μὲν οὖν εἴδη ταῦτα μοναρχίας, ἕτερον δ' ὅπερ ἦν ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις Ἕλλησιν,
οὓς καλοῦσιν αἰσυμνήτας. ἔστι δὲ τοῦθ' ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν αἱρετὴ τυραννίς,
διαφέρουσα δὲ τῆς βαρβαρικῆς οὐ τῷ μὴ κατὰ νόμον ἀλλὰ τῷ μὴ πάτριος
εἶναι μόνον. ἦρχον δ' οἱ μὲν διὰ βίου τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην, οἱ δὲ μέχρι τινῶν
ὡρισμένων χρόνων ἢ πράξεων, οἷον εἵλοντό ποτε Μυτιληναῖοι Πιττακὸν
πρὸς τοὺς φυγάδας ὧν προειστήκεσαν Ἀντιμενίδης καὶ Ἀλκαῖος ὁ ποιητής.
δηλοῖ δ' Ἀλκαῖος ὅτι τύραννον εἵλοντο τὸν Πιττακὸν ἔν τινι τῶν σκολιῶν
μελῶν· ἐπιτιμᾷ γὰρ ὅτι "τὸν κακοπάτριδα Πίττακον πόλιος τᾶς ἀχόλω καὶ
βαρυδαίμονος ἐστάσαντο τύραννον μέγ' ἐπαίνεντες ἀόλλεες". αὗται μὲν οὖν
εἰσί τε καὶ ἦσαν διὰ μὲν τὸ δεσποτικαὶ εἶναι τυραννικαί, διὰ δὲ τὸ αἱρεταὶ καὶ
ἑκόντων βασιλικαί.
Although Alcaeus' testimony, referred to in this passage, shows that at least
some of Pittacus' contemporaries considered him to be a tyrant (ἐστάσαντο
τύραννον), Aristotle classies him as aisymnetes, explaining this designation
with the fact that he was elected autocrat by the people of Mytilene Accordingly,
Aristotle attributes to aisymneteia a position between tyranny and hereditary
monarchy, taking more into account the way Pittacus rose to power than the
manner in which he may have ruled. However, later authors like Strabo (13.2.3)
and Diogenes Laertius (1.75) record that Pittacus abandoned tyranny of his
own will, and it is perhaps not illegitimate to conclude from these testimonies
that he exerted autocratic power in a positive manner and mainly with the
goal of calming the atmosphere of civil dissension that may have justied his
appointment as tyrant7 .
6 Frgs. 75 and 348 Voigt (cf. infra commentary to Pol. 3.1285a29-1285b3). In other poems
(frgs. 69, 70 and 72 Voigt), the poet continues to attack Pittacus in other ways, citing, for
example, his physical looks, his opportunism and tendency towards violent behaviour.
7 e testimony of Diodorus (9.11.1) is particularly elucidative by the way it synthesizes
Although the question is controversial, it is not improbable that the term
aisymnetes was used in Pittacus' time to describe his government and that
Aristotle may therefore have adopted from Pittacus' ruling experience the same
expression to refer to this political category, an hypothesis that nds support
in the fact that Pittacus' case is precisely the sole example of an aisymnetes that
Aristotle provides8 . is term, however, is used already by Homer to dene
someone engaged in activities appropriate for a 'judge' or informal 'evaluator'9 .
e conuence of these several aspects must have contributed to create a quite
favourable image of Pittacus, to the point of him being considered one of the
Seven Wise Men.
Up to a certain point, it is also appealing to compare Pittacus' role as
aisymnetes with the position of diallaktes ('arbiter') that Solon held in Athens10 .
Both seem to have enjoyed strong support from the people who had put the
government of the city into their hands, in the expectation that they might bring
to an end the ambience of enormous instability felt by then in Mytilene and in
Athens. Both were equally well succeeded in these functions, notwithstanding
the opposition they also met, and both also chose not to remain in power as
tyrants. Moreover, both of them acted as lawgivers, although at this level Solon's
activity is much more notorious and inuential — a clear sign of this is given
by the fact that Aristotle says that Pittacus was responsible for the creation
of new laws, but not of a new constitution (ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Πιττακὸς νόμων
δημιουργὸς ἀλλ' οὐ πολιτείας)11 . ere is still another important dierence
to add in considering the two statesmen: although Pittacus was a tyrant
aisymnetes, this does not necessarily imply that such a political position was
regular; Solon, on the contrary, had on his side the supplementary legitimacy
of occupying a legal oce (the archonship), reinforced by the concession of
exceptional powers.
At any rate, and even taking into account these limitations, Pittacus'
situation was suciently special to allow him to keep deserving the post of
Pittacus' political action: καὶ τὴν πατρίδα τριῶν τῶν μεγίστων συμφορῶν ἀπέλυσε, τυραννίδος,
στάσεως, πολέμου.
8 e fragment of Alcaeus quoted by Aristotle shows that the word tyrannos could have
a pejorative connotation as early as the turn of the VII to the VI century, although in this
particular case the negative overtone should also be understood as an expression of the poet's
own animosity towards the former political ally. In fact, in the Septem Sapientium Convivium
(157d-e), Plutarch records a popular song from Lesbos which mentions Pittacus as a basileus ;
if the testimony is genuine, it will contribute to show that, before the time of ucydides, the
concepts of tyrannos and basileus were not necessarily opposites. On this matter, see the pertinent
observations of V. P, 1998, pp. 156-7 and 170-1, n. 130.
9 In the sense that the aisymnetes was not a regular ocial. Cf. Il. 24.347; Od. 8. 258. See also
J. F. MG, 1993, pp. 79-81; K.-J. H, 1999, pp. 219-26.
10 Cf. [Aristotle], Ath. 5.2; Plutarch, Sol. 14.3.
11 Pol. 2.1274b18. is commentary is made when Aristotle is about to mention the best-
known law of Pittacus: the one that denes harsher penalties for crimes committed under the
inuence of wine. is tradition also left traces in the Septem Sapientium Convivium (155f). On
the remnants of other pieces of legislation implemented by Pittacus, see K.-J. H ,
1999, pp. 221-3.
515
e tyrannos as a sophos in the Septem Sapientium Convivium
sapiens in a period during which animosity towards autocratic rulers was well
established, even within the tradition of the Seven Wise Men. On the other
hand, the ethical and political resemblances between him and Solon must also
have helped to conrm the legitimacy of his presence in the symposion, because
the Athenian legislator (together with ales) played an undisputed central
role both in the Seven Sages tradition and in Plutarch's Convivium.
Cleoboulus of Lindos
Cleoboulus, son of Evagoras, was tyrant of Lindos during around forty
years, until the middle of the VI century. Even so, the information given by
the sources about this gure is much less expressive than in the case of Pittacus
and, because of that, maybe the justication for his presence in the Septem
Sapientium Convivium should be sought not in his own credits but rather in a
kind of homage that Plutarch would like to pay to Cleobouline/Eumetis. e
young girl is presented as the daughter of the autocrat Cleoboulus, but one
of the rst objections to ponder in this context has to do precisely with the
historical existence of Cleobouline. In fact, we have the record of a comedy
from Cratinus called Kleoboulinai, and because of this it has already been
argued that her name may simply be a personication of the riddles invented
by Cleoboulus12 . Elsewhere Plutarch states (De Pythiae oraculis¸ 401b) that
her real name was Eumetis, although it was superseded by the nickname
Cleobuline, given after her father. Anyway, more signicant than this detail
is the fact that Eumetis is a name that speaks for itself: it means 'prudent' or
'wise', and this is in accord with the characterization of the young girl in the
Convivium and with the positive eect that she exerts upon her father – which
is the aspect that is most relevant to the subsequent analysis.
In fact, the presence of Cleoboulus is quite discreet throughout the Septem
Sapientium Convivium. Bias discusses some ideas apart with him before giving
his response to the enigmatic questions advanced in Amasis' missive (151c).
However, this procedure may be justied simply by the fact that Cleoboulus is
reclined close to Bias, thereby not implying any special deference towards the
tyrant of Lindos. Cleoboulus is also responsible for some short observations
on political regimes and on the government of the house, suggesting by these
interventions to have a moderate nature. His major contribution has to do
with the way he explores the concept of μέτρον (157a-c), but even this may
be understood as an explanatory development of the sentence μέτρον ἄριστον,
which was traditionally attributed to him13 . is second-rate position of
12 Cf. Diogenes Laertius, 1.89: γενέσθαι τε αὐτῷ θυγατέρα Κλεοβουλίνην, αἰνιγμάτων
ἑξαμέτρων ποιήτριαν, ἧς μέμνηται καὶ Κρατῖνος ἐν τῷ ὁμωνύμῳ δράματι, πληθυντικῶς
ἐπιγράψας (K , 1 39). In fact, in the same passage Diogenes credits Cleoboulus as being the
author of around three thousand verses characterized by their enigmatic nature. Nevertheless,
Diogenes seems to believe in the historical existence of Cleobouline, a perspective which is in
fact preferable. On this see D. F, 1985, pp. 48-9; A. B P H. R
S, 1994, pp. 128-9.
13 Cf. Diogenes Laertius, 1.93.5.
Cleoboulus is again stressed by Plutarch in the De E apud Delphos (385d-e),
a passage already commented on in the introduction, where he expressly
eliminates the tyrant of Lindos from the core of Sages. Accordingly, it would
have been easy for Plutarch to choose a character dierent from that of
Cleoboulus, among the many other candidates recorded by the tradition of
the Seven Wise Men14 . Consequently, the justication for the presence of the
tyrant Cleoboulus within the circle of the sophoi should perhaps be sought not
so much in the inherent qualities of the autocrat (as happened with Pittacus)
but in the opportunity to make Cleobouline appear in the convivial space15 .
In fact, although the young girl does not voice a single word, it is
particularly impressive to see the way she is presented for the rst time in
the Septem Sapientium Convivium in the act of combing the dishevelled hair
of Anacharsis (148d-e). e symbolic importance of this scene is underlined
during the conversation between Neiloxenos and ales when it is said that
both the Greek girl and the Scythian sophos derived benets from that mutual
proximity. Neiloxenos also pays her a compliment by recognizing that her
riddles were renowned as far as Egypt. is is a very interesting statement
because, apart from the obvious attering remark, it may also provide an
historical hint at the way personalities and events connected with the Seven
Sages spread throughout the Hellenized world.16 Particularly signicant is
also the comment made by ales when he emphatically mentions the natural
good character of Eumetis to the foreigner of Naucratis and at the same time
states the positive eect that she exerts on her father (148d):
καὶ ὁ Νειλόξενος "ἦ που τὴν περὶ τὰ αἰνίγματα δεινότητα καὶ σοφίαν" ἔφη
"τῆς κόρης ἐπαινεῖς· καὶ γὰρ εἰς Αἴγυπτον ἔνια τῶν προβαλλομένων ὑπ'
αὐτῆς διῖκται."
"oὐκ ἔγωγ'" εἶπεν ὁ Θαλῆς· "τούτοις γὰρ ὥσπερ ἀστραγάλοις, ὅταν τύχῃ,
παίζουσα χρῆται καὶ διαβάλλεται πρὸς τοὺς ἐντυχόντας. ἀλλὰ καὶ φρόνημα
θαυμαστὸν καὶ νοῦς ἔνεστι πολιτικὸς καὶ φιλάνθρωπον ἦθος, καὶ τὸν πατέρα
τοῖς πολίταις πραότερον ἄρχοντα παρέχει καὶ δημοτικώτερον.
According to him, the natural qualities of Cleobouline — where
intelligence, political sensibility and a generous character are particularly
evident (φρόνημα θαυμαστὸν καὶ νοῦς ἔνεστι πολιτικὸς καὶ φιλάνθρωπον
ἦθος) — project over her father and help to make his government become
'sweeter' (πραότερον) and 'closer to democracy' (δημοτικώτερον). rough
Eumetis, Plutarch manages to attenuate the negative traits of Cleoboulus and
14 See the elucidative testimony of Diogenes Laertius (1.41-42) on the number of
personalities that could play the role of sophos.
15 us contributing to innovate within the Greek tradition in what concerns the presence
of 'serious' women in the banquet, which was an ambience clearly marked by masculine
Weltanschauung. For more on this, see D. F. L, 2008, pp. 486-7.
16 A. B, 2002, pp. 65-71, too, calls attention to this issue, when analysing the work of
Demetrius of Phalerum and Callimachus of Cyrene in Alexandria. However, the author does
not discuss this particular case of Cleobouline.
517
e tyrannos as a sophos in the Septem Sapientium Convivium
dilutes the fact that he is tyrant of Lindos, thus making it easier to accept his
inclusion in the restricted group of the Seven Wise Men. To put it in a nutshell:
Plutarch allows Cleoboulus to be considered one of the Sages this time in order
to have the opportunity of presenting in the Convivium the young Eumetis, in
whom one can detect special traits of feminine sensibility and of the positive
eect they produce within the masculine space of the symposion.
Periander of Corinth
In the analysis of Pittacus' and Cleoboulus' characters, I have not adduced
an argument that could have carried some weight in Plutarch's choices: the fact
that his core of sophoi is very similar to the list presented in Plato's Protagoras
(343a). In fact, although Plato has Anacharsis replaced by Myson, he also
includes the names of Pittacus and Cleoboulus, leaving Periander equally
aside17 . is mistrust towards tyranny is found in other parts of Plato's work,
the best-known passage being the one in the Republic (335e-336a) where, to
the wisdom of gures like Simonides, Bias and Pittacus, he opposes the image
of personalities inebriated by wealth, in a group headed precisely by Periander,
but where Perdiccas, Xerxes and Ismenias of ebes are also present. One of
the important things about this passage of the Protagoras is that it provides
the rst complete list of the Seven Wise Men. A clear sign that Plato was
innovating in supplying the full sylloge in writing is given by the fact that
the philosopher presents «l'intégralité des sept noms et leurs ethniques
respectifs»18 . If this was not the case, it would be more natural to refer to the
Sages by simply using the expression οἱ ἑπτὰ σοφοί, which would later become
the usual designation19 . Solon is the only sophos of whom the ethnonym is not
given; rather he is designated by Socrates as Σόλων ὁ ἡμέτερος. is suggests
that, from the very beginning, Solon was a polarizing personality among the
Sages and that Athenian inuence played an important role in establishing
their political and ethical idiosyncrasy.20 is is still clearly visible in Plutarch's
Convivium, as shown by the importance attributed to the old legislator and to
the democratic regime in terms of political discussion.
e elimination of Periander from the core of Sages is thus justied,
in the rst place, by the fact that he was a tyrant and that there is a deep
animosity towards this form of government in the Convivium, inherited from
17 Possibly following Ephorus; by contrast, Demetrius of Phalerum admitted the presence of
Periander. See the aforementioned testimony of Diogenes Laertius, 1.41-42.
18 A. B, 2002, pp. 33-4, who also calls attention to the fact that Plato presented already
in the Hippias Major (281c) what could be considered a "proto-list" of the sapientes (pp. 31-2).
19 is does not imply, of course, that Plato was himself creating the legend of the Seven
Wise Men, because, as said before, it should already have been present in the oral tradition.
20 A reality conrmed by Plato himself (Ti. 20d: ὁ τῶν ἑπτὰ σοφώτατος Σόλων). If one
takes into consideration that this dialogue was written after the Protagoras, then it becomes
signicant that, this time, Plato felt that it was no longer necessary to provide the whole sylloge.
On this see A. B, 2002, p. 36.
Plato and echoed equally by Plutarch at several points of his work21. Periander
admittedly fulls an important function in his capacity as host, although his
presence starts to vanish especially when the guests begin the eulogy of the
democratic regime, to the extent that the honour of closing the banquet falls to
Solon and not to the host (164c-d). In order to reach a better understanding of
the more specic reasons that may lie behind this treatment, it will be useful to
recall some further information concerning the life of the tyrant of Corinth.
Periander, son of Cypselus, was in power for about forty years (c. 627 to
587 BC). Under his government, Corinth reached a notable development at
the economic, military and cultural levels, as can be seen by the foundation of
several colonies, by important military campaigns, and by the tyrant's capacity
to attract to his court poets and other artists22 . is image of a successful ruler
and protector of the arts, common in fact to several other tyrants of ancient
Greece, should have been the reason why he was sometimes placed among
the group of sapientes 23 . On the other hand, Periander also has the image
of a person given to excesses, a tradition that Plutarch could not aord to
ignore, as shown by the allusions made to them in the Convivium. is is what
happens, for example, with the practice of incest with his mother, a hideous
crime that led her to commit suicide24 ; the future uxoricide of Melissa25; or
even a crime as repulsive as the practice of necrophilia with his wife's corpse26 .
is latter transgression was reinforced by other forms of equally shocking
intemperance: still according to the same passage in Herodotus, Periander
ordered the women of Corinth to gather in the temple of Hera, with the
goal of having them stripped and all their clothes burned in order to appease
the spirit of Melissa — signicantly not to obtain her pardon, but to feed his
continuous thirst for wealth. Although in the Septem Sapientium Convivium
there is no tension between the two (Melissa does not even speak), Plutarch's
readers were already aware of Periander's subsequent excesses and therefore
knew what was going to happen to him27 . Nevertheless, it is worth noting that
even in Herodotus there are also a few positive hints concerning Periander,
21 Even with notable animosity. Cf. Dio 9.3-8; Arat. 26.1-5.
22 Like Chersias of Orchomenus, known precisely from his participation in the Septem
Sapientium Convivium.
23 Note that, according to Diogenes Laertius (1.122), a few authors also considered
Peisistratus, tyrant of Athens, one of the sophoi.
24 Cf. Septem Sapientium Convivium, 146d. e incestuous relation of Periander with his
mother is attributed by Diogenes Laertius (1.96) to Aristippus. Parthenius (Erotika Pathemata
17) presents a more romanticising version of the account, which bears some similarities to
Apuleius' Cupid and Psyche.
25 Cf. Herodotus, 3.50; Diogenes Laertius, 1.94.
26 Herodotus, 5.92.η. 1-4.
27 Something similar occurs, for example, with the indication that Aesop participated in
the banquet as Croesus' envoy after the latter had sent him to the court of Periander and to the
oracle of Delphi (150a). In a certain way, this detail throws a shadow of discomfort over his
participation, since, according to the legend, Aesop would suer a violent death in Delphi for
having disrespected the priests of the oracle and the inhabitants of the region by accusing them
of simple parasitism.
519
e tyrannos as a sophos in the Septem Sapientium Convivium
like the story of Arion and the dolphins (1.23-24), which is recovered and
developed in Plutarch's Convivium (160e-162b). And even episodes like
banishing or putting to death the most inuential citizens, and burning the
clothes of the Corinthian women, were sometimes interpreted as reecting
a positive motivation: to promote social balance and implement sumptuary
legislation28 . In fact, in the Convivium Plutarch does not forget to mention the
detail that the tyrant told his wife to dress in a simple manner for the dinner
with de Seven Wise Men (150d). is conicting evidence suggests that there
were two dierent traditions concerning Periander: one mainly hostile to the
tyrant, which is widely detected in Herodotus, and another pervaded with
more positive traits, possibly Corinthian in origin29 .
If one takes all these aspects into consideration, it will become quite clear
that, despite the fact that Periander played an important role as host of the
Convivium, Plutarch had to put him at a level dierent from the one occupied
by the Seven Wise Men. At any rate, the relationship with the sapientes helped
Periander — who inherited the tyranny as if it was a disease (147c) — to
exercise power in a more moderate fashion, at least in the initial phase of his
government30 . Although Plutarch concedes him some deference along with
the interventions he makes during the symposion, the tyrant of Corinth thus
fails to exhibit the serenity characteristic of someone who is at peace with
his conscience, certainly because of the excesses already perpetrated, which
constitute a clear sign that he will continue to reveal in the future the same
propensity to immoderation. As such, he keeps living in fear of the deity he
knows he has oended (146d) and this leads him to anxiety and superstitious
terror, visible at the moment a shepherd carries a new-born centaur to the
gardens of the palace (149c-e). Even if ales' rationalism helps him to dispel,
at least temporarily, the shadow of apprehension, it is a matter of fact that
the qualms manifested by Diocles will nd their conrmation in the time to
come31 . Periander also tries to overcome, with apotropaic rituals directed to
28 See J. B. S, 1997, pp. 46-65. Aristotle (Pol. 5.1311a20-22; 5.1313a40) tells the
story of 'lopping o the heads' (an advice that according to him was given by Periander and
not by rasybulus, as sustained by Herodotus) in a context where he seeks to exemplify
the excesses characteristic of tyranny. e episode is also recorded by Plutarch in the Septem
Sapientium Convivium (147c-d). In another study, J. B. S, 1984, p. 206 e n. 80, points
out that, according to Diogenes Laertius (1.100) and eodorus Metochites (p. 668 Müller),
Periander was an aisymnetes, similar to Pittacus, but the scholar rightly considers neither of these
testimonies to be trustworthy.
29 See A. B, 2002, pp. 21-2, who also states (p. 73) that Ephorus was one of the authors
responsible for partially rehabilitating Periander as politician.
30 V. P, 1998, pp. 166-7, calls attention to the fact that, when considering the dierent
ways of reaching tyranny, Aristotle does not discuss the case of those (Periander of Corinth,
Pindarus of Ephesus, Hippias of Athens and Polycrates of Samos) who inherited power from
their fathers, a factor that would make their political position closer, in a certain way, to the
status of basileus.
31 Diocles advised the tyrant to make purications in order to appease the deity (Aphrodite)
that once again manifested herself because of the incestuous relations of Periander with his
mother. As remarked above, the tyrant will end up killing his wife and losing all his children
Aphrodite and Poseidon (146d, 160d), the fear generated by the warnings he
keeps receiving through dreams and oracles, but that will not be enough to dry
up the seeds of disgrace that are still feeding from his acts and shall, sooner or
later, fructify.
To conclude: Plutarch seems to have been sensitive to the position
Periander held in the tradition of the Seven Wise Men and, because of that, he
decided to characterize him as someone close to the sophoi, by giving him the
role of host in the meeting of the sapientes, at an early stage of his government.
Nevertheless, the author's reservations about tyranny (inherited from Plato)
and the awareness of the fact that Periander carried along with him the
image of deeply shocking excesses must have led Plutarch to the decision that
the tyrant was not suitable to be part of the core of Sages, contrary to what
happened with Pittacus and Cleoboulus, due to the reasons discussed above.
At any rate, the presence in the group of sophoi of several gures connected
with autocratic regimes must represent a sign of the antiquity of this tradition. In
fact, the animosity towards tyranny as such was certainly not present at the earlier
stages of the legend32 . e odious character of the term is mainly a consequence of
the irty Tyrants' oppressive and violent behaviour when they ruled over Athens
in 404. Plato already records this growing acrimony that was to be transmitted to
later tradition and nds a clear expression in Plutarch's Convivium. However, two
of these gures were able to full enough conditions to keep being considered
part of the group, either owing to personal merits (Pittacus) or due to the positive
inuence of a close relative (Cleoboulus). In Periander's case, however, the shadow
of domestic excesses severely dimmed the light of his political, military and
cultural achievements, to the extent that Plutarch was no longer able to recognize
in him the entire dignity of a fully-edged sophos .
W o r k s c i T e d
A, G. J. D., "Political thought in Plutarch's Convivium Septem
Sapientium", Mnemosyne, 30 (1977) 28-39.
A, J., Aristote. Politique. Tome II. Livres III et IV, texte établi et traduit
par, Paris, 1971, 2002 (rev. ed.).
B P, A. R S, H., Poetisas griegas, Madrid,
1994.
(both legitimate and illegitimate), to the point of being forced to leave the throne to his nephew,
Psammetichus. Psammetichus would then take the name Cypselus II, meeting his death only
three years after having reached power, thus putting an end to the dynasty of the Cypselids. Cf.
Herodotus, 3.50-53.
32 In the rst occurrence of the term (frg. 19 W of Archilochus), tyranny is considered to
be 'powerful' 'great' (μεγάλη), and even in the second half of the V century the words tyrannos
and tyrannis are still used with the meaning of 'king' 'sovereign' 'wealth' 'power', although the
negative tones are also detectable already in an early phase (frg. 33 West of Solon). On this see
V. P, 1998.
521
e tyrannos as a sophos in the Septem Sapientium Convivium
B, A., Les Sept Sages de la Grèce antique, Paris, 2002.
F, D., Die sieben Weisen und die frühgriechische Chronologie. Eine
traditionsgeschichtliche Studie, Bern, 1985.
H, K.-J., Schiedsrichter, Gesetzgeber und Gesetzgebung im archaischen
Griechenland, Stuttgart, 1999.
L, D. F., "A tradição dos Sete Sábios: o sapiens enquanto paradigma de uma
identidade", in D. F. L ., Paideia e cidadania na Grécia antiga,
Coimbra, 2006, pp. 35-78.
_____ "Plutarch and the Character of the Sapiens", in A. G. N (ed.),
e Unity of Plutarch's Works. Moralia emes in the Lives, Features of the
Lives in the Moralia, Berlin/New York, 2008, pp. 480-88.
MG, J. F., Tyranny and Political Culture in Ancient Greece, Ithaca, 1993.
M, C., "Plutarch and the Sicilian tyrants", in S. Lewis (ed.), Ancient
Tyranny, Edinburgh, 2006, pp. 188-196.
P, V., "Tύραννoς. e semantics of a political concept from Archilochus
to Aristotle", Hermes, 126 (1998) 145–72.
S, J. B., Wealthy Corinth. A History of the City to 338 B.C., Oxford,
1984.
_____ ''Lopping o the heads? Tyrants, politics and the polis'', in L. G.
M & P. J. R (eds.), e Development of the Polis in Archaic
Greece, London, 1997, pp. 60–73.
523
Index rerum
Aemilius Paullus, L. (cos. 182 and 168
B.C.) 128 (n 7); 165-179; 227; 284.
aisymnetes 511-521.
Agesilaus II (Spartan king) 169; 283 (n.
24); 478.
ainigma 3-4; 89; 91; 93; 95; 97-102;
133 (n. 16); 421; 482; 485; 487-489;
498; 515-516.
akratos 133; 201-209; 212-213; 219;
248; 315; 321; 323 (n. 62); 390.
Alcibiades (Athenian politician) 4 (n.
5); 5-6; 8; 37-50; 99; 125-126; 147;
169; 361; 388 (n. 11); 464 (n. 25);
466.
aletheia 79 (n. 28); 80 (n. 38); 90;
134-137 (n. 44); 139; 283 (n. 26);
301; 303; 316 (n. 19); 319 (n. 32);
323; 347 (n. 24); 374; 376 (n. 27);
387; 398-399; 411; 416; 420; 423;
465 (n. 33); 466; 489-490; 499 (n.
12).
Alexander II (Macedonian king) 236.
Alexander III the Great (Macedonian
king) 27; 34; 67; 117; 156 (n. 54);
182; 185 (n. 17); 193-200; 201-209;
211-222; 231; 245; 247-251; 334
(n. 3).
Alexander V (Macedonian king) 246;
258 (n. 18).
allusion 19-29; 32-33; 37-39; 42; 44 (n.
28); 45; 47 (n. 43); 51-61; 82; 91;
124 (n. 2); 134 (n. 22); 133; 136;
147-148; 150; 152; 155; 170; 181;
184-186; 188; 237 (n. 38); 299;
307-308; 310; 333-340; 355; 361;
377; 379; 386 (n. 4); 396; 406; 409;
412; 417; 425; 426 (n. 6); 432 (n.
32); 439; 442; 444; 447-448; 453;
460 (n. 11); 461 (n. 17); 467; 474;
476; 483; 484 (n. 14); 493 (n. 39);
497-498; 500; 505-508; 518.
Anacharsis (Scythian prince and sage)
482-492; 500-501; 506; 508; 511;
516-517.
andreia 39; 41; 169; 287 (n. 40); 302 (n.
25); 342; 359; 361.
animals (cf. philanthropia, animal) 80
(n. 37); 82 (n. 54); 152 (n. 29); 157;
196; 236; 271 (n. 93); 290; 308 (n.
9); 351-352; 411; 419; 433; 445;
447; 452; 481 (n. 2); 484; 489 (n.
29); 507-508.
dolphins 12; 55; 82; 235 (n. 26);
309 (n. 11); 482; 484; 491-492;
497-503; 508; 519.
Antigone (daughter of Oedipus and
Iocasta) 338.
Antigone (mistress of Philotas, son of
Alexander's associate Parmenio)
202.
Index rerum
Antigonus III Doson (Macedonian
king) 203.
Antonius, M. (triumvir) 152 (n. 29);
242 (n. 61); 247; 284; 339.
Aphrodite 8; 65; 152 (n. 29); 299 (n.
8); 300; 307-311; 316; 323-324;
429-430; 465; 475; 519 (n. 31);
520.
aplestia 263-265.
Archias (poet from Antioch) 55 (n. 21);
336-338.
arete 5; 38; 40-41; 45; 68 (n. 24); 69-70;
81-83; 123; 139 (n. 53); 147; 149;
157; 169; 181; 196; 199; 208; 212;
217; 221; 227 (n. 10); 263; 268 (n.
51); 269; 271 (n. 92); 276 (n. 5);
279-281; 283-284; 287; 289; 291
(n. 5); 292; 294; 297-305; 307; 311;
313 (n. 1); 314-316; 320; 341-348;
353; 355; 360-365; 374 (n. 18); 380;
385; 388-392; 399; 425 (n. 3); 426
(n. 5); 431 (n. 25); 433 (n. 34); 434
(n. 38); 435; 442 (n. 26); 465 (n. 33);
473; 476-477; 493; 500.
Arion (citharode) 12; 55; 81; 82 (n. 59);
235 (n. 26); 466; 482; 484; 490-493;
497-503; 507-508; 519.
Aristides (Athenian politician) 147;
152 (n. 26); 157; 364.
Artaxerxes I (Persian king) 246; 471
(n. 3).
Artaxerxes II (Persian king) 131-146;
231; 257; 259; 277.
aša vide Zoroastrianism.
astrology 447-455; 478.
Attalus (uncle of Cleopatra, the second
wife of Philip II) 193-194; 197;
204; 207; 214.
barbarian (cf. symposion, barbarian) 98;
249; 293; 333; 345; 364; 365; 408;
508; 511.
Bias of Priene (philosopher and sage)
76 (n. 7); 77 (n. 17); 78 (n. 21); 83;
462; 463 (n. 24); 482; 484-490; 498;
507-508; 511-512; 515; 517.
biography 32; 123; 131-133; 136; 141;
147; 151 (n. 24); 166; 168 (n. 17); 193;
195; 201; 208; 212-213; 217-218;
220; 223; 231; 240-241; 259; 334 (n.
3); 341-346; 355; 359-366; 398-399;
472; 473 (n. 12); 481; 486.
negative 141 (n. 74); 147-148; 152
(n. 29); 166; 181; 185; 188;
193-195; 198; 225-226; 228;
240-241; 280; 284; 334; 342;
344; 351-355.
Bucephalas (Alexander the Great's
favourite horse) 196-197.
Calvenus Taurus (Platonist and teacher
of Aulus Gellius) 377-379.
Chilon (Spartan ephor and sage) 12; 76
(n. 7); 77; 80 (n. 43); 81; 461 (n. 17);
463; 465 (n. 32); 466; 477; 482; 485;
511-512.
chreia vide progymnasmata.
Christian gathering 103-112; 240; 477.
Cimon (Athenian politician) 282; 371
(n. 11).
citations 19-29; 31-33; 51-61; 76 (n. 7);
150 (n. 20); 248; 323-324; 334; 449
(n. 10); 452 (n. 20); 461; 463 (n. 23);
467; 503 (n. 27).
Cleitus the Black (brother of the
wet-nurse of Alexander the Great)
193-200; 204; 207; 215-220; 247;
249-251.
Cleobulina (also called Eumetis;
daughter of Cleobulus) 55; 98; 101;
426; 462; 468; 482; 483 (n. 8); 486;
511 (n. 3); 515-517.
Cleobulus (autocrat of Lindos and sage)
76 (n. 7); 78 (n. 21); 79 (n. 29, 32);
101; 462-464; 482-483; 487-488;
511-512; 515-517; 520.
Cleomenes III (Spartan king) 129 (n.
9); 248; 286.
Cleopatra (second wife of Philip II of
Macedon) 193; 195; 197; 204-205;
214.
Cleopatra VII (Egyptian queen) 152 (n.
29); 232; 242 (n. 61); 435 (n. 39).
Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, P. (cos .
147 and 134 B.C.) 278.
Cornelius Scipio Africanus, P. (cos. 205
and 194 B.C.) 284; 286; 344-346;
354-355.
Cornelius Sulla, L. (dictator) 171 (n.
45); 184; 284; 432.
Cyrus the Great (Persian king) 131 (n.
2); 235-236.
Cyrus the Younger (second son of
Darius II) 131-132; 136-139; 259.
daimon 55; 57-58; 141; 217; 249; 275
(n. 2); 322 (n. 57).
dance (cf. symposion, dance) 426.
deipnon (cf. symposion, vs. deipnon) 55 (n.
21); 66; 114-115; 134 (n. 22); 184;
252 (n. 30); 270 (n. 78); 277; 282;
439 (n. 3)
Demaratus of Corinth (father of
Tarquinius Priscus) 199.
Demetrius I Poliorcetes (Macedonian
king) 201-202; 204; 206; 218; 246;
278; 284; 286; 351.
Demetrius of Tarsus (grammarian) 58.
dietetics 20; 22 (n. 10); 32.
dikaiosyne 151 (n. 26); 280 (n. 20); 287;
342; 359.
dialogue/discussion 3-5; 7; 9; 11-14;
21-22; 35; 38; 43-49; 51-61; 63-74;
78 (n. 21); 87-90; 95; 99-103;
113-115; 124-129; 134; 139; 147;
151; 153; 169; 181; 184-186;
188; 194-197; 201; 205-207;
212-213; 215 (n. 26); 219-220;
235; 249; 277; 298-304; 310-311;
315; 352; 369-381; 385-393;
395-398; 400; 404-413; 419-424;
426-429; 432-433; 435; 441-444;
448; 459-470; 473-479; 481 (n.
2); 483-489; 492-493; 497-499;
505-506; 508; 515; 517.
Dionysus (deity) 8; 13; 78 (n. 21); 106;
115; 126 (n. 4); 137 (n. 43); 152 (n.
29); 207; 323-324; 410; 412; 418;
420; 466.
discord 123; 134 (n. 19); 325 (n. 72);
476.
drauga/drug vide Zoroastrianism.
education (cf. paideia) 3; 5; 7; 14-15;
26-27; 28 (n. 25); 41; 45 (n. 34);
48; 53 (n. 11); 63-74; 135; 156 (n.
53); 157; 165 (n. 3); 166-167; 196;
208; 211 (n. 2); 225; 268 (n. 54);
269-271; 297; 299 (n. 9); 301; 303
(n. 31); 334; 341-350; 360; 362;
369-383; 425-426; 435.
epieikeia 250; 268; 271; 278; 280 (n. 20);
342; 359; 365.
epithalamium 297-305.
Eros 5; 7-8; 152 (n. 29); 275 (n. 2); 298;
299 (n. 10); 300-303; 307-312; 315
(n. 12, 13, 14); 316; 319; 322; 324
(n. 67); 325 (n. 73); 405; 407.
eros (cf. love) 8 (n. 17); 116; 124 (n. 2);
297-305; 313; 316 (n. 20); 317 (n.
23); 319 (n. 32, 33, 36, 37); 322 (n.
57); 323-325; 341-350; 468; 474 (n.
25).
eschatology 53; 299; 303.
ethical behaviour (cf. symposion, ethical)
11; 91; 116; 218; 248; 263 (n.
2); 275-288; 292; 303; 313; 326;
333-335; 341-344; 346 (n. 19); 348;
362; 432; 435; 477; 497; 501-503;
507; 515; 517.
ethos 5 (n. 11); 8; 23; 34; 128; 131; 141;
142 (n. 75); 198; 211; 220; 224; 250;
266; 268; 270 (n. 84); 280 (n. 18);
301-302; 325 (n. 76); 333; 337; 339;
345; 359-360; 364; 468; 516.
etymology 65; 98; 269 (n. 70); 449.
eudaimonia 275 (n. 2); 289.
eugnomosyne 268; 271; 364 (n. 16).
Eumetis vide Cleobulina.
eunoia 212 (n. 5); 270 (n. 82); 285; 313
(n. 1); 314; 316 (n. 19); 317-318;
417; 421.
eunuchs 97; 132-134; 136; 203; 259.
euphrosyne 134.
Favorinus of Arles (philosopher and
friend of Plutarch) 104-105;
379-380.
frugality 20; 22; 32; 148-149; 152; 287.
Galba (Roman Emperor) 223;
227-228.
gnome 26-27; 35; 77; 78 (n. 21); 83; 338;
343; 451 (n. 17); 463 (n. 22, 23);
466-468; 473-476; 483; 489-490;
493.
Greekness 165; 211-212; 365 (n. 20).
harmony 70; 123; 126-129; 212; 227;
231; 275; 279; 297; 361-362; 406;
418; 420; 490.
humanitas 208; 267; 353.
hybris 42; 79 (n. 34); 127; 134; 214;
390.
ignorance 40; 69; 139 (n. 57); 264; 336;
372-373; 426.
immortality 95; 289; 294; 298;
302-304.
intertextuality 19; 25; 37; 49.
Iulius Caesar, C. (dictator) 156-157;
182; 185 (n. 17); 188 (n. 25); 223;
248 (n. 18); 281; 285; 355; 363.
karpos 6; 269 (n. 68); 298-300; 315 (n.
12, 13); 323 (n. 61); 433; 453.
koinonia 63; 65-67; 71; 77 (n. 18); 136;
142; 212 (n. 5); 267; 269 (n. 69);
270; 272 (n. 95); 277; 280; 313 (n.
1); 316 (n. 20); 317; 319 (n. 32);
321; 325; 352 (n. 4); 412; 417;
420-421; 429.
krasis 35; 134 (n. 17); 278; 313-332;
407; 431 (n. 26); 432.
Lamprias (1) (brother of Plutarch) 23;
53; 56-57; 65; 376-377; 400; 407;
409; 412; 423.
Lamprias (2) (grandfather of Plutarch)
400.
lethe 137 (n. 42); 139; 141 (n. 69).
libation 12; 133; 219 (n. 48); 249; 283;
506.
Licinius Crassus, M. (cos. 70 and 55
B.C.) 181-190; 232; 281-286.
Licinius Lucullus, L. (cos. 74 B.C.) 182
(n. 8); 255 (n. 3); 282 (n. 23); 284.
love (cf. eros) 5; 8; 37-48; 54-56; 99;
125; 127; 150; 156 (n. 52); 181; 193;
195; 211; 213; 217 (n. 35); 275; 278;
297-305; 307-312; 313-332; 333;
339; 431 (n. 26); 432; 466 (n. 37);
483; 508.
Macedonia (cf. symposion, Macedonian)
167 (n. 15); 171; 193-200; 227;
336-338.
Marcius Coriolanus, Cn. (Roman
aristocrat) 44 (n. 30); 45 (n. 32, 36);
46 (n. 40); 47 (n. 46); 359-366.
marriage 8; 45; 54-56; 116; 151; 183;
193; 197; 198 (n. 10); 214; 231;
238; 239 (n. 51); 297-305; 307-312;
313-332; 347-348; 353-354; 377;
404; 425; 429; 431-434; 467 (n.
41); 493.
Medea 246; 255-260.
Media 216; 235.
medicine 20-22; 31-35; 56; 126 (n. 4);
255 (n. 2, 6); 322; 353; 377; 397;
421; 442 (n. 26); 444; 449; 452;
464; 499.
Melissa (wife of Periander) 55; 426;
482; 483 (n. 8); 484; 518.
(to ) metrion 5; 31-35; 69; 116; 142; 147;
151; 155; 181; 183; 185; 188; 206;
211; 216; 220; 264; 270 (n. 84); 313;
321; 325-326; 335-336; 360-363;
371; 385-386; 403-409; 413; 417;
515; 519.
mimesis 343; 375; 412-413.
Mithridates (a young Persian)
131-146.
Mithridates VI Eupator (king of
Pontus) 420.
moon 290; 426; 447-455; 491; 508.
moral 38-39; 41; 48-49; 67 (n. 17);
84; 88; 104; 107-108; 113; 116;
124-125; 129; 138 (n. 47); 149 (n.
12); 165 (n. 2); 170; 185 (n. 18); 203;
211 (n. 2); 212; 248-252; 259; 269;
275-288; 292-294; 319 (n. 34); 324
(n. 66); 325 (n. 77); 333-335; 339;
341-350; 359-361; 370; 373-377;
385-393; 409; 413; 426 (n. 5);
427-432; 435 (n. 39); 447; 461; 464
(n. 26); 476-477; 493; 497; 503.
Muses 21; 26; 56 (n. 24); 127-129;
297-298; 303; 324-325; 390; 444;
505-507.
music (cf. symposion, music) 26; 128;
195; 202 (n. 7); 298; 310; 405;
411-412.
Musonius Rufus, C. (Roman
philosopher) 302 (n. 25); 426 (n.
6); 434.
mythology 53; 231-240; 333; 365 (n. 20);
371 (n. 14); 405; 409; 421; 425; 443.
Nearchus (1) (satrap of Lycia and
Pamphylia) 150; 204; 219.
Nearchus (2) (Pythagorean philosopher)
343-344.
Nicias (Athenian politician) 169; 184;
187-188; 241 (n. 59); 282-283; 286;
447.
Olympia 195; 197; 231 (n. 1).
Olympias (mother of Alexander the
Great) 194; 214; 231; 278; 435 (n.
39).
ora 299-303; 325 (n. 76); 347 (n. 24);
453 (n. 26).
Otho (Roman Emperor) 223-229; 247;
282.
paideia (cf. education) 4-5; 45 (n.
34); 63-64; 157; 171 (n. 29); 183;
207-208; 223-224; 228; 297; 326;
334; 341-350; 354; 359-365; 370;
461 (n. 16); 465.
pantomime 14; 404-413; 429.
paraphrase 21; 24-25; 43 (n.22); 148;
156; 241.
paroinia 6 (n. 16); 134; 390.
Parthia (cf. symposion, Parthian) 181;
185 (n. 17, 18); 186.
pederasty 8; 39; 46; 48; 297; 299 (n. 9,
11); 300-303; 369.
Periander (tyrant of Corinth and sage)
11-13; 22; 76 (n. 7); 77 (n. 14); 83;
101; 417; 426; 460 (n. 12); 462; 466;
467 (n. 40, 41); 468 (n. 44); 471 (n.
3); 475-477; 481-485; 487-492;
502; 506-508; 511-512; 517-520.
Pericles (Athenian politician) 37; 45
(n. 33); 125; 213; 245; 275; 279;
283-284; 293.
Persia (cf. symposion, Persian) 3; 169;
194; 196; 214-219; 259; 284 (n. 29);
431 (n. 28).
philanthropia (cf. symposion, philanthropia)
passim.
absence of 131-146; 185 (n. 18);
351-357.
animal 497-504.
concept 208; 263-273; 275-288;
333-334; 342; 352-355.
in Aemilius Paullus 165-179.
in Alexander 212-214.
in Artaxerxes 131-146.
in Cato the Elder 342-346;
351-357.
in Cato the Younger 280-281;
361-363.
in Cicero 338-340; 362-363.
in Coriolanus 362.
in Crassus 282-283.
in Demosthenes 335-338.
in Flamininus 165-179.
in Marcellus 360.
in Pericles 283-284.
in Phocion 280; 359; 361-362.
in Septem Sapientium Convivium
477; 497-504; 516.
philia 8; 63; 66-67; 70-71; 98; 124-125;
134; 149; 184 (n. 12); 198; 211-213;
216; 223; 228; 258; 263-270; 275
(n. 2); 279; 297-305; 310-311;
313-332; 341; 344-345; 369-370;
375-377; 380; 417-418; 421; 461 (n.
17); 477-478; 501-503; 505-506.
Philip II (Macedonian king) 142 (n.
75); 193-200; 201-207; 214; 221 (n.
59); 231; 251 (n. 27); 278; 279 (n.
16); 335-336.
Philip V (Macedonian king) 309 (n.
14).
Philippus (Greek jester) 6-7; 463 (n.
25).
Philippus of Prusias (Stoic philosopher)
58; 115; 370; 376.
philophrosyne 8; 22 (n. 9); 33-34; 41; 66;
127; 170-171; 184; 212 (n. 5); 271;
276-280; 283; 285; 301-302; 313 (n.
1); 314; 316; 323 (n. 65); 324-325.
philonikia 124; 169; 269; 359.
philoploutia 181-185; 227 (n. 10); 354.
philosophy (cf. symposion, philosophy)
passim.
Aristotelianism 93; 142 (75); 267;
271; 287; 291; 294 (n. 15); 313;
317 (n. 27); 419; 449 (n. 8);
413.
Atomism 311; 319-320.
cosmology 87-96.
Epicureanism 53; 87; 267; 286 (n.
39); 311; 319-320; 372-378;
426 (n. 6).
epistemology 87-88; 90-91.
ethics 91; 114; 213; 287; 325 (n. 77);
334; 344; 359; 413; 420-422;
432; 435; 502.
logic 69 (n. 30); 87-88; 129; 339;
420-422; 441.
(ph. of) love 297-305.
metaphysics 32; 87; 92; 94-95; 421;
492.
moral ph. 263-273; 334.
ontology 90 (n. 9); 91; 93; 294 (n.
15).
Peripatetics 153; 263; 267; 271 (n.
93); 287; 325 (n. 77); 376; 409;
411; 419; 460 (n. 9).
Platonism 9; 14; 20-21; 37-50;
53; 55; 88-95; 114; 116;
125; 139-140; 142 (n. 75);
196-197; 267 (n. 38); 290-294;
298; 300-304; 319-326; 341;
376-380; 408; 415-420; 433;
447; 459-468; 474-475; 482 (n.
4); 483; 492; 507.
physics 419-420; 439-446.
Pythagoreanism 92; 100 (n. 13);
150; 279; 291; 343; 376.
Scepticism 376 (n. 27); 447.
Stoicism 44; 53; 58; 87; 115; 151 (n.
26); 153-157; 267; 270 (n. 74);
271; 280 (n. 20); 284; 289-295;
299 (n. 11); 300; 302 (n. 24, 25);
318; 322; 325 (n. 77); 373; 376;
378 (n. 33); 421; 426 (n. 6); 429;
432; 434-435; 439; 442-445;
452; 465; 500; 502-503.
philotimia 48; 124; 136; 166; 169 (n.
20); 185; 195; 263; 351; 360.
Phocion (Athenian politician) 148; 154
(n. 38); 155-157; 275; 279 (n. 16);
280-281; 359; 361.
phronesis 139 (n. 53); 169; 342; 359;
499-500.
physician 22; 56; 79 (n. 29); 101; 132;
301; 372; 376; 449; 452; 464-465.
physiology 419; 432-433; 449; 452.
Pittacus of Mytilene (elective tyrant
and sage) 12; 76-80; 338 (n. 15);
463 (n. 24); 474; 482; 486; 487 (n.
23); 488-489; 511-512; 516-517;
519 (n. 28); 520.
Pixodarus (satrap of Caria) 197-199.
poetry (cf. symposion, poetry) 27; 28 (n.
25); 65; 297-305; 308-310; 323;
333-334; 443; 508; 518.
poison 35; 204; 231; 238; 246; 255-260;
311; 337.
Pompeius Magnus, Cn. (cos. 70, 55 and
52 B.C.) 27; 182; 184 (n. 12); 185
(n. 17); 187 (n. 24); 188 (n. 25); 247;
251; 281-282; 286.
Porcius Cato (the Elder), M. (cos. 195
B.C.) 147-163; 172 (n. 39); 173 (n.
44); 207; 265-266; 268 (n. 50); 286;
341-350; 351-357; 361; 428.
Porcius Cato (the Younger), M. (pr .
54 B.C.) 115; 129; 147-163; 246;
280-281; 284; 359; 361-365; 371
(n. 11).
Poseidon 81; 217 (n. 38); 336; 508;
520.
praotes 138 (n. 48); 147; 165; 250; 264;
266 (n. 34); 267-268; 276 (n. 4);
279; 281; 333 (n. 2); 342; 359; 360;
363; 365; 374; 502 (n. 23); 516.
problema 3; 6; 87-88; 92-94; 97-102;
114-115; 375; 378; 395; 397; 399;
418-423; 439-446; 448; 452; 459
(n. 4); 498.
progymnasmata
chreia 26-27; 65 (n. 10); 67; 76-79;
471-479.
diegema 81-83.
mythos 27; 80-81.
psychology 40; 126; 322; 419; 432; 448;
500.
Pylades (Roman pantomimus)
408-409.
quaestio vide problema
Quinctius Flamininus, T. (cos. 198 B.C.)
165-179; 280 (n. 18).
reality 6; 137-139; 232; 376; 389; 391;
411-412; 427 (n. 16); 442 (n. 28);
445.
in the Quaestiones Convivales
395-401.
reconciliation 231; 311; 336-337.
rhetoric 26; 32; 37; 53; 63-74; 75; 76 (n.
8); 79-80; 83; 149; 157; 212; 226;
240; 299 (n. 11); 300; 324 (n. 68);
341; 343; 372; 376; 382 (n. 2); 411;
421; 460 (n. 9); 471-472.
Second Sophistic 32 (n. 7); 63; 165; 208;
241; 300 (n. 16); 365; 369; 379.
Sempronius Gracchus, C. (tr . pl . 123
and 122 B.C.) 286.
Seven Sages 11; 75-85; 100-101; 338;
459-521.
slaves 33 (n. 11); 43; 105; 110; 115;
132-134; 147-157; 185; 216; 255
(n. 3); 257; 259; 265; 268 (n. 50);
308; 346; 348; 351; 361; 379; 429;
431 (n. 28); 434 (n. 36, 38); 465;
468.
Socrates (philosopher) 3-8; 12; 37-50;
52; 55; 99; 125; 147-163; 246 (n. 7);
300 (n. 15); 301 (n. 22); 308; 347;
354; 384 (n. 8); 404; 407; 409; 416;
421; 434; 461; 463 (n. 23); 464 (n.
26); 465 (n. 30); 475; 486; 493 (n.
39); 517.
Solon (Athenian politician and poet) 11;
22; 76 (n. 7); 77; 79-80; 302 (n. 28);
319; 352; 398-399; 460; 462-467;
471 (n. 3); 482-486; 488; 490; 493;
500-503; 507-508; 511-518.
sophrosyne 4 (n. 8); 5; 41; 125; 138; 140
(n. 62); 181 (n. 3); 183; 194; 207;
287 (n. 40); 316 (n. 16); 342; 353;
370-371.
sun 197; 281; 290; 311; 447-455.
symposion passim.
barbarian 131-155; 201; 206-208;
211-222; 237; 429.
concept 3-4; 51-58; 63; 103;
127; 131; 134-135; 147; 182;
201-202; 211-213; 245-246;
255-256; 285; 314; 369;
385-386; 415-416; 505.
dance 3-4; 6-7; 10; 14; 103-104;
128; 131 (n. 2); 133; 239; 369;
377; 397; 403-414; 419; 429;
505.
death 198-199; 204-207; 215-218;
231-243; 246-253; 256-260.
(vs.) deipnon 3; 106; 114; 133; 415.
drinking 3-6; 8-9; 12-14; 20-21; 42
(n. 20); 51; 58; 66; 68-71; 80;
97-98; 100; 103; 106; 124-126;
128-129; 131 (n. 2); 133; 137
(n. 44); 138-141; 147; 151; 156
(n. 52); 168; 182; 185; 193-194;
196 (n. 3); 198 (n. 8); 203-207;
211-215; 218-220; 231; 236;
239; 247-252; 280; 284-285;
313-332; 369-383; 385-393;
397-398; 400; 403-406;
416-420; 426; 427 (n. 15); 429;
431 (n. 27); 461 (n. 17); 463;
477; 487-488.
drunkenness 4-5; 13; 34; 42; 98;
125-126; 134; 136; 140 (n. 63);
186; 193-200; 204; 206-207;
214-215; 217 (n. 38); 219; 220
(n. 55); 251 (n. 29); 285; 315;
323; 326 (n. 77); 369; 371 (n.
10); 380; 385-387; 390-391;
397; 405; 415; 428; 452 (n. 22);
517.
education 3; 5; 14-15; 26; 39; 53
(n. 11); 63-74; 125; 216-217;
369-383; 387; 389; 417;
420-421; 430; 505.
entertainment 3; 6; 12; 14-15; 66;
68; 71; 101; 103-105; 113-115;
125; 127-128; 133; 147; 153;
165; 174; 182; 184; 186; 205;
212; 225; 248; 256 (n. 8); 258;
277-278; 369-372; 376; 378 (n.
32); 385-393; 406-407; 409;
415-418; 429.
ethical 3; 13-15; 87; 108; 113-114;
129; 136; 213; 413; 417-421;
423; 434; 497; 498 (n. 3).
genre and tradition 3-16; 51-58;
99-100; 103; 113-114; 285;
369-370; 385-386; 395-397;
415-416; 459-460; 472-479;
481-495.
jokes 67; 70; 78 (n. 19); 114; 116;
258; 416-417.
Macedonian 134 (n. 22); 198 (n. 8);
201-209; 211-222; 236; 246;
249-251.
Menippean 3; 10; 15; 468 (n. 44).
music 3; 9; 14; 26; 56 (n. 24); 71;
113 (n. 6); 115; 126 (n. 5);
133; 202; 245; 371; 377; 397;
403-404; 406-407; 409; 415;
429; 505-509.
Parthian 185-187; 232.
Persian 131-146; 197; 277; 385-393;
419; 428; 429 (n. 21).
philanthropia 131; 142; 165-179.
philosophy 3-7; 10-11; 14; 44; 51-58;
63; 66-68; 70 (n. 32); 87-96;
97-102; 104-105; 115; 124 (n.
2); 125; 127; 129; 147-163;
182-183; 187; 197-200; 212;
217-218; 276-280; 369-383;
385-393; 395-396; 404-406;
413; 415-424; 428-429; 481;
488-489; 492-493.
poetry 3; 69-70; 82; 98; 104-105;
113-115; 117; 127-128; 237;
376; 403-405; 409-413; 415;
505; 514 (n. 8).
reading 103-110; 113-119;
487-492; 508; 515.
recitation 3-4; 98; 104-105; 115;
117 (n. 19); 133; 256; 278; 403
(n. 2).
science 14; 54; 56-57; 102; 104;
376; 398; 404; 419-420; 422;
439; 441-445; 449.
symposiarch 23; 123-129; 141; 172;
182-184; 187.
treacherous 231-243; 245-253.
wine 4-6; 12-13; 20-24; 33-35; 55
(n. 21); 63; 66-67; 70; 71 (n. 35);
80-81; 116; 126-128; 131 (n. 2);
133; 135-138; 140; 142; 156 (n.
52); 182; 201-207; 212-215;
218-220; 231-232; 235; 239;
241; 245-251; 256-258; 271
(n. 86); 277; 313-332; 369-383;
386-390; 397; 400; 403; 405;
416-421; 428-431; 451; 452 (n.
22); 454; 461 (n. 17); 463 (n.
25); 477; 505-506.
women 7; 12; 55; 101; 133; 148;
157; 202-203; 224; 231; 234;
236; 239; 247-248; 257-258;
259 (n. 24); 413; 425-437; 477;
482; 483 (n. 8); 516 (n. 15).
ales of Miletus (philosopher and
sage) 11-13; 76 (n. 7); 77 (n. 11);
78-79; 83; 101; 426 (n.8); 460 (n.
12); 460-463; 468; 471; 475-478;
482; 484; 486-487; 489 (n. 28,
29); 490; 493; 498-499; 506-507;
511-512; 515-516; 519.
theology 57; 87-96; 289-295; 449.
tyranny 76 (n. 7); 77 (n. 14); 78; 83;
129; 169; 227; 248; 258; 285; 291;
354; 364; 460 (n. 12); 468; 473; 489;
511-521.
tragedy 20; 27 (n. 22); 43; 116; 195;
233; 333-340; 407; 409; 413.
Trajan (Roman Emperor) 106; 124;
224; 341; 353; 355; 399.
war 3; 27; 40 (n. 11); 47 (n. 46); 123;
129; 134; 137-138; 169; 173;
196-197; 223; 233; 235; 259; 278;
284 (n. 29); 286; 289; 292-293; 339;
345; 354-355; 360; 364; 403; 410;
477; 488.
wine (cf. symposion, wine) 65; 151; 464
(n. 27); 514 (n. 11).
women (cf. symposion, women) 21 (n. 7);
25; 54 (n. 18); 134 (n. 23); 151; 214;
235; 238; 297-305; 307-312; 315;
318 (n. 31); 320-326; 346-347; 397;
451-452; 462; 464; 476; 518-519.
zetema 15; 89; 95; 375.
Zeus 6; 171; 196 (n. 3); 216; 231 (n. 1);
234; 289; 292-295; 308-309; 333;
450.
Zoroastrianism 135-136; 138 (n. 47);
454 (n. 31).
533
Index locorum
Index locorum
A T
5.3.7-8 234 ns. 21/22
A
Varia Historia
3.23 213 n. 15
De Natura Animalium
12.45 502
A 38 n. 6, 336
2.169 47 n. 44
In Timarchum
168 202
Alcibiades
(Giannantoni)
6 A 53.26-27 38 n. 6
A 5, 267, 337
Agamemnon
1590-1601 233 n. 17
Prometheus Vinctus 333, 334
240 sqq. 333 n. 1
Fragmenta
(Nauck)
44 308 n. 3
393 5 n. 12, 135 n. 24
A 12, 462, 462 n. 20, 462 n.
21, 464, 467, 518 n. 27
Fabulae
(Perry)
4, 4a 464 n. 28
62 82 n. 54
73 82 n. 54
113 82 n. 54
145 82 n. 54
ah u r a m a z d a 135
A 5, 63, 505, 512, 513, 514
n. 8
Fragmenta
(Lobel-Page)
327 308
333 135 n. 24
366 135 n. 24, 369
(Voigt)
69-70 513 n. 6
72 513 n. 6
74 513 n. 6
332 512 n. 5
333 5
348 513 n. 6
366 5
A M
30.1.23 251 n. 29
A 27
A 104, 505
Fragmenta lyrica
(Page)
11b (= PMG 356) 140 n. 61
Fragmenta elegiaca
(West)
2 134 ns.19/21
an a c r e o n t e a
43 404
A C
eologiae Graecae compendium 443
A
De Sublime
32.7 323 n. 62
an t h o l o g i a p a l a t i n a 97, 308
5. 309 308 n. 8
7.14 298 n. 5
7.407 298 n. 5
7. 703 309 n. 10
7. 385.7 322 n. 54
9.221 309 n. 11
9. 248 408 n. 12
9.440 308 n. 7
9. 616 308 n. 8
9.627 309 n. 11
12. 206 40 n. 13
12. 222 40 n. 13
14 97
14.54 98 n. 6
16.290 408 n. 12
17 298
an t h o l o g i a p l a n u d e a
195 308 n. 7
198-199 308 n. 7
200 309 n. 10
202 309 n. 10
207 309 n. 11
338 309 n. 11
A T S
(von Harnim)
3.63.11.16 431 n. 26
A (FGrH 1004) 7
Fragmenta
(Jacoby)
4 48 n. 50
A
4.5-6 42
A
Bibliotheca 234
1.9.28 257 n. 12
2 235 n. 23
3 234 n. 21, 235 ns.23/24
4-5 235 n. 23
8 234 n. 21
11 235 n. 23
14 234 n. 21
Epitome
1.5-6 257 n. 12
A
Bella Ciuilia
2.99.410-414 155 n. 43
5.73.308-311 247 n. 14
A
Mirabilia
47 439 n. 1
140 439 n. 1
258-259 439 n. 1
A R
3.26 308
A R
1. 348. 4-7 [= 242. 6 Spengel and
Hammer] 42 n. 20
A 15, 518 n. 24
A
Fragmenta
(West)
19 520 n. 32
85 463
A T 90 n. 8, 93
A
Epistolae
1.24 44 n. 28
A 463 n. 23, 518 n. 24
A 97, 113, 117, 462 n.
21
Acharnenses
1045 133 n. 13
1091 133 n. 13
1093 133 n. 11
Aves
71-72 43 n. 25
700 324 n. 67
Ecclesiazusae
844 133 n. 13
964-5 13
Equites
105 133 n. 15
Pax
896-898 40 n. 13
Vespae 416, 417
20 sqq. 97 n. 3, 133 n. 16
1175-1206 415
1208-1537 4 n. 5
1300-1325 415
1308-1313 133 n. 16
A vi, 56, 98, 196-
197, 199, 275 n. 1, 291, 413, 449 n.
8, 451, 498, 513, 514
Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία
5.2 514 n. 10
De anima
403a 31 322 n. 54
Ethica Nicomachea 271
1103a 17 279
1140b 20-21 499
1155a 268 n. 51
1155a 2-3 314 n. 4
1155a 20-22 271 n. 91
1155a 22-23 325 n. 71
1155b 33-34 317 n. 25
1156a 6-35 317 n. 27
1156b 1-12 317 n. 27
1156b 17-18 317 n. 27
1157a 30-31 314 n. 4
1157b 7-19 318 n. 29
1157b 17-24 317 n. 24
1162a 23 325 n. 73
1166b 30 317 n. 21
1167a 6-8 317 n. 25
1167a 13-14 317 n. 25
1447a 24 411
De Generatione animalium
432 n. 32
Historia animalium 432 n. 32
588a 451 n. 19
De partibus animalium 432 n. 32
Poetica
1458a 29 98 n. 6
Metaphysica
980b 22 499
Meteorologica
383a 31 324 n. 68
Politica
1254b 13 434 n. 38
1259a 39 434 n. 38
1260a 6 434 n. 38
1260a 9 434 n. 38
1260a 21 300 n. 15
1264b 426 n. 6
1274b 18 514 n. 11
1285a 29-1285b 3 513
1311a 20-22 519 n. 28
1313a 40 519 n. 28
[Problemata]
1.6 420
1.6-9 419
2.2-3 419
2.6 419
2.7 420
3.2-10 419
4.2 419, 420
4.4 419
4.5 422
4.7 419
4.10 419
5.1 419
5.3 422
5.9 419
6.1-6 419
6.1 422
6.8-10 422
6.8 419
6.10 410
7-9 419
7 422
7.1 419
7.3 419
7.5 419
8.3 419
8.8-10 419
9 422
9.2 422
9.9-10 419
872a 3-9 140 n. 60
880a 13 432 n. 32
Rhetorica 98
135a-b 69 n. 30
1403b 69 n. 27
1405a 37 98 n. 6
1408a-b 68 n. 24
[De Virtutibus et Vitiis ] 271
1250b 33 271 n. 92
1251b 31 276 n. 5
1251b 33-36 269 n. 65, 271 n. 92
1251b 34f 276 n. 5
Fragmenta
(Rose)
72 416
107 432 n. 32
A 9, 507
Fragmenta
(Wehrli)
103 409
A
Anabasis
3 8 219 n. 219
4.3.7 215 n. 31
4.7.4 206
4.9.9 206
7.6.2 206
4.13.2 218 n. 43
7.14.10 205
7.11.8-9 203, 205 n. 19
7.15.5 208
7.22.2-5 206
7.25.1 205
7.29.4 207
A R V
R
1438 a 3-1438b 13 82 n. 52
A
In Ethica Nicomachea Commentaria
CAG XIX 1 267 n. 42
A 9, 10, 14, 15, 53,
54, 98, 395, 396, 408, 409, 410, 429,
440, 459, 459 n. 4, 505
Deipnosophistae 9, 54 n. 16, 97, 212
n. 6, 395, 481
1.18a 203
1.20d-e 408
2.37 135 n. 24
2.52 395
2.62a-c 439 n. 1
2.62b 439 n. 6, 440 ns.7/9
4.149c 133 n. 15
4.162b-c 10 n. 30
5.182a 9 n. 27
5.185c 270 n. 84
5.186e 9 n. 27
5.187c 9 n. 27
7.276d-e 453 n. 24
10.43 207
10.49 205
10.419a 150 n. 15
10.427a-c 140 n. 60
10.434b 213 n. 15, 214 n. 18, 215 n.
28
10.448b 133 n. 16
10.448c 99
10.449e-f 98 n. 5
10.451b-c 98 n. 5
10.452b 98 n. 6
10.452c 98 n. 4, 133 n. 12
10.457c-d 97 n. 2
10.457e-f 98 n. 7
11.499f 140 n. 60
12.512b 430 n. 24
12.537e 206
13.577e-f 4 n. 7
13.579a, d 4 n. 7
13.595 205 n. 19
13.607b 10 n. 30
13.607c-d 4 n. 7
14.613a-c 323 n. 62
14.629e-f 10 n. 31
14.630c 409
14.631a-b 410
15.669c 133 n. 13
15.674f-675a 9 n. 22
av e S t a 135, 135 n. 28
C 10
[De Bello Africano]
88.3-4 155 n. 43
C 63
[C]
1.34.2 206
2.22 215 n. 24
C D 224
43.11.4-5 155 n. 43
48.38 247 n. 14
63.8-9 225 n. 5
64.1-6 228 n. 11
64.9.2 224 n. 1
64.13-15 228 n. 12
ca t a l o g u S co d i c u m
aS t r o l o g o r u m g r a e c o r u m
4 (1903), p. 143 453 n. 27
11.1 (1932), p. 141 453 n. 27
C 453, 453 n. 26
ce r t a m e n ho m e r i e t he S i o d i
60 25 n. 18
100 20
C 443, 449 n. 8
C iii, vi, 51, 52, 53 n. 9, 449 n.
8
De amicitia
2.6-10 151 n. 22
De consulatu suo 444
De nibus
3.67 502
De ociis
1.50 502 n. 25
In Verrem
2.1.26 428
2.1.64-66 211
2.1.66 428
Epistolae ad Atticum
1.4.3 181 n. 2
2.1.8 155 n. 47
2.4.2 181 n. 2
Epistulae ad Familiares
9. 24.3 iii
Tusculanae Disputationes 53 n. 9,
155 n. 51
1.13 181 n. 2
1.71 sqq. 156
Orator
2 237 n. 36
86 237 n. 36
232 173 n. 41
351-353 237 n. 36
De diuinatione 443, 444, 445
1.9 443 n. 31
1.13 443 n. 34, 444 ns. 35/37
1.14-15 443 n. 34
1.17-22 444 n. 36
1.111-112 444 n. 38
1.127 443 ns. 31/32
1.130 444 n. 39
2.22 181 n. 2
2.47 444 n. 40
De inventione
1.28 69 n. 28
De ociis
2.76 173 n. 41
3.75-76 181 n. 2
De Senectute 150, 151
3 150 n. 20
41-42 150
45 iii
46 153
47 151
C 289
C 98
Fragmenta
(Wehrli)
63 97 n. 1
86 99 n. 11
94 98 n. 4
C A
Protrepticus
6.72.61 294
Stromateis
4.19.618 P. 13 n. 36
5.1.13.1 44 n. 28
C R
Epistula 2 109 n. 43
C 462
C 453 n. 27
De Re Rustica
11.2.11 453 n. 26
C N
Atticus
13.3 105 n. 19
14.1 105 n. 19
Cato
2.2 344 n. 12
Liber de Exc. Duc. Exter. Gentium
Praef. 6.7 427
C
Fragmenta
(Diehl)
4 460 n. 11
C (FGrH 688)
Fragmenta
(Jacoby)
9.1 135 n. 33, 137 n. 44
16.67 132
29b 246 n. 10
C R
6.6.4-5 205
C
Epistulae
29.1 110 n. 47
da r i u S , B e h i S h t a n (DB)
1.34 135 n. 32
1.78 135 n. 32
3.80 135 n. 32
4.33-5 135 n. 32
4.36-39 135 n. 32
4.63 135 n. 32
da r i u S , na q S h -i ru S t a m (DN)
12 135 n. 32
D P (FGrH
228) 517 n. 17
Elocutione
102 98 n. 6
3.150 65 n. 10
4.197-198 69 n. 28
Fragmenta
(Jacoby)
114 466 n. 39
D 311, 422
D 83
3.31 201 n. 3
21.143 48 n. 48
54.9 43 n. 25
di d a S k a l i a ap o S t o l o r u m
2.58 110 n. 48
D (FGrH 690)
Fragmenta
(Jacoby)
15b 246 n. 10
D C
1.37-41 216 n. 34
2 221 n. 59
2.71-72 217 n. 36
2.75-78 216 n. 34
2.51-53 216 n. 34
4 221 n. 59
4.40-43 216 n. 34
20.10 104
20.67.1 173 n. 41
D 461, 519
D S 219
4.55.4-6 257 n. 12
9.10. 1 466 n. 39
9.10.4 466 n. 39
9.11.1 513 n. 7
12.84.1 48 n. 48
16.87.1 204 n. 15
16.93.7 204 n. 16
17.72 219 n. 53
17.77 219 n. 51
17.77.5 205
17.117 219 n. 49
31 8. 1-9 171 n. 32
31 8. 13 172 n. 35
31 26.1 sqq. 173 n. 41
37.22 251 n. 29
D L 275, 486
1.27 486 n. 22
1.35 463 n. 22, 490
1.40-44 484 n. 13
1.41-42 516 n. 14, 517 n. 17
1.40 460 n. 9, 460 n. 9
1.77 338 n. 15
1.89 515
1.93.5 515 n. 13
1.94 518 n. 25
1.96 518 n. 24
1.98 267 n. 37
1.100 519 n. 28
1.122 518 n. 23
2.48 463 n. 23
2.86 463 n. 23
3.80-109 275 n. 1
3.48 416
3.98 275 n. 1
5.22 9 n. 22
5.76 13 n. 36
6.12 300 n. 15, 434 n. 37
6.72 434 n. 37
6.96 434 n. 37
7.24 44 n. 28
7.105 292 n. 9
7.147 305
7.149 443 n. 30
9.53-55 474 n. 27
D
Paroamiae
4.81 135 n. 24
7. 28 135 n. 24, 137 n. 44
D H
Antiquitates Romanae
1.89.1 364
Ars Rhetorica
3 64
De ucydide 70 n. 31
D
Fragmenta
(Kassel-Austin)
49 98 n. 5
E 291
E 517 n. 17
E C
Fragmenta
(Kassel-Austin)
212 278 n. 12
E
Fragmenta
(Edmonds)
11 422
E 267
3.25.1 43 n. 23
E 9, 311
E 464
et y m o l o g i c u m gu d i a n u m
124.2 13 n. 36
et y m o l o g i c u m ma g n u m
718.35 13 n. 36
E
Fragmenta
(Kassel-Austin)
106 98 n. 5
E 90 n. 8
E 434
Bacchae 186, 232, 246
298-301 137 n. 43
Cyclops
617 323 n. 62
Electra
1282-3 293 n. 13
Helena
36-40 293 n. 13
1455 82 n. 54
Hippolytus
530-534 308
Orestes 27 n. 22
1639-42 293 n. 13
Fragmenta
(Knox)
254. 2 293
286b 7 293
E C
Historia Ecclesiastica
6.43.11 110 n. 47
Chronicon
(Helm)
2161 377
E
1788. 53-54 13 n. 36
E
6.1.3 251 n. 29
F
1.13.22 150 n. 15
1.46.1 185 n. 17
2.13.71-2 155 n. 43
G 35, 452 n. 20
Προτρεπτικός
17 34
De dierentis febrium libri II
(Kühn)
7 2, p. 283 322
[Introductio seu medicus]
(Kühn)
14 Intr. p.768 322 n. 55
A G 15, 53 n.
11, 54, 104, 105, 377, 378, 379, 395,
396, 397
Noctes Atticae 395
Praef. 4 396
Praef. 11 397
1.1 396
1.9-10 377, 398
1.9.1-11 377
1.26.4 379 n. 35
2 398
2.2.1 377
2.3 398
2.22 104 n. 10
2.22.2 379
2.22.26-27 379
3.2 398
3.19 104 n. 11, 105 n. 20
3.19.1-5 379
6.3 398
7.7 398
7.10.1-5 377
7.13.4 378
7.13.7-11 378
7.13.12 377
12.5.3 377
12.5.5 377
17.8.3-9 378
17.8.11 378
17.8.11-16 378
17.20 104 n. 9
17.20.5-6 379
18.10.1-7 377
20.8 28 n. 27
Geoponica
7.5 454 n. 31
7.6. 8 24 n. 15
7.34.2 432 n. 32
H
2.16.3 452 n. 20
H. P A.
De adnium vocabulorum dierentia
(Valck)
35 13 n. 36
H 472
Περὶ εὑρέσεως
1.65 69 n. 26
H 49 n. 53, 83,
235, 386, 474, 476, 484, 485, 485 n.
20, 486, 488, 491, 498, 502, 518
1.22 485
1.23-24 518-519
1.24 508 n. 10
1.27 474 n. 18
1.29 474 n. 18, 485
1.46-48 485
1.59 474 n. 18
1.74 474 n. 18
1.119 236 n. 28
1.133 131 n. 2, 386 n. 4
1.136 135 n. 30
1.138 135 n. 31
1.170 474 n. 18
1.207 236 n. 30
2.78 461 n. 17
2.100 235 n. 27
3.27 135 n. 33
3.32 237 n. 35
3.34-35 237 n. 35
3.50 518 n. 25
3.50-53 476 n. 40
3.61-3 136 n. 35
3.66 136 n. 35
3.72 136 n. 35
3.109 433
4.76-77 511 n. 1
5.18-20 140 n. 63
5.18-21 202
5.19-20 236 n. 31
5.20 134 n. 22
5.92 518 n. 26
6.84 140 n. 60
6.129 403
7.102 135 n. 31
7.188 322 n. 53
7.209 135 n. 31
8.124 47 n. 44
8.142 136 n. 35
9.16 237 n. 35
9.108-13 237 n. 33
9.110 237 n. 34
H 22, 25, 104, 309, 463,
464
Opera et Dies vii, 19, 20, 22-27,
11 21, 24
26 21, 23
41 20, 22
45 20, 24
46 20
203-212 20
342 21, 23
368 21, 23, 24
373-375 464 n. 27
398 sqq. 19
405 21, 24, 25
464 21
471 21, 23
505-511 319 n. 35
559 sqq. 20, 464 n. 27
592-595 464 n. 27
595 21, 23
654 sqq. 21, 24, 25
699-705 464 n. 27
735-741 464 n. 27
744 20, 21, 22, 24, 324
748 21, 23
750 20
750-753 464 n. 27
763 21, 24
764 23
812 464 n. 27
eogonia 19, 26
26 33 n. 13
116-122 307
201-202 301 n. 20
590-612 434
Fragmenta
(Merkelbach-West)
9 20
267 26
H
Lexicon I
(Schmidt)
255 322 n. 54
H 432
Περὶ διαιτῆς ὑγιείνης 34
hi S t o r i a au g u S t a
Vita Heliogabali
26.3-4 225
H vi, 25, 31, 104,
113, 117, 336, 406, 463, 464, 505
Ilias vii, 31, 35, 65
1.595-604 3 n. 1
1.603-604 505
2.381 134 n. 22
6.261 33
7 415
7.282-293 467
8.7 433
9 415
9.3-11 505
9.185-89 202
9.197-224 3 n. 1
9.215-21 203
9.485-95 206
9.639 33 n. 11
14.214 430 n. 23
19.97 433
19.167-170 33
21.22 sqq. 82 n. 54
24.347 514 n. 9
Odyssea vii, 31, 231, 233, 237 n. 38,
336 n. 11
1.152-155 505 n. 1
1.370 505 n. 1
1.421 505 n. 1
4.519-537 233 n. 15
5.368 319 n. 35
6.587-615 203
7 32
7.115-116 118
7.169 203
7.182 33
7.215-217 32
7.219-221 32
8.72-75 403
8.250-55 127
8.258 514 n. 9
9 33 n. 12
10 33 n. 11
10.233-240 233 n. 12
11.426-34 434
13 32
13.53 33
20.392-393 233 n. 13
21-22 233 n. 14
21.430 505 n. 1
22.8-325 204
H 10, 468 n. 44
Carmina
1.4.89 135 n. 24
3.21.14-16 135 n. 24
I
De mysteriis 444
3.26 444 n. 42, 445 ns. 44/45
3.36 444 n. 41
I
Fragmenta
(Diels)
286.9-13 319 n. 35
I C 5
Fragmenta
(West)
26.12 5 n. 12, 135 n. 24
F I
Antiquitates Iudaicae
9.233-235 241 n. 57
18.110-111 239 n. 51
18.136-137 239 n. 51
18.148 239 n. 51
18.240 239 n. 51
I
Origines
6.5.1 173 n. 42
I
16.29 47 n. 44
I
12.3.8 206
I
Apologia
1.67.3 108 n. 38
1.67.4 109 n. 44
I
Saturae 104
5.116-118 440 n. 10
10.105-09 185 n. 16
11.180 104 n. 7
L
Catalogus 31, 83
113 265 n. 19
132 265 n. 19
L
Epistulae
1036.4 28 n. 4
Declamationes
12.10 42 n. 20
fr. 50 42 n. 20
T L
9.17 208
33.31.7-11 168 n. 16
33.32.3-33.8 168
34 344 n. 12
34.41.1-3 170 n. 28
34.48.2 170 n. 27
34.49.9-10 170 n. 27
43 344 n. 12
45.27.5-28.6 171
45.29.2-3 172
45.29.4-30.8 171 n. 32
45.31 173
45.32.1-7 171 n. 32
45.32.11 172 n. 35
45.29-33 171
45.32.10 173
45.32.11 128 n. 7
Periochae Librorum
46.14 173 n. 41
96 251 n. 29
114 155 n. 43
L 10, 15, 54, 104, 467-468
n. 44
Amores
19 315 n. 8
37 299 n. 11
41.9 266 n. 32
[Asinus]
7-11 40 n. 13
De Domo
7-15 430
Verae Historicae
2.15 104 n. 13
Dialogi Mortuorum
23 309 n. 15
De Morte Peregrini
11 106 n. 28
Symposium 53, 54, 481
3 51 n. 1
17 104 n. 14
21 107 n. 33
21-27 485 n. 17
L 10, 468 n. 44
L
14 48 n. 48
14.42 48 n. 49
18 48 n. 48
27.7 268 n. 56
28 48 n. 48
M 15
Saturnalia 54 n. 16
2.7.12-19 409
3.17.7-9 183
7.12.13 24 n. 15
7.16.15-34 450 n. 24
7.16.24 450
M 452 n. 20
M
1.27.7 51 n. 1
2.89 280 n. 19
M T iii, 386,
389, 390, 392
Orationes
3.7d 387 n. 8
11.7g 388
14.7f 387 n. 7
22 385
22.4e 386
25.5h-6a 388
25.6a 387 n. 9
30.3 388 n. 10
39.4 388 n. 11
M 10, 468 n. 44
M S
Peri Pascha 107 n. 36
M vi, 70, 104, 113,
117
M C
Fragmenta (Kassel-Austin)
451.15 133 n. 13
M R
407.12-14 302 n. 26
M 10
M L
(Bergk)
Fragmenta
3.1 299 n. 12
M
29 308 n. 9
M R 426, 434
Fragmenta minora
(Hense)
3.4 426 n. 6
N T
Ad Colossenses
4.16 107 n. 32
Ad Corinthios 310
Ad essalonicenses I
5.27 107 n. 32
Ad Timotheum I
4.13 107 n. 35, 109
Epistula Petri I 108
20 108 n. 39
Secundum Lucam
7-20 240 n. 53
14.7-11 477-478
22 240 n. 53
Secundum Marcum
6.17-29 239 n. 51
14.12-25 240 n. 53
Secundum Matthaeum
14.3-12 239 n. 51
26.17-29 240 n. 53
O
5.23.13 251 n. 29
O
Metamorphoses
1.196 234 n. 20
6.401-411 234 n. 19
6.426-674 234 n. 21
P
Erotika Pathemata
17 518 n. 24
P 8, 39, 204, 299 n. 11,
307 n. 1, 336
1-2 234 n. 20
2.3.8 257 n. 12
8 234 n. 20
8.51.3 360 n. 4
P C 10
P 10, 13, 468 n. 44
Satyricon 54, 442
55 105 n. 17
71.4 105 n. 17
109.10.3-4 442 n. 24
P
Fragmenta
(Kassel-Austin)
155 508 n. 9
P A 267
De Somniis
2.127 107 n. 31
P
Volumina Rhetorica
(Sudhaus)
90.27 9 n. 25
96.22 9 n. 25
97.22 9 n. 25
P
Bibliotheca
Codex 72 133 n. 9
P 104
Olympia
7.8 299 n. 9
Pythia
2.74 299 n. 9
Nemea
10.2 299 n. 9
P iv, vi, vii, 3, 6,
9, 14, 51, 52 n. 5, 54, 63, 83, 88, 89,
93, 98, 107, 113, 117, 129, 213, 275,
294, 301 n. 21, 302 n. 27, 310, 334,
392, 395, 406, 413, 416, 421, 422,
434, 459, 460, 466, 467 n. 44, 471,
489, 507
Charmides
154c 38 n. 5
Cratylus
408c 408 n. 10
419e 322 n. 54
Crito
49b 148 n. 7, 155 n. 49
53 c-d 40 n. 15
Denitiones
412e 267 n. 38, 275 n. 2
Euthyphro
3d 275 n. 2
Meno
72a-73c 300 n. 15
Protagoras 417, 486, 493 n. 39
11 267 n. 40
309c 38 n. 6
342a-343d 148 n. 6, 155 n. 48
342e 486 n. 21
343a-b 486
343a 517
347c-348a 370
347c-d 378
347c-e 41
347c 429 n. 22
Gorgias 37 n. 1, 389
447a 416
462 sqq. 389 n. 13
469c 148 n. 7, 155 n. 49
474b sqq. 148 n. 7, 155 n. 49
502b 408 n. 10
521d-522a 389 n. 13
Hippias Maior
281c 517 n. 18
Hippias Minor
376a 351 n. 1
Respublica 39, 42, 91, 125,
129 n. 8, 378, 475 n. 28, 475 n. 28
7 90
329b-c 476
330e 43 n. 23
335d 148 n. 7, 155 n. 49
335e-336a 517
352b 416
354a-b 416
376c 227
395e- 396a 4 n. 8
389d-e 4 n. 8
411b 324 n. 68
412c-e 125
440c 322 n. 54
451-457 426 n. 6
451d-e 300 n. 15
455d-e 300 n. 15
462c 325 n. 72
468b 47 n. 44
479b-c 4 n. 9, 98 n. 4, 133 n. 12
491c 38 n. 8
491d-492a 38 n. 7, 351 n. 1
491d 45 n. 34
493e-5b 38 n. 7
494c 47 n. 42, 48 n. 48
494d 44 n. 29
498b 47 n. 44
548e-549a 154 n. 39
559d-560a 44 n. 29
586a 139 n. 53
605d-e 300 n. 15
779b-c 4 n. 9
Apologia Socratis 37 n. 1, 148
10 40 n. 14
20c 40 n. 15
23c-d 40 n. 14, 149
24b-26b 40 n. 14
30a 40, 42 n. 21
30b 40 n. 14
30c-d 148 n. 7, 155 n. 49
33c-34b 40 n. 14
41d 148 n. 7, 155 n. 49
Menexenus
238a 433
718e-f 90
Symposium vii, 3, 5, 7, 8, 12,
37-50, 51, 52, 97, 99, 125, 198, 301
n. 22, 416, 416, 460, 462, 463, 466,
475 n. 28, 477, 489, 505
176a 133 n. 15
176e 370, 378
177d 202
179a 46
178c-179b 48
178d 46 n. 38, 48
178e-179b 46
183d-185b 39
189c-d 275 n. 2
192d-e 324 n. 68
194b 408 n. 10
203c-d 308
208 303
210a 303 n. 31
211b-c 301 n. 22
211c 465 n. 33
212a 303, 465 n. 33
212b sqq. 463-4 n. 25
212c-d 38 n. 4
212d-e 42
213e 125
215a 133 n. 16
216b 43 n. 27
215a-216c 38 n. 4
215c-216a 40
215d-216c 42
215d 38 n. 5
215e 43
216a-b 41
216a 44, 45
216b-c 43
216b 43 n. 27
216e 41
217a 38 n. 4
217b-d 41
217c 40
217e-218a 38
217e 135 n. 24
218a 43
218b-219d 37
219c-e 41
219d 39
219e 38 n. 9, 46
220b 155 n. 46
220d-221c 45, 46
220d-e 46 ns. 38/39
220e-221a 48
222c 16
Phaedrus 37, 48, 54 n. 18, 299, 301
n. 22
113a 322 n. 53
229a-b 299 n. 6
229a 155 n. 46
229b 319 n. 35
237d 127
238e-241d 39 n. 11
246a 140
247b 140 n. 67
247c 319
248b 301 n. 22
248c-d 141 n. 69
251c 321
255d 41
271a-272b 126 n. 4
Phaedo 41, 154, 155, 475 n. 28
58e 154 n. 38
61c-62c 155 n. 51
64-65d 150
64a-67b 465 n. 30
66b 500
67d 156 n. 57
80e 156 n. 57
108d 155 n. 42
Alcibiades I 37, 38, 40, 41 n. 19, 42
103a-104c 42 n. 19
104a-b 48 n. 48
104a 45 n. 34
104d 40 n. 15
122b 37 n. 3
131e 38 n. 6
eaetetus 4
173d 4 n. 10
Philebus
24a 6 sqq. 294
Timaeus 52, 53, 95
20c 416
20d 465 n. 31, 517 n. 20
28b 94
41a 95
43c sqq. 419
47e 294
48e 92, 93
52d 92, 93 n. 17
53a-b 93 n. 18
53c 92
56c 294
69b 93 n. 18
69d 150 n. 18
78e sqq. 419
90e-91a 300 n. 15
Leges 90, 91, 125, 291, 322, 323 n.
63
639c-641c 125
641b-d 370 n. 7
642a 370 n. 7
643a 370 n. 7
645c 370 n. 7
646c-650b 370
646d-e 5 n. 11
648a-c 137
648b 5 n. 11
649a-650b 135 n. 24
649d-650b 125
649e 137 n. 44
650a 5 n. 11
652a 370 n. 7
659a-c 408 n. 10
666b 126
671a-674c 370 n. 7
671a 420 n. 15
671c-d 125
673e 125
700d-701b 408 n. 10
713d 269 n. 66, 275 n. 2
773c-d 321, 323 n. 62
781a-b 300 n. 15
783a 323
792e 279
804e-806c 300 n. 15
816 411
829c 300 n. 15
831b 301 n. 21
876f 408 n. 10
896d-e 291
Politicus
269c-274 e 95
270a 95
Sophista
221-222 301 n. 21
231d 301 n. 21
P 452 n. 20
Stichus
773 442 n. 22
P M
Naturalis Historia
7.42 451 n. 16
9. 28 502
14.141 135 n. 24
18.321 453 n. 27
19.33 441 n. 20
19.34 440 n. 8
19.37 440 n. 6, 439 ns. 1/4, 440
n. 7, 442 n. 21
19.87 150 n. 15
22.100 442 n. 22
36.82 486 n. 22
P M 439, 440, 442, 453
Epistulae
1.15.2 104 n. 6
3.12.2-3 280 n. 19
10.96 106 n. 29
Panegyricus
2.7.2 353 n. 11
3.4.4 353 n. 11
4.7.1 353 n. 11
24.2.3 353 n. 11
47.3.2 353 n. 11
49.6.1 353 n. 11
71.5.3 353 n. 11
P
MORALIA
De audiendis poetis
15A 321 n. 49
17F 412 n. 21
19EF 448
27F 339 n. 16
28B 139 n. 59
31E 373 n. 16
37B 334 n. 5
De audiendo
37F 270 n. 74
38C 44 n. 28, 489
41F 408 n. 11
47A 38 n. 10
47BC 270 n. 74
De adulator et amico
51B 316 n. 19
55CD 38 n. 10
58B 412 n. 21
59D 38 n. 10
61C 486 n. 22, 489
65A 325 n. 73
66B 314 n. 5
68B 389 n. 16
68F69A 38 n. 10
69F 43 n. 22
70E 377 n. 29
71B 249 n. 22
De profectibus in virtute
79D 270 n. 74
80A 389
80E 374
81BC 374
84D 43 n. 22
85BC 374
De capienda ex inimicis utilitate
88C 268 n. 49
89B 264 n. 9
91C 279
92D-E 264 n. 17
De amicorum multitudine
94A 314 n. 4
97B 317 n. 24
De fortuna
99E 264 n. 17
De virtude et vitio
100C 264 n. 17
101B-D 264 n. 17
Consolatio ad Apollonium
109B 255 n. 6
120B 269 n. 64
De tuenda sanitate praecepta
123C 270 n. 74
130A-D 114
132B 34, 270 n. 83
133B-C 114
Coniugalia praecepta
138B 297
138C 297, 426 n. 6
138CD 299 n. 8
138D-E 298
138D 318 n. 29
138F 325 n. 76
139CD 425 n. 4
139D 430 n. 25
140E-F 321 n. 48
141B 318 n. 29
141D 318 n. 29
142DE 425 n. 4
142F-143A 318
142F 431 n. 26
143A 320
144CD 431
145C sqq 426
145C 413, 425
145D 303 n. 31
145F-146A 297 n. 1
Septem Sapientium Convivium 459-
521
146B-150D 482
146B-C 482
146C-D 475
146D-148B 482
146D 518 n. 24, 519, 520
146E 489 n. 28
146F 498
147A-B 76, 486 n. 22
147A 76, 78 n. 24, 79 ns. 26/34
147B-C 76
147B 78, 79 n. 31
147C-D 519 n. 28
147C 76, n. 7, 77 n. 11, 78 n. 24, 79
n. 26, 468, 484 n. 14, 519
147E 270 n. 78, 477
147F-148A 477
147F 506
148A-B 270 n. 77, 477
148A 76, 79, 477
148B 477
148C-D 426
148D-E 101 n. 21, 516
148D 462, 468, 516
148E-F 80 n. 43
149A-B 76 n. 7, 78 n. 24, 79 ns.
26/35
149A 447, 478, 506
149C-D 462
149C-E 499, 519
149E 462, 476
149F 80 n. 43
149F-150A 506
150A-B 80 n. 36, 80 n. 42
150A 499, 518 n. 27
150B-C 76 n. 7, 78 n. 24, 79 n. 26
150C 462
150D-155D 482
150D-E 506
150D 426, 519
150E-F 486
150F 506
151B-E 462
151C 515
151D 488
151E-F 77 n. 14, 101 n. 17
151E 465 n. 32
151F-152D 462
152A-D 76 n. 7, 77 n. 14, 78 n. 24,
79 n. 26
152A 76, 79 n. 32
152B 13
152D 76 n. 7, 77 n. 16, 78 n. 24, 79
n. 26, 486, 500
152E 462
152F 100 n. 16, 133 n. 16
153B-C 475
153C-D 463
153E-154C 462 n. 20
153E 13, 76
154A-B 101 n. 20
154A 20 n. 4
154B 98 n. 6, 101 n. 18, 426,
486
154C-D 77 n. 14
154D-E 76 n. 7, 77 n. 14, 78 n. 24,
79 n. 26
154D 488
154F 77 n. 14, 463
154F-155D 489
155B-C 80 ns. 36/42
155C-D 76 n. 7, 77 n. 14, 78 n. 24,
79 n. 26
155C 500
155D-156A 80
155D 76 n. 7, 78 n. 24, 79 n. 26
155E-164D 482
155E 426, 489 n. 28, 506 n. 3
155F 514 n. 11
156A 80
156B 490
156C-D 131 n. 1, 271 n. 85, 323
156C 507
156D 270 n. 84, 418
156E-157F 25
156E 20, 21, 22, 24
157A-B 80 ns. 36/42/43
157A-C 515
157A 77 n. 14, 464
157B 76 n. 7, 77 n. 14, 78 n. 24, 79
n. 26, 80 ns. 36/42
157C 76 n. 7, 78 n. 24, 79 ns. 26/29
157D-E 514 n. 8
157D 76 n. 7, 78 n. 24, 79 n. 26,
506 n. 3
157E-158B 22
157E 20
157F 20, 21, 22, 506 n. 4
158A-B 464 n. 27
158B 20, 25, 464
158C 76, 77 n. 11, 78 n. 24, 79 n.
26, 131 n. 1, 270 n. 75, 277
158D-E 465
159A 465
159B-C 500
159C-D 465
160A-B 76, 78 n. 24
160C-D 507
160C 465, 466
160D-161B 81
160D 81 n. 47, 83, 520
160E-162B 508, 519
160E 83, 486, 507
160F sqq. 81
161A 82, 502
161D 502, 503
161EF 491
161F 501
162A-B 81
162B 81 n. 50
162E162B 497
162F 502, 508
163A 503
163D 441 n. 13
163E-F 501, 508
163E 466 n. 38
164D 467
Regum et imperatorum
apophthegmata
172B 138 n. 49, 277 n. 11
172DE 473
173E 131 n. 2
176E 429 n. 22
186C 125
194F 150 n. 15
195B 255 n. 6
198A 427 n. 10
198B-C 173 n. 41
198B 128 n. 7, 172 n. 36, 389 n. 15
Mulierum virtutes
242EF 425 n. 3
242F 302 n. 24
243C 361 n. 9
256B-D 255 n. 6
258B-C 255 n. 4
Quaestiones Romanae
263E 318 n. 29
269A 359 n. 1
274EF 359 n. 1
279E 245 n. 4
282C 449
De Alexandri Magni fortuna aut
virtute
328CD 207, 208
328D 117
329C 324 n. 70
329D 201
329F330A 205
331E 217 n. 15
336E 268 n. 49
337F 217 n. 38
338A 217 n. 38
De gloria Atheniensium
346F 412
De Iside et Oriside
360E 291
369A 291
370D 447
De E apud Delphos
384D-E 364 n. 19, 516
385D-E 512
393A 289
De Pythiae oraculis
401B 515
401E-F 255 n. 5
402A 269 n. 68
404B 491
405F 389 n. 16
408E-F 493 n. 37
408E 493
De defectu oraculorum
410C-F 58
414F-418D 58
418A 58 n. 31
419A-E 491
419B-E 58
419B-420B 58
421A 324 n. 70
422B 140 n. 68
426A 432 n. 30
426B 289
428B 271 n. 93, 291 n. 7
428F 291 n. 7
429A 291 n. 7
432F 451 n. 19
De virtute morali
443C-D 279
443C 270 n. 74
451C-D 325 n. 77
451E 269 n. 72
452B 326 n. 77
De cohibenda ira
455B 154 n. 41
457DE 473 n. 17
458CD 147
459B 270 n. 74, 279
459B-460C 154
461A462A 154
461D 389 n. 17
462F 263 n. 4
463B 154
De tranquillitate animi
464F 396 n. 1, 473 n. 16
466D 264 n. 17
466F-467A 270 n. 74
467C 462
468E-F 264 n. 16
475D476A 142 n. 75
De fraterno amore
478C 264 n. 6, 266 n. 31
479C 265 n. 23
479D 265 n. 26
481B-C 264 n. 10
481F 264 n. 7, 266 n. 31
482B 269 n. 72
490E 271 n. 93, 325 n. 73
De amore prolis
493B-C 265 n. 27
493D-E 265 n. 29
495A 265 n. 25
495C 264 n. 11, 265 n. 28
497C-D 264 n. 8
De garrulitate
502F 389 n. 14
504D 117
504E 277
506C 489
510C-D 270 n. 74
510C 278 n. 12
510D 279
510E 486
511AB 493
511EF 279
511E 270 n. 74
512DF 279
513A 278
514C 389
514E 279
De curiositate
517C 277 n. 6, 278
520D 270 n. 74, 279
521A-E 279
522B 279
De cupiditate divitiarum
523B 264 n. 6
524B 264 n. 13
524D 265 n. 22
525C 265 n. 24
526F-527A 264 n. 16
527B 389 n. 17
De vitioso pudore
531B 117
531B-C 389
532C 279
De se ipsum citra invidiam laudando
546E 278, 282 n. 23
De sera numinis vindicta
550D 291 n. 5, 294
551D-552D 351 n. 1
551E 279
559B-C 142 n. 75
566A 451 n. 19
566F 255 n. 6
De genio Socratis
578D 486
584E 270 n. 74
588B 55 n. 21
593A 269 n. 68
596C 55 n. 21
De exilio
602C 270 n. 74
Consolatio ad uxorem
608C 156 n. 52
609B 156 n. 52
610A-B 270 n. 82
610A 131 n. 1, 270 n. 80
611A 156 n. 52
Quaestiones conuiuales1 367-455
1 396
1.2-3 396 n. 2
1.2 57, 400, 439
1.4 58, 125
1.5 124 n. 2, 400
1.6 213, 215
1.9 56, 58
2 396
2.1 56, 124 n. 2
2.2 397, 400
2.4-5 396 n. 2
2.5 57
2.8-9 396 n. 2
3.1-2 396 n. 2
3.1 397
3.2 56
3.3-5 396 n. 2
3.6 397
3.7-9 396 n. 2
3.7 400
3.10 448
4 396
4.2 439
4.3 58
4.4 397
4.5 57, 397, 448
4.4.6 396 n. 2
4.7 448
4.10 397
5 396
5.5-6 396 n. 2
5.7 124 n. 2
5.8-9 396 n. 2
6.1 58
7 396
7.1 56
1 Please note that there are separate lists
for the two reference systems used by the
respective authors.
7.4 397
7.5 14 n. 37
7.6 124, 397
7.7-8 396 n. 2
7.7 124 n. 2
7.8 14 n. 38, 124 n. 2
7.9-10 396
7.9 386
7.10 387
8.1-2 396 n. 2
8.2 397
8.3 397
8.6 57, 58
8.7-8 396 n. 2
8.8 58
9 396
9-10 396 n. 2
9. 1-2 57
9. 4 397
9. 5 57
9.10 448
9.14 57, 124 n. 2
612C-748D 19
612C 51 n. 1
612D 67, 124, 270 n. 80, 417
612D-E 9 n. 28
612E615 C 67, 87
612E 99 n. 8, 395, 114 n. 8, 416,
422 n. 19
613AC 127
613A 69, 131 n. 2, 419, 428
613B 212, 314 n. 5, 421
613C 134 n. 22, 217 n. 39, 418, 421
613D 68, 370
613E 420
613F 68
614A-B 67, 498 n. 3
614A 127, 396 n. 3
614B 183 n. 10
614CD 127, 371 n. 14
614C 69, 419
614D-615B 371 n. 13
614D-E 406
614D 54, 419, 421, 422 n. 19
615EF 128, 172 n. 36
614E 68, 314 n. 5, 420, 422 n.
19
614F615A 67
615A-B 324 n. 70
615A 325 n. 72
615B 67
616B 68
616E 68
617B 278
617E 422 n. 20
618D 422 n. 20
618E 70, 270 n. 80, 270 n. 82, 314
n. 3
618F 21, 22, 23, 25
619A 324 n. 68
619B 422 n. 19, 422 n. 20
619D 430
620A-622B 123, 141 n. 71,
215 n. 26, 220 n. 54
620A 370 n. 10
620B 69
620C 131 n. 2, 314 n. 3
620D-E 270 n. 84
620E-621A 126
621A 70
621B 126 n. 5
621C-622B 126
621C-D 320 n. 45
621C 67, 124, 131, 258 n. 16, 270
ns.80/82, 314 n. 3
621D622B 127
621D 70
622B 70
622D 323
623D 67, 213 n. 16
623E 213 n. 17, 215 n. 28
624A 213 n. 18, 422 n. 20
625A 422 n. 20
625C 373 n. 17
625F 422 n. 20
626A 423
626F 422 n. 20
627A-D 419
627A 422 n. 20
628B 277, 422 n. 19
628CD 422
628C 422 n. 20
628D 376 n. 26, 422 ns. 19/20
629A630A 131
629C 371
629D634F 67
629D 54 n. 14
629E630A 131
629E 134 n. 18
630A631C 127
630A 68, 371 n. 13
630C-631B 68
631C-F 127
631CF 127
631C 70
632B 373 n. 17
632E 270 n. 79, 270 n. 80
633E 70
634DE 70
635B 422 n. 20
635D 422 n. 20
635F 422 n. 20
636A 422 n. 19
636D 453 n. 26
638A 433
639D 422 n. 20
640C 422 n. 20
640EF 433
641CD 422 n. 20
642A 422 n. 20
642E644E 66
643A 314 n. 3
643B 66, 324 n. 70
643D 266 n. 30, 277 n. 7
643E 270 n. 2
644A 70, 134 n. 18
644E 69
644F 134 n. 20
645AC 135 n. 24
645B 70, 71
645D-646A 372
645F 278, 372
646A 371, 374, 376, 422 n. 19
647A 270 n. 83
648B 376
649A 376
649D-E 422 n. 20
650A-B 432
650A 419, 422 n. 20
650C 452 n. 22
650E-660C 322
650F 433
651A 422 n. 19
652A 419
652D 71
653B-C 372
653B 371, 374, 378
653C 372
653C-E 372
653E 372
654C 377
655E-F 371, 372
655E 270 n. 83
655F 372, 418
655F656A 372
656A 376
656B-D 419
656C-D 376
656C 422 n. 20
656D 422 n. 20
656E 373
657D 21, 22, 23, 25
657E 315 n. 9, 320 n. 45
657F 422 n. 20
658B 449 n. 6
658C 422 n. 20
658E 449, 450
658F-659A 449
658F 449 n. 7, 451
659A 453, 454
659D 419, 454 n. 28
659E-660A 66, 313
660A-C 477
660A-B 131 n. 1
660A 269 n. 73, 270 n. 82, 277 n. 6,
279 n. 13
660B 66, 212, 270 ns.
77/81/82/84, 271 ns. 86/88, 417,
418
660C 70, 277 n. 9, 279 n. 13, 324 n.
68, 418
660D 100 n. 14, 372
664B-C 440 n. 12
664B 439 n. 3, 440 n. 11
664C 422 n. 20
664D 376 n. 26, 422 n. 19, 422 n.
20, 441 ns. 14-17
664F 441 ns. 19/21
665A 441 ns. 19/20, 442 n. 27
665D-E 422 n. 20
666A 422 n. 20
666D-E 422 n. 20
667B 430, 435
667E 422 n. 19
670A 422 n. 20
670B 422 n. 20, 452
672E 66, 270 n. 82
673A 66, 67, 375
673A-B 100 n. 15, 133 n. 16
673C 422 ns. 19/20
675A 20 n. 4, 21, 22, 24
675E 25, 422 n. 19
676A 422 n. 20
676C-F 372
676E 371, 372
677C-678B 65
677C 422 n. 20
678E 278
678F 26, 422 n. 20
679A-B 67
679C 422 n. 20
680B 277 n. 9, 450
680C-D 421, 441 n. 13
680C 422 n. 20
680F 422 n. 20
682C 270 n. 74
682F 422 n. 20
683B-C 117
683C 422 n. 19
686C-D 11 n. 32
686C 67, 100 n. 12, 418
686D 51 n. 2, 417, 461 n. 17
689C 422 n. 20
689E 422 n. 20
690C, F 419
690F 422 n. 20
691C 422 n. 20
692B-E 374, 378
692B 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 371, 372
692C-E 373
692E-693E 373
693B 422 n. 20
693C 429
694B 422 n. 20
694D 376, 419
695E696D 65
696D 419
696E-F 422 n. 20
697C 66, 275 n. 2, 277
697DE 279 n. 13
697D 66, 314 n. 2
697E 67
699E 422 n. 20
700C 115, 422 n. 19, 422 n. 20
700D-F 422 n. 20
701A 422 n. 19, 422 n. 20
701B 21, 22, 23, 25
701D 19, 21, 22, 24
701E 422 n. 20
702B 419, 422 n. 20
703B 269 n. 71, 269 n. 73
703D 21, 22, 23, 25, 26
704CE 377
704E 371, 422 n. 20
704F 419
705A 406 n. 9
705B706C 377
707C 21, 22, 23, 25
708B 125
710B-711D 370 n. 8
710B-C 370
710B 429
711A-713F 115
711A 417
711B712C 104 n. 6
711C 104 n. 12, 105 n. 21, 107 n.
34
711E-F 116, 407, 429 n. 21
712B 70, 104 n. 15, 270 ns. 81/84
712B-C 116
712D 104 n. 8
713B-C 71
713C 417
713D 71, 418
713E-F 71
713F 126 n. 5, 420, 422 n. 19
714AD 67
714AC 386
714A 126 n. 5, 131 n. 2, 385
714D716C 67, 387
714D 131 n. 2, 422 n. 19
715DF 135 n. 24
715E 207 n. 25
715F 387
716D717A 387
716E 71
716F 390
717A 385, 390
717B vii
718B-720C 87
718C-720C 88
718C-D 89
718E 90
719F 89
719A-C 91
719C-E 92
719E 376
720A-C 92
720C 364 n. 19
720D 418
722D 422 n. 20
724D 408 n. 11, 419
725A 422 n. 19, 422 n. 20
725B 422 n. 20
725D 21, 22, 23, 26
726C 422 n. 19
726E 65
728E 422 n. 20
729A 422 n. 20
729E 279, 422 n. 20
730B 422 n. 20
731A-B 422 n. 20
731D 422 n. 20
732A 422 n. 20
732B 361 n. 9
733D 422 n. 20
734E735C 379
734E 419, 422 n. 20
735C 419
736D 65
736E 21, 22, 24, 26, 70
737C738C 64
737C 21, 22, 24, 25
737D-E 26
737E 65, 125, 422 n. 20
738A 21, 22, 24, 25
738C-739A 64
738E 25
739AD 65
740B 422 n. 20
740D 422 n. 20
741B 422 n. 20
742AB 65
743D 66
743E-F 65
744C 376, 422 n. 20
744D 63 n. 2, 423
745D 422 n. 20
746B-747A 127
746B 376
747B-748D 128
747B 422 n. 19
747C 429 n. 21
748AB 412
Amatorius
748F 298
749A 299 n. 6
749D 278, 318 n. 29
750C 303 n. 30
750D 299
750E 299, 315 n. 12
751A 300
751C-D 317 n. 23
751C 300
751D 316 n. 17
751E-F 300
751E 300, 319, 322
752A 300, 303, 322 n. 52
752B 315 n. 13
752C 316 n. 20, 317
752D 322 n. 58
752E 320
753A 322 n. 58
753C-754E 321 n. 47
753F-754A 310
754A 300 n. 18, 318 n. 29, 322
754C 300, 319
754D 425 n. 4
755E 322 ns. 57/58
756B 320, 320 n. 42
756E 300, 315 n. 14
757D-E 301
757F sqq. 300 n. 18
757F-758A 301
758A 269 n. 68, 301
758B 316 n. 19
758C-D 317 n. 27
758C 322 n. 59
758D-759B 322 n. 58
758D-E 310 n. 17
758E-759B 310 n. 18
758E 301
759A 323 n. 61
759E-F 301 n. 20
759E 309 n. 12
759F-760 427 n. 13
759F 309 n. 13, 319 n.
35, 322 n. 58
759F-760B 309 n. 14
760E-761A 310 n. 16
761B 46 n. 38, 310
761C 322 n. 59
761E-F 309 n. 15
762B sqq. 310 n. 19
762C-D 42
762C 278, 322 n. 58, 322 n. 59
762D 277 n. 10, 323 n. 61
763F 311 n. 20
764B-D 322 n. 58
764B 301, 311 n. 21
764F-765A 301
765B-C 322 n. 58
765B 301, 302, 323 n. 63
765C 301, 316 n. 18, 320
765D 302 n. 29
765E 308 n. 4
766A-B 322 n. 58
766A 322 n. 59
766B 302, 303
766C 303
766E-F 301
766E 311 n. 22
767A 269 n. 65
767B 302, 311 n. 23, 322 n. 58
767D-E 324 n. 68, 425 n. 4
767D 316 n. 19, 325 n. 73
767E 311 n. 24, 322 n. 59
767F 322 n. 58
768B-D 311 n. 25
768B 302
768C 255 n. 4
768E 316 n. 16
769 311 n. 26
769A-D 302
769C 316 n. 19
769D 311 n. 27
769E 303
769F-770A 425 n. 4
769F 318, 320, 321, 431 n. 26
770A 303
770D-771C 311 n. 25
771E 409
Maxime cum principibus
776B 269 n. 65
Ad principem ineruditum
779D 354 n. 14
780A 354 n. 14
781A 269 n. 65, 269 n. 66, 271 n.
87, 354 n. 14
781B 217 n. 35
An seni respublica gerenda sit
783E 269 n. 65
786B 269 n. 68
786C 269 n. 67
790F-791B 321 n. 49
791C 269 ns. 65/69
791D 263 n. 1
796D 41 n. 17, 147
Praeceptae gerendae reipublicae
799B 128
799C-D 364 n. 19
800A 128
802B 324 n. 68
806F 354 n. 17
809E 128
810C 38 n. 10
813E 125
814E-825F 169
816C 278, 361
816D 278
819E 354 n. 18
823 460 n. 11
823A-C 360
823A 276 n. 5
825A 129
De uitando aere alieno
829C 135
Aristophanis et Menandri comparatio
853A-854D 117
854A-B 117
De Herodoti malignitate
866F 280
Placita philosophorum
881C-D 294
881E 291 n. 7
Quaestiones naturales
917F-918A 448 n. 5
918A 450
De facie in orbe lunae
926C 408 n. 11
939F 452
De sollertia animalium
959F 502 n. 23
960A 269 n. 74, 503 n. 26
970A 266 n. 30, 268 n. 56
984 263 n. 2
984C 269 n. 64
984D 503
959F 270 n. 74, 279, 502
967E 500
973B 500 n. 13
973C 500
973E 500 n. 15
De esu carnium I
994E 501
996A-B 279
996A 269 n. 74
Platonicae quaestiones
1001C 90 n. 9
1002B 91
1003A 94 n. 19
De anima procreatione in Timaeo
1013C 94 n. 19
1015B 94 n. 19
1017B 94 n. 19
1023D 94 n. 19
1024B-C 93 n. 17
1029E 94 n. 19
De Stoicorum repugnantis
1033B 373 n. 16
1048C 292
1048E 292
1049AB 293
1049CD 292
1049DE 293
1050E 293
1050F 291
1051A 294
1051E 276 n. 5
De communibus notitiis
1065 293 n. 11
1065B 291
1065C-D 292
1065C 293
1065D 293 n. 12
1070E 373 n. 16
1072F 373 n. 16
1073B 300 n. 14
1075E 276 n. 5
Non posse suaviter vivi secundum
Epicurum
1095C-E 389 n. 16
1095C-D 9 n. 26
1095E 9 n. 24
1099A 263 n. 1
Adversus Colotem
1108C 272 n. 95
VITAE
Aemilius Paullus
1 166 n. 10
1.1 375
3.2-7 167, 172
4.4 173 n. 41
6.5 362 n. 10
11 167
17.4 167
28.5 389 n. 15
28.9 128 n. 7
22 152 n. 28
26.8-27.6 167
27 201 n. 1
28 165
28.1-5 171
28.1 266 n. 35
28.5 389 n. 15
28.6 171
28.7-8 172
28.9 172
28.10-11 173
29.1 171
30.1 167
36 167
38.1-2 167
38.6-9 167
39.9 266 n. 35
39.10 173 n. 41
Agesilaus
1.5 266 n. 35, 268 n. 59, 277 n.
11, 282 n. 22
12.5 139 n. 52
23 263 n. 4
33 263 n. 4
Agis et Cleomenes
7-8 248 n. 35, 268 n. 59, 277 n.
11, 282 n. 22
12.4-9 129 n. 9
13.3 277 n. 10
32.5 276 n. 5
34.3-4 266 n. 35
34.3 268 n. 60
Alcibiades
1.3 47
1.8 43 n. 25
2.1 44 n. 30, 47
2.2-3 38
4.1-2 42, 48 n. 48
4.1 41 n. 18, 42 n. 19, 45, 46,
47, 49, 299 n. 12
4.2 44
4.3 45
4.4-5.5 41
4.4 41 n. 18, 42 n. 19, 43, 46 n.
36
5.1-5 42
5.1 42 n. 19
5.5 47 n. 42
6.1 39, 42 (n. 19), 43, 44
6.2 44
6.3-5 45
6.4 45, 47
7 46 n. 40
7.1-3 45
7.3-6 45
7.4-5 46
7.4 49
7.5 46 n. 41
10.3 47 n. 43, 48 n. 48
14.12 47 n. 42
16.1 43 n. 25
16.5-6 361 n. 7
20.1 47 n. 42
24.5 44 n. 30
25.2 47 n. 42
32.1 44 n. 30
32.3 47 n. 42
Alexander
1.2 224
2.4-5 194
2.9 207
4.7-11 194
4.7 207 n. 28
4.9-11 195
4.11 195, 205 n. 19
5.4-6 196
5.4-8 196
8.4 196
9 193, 207, 231 n. 4
9.4 196
9.7-11 204 n. 12
9.7 214
9.8 214 n. 21
9.9 206
9.9-10 206, 207
9.10 214 n. 23
9.12-14 199
10.2-4 205 n. 19
15.9 202
17.9 207
21.7 214 n. 23
21.10 215 n. 24
22 207
22.3 214
23.1-2 215 n. 25
23.1 207
23.6 215 n. 26
23.7 207
29.1-6 205
37.5 204
38.1-2 203 n. 10
38.2 207
38.6 219 n. 50
38.8 219 n. 52
39.2 204
39.6 206
42.10 198 n. 10
45 215 n. 30, 219 n. 51
45.2 205
47.7 205 n. 19
48.4-49.1 203
48.5 204 n. 12
50-51 193
50.2 217
50.7 204, 252 n. 30
50.9-10 217
50.9 207, 215
50.11 196 n. 3
51 134 n. 19
51.3 216
51.5 216 n. 32
51.9-10 204
51.11 216
52.3 217
52.4 217 n. 38
52.7 198
52.8-9 205
52.8 220 n. 56
53-55 199
53.1 218 n. 41
53.3-4 207
54.3 218 n. 42
54.4-6 205 n. 22
55.7-8 199
57.3 220 n. 58
58.8 266 n. 35, 278
67.1-6 204, 205 n. 20, 207
67.7-8 203, 205 n. 19, 207
69.9 204
70 231 n. 5
70.1-2 205, 206, 207
70.3 219 n. 48
72.1-2 205
72.2 207, 218 n. 46
74.3 218 n. 45
75 251, n. 28
75.4-5 204, 205
75.5 206
75.6 219 n. 47
Antonius
3.10 266 n. 35
10 152 n. 29
14 152 n. 29
18.2 280 n. 16
25.3 266 n. 35, 277 n. 10
26 152 n. 29
28.2 232 n. 11
29 152 n. 29
32.3 247 n. 14
32.3 252 n. 30
32.4 252 n. 30
32.8 247 n. 14
36.2 140 n. 65
54.8 205
63 152 n. 29
67-68 152 n. 29
75-87 152 n. 29
76 152 n. 29
Aratus
6.4-7.1 247 n. 13, 252 n. 30
26.1-5 518 n. 21
43 203
49.1 142 n. 75
52 205
Aristides
1.2 147 n. 5
1.9 147
2.2 152 n. 26
6.3-6 269 n. 66
10 152 n. 28
23.1 266 n. 35
27.7 268 n. 56, 269 n. 61, 364 n. 17
Artaxerxes
3.5-6 138
4.4 138, 277
5.2 137 n. 40, 138
5.3-4 136 n. 38
5.4 138
6.5 259 n. 24
9.3 139
10.1 137 n. 42
11.1-2 139
11.2-10 132
11.5 131
11.6 131 n. 6
11.9-10 132 n. 5
12.2 132
13.1 132
14.3-4 138
14.5 132 n. 6
14.7 132
14.9-10 138
15 201 n. 2
15.1-7 131 n. 4
15.1 136 n. 37
15.2 134
15.3 137 n. 41
15.4 134, 141 n. 72
15.5 136, 139
15.6 136 n. 39, 137, 139, 141 n. 70
15.7 134, 139, 141 n. 72
16.2 132 n. 8, 137 n. 46
16.4 137 n. 45
16.7 138
17.1-8 132 n. 7
17.6 259 n. 24
19 231 n. 2, 246 n. 10
19.1-5 257
19.1 252 n. 30, 260 n. 25
19.6 259 n. 21
19.7 231 n. 3
23.1 132 n. 7
29.11 141 n. 72
Brutus
27.5 139 n. 52
30.6 266 n. 35
Caesar
4.8 277 n. 9
8.1 363
13.4 363
21.5 363
34.7 266 n. 35
40.5 363
45.3 363
46 152 n. 28
47.7 363
54.6 157
Camillus
17.2 289 n. 16
Cato Maior
1.9 151 n. 25
2.1-4 149
2.3.4 150
2.3 149, 244
2.5 150 n. 20
3.2 151
3.7 277 n. 10, 345, 354 n. 19
4 351
4.2-5 149
4.5-6 151
4.5 346
5 351, 361
5.1-7 151
5.1 266 ns. 33/35, 346, 352 n. 4
5.2-5 265 n. 21
5.2 265 n. 20, 266 n. 35
5.5 266 n. 35, 268 n. 50, 269 n. 74,
279, 345, 352
6.1-3 347
6.1 207
6.4 355 n. 22
7.1 43 n. 22, 148
7.2 149
8.4 428
8.6 149
10.1 345
10.6 152
11.1 344
12.5-7 172 n. 39
17 201 n. 1
17.1-6 150, 153
19.7 149
20.1-4 346
20.3 148
21 352 n. 8
21.1-4 152
21.4 153
21.5 363
21.10 363
22 352
22.2 246
22.5 363
22.6 352 n. 9
23.1 148, 363
24.1-10 151
24.1 347
24.2-7 348 n. 26
24.8 354 n. 15
24.11 354 n. 15
25.3-4 153
25.3 149
25.4 270 n. 79
26.5 363
27.7 148, 364 n. 14
29(2).4 363
31(4) 352 n. 9
31(4).2 264 n. 6, 265 n.18
31(4).2-4 354 n. 16
32(5).4 355 n. 20
33(6).1 353 n. 13
33(6) 15
33(6).1-2 151
Cato Minor
1.1 148
1.3-6 280 n. 18
1.3 281
1.5 153 n. 36
1.8 155 n. 51
2.3 151
4.1-2 151 n. 26
4.1 364 n. 15
4.2 155, 280 n. 20
5.1 148
6.1-2 371 n. 11
6.1 181 n. 4
6.2-4 156 n. 52
6.2-5 156 n. 52
6.3 280
6.6 155
8.2-3 148
10.1-3 155
11.3-8 156
21.3-4 281
21.10 266 n. 35
23.1 266 n. 35, 282 n. 22
26.1 277 n. 6, 281
29.4 266 n. 35
30-31 281
37.3 453
44.1 155
46.1 154, 155
47.2-4 281
49.6 281
50.1 155
50.2 280
50.3 281 n. 21
60.1 363
60.3-4 153 n. 33
65.10 155 n. 50
65.11 153 n. 35
67 115, 153, 246 n. 7, 252 n. 30
67.4 154 n. 38
68.2-5 154
70 154
Cicero
3.1-4 344
3.5 156 n. 4
4.10 344
5 335 n. 6
8.2 156 n. 4, 363 n. 11
9.6 363 n. 13
10.5 182 n. 7
12.39 344
30.1 363
32.5-7 156 n. 53
36.3-5 363 n. 11
36.3 181 n. 4
41.8 156
46.6 339
47.7 363
52(3).2-3 338
52(3).4 363
Cimon
1.5 248 n. 20, 252 n. 30
3.3 282 n. 23
4.3 371 n. 11
6.2 266 n. 35
9.1 4 n. 2
9.4 252 n. 30
10.6-7 268 n. 56
10.6 266 n. 30
10.7 266 n. 35
15.3 371 n. 11
Coriolanus
1.3 45 n. 34, 268 n. 55, 351 n.
1, 362
4.1-4 46, 47 n. 45
4.3 360 n. 5
15.4 360 n. 5
16.2 362
17.7 362
18.2-3 45 n. 32
19.3 362
21.1 45 n. 32, 35
22.4 44 n. 30
23 201 n. 1
30.7 362
31.6 362
39.8 46 n. 40
44(5) 362
Crassus
1.1-2 183
1.1 282
1.4 184
2.5 184
2.6 185
3.1-2 282
3.2-8 182
3.4 282 n. 23
3.5 266 n. 35, 268 n. 59, 282
5.2 183
6.7-8 184
7-9 232 n. 8
7.3-4 282
7.4 282
12.3 184 n. 12
13.2 185
16.1-2 185
17.8-9 185 n. 17
18.2 280 n. 16
29.4 447
33 232 ns. 7/8
33.1-4 246 n. 8
33.1-7 134 n. 23, 185
33.1 252 n. 30, 252 n. 30
33.5 255 n. 6
33.6 252 n. 30
34(1).1 184
34(1).4 184 n. 15, 188 n. 30
34(4).1-4 185 n. 17
Demetrius
1 152 n. 29
1.5 268 n. 58
1.7-8 351 n. 1
2 399
4.1 266 n. 35
16 202, 205
17.1 266 n. 35
19 206, 206
20 204, 206
22.1 278
22.2 268 n. 56
25 204
27 202
36 204, 206
36.4-12 247 n. 11
36.4 252 n. 30, 252 n. 30
36.11 252 n. 30
37.1 280 n. 16
42 206
42.3 351 n. 3
50.1 266 n. 35
52 206
Demosthenes 336, 337, 338
1 152 n. 29
7 335 n. 6
22.2-4 335
22.5 335 n. 7
29.3 337
Dio
7.5 265 n. 23, 266 n. 35
9.3-8 518 n. 21
13.2 389 n. 17
16.1 280 n. 16
20 201 n. 1
Eumenes
13.4 278
13.5 205
14.2 205
Fabius Maximus
4.3.8 173 n. 41
16.5 48 n. 51
22.8 266 n. 35
Flaminius
5.7 138 n. 50, 280 n. 18
7.1-3 166
10.1-3 167
10.4-7 168
11 165
11.1-3 168
11.4-7 169
12 166
12.1 168,169
12.5-6 170
12.8-13 170
13.1-4 166
18.3-21.14 166
18.10 150
22(1).4 169 n. 20
22(1).7 169 n. 20
24(3).4 266 n. 35
Galba
1 227 n. 9
10-28 228 n. 11
20.5 282
Lucullus
18.9 266 n. 35
29.6 266 n. 35
38.5 182 n. 8
41.9 264 n. 9
43.1-2 255 n. 3
44(1).5 282 ns. 22/24
44(1).6 268 n. 60
Lycurgus
2 152 n. 28
10 201 n. 1
11 152 n. 28
12 201 n. 1
13.3 252 n. 30
16 152 n. 28
24 152 n. 28
25.2 389 n. 15
26 201 n. 1
28 152 n. 28
Lysander
4 201 n. 1
27.7 138 n. 50
Marcellus
1.2-3 360
1.3 266 n. 35
10.6 266 n. 35, 268 n. 54
14.9 90 n. 8
20.1-2 276 n. 5
20.1 266 n. 35, 269 n. 62, 364 n.
16
23.5 364 n. 18
Marius
2 152 n. 28
5 152 n. 28
37 152 n. 28
43-44 152 n. 28
Nicias
3.2 188 n. 27
5.1 188, 241 n. 59
9.1 351 n. 1
9.2 268 n. 48
11.2 266 n. 35, 268 n. 60, 282 n. 22
Otho
1.1 278
3.2-6 228
3.3-7 223, 226
3.4 247 n. 12, 252 n. 30
5.3 228
16-18 228
Pelopidas
3.3 352 n. 7
4-11 232 n. 9, 236 n. 31
4.5 364 n. 18
6.2 364 n. 19
6.4-5 276 n. 5
6.5 268 n. 56
9 232 n. 9, 236 n. 31
9.4 247 n. 17, 252 n. 30, 252 n.
30
11 202 n. 9
11.3 252 n. 30
17.13 46 n. 38
21.3 266 n. 35
Pericles
1.1-2 264 n. 15
1.1 269 n. 72
1.3-2.4 375
1.6 202
2.4 271 n. 88
5.3 279
7.3 258 n. 14
7.4 188 n. 26
7.5 213 n. 14, 375
15.1 38 n. 10
30.3 266 n. 35
Philopoemen
1.7 169
2.2-4 359 n. 3
3.1-2 359 n. 3
3.1 169 n. 20, 269 n. 62
8.1 138 n. 50
8.2 268 n. 56
9.7 139 n. 59
13.8 359 n. 3
16.7-9 360 n. 4
17.5 359 n. 3
Phocion
1.3 281
1.5 335 n. 8
2.3 38 n. 10
2.6 281
3.1 155
3.2 129
3.5 281
3.8 281, 361 n. 9
4.1-2 155
4.3 280 n. 17
4.4 155
5.1 266 n. 35, 280
5.4-5 148, 155
5.5 266 n. 35
10.7-8 276 n. 5
10.7 282
16.5 279 n. 16
19 201 n. 1
27.6 362 n. 10
32.6-7 148, 155
36.1 155
38.5 148, 155
Pompeius
2.11-12 181 n. 4
3.2 247 n. 15, 252 n. 30
20.3-4 250 n. 25
24 187 n. 24
49 152 n. 28
75 152 n. 28
76.6 187 n. 24
79.1 280 n. 16
Publicola
1.2 266 n. 35, 276 n. 5, 282
4.5 266 n. 35, 282
25(2).7 282
Pyrrhus
1.4 138 n. 50
5.1 259
5.2 258 n. 19
5.7-14 247 n. 11, 252 n. 30, 256
5.8 256 n. 10
14 259
18.6 362 n. 10
21.1 255 n. 6
28.1-3 47 n. 42
28.5-7 47 n. 42
29.5-6 47 n. 42
Sertorius
25.6 142 n. 75
26 232 n. 6, 250 n. 23
26.6-8 252 n. 30
Solon
2.1 277 n. 6, 352 n. 6
3.5 493
4.1 484 n. 13
4.2-7 489 n. 28
7 152 n. 28, 493
7.2 269 n. 66
7.3 264 ns. 12/14
14.3 514 n. 10
15.3 266 n. 35, 276 n. 5
20 493
20.4 302 n. 28
23 493
27.1 398
Sulla
2.2 181 n. 4
5.5 447 n. 2
9 152 n. 28
12 174 n. 45
14.8 266 n. 35
28 152 n. 28
37 152 n. 28
37.6 447 n. 2
43(5).5 280 n. 16
emistocles
2.3-4 4 n. 2
2.4 202 n. 7
2.7 351 n. 1
9.3 9.3
18.7 428
30 152 n. 28
eseus
6.4 266 n. 35
12.2-3 257 n. 11
12.2 259 n. 22
12.3-4 246 n. 9, 252 n. 30
30 201 n. 1, 206
30.3-4 246 n. 6
30.3 231 n. 1, 252 n. 30
36.4 266 n. 35, 276 n. 5, 361
Tiberius et Caius Gracchus
2 152 n. 28
8 152 n. 28
19.2 277 n. 8
Timoleon
41(2).8 173 n. 41
FRAGMENTA
(Sandbach)
61 453
93 324
105 452 n. 21
109 453 n. 26
111 454 n. 30
134 319
135 322 n. 57, 322 n. 58
137 322 n. 56, 322 n. 58
138 322 n. 58
154-166 265 n. 19
157.5 450 n. 10
157.5-6 318 n. 29
167 320
203 38 n. 10
210 321 n. 49
[Homericae Quaestiones ] 31, 31 n. 2
[Vita Homeri ] 31 n. 2, 34, 35
204 32 n. 5
205-6 32
207 32 n. 6
P
3.155 43 n. 23
10.100 44 n. 28
P
4.24 203
P
8.12.1-6 205
18.35.4-6 173 n. 41
18.45.7-12 168 n. 16
18.46.1-15 168
21.32.3 360 n. 4
30.14 128 n. 7, 172
31.22.1-7 173 n. 41
P T
De Antro Nympharum 31
P 443, 444, 445
Fragmenta
(Edelstein-Kidd)
7 443 n. 30
27 443 n. 30
110 444 n. 39
(eiler)
258 443 n. 30
371a 443 n. 30
378 444 n. 39
P 28
P
Tetrabiblos
1.2 448 n. 4
Q
Institutio Oratoria
1 (praef.) 71 n. 36
2 237 n. 36
2.42 69 n. 29
3.1 69 n. 26
4.2.31 69 n. 28
5.14.5 69 n. 30
6.39 65
8.1.1 69 n. 27
11-16 237 n. 36
11.1.1 68 n. 24
11.1.43 68
R 452 n. 20
S
Historiarum fragmenta
(Maurenbrecher)
3.83 251 n. 29
Catilina
48.5 181 n. 2
S 297, 298, 308
Fragmenta
(Voigt)
47 319
103.8 297
105 (a) + (b) 297
130 319 n. 35
S
4.601.15-17 Walz 42 n. 20
Ad Platonem Resp. 479c 98 n. 4
In eocritum 3.21 9 n. 22
In eocritum 13.1-2 308
S 434
S 267, 442, 443, 449 n. 8
De Constantia
18.2 427 n. 13
Agamemnon 233
875-909 233 n. 16
Hercules Furens
409 n. 15 409 n. 15
yestes 17
Epistolae Morales ad Lucilium
67.7 157 n. 60
71.17 157 n. 60
98.12 157 n. 60
104.28 sqq. 157 n. 60
De providentia
3.4 157 n. 60
3.12 sqq. 157 n. 60
De tranquillitate animi
16.1 157 n. 60
Ad Marciam
22.3 157 n. 60
De Ira
2.25.4 154
3.13.3 154 n. 41
3.24.2 154
3.35.1-3 154
3.39.2-4 154
S 69, 235, 237, 412, 460
n. 11, 517
Fragmenta
(Page)
70 308
S 77, 80, 319, 352,
460, 463 n. 24, 464, 465, 465 n. 31,
467 n. 41, 484, 514
Fragmenta
(West)
33 520 n. 32
S
Ajax 334
Antigona 333, 334, 335, 336, 337
175-177 339
781-800 308 n. 3
Electra 27 n. 22
Oedipus Coloneus 334, 337 n. 13
434 322 n. 54
Trachiniae 334
S 452
S B
305.1 13 n. 36
314.6 13 n. 36
452.8 13 n. 36
S
2.120.20 267 n. 41, 271 n. 90
2.121.22 267 n. 41, 271 n. 90
3.6.23 432
4 432
4.22.21 432
6.22.20 432
St o i c o r u m Fr a g m e n t a
(von Arnim)
1.174 443 n. 30
1.537 289
1.557 294
2.463-481 318 n. 31
2.1010 290, 292
2.1021 305
2.1075 290
2.1080 290
2.1191 443 n. 30
3.63 318 n. 31, 318 n. 31
3.126 292 n. 9
3.716-717 299 n. 11
3.718A 302 n. 24
S
13.2.3 513
15.3.18 135 n. 30
15.3.20 131 n. 2
S 237
Augustus
45.4 408
69.1 427
Caligula
25.1 427 n. 13
36.2 427 n. 13
Nero
22-26 225
25.1 225, 226 n. 6
Galba
11.1 266 n. 35, 268 n. 59
11.20 228 n. 11
12.2 228 n. 11
20.5 266 n. 35
Otho
1.3 268 n. 59
7-12 228 n. 12
8.1 sqq. 224 n. 1
10-11 228 n. 12
Tiberius
39 237 n. 39
T 224, 237, 238
Annales
3-4 238 n. 43
4 4.59
11 238 n. 40
13 238 n. 42
14 238 n. 43
16 238 n. 42
26-32 238 n. 40
Historiae
1.4-41 228 n. 11
1.44-47 228 n. 12
1.71-90 228 n. 12
1.80-82 224 n. 1
1.82 226
2.11-56 228 n. 12
2.48-49 228 n. 12
T 108, 109
Apologeticum 106 n. 30
39.3 108 n. 40
Praescriptio adversus haereses 41.8
T 460 n. 12, 461, 461
n. 17, 462, 463 n. 24, 477, 478, 482,
515, 516, 519
T
Idyllia
22 235 n. 23
29.1 135 n. 24
29.1-3 5 n. 12
T
(Müller)
668 519 n. 28
T 63, 369
309-312 136 n. 36
500 135 n. 24
681-682 133 n. 16
763-764 134 n. 21
1001 133 n. 13
T 75, 472, 474, 476, 478
Progymnasmata 75-85
(Spengel)
1.1-4 473 n. 13
2.16-19 473 n. 14
9.13-20 476 n. 38
10.2-7 475 n. 28
12.8-13 475 n. 29
12.23-26 475 n. 30
12.26–13.1 475 n. 31
16.25-26 476 n. 37
17.1 476 n. 37
19.5-8 476 n. 42
20.3-6 474 n. 22
59 75 n. 3, 80 n. 38, 84
60 sqq. 83
62 27 n. 24
65 27 n. 24, 83
66 83
70 27 n. 24, 83
70.1-3 475 n. 33
72 80 n. 38
74 80
75 80, 81
76 80 n. 39, 81, 83 n. 62
78 81
79 81, 82
80-81 82
83 82 n. 60
84 83 n. 61
93 sqq. 83
96 76 n. 8
97 76 n. 8, 77 n. 10
98 77 ns. 13/15/17
99 77, 78
100 78
101 78, 79
102-103 79
104 sqq. 79
T 9, 439, 440, 442
Historia Plantarum
1.6.5 439 n. 1
5.1.3 453
Fragmenta
(Fortenbaugh)
L 91 271 n. 93
L 195-196 271 n. 93
400 439 n. 1
400a 439 n. 6, 440 ns. 7/9, 441 n.
21
T 37, 45 n. 31, 83,
339, 425 n. 3, 514 n. 8
1.62-63 45, n. 35
5.43.2 47 n. 43
6.15.3 47 n. 43
6.15.4 45 n. 31
6.28 38 n. 4, 42 n. 20
T
2.5.92 44 n. 28
T 63
T 28
V M
Facta et Dicta Memorabilia
4.3.5a 150 n. 15
De viris illustribus
56.6 173 n. 41
V 10, 449 n. 8, 453
n. 26, 468 n. 44
V P
2.31.1 251 n. 29
V
Aeneis
4.441-449 319 n. 35
V T
Daniel
5 239 n. 50
Genesis
40.20-23 238 n. 44
Iudices
14.10-20 238 n. 46
Iudith
12-13 239 n. 49
Liber II Regum
15.25 241 n. 57
X 505
Fragmenta
(West)
1 505
B1 15-17 134 n. 18
B1 21-24 134 n. 21
X 3, 7, 9, 12, 14, 67, 213,
301 n. 21, 365, 386 n. 4, 392, 395,
406, 459, 466, 468, 471, 475, 489
Anabasis
1.8.24 139
1.8.27 132
6.1.5-13 409 n. 18
6.1.5 133 n. 15
Cynegeticus
13.9 301 n. 20
Cyropaedia 140 n. 63, 370, 386 n. 4
4.1.6 133 n. 15
5.2.18 131 n. 2
8.2.2-3 205 n. 18
Historia Graeca
4.1.4 351 n. 1
4.1.34 139
Memorabilia 6, 460, 475
1.2.12-48 42 n. 21
2.1.4 433
4.1.2 38 n. 6
Symposium 6, 8, 11, 97, 99, 198, 298,
370, 404, 461, 489 n. 27, 505
1.1 416
1.11-16 463 n. 25
1.11 7
2.1 133 n. 11, 133 n. 15
2.9 300 n. 15
2.16-19 409
2.23-27 6 n. 15
2.26 153
3-6 7
4 12 n. 33
4.29 7
6.2 6 n. 16, 134 ns.18/20,
7.1-2 4 n. 4
8.1-41 38 n. 6
8.1 8 n. 17
8.13 8 n. 19
8.15 8 n. 18
8.24 8 n. 17
8.32-40 8 n. 21
8.32 46 n. 38
ya S n a
31.8 135
47.5 135
46-96 135 n. 28
Z C 10
Z E 443
Z
Paroemiographi
4.5 135 n. 24
Z
9.24.4 173 n. 41
567
li s T o f c o n T r i b u T o r s
al d o s e T a i o l i is professor emeritus at the University of Perugia. His scholarly
activity centers on Latin literature but he also devotes constant attention to
Greek literature. He has devoted books and papers on Seneca, Virgil, Servius,
Petronius, as well as to many other authors and problems.
ál i a r o s a c. ro d r i g u e s translated the seventh book of the Quaestiones
Conuiuales and assists the scholars working on the Portuguese Plutarch Project.
Moreover, she is preparing a translation of the Life of Fabius Maximus. At the
moment, she is working on her master's thesis on Poetics and Hermeneutics and
is also a collaborator on the Ancient Women's Dictionary. She is about to start
her PhD thesis on Plutarch's Lives of Lycurgus and Numa.
an a v i c e n T e s á n c h e z is Assistant Professor of Greek Philology at the
University of Zaragoza (Spain) and has done research on Greek epistolography,
the history of the Greek language and late antique literature.
an a s T a s i o s g. n i k o l a i d i s , Ph.D (London, King's College) is Professor
of Classics at the University of Crete, Greece. His research interests and
publications comprise Plutarch (mostly), Greek and Roman historiography
(Herodotos, ukydides, Sallust, Tacitus), Greek and Roman ethics (Platon,
Aristoteles, Seneca), and Latin love elegy (Ovid).
an T o n i o ig n a c i o m o l i n a m a r í n is Doctor of Ancient History at Murcia
University, Spain. He has done research on the history of ancient Macedonia
(Alexander the Great) and Greek geography.
au r e l i o p é r e z J i m é n e z is Professor of Greek Philology at the University of
Málaga, Spain. He has been president of the Spanish Plutarch Society ever since
its foundation in 1987, and presided over the International Plutarch Society
from 2002 to 2005. Among his works on Plutarch are Spanish translations
of fourteen Lives (1985, 1996, 2006) and the edition of the De capienda ex
inimicis utilitate (2008) for the Corpus Plutarchi Moralium.
ca r l o s a. ma r T i n s d e Je s u s is a PhD student at the University of Coimbra
and fellow of the Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (FCT). He is currently
working on Greek literature and myths, while preparing his PhD thesis on
Bacchylides. Among other things, he is the author of several books and papers
on Greek archaic poetry. He has also translated into Portuguese Archilochus'
fragments, Aristophanes' Wasps and Epictetus' Encheiridion. As for Plutarch,
besides some papers in national and international conferences, he has translated
books 4 and 6 of Table Talk, Amatorius and Amatoriae Narrationes, and is now
working on a Portuguese version of the Life of emistocles.
dá m a r i s r o m e r o g o n z á l e z is a postdoctoral researcher at the Institute
for Textual Scholarship and Electronic Editing at Birmingham University,
England. Her research elds are Plutarch, women in antiquity and the
semantics of the New Testament.
de l f i m l e ã o is professor of Classics at the University of Coimbra. He has a
deep interest in law, politics and the constitutional history of ancient Greece,
as well as in theatrical practice and the Roman novel. He is one of the editors
(together with E. M. Harris and P. J. Rhodes) of Law and Drama in Ancient
Greece (Duckworth, forthcoming).
er a n a l m a g o r is a post-doctoral scholar based at the Hebrew University
of Jerusalem, Israel. His PhD dissertation (2007) was a historical and literary
commentray on Plutarch's Life of Artaxerxes. He is interested in Achaemenid
history, ancient ethnography, narratology in Plutarch and perceptions of the
"other" in ancient Classical and Jewish literature.
fr a n c e s b. Ti T c h e n e r is Professor of History and Classics at Utah State
University, USA. She has published research on the development of biography
and autobiography, as well as the works of Plutarch. She serves as International
Coordinator of the International Plutarch Society and co-editor of its journal,
Ploutarchos.
fr a n c e s c a m e s T r e has been Tenured Lecturer of Greek Philology at the
University of Barcelona since 1988. Her main elds of study are Greek
Literature in the Roman Empire, the Second Sophistic, authors such as
Lucian, Plutarch and Philostratus, historiography, and Hellenism. Since 2001
she has led the research group "Graecia Capta" on Greek culture under the
Roman Empire.
fr a n c e s c o b e c c h i is professor of Greek Language and Literature at Florence
University ("G. Pasquali" Dept. of Ancient Classics), Italy. He studied ethical
literature in its historical development from the classical to imperial age
(eophrastus, Stoics, Posidonius, Middle Platonism, Alcinous, Peripatetics,
Aspasius, Neopythagoreans, Plutarch of Chaeronea, Alexander of Aphrodisias,
Galenus). Among his works on Plutarch, he has published a critical edition
with introduction, translation and commentary of the De virtute morali and of
the De fortuna.
fr a n c o f e r r a r i is full professor of the history of ancient philosophy at the
University of Salerno. He has a PhD in Philosophy (University of Torino:
1993) and in History (University of San Marino: 1997). He was Alexander-
von-Humboldt Fellow at the University of Münster in Germany (1997-1999),
where he worked on the project "Der Platonismus in der Antike" directed by
Matthias Baltes. Since 1999 he has been teaching at the University of Salerno.
He is member of the Editorial Board of the International Plato Society and of
the Academia Platonica.
fr e d e r i c k e. br e n k is Emeritus Professor of the Greek and Roman
Background of the Old and New Testament at the Pontical Biblical Institute
in Rome. He has written many articles on Plutarch, in particular on the
Moralia, and several monographs treating Plutarch, along with Greek and
Roman literature, religion, and philosophy, especially during the rst century.
ge e r T r o s k a m is research professor at K.U. Leuven. He has published
extensively on Hellenistic and Middle Platonist philosophy, including On the
Path to Virtue. e Stoic Doctrine of Moral Progress and its Reception in (Middle-)
Platonism (2005), Lathe biôsas. On the Vicissitudes of an Epicurean Doctrine
(2007), A Commentary on Plutarch's De latenter vivendo (2007), and Plutarch's
Maxime cum principibus philosopho esse disserendum. An Interpretation with
Commentary (2009).
ge n n a r o d'ip p o l i T o teaches Greek literature at the Facoltà di Lettere e
Filosoa of the University of Palermo. He has published widely on poetry
(Homer and the minor poets, Mimnermus, Euripides, Callimachus, Pantaleon,
Gregory of Nazianzus, Synesius, Tryphiodorus, Nonnus, Kavas, Seferis, Elytis)
and, in the area of prose writing, on the novel and especially on Plutarch. He
has participated in 15 conferences on Plutarch and is a Council member of the
Italian section of the IPS. Moreover, he is co-director of the Corpus Plutarchi
Moralium, which is being published at Naples.
is r a e l m u ñ o z g a l l a r T e is PhD Researcher of Greek Religion at
Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, e Netherlands. He has done research on
semantic of New Testament Greek and on Plutarch, esp. on historical and
religious topics.
Ja m e s T. c h l u p is Assistant Professor of Ancient History at the University of
Manitoba. In addition to Plutarch, his research interests include Greek and
Latin historiography and the Roman Middle East. He has written articles on
ucydides and Livy, and it currently working on a commentary on Plutarch's
Life of Crassus.
Je f f r e y b e n e k e r is assistant professor of Classics at the University of
Wisconsin in Madison.
Je r o e n la u W e r s is currently preparing his PhD as a research assistant of the
Research Foundation Flanders. His research revolves around authorial self-
presentation and the use of authority in Imperial Greek Literature (the era
of the so-called 'Second Sophistic'), with a particular interest in Maximus of
Tyre.
Jo a q u i m J. s. pi n h e i r o is Assistant Professor of Classics and Humanistic
Studies at Madeira University, Portugal. In 2007 he nished his PhD thesis
on Time and Space of Paideia in Plutarch's Lives. Presently he is member of the
Project Plutarch and the Founding of an European Identity and he also conducts
research in Greek literature and culture, especially on political thought,
education and rhetoric.
Jo s é an T o n i o f e r n á n d e z d e l g a d o is Professor of Greek Philology at the
University of Salamanca (Spain). He has been the head of nine research projects
nanced by the Spanish Ministry and the Government of Castilla and León,
by which his research team has been recognised as Group of Excellence. He has
supervised ten Ph. D. eses, has participated in more than 30 International
Congresses, and has occupied important posts in the University Government.
He has done research mainly on Hesiod and Archaic and Classical poetry, on
dierent texts about Greek education, on school inuence on Greek literature,
and on Plutarch from this and other points of view.
Jo s e f a f e r n á n d e z z a m b u d i o works on the web page http://interclassica.
um.es, which is concerned with the study and diusion of the ancient Greek
and Roman worlds. She has done research on ancient biography, especially
the Lives of Homer and Alexander the Great, and is currently working on the
inuence of ancient mythology in Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz.
Jo s é m a r í a c a n d a u m o r ó n is Professor of Greek Philology at Seville
University, Spain. He has done research on Greek historiography, Plutarch and
Julian the Apostate and has published translations into Spanish of Zosimus,
Cassius Dio and Polybius.
Jo s é ve l a Te J a d a is Permanent Professor of Greek Philology at the University
of Zaragoza, Spain. He has done research on the history of the Greek language
(koiné and atticism), Greek historiography, especially Xenophon, and on
Plutarch by attending ve conferences of the IPS, contributing to the Studies
in honour of Prof. Stadter and editing the Proceedings of the 5th Spanish
Conference of the IPS.
la W r e n c e k i m is Assistant Professor of Classics at the University of Texas at
Austin. His research focuses on Greek literature under the Roman Empire and
his publications include articles on the ancient novel, Strabo, Dio Chrysostom,
and Atticism. His book, Homer between History and Fiction in Imperial Greece
is forthcoming from Cambridge University Press.
ll u í s g o n z à l e z J u l i à is preparing his PhD thesis at the University of
Barcelona, Spain, on Lucian's declamations. He conducts research on ancient
education, rhetoric, and declamation.
lu k a s d e b l o i s has been since 1980 professor of ancient history at the
Radboud University of Nijmegen in e Netherlands. He published books
and articles on the history of the Roman Empire in the third century A.D., the
history of the Late Roman Republic, ancient historiography (Sallust, Tacitus,
Cassius Dio), Plutarch's works, and Greek Sicily in the fourth century B.C.
He has also published a manual, together with R.J. van der Spek (English ed.:
L. de Blois & R.J. van der Spek, Introduction to the Ancient World, Routledge,
London/ New York, 2nd ed. 2008, 1st ed. 1997). He is a member of the editorial
board of the international network Impact of Empire (Roman Empire, 200
B.C. – A. D. 476).
ma n u e l T r ö s T e r studied History and Politics at Trier, London, and
Cambridge, writing his doctoral thesis on emes, Character, and Politics in
Plutarch's Life of Lucullus (Stuttgart, 2008). He currently holds a postdoctoral
fellowship funded by the DAAD at Coimbra University. His principal elds of
research are Roman Republican history, Plutarch's Lives, and foreign relations
in the ancient and modern worlds.
ma r i a le o n o r sa n T a bá r b a r a is professor of Greek and Greek Literature
at the Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas of the Universidade Nova de
Lisboa. She is also responsible for the research group of Studies on Antiquity,
at the Centro de História da Cultura of the same University. She has been
working mainly on the Hellenistic age, namely on the Greek Anthology.
ma r k b e c k is Assistant Professor of Classics at the University of South
Carolina in Columbia, South Carolina, USA. He has published numerous
articles on Plutarch and is currently working on a monograph Distinguishing
the Individual: Ideology and Individuality in Ancient Greek Biography and is
editor of the forthcoming Blackwell Companion to Plutarch.
ma r T a i s a b e l d e o l i v e i r a v á r z e a s is professor of Classical Studies at the
Faculty of Humanities of the University of Oporto. Her area of research covers
Greek Literature, Rhetoric and Poetics.
nu n o s i m õ e s r o d r i g u e s has a PhD in Classical History and is Professor of
Classical History at the University of Lisbon. He has published Mitos e Lendas
da Roma Antiga (Lisboa, 2005) and Iudaei in Vrbe. Os Judeus em Roma do tempo
de Pompeio ao tempo dos Flávios (Lisboa, 2007).
pa o l a v o l p e c a c c i a T o r e is Professor of Greek at Salerno University, Italy.
She has done research on Byzantine philology, Attic theater, Plutarch and
humanistic translations from Greek texts. At present, she is engaged in the
critical edition of Aeschylus' Persae. She is President of the Italian section of
the International Plutarch Society.
ph i l i p a. s T a d T e r is Professor of Classics Emeritus at the University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He has published extensively on Greek
historical authors, especially Plutarch, including A Commentary on Plutarch's
Pericles (Chapel Hill, 1989), Plutarch and the Historical Tradition (London,
1992) and introductions and notes to Plutarch, Nine Greek Lives (Oxford,
1998) and Plutarch, Eight Roman Lives (Oxford, 1999).
pi l a r gó m e z has been Tenured Lecturer of Greek Philology at the University
of Barcelona since 1988. She has published on the Greek fable and Aesop, as
well as on Plutarch, Lucian and the Second Sophistic. She is a member of the
research group "Graecia Capta".
ro d o l f o g o n z á l e z e q u i h u a is currently studying for his Ph.D. degree
at the University of Salamanca. He is working on the reception of the full
progymnasmata in Heliodoros.
ro d o l f o l o p e s is a researcher in the Centro de Estudos Clássicos e
Humanísticos at the University of Coimbra. He is currently preparing a
doctoral thesis on the myths of Plato.
ro o s e v e l T a r a Ú J o r o c h a J Ú n i o r is Professor of Greek at the Universidade
Federal do Paraná, in Curitiba (Paraná – Brazil). For his Ph.D. thesis, he made
a translation into Portuguese of the Plutarchean work De musica, together with
notes and a study of important aspects of this work. He is researching on
ancient Greek music and archaic Greek poetry (lyric, elegy and iambus), and
working on translations into Portuguese of authors such as Aristoxenus and
some lyric poets (Stesichorus, Alcman, Alcaeus, etc.).
ro s a r i o sc a n n a p i e c o has achieved a "PhD" in Classical Philology at the
Università degli Studi di Salerno; his studies concern Greek prose of the
Imperial period, especially Dio Chrysostom's and Plutarch's, in both its
contents and textual aspects.
si m o n e b e T a is currently Research Assistant of Classical Philology in the
Department of Classical Studies at the University of Siena (Italy). His research
interests include classical theatre (mainly Greek comedy and its reception),
Greek epigrams and novels, rhetoric, wine, and symposium. He is the author
of Il linguaggio nelle commedie di Aristofane (Rome, 2004); he has also published
Vino e poesia. Centocinquanta epigrammi greci sul vino, an anthology of Greek
epigrams on wine (Milan, 2006), and I comici greci, an anthology of Greek
comic fragments (Milan, 2009).
sT e p h e n T. n e W m y e r is Professor of Classics and Chairman of the Department
of Classics at Duquesne University in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA. He is
author of a number of studies of Plutarch's attitudes toward animals, viewed
both in their ancient context and in their relation to modern animal rights
philosophy.
sv e n -T a g e T e o d o r s s o n is Professor of Greek at Göteborg University,
Sweden. He has done reseach on the history of the Greek language (phonology),
Anaxagoras' theory of matter, and on Plutarch, especially a Commentary on
his Table Talks.
Ti m o T h y e. du f f is Reader in Classics at the University of Reading. His
publications include Plutarch's Lives: Exploring Virtue and Vice (Oxford
University Press 1999).
T o n i b a d n a l l is a University Teacher in Greek Literature at the University
of Nottingham, where she nished her PhD in 2008. Her research interests
focus on gender in Greek literature, and her thesis examined the function of
the wedding song in Greek literature and culture. is has inspired her interest
in ἔρως and gender relations in later Greek prose, and her project will explore
the construction of gender in Plutarch.
v a l e r i y a l i k i n , born in Kemerovo, Russia, is currently a PhD researcher of
the Faculty of Humanities at Leiden University, Netherlands. He does research
in the area of early Christianity and the Graeco-Roman world. He has several
forthcoming publications on the history of early Christian gatherings and
Church History.
vi c e n T e ra m ó n p a l e r m is Associate Professor (Profesor Titular) of Greek
Philology at Zaragoza University, Spain. He is currently working on Greek
historiography and Greek literature of the classical period. His main focus is
on Plutarch. He is presently Secretary of the Spanish Section of the I.P.S.
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any references for this publication.
Source: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/303371806_DF_Leao_J_R_Ferreira_M_Troster_P_B_Dias_Symposion_and_Philanthropia_in_Plutarch_eds_Coimbra_Imprensa_da_Universidade_de_Coimbra_Classica_Digitalia_2009